13 — Theme主题

Technology科技

7 questions in this theme个问答

# I have worked in various technologies businesses, but I understand that you do not typically invest in the technology sector. Why is that? How do you view technology as an individual and as an investor?

Technology is clearly a boost to business productivity and a driver of better consumer products and the like, so as an individual I have a high appreciation for the power of technology. I have avoided technology sectors as an investor because in general I don't have a solid grasp of what differentiates many technology companies. I don't know how to spot durable competitive advantage in technology. To get rich, you find businesses with durable competitive advantage and you don't overpay for them. Technology is based o­n change; and change is really the enemy of the investor. Change is more rapid and unpredictable in technology relative to the broader economy. To me, all technology sectors look like 7-foot hurdles.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

[Regarding 'bottom fishing' amongst technology stocks] I've seen a list of technology companies valued below their cash, but they're determined to spend that cash, so it'll go away.

[Pharmaceutical stocks in the early 1990s vs. tech stocks in 2001] "There is nothing obvious to us that technology stocks as a group are undervalued today. Also, pharmaceuticals as a group have a stellar track record of generating high returns on large amounts of capital, whereas the tech industry doesn't."

[On tech stock mania] "What the Internet offered was the ability to monetize the hopes of others. A lot of money was transferred from the gullible to the promoters. It's been a huge trap so far."

"The monetization of hope and greed is the way to make a huge amount of money. The biggest money made on Wall Street in the past few years has not been made by great performance but by great promotion."

BRK Annual Meeting 2001 · 2001

# 我在多家科技企业工作过,但据我了解,你通常不投资科技板块。这是为什么?作为个人和作为投资者,你又是如何看待科技的?

科技显然能提升企业的生产率,也催生出更好的消费品等等,所以作为一个普通人,我对科技的力量是高度赞赏的。但作为投资者,我一直回避科技板块,因为总体上我并没有真正搞懂是什么让许多科技公司彼此区分开来。我不知道如何在科技领域里识别出持久的竞争优势。要想致富,你得找到那些拥有持久竞争优势的企业,而且别为它们出高价。科技建立在变化之上,而变化恰恰是投资者的敌人。相对于整个经济,科技领域的变化更快、更难预料。在我看来,所有科技板块都像是 7 英尺高的跨栏。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

[关于在科技股里“抄底”]我见过一份名单,上面的科技公司市值还低于它们手里的现金,但它们铁了心要把这些现金花出去,所以那点现金迟早会没的。

[20 世纪 90 年代初的医药股与 2001 年的科技股相比]“我们看不出今天的科技股作为一个整体有什么明显被低估的地方。再者,医药股作为一个整体,在用大量资本创造高回报方面有着辉煌的纪录,而科技行业没有。”

[谈科技股狂热]“互联网带来的,是把别人的希望变现的能力。大量金钱从轻信者手中转移到了鼓吹者手里。到目前为止,这是一个巨大的陷阱。”

“把希望和贪婪变现,是赚大钱的途径。过去这几年里,华尔街上赚到的最大一笔钱,靠的不是出色的业绩,而是出色的鼓吹。”

伯克希尔 2001 年股东大会 · 2001

# With speculation in the high tech area, what are your views on a crash? (2000)

Any time there have been real bursts of speculation in the market it does get corrected eventually. (He gave the Ben Graham voting machine quote). No wealth created just an enormous transfer of wealth. Money has been destroyed by the frictional cost of trading.

We had a mania in farmland in Nebraska, land prices spiked and when farm prices went down a lot of people and banks were devastated. A huge number of participants creates it’s own truth for a long period of time.

