17 — Theme主题

The Big Picture大局观

45 questions in this theme个问答

# What do you believe are the greatest successes of capitalism?

Of the clear successes of capitalism, a greater abundance of things we want and need, and considerable improvements in the standard of living are good candidates. The standard of living in the U.S. has increased almost seven fold in the last century. One century is a speck on the greater timeline, and such an increase in productivity in the standard of living is surely unprecedented. Another noteworthy success of capitalism is that it is surely better than any alternative system at allocating resources and getting the best people to their most appropriate places. Consider this: in 1790, the first global census was conducted; there were 290m people in China, 100m in Europe, and 4m in what is now the U.S. Now the U.S. holds 4.5% of the world's population but is responsible for 30% of global GDP. I believe the great American book is yet to be written and will be the one that manages to capture how spectacular this growth has been; again 214 years is just an instant. When we think about such growth, I don't believe the causal factors are the people; it must be the system. The smartest people in Guam are as smart as the smartest people in Iceland are as smart as the smartest people in the U.S. Being born in the U.S. is more important to my success than anything that has happened since.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

# 你认为资本主义最大的成功是什么?

在资本主义那些显而易见的成功里,更丰富的、我们想要和需要的物品,以及生活水平的大幅提升,都是很好的候选答案。过去一个世纪里,美国的生活水平提高了将近七倍。一个世纪在更宏大的时间轴上不过是一个小点,而生活水平上这样的生产力跃升,无疑是史无前例的。资本主义另一个值得一提的成功在于,它在配置资源、把最优秀的人放到最合适的位置上这件事上,肯定胜过任何其他制度。想想看:1790 年进行了第一次全球人口普查,当时中国有 2.9 亿人,欧洲有 1 亿人,而如今美国所在的这片土地上只有 400 万人。如今美国只占世界人口的 4.5%,却贡献了全球 GDP 的 30%。我相信,那部伟大的美国小说还没有被写出来,而它将是一部能够捕捉到这种成长有多么惊人的作品;再说一遍,214 年只是一瞬间。当我们思考这样的成长时,我不相信起决定作用的因素是人,那一定是这套制度。关岛最聪明的人,和冰岛最聪明的人一样聪明,也和美国最聪明的人一样聪明。生在美国,对我的成功而言,比此后发生的任何事都更重要。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

# What do you see as the shortcomings of capitalism?

Capitalism, like any system, is imperfect, but it's getting better and we're getting closer to goals such as equality of opportunity and learning how to deal with those that are hurt by the system. But capitalism is surely a free marketplace, a dog-eat-dog marketplace in many ways. And a marketplace implies losers. Early in my career, I bought a textile mill in New Bedford and the vast majority of the mill workers were Portuguese and could not speak any English. Over time, textile mills in other parts of the world were able to operate more efficiently and we simply could not compete. I had to shut the plant down and fire everyone; the workers were casualties of the system. You can't retrain or save those people; they'd had it. So the real challenge with capitalism is that you can't throw sand in the gears of greater output but you also want to care for the casualties. If you look around, it's clear that most people are burdened with real fear; fear is terrible and people shouldn't have to live with it. We should want to reduce societal fear of the things that they should never have to worry about - fear of going hungry, fear of going without medical care. These are the problems you should be thinking about solving.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

# 你认为资本主义的缺陷是什么?

资本主义和任何制度一样并不完美,但它正在变好,我们也越来越接近诸如机会平等、学会照顾被这套制度所伤害的人这样的目标。但资本主义无疑是一个自由市场,在很多方面是一个弱肉强食的市场。而市场就意味着有输家。在我职业生涯的早期,我在新贝德福德买下了一家纺织厂,厂里绝大多数工人是葡萄牙人,一句英语都不会说。随着时间推移,世界其他地方的纺织厂运营效率更高,我们根本没法竞争。我不得不关掉工厂,解雇所有人;这些工人就是这套制度的牺牲品。你没法重新培训或拯救这些人,他们彻底完了。所以资本主义真正的难题在于:你既不能往“产出更多”这台机器的齿轮里撒沙子,又想照顾好那些牺牲者。你环顾四周就会发现,大多数人都背负着实实在在的恐惧;恐惧很可怕,人们本不该在恐惧中生活。我们应当想方设法减轻社会对那些他们本不必担心之事的恐惧——挨饿的恐惧、看不起病的恐惧。这些才是你应该想着去解决的问题。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

# How should we take care of those who are harmed by the system, like your former textile mill workers?

I would start with the tax system. It would not be easy to implement, but some form of a steeply progressive consumption tax for the wealthy makes a lot of sense to me. For instance, when I fly my private jet I use hundreds of gallons of jet fuel but I'm not taxed at a higher rate. Flying in a private jet is usually unnecessary, excessive consumption and I should be taxed appropriately via a higher consumption tax. Here's another example: I could easily hire 20,000 people and pay them $50,000 per year to sit here and paint portraits of me all day in search of the perfect o­ne. Not o­nly would that be ridiculous, but it would pull 20,000 productive contributors out of system and I should pay highly for that. Other than figuring out ways of reallocating money to the 'bottom 20%,' we need to focus o­n finding ways to help people be useful and feel useful. This means finding people jobs, keeping them involved in society, and the like.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

# 我们该如何照顾那些被这套制度所伤害的人,比如你当年的纺织厂工人?

我会从税收制度入手。要落实并不容易,但对富人征收某种形式的、累进幅度很陡的消费税,在我看来很有道理。比如,我开私人飞机时要烧掉几百加仑航空燃油,却并没有因此被按更高的税率征税。坐私人飞机通常是不必要的、过度的消费,我理应通过更高的消费税被恰当地征税。再举个例子:我大可以轻松雇上 2 万人,每人每年付 5 万美元,让他们整天坐在这儿给我画像,只为找出最完美的那一幅。这不仅荒谬,还会把 2 万名有生产力的贡献者从这套制度里抽走,我理应为此付出高昂的代价。除了想办法把钱重新分配给“最底层的 20%”,我们还需要把重心放在帮助人们变得有用、感到自己有用上。这意味着帮人们找到工作、让他们继续参与社会,诸如此类。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

# With the recent changes in the global political economy and surges in terrorist activity, some would argue that uncertainty is increasing for all types of global markets. Where do you think things are heading and how should we deal with this heightened uncertainty?

Human beings don't change very much over time. But until recently, most dangerous people had limited ability to harm others in scale…. I think the terrorism issue is one problem to which there is clearly no solution. I'm confident that we'll solve everything else out - we making progress o­n cures for major diseases and all that - but terrorism, it seems to me, is impossible to solve because there will always be troubled people seeking to do harm to large masses of people. The intent is surely there. And knowledge of how to inflict terror is spreading. If you have intent and knowledge, the third aspect of terrorism is 'materials and deliverability.' This is harder to come by for the terrorists and what we should be working to prevent. If I knew we could devise a solution to terrorism, I would dedicate 100% of my foundation's funds to this effort; but I'm just not sure there's a solution.

2005 Tuck School of Business Trip to Omaha · 2005

# 随着近年来全球政治经济的变化和恐怖活动的激增,有人会说,各类全球市场的不确定性正在上升。你认为事态会走向何方?我们又该如何应对这种加剧的不确定性?

人类经过漫长岁月并没有多大改变。但直到最近,大多数危险人物大规模伤害他人的能力还很有限……我认为恐怖主义是一个显然无解的问题。我相信其他一切问题我们都能解决——我们在攻克重大疾病等方面正不断取得进展——但在我看来,恐怖主义是无法解决的,因为总会有心怀不满的人想对大批民众施加伤害。意图肯定是有的。而如何制造恐怖的知识也在扩散。如果你既有意图、又有知识,那么恐怖主义的第三个要素就是“材料与投送能力”。这对恐怖分子来说更难弄到,也正是我们应当努力去阻止的环节。如果我知道我们能设计出对付恐怖主义的办法,我会把我基金会 100% 的资金都投入到这项努力中;可我实在不确定有没有解决之道。

2005 年塔克商学院奥马哈之行 · 2005

# What kind of impact will the demographic shift (i.e. baby boomers) have on the United States?

We aren't big on demographic trends. It's difficult to translate that information into profitable decisions. It is hard to figure out what businesses will prosper in the future, based on macro trends. See's candy is for anyone and Fruit of the Loom is for people who need underwear today. We want to be right on something that will work right now, not something that might work in the future. I doubt that Wal-Mart spends a lot of time on demographics. They instead focus on where to put the store and what to put on the shelves. I've never found those kinds of stats useful. People were all excited to go into stocks 6 years ago, but it wasn't because of demographic trends.

[Warren then referred to a recent WSJ article written by Jeremy Siegel that discussed funds flowing out of investments because baby boomers will need to cash in their investments during retirement. He said he respected Siegel, but he doesn't find fund flows data useful.]

Student Visit 2005 · May 6, 2005

# 人口结构的变化(比如婴儿潮一代)会对美国产生什么样的影响?

我们不太看重人口趋势。把这类信息转化为能赚钱的决策很难。要根据宏观趋势去判断哪些企业未来会兴旺,是很困难的。喜诗糖果适合所有人,而 Fruit of the Loom 适合今天就需要内衣的人。我们想在“眼下就管用”的东西上做对,而不是在“也许将来会管用”的东西上。我怀疑沃尔玛会花很多时间研究人口结构。他们关注的反而是把店开在哪里、货架上摆什么。我从没觉得那类统计数据有用。6 年前人们都兴奋地涌进股市,但那可不是因为什么人口趋势。

[随后沃伦提到杰里米·西格尔近期发表在《华尔街日报》上的一篇文章,文中讨论了资金会流出投资,因为婴儿潮一代退休后需要套现自己的投资。他说他尊重西格尔,但他并不觉得资金流向的数据有什么用。]

2005 年学生来访 · 2005 年 5 月 6 日

# Do you believe that the Federal Reserve is fostering moral hazard thereby leading to the misallocation of capital and subsequent asset bubbles? If so, what are the long term risks?

There is always some introduction of moral hazard when government decides to act in favor of the common good versus letting someone fail. There was moral hazard with the bailout of LTCM and there is some aspect of that with the current situation. But it’s hard to measure because the consequences are 15-20 years out. During the 1987 market crash, Greenspan was new to the job and unsure of what would happen. The specialist system got hit, most of them operated on very little capital and were broke. The Fed provided them with more capital. Will that change future behavior? Maybe, but at the time it was the right call. It’s also resulted in the “Too Big to Fail” doctrine. The big banks, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae figured the US Government wouldn’t allow them to fail and the managements of those companies knew that. I would be disinclined to second guess the Fed, they have more information and are trying to do what’s right.

Emory's Goizueta Business School and McCombs School of Business at UT Austin · February 2008

# 你是否认为美联储正在助长道德风险,从而导致资本错配以及随之而来的资产泡沫?如果是,长期风险是什么?

每当政府决定为了公共利益而出手、而不是任由某些人破产时,总会引入一些道德风险。当年救助长期资本管理公司时存在道德风险,眼下的局面也多少有这种成分。但这很难衡量,因为后果要 15 到 20 年后才显现。1987 年股灾时,格林斯潘刚上任,不确定会发生什么。专家做市商体系遭到重创,他们大多只靠很少的资本运作,结果都破产了。美联储给他们注入了更多资本。这会改变未来的行为吗?也许会,但在当时这是正确的决定。它也催生了“大到不能倒”的信条。那些大银行、房地美和房利美都料定美国政府不会让它们倒闭,这些公司的管理层也心知肚明。我不太愿意去质疑美联储,他们掌握更多信息,也在努力做正确的事。

埃默里大学戈伊苏埃塔商学院与得州大学奥斯汀分校麦库姆斯商学院 · 2008 年 2 月

# Could you comment on the current rise of sovereign wealth funds from theMiddle East and Asia and how they are playing an increasing role in how corporations raise capital. Is competition from these sources for the cash flows of corporations affecting your investment strategies or opportunities?

Any competition is competition. The situation of sovereign wealth funds is interesting. A lot of it is China bashing, OPEC bashing and plays right into politician’s hands. Today, the US will buy $2 billion more from the world than they buy from us. In exchange we give them little pieces of paper and they have to buy assets. As long as we consume more than we produce we have to let the rest of the world invest in us. We created sovereign wealth funds and that $2 billion gains interest. US funds feel they can get the best terms from these foreign investors and lately, enticed them into buying equity. China wanted to buy Unocal, a 3rd rate oil producer with production overseas in places like India. US Congress went ape and 395 representatives signed an anti-Chinese resolution to block the deal. For 100 years the US companies went around buying the world’s assets and bribing officials, but told China they couldn’t buy Unocal. The Chinese took it, but they didn’t like it. It doesn’t make sense that we are buying foreign assets, and giving them pieces of paper and then telling them what they can’t do with that money. We have created them and I have no objection to them. I recommend an index fund for these sovereign wealth funds. It gives them exposure to the US market, but they won’t get taken by salespeople with bad deals. In economics you always want to say “And then what?”

Emory's Goizueta Business School and McCombs School of Business at UT Austin · February 2008

# 能否谈谈眼下来自中东和亚洲的主权财富基金的崛起,以及它们如何在企业融资中扮演越来越重要的角色?来自这些资金的、对企业现金流的竞争,是否在影响你的投资策略或机会?

任何竞争都是竞争。主权财富基金的情况很有意思。其中很多说法不过是抨击中国、抨击欧佩克,正好迎合了政客的需要。今天,美国从世界各国买进的东西,会比卖给他们的多出 20 亿美元。作为交换,我们给他们一些小纸片,他们就得拿去买资产。只要我们消费的多于生产的,就不得不让世界其他地方来投资我们。是我们创造了主权财富基金,而那 20 亿美元会产生利息。美国的基金觉得能从这些外国投资者那里拿到最优惠的条件,最近还诱使他们去买股权。中国曾想收购优尼科——一家三流的石油生产商,海外产油地包括印度等地。美国国会跳脚反对,395 名众议员联署了一份反华决议来阻挠这笔交易。一百年来,美国公司满世界收购资产、贿赂官员,却告诉中国他们不能买优尼科。中国人忍了下来,但他们并不喜欢这样。我们买外国资产、给人家纸片,回头又对人家拿这笔钱能干什么指手画脚,这毫无道理。是我们创造了它们,我对它们没有意见。我建议这些主权财富基金买指数基金。这既能让他们参与美国市场,又不至于被那些兜售烂交易的推销员坑了。搞经济,你永远要会问一句“然后呢?”

埃默里大学戈伊苏埃塔商学院与得州大学奥斯汀分校麦库姆斯商学院 · 2008 年 2 月

# It seems that the worldwide trend is towards lower corporate tax rates. Do you think that the US risks becoming less competitive if it maintains its current corporate tax rate?

Relative to GDP, government taxation is 18.5% and spending is 20%, so we borrow the balance. The national debt should not be a scary topic and the fact that it’s gone up is fine as long as it’s proportional to GDP. Where do we get that 18.5%? There’s 2.7 trillion in government revenues. 2.2 trillion comes from individuals, and less than 1% of that comes from the estate tax. 1.1 trillion comes from income taxes, with payroll taxes consisting of 900 billion, but it’s capped at the first $100,000 of salary. We want a tax system that encourages greater prosperity, but it needs to take care of the family.

We did an informal office survey by looking at the total tax footprint versus the total income. I earned 46 million and paid a tax rate of 17.5%. My rate was the lowest, the average was 33%, and my cleaning lady paid 40%. The system is tilted towards the rich. The Forbes 400 total net worth has gone from 220 billion to 1.54 trillion, an increase of 7-to-1. You see in legislature that there is lobbying carried on by the powerful over issues such as the estate tax and carried interest for private equity investments. We need to flatten income and payroll taxes, and those making under $30,000 shouldn’t be bothered.

Let’s imagine that 24 hours before you are born, a genie comes to you and tells you devise a social and economic system. The only catch is that after you designed the system, you would choose a paper from a barrel which would determine your demographics. What objectives would you want? You need to devise a system that creates prosperity. It needs to be a meritocracy, to put the right people in the right place. It needs to have a strong education system, and throw off lots of goods and services. It also needs to not discriminate against women or minorities. Even though the per capita GDP is $47,000, 20% of the population makes less than $20,000. We need to eliminate that fear of sickness or old age. A tax code is the codification of a country’s values. But you can’t kill the golden goose of prosperity.

