07 — Theme主题

The Investment Industry投资行业

9 questions in this theme个问答

# Is the individual investor even capable of assessing the riskiness of securities given the large number of institutions/hedge funds in the market?

I don’t think there is much being overlooked now, but I’m forced to look at big things. That’s the advantage you have over me. A few years ago a friend of mine mentioned that I should look at Korea. We bought Posco for 3-4 times post-tax earnings. I found 20 other companies selling at 2-3 times earnings and strong balance sheets. I diversified because I didn’t know the Korean market as well. We are looking for the very unusual. Occasionally things will happen in a securities market that are extraordinary. I like shooting fish in a barrel, but I like to make sure the water’s drained out.

We had that situation a few years ago with the 30 year versus 29 ½ year Treasury bonds. Because of less liquidity, the off-the-run bonds were selling for 30 basis points less, which translates into 3% of principal value. LTCM entered the trade at 10 basis points originally, but they overleveraged and were forced to unwind the position. If you went long/short you could make money really quickly.

Markets are efficient most of the time about most things. But for these opportunities, nobody will tell you about them. They won’t be on CNBC and they won’t be in brokerage reports. You have to go find them yourself. In 1951, after I graduated from school, I used Moody’s and S&P manuals as my sources of information. I went through them page by page. I was like a basketball coach looking for 7-footers. I still have to find out if he’s coordinated, and can stay in school. But if someone comes up to me that’s 5’6” and says, “Wait ‘til you see me handle the ball”, I say “No thanks”. On page 1443 of Moody’s, I found Western Insurance Securities. It had earned $21.66 per share 2 years ago, and earned $29.09 last year. Over the past year the stock was selling for between $3 and $13 per share. I still had to do the work to make sure the earnings were valid. The markets will get it right eventually. But they are there. You don’t have to find too many. Finding 10 of these opportunities in your lifetime will make you so rich. But you can’t be wrong. You can’t have any zeroes. A list of big numbers multiplied by zero will equal zero. You can’t go back to “Go”.

Emory's Goizueta Business School and McCombs School of Business at UT Austin · February 2008

# 面对市场上数量庞大的机构和对冲基金,个人投资者真有能力评估证券的风险吗?

我觉得如今被忽略的东西不多了,但我被迫只能去看那些大块头。这恰恰是你们相对于我的优势所在。几年前,一位朋友跟我提起,说我该看看韩国。我们以 3 到 4 倍税后盈利买下了 POSCO。我还找到了另外 20 家市盈率只有 2 到 3 倍、且资产负债表很扎实的公司。我做了分散投资,因为我对韩国市场没那么熟。我们要找的是极不寻常的机会。证券市场里偶尔会冒出一些非同寻常的事。我喜欢瓮中捉鱼,但我喜欢先确保水已经放干了。

几年前,我们在 30 年期与 29 年半期国债上就碰到过这样的情形。由于流动性较差,那些非新发(off-the-run)债券的售价低了 30 个基点,折算下来相当于本金价值的 3%。长期资本管理公司最初是以 10 个基点的差价入场的,但他们杠杆用得太满,最后被迫平仓。要是你做多/做空对冲,赚钱会非常快。

在大多数时候、对大多数事情,市场都是有效的。但对于这类机会,没人会来告诉你。它们不会出现在 CNBC 上,也不会出现在券商报告里。你得自己去把它们找出来。1951 年,我从学校毕业后,把穆迪和标普的手册当作我的信息来源,一页一页地翻。我就像个寻找两米一以上大个子的篮球教练。我当然还得弄清楚他身体协调不协调、能不能留在学校念书。但要是有个一米七的人跑来跟我说“等着瞧我怎么运球”,我会说“不必了,谢谢”。在穆迪手册的第 1443 页,我找到了西部保险证券公司(Western Insurance Securities)。它两年前每股盈利 21.66 美元,去年每股盈利 29.09 美元。而过去一年里,这只股票的成交价在每股 3 美元到 13 美元之间。我当然还得下功夫去核实这些盈利是真实的。市场最终总会把价格定对。但这样的机会就在那里。你不必找到太多。一辈子能找到 10 个这样的机会,就足以让你富得流油。但你不能犯错。你不能出现任何一个零。一串大数字一旦乘以零,结果就是零。你没法重新回到起点。