[CM: Wretched excess, wretched consequences. Mixing ponzi schemes with good possibilities of internet. When you mix raisins with turds, they are still turds.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2000 · April 29th 2000

# 面对高科技领域的投机,你如何看待一场崩盘?(2000 年)

每当市场出现真正的投机狂潮,它终究会被修正。(他引用了本·格雷厄姆那句“投票机”的名言。)这并没有创造任何财富,只是一场巨大的财富转移。交易的摩擦成本,把钱给消耗掉了。

我们内布拉斯加曾有过一场农地狂热,地价飙升,而当农产品价格下跌时,许多人和银行都遭受了重创。一旦参与者数量极其庞大,它就能在很长一段时间里自行制造出一套“真理”。

[芒格:可悲的过度,可悲的后果。把庞氏骗局和互联网真正的机会混在一起。可当你把葡萄干和粪球搅在一起,它们终究还是粪球。]

伯克希尔 2000 年股东大会 · 2000 年 4 月 29 日

# Are you worried about technology affecting investing?

No religious belief that we will not invest in tech, just can't find one where we think we know what the bush will look like in ten years or how many birds will come out of the bush.

I have talked with Stan Lipsky at length on how the internet will affect Buffalo News, what they can do better, etc. The internet can deliver news with no incremental cost, it will change the newspaper field dramatically, people are essentially paying prices for newspapers that don't reflect their future.

BRK Annual Meeting 2000 · April 29th 2000

# 你担心科技会影响投资吗?

我们并没有什么“绝不投科技”的教条式信念,只是找不到一家能让我们自认为看得清——十年后那片树林会是什么样、林中又会飞出多少只鸟——的科技公司。

我和斯坦·利普西详谈过互联网会如何影响《布法罗新闻报》、他们能在哪些方面做得更好等等。互联网可以零增量成本地传送新闻,它会剧烈改变报业,而人们如今为报纸付出的价格,实质上并没有反映出它们的未来。

伯克希尔 2000 年股东大会 · 2000 年 4 月 29 日

# Because of the Internet, certain stocks will show great revenue and income growth like AT&T and Nokia. Would you consider investing in the telecommunications industry this way? (1999)

It’s interesting that you mention AT&T - they’ve done poorly for years, despite charge after charge. For people who understand it, there are tremendous amounts of money to be made in this business - a lot of them in this city of Omaha. But I’m not one of them.

There’s a big difference in making a lot of money and spotting a great business. At the turn of the century there were two industries that had never existed before but changed the entire twentieth century: the airlines and the autos. They’ve been wonderful industries but lousy investments. There have been tons of capital lost in those industries, and it’s been very hard to make money by riding on the coattails of the players in these businesses.

BRK Annual Meeting 1999 · 1999

# 因为互联网,AT&T、诺基亚之类的某些股票会呈现出强劲的营收和利润增长。你会考虑用这种思路投资电信行业吗?(1999 年)

有意思的是,你偏偏提到了 AT&T——这么多年来,尽管它一次又一次地大刀阔斧调整,业绩却一直很差。对于那些真正懂这门生意的人,确实能从中赚到巨额的钱——光是奥马哈这座城市里就有不少这样的人。但我不是其中之一。

“赚到大钱”和“识别出一门伟大的生意”是两码事,差别很大。世纪之交时出现了两个此前从未存在、却彻底改变了整个 20 世纪的行业:航空和汽车。它们是了不起的行业,却是糟糕的投资。这两个行业里损失掉的资本数以吨计,想靠搭这些企业的便车来赚钱,是非常困难的。

伯克希尔 1999 年股东大会 · 1999

# Can you comment on how technological advances affect us financially?

As Alan Greenspan puts it, some hard-to-measure factor has caused us to not have inflation while enjoying growth. Technology is probably some part of that. It’s been good for stocks, and good for bonds - you can see it in the markets and it’s been beneficial from a societal standpoint.

We’re just cautious in how technological advancements affect our businesses. We try to avoid ones where change will threaten the way a business is making money.

[CM: Steel-toed work shoes, for example, do not employ a lot of technological change.]

For example, Coke is making a product that is fundamentally unchanged from fifty years ago. We’ve avoided lots of winners by sticking to this discipline - but we’ve avoided lots of losers too.

Peanut brittle also does not have a lot of technological change.