Emory's Goizueta Business School and McCombs School of Business at UT Austin · February 2008

# 全球趋势似乎是朝着更低的公司税率发展。你认为如果美国维持现行的公司税率,会有竞争力下降的风险吗?

相对于 GDP,政府税收占 18.5%,支出占 20%,差额我们靠借债填补。国债不该是个吓人的话题,只要它与 GDP 成比例,债务上升也没什么问题。这 18.5% 是从哪儿来的?政府收入有 2.7 万亿美元。其中 2.2 万亿来自个人,而遗产税在其中占比还不到 1%。所得税贡献 1.1 万亿,工薪税占 9000 亿,但工薪税只针对工资的前 10 万美元征收。我们想要一套能鼓励更大繁荣的税收制度,但它也需要照顾到家庭。

我们在办公室里做了一次非正式调查,比较了大家的纳税总额与总收入。我赚了 4600 万美元,税率是 17.5%。我的税率是最低的,平均税率是 33%,而我的清洁女工税率是 40%。这套制度向富人倾斜。福布斯 400 富豪榜的总净资产从 2200 亿美元涨到了 1.54 万亿美元,增长了 7 倍。你能在立法机构里看到,权势者就遗产税、私募股权投资的附带权益(carried interest)等问题进行游说。我们需要把所得税和工薪税降下来、拉平,年收入不足 3 万美元的人不该被它们所累。

让我们想象一下:在你出生前 24 小时,一个精灵来找你,让你设计一套社会与经济制度。唯一的附加条件是,等你设计好之后,要从一个桶里抽一张纸片,由它决定你的人口学属性。你会想要什么样的目标?你需要设计一套能创造繁荣的制度。它必须是任人唯贤的,把对的人放到对的位置上。它必须有强大的教育体系,并源源不断地产出大量商品和服务。它还不能歧视女性或少数族裔。尽管人均 GDP 是 4.7 万美元,但仍有 20% 的人口年收入不足 2 万美元。我们需要消除人们对疾病或老年的恐惧。税法是一个国家价值观的成文体现。但你不能杀掉那只下金蛋的繁荣之鹅。

埃默里大学戈伊苏埃塔商学院与得州大学奥斯汀分校麦库姆斯商学院 · 2008 年 2 月

# Do you feel that the might of America has changed?

You can bet against the dollar, but I would never bet against America. The system in the U.S. has allowed the country to unleash more for the world than any other country. Since 1776, the U.S. had a different system than the rest of the world and that system unleashed the human potential. We were not the smartest nor did we have the best resources. This is the same system we have in place today with people of similar intelligence. I have and would bet against the U.S. currency, stocks, etc. but the United States prevails over time. There are all kinds of rocky roads but we have rule of law, equality of opportunity, and a meritocracy. We have a market system and people apply energies and imagination to come up with things someone would want. Everyone in this room is working far below his/her potential.

Q&A with 6 Business Schools · Feb 2009

Overall, I’m an enormous bull on the United States. In 1790, we had a population of 3.9 million people vs. 290 million in China and 190 million in Europe. We’ve all had roughly the same conditions since then, yet 215 years later, we have 30% of the world’s GDP. This is one of the great all-time success stories.

[CM: I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great civilization.]

I don’t feel that way. You’ll know who’s right in 20 or 30 years.

What we do is no secret. The relative importance of America will diminish. The rest of the world is catching on and adopting our best practices. But our castle will grow. It’s good for us if the rest of the world does well, and they’re growing from a lower base. I don’t think their success comes out of our hide.

[CM: In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the part of the world that will do best will be Asia.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes · 2005

# 你觉得美国的实力发生改变了吗?

你可以做空美元,但我永远不会做空美国。美国这套制度,让这个国家为世界释放出的东西比任何其他国家都多。自 1776 年以来,美国就有一套不同于世界其他地方的制度,而这套制度释放了人的潜能。我们并不是最聪明的,也没有最好的资源。今天我们用的还是同一套制度,人们的智力也相仿。我曾经做空、将来也会做空美元、美股等等,但美国长期来看终将胜出。一路上有各种坎坷,但我们有法治、有机会平等、有任人唯贤。我们有市场制度,人们投入精力与想象力去创造别人想要的东西。在座每一个人,工作时发挥出的都远低于自己的潜能。

与六所商学院的问答 · 2009 年 2 月

总体而言,我对美国极度看多。1790 年,我们的人口是 390 万,而中国有 2.9 亿、欧洲有 1.9 亿。此后大家的起点条件大体相同,可 215 年后,我们却拥有了全球 30% 的 GDP。这是有史以来最伟大的成功故事之一。

[芒格:我认为我们正处于一个伟大文明的顶点,或者已经接近顶点。]

我可不这么觉得。再过二三十年,你就会知道谁说得对了。

我们的做法没什么秘密。美国的相对重要性会下降。世界其他地方正在领悟并采纳我们最好的做法。但我们的城堡会变得更大。世界其他地方过得好,对我们也是好事,而且他们是从更低的基数起步的。我不认为他们的成功是从我们身上割肉得来的。

[芒格:再过 50 到 100 年,如果我们在亚洲某些国家面前沦为差得多的“老三”,我也不会感到意外。要我下注,世界上表现最好的地区将会是亚洲。]

伯克希尔 2005 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2005

# What are the biggest challenges that this country faces?

The biggest problem is probably weapons of mass destruction. We have always had people who were ill-fitted to society and wished harm on others. In 1945 we unlocked the atom, and that changed everything. The human animal hasn’t changed, you still have the same percentage that are maladjusted. The problem is knowledge, materials, and deliverability. What you could do with the wrong kind of infectious disease is incredible. You can transmit things much faster today. Governments, individuals and organizations can’t control security. It’s what I would spend all of my money on if I could fix it. Everyone here in this room won what I call the ovarian lottery. You were born at the right time and we were all very, very lucky. We are in the luckiest 1% of humanity.

Q&A with 6 Business Schools · Feb 2009

# 这个国家面临的最大挑战是什么?

最大的问题大概是大规模杀伤性武器。我们一直都有那些不适应社会、希望伤害他人的人。1945 年我们解开了原子的奥秘,那改变了一切。人这种动物没变,格格不入者的比例还是那么大。问题在于知识、材料和投送能力。用一种错误的传染病能造成的破坏简直难以想象。如今传播东西的速度要快得多。政府、个人和组织都无法掌控安全。如果能解决这个问题,我会把全部的钱都投进去。在座每一个人都中了我所说的“卵巢彩票”。你们生在了对的年代,我们都非常非常幸运。我们身处全人类最幸运的那 1%。

与六所商学院的问答 · 2009 年 2 月

# What do you think about the U.S. trade deficit?

I talked to Barack back in August, and said: “I have good news and bad news. The good news is that the economy will be terrible, so you’ll definitely get elected. The bad news is that the economy will be even worse at inauguration.” He asked, “Do you think it’s too late to throw the election?” The trade situation is there and it causes problem and could exacerbate the situation. However, all issues go on the back burner until we solve the big problem. We create sovereign wealth funds, buying more goods and services than everyone else in the world. The decline in the oil price has helped the trade deficit but nothing will get better until everyone feels better. Every day, we buy $2 billion of goods and service more than we produce and export. We give the exporting nations USD. The trade deficit creates claims on the United States. Sometimes we’re a little hypocritical. For example, three years ago, the Chinese wanted to buy Unocal (a small oil company in California) and Congress wanted to condemn China for wanting to buy the oil company with the money we gave them (through U.S. imports). That’s a little disingenuous. The trade deficit creates a situation because we give people claim checks, then we get upset when they want to use them. The Japanese bought Rockefeller Center in the 80’s. Did we think they were going to move it? It’s not useful to fan those flames in a nuclear world, and that’s what’s wrong with “Buy America.” The trade deficit will come up big time when we get past the current problems.

Q&A with 6 Business Schools · Feb 2009

# 你如何看待美国的贸易逆差?

去年八月我跟巴拉克聊过,我说:“我有好消息也有坏消息。好消息是经济会很糟,所以你肯定能当选。坏消息是,到你就职时经济会更糟。”他问:“你觉得现在退选还来得及吗?”贸易问题确实存在,它会带来麻烦,也可能让局势恶化。不过,在我们解决那个大问题之前,所有这些问题都得先搁一边。我们创造了主权财富基金,买进的商品和服务比世界上任何其他人都多。油价下跌帮了贸易逆差一把,但在所有人都重拾信心之前,什么都不会好转。每一天,我们买进的商品和服务都比我们生产和出口的多 20 亿美元。我们把美元给了出口国。贸易逆差形成了对美国的索取权。有时候我们有点虚伪。比如三年前,中国人想收购优尼科(加州一家小石油公司),国会却想谴责中国,怪他们想用我们(通过进口)给他们的钱来收购这家石油公司。这有点不厚道。贸易逆差造成了这样一种局面:我们给了别人提货单,等人家想用的时候我们又不高兴了。80 年代日本人买下了洛克菲勒中心。难道我们以为他们会把它搬走吗?在一个有核武器的世界里去煽风点火没什么好处,这正是“买美国货”运动的问题所在。等我们度过眼前的难关,贸易逆差会成为一个大问题。

与六所商学院的问答 · 2009 年 2 月

# What level of taxation on capital gains is most conducive to the long-term economic health of this society, and is that also the fair and just rate?

[CM: I think there's an easy answer to your capital gains issue, and one is what makes an economy work best in some abstract mathematical sense, and the other is the consideration that you allude to that gets into issues of fairness. Aristotle felt that systems worked better when they were generally perceived as fair, and civilization worked better if people saw the differences in rewards as being reasonably fair, anyway. I think that if you have a civilization where you work 90 hours a week driving a taxicab, with no money and no medical insurance and so forth, and somebody else does nothing but own Berkshire Hathaway shares and sit on the country club porch and peel off a few every year to pay the bills, that would be regarded as so unfair, that even if it had some theoretical economic efficiency that it would be counterproductive for our particular civilization to have that kind of a tax code. I'm all for having some taxation of capital gains. Once you reach that conclusion, you get into the question of what is the fair rate. I think the fair rate might be a little lower than it is now, but not much lower.

Sounds to me like he's a seller of Berkshire. (laughter) Patrick [the questioner, who Buffett knew previously--ed.] gave me a system of mental construct to attack questions like this. He said just imagine that you were going to be born 24 hours from now, and you had been granted this extraordinary power: You were given the right to determine the economic rules of the society that you were going to enter. Those rules were going to prevail for your lifetime, and your children's lifetime, and your grandchildren's lifetime. But as in most of these types of questions, there's one hooker: You don't know whether you're going to be born black or white, male or female, bright or retarded, infirm or able-bodied, in the United States or Afghanistan--in other words you're going to participate in 24 hours in what I call the ovarian lottery. (laughter) It's the most important event in which you'll ever participate. It's going to determine way more than what school you go to, how hard you work, all kinds of things. You're going to get one ball drawn out of a barrel that probably contains 5.7 billion balls now. And that's you. Now what kind of society are you going to construct with that in prospect?

Well I suspect you would focus on two issues that Patrick mentioned in his question. You would try to figure out a system that is going to produce an abundant amount of goods, and where that abundance is going to increase at a rapid rate during your lifetime and your children's and your grandchildren's. You'd want some system that turned out what people wanted and needed, and you'd want something that would turn them out in increasing quantities for as far as the eye could see. But you'd also want a system that, while it did that, treated the people that did not win the ovarian lottery in a way that you would want to be treated if you were in their position, because a lot of people don't win the lottery. I mean, Charlie--when we born the odds were over 30 to 1 against being born in the United States. Just winning that portion of the lottery is an enormous plus. We wouldn't be worth a damn in Afghanistan. We'd be giving talks and nobody would be listening. (laughter) It would be the worst of all worlds. So we won in that way--we won partially in the era in which we were born by being born male. When I was growing up, women could be teachers and secretaries and nurses and that was about it. 50% of the count of the country was excluded from a very large part of the occupations. We won it by being white. No tribute to us, it just happened that way. And we won it in another way by being wired in a certain way which we had nothing to do with, that happens to enable us to be good at valuing businesses. Is that the greatest talent in the world? No, it just happens to be something that pays off like crazy in this system. (laughter)

When you get through with that, you still want to have a system where the people that are born like Bill Gates or Andy Grove or something get to turn those talents to work in a way that really maximizes those talents. It would be a crime to have people like that or Tom Murphy working in some pedestrian occupation just because you have this great egalitarian instinct. The trick, it seems to me, is to have some balance that causes the people who have the talents that can produce goods that people want in a market society to turn them out in great quantity, and to keep wanting to do it all their lives, and at the same time, takes the people that lost the lottery, and makes sure that just because they got the wrong ticket, they don't live a life that's dramatically worse than people that were luckier.

When I get through that long speech, I probably come out with the idea that the capital gains tax as it is today is just about right. I've been around a lot of people with money and talent over time, they don't always go together but I've been around both classes (laughter) and I see very few of them that are turned off from using their talents by a 28% capital gains tax--it just doesn't happen. They do what they like to do. I've just never seen it happen. I see a lot of people that pay taxes that are higher than 28% that are contributing more to society by some judgment other than a pure market system. I just don't think it's inappropriate in a country like this to tax me at 28% for selling some of my Berkshire shares whereas somebody who makes even relatively modest amounts of money can get up to 39% while they're trying to figure out a cure for cancer. That's where I come out on that. (applause)

BRK Annual Meeting 1997 · 1997

# 什么样的资本利得税率最有利于这个社会的长期经济健康?而这个税率是否也是公平公正的税率?

[芒格:我觉得你这个资本利得的问题有个简单的答案。一方面是从某种抽象的数学意义上看,怎样能让经济运转得最好;另一方面则是你所暗示的那个考量,它牵涉到公平问题。亚里士多德认为,一套制度若被普遍视为公平,运转起来就会更好;如果人们认为回报上的差异还算合理公平,文明也会运转得更好。我想,如果在一个文明里,有人一周开 90 小时出租车,既没钱又没医保等等,另一个人却什么都不干,只持有伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票,坐在乡村俱乐部的门廊上,每年卖掉几股来付账单——这会被视为极不公平,以至于哪怕它在理论上有某种经济效率,对我们这个特定的文明来说,采用那样的税法也是适得其反的。我完全赞成对资本利得征收一些税。一旦你得出这个结论,就会面临“公平税率是多少”的问题。我觉得公平税率也许会比现在稍低一点,但低不了多少。

听起来他像是想卖掉伯克希尔。(笑)帕特里克[即提问者,巴菲特此前就认识他——编者注]给了我一套思考这类问题的思维构造。他说,你就想象自己将在 24 小时后出生,并被赋予了这样一种非凡的权力:你有权决定你即将进入的那个社会的经济规则。这些规则将在你的一生、你子女的一生、你孙辈的一生中一直有效。但和大多数这类问题一样,有一个圈套:你不知道自己生下来是黑人还是白人、是男是女、是聪明还是弱智、是体弱多病还是身强力壮、是在美国还是在阿富汗——换句话说,24 小时后你将参与我所说的“卵巢彩票”。(笑)这是你这辈子参与的最重要的一次抽奖。它决定的东西,远远超过你上哪所学校、你多努力工作等等。你将从一个大概装着 57 亿个球的桶里抽出一个球,那个球就是你。那么,在这种前景下,你会构建一个什么样的社会呢?