埃默里大学 Goizueta 商学院与德州大学奥斯汀分校 McCombs 商学院 · 2008 年 2 月

# What do you think about all the money flowing into private equity and hedge funds? And do you see the future of buying businesses changing based o­n the considerable increase in private equity activity?

I'll tell you what I think of hedge funds. Hedge funds are a huge fad. You can pick any ten hedge funds and I'll bet that o­n average they will underperform the S&P over the next ten years. You can't create more money out of American business than the business itself creates; so most of these hedge funds will not be able to justify their outlandish fees over the long-term and they will disappear. o­n Wall Street, there are innovators, imitators, and total incompetents. I'm afraid that the majority of hedge funds around the globe now are run by the latter two categories of people.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

# 你如何看待大量资金涌入私募股权和对冲基金?随着私募股权活动大幅增加,你认为未来收购企业的格局会因此改变吗?

我来告诉你我怎么看对冲基金。对冲基金是一阵巨大的风潮。你随便挑十只对冲基金,我敢打赌,未来十年它们平均下来会跑输标普 500。你从美国企业身上榨出的钱,不可能多于企业本身所创造的;所以这些对冲基金里的大多数,长期来看根本撑不起它们离谱的收费,最终会销声匿迹。在华尔街上,有创新者,有模仿者,还有彻头彻尾的无能者。恐怕如今全球大多数对冲基金,都是由后两类人在管理。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

# What do you think about how most money is managed?

[CM: We have this investment discipline of waiting for a fat pitch. If I was offered the chance to go into business where people would measure me against benchmarks, force me to be fully invested, crawl around looking over my shoulder, etc., I would hate it. I would regard it as putting me into shackles.]

I would hate it. In 1956 [when I started the Buffett Partnership], I passed out the ground rules, which said "here's what I can do and can't do." The idea of setting out to do what you know you can't do [is terrible].

[CM: The general systems of money management [today] require people to pretend to do something they can't do and like something they don't. It's a terrible way to spend your life, but it's very well paid.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes · 2003

# 你如何看待当下绝大多数资金的管理方式?

[芒格:我们有这样一条投资纪律:耐心等待一个好打的球(fat pitch)。如果有人请我去做这样一份工作——人们拿基准指数来考核我、逼我满仓、还成天围着我、从我肩头窥探,我会深恶痛绝。我会把这视为给我套上了枷锁。]

我会深恶痛绝。1956 年[我创办巴菲特合伙公司]时,我就把基本规则发了下去,上面写着“这些是我能做的、那些是我不能做的”。明知做不到却偏要硬着头皮去做,这种念头[糟透了]。

[芒格:[如今]普遍的资金管理体系,逼着人们去假装做自己做不到的事、去喜欢自己并不喜欢的东西。用这样的方式度过一生,实在糟糕,但报酬却高得很。]

伯克希尔 2003 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2003

# Advice for finding good investment advisors?

The question of finding investment advisors is a hard one. When I was winding up my partnership [in the early 1970s], I was returning a fair amount of capital to people, and they asked me what to do with it. I recommended two people who I felt were exceptionally good and honest: Sandy Gottesman, who just joined Berkshire’s board, and Bill Ruane [of the Sequoia Fund]. They were contemporaries of mine, so I knew their results and how they’d achieved them, which is critical. I don’t know today’s managers, so I can’t recommend anyone.

The fact that I only knew two shows the difficulties of finding someone good. The promotional types going around to institutions today are not likely to be good – or have high integrity.