BRK Annual Meeting 1999 · 1999

# 你能谈谈技术进步在财务上对我们有何影响吗?

正如艾伦·格林斯潘所说,某种难以衡量的因素,让我们既享受到了增长,又没有出现通胀。科技大概是其中的一部分原因。它对股市有利,对债市也有利——你能在市场上看到这一点,而从社会的角度看它同样是有益的。

我们只是对技术进步会如何影响我们的企业保持谨慎。我们尽量回避那些“变化会威胁到企业赚钱方式”的生意。

[芒格:举个例子,钢头工鞋就用不上多少技术变革。]

再比如,可口可乐生产的产品,与五十年前相比根本没什么变化。坚持这条纪律,让我们错过了许多大赢家——但也让我们躲开了许多大输家。

花生脆糖同样没有多少技术变革。

伯克希尔 1999 年股东大会 · 1999

# Why don't you use Bill Gates to invest in tech stocks?

Charlie and I put money in things we understand and think we’ll know what it’ll look like in 5, 10 or 20 years. Bill being on the board doesn’t change this. I’ll listen to any idea of his and, in fact, our investment ideas overlap quite a bit. I still wish I’d bought Microsoft when I’d first met him. (Laughter)

BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes · 2005

# 你为什么不借助比尔·盖茨来投资科技股呢?

我和查理只把钱投到我们看得懂、并且自认为能预见它 5 年、10 年或 20 年后会是什么样子的东西上。比尔进了董事会,也改变不了这一点。他的任何想法我都会听,事实上,我们的投资理念重合的地方还不少。我至今仍后悔,第一次见到他的时候没把微软买下来。(笑)

伯克希尔 2005 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2005

# Won’t Microsoft be doing software development ten years from now, just like Coke will be selling soda? Doesn’t that make it a candidate for investment?

You cannot buy high tech companies at prices like, say, you were able to buy pharmaceutical companies for in the beginning of the 1990’s. If I had to bet on anyone, it would be Microsoft. But I don’t have to bet. If anyone has superior knowledge and confidence, they can make such an investment. And they deserve to profit from it.

We’re willing to trade away a big payoff for a certain payoff. Bill Gates told me two tech companies in 1991 that he’d buy if he went to a desert island. We would have made a ton of money in them if we’d bought them, maybe more than in Coke. But he also named Coke as a third one, and we were happy to stick with that. The Dilly Bar9 has more certainty of being around in ten years than any software company.

There are dozens of software companies selling at prices that imply they’ll make $200 million or more per year in a few years - and that doesn’t happen very often. Only a dozen or so companies move into that category each year in the S&P 500. Look at the biotech companies: how many of them ever grew into the valuations they were given in the early 1990’s?

BRK Annual Meeting 1999 · 1999

# 十年后微软不还是会在开发软件吗,就像可口可乐还会在卖汽水一样?这难道不让它成为一个值得投资的候选对象吗?

你没法用像 20 世纪 90 年代初买医药公司那样的价格去买高科技公司。如果非让我押注某一家,那会是微软。但我并不需要押注。如果有谁拥有过人的认知和把握,他完全可以做这样的投资,也理应从中获利。

我们愿意拿一份大回报,去换一份确定的回报。1991 年,比尔·盖茨告诉我两家科技公司,说如果他要去荒岛、就会买它们。要是我们当时买了,本会赚到一大笔钱,也许比可口可乐赚得还多。但他同时把可口可乐列为第三家,而我们乐于守着可乐不放。Dilly Bar 雪糕能在十年后依然存在的确定性,比任何一家软件公司都要高。

有几十家软件公司,其售价所隐含的预期是:再过几年它们每年能赚 2 亿美元甚至更多——可这种事并不常发生。标普 500 里,每年大概也就十来家公司能跨入那个量级。再看看那些生物科技公司:90 年代初被赋予了那样的估值,最后真正成长到配得上它的,又有几家?

伯克希尔 1999 年股东大会 · 1999