嗯,我猜你会聚焦于帕特里克在问题里提到的两点。你会努力设计一套能产出大量商品的制度,而且在你、你子女、你孙辈的一生中,这种富足还会以很快的速度持续增长。你会想要一套能产出人们想要和需要之物的制度,而且要让它产出的数量在目力所及的未来不断增加。但你也会想要这样一套制度:在做到这些的同时,它对待那些没有中“卵巢彩票”的人的方式,也是你假如身处他们的境地时希望被对待的方式——因为很多人是抽不中这个彩票的。我是说,查理——我们出生时,生在美国的几率是 30 多比 1 对我们不利。光是抽中了这一部分,就已经是巨大的加分。要是在阿富汗,我们一文不值。我们去做演讲,没人会听。(笑)那将是最糟糕的境地。所以我们这样赢了——我们生在那个年代、又生为男性,也算赢了一部分。我小时候,女人能当的也就是教师、秘书和护士,差不多就这些了。占全国一半人口的女性,被排除在很大一部分职业之外。我们生为白人,又赢了一回。这不是我们的功劳,事情碰巧就这样。我们还以另一种方式赢了:碰巧生来就被以某种方式“接线”,这与我们毫不相干,却恰好让我们擅长给企业估值。这是世上最了不起的天赋吗?不是,它只是碰巧在这套制度里回报高得离谱罢了。(笑)

把这些都想透之后,你仍然会想要一套制度:让像比尔·盖茨、安迪·格鲁夫这样生来如此的人,能把他们的才华投入工作,真正把这些才华发挥到极致。如果仅仅因为你有一种伟大的平等主义本能,就让这样的人、或让汤姆·墨菲去干些平庸的活儿,那就是一种罪过。在我看来,诀窍在于取得某种平衡:既让那些拥有才华、能在市场社会中产出人们想要之物的人大量地产出,并让他们一辈子都乐意这么做;同时,又照顾好那些在彩票中失利的人,确保他们不会仅仅因为抽到了一张坏彩票,就过上比那些运气更好的人差得离谱的生活。

讲完这一长篇大论,我得出的结论大概是:今天的资本利得税率差不多正合适。这些年我接触过很多有钱又有才的人,这两样未必总在一起,但这两类人我都打过交道(笑),我几乎没见过哪个人会因为 28% 的资本利得税就不愿施展才华——根本不会有这种事。他们就是做自己喜欢做的事。我从没见过这种情况发生。我倒是见过很多人,他们缴的税率高于 28%,而且按某种市场制度之外的判断标准,他们对社会的贡献更大。在这样一个国家里,我卖掉一些伯克希尔的股票被按 28% 征税,而另一个赚钱相对不多的人,在努力寻找治愈癌症的方法时却要被征到 39%,我实在不觉得(28% 这个税率)有什么不妥。这就是我对这件事的看法。(掌声)

伯克希尔 1997 年股东大会 · 1997

# What's your opinion of oil? peak oil?

Oil is finite. It will eventually run out for practical purposes. America found oil early, and there isn’t much left here. We will see a plug‐in electric car. BYD is very smart. Doesn’t know if change to alternatives will be evolutionary or revolutionary. But oil will be higher and solar/electric will be more abundant. (A side note: Buffett went from average oil out of the ground down the value chain and into a personal consumption calculation in his head in about ten seconds.)

John Reuwer · Nov 19 2009

[Q - Oil will run out this century. Considering US policy is to do nothing until the last second, will we face World War III? Will oil companies go to zero?]

WB: Oil won’t run out - it doesn’t work that way. At some point the daily productive capacity will level off and then start declining gradually. There is the depletion aspect and the decline curves. We are producing 86 million barrels per day or so, more than ever produced. We are closer, by my calculations, to almost our productive capacity, than we have ever been. I think our surplus capacity is less, and quite a bit less, than in the past. Whatever that peak is, whether it’s 5 years, 10 years, etc., the world will adjust, and we will think about it. Adjustments will cause demand to taper off. I don’t know how much oil is there, but there are lots of barrels of oil in place. We never recover total potential. We may have better engineering recovery in the future. It is nothing like an on and off switch. You may still have enormous political considerations to get access to available oil since it is so important. There is nothing you can do over a short period of time to wean the world off oil.

CM: If we get another 200 years of growth dispersed over the world while the population goes up, all oil, coal and uranium will run out, so we will have to use the sun. I think there will be some pain in this process. I think it is stupid to use up the hydrocarbons of the world so quickly. It’s stupid when there are so few, and limited, alternatives. What should we have done? We should have brought all the oil over from the Middle East in the 1930s and put it in our ground. Are we doing it now? No. Government policy is behind in rationality. If we are to have a prosperous civilization, we must use the sun.

WB: Charlie, what is your over/under for oil production in 25 years?

CM: Oil in 25 years? Down.

WB: If that is true, that is a big number. China is doing about 10 million cars this year, so down in 25 years is significant.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

[Q - You speak frequently about future prosperity. How about oil – when it runs out. Isn’ t it like trying to satisfy a drug addict with Coca-Cola?]

WB: Titusville 1853 changed the world. There are 500k producing wells in the US. It contributed to the prosperity of the world. The world will not be dependent on that windfall for next 100 yrs. There will be other free lunches available, whether it be solar or other. Don’t give up on humans’ ability to innovate to face problems that seemed insoluble. We haven’t really started. If you could a point in time to be born, I would pick today. CM will give you something more dire.

CM: 150 yrs ago they needed the oil to get ahead. We can get ahead without the oil if we have to, we are advanced civilization. We need gas, coal and oil for chemical feedstock, not warmth or motor vehicles. Freeman Dyson has pointed out that we could go off oil. It doesn’t mean because we couldn’t do it before that we can’t do it in future. If it doesn’t bother Freeman Dyson, it shouldn’t bother you too much.

WB: He’s always pulling that one on me too. [laughter]

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 你对石油怎么看?峰值石油呢?

石油是有限的。就实际用途而言,它终将枯竭。美国很早就发现了石油,如今这里剩下的已经不多了。我们会看到插电式电动车。比亚迪非常聪明。(巴菲特)不知道转向替代能源会是渐进式的还是革命式的。但石油价格会更高,太阳能和电力会更充裕。(旁注:巴菲特大约用了十秒钟,就在脑子里把油从地里采出来、沿价值链一路算到个人消费这一整套账算了一遍。)

John Reuwer · 2009 年 11 月 19 日

[问 - 本世纪石油就会枯竭。考虑到美国的政策是不到最后一刻什么都不做,我们会面临第三次世界大战吗?石油公司会归零吗?]

巴菲特:石油不会枯竭——事情不是那样的。在某个时点,每日产能会先趋于平稳,然后开始逐渐下降。这里有枯竭的因素,也有递减曲线。我们现在每天生产 8600 万桶左右,比以往任何时候都多。按我的计算,我们比以往任何时候都更接近自己的产能极限。我认为我们的剩余产能更少了,少了相当多。无论峰值在何时到来,是 5 年还是 10 年等等,世界都会做出调整,我们也会去思考它。这些调整会让需求慢慢减弱。我不知道地下还有多少石油,但储量是相当可观的。我们从来无法把全部潜在储量都采出来。将来我们也许会有更好的采收工程技术。这绝不像开关那样非开即关。由于石油太重要,要拿到可供开采的石油,你可能仍要面对巨大的政治考量。在短期内,你没有任何办法让世界戒掉石油。

芒格:如果世界人口持续增长、增长又再延续 200 年并散布到全球,那么所有的石油、煤炭和铀都会耗尽,所以我们将不得不利用太阳。我想这个过程中会有些痛苦。我认为这么快就把世界上的碳氢化合物用光是愚蠢的。在替代品如此之少、又如此有限的情况下,这么做很愚蠢。我们本该怎么做?我们本该在 1930 年代就把中东的石油全运过来,埋进我们自己的地下。我们现在这么做了吗?没有。政府政策在理性方面是滞后的。如果我们想要一个繁荣的文明,就必须利用太阳。

巴菲特:查理,对于 25 年后的石油产量,你押大还是押小?

芒格:25 年后的石油?下降。

巴菲特:如果真是这样,那可是个大数目。中国今年的汽车产量约为 1000 万辆,所以 25 年后还能下降,意义重大。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

[问 - 你常谈到未来的繁荣。那石油呢——等它枯竭的时候。这是不是就像想用可口可乐去满足一个瘾君子?]

巴菲特:1853 年的泰特斯维尔改变了世界。美国有 50 万口在产油井。它为世界的繁荣作出了贡献。未来一百年,世界不会一直依赖这份意外之财。还会有别的免费午餐,无论是太阳能还是别的什么。别低估人类面对看似无解的问题时的创新能力。我们其实还没真正开始。如果让我选一个出生的时点,我会选今天。查理会给你讲些更悲观的。

芒格:150 年前他们需要石油才能向前发展。如果不得不如此,我们没有石油也能向前发展,我们是先进的文明。我们需要天然气、煤炭和石油作为化工原料,而不是用来取暖或开车。弗里曼·戴森指出过,我们可以摆脱石油。不能因为过去做不到,就说将来也做不到。如果这事都不让弗里曼·戴森发愁,那你也用不着太发愁。

巴菲特:他也老拿这一套来唬我。(笑)

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# The current tenuous economic situation and interest rates? Where are we going?

I don’t think about the macro stuff. What you really want to in investments is figure out what is important and knowable. If it is unimportant and unknowable, you forget about it. What you talk about is important but, in my view, it is not knowable. Understanding Coca-Cola is knowable or Wrigley’s or Eastman Kodak. You can understand those businesses that are knowable. Whether it turns out to be important depends where your valuation leads you and the firm’s price and all that. But we have never not bought or bought a business because of any Macro feeling of any kind because it doesn’t make any difference. Let’s say in 1972 when we bought See’s Candy, I think Nixon put on the price controls a little bit later, but so what! We would have missed a chance to buy something for $25 million that is producing $60 million pre-tax now. We don’t want to pass up the chance to do something intelligent because of some prediction about something we are no good on anyway. So we don’t read or listen to in relation to macro factors at all. The typical investment counselor organization goes out and they bring out their economist and they trot him out and he gives you this big macro picture. And they start working from there on down. In our view that is nonsense.

If Alan Greenspan was on the one side of me and Robert Rubin on the other side and they both were whispering in my ear exactly what they were going to do the next twelve months, it wouldn’t make any difference to me what I would pay for Executive Jet or General Re or anything else I do.

Lecture at the University of Florida Business School · October 15th 1998

[Q - your opinion on low interest rates?]

WB: Very difficult for many with such low rates. People talk about easy money, but it’s not easy on the people who have money. If you invested at these rates when Columbus landed, and didn’t pay taxes, you’d have doubled your money by now! It won’t go on forever, but I’m very sympathetic with people living on a fixed income. Purchasing power is getting eaten away. This will end at some point. I would not want to be Chairman of the Fed. It won’t work forever to run big budget deficits and have easy monetary policy. When we run into trouble the blame doesn’t go to the Fed, it goes to Congress.

CM: In some sense, the reality of our situation is depressing, stocks are up because running fixed income returns are so lousy. But if it does last, we won’t like it – just like Japanese. We will be mired in stagnation. This is a very easy message. [laughter]

WB: The pressure of extremely low rates can’t be underestimated. Afraid of everything else, pressure to put other prices back up will be enormous as fear gets resolved. You shouldn’t underestimate the degree to which the last year of stock prices is result of agony of very low interest rates. We have seen a lot of that, and we’ll see what happens when rates go up.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 当前脆弱的经济形势和利率?我们将走向何方?

我不去想宏观那些东西。投资中你真正要做的,是弄清楚什么是既重要又可知的。如果一件事既不重要又不可知,那就把它忘掉。你谈的这些东西很重要,但在我看来不可知。理解可口可乐是可知的,箭牌、伊士曼柯达也是。那些可知的生意你是能搞懂的。它最终是否重要,取决于你的估值把你引向何方、企业的价格如何,诸如此类。但我们从来没有因为任何一种宏观判断而买或不买一家企业,因为那毫无影响。比如 1972 年我们买喜诗糖果的时候,我记得尼克松稍后才推出价格管制,可那又怎样!我们差点就错过了一次机会:花 2500 万美元买下一家如今税前利润达 6000 万美元的企业。我们不想因为对某件我们本来就不在行的事做了某种预测,而错过做一件聪明事的机会。所以我们在宏观因素方面什么都不读、也什么都不听。典型的投资顾问机构会请出他们的经济学家,把他亮出来,让他给你描绘一幅宏大的宏观图景。然后他们就从这里一路往下推演。在我们看来,那是胡扯。

就算艾伦·格林斯潘坐在我一边、罗伯特·鲁宾坐在我另一边,两人都凑在我耳边把他们未来十二个月要做的事一五一十地告诉我,那对我为 Executive Jet、通用再保险或我做的任何别的事愿意出什么价,都不会有任何影响。

佛罗里达大学商学院演讲 · 1998 年 10 月 15 日

[问 - 你对低利率怎么看?]

巴菲特:利率这么低,对很多人来说非常艰难。人们都说钱很宽松,可对那些有钱的人来说一点也不轻松。要是你在哥伦布登陆时按这样的利率投资、又不缴税,到现在也才把本金翻一倍!这不会永远持续下去,但我非常同情那些靠固定收入生活的人。购买力正被一点点啃食。这总有一天会结束。我可不想当美联储主席。长期搞巨额财政赤字、再加上宽松的货币政策,是行不通的。等我们遇上麻烦时,挨骂的不会是美联储,而是国会。

芒格:从某种意义上说,我们处境的现实令人沮丧:股票上涨,是因为眼下固定收益的回报太糟糕了。但如果这种局面持续下去,我们也不会喜欢——就像日本人那样。我们会陷入停滞的泥潭。这话很好懂。(笑)

巴菲特:极低利率所带来的压力不可低估。在对其他一切心怀恐惧之际,随着恐惧逐渐化解,把其他资产价格重新推高的压力会变得极其巨大。你不该低估过去一年股价的上涨在多大程度上是极低利率之苦的产物。这种情况我们已经见了不少,等利率上行时我们再看会发生什么。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# What was the impact of September 11th?

It made everyone realize that human haven't progressed in how they behave, but have progressed in terms of their ability to hurt someone they hate. 9/11 brought that home. It used to be that if you hated someone, you could only throw a rock at them.

There are millions of people who hate us, but most can't do anything about it. But a few can, and there's incredibly more ability for a deranged person to do harm to us today.

Before 9/11, we weren't being paid for insuring the risk of terrorist attacks. Since then, the insurance industry has recognized that it has exposures that it had to exclude or charge for.

For new policies, we've sold quite a bit of terrorism polities, but almost all exclude NCB -- nuclear (and fires afterward), chemical and biological. The World Trade Center attack was about as extreme as you can get without NCB.

As an industry, we can pay claims of tens of billions of dollars, but not hundreds of billions.

We write a few policies that cover NCB because we can take a loss of a few billion.

Most people don't realize that the World Trade Center attack was, by a huge margin, the largest workman's comp loss in history. Had the attack been on, say, Yankee Stadium, there would have been few workman's comp claims, but people were at work in the World Trade Centers. Imagine if someone developed a deadly biological agent and released it into the ventilation systems of a number of large buildings simultaneously. It would make the workman's comp claims for the World Trade Center look like nothing.

[CM: "To the extent that 9/11 causes us to be less weak, foolish and sloppy, it's a plus. We regret what happened, of course, but it's good that people become more realistic. For example, we should have tightened our immigration policies years ago." [I didn't interpret this as opposition to immigration in general -- simply that it should be monitored more carefully so that people like the 9/11 attackers couldn't enter the country and operate freely.]]

The key to both investing and insurance underwriting is to be realistic and disciplined. 9/11 drove home these lessons.

BRK Annual Meeting 2002 · 2002

# 9·11 事件的影响是什么?

它让每个人都意识到:人类在行为方式上并没有进步,但在伤害自己所憎恨之人的能力上却进步了。9·11 把这一点彻底点明了。过去要是你恨一个人,你顶多朝他扔块石头。

有成百上千万人憎恨我们,但大多数人无能为力。可总有一小撮人能下手,而如今一个精神错乱的人能对我们造成伤害的能力,要大得多得多。

在 9·11 之前,我们承保恐怖袭击风险是没有收取相应保费的。从那以后,保险业认识到自己有一些必须排除在外、或必须为之收费的风险敞口。

对于新保单,我们卖出了相当多的恐怖主义险,但几乎都排除了 NCB——核(及其后续引发的火灾)、化学和生物。世贸中心遇袭,已经是不含 NCB 情况下你所能遭遇的最极端的情形了。

作为一个行业,我们能赔付数百亿美元的索赔,但赔不起数千亿美元。

我们承保了少量包含 NCB 的保单,因为我们承受得起几十亿美元的损失。

大多数人没有意识到,世贸中心遇袭以巨大的差距成为历史上最大的一笔工伤赔偿损失。假如袭击发生在比如说扬基体育场,工伤索赔会很少,可世贸中心里的人都在上班。设想一下,如果有人研制出一种致命的生物制剂,同时投放进若干栋大楼的通风系统,那会让世贸中心的工伤索赔相形见绌、不值一提。

[芒格:“如果 9·11 能让我们少一点软弱、愚蠢和马虎,那就是好事。我们当然为发生的事感到遗憾,但人们变得更现实是好事。比如,我们多年前就该收紧移民政策了。”[我并不把这理解为反对移民本身——只是说应当更审慎地加以监控,好让 9·11 袭击者那样的人无法进入这个国家并自由活动。]]

投资和保险承保的关键,都在于既现实又自律。9·11 让这些教训深入人心。

伯克希尔 2002 年股东大会 · 2002

# Could you use your clout to advocate for tort reform?

I'm sympathetic to what you're saying, but our clout is nothing compared to that of trial lawyers. It's appalling the friction costs to our society of tort insurance. People pay off rather than go through the nuisance of a suit. The people that pursue that activity pursue it not because it's right, but profitable.