I read an article [in the Wall Street Journal last week] about the two fellows who founded Google and all the problems they’ll have with their new-found riches – I almost sent a sympathy card. [Laughter.] They don’t have a big problem. They’re smarter than the people coming to them. The people with the problem are the people trying to sell them services and want to convince them that they have a problem.

It’s merchandising. You don’t need these people at all in investing – all these professionals who say you’re going to be in big trouble if you don’t listen to them. They’re selling.

It reminds me of when I asked my former brother-in-law: “How do you get farmers to pay you to sell their cow to Swift or Armour?” He replied, “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.”

[The Investment Advisory Business]

[CM: Mutual funds charge 2% per year and then brokers switch people between funds, costing another 3-4 percentage points. The poor guy in the general public is getting a terrible product from the professionals. I think it’s disgusting. It’s much better to be part of a system that delivers value to the people who buy the product. But if it makes money, we tend to do it in this country.]

[Hedge Funds]

I think people who invest in hedge funds, in aggregate, are unlikely to do well. Hedge funds are in the midst of a fad. It’s distinguished by an extraordinary amount of fees. If the world is paying hedge funds 2% and a percentage of the profits, and the losers fade away, then it won’t be good for all investors. Obviously, some will do well, but not in aggregate.

[CM: Why would you want to invest with a guy whose thought process says, “If a second layer of fees is good, then let’s add a third layer.”]

Maybe [high fees] are what the traffic can bear, but that reflects an attitude. It’s a basically unfair arrangement. In effect, [hedge fund managers] are getting four times standard fees. And I’d bet they don’t have all of their own money in their own funds.

Charlie and I both ran partnerships that would generally be classified as hedge funds. There are some similarities, but I don’t think we had quite the same attitude that the present managers have.

The fund of funds stuff – it’s really unbelievable, piling on the layers of costs. People don’t become geniuses because on the door it says “hedge fund.” But they may be good at marketing – in fact, if they’re good at this, they don’t need to be good at anything else.

BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes · 2004

# 对于寻找优秀的投资顾问,你有什么建议?

找到好的投资顾问,是个很难的问题。[上世纪 70 年代初]我清算合伙公司时,要把相当一笔资金退还给大家,他们就问我该拿这些钱怎么办。我推荐了两个我觉得格外出色、又格外诚实的人:Sandy Gottesman(他刚刚加入伯克希尔董事会),以及 Bill Ruane[他执掌 红杉基金]。他们都是我的同辈,所以我了解他们的业绩,也了解这些业绩是怎么取得的,而这一点至关重要。我不了解今天这些基金经理,所以我没法推荐任何人。

我只认识两个,这个事实本身就说明,要找到一个真正出色的人有多难。如今四处奔走、向机构兜售自己的那种推销型人物,多半既不出色,也谈不上有高度的正直。

[上周华尔街日报上]我读到一篇文章,讲创办谷歌的那两个家伙将会因这笔从天而降的财富而面临种种烦恼——我差点给他们寄了张慰问卡。(笑)他们没什么大麻烦。他们比那些找上门来的人聪明。真正有麻烦的,是那些想向他们兜售服务、并极力让他们相信自己有麻烦的人。

这就是推销。在投资上,你根本不需要这些人——所有这些专业人士都跟你说,你要是不听他们的就会有大麻烦。他们是在卖东西。

这让我想起我曾问过我的前姐夫:“你是怎么让农场主反过来付钱给你、好让你帮他们把牛卖给 Swift 或 Armour 的?”他回答:“沃伦,关键不在于你怎么卖,而在于你怎么说。”

[投资顾问这门生意]

[芒格:共同基金每年收 2% 的费用,然后经纪人再撺掇客户在各只基金之间来回换,又得搭进去 3 到 4 个百分点。可怜的普通老百姓,从这些专业人士手里买到的是一件糟糕透顶的产品。我觉得这令人作呕。能身处一个真正为购买产品的人创造价值的体系,要好得多。可在我们这个国家,只要某件事能赚钱,我们就往往会去做它。]