But when I look at what's happened in Corporate America, I don't think they should get off scot-free. I just wish the people who engaged in the wrong-doing would pay, not the D&O insurance.

[CM: If you say the tort system includes Workman's Comp, which I would, I'd agree [that the system has serious problems]. In California, Costco has 1/3 of its employees but pays 2/3 of its total Workman's Comp [bill]. It's institutionalized fraud -- chiropractors, etc. all working together. It'll cost jobs. I had a friend who moved his plant from Texas, where his Workman's Comp was 30% [of wages] to Utah, where it was 2%. In California, it's gotten so bad that I think there will be reform, even though the legislature is controlled by Democrats.

Most of the time they [the plaintiffs' lawyers] are suing someone who has done something terrible. A lot of defendants who are screaming about plaintiffs bar have done some terrible things. The present system is crazy, but I don't know how to fix it.]

Would you make people who did wrong things pay a portion themselves?

[CM: I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you'd be better off.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes · 2003

# 你能否运用你的影响力来倡导侵权法改革?

我很理解你说的,但跟那些出庭律师比起来,我们的影响力不算什么。侵权责任保险给我们社会带来的摩擦成本糟糕透顶。人们宁可花钱了事,也不愿忍受打官司的麻烦。那些干这行的人之所以追逐这门营生,不是因为它正当,而是因为它有利可图。

但当我审视美国企业界发生的事情时,我并不认为他们就该完全脱身。我只是希望,付出代价的是那些做了错事的人,而不是董事及高管责任险(D&O 保险)。

[芒格:如果你说侵权制度包括工伤赔偿——我认为它包括——那我同意[这套制度有严重的问题]。在加州,开市客(Costco)的员工只占其总员工数的三分之一,工伤赔偿[账单]却要占到三分之二。这是制度化的欺诈——脊椎按摩师等等串通一气。它会害人丢掉工作。我有个朋友把工厂从得州(那里他的工伤赔偿是工资的 30%)迁到了犹他州(那里只有 2%)。在加州,情况已经糟糕到我认为终会有改革,尽管立法机构由民主党控制。

多数时候,他们[原告律师]起诉的对象都干过一些很恶劣的事。很多对原告律师界大喊大叫的被告,自己也干过一些可怕的事。现行制度很疯狂,但我不知道该怎么修好它。]

你会让做错事的人自己承担一部分赔偿吗?

[芒格:我认为如果根本没有 D&O 保险,会是一个巨大的改进。反方观点是,那样一来就没有任何有钱人愿意进董事会了。但我认为,里外里算下来你会过得更好。]

伯克希尔 2003 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2003

# Views on growing income inequality?

The American consumer overall is better off, but not dramatically better than 10 years ago. You're right that there's been increasing inequality. We don't make decisions on what business we buy based on some sweeping projections about what American consumers will do. We're very certain that Americans will do better over time. Average income per capita rose 7x in the 20th century. A simple phone call across the country used to cost a great deal relative to income. People will be better off decade after decade. We're not big on being futurologists.

Our consumer businesses -- candy, furniture, etc. -- are very very soft. They were down in Q1. I think we've been in a recession -- although not huge or violent one -- for two years. When government talks about GDP growing 2%, keep in mind that the population grows 1%. It's GDP per capita that counts. And GDP counts people who make you take off your shoes before you get on a plane. It counts good and services that we wish we didn't want. When you get into a war, if you drop planes into the ocean, it [building replacement planes] is part of GDP. Desirable GDP, my guess, has gone no place in the past three years. The quality of GDP isn't talked about very much.

[CM: Figures you gave on inequality obscure an important fact: if the same family were always on the bottom, then you'd have big resentments. But if DuPonts go down and Pampered Chef up, [that's good]. That much churn makes people think the system is fairer. Buffett: We don't like churn now, but we liked it more 30-40 years ago. [Laughter.]]

[BRK2004 - I don’t see how corporate profits will move up as percentage of GDP.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes · 2003

Buffett: Corporate profits today are close to their highs, except for a few years after World War II. Incidentally, corporate taxes are nowhere near their highs, so there’s a disconnect there.

It is certainly true that in the last 5 to 10 years, the disparity in income has widened significantly and the tax breaks for the wealthy have been extraordinary. I’ve said in the past that most of the members of the Forbes 400, myself included, pay a lower percentage of their income in taxes than their receptionist. This wasn’t true decades ago and it’s wrong in a rich society.

In 2004, my tax rate was the lowest of the 15 people in my office – and I’m not taking advantage of any tax shelters – and it’s even lower in 2005. That’s crazy. I don’t think the American people understand that, and if they did, they wouldn’t be very happy about it.

Munger: GDP per capita figures have been very good. I wouldn’t get too wild about the median income. There are huge fluctuations up and down. What’s really important is that the pie keeps growing.

That being said, I don’t disagree that Warren’s right about too many tax cuts for the wealthy, but I don’t think it’s as important.

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

# 对日益扩大的收入不平等有何看法?

美国消费者总体上过得更好了,但比起 10 年前并没有好得惊人。你说得对,不平等一直在加剧。我们决定买哪家企业,并不是基于对美国消费者将会怎样的某种笼统预测。我们非常确信,美国人随着时间推移会过得更好。20 世纪人均收入增长了 7 倍。从前在全国范围打一通电话,相对于收入来说要花一大笔钱。人们会一个十年比一个十年过得更好。我们不太热衷于当未来学家。

我们那些面向消费者的生意——糖果、家具等等——非常非常疲软。一季度都在下滑。我认为我们已经处于衰退中两年了,尽管不是那种规模巨大或来势汹汹的衰退。当政府谈论 GDP 增长 2% 时,别忘了人口增长了 1%。真正重要的是人均 GDP。而 GDP 把那些让你上飞机前得脱鞋的人也算了进去。它把我们但愿自己并不需要的商品和服务也算了进去。打起仗来,你把飞机扔进海里,这(建造替补飞机)也是 GDP 的一部分。我猜,过去三年真正有意义的 GDP 其实原地踏步。GDP 的质量,没什么人去谈论。

[芒格:你给出的关于不平等的数字掩盖了一个重要事实:如果总是同一个家庭待在最底层,那就会积累起巨大的怨恨。但如果杜邦家族在下沉、Pampered Chef 在上升,[那就是好事]。这样的阶层流动会让人觉得这套制度更公平。巴菲特:我们现在不喜欢这种流动,但三四十年前我们更喜欢它。(笑)]

[伯克希尔 2004 - 我看不出企业利润占 GDP 的比重还能怎么往上走。]

伯克希尔 2003 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2003

巴菲特:如今的企业利润已接近历史高位,二战后的少数几年除外。顺带一提,企业税却远不及历史高位,所以这里存在一种脱节。

确实,过去 5 到 10 年里,收入差距显著拉大,给富人的减税幅度也大得离谱。我过去说过,福布斯 400 富豪榜上的大多数成员,包括我自己,缴税占收入的比例比他们的前台接待员还低。几十年前并非如此,在一个富裕的社会里这是错的。

2004 年,我的税率是我办公室里 15 个人中最低的——而我并没有利用任何避税手段——到 2005 年还更低了。这太荒唐了。我认为美国民众并不了解这一点,如果他们了解,是不会很高兴的。

芒格:人均 GDP 的数据一直非常好。我不会太纠结于收入中位数。它有巨大的上下波动。真正重要的是这块饼不断在变大。

话虽如此,我并不反对沃伦说的“给富人减税减得太多”这一点是对的,只是我不认为它有那么重要。

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

# Thoughts about the odds of a nuclear attack?

You are quite correct that people tend to underestimate low probability events when they haven’t happened recently, and overestimate them when they have.

On the nuclear question, you can do the math easily – the question is whether your assumptions are right. If there’s a 10% chance each year [of an attack], then there’s only a 0.5% chance it doesn’t happen sometime in the next 50 years. But if the odds are only 1% each year, then there’s a 60% chance you get through the next 50 years.

BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes · 2004

Buffett: I couldn’t agree more that the ultimate problem of mankind is a state- sponsored use of a nuclear weapon. It will happen someday.

Thousands of years ago, if you wished evil upon your neighbor, you threw a rock, but since 1945, the potential for inflicting enormous harm on a large number of people has increased geometrically.

To those who believe the idea that if we solve poverty it will take care of the problem, I’d remind you that the only country to use nuclear weapons on another is us.

What holds the danger in check is a lack of knowledge, materials and deliverability. But knowledge is getting more widespread, and materials are too.

I don’t know how money attacks this, but I think this should be a top priority, at least for my foundation.

There are six billion people and a few percent are really crazy and they would like to do great harm to a lot of people. And only one has to succeed. I don’t know how many we’ve stopped. It could be state-sponsored or by a terrorist.

As for how our company and stock would do, Berkshire is better positioned than anyone else, but that won’t make much difference.

Munger: I think chances that we won’t have any nuclear attacks over the next 50-60 years is probably zero. But I don’t think there’s anything we can do about it.

Buffett: You can elect leaders who are very aware of the problem and devote efforts to mitigate it. The genie’s out of the bottle, but you’d like to have leaders who focus on this. Both candidates in the 2004 Presidential race agreed that it was the biggest problem we faced.

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

[Q - How can further nuclear proliferation be prevented?]

WB: The great problem of mankind is that the genie is out of the bottle on nuclear weapons. More and more people will know how to do damage. Psychotics will wish ill will. Materials and deliverability is the choke point. People generally associate this risk with terrorists and rogue states. But I regard it as a big threat to the future of mankind. We haven’t made much progress and we should be doing everything to reduce access to materials. We have a proposal to reduce the rationale to have big weapons. The world has 6.5 billion people, and it is very likely that twice the number of people wish ill than when the world had 3 billion. We used to just pick up a stone and throw it at our neighbor, so massive damage was limited. Since 1945, everything in the world has changed except how men think. There’s been exponential growth, and we haven’t gotten rid of the nuts. We live in a dangerous world, and it’s getting more dangerous as we go along. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the odds were probably 50/50. We were lucky. It won’t go away. You would hope we have an administration which will try to figure out how to minimize the risk. It should be paramount to eliminate deaths on a large scale.

CM: Well, you can talk about death on a large scale. The population of Mexico probably had a population decline of 95% as result of European pathogens. It won’t wipe out the species. I hope that cheers you up.

WB: The cockroaches will survive.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 对核袭击概率的看法?

你说得很对:当一类小概率事件近期没有发生时,人们往往低估它;而一旦它刚发生过,人们又会高估它。

关于核问题,你可以很容易地算出来——问题在于你的假设是否正确。如果每年[发生袭击]的概率是 10%,那么未来 50 年内它一次都不发生的概率只有 0.5%。但如果每年的概率只有 1%,那么你平安度过未来 50 年的概率就有 60%。

伯克希尔 2004 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2004

巴菲特:我完全同意,人类最终极的问题是某个国家动用核武器。这总有一天会发生。

几千年前,要是你诅咒邻居遭殃,你就扔块石头;可自 1945 年以来,对大批民众施加巨大伤害的潜力已呈几何级数增长。

对那些相信“只要解决了贫困就能解决这个问题”的人,我要提醒一句:迄今为止唯一对另一个国家使用过核武器的国家,是我们。

目前遏制这种危险的,是知识、材料和投送能力的匮乏。但知识正变得越来越普及,材料也是如此。

我不知道钱要怎么去对付这个问题,但我认为这应当是头等大事,至少对我的基金会而言是这样。

世上有 60 亿人,其中有百分之几是真正的疯子,他们想对很多人造成巨大伤害。而只要有一个得手就够了。我不知道我们已经阻止了多少次。它可能是国家支持的,也可能是恐怖分子干的。

至于我们公司和股票会怎样,伯克希尔比任何人都更有准备,但那也不会有太大区别。

芒格:我认为未来 50 到 60 年里我们一次核袭击都不会发生的概率大概是零。但我不认为我们对此能做什么。

巴菲特:你可以选出一些对这个问题高度警觉、并致力于加以缓解的领导人。精灵已经放出了瓶子,但你总希望有专注于此的领导人。2004 年总统大选的两位候选人都同意,这是我们面临的最大问题。

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

[问 - 如何才能防止核武器进一步扩散?]

巴菲特:人类的大问题在于核武器这个精灵已经跑出了瓶子。会有越来越多的人懂得如何制造破坏。精神错乱者会心怀恶意。材料和投送能力是瓶颈所在。人们通常把这种风险跟恐怖分子和流氓国家联系在一起。但我把它视为对人类未来的一大威胁。我们没取得多少进展,本该不遗余力地减少对材料的获取渠道。我们有一项提案,旨在削弱拥有大型武器的动机。世界有 65 亿人,很可能心怀恶意的人数,是世界只有 30 亿人时的两倍。我们以前不过是捡块石头朝邻居扔过去,所以造成的大规模破坏是有限的。自 1945 年以来,世上一切都变了,唯独人的思维方式没变。一直有指数级的增长,可我们并没有把那些疯子清除掉。我们生活在一个危险的世界里,而且越往后越危险。古巴导弹危机时,几率大概是五五开。我们当时走运了。这种风险不会消失。你只能寄望于有一届政府会努力想办法把风险降到最低。把避免大规模死亡当作头等大事,理应如此。

芒格:嗯,说到大规模死亡。墨西哥的人口很可能因为欧洲人带来的病原体而下降了 95%。它不会让整个物种灭绝。但愿这能让你高兴点儿。

巴菲特:蟑螂会活下来的。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# Opinion on immigration?

[CM: I’m very pleased when the smartest people come [to the U.S.] and almost never pleased when the very bottom of the mental barrel comes in.]

Over the past 200 years, we started with four million people and we now have over 30% of the GDP of the world. We’ve been characterized by lots of immigration. Whether that’s responsible for our success, I don’t know, but I suspect so. I don’t think we’ve been hurt by immigration.

I think Charlie would like to be the admitting officer. It would work pretty well, but it’s not very practical.

BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes · 2004

Buffett: I think illegal immigration is a problem and should be addressed quickly. I don’t think 11 million people should be shipped home. I also think more liberal rules going forward should be enforced.

I don’t think it would have a dramatic effect on the economy if the people here illegally became legal. [I missed this, but I think he said something like costs at businesses that employ illegal immigrants would go up and would be passed along, but the impact would be minor.]

Who’s to say if Charlie and I were born elsewhere that we wouldn’t try to get in, so I’m sympathetic [to the illegal immigrants].

Munger: If you don’t like the results, get used to it. We have never had the will to enforce the immigration laws. What you see is what you’ll continue to get.

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

# 对移民的看法?

[芒格:当最聪明的人来到[美国]时我非常高兴,而当智力垫底的那拨人涌进来时我几乎从不高兴。]

过去 200 年里,我们从 400 万人起步,如今已占世界 GDP 的 30% 以上。我们一向以大量移民为特征。这是不是我们成功的原因,我不知道,但我猜是的。我不认为我们因移民而受到了损害。

我想查理愿意当那个把关的审核官。那大概会运转得相当不错,只是不太现实。

伯克希尔 2004 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2004

巴菲特:我认为非法移民是个问题,应当尽快处理。我不认为应该把 1100 万人遣送回国。我也认为今后应当推行并执行更宽松的规则。

我不认为如果这里的非法移民合法化了,会对经济产生戏剧性的影响。[这段我没听清,但我想他大意是说,雇用非法移民的企业成本会上升、并转嫁出去,但影响会很小。]

谁能说要是查理和我生在别处,就不会想方设法挤进来呢?所以我对[非法移民]是抱同情态度的。

芒格:如果你不喜欢这个结果,那就习惯它吧。我们从来就没有执行移民法的意志。你现在看到的,就是你今后会继续看到的。

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

# Opinion on social security?

I don’t want to do anything to hurt the bottom 10-20% of the population. I’ve seen people who fear for the last years of their lives [that they won’t have enough money].

We’re worrying about a problem in 25 years, that’s a fraction of our current $500 billion trade deficit. We’re spending 4.5% of our GDP on Social Security now; if we have to increase it to 6% in 50 years, this is not a worry.

There are some things we should do, however: means test it, lift the $90,000 cut-off [there are no Social Security taxes above this amount each year] or eliminate it, and increase the retirement age. 2005 is a lot different from 1935 [in terms on longevity].

[CM: That’s the perspective of the Democrat up here, so you might be surprised to hear from the Republican that I think the Republicans are out of their cotton-pickin’ minds to be taking on this issue at this time. The thought that more of our GDP will be going to the elderly over time is not anathema to me.

Social Security is very successful. Apart from disability – a small part – there’s almost no fraud; it’s hard to fake being dead. (Laughter) It rewards work, it’s low cost. It’s one of the most successful government programs ever.

For the current administration, which needs to face down North Korea and Iran, deal with Iraq, etc., to waste political capital on this twaddle.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes · 2005

Buffett: Every society has to decide how to allocate wealth. Starting in 1935, we formally took the idea that the government should provide for the elderly. The government has always been there for young, via schools. Perhaps the idea that 65 isn’t the right age for retirement anymore is correct and more change is needed.

This country has output of nearly $40,000 of GDP per capita. Some people like Charlie and me are wired to earn a lot in our society, but many people aren’t [and they need to be taken care of in their retirement]. Our country can easily handle the Social Security issue. It astounds me that a government running a $300-400 billion deficit now is worried about a $100 billion deficit decades from now. We produce more every year as we go along. There’s always a debate over how to split the pie, but it’s a huge and growing pie so we can take care of older people.

Munger: Of course if we don’t change anything, Social Security will run low on funds. But if we grow, then it’s child’s play to [deal with this problem]. And it’s crazy to think we’d freeze the amount we’d pay to the elderly. Social Security is a low-overhead, efficient program. I wish my own party would wise up on this issue.

Buffett: This is what happens when you ask a couple of old guys about how much to give to the elderly. [Laughter]

Politicians are very happy to talk about the Social Security surplus and trumpet that, but when there’s a deficit decades out, they panic. There’s a lot of hypocrisy.

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

# 对社会保障的看法?

我不想做任何会伤害最底层 10% 到 20% 人口的事。我见过一些人,他们害怕自己生命的最后那些年[钱不够花]。

我们在为 25 年后的一个问题发愁,而它只是我们当前 5000 亿美元贸易逆差的一个零头。我们现在把 GDP 的 4.5% 花在社会保障上;就算 50 年后不得不提高到 6%,也不值得担心。

不过,有些事我们确实该做:进行收入审查、提高或取消 9 万美元的封顶线[每年超过这个数额的部分不缴社会保障税],并提高退休年龄。2005 年和 1935 年[在寿命上]已经大不一样了。

[芒格:那是台上这位民主党人的看法,所以你或许会惊讶地听到台上这位共和党人说:我认为共和党人在这个时候揪着这个议题不放,简直是疯了。随着时间推移,更多的 GDP 会流向老年人,这在我看来并不可恶。

社会保障非常成功。除了伤残这一小部分,几乎没有欺诈;装死可不容易。(笑)它奖励劳动,成本又低。它是有史以来最成功的政府项目之一。

对当前这届政府而言——它需要镇住朝鲜和伊朗、处理伊拉克等等——却把政治资本浪费在这种无聊的废话上。]

伯克希尔 2005 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2005

巴菲特:每个社会都得决定如何分配财富。从 1935 年起,我们正式接受了“政府应当赡养老人”这一理念。而政府向来通过学校在照顾年轻人。也许“65 岁不再是合适的退休年龄”这个看法是对的,需要做更多的改变。

这个国家的人均 GDP 产出接近 4 万美元。像查理和我这样的人,天生就善于在我们这个社会里多挣钱,可很多人并非如此[他们退休后需要有人照顾]。我们国家完全能轻松应对社会保障问题。一个如今背着三四千亿美元赤字的政府,却为几十年后一千亿美元的赤字担忧,这让我很吃惊。我们每年的产出都在增加。关于这块饼怎么分,永远会有争论,但这是一块巨大且不断变大的饼,所以我们养得起老人。

芒格:当然,如果我们什么都不改,社会保障的资金就会见底。但如果我们持续增长,那么[解决这个问题]简直是小儿科。而且,认为我们会冻结付给老人的金额,是很疯狂的。社会保障是个管理费用低、效率高的项目。我真希望我自己所在的党在这个问题上能明智一点。

巴菲特:让两个老头来回答“该给老人多少钱”,结果就是这样。(笑)

政客们很乐意大谈社会保障的盈余、为它大唱赞歌,可一旦几十年后会出现赤字,他们又惊慌失措。这里头有大量的虚伪。

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

# Opinion on public education?

A good public school system is a lot like virginity: easy to preserve, but not to restore. To succeed, well-to-do people need to be involved. I admire the fact that people like John Walton, Bill Gates and Ted Forstmann have gotten involved with this issue.

Next to the nuclear/chemical/biological weapon problem, the #1 problem we face is making sure our educational system is providing a good education to all children – and it’s not. Dealing with the problem is complicated, as there are thousands of school districts and many unions as well.

A big problem is that in many places, the rich have opted out. I imagine that if I used the local golf courses, I’d care a lot about how they were managed and maintained – it’s the same with schools. There’s a two-tiered system right now.

I’m a big believer in public schools.

[CM: I met a guy whose wife teaches 8th grade in the local schools. He told me that, due to requirements of No Child Left Behind, for the numerous students who can’t read, she records the books herself so that these students can listen to the books and follow along in class. This is [the best of] No Child Left Behind in a sense, but it’s also a failure. It’s very hard for a civilization to fix failure when 8th graders can’t read.

It’s a very serious failure that we’ve allowed this to happen.]

Bill Ruane [of Ruane, Cunniff, managers of the Sequoia Fund] has an extraordinary program that teaches kids to read. It’s been going on for 10 years and the kids are enthusiastic.

A major reason for the success of the United States is the equality of opportunities compared to the rest of the world. It’s a bad situation when some kids have great families, caring teachers, good schools, etc., but less advantaged kids have teachers that just push their students through the system, in schools where other students are doing bad things...

This [failure of the educational system] shouldn’t be allowed in a country with almost $40,000 of GDP per capita.

BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes · 2005

# 对公立教育的看法?

一个良好的公立学校体系很像贞操:易于保全,却难以恢复。要成功,富裕阶层必须参与进来。我很钦佩约翰·沃尔顿、比尔·盖茨和泰德·福斯特曼这样的人投身于这个议题。

仅次于核/化学/生物武器问题,我们面临的第一大问题就是确保我们的教育体系为所有孩子提供良好的教育——而它并没有做到。处理这个问题很复杂,因为有成千上万个学区,还有许多工会。

一个大问题是,在很多地方,富人已经选择退出了。我想,假如我去用本地的高尔夫球场,我会非常在意它们是怎么经营和维护的——学校也是一样。眼下是一套双轨制。

我是公立学校的坚定信奉者。

[芒格:我遇到一个人,他妻子在本地学校教八年级。他告诉我,由于《不让一个孩子掉队》法案的要求,对于众多读不了书的学生,她亲自把书录下来,好让这些学生能在课堂上一边听书一边跟着看。从某种意义上说,这是《不让一个孩子掉队》[最好的体现],但它同时也是一种失败。当八年级学生都读不了书时,一个文明要修复这种失败是非常难的。

我们听任这种情况发生,是一个非常严重的失败。]

比尔·鲁安[Ruane, Cunniff 公司的,红杉基金的管理人]有一个非凡的项目,教孩子们读书。这个项目已经办了 10 年,孩子们都热情高涨。

美国成功的一个主要原因,是相对于世界其他地方的机会平等。当有些孩子拥有美满的家庭、用心的老师、好的学校等等,而处境较差的孩子遇到的老师只是把学生糊弄着推过整个体系、在那种别的学生都在干坏事的学校里读书时,这就是一种糟糕的局面……

在一个人均 GDP 接近 4 万美元的国家里,[教育体系的这种失败]是不该被容许的。

伯克希尔 2005 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2005

# Views on the U.S. Current Account Deficit?

We have earned more on American assets owned by people outside this country than the reverse. The net balance flipped in the most recent quarter and I expect this to continue. One reason is that the foreigners owning our Treasury bonds were getting only a little over 1% not long ago, so this was leading to a favorable balance. Now, that’s turning as our interest rates are up. And, over time, it’s going against us.

Now if you consider the magnitude and consequences of our $3 trillion net debtor position, that depends on what the dollar does. Over the past few weeks, the dollar has weakened, which reduces our debt, but could lead to inflation. Overall, [these trends] will not be favorable.

Munger: This is not a field to which I’ve devoted the same attention as Warren, but I do share his general pessimism that there will be a price to pay for the course we’re on. I’ve always thought we could get away with more ruinous behavior than Warren has. We started from such a strong position. It’s not as if the alternatives are all so great. I can understand why people would rather invest in the U.S.

Buffett: Yeah, if you landed from Mars, you’d still rather land in the U.S. than anywhere else.

Munger: Do you want to be in Europe, where 12-13% of people are unemployed and most 28-year-olds are living at home and being paid by state to do it? Or be in Brazil or Venezuela with the political instability that you fear? It’s not totally irrational that people still like the U.S., despite its faults. Whatever misbehavior there is could go on quite a long time without a price being paid.

Buffett: I agree. This is the country that could sustain fiscally irresponsible policies for a long time. We still think this is the best place to be. But I also think there’s a chance for something to suddenly go wrong.

BRK Annual Meeting 2006 Tilson Notes · 2006

# 对美国经常账户赤字的看法?

我们从这个国家以外的人所持有的美国资产上赚到的钱,比反过来(外国人从我们这儿赚到的)要多。这一净差额在最近一个季度发生了反转,我预计这种情况会持续下去。原因之一是,持有我们国债的外国人不久前拿到的利息只有一点点、刚过 1%,所以这带来了有利的差额。而如今随着我们的利率上行,局面正在逆转。长期来看,它会变得对我们不利。

再说,如果你考虑我们 3 万亿美元净债务头寸的规模和后果,那就取决于美元怎么走了。过去几周美元走弱,这降低了我们的债务,但可能引发通胀。总体而言,[这些趋势]不会是有利的。

芒格:在这个领域我投入的关注不像沃伦那么多,但我确实和他一样总体上感到悲观:我们走的这条路终将付出代价。我一直认为,我们能比沃伦所想的、更能侥幸躲过那些更具毁灭性的行为的后果。我们的起点实在太强了。况且,替代选项也并非个个那么美好。我能理解为什么人们宁愿投资美国。

巴菲特:是啊,要是你从火星降落下来,你还是宁愿降落在美国,而不是别的任何地方。

芒格:你愿意待在欧洲吗?那里 12% 到 13% 的人失业,大多数 28 岁的人还住在家里、由国家出钱养着。或者待在巴西、委内瑞拉,去面对你所担心的那种政治动荡?人们至今仍然喜欢美国,尽管它有种种缺点,这并非全无道理。无论这里有什么不当行为,恐怕都还能持续相当长一段时间而不必付出代价。

巴菲特:我同意。这个国家能把财政不负责任的政策维持相当长的时间。我们仍然认为这里是最好的去处。但我也认为,存在某种东西突然出问题的可能性。

伯克希尔 2006 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2006

# What do you think the likelihood is of a major credit contraction?

It occurred during the junk bond crisis in 2002 and for equities in 1974. I don’t think you’ll necessarily see a contraction of credit or the Fed stepping on the brakes. I think you might see an exogenous event, a shock to the system, that causes a huge widening of credit spreads and a cheapening of equities. This would be good for Berkshire because we have money to take advantage of this.

In the past, when credit contracted, there was no money around. We tried to buy a bank in Chicago 30 or 40 years ago and couldn’t borrow at all. The only people willing to lend to us were in Kuwait, and would only lend in dinars. That was real credit contraction. The reason the Fed was established was in response to this. We really needed a system where that would not happen. I think the Fed will not by design produce any credit contraction.

Munger: The last time we had a credit contraction [in the junk bond crisis in late 2002], we made a quick $3-4 billion. The whole investing world is getting more and more competitive. If we had a big credit contraction, it would really gum up the world. If we had this, especially after a period of excess like we’ve had, we’d get legislation that most of us wouldn’t like.

Buffett: Jon Alter, in his book about the Great Depression [The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope], describes how this country was close to the brink and FDR got any law passed he wanted, as soon as he could write them. It was a good thing in this case – banks were closing and people were dealing in scrip.

In 1998, Long Term Capital Management blew up and you had a seize-up of the credit markets that was not orchestrated by the Fed. People panicked about even the safest instruments. This happened not 100 years ago but less than 10 years ago. There were plenty of smart people with a lot of money, but people panicked in part because they saw others panicking.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes. We’ll have something that rhymes.

BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes · 2007

# 你认为发生一次大规模信贷收缩的可能性有多大?

2002 年的垃圾债危机期间发生过一次,1974 年的股市也发生过一次。我不认为你一定会看到信贷收缩、或美联储踩刹车。我倒觉得你可能会看到一个外生事件、一次对体系的冲击,导致信用利差大幅走阔、股票变得便宜。这对伯克希尔是好事,因为我们有钱去把握这种机会。

过去信贷收缩时,市面上根本没钱。三四十年前我们想在芝加哥收购一家银行,结果一分钱都借不到。唯一愿意借给我们的是科威特人,而且只肯借第纳尔。那才是真正的信贷收缩。美联储之所以设立,就是为了应对这种局面。我们确实需要一套能让这种事不再发生的体系。我认为美联储不会有意去制造任何信贷收缩。

芒格:上一次我们遇到信贷收缩[即 2002 年底的垃圾债危机]时,我们很快就赚了三四十亿美元。整个投资世界正变得越来越激烈。如果我们遭遇一次大规模信贷收缩,那会把整个世界搅得一团糟。如果发生这种事,尤其是在像我们经历过的那种过度繁荣之后,我们就会迎来大多数人都不会喜欢的立法。

巴菲特:乔恩·阿尔特在他那本写大萧条的书[《决定性时刻:罗斯福的百日新政与希望的胜利》]里描述了,这个国家当时如何濒临崩溃,而罗斯福想要什么法案就能通过什么法案,一写出来就能获批。在那种情况下这是好事——当时银行纷纷倒闭,人们都在用代用券交易。

1998 年,长期资本管理公司爆雷,信贷市场陷入冻结,而这并不是美联储编排出来的。人们连最安全的工具都惊慌抛售。这不是 100 年前的事,而是不到 10 年前的事。当时有大把聪明人手握大量资金,但人们之所以恐慌,部分原因正是他们看到别人在恐慌。

历史不会重演,但会押韵。我们会遇到某种押韵的东西。

伯克希尔 2007 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2007

# The state of Florida getting into the insurance business?

It’s easy to understand both sides. The average homeowner will not read line by line of an insurance policy and the agent often won’t explain it. So when something goes wrong, the homeowner wants to be paid. It’s worse when tens of thousands of homeowners are affected at the same time. It’s natural for government to step in and expand what an insurance company thought they were covering, which leads insurance companies to pull out.

I can understand the insurance company not wanting to write policies if the words won’t be adhered to, and I can understand the upset homeowner. If I were writing policies, I’d put exclusions in big type, but even so, I’d expect courts and legislatures to extend or even abrogate the terms of the contracts, figuring a guy like me or insurance companies can better afford it vs. the people affected.

When you have people around the country subsidize people who suffer from hurricanes in Florida, that gets very tough. It might become so expensive that they want to socialize it, but the guy in Nebraska says “Why should I subsidize you living in a hurricane path?”