[对冲基金]

我认为,投资对冲基金的人,整体而言不大可能有好结果。对冲基金正处在一阵风潮之中,其显著特征就是高得出奇的收费。如果全世界都在向对冲基金支付 2% 的费用外加一部分利润提成,而那些亏钱的人则悄然退场,那么这对全体投资者来说绝不会是好事。当然,会有一些人做得不错,但整体上不行。

[芒格:一个人的思维方式是“既然加一层费用是好事,那干脆再加上第三层”,你为什么还要把钱交给这样的人去打理呢?]

也许[高收费]是市场所能承受的,但它反映出一种心态。这本质上是一种不公平的安排。实际上,[对冲基金经理]拿到的是标准费率的四倍。而且我敢打赌,他们并没有把自己的全部身家都投进自己的基金里。

查理和我都管理过通常会被归类为对冲基金的合伙公司。两者之间是有一些相似之处,但我不认为我们当年抱着和如今这些基金经理一样的心态。

至于“基金中的基金”那套东西——真是让人难以置信,把一层又一层的费用叠加上去。门上挂着“对冲基金”的牌子,并不能让人摇身变成天才。但他们或许擅长营销——事实上,只要这一点擅长,别的什么都不擅长也无妨。

伯克希尔 2004 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2004

# Comments on the mutual fund scandal? (2004)

[CM: The business of selecting investment managers was recently shown to be even harder by the revelation that a significant fraction of mutual fund managers took bribes to betray their own shareholders.

It was as if a man came up and said, “Why don’t we kill your mother and we’ll split the insurance money?” And many people said, “Why, yes, I’d like some of that insurance money.]

And they were already rich.

[CM: And many of them think what happened to them was unjust.]

Many people had to know what was going on. Many people at the big funds, even if they were not doing it themselves, had to know. The Investment Company Institute was patting itself on the back and getting cozy with legislators, but nothing was done until a whistleblower went to Spitzer and he publicized it.

Hundreds of people knew and it went on for a long time, but nobody did anything.

BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes · 2004

# 对共同基金丑闻有什么评论?(2004 年)

[芒格:挑选投资经理这门生意,最近被证明更加困难——爆出的丑闻显示,相当一部分共同基金经理收受贿赂,背叛了自己的股东。

这就好比有人凑上前来说:“咱们干脆把你母亲杀了,然后平分那笔保险金,怎么样?”而许多人居然回答:“嗯,行啊,我也想分一杯那笔保险金的羹。”]

而他们本来就已经很有钱了。

[芒格:而且他们当中许多人还觉得,落到自己头上的下场是不公平的。]

很多人不可能不知道当时在发生什么。那些大基金里的许多人,就算自己没动手,也不可能不知情。投资公司协会(ICI)当时还在自我表功、跟立法者们打得火热,可在一名举报人找到斯皮策、由他把事情公之于众之前,什么都没有被处理。

成百上千的人都心知肚明,而且这事持续了很长时间,却没有一个人出手去管。

伯克希尔 2004 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2004

# Why don't you start a mutual fund?

[Responding to a shareholder’s suggestion that they get into the money management business, Buffett replied:]

There would be too many conflicts. We’re managing too much money as it is and we can’t wear two hats. I certainly wouldn’t want to start a fund management company and then pro-rate purchases. I’ve been pitched many times [to start a fund company] and we could certainly sell it, but once we did so I don’t know what we’d do with it. Do you, Charlie?

Munger: No. That’s why we don’t do it. But that doesn’t seem to bother other people.

BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes · 2004

# 你为什么不创办一只共同基金?

[针对一位股东建议他们进军资产管理业务,巴菲特回答说:]

那样会带来太多利益冲突。我们眼下管理的资金已经太多了,我们没法一身二任。我当然不愿意创办一家基金管理公司,然后还得按比例去分摊买入的份额。曾有很多人来游说我[去创办一家基金公司],我们当然能把它卖出去,可一旦卖出去了,我都不知道接下来该拿它怎么办。你知道吗,查理?