It will really become an issue if you have a $100 or $150 billion loss in Florida. This would lead to a huge increase in taxation in Florida, so the state might call on Washington [the federal government] to pay for it. How much should people who are not exposed to risk send to people who choose to have this risk? I think you’ll see a big struggle over this in the next 10 years.

I can’t tell you with precision what the Florida legislation says, but the state of Florida has gotten more into the business of insuring citizens than it was before.

[Buffett asked Joe Brandon, CEO of Gen Re, to take the microphone and answer the question.]

Brandon: Back in mid-January, the Florida legislature met in a special session and passed legislation that is moving a lot of risk in personal lines. It is having a depressing effect on the insurance industry. There is no free lunch. The state and citizens of Florida are taking a lot of risk. It will work out well if the wind doesn’t blow, but odds are that it will. [According to this summary of the legislation, the state has taken on a $12 billion increase in exposure from $16 billion to $28 billion, with the possibility of an additional $4 billion more.]

Buffett: The real problem will be with a $100 billion insured loss. The state might have to issue $60 billion in bonds and might go to the federal government and say, “It’s not our fault and the entire country should pay.” $100 billion isn’t likely – Hurricane Andrew, inflation adjusted, was $30 billion – but if that storm had come through 20 miles north, it could have been. If this happens, we’ll find out if the whole country has, in effect, been insuring Florida. If the federal government throws it back to Florida, they’d have to issue a lot of bonds and raise taxes.

BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes · 2007

# 佛罗里达州涉足保险业务这件事?

双方的立场都不难理解。普通房主不会逐行去读保单,代理人也常常不会去解释。所以一旦出了事,房主就想拿到赔付。当成千上万的房主同时受影响时,情况就更糟了。政府出面、扩大保险公司原以为自己承保的范围,是很自然的事,而这会导致保险公司退出市场。

我能理解保险公司不愿在条款不被遵守的情况下承保,也能理解房主的不满。要是由我来写保单,我会把除外责任用大号字印出来,但即便如此,我也料到法院和立法机构会去扩大、甚至废除合同的条款,理由是像我这样的人或保险公司比受影响的民众更承受得起。

当你让全国各地的人去补贴佛罗里达州那些遭飓风之苦的人时,那就变得非常棘手了。它可能会贵到大家想把它社会化(共担),可内布拉斯加的那个人会说:“凭什么要我补贴你住在飓风经过的地带?”

如果佛罗里达发生一笔 1000 亿或 1500 亿美元的损失,这真会成为一个大问题。它会导致佛罗里达大幅加税,于是该州可能会求助华盛顿[联邦政府]来买单。那些并未暴露于风险中的人,该向那些选择承担这种风险的人转移多少钱呢?我认为未来 10 年你会看到围绕这一点的一场大博弈。

我没法精确告诉你佛罗里达的立法具体说了什么,但佛罗里达州如今比以前更深地介入了为本州居民承保的业务。

[巴菲特请通用再保险的 CEO 乔·布兰登拿起话筒来回答这个问题。]

布兰登:今年 1 月中旬,佛罗里达州议会召开了一次特别会议,通过了一项立法,把大量个人险业务的风险转移了过来。它正对保险业产生抑制作用。天下没有免费的午餐。佛罗里达州和州民正在承担大量风险。要是不刮风,那就皆大欢喜,但十有八九是会刮的。[根据这份立法摘要,该州把自身风险敞口增加了 120 亿美元,从 160 亿增至 280 亿,还可能再增加 40 亿。]

巴菲特:真正的问题会出在一笔 1000 亿美元的承保损失上。该州可能不得不发行 600 亿美元债券,还可能去找联邦政府说:“这不是我们的错,整个国家都该出钱。”1000 亿美元不太可能——按通胀调整后,安德鲁飓风的损失是 300 亿美元——但要是那场风暴当年从偏北 20 英里处经过,是有可能达到的。一旦发生这种情况,我们就会知道整个国家实际上是不是一直在为佛罗里达兜底。如果联邦政府把皮球踢回给佛罗里达,他们就得发行大量债券并加税。

伯克希尔 2007 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2007

# What's your opinion on global warming? climate change?

Buffett: I believe the odds are good that global warming is serious. There’s enough evidence that it would be foolish to say there’s a 99% chance it isn’t a problem. In this case, you have to build the ark before the rains come. If you have to make a mistake, err on the side of the planet. Build a margin of safety to take care of the only planet we have.

Gen Re writes way less business subject to the effects of global warming than does National Indemnity, which writes super-cat policies. We think much more about whether global warming will produce atmospheric changes that will change the frequency and intensity of major storms. We think the exposure goes up every year, even though we don’t know exactly what goes on in the atmosphere.

The relationship is explosive – global warming could increase expected losses by two, three, four or five times. It’s not something that keeps me up in terms of the financial prospects of Berkshire, but [it’s worth thinking about].

Munger: Carbon dioxide is what plants eat. Generally speaking, it would be more comfortable if the world were a little warmer. It’s not as if a vast flood of people are moving to South Dakota from southern California. [Laughter] It’s not clear that it would be a disaster for all humans, but the dislocations would be hard.

Buffett: You don’t think it would be a problem is the sea level were 15-20 feet higher?

Munger: With enough time, these things can be adjusted to. I don’t think this is likely to be an utter calamity for mankind. You’d have to be a pot-smoking journalism student to think so.

Buffett: We do know that in 2004 and 2005, hurricanes hit with a frequency and intensity that would not be expected looking at the past century. We were spared a far worse scenario by a couple of category 5 hurricanes that didn’t hit the coastline.

I don’t think Katrina is the worst that we’ll see. I don’t know all of the factors that go into hurricanes – there could be 50 variables, but all I know is that it’s likely to get worse. And it would be crazy to write insurance at prices from a few years ago, so it’s a factor for us.

BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes · 2007

# 你对全球变暖怎么看?气候变化呢?

巴菲特:我相信全球变暖很有可能是严重的。证据足够多,要说有 99% 的把握认为它不是个问题,那就太愚蠢了。在这件事上,你得在雨来之前就把方舟造好。如果非要犯错,那就往有利于地球的那一边去犯。建立一道安全边际,去守护我们仅有的这颗星球。

通用再保险承保的、会受全球变暖影响的业务,比承保超级巨灾保单的国民赔偿公司(National Indemnity)要少得多。我们更多考虑的是,全球变暖是否会带来大气变化、从而改变大型风暴的频率和强度。我们认为这一风险敞口每年都在上升,尽管我们并不确切知道大气里到底在发生什么。

这种关系是爆炸性的——全球变暖可能让预期损失增加两倍、三倍、四倍乃至五倍。就伯克希尔的财务前景而言,它不是那种让我夜不能寐的事,但[它值得好好想想]。

芒格:二氧化碳是植物的食物。一般来说,世界要是暖和一点会更舒适。又不是有大批人正从南加州涌向南达科他。(笑)并不能断定它对所有人类都会是一场灾难,但那种错位(流离失所)会很难受。

巴菲特:你不觉得海平面要是高出 15 到 20 英尺会是个问题吗?

芒格:只要有足够的时间,这些事情都能适应过来。我不认为这会成为人类的彻底浩劫。要这么想,你非得是个抽大麻的新闻系学生不可。

巴菲特:我们确实知道,2004 年和 2005 年飓风来袭的频率和强度,是从过去一个世纪来看料想不到的。我们之所以躲过了一个糟糕得多的情形,是因为有几场 5 级飓风没有登陆。

我不认为卡特里娜就是我们将会见到的最糟的。我不了解所有影响飓风的因素——可能有 50 个变量,但我只知道它很可能会变得更糟。而按几年前的价格去承保会很疯狂,所以这对我们是个要考虑的因素。

伯克希尔 2007 年股东大会(Tilson 笔记) · 2007

# What's your opinion on politics, elections, and the political system?

Politics is difficult. Famous line from Bill Buckley about what would you do if elected? ‘I would demand a recount.’ The truth is that you get lots of pandering in the policies that are proposed. The candidates are pretty smart about economics. The political process is something that doesn’t lend itself to Douglas-Lincoln debates on the fine points. I think the current candidates will be better in office than on a soap box. We have a country that works well regardless of who is in office. You want to buy stock in a business that is so good because sooner or later an idiot will run it. I think we have three very good candidates. The motivations of people running are better than their proclamations. You may win a badge for courage, but you won’t win the presidency in Iowa if you’re against ethanol.

CM: When Enron shocked the nation, our politicians passed Sarbanes-Oxley. We are currently shooting at an elephant with a peashooter. I confidently predict we will have changes in regulation, and they won’t work for everybody. Human nature always has incentives to rationalize and misbehave. For this reason, we will have turmoil for as far ahead as you can see. [There will always be something.]

WB: I would gladly pay to have this job. Let’s assume I was campaigning for this job, and if so, my answers might be different. It is a corrupting process, naturally. There is a boom in oil and also in soybeans. Because of increases in food prices, would anyone expect to propose an excess profits tax on farmers? But what about an excess profits tax on Exxon? Situational ethics and policymaking depend a lot on voters. I’m not sure I’d be able to do better, but if I wanted to be President, I’m not sure my behavior wouldn’t be bad too. Any one of the three candidates will do well in the White House. I think they will do what is best for the country.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 你对政治、选举和政治制度怎么看?

搞政治很难。比尔·巴克利有句名言,被问到“当选了你会怎么做?”时,他答:“我会要求重新计票。”事实是,提出的政策里有大量迎合讨好的成分。这些候选人在经济学上都挺精明的。政治这个过程,不适合搞那种针对细枝末节的“道格拉斯—林肯式辩论”。我认为当前这些候选人,上任后会比站在肥皂箱上演讲时表现更好。我们这个国家无论谁在台上都运转良好。你想买一家好到这种程度的企业的股票:因为迟早会有个傻瓜来经营它。我认为我们有三位很不错的候选人。这些参选者的动机,比他们的宣言要好。你或许能赢得一枚勇气勋章,但如果你在艾奥瓦州反对乙醇,你就赢不了总统大选。

芒格:当安然震惊全国时,我们的政客通过了《萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。我们眼下是在拿一把豆枪去打大象。我可以很有把握地预言,监管会有变化,而它们不会对所有人都奏效。人性总有把行为合理化、并行不端的诱因。正因如此,在目力所及的未来我们都会动荡不安。[总会有点什么事的。]

巴菲特:我倒乐意倒贴钱来干这份差事。假设我在竞选这个职位,如果是那样,我的答案也许会不一样。这自然是个腐蚀人的过程。石油在涨,大豆也在涨。因为食品价格上涨,会有人想到提议对农民征收暴利税吗?可对埃克森征收暴利税又如何呢?情境伦理和政策制定,在很大程度上取决于选民。我不确定自己能做得更好,但要是我想当总统,我也不确定自己的行为不会同样变坏。三位候选人中的任何一位入主白宫都会干得不错。我相信他们会做对国家最有利的事。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# Maybe there should be a Buffett/Munger Presidential ticket. Please name three difficult policy decisions and three perfect solutions to better the country.

WB: Charlie will serve the first term, so he’ll answer first.

CM: That takes us so far afield. Three perfect solutions to the problems of mankind, we are not up to it.

WB: I would do something about the tax system. The super rich should pay more. The middle class should pay a little less.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 也许该有一张巴菲特/芒格的总统竞选搭档名单。请说出三个棘手的政策抉择,以及三个能让国家变得更好的完美解决方案。

巴菲特:第一任期由查理来当,所以他先回答。

芒格:这扯得也太远了。要给人类的问题开出三个完美的解决方案,我们可没那个本事。

巴菲特:我会对税收制度动点手。超级富豪应该多缴一些。中产阶级应该少缴一点。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# Can volunteering help the economy? If so, then why aren't people doing it? I stick to my motto if you see something that needs doing, do it.

Volunteering can definitely help the economy. Value is created in many ways and public service is definitely an important one. It is an investment in our society and country. Your attitude will bring positive dividends to not only yourself, but to others around you.

Secret Millionaires Club · 2010

# 做志愿者能帮助经济吗?如果能,那人们为什么不去做?我一直信奉我的座右铭:看到有什么事需要做,就去做。

做志愿者当然能帮助经济。价值的创造有很多种方式,公共服务无疑是重要的一种。它是对我们社会和国家的一种投资。你的态度不仅会给你自己、也会给你周围的人带来正向的回报。

Secret Millionaires Club · 2010

# Should the U.S., and U.S. companies such as Coca-Cola, withdraw sponsorship of the Beijing Olympics because of humanitarian values?

WB: I think the Olympics should be allowed to continue forever with everyone participating. It is hard to grade a couple hundred countries. It is a terrible mistake to try to start grading. The more that participate, the better. I would not start getting punitive. I think it’s a terrible mistake to ban countries from the Olympics. The United States only started allowing women to vote in the 1920s, and I consider that a huge violation of human rights, but we wouldn’t want to be banned from the Olympics for the years prior. I think that over time, China is contributing and getting better.

CM: Warren understates my position. Many are distressed by imperfections in China, so I ask - has China gotten more or less imperfect as the decades have gone by? It is moving in the right direction. That is a good thing, and it is not good to pick the worst thing about a person you don’t like and obsess about it.

WB: You will do better with people you are working with if you nudge them a bit.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 出于人道主义价值观,美国以及像可口可乐这样的美国企业,是否应当撤回对北京奥运会的赞助?

巴菲特:我认为奥运会应当被允许永远办下去,所有国家都参与进来。给两百来个国家打分是很难的。试图开始打分是个糟糕的错误。参与的国家越多越好。我不会动用惩罚手段。我认为把某些国家逐出奥运会是个糟糕的错误。美国直到 1920 年代才开始允许女性投票,我认为那是对人权的巨大侵犯,可我们并不希望因为此前那些年的事就被逐出奥运会。我认为随着时间推移,中国在作贡献、也在变得更好。

芒格:沃伦把我的立场说轻了。很多人为中国的种种不完美而苦恼,那我倒要问——几十年过去,中国是变得更不完美了,还是更不那么不完美了?它在朝正确的方向前进。这是件好事,而盯着一个你不喜欢的人身上最糟糕的那一点、揪住不放,可不是什么好事。

巴菲特:跟你共事的人,你稍微推他们一把,他们会表现得更好。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# Why is it that Americans do not save, and what can we do?

WB: The savings rate has fallen. It may be negative. But the value of the country in real terms increases decade to decade. It’s worth more now than 20 years ago—something good has happened. The propensity to save seems innate in some places. If you own Berkshire, you are saving because we retain earnings and therefore you are net saving—and I have been doing it in Berkshire for 43 years. I don’t know that the savings rate—based on calculations on consumption and imports—is accurate. We are importing $700 billion more of services than we are exporting [per year]. We are exporting claims against America. But we are so rich, it may not be really apparent. Average standards are likely to improve, but it may be disproportionate. In net real terms, the value on a per capita basis will very likely increase decade to decade. But it is nothing compared to China or Korea where the savings rate is very high. We may not save very much because we don’t need to. We are a very rich country, and we may not need to save as much as other countries trying to reach their potential.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 为什么美国人不储蓄?我们能做些什么?

巴菲特:储蓄率下降了,甚至可能为负。但这个国家以实际价值计的财富,仍是一个十年比一个十年增加。它现在比 20 年前更值钱了——好事确实发生了。储蓄的倾向在某些地方似乎是与生俱来的。如果你持有伯克希尔,你就是在储蓄,因为我们留存盈余,因此你是在净储蓄——而我在伯克希尔已经这么干了 43 年。我说不准储蓄率——基于消费和进口的计算——是否准确。我们进口的服务比出口的多 7000 亿美元[每年]。我们出口的是对美国的索取权。但我们太富了,这一点也许不那么显眼。平均生活水准很可能会改善,但可能并不均衡。以实际净值的人均口径来算,价值很可能一个十年比一个十年增加。但跟中国或韩国比起来这不算什么,那里储蓄率非常高。我们之所以可能存得不多,是因为我们不需要。我们是个非常富裕的国家,也许不需要像那些正努力发挥自身潜能的国家那样存那么多。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# What is the future of mass transit?

WB: Passenger traffic? [Yes.] The American public generally doesn’t like mass transit. Americans have a love affair with their car, which translates into an aversion to mass transit. One person to a car seems to be a popular method for moving around. We are unlikely to see expansion in mass transit. The American public is genetically averse to mass transit. It seems to be human nature that people want to drive even if they have to pay $4 a gallon on gas and double on parking. I wouldn’t be optimistic about something that has a long trend in human nature to reverse all of the sudden.

CM: You have a more optimistic view of it than I have.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# 公共交通的未来如何?

巴菲特:你是说客运吗?[是的。]美国公众普遍不喜欢公共交通。美国人对自己的汽车爱得深沉,这转化成了对公共交通的反感。一人一车似乎是大家偏爱的出行方式。我们不太可能看到公共交通的扩张。美国公众从基因上就排斥公共交通。人们就算每加仑油得花 4 美元、停车费翻倍,也还是想自己开车,这似乎是人之天性。对于一件在人性中有着长期趋势的事,我可不会乐观地指望它会突然逆转。

芒格:你对它比我乐观。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# Is there a chance the CDS [Credit Default Swap] market may eclipse subprime?

WB: The CDS notional value is about $60 trillion. There is lots of double counting, etc, but no doubt it is a lot of money. They are swaps, or insurance against companies going bankrupt. We have written two types of derivatives, and we have insured a swap that pays to someone else in the event of a default on high yield indices. I think we will make significant money. I think there is no question that the corporate default rate will rise. That has been included in the price in writing this insurance. Will the CDS market lead to chaos? Probably not, but if Bear [Stearns] had failed, you would have had chaotic conditions. A CDS is a payment by one party to another. When someone loses money on a loan, they’ve lost real money, but there is not a swap of dollars immediately when the loan goes bad. In a CDS, there is an exchange of cash. Whether the counterparties fail [on a massive scale]—I don’t think it will happen. We’ve had enormous collateral payments from one firm to another in this recent crisis. Fairfax Financial made $1 billion in CDS’s. This means another guy lost $1 billion. They have been the most volatile of instruments and it really hasn’t created a problem in the system. If the Fed must step in, I don’t think it will be due to CDS’s. It may cause big losses, but it will be matched by big gains by others. There is a problem of an overnight disruption in the system [i.e. Bear, nuclear bomb]—where discontinuity and collateral posings are inadequate. At that time, large CDS exposure could exacerbate chaos to a considerable degree.

CM: Could we have a mess in CDS’s? Yes, but the stupidity is not as bad as sweeping bums off skid row to give them houses. There is an issue of insuring against the outcome of losing money on a $100 million bond issue when you have $3 billion worth of contracts on that $100 million bond issue—there are incentives to manipulate the smaller loss to make a big collection on the larger position. It used to be illegal to buy life insurance on people you didn’t know, with big payoffs in the event of their death. Why did we want enormous bets to be made in unregulated markets? We have a major nutcase bunch of regulators and proprietors in this field.

WB: Charlie 1 point, Invisible Hand 0 points.

BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes · 2008

# CDS[信用违约互换]市场有没有可能让次贷问题相形见绌?

巴菲特:CDS 的名义价值约为 60 万亿美元。这里头有大量重复计算等等,但毫无疑问是一大笔钱。它们是互换,也就是为公司破产投的保。我们写过两类衍生品,其中我们承保了一种互换:当高收益指数发生违约时由我们向对方赔付。我认为我们会从中赚到可观的钱。我认为企业违约率上升是毫无疑问的。我们在写这份保险时,已经把这一点计入了价格。CDS 市场会引发混乱吗?大概不会,但要是贝尔斯登倒了,那就会出现混乱的局面。CDS 是一方向另一方的支付。当有人在一笔贷款上亏了钱,他亏的是真金白银,但贷款变坏时并不会立刻发生美元的互换。而在 CDS 里,是有现金交换的。交易对手会不会[大规模]违约——我不认为会发生。在最近这场危机中,公司之间已经发生了巨额的抵押品支付。Fairfax Financial 在 CDS 上赚了 10 亿美元。这意味着另一个家伙亏了 10 亿美元。它们一直是最易波动的工具,可它并没有真正在体系里制造出问题。如果美联储非得出手,我不认为会是因为 CDS。它可能造成大额亏损,但会被其他人的大额盈利所抵消。问题在于体系中的隔夜性中断[比如贝尔斯登、核弹]——这时会出现不连续,抵押品的追加也来不及。在那种时刻,巨大的 CDS 敞口可能在相当程度上加剧混乱。

芒格:CDS 会不会闹出乱子?会,但这种愚蠢还不至于像把贫民窟里的流浪汉一扫而光、给他们发房子那么糟。这里有个问题:当你为一笔 1 亿美元的债券发行投保、防它亏钱,可你手里却握着针对这 1 亿美元债券的 30 亿美元合约时——你就有动机去操纵那笔较小的损失,好在较大的头寸上大捞一笔。从前,给你不认识的人买人寿保险、并在其死亡时获得巨额赔付,是违法的。我们为什么要让人们在不受监管的市场里下如此巨大的赌注呢?这个领域的监管者和从业者里有一帮十足的疯子。

巴菲特:查理得 1 分,看不见的手得 0 分。

伯克希尔 2008 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2008

# How do you envision a nationalized healthcare system, and how it would affect Berkshire’s portfolio?

Munger: Something more like Europe, supplemented by a private system, like private schools [compete with public schools], will probably come to the U.S. in due course. I’m a Republican, but I’m not personally horrified by that. I wish they’d put it off for a year to solve other economic problems.

Buffett: Berkshire will adjust. It would pose no specific problems and specific opportunities.

BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes · 2009

# 你设想中的国有化医疗体系是怎样的?它又会如何影响伯克希尔的投资组合?

芒格:某种更接近欧洲、再辅以私营体系(就像私立学校[与公立学校竞争]那样)的模式,很可能在适当的时候会来到美国。我是个共和党人,但我个人对此并不感到恐惧。我倒希望他们把这事推迟一年,先去解决别的经济问题。

巴菲特:伯克希尔会适应。它既不会带来什么特别的问题,也不会带来什么特别的机会。

伯克希尔 2009 年股东大会(Bruni 笔记) · 2009

# Would the government’s stimulus spending be better spent acquiring national infrastructure, as during the Great Depression, in order to put people to work?

Munger: Let me answer that one: Yes. [laughter]

Buffett: I certainly agree. A lot of wonderful things were done in the Great Depression. The 1930s should be the goal and model. Obviously, we want to use it intelligently. The intent is to get it into action quickly. Any time the federal government does something on a massive scale, there’s going to be a lot of slop. We have a [political] system that doesn’t detach the interest of individual legislators [leading to pork-barrel spending]. I am distressed when I look at what is attached to the bill. When the American public pulls back, government has to step in. There will be consequences [of the stimulus program].

Munger: One no brainer: Nationwide, we need a hugely improved electrical grid. That will help Berkshire subsidiaries, but we don’t depend on it. The chance that it won’t help us is zero.

BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes · 2009

# 政府的刺激性支出,是否更应像大萧条时期那样,用来购置国家基础设施,从而让人们有活儿干?

芒格:让我来回答这个:是的。(笑)

巴菲特:我当然同意。大萧条期间做了很多了不起的事。1930 年代应当成为我们的目标和样板。当然,我们要明智地加以运用。本意是要让它迅速付诸行动。每当联邦政府大规模地做事时,总会有大量的浪费和走样。我们这套[政治]体制并不能把单个议员的私利剥离出去[于是导致了分肥式拨款]。看到这项法案上附加的那些东西,我感到很沮丧。当美国公众收缩时,政府就不得不顶上去。这[刺激计划]会有后果的。

芒格:有一件想都不用想的事:在全国范围内,我们需要一张大幅升级的电网。那会让伯克希尔的子公司受益,但我们并不依赖于它。它帮不到我们的概率是零。

伯克希尔 2009 年股东大会(Bruni 笔记) · 2009

# Will retail, manufacturing and service businesses still be below their 2007 levels three years from now, given how they have been affected by the recession?

Buffett: I don’t know. If housing starts [remain] at 500,000, we’ll get [housing market] equilibrium in two years or less. The government is now unhappy that people are saving. Retailing has been hit very hard. The higher end has been the hardest hit — it will last quite a bit longer. The experience of the last couple of years will not go away [be forgotten]. Retail real estate will be a tough area for quite a while. Shopping centers will be tough for years. Cap rates of 5% will look pretty silly. Service businesses are generally the better ones, because they require less capital and can be more specialized. I would not look for a quick rebound. South Florida will be a problem for a long, long time.

Munger: I have nothing to add.

[Comment: A “cap rate” is essentially the reciprocal of a price/earnings ratio, so a cap rate of 5% corresponds to a P/E of 20, which would be a rich valuation for the stock market.]

BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes · 2009

# 考虑到零售、制造和服务业受衰退影响的程度,三年后它们是否仍会低于 2007 年的水平?

巴菲特:我不知道。如果新屋开工量[保持]在 50 万套,我们会在两年或更短的时间内迎来[住房市场的]均衡。政府现在为人们储蓄而不高兴。零售业受到了非常沉重的打击。高端市场受创最重——这会持续相当长一段时间。过去这一两年的经历不会消失[被遗忘]。零售地产在相当长一段时间里都会是个艰难的领域。购物中心会难受好几年。5% 的资本化率(cap rate)会显得相当可笑。服务型生意一般要更好些,因为它们所需资本更少、也能更专业化。我不会指望快速反弹。南佛罗里达会成为一个长期、长期的问题。

芒格:我没什么要补充的。

[注:“资本化率”本质上是市盈率的倒数,所以 5% 的资本化率对应 20 倍市盈率,对股市来说这会是一个偏高的估值。]

伯克希尔 2009 年股东大会(Bruni 笔记) · 2009

# What problems do you see in the world economy?

Buffett: There’s always a lot of things wrong in the world; unfortunately, it’s the only world we’ve got. We have a great system that works very well. Over time, people will live better and better. Our system unleashes human potential like no other—we haven’t reached the end of that road by a long shot. We have these interruptions in the progress of society, but we have moved ahead pretty fast. We’ve wasted human potential in fits and starts. There will be bad years in capitalism, but in the 20th century there’s been a seven-to-one improvement in the standard of living. There is enormous human potential, and the opportunities will win in the end. Every year we meet you can name a bunch of problems. Your children and grandchildren will live better than you do.

Munger: Interestingly, now as I get closer to death, I grow more cheerful economically. I especially like that we are about to harness the direct energy of the sun and [to get drinkable water from] seawater. It’s probably a mistake to think only about your probable misfortunes. You should think about your blessings as well. The main technical problem of man is about to be fixed — energy.

[Q - A shareholder from Dayton, Ohio referred to Buffett’s op-ed piece in The New York Times, wherein Buffett said he was moving toward a 100% investment in U.S. stocks, and asked him to comment on the relative severity of the current downturn.]

Buffett: Stocks got much cheaper in 1974, about four times earnings, than now, but interest rates were far higher, so maybe they were not really cheaper. It’s not as dramatic as in 1974 in terms of buying opportunities—that was the best period I’ve seen. I bought some equities and bonds, too. I like when things get cheap, as long as the value’s in the business. I’d much rather pay half of X than X.

Munger: It’s nothing like 1973 – 74. I knew at the time that was my time [to invest], but I had no money—but that’s part of the way it happens. 1974 was obvious. If I were you, I wouldn’t try to wait for 1973 – 74 [conditions].

Buffett: What I paid yesterday doesn’t matter. Picking bottoms is not our game— that’s impossible. I spend 99% of my time thinking about Berkshire [not my separate money]. We had the chance to buy great corporate bonds. Our idea is not to tiptoe into anything.

Munger: Sometimes opportunities are under shell A when [you’re] looking under shell B.

BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes · 2009

# 你看到世界经济中存在哪些问题?

巴菲特:这世界上总有许多不对劲的地方;可惜,这是我们仅有的世界。我们有一套运转得非常好的伟大制度。随着时间推移,人们会过得越来越好。我们这套制度释放人的潜能,是其他任何制度都比不上的——而我们离这条路的尽头还差得远。社会的前进中会有这样那样的中断,但我们前进的速度相当快。我们曾在断断续续中浪费过人的潜能。资本主义会有不好的年份,但 20 世纪生活水平提高了 7 倍。人的潜能是巨大的,机会终将胜出。每年我们见面,你都能数出一堆问题来。你们的子孙会比你们过得更好。

芒格:有意思的是,如今我越接近死亡,在经济上反倒越发乐观。我尤其欣喜于我们即将驾驭太阳的直接能量、并[从海水中获得饮用水]。只想着自己可能遭遇的不幸,大概是个错误。你也该想想自己拥有的种种福分。人类最主要的技术难题——能源——即将被解决。

[问 - 一位来自俄亥俄州代顿的股东提到巴菲特在《纽约时报》上的专栏文章,文中巴菲特说他正转向 100% 投资美股,请他评价一下当前低迷的相对严重程度。]

巴菲特:1974 年股票比现在便宜得多,大约 4 倍市盈率,但那时利率高得多,所以也许它们并没有真的更便宜。就买入机会而言,眼下不像 1974 年那么戏剧化——那是我所见过的最好的时期。我当时既买了一些股票,也买了一些债券。我喜欢东西变便宜,只要价值还在企业本身。我宁愿付半个 X,也不愿付一个 X。

芒格:现在跟 1973 至 1974 年完全不能比。当时我就知道那是属于我的[投资]时机,可我没钱——但这本就是事情发生的一种方式。1974 年是显而易见的好机会。要是我处在你的位置,我不会去等 1973 至 1974 年[那样的条件]。

巴菲特:我昨天付了多少,无关紧要。抄底不是我们的游戏——那是不可能的。我 99% 的时间都花在思考伯克希尔上[而不是我个人那点钱]。我们当时有机会买到很棒的公司债。我们的做法不是蹑手蹑脚地试探着进场。

芒格:有时候机会藏在 A 壳底下,可[你却]在 B 壳底下找。

伯克希尔 2009 年股东大会(Bruni 笔记) · 2009

# Financial reform - what are the good ideas, and what are the bad ideas?

WB: The bill in Congress is 1550 pages. Charlie you take first 1500 pages... I’ll take the last 50.

CM: My guess is most of the Senators have not read the bill and everyone is in doubt about what is going to happen. One thing is perfectly clear, our governmental system which regulates banks and investment banks, was too permissive. Every big bank was going to go blooey. A system so important with this risk should be changed. People are thinking about that. Banks hate losing investment flexibility. JP Morgan would hate to give up the biggest derivative book in the world. However, so much derivative exposure may not be good for the country.

If he were the benevolent despot of the country he would make Volcker look like a “sissy.” He would reduce the activities of banks that are permitted. We need a new version of the Glass-Steagall Act that limits what commercial and investment banks are allowed to do. They need to be much safer businesses. Then Charlie gave an example of an S&L he was familiar with. As long as the repertoire was limited, the S&Ls were ok. But when people have unlimited credit like under the repo system, they are bound to go “plum crazy.”

WB: What would you vote today?

CM: I don’t think anybody knows what’s going to happen. I don’t know enough about it. If I was the benevolent despot of America, I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy. I would reduce the activities permitted if you used the government guarantee. If you are defacto using government money to make a business run, then you should not have a structure so complex that even the partners in the business don’t understand the balance sheet. The complexity in the system is ridiculous and counterproductive. We need a new version of Glass-Steagall that drastically limits what both commercial and investment banks are allowed to do. When we owned a savings and loan, we had a restricted repertoire. We had government [deposits], and we were limited. If you give human beings too much freedom, especially in the repo system, they will go plumb crazy, and of course they did.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 金融改革——哪些是好主意,哪些是坏主意?

巴菲特:国会里那项法案有 1550 页。查理你看前 1500 页……我来看最后那 50 页。

芒格:我猜大多数参议员都没读过这份法案,每个人都拿不准接下来会发生什么。有一点再清楚不过:我们这套监管银行和投行的政府体系,过去太宽松了。每家大银行都曾濒临爆雷。一个如此重要、又带着这种风险的体系,理应被改变。人们正在思考这件事。银行讨厌失去投资上的灵活性。摩根大通会很不情愿放弃全世界最大的那本衍生品账册。然而,如此巨大的衍生品敞口对国家未必是好事。

如果他是这个国家仁慈的独裁者,他会让沃尔克显得像个“胆小鬼”。他会削减银行被允许从事的活动。我们需要一部新版的《格拉斯—斯蒂格尔法案》,限制商业银行和投资银行被允许做的事。它们需要成为安全得多的生意。随后查理举了一个他熟悉的储贷机构(S&L)的例子。只要业务范围有限,储贷机构就没问题。可一旦人们像在回购体系下那样拥有无限的信贷,他们就注定会“彻底疯掉”。

巴菲特:今天让你来投票,你会怎么投?