芒格:不知道。这正是我们不干这件事的原因。但这似乎一点也困扰不到别人。

伯克希尔 2004 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2004

# Opinion of money management as a job to aspire to?

[CM: I think money management is a low calling relative to being a surgeon. I don’t like the percentage of our GDP and brainpower and professional effort that’s in money management. I don’t think it’s a good thing for our country, and don’t expect it to end well.

The present era has no comparable precedent in the history of capitalism when so many people are trading pieces of paper. We have a higher proportion of the intelligent sections of society involved in buying and selling bits of paper and trying to make money doing it. There are more people doing this than at any time in history. A lot of this reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah.]

When we’ve seen baby versions of this in the past, there have been future [very negative] implications [for the stock market].

[CM: When you get so much nonsense going on, it feeds on itself and creates a frenzy. [When this has happened historically,] there have been serious implications.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes · 2005

# 把资金管理当作一份值得追求的职业,你怎么看?

[芒格:相比当一名外科医生,我认为资金管理是一种格调不高的营生。我不喜欢我们的 GDP、智力和专业精力被用在资金管理上的那个比例。我不认为这对我们的国家是件好事,也不指望它会有好下场。

在资本主义的历史上,当下这个时代没有可与之相比的先例——竟有这么多人在买卖一张张纸片。社会中聪明的那一部分人,有更高的比例投身于倒腾这些纸片、并以此谋利。从事这一行的人数比历史上任何时候都多。这其中的很多景象,让我想起索多玛和蛾摩拉。]

过去我们曾见过这种局面的“婴儿版”,事后[对股市]都产生了[非常负面的]影响。

[芒格:当这么多荒唐事一齐上演时,它会自我喂养、愈演愈烈,催生出一场狂热。[历史上每当这种情形发生,]事后都伴随着严重的后果。]

伯克希尔 2005 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2005

# What's your opinion of the wider money management industry?

Munger: There are certainly a lot more helpers. The ones who come here [to the Berkshire annual meeting] are the best of them, so don’t judge the class by the ones here.

The best thing you can do as you think about following in Warren’s footsteps is to reduce your expectations.

Buffett: If your wife is going to have a baby, you’d be better to call an obstetrician than do it yourself. If your pipes leak, you should call a plumber. Most professions add value beyond what the average person can do for themselves. But in aggregate, the investment profession does not do this – despite $140 billion in total annual compensation. It’s hard to think of another business like that. Can you, Charlie?

Munger: I can’t think of any.

Buffett: It’s become a bigger and bigger business. And the more you charge, the more money you bring in. It’s useful to get into a business like that. When I speak to students, I ask them to name a great business. One answer is running a business school, because the amount you charge is a sign of prestige. No one wants to go to the business school that charges $20,000 in tuition, but if the school charges $40,000, more do.

In the investment field, you now have large portions of investment managers that charge fees that, in aggregate, cannot work out for investors. Obviously, some [investments in high-fee managers] do [work out well]. But you can’t pay 2 and 20 [2% annual management fee and 20% of the profits, standard for private-equity and hedge funds], in which you pay the manager 20% of the profits if they make money and, if they don’t, they just close up and reopen later. If you charge this in an economy that’s only growing a few percent a year, the math doesn’t work. The question for you is how to pick out the exceptions [e.g., the managers who will outperform, even after fees]. Everyone who calls on you says they are the exceptions.

I will bet you that if you name any 10 partnerships with over $500 million in assets and put them up against the S&P 500, they will trail the S&P, after fees, over time.

If you know enough about the person and how they’ve done in the past, you can occasionally find someone. But if you’re running a big pension fund, with everyone calling on you, you will likely invest in the best salespeople.

Munger: I think it ought to be a crime [for an investment manager or his agent] to entertain a state pension-fund manager, and it should be a crime for that person to accept it.