芒格:我不认为有谁知道接下来会发生什么。我对它了解得还不够多。如果我是美国仁慈的独裁者,我会让保罗·沃尔克显得像个胆小鬼。我会削减那些动用了政府担保的机构被允许从事的活动。如果你实际上是在用政府的钱让一门生意运转,那你就不该拥有一个连生意合伙人自己都看不懂资产负债表的、复杂到那种程度的架构。这套体系的复杂性荒唐可笑、适得其反。我们需要一部新版的《格拉斯—斯蒂格尔法案》,大幅限制商业银行和投资银行各自被允许做的事。当年我们拥有一家储贷机构时,业务范围是受限的。我们有政府[存款],也受到限制。如果你给人太多自由,尤其是在回购体系里,他们就会彻底疯掉,而他们当然真就疯了。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# The leading cause of death among young people is car crashes. BRK insures many of these crashes. New technology is helping give people feedback on their driving. How are GEICO and the Gates Foundation positioned to help save lives and improve this technology?

Buffett: The Gates Foundation has a large initiative on cigarette smoking, which is probably a lot more serious that car crashes. The Gates Foundation can’t solve all the problems in the world. Deaths/mile have diminished over the years as cars have become safer (not due to cell phones and Blackberries of course, technologies that are leading to more deaths). Everyone has an interest in bringing down deaths and GEICO has a large safety program. Auto companies are working to make cars safer as well.

Munger: Nothing to add

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 年轻人死亡的首要原因是车祸。伯克希尔为许多这类车祸提供保险。新技术正帮助人们获得关于自身驾驶行为的反馈。GEICO 和盖茨基金会处于怎样的位置,能帮助挽救生命并改进这项技术?

巴菲特:盖茨基金会有一项针对吸烟的大型计划,吸烟可能比车祸严重得多。盖茨基金会没法解决世界上所有的问题。随着汽车变得更安全,每英里行驶的死亡人数这些年来一直在下降(当然不是拜手机和黑莓所赐,这些技术正导致更多死亡)。每个人都有降低死亡人数的利益所在,GEICO 也有一项大型安全计划。汽车厂商同样在努力让汽车更安全。

芒格:没什么要补充的。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# What is biggest challenge facing the US economy – what are implications of that for investing globally over next decade?

WB: Charlie? [laughter]

CM: Thank you for that easy problem. We haven’t made our way in life with great global allocation systems. Berkshire’s attitude is to concentrate on what we know, find things that seem sensible to us and let everything else fluctuate as they will. We do prefer to do more in responsible countries. More responsible countries make us more comfortable. We don’t have global allocation system at Berkshire unless WB is hiding it from me.

WB: Not that one. [laughter]

WB: We aren’t moving BNSF to China... A nuclear or biological event is pretty high probability over next 50 yrs. We have made remarkable progress in USA – it is a system that unleashes human potential. This crowd is not smarter than 200 yrs ago, and don’t work harder, but boy do they live differently. System allows ordinary people to do extraordinary things over time. We don’t know our own potential -- just like guys in 1790 hoping for better farm tools. We hope rest of world does well, it is not zero sum. If China and India do better, we don’t necessarily do worse. I would be perfectly content to limit investments to US alone. But I’d rather have the whole world. Opportunities will be ample. I would not run from the United States.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 美国经济面临的最大挑战是什么——它对未来十年的全球投资有何启示?

巴菲特:查理?(笑)

芒格:谢谢你出了这么个简单的问题。我们这辈子可不是靠什么了不起的全球配置系统混出来的。伯克希尔的态度是专注于我们懂的东西,找出在我们看来合情合理的标的,至于其余一切就任它们随波逐流去吧。我们确实更愿意在负责任的国家多做一些。越负责任的国家越让我们安心。伯克希尔并没有什么全球配置系统,除非沃伦把它藏起来没告诉我。

巴菲特:没有那玩意儿。(笑)

巴菲特:我们不会把 BNSF(伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路)搬到中国去……未来 50 年内发生一次核或生物事件的概率相当高。我们在美国取得了非凡的进步——这是一套释放人类潜能的制度。这群人并不比 200 年前的人更聪明,也没更卖力,可天哪,他们的生活方式完全不同了。随着时间推移,这套制度让普通人能做出非凡的事。我们并不了解自己的潜能——就像 1790 年那些盼着有更好的农具的人一样。我们希望世界其他地方过得好,这不是零和游戏。如果中国和印度过得更好,我们未必就过得更差。把投资仅限于美国,我也会十分满足。但我更愿意拥有整个世界。机会会很充足。我不会从美国逃离。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# We need hope and jobs. Can you help?

WB: We will hire people when we have something for them to do. When BNSF carrying 173,000 loads per week (vs 150k before), we need more people. In our carpet business we are still down 6,000 from peak, but there is no reason to hire people if you have nothing for them to do. Get someone in textile mill who is 55 yrs old, they speak Portuguese – it is hard to retrain them. If you believe in creative destruction, you better have a social safety net. We have a pretty good one in this country, a lot better than 30 yrs ago. It isn’t going to go away. Society owes some minimal living standard to people looking for work. But I don’t think Berkshire Hathaway should be the social safety net.

CM: If Berkshire tried to hire make-work jobs to raise hope, the net effect over time would be to reduce hope.

WB: I believe the same, but rather Charlie say it.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 我们需要希望和工作。你能帮忙吗?

巴菲特:当我们有活儿给人们干的时候,我们就会招人。当 BNSF 每周运送 17.3 万车货物(之前是 15 万)时,我们就需要更多的人。我们的地毯业务如今仍比峰值少了 6000 人,但如果你没活儿给人干,就没理由招人。找一个 55 岁、在纺织厂干活、说葡萄牙语的人——你很难给他重新培训。如果你信奉创造性破坏,那你最好有一张社会安全网。我们这个国家有一张相当不错的安全网,比 30 年前好多了。它不会消失。社会对那些找工作的人,欠他们某种最低限度的生活水准。但我不认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦该去充当那张社会安全网。

芒格:如果伯克希尔为了点燃希望去硬造一些“做做样子”的岗位,那随着时间推移,净效果反而会削减希望。

巴菲特:我也这么认为,不过还是让查理来说吧。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# This was an opportunity, but in thick of the action, I was too scared. Given that we are not out of the woods yet in terms of the economy and the financial system, how would you assess the current buying opportunity for stocks?

Buffett: He has seen some times when undervaluation screamed at him and when overvaluation screamed at him. For the most part he believes that we have been somewhere in between. Right now we are somewhere in between and it is not the best time he has seen.

In terms of being scared during the depths of the market lows, if you can’t handle the ups and downs and have the right temperament then you won’t make much money in the investing business. People are focused on the pricing and quotes for stocks on a daily basis. But you wouldn’t buy a farm and think about what it was worth on a day to day business. Ben Graham wrote about the importance of temperament years ago and everything he said still applies. Most people don’t have the temperament to handle the ups and downs in the market. People who own a farm don’t think that the market and the price is “telling” them something. What counts is buying a business at a great price and forgetting about it for a long time.

Munger: Said he developed more courage when he learned he could handle hardship. Maybe people should get their feet wet with more failure.

Buffett: How liquid is my farm? I’m not expecting prices to tell me what to do. There is a lot of interest in investing. What counts is buying a good business at a decent price and forgetting about it for a long, long time.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Claremon Notes · 2010

# 那本是个机会,可在风口浪尖上我太害怕了。鉴于我们在经济和金融体系方面尚未走出困境,你会如何评估当前买入股票的机会?

巴菲特:他经历过这样的时候——有时低估对他大声呼喊,有时高估对他大声呼喊。但他认为大多数时候我们都处在两者之间的某个位置。眼下我们就处在两者之间的某个位置,并不是他所见过的最好时机。

至于在市场低谷最深处的恐惧,如果你受不了起起落落、没有那种合适的性情,那你在投资这行就赚不到多少钱。人们盯着股票每天的定价和报价。可你买下一座农场后,是不会去想它一天天值多少钱的。本·格雷厄姆多年前就写过性情的重要性,他所说的一切至今仍然适用。大多数人没有那种能扛住市场起落的性情。拥有农场的人不会觉得市场和价格在“告诉”他们什么。真正重要的,是以很好的价格买下一门生意,然后在很长一段时间里把它忘掉。

芒格:(他说)当他明白自己扛得住艰难时,就生出了更多的勇气。也许人们应该靠多经历一些失败来淌淌水、试试身手。

巴菲特:我的农场流动性如何?我可不指望价格来告诉我该怎么做。如今人们对投资有很大的兴趣。真正重要的,是以像样的价格买下一门好生意,然后在很长很长一段时间里把它忘掉。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Claremon 笔记) · 2010

# Is there a way to create synergies between BRK companies to promote solar solutions?

CM: Solar solutions are coming because they are so obviously needed. I never pass on an opportunity to not put them in, because they will get cheaper.

WB: That’s long term thinking!

CM: I have to think of long term. And I am going to miss you terribly when you’re gone. It reminds me of the old quote, Husband: “Will you still love me if I lost all my money?” Wife: “I will always love you but I will miss you terribly.” What would modern civilization do if we had no alternative to fossil fuels? Cities are choking on themselves. More renewable energy is the answer. It is a stunningly stupid idea to grow corn with fossil water and fossil fuel. I am enormously optimistic about the new energy grid, and we will be way better for it. It is not all that important if solar power costs twice as much as we are used to – it is a blip in the economic future. Immediate business decisions, frequently the right answer is counterintuitive. Wait, they will get cheaper.

WB: I have nothing to add. [laughter]

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 有没有办法在伯克希尔旗下各公司之间创造协同效应,来推广太阳能解决方案?

芒格:太阳能解决方案正在到来,因为对它的需求实在太明显了。我从不放过任何一个“不去安装它”的机会,因为它们会变得更便宜。

巴菲特:这可是长远思维!

芒格:我不得不从长远着想。等你走了,我会非常想念你。这让我想起那句老话,丈夫问:“要是我把钱全亏光了,你还会爱我吗?”妻子答:“我会永远爱你,但我会非常想念你。”如果我们没有化石燃料的替代品,现代文明该怎么办?城市正被自己(的污染)噎死。更多可再生能源才是答案。用化石水和化石燃料去种玉米,是个蠢得惊人的主意。我对新的能源电网极为乐观,我们会因它过得好得多。太阳能就算贵到我们习以为常价格的两倍,也并不那么要紧——在经济的长远未来里这只是一个小波折。在眼下的商业决策中,正确答案常常是反直觉的。等等看吧,它们会变得更便宜。

巴菲特:我没什么要补充的。(笑)

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# Rail business – does our country need high speed passenger rail? Private or public?

WB: By its nature, it is non-economic when competing with auto and air. We don’t have point to point density to produce economic return. If it gets done, unless heavily subsidized, it won’t meet test for private economics.

CM: I know little, but I am at least as dubious as you are. It would be competing with a system that works. The cost of a high speed rail in a densely populated place is enormous – a bottomless pit of cost and trouble in LA.

WB: If it is high speed, it can’t stop very often. It can’t spoke easily. They are considering a trolley system in Omaha – it will cost several hundred million dollars, and revenues are something like $400k, not including operating expenses. The math gets to be staggering. Money is from federal government so costs are shared, and it was done in Buffalo – and costs are huge – it would be cheaper for society as a whole to give everyone a cab ride. It is tough in a country of 3mil square miles. It is hard to make math work. If it becomes a huge project of government, then maybe it will work. But it won’t happen with money that wants a return.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 铁路业务——我们国家需要高速客运铁路吗?是私营还是公营?

巴菲特:就其本质而言,在与汽车和飞机竞争时它是不经济的。我们没有那种点对点的密度来产生经济回报。如果它真要建成,除非有大量补贴,否则它通不过私营经济的检验。

芒格:我了解得不多,但我至少和你一样心存疑虑。它将要与一套运转良好的体系竞争。在人口稠密之地修高铁的成本极其高昂——在洛杉矶那简直是个填不满的成本和麻烦的无底洞。

巴菲特:如果它是高速的,就不能太频繁地停靠。它没法轻易地像辐条那样四处延伸。他们正在考虑在奥马哈搞一套有轨电车系统——它将耗资好几亿美元,而收入大约只有 40 万美元,这还没算运营开支。这笔账算起来令人咋舌。钱来自联邦政府,所以成本是分摊的,布法罗也搞过一次——成本巨大——对整个社会来说,给每个人叫一趟出租车都还更便宜。在一个有 300 万平方英里的国家里,这很难办。这笔账很难算得通。如果它成了政府的一项浩大工程,那也许行得通。但靠着那些想要回报的钱,它是搞不成的。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# What would be impact on portfolio of a Chilean size earthquake in LA or SFO?

WB: Fire following SFO quake was major cause of damage. In the industry they call it shake and bake – how much shake and how much bake? We think hard to get over $100bil. Big quakes in Pacific Northwest – possibility of high quake, new Madrid Missouri was well over 8 scale. I tend to think, when I think about quake exposure, I think $100bil. Northbridge caused more damage than San Francisco. Berkshire is totally prepared. I think in terms of $250bil worst case. And my guess is that Berkshire would still have positive earnings of some substantial amount in that case.

CM: A lot of fire in SFO in 1906 caused the damage, a lot of damage in an earthquake is uninsured. Earthquake insurance is not universal like fire insurance. Recent quakes didn’t cause much fire. Fire or wind catch people worse than earthquakes. Chile I think 40% of cost was tsunami, and 60% quake.

WB: We have so much earning power outside insurance business. We have 3-4% of all earthquake insurance on $250bil, or $10bil dollars, and our pretax earnings are more than that. Everyone else gasping, and we’ll be okay.

BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes · 2010

# 如果洛杉矶或旧金山发生一场智利那样规模的地震,会对投资组合产生什么影响?

巴菲特:旧金山地震后的火灾是损失的主因。在这个行业里他们管它叫“震加烤”——震有多厉害、烤又有多厉害?我们认为很难超过 1000 亿美元。太平洋西北地区的大地震——高震级的可能性,密苏里州新马德里那次远超 8 级。每当我想到地震敞口时,我倾向于想成 1000 亿美元。北岭地震造成的损失比旧金山那次还大。伯克希尔已做好万全准备。我会按 2500 亿美元的最坏情况来考虑。我猜即便在那种情况下,伯克希尔仍会有相当可观的正盈利。

芒格:1906 年旧金山的大量火灾才是损失的成因,地震中很大一部分损失是没有投保的。地震险不像火险那样普及。最近的几次地震没引起多少火灾。比起地震,火灾或大风对人们的打击更狠。智利那次我想 40% 的损失来自海啸,60% 来自地震。

巴菲特:我们在保险业务之外有如此庞大的盈利能力。在那 2500 亿美元(地震险总盘子)里我们承保了 3% 到 4%,也就是 100 亿美元,而我们的税前盈利比这还多。在别人都喘不过气的时候,我们会安然无恙。

伯克希尔 2010 年股东大会(Boodell 笔记) · 2010

# How do you hope to tackle administrative costs when it comes to Aids treatment in Africa?

Bill and Melinda Gates can tackle these issues better then I can. I work on giving them more money so they can have more to work with. I am better suited to raising the capital, letting others do the work they are good at. We can do a lot more with private charities than the government can. We judge our success on how intelligently we attack a problem rather than on success or failure. Bill Gates regards every human life as valuable; we in the US need the help much less then other countries do.

Student Visit 2007 · January 2007

# 在非洲的艾滋病治疗问题上,你打算如何应对行政成本?

比尔和梅琳达·盖茨处理这些问题比我在行。我所做的是给他们筹更多的钱,好让他们有更多资源可用。我更适合去筹集资本,让别人去做他们擅长的事。我们靠私人慈善能做的,远比政府能做的多。我们评判自己是否成功,看的是我们攻克一个问题有多明智,而不是成功还是失败。比尔·盖茨视每一条人命都很宝贵;我们美国人比起其他国家,所需要的帮助要少得多。

2007 年学生来访 · 2007 年 1 月