The whole concept of the house advantage is an interesting one in modern money management. The terms of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.

Buffett: Is there anyone we’ve forgotten to offend? [Laughter]

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

# 对于更广义的资金管理行业,你有什么看法?

芒格:如今“帮手”确实多得多了。来到这里[参加伯克希尔股东大会]的,是其中最优秀的一拨人,所以别拿在场这些人来评判整个群体。

在你考虑追随沃伦的脚步时,你能做的最好的一件事,就是把自己的预期调低。

巴菲特:要是你太太快生孩子了,你最好去叫一位产科医生,别自己上阵。要是你家水管漏水了,你该叫个水管工。大多数职业所创造的价值,都超出了普通人自己动手所能达到的程度。但整体而言,投资这一行并没有做到这一点——尽管它每年的薪酬总额高达 1400 亿美元。很难再想出第二个这样的行当。你能想到吗,查理?

芒格:我一个也想不出来。

巴菲特:这门生意越做越大。而且你收费越高,进账就越多。能挤进这样一门生意里是很划算的。我跟学生们演讲时,会请他们说出一门很棒的生意。其中一个答案就是办商学院,因为你的收费高低本身就是声望的象征。没人愿意去一所学费只收 2 万美元的商学院,可要是这所学校收 4 万美元,反倒有更多人想去。

在投资领域,如今有相当大一部分投资经理所收取的费用,整体来看不可能让投资者获益。当然,[投资那些高收费的经理]里有些[结果确实不错]。但你不能去支付“2 和 20”[即 2% 的年度管理费外加 20% 的利润提成,这是私募股权和对冲基金的标准收费方式]——在这种安排下,经理赚了钱就拿走 20% 的利润,要是没赚钱,他们就一关了之,过阵子再换个名头重开。在一个每年只增长百分之几的经济体里这么收费,账根本算不过来。摆在你面前的问题是:如何挑出那些例外[比如,那些扣除费用后仍能跑赢的经理]。可每一个上门来找你的人都说自己就是那个例外。

我敢跟你打赌:随便你点出 10 家资产规模超过 5 亿美元的合伙基金,让它们与标普 500 同台比拼,时间一拉长,扣除费用后它们都会跑输标普。

如果你对一个人足够了解、也清楚他过往的表现,那你偶尔能找到一个合适的人选。但如果你管理着一只规模庞大的养老基金、人人都来登门拜访,那你最终很可能把钱投给了最会推销的人。

芒格:我认为[投资经理或其代理人]去款待一位州养老基金的负责人,应当算作犯罪;而那位负责人接受款待,也应当算作犯罪。

在现代资金管理中,“庄家优势”这整个概念是个很有意思的东西。那些私募合伙基金经理所开出的条款,看上去很像蒙特卡洛赌场里荷官的抽成,只不过更狠。

巴菲特:还有谁是我们忘了得罪的吗?(笑)

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

# What effect does large institutional ownership have on stock price volatility?

Never has so much been managed by so few that care so much about what happens tomorrow. So much of the world of investing is people who are trying to beat indexes, and they have a willingness and eagerness to make decisions in the next 24 hours. This condition didn't exist years ago. It has created a “hair trigger” effect. An example of this hair trigger effect was Black Monday in '87. The cause was program trading and stop loss orders.

Student Visit 2005 · May 6, 2005

# 机构大规模持股,对股价波动有什么影响?

从来没有哪个时候,是由这么少的人、管理着这么多的钱,又如此在意明天会发生什么。投资世界里有太多人一心想跑赢指数,他们既愿意、又急切地要在接下来的 24 小时内做出决策。这种状况在多年以前并不存在。它催生出一种“一触即发”的效应。1987 年的“黑色星期一”就是这种一触即发效应的一个例子。罪魁祸首是程序化交易和止损单。

2005 年学生来访 · 2005 年 5 月 6 日