2014 meeting
Morning session
1. Buffett’s “second career” with singer Paul Anka
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)
Good morning. Before we start, there are two very special guests that I’d like to introduce, have stand up.
The first, even though he was on tour, he took a quick detour to Omaha to be here today. And will my friend [singer-songwriter] Paul Anka please stand up. Paul? (Applause)
With all the talk that had been around about my succession, I thought it was probably a good idea to try and hook up with someone famous that might give me a shot at a second career here. (Laughter)
So we’re available for weddings and funerals and bar mitzvahs. (Laughter)
We actually had one offer the other day. I thought it was kind of insulting. They offered $1,000. And, I mean, for me and Paul, that really seemed a little ridiculous.
I told the people that and they said, “OK. We’ll make it $10,000 if just Paul comes.” (Laughter)
2. Berkshire’s Carrie Sova introduced
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we have one other very special guest.
This affair does not just happen by itself.
And there’s a young woman who had a baby, a young boy named Brady, in September. And she has marshaled together 400-plus of the people from our various companies and put on the show you’re witnessing today.
And I just want to say a special thanks to the woman we all love, and especially me, Carrie Sova. Carrie? (Applause)
Please stand up. There she is. (Applause)
3. Berkshire directors introduced
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we get down to the minor players and we’ll introduce the board of directors. (Laughs)
We’re going to have the — we’ll have the board meeting — the shareholders meeting, I should say — after the Q&A, which will end at 3:30. And then we’ll recess for 15 minutes. And at 3:45, reinstitute the — or begin — the shareholders meeting.
But for those of you who won’t be around at 3:45, I’d like you to have a chance to meet the directors now.
So, I will introduce them one at a time and ask them to stand. Hard as it may be, withhold your applause until they’re all finished standing, and then you can go crazy.
So, doing it alphabetically, and if you’ll stand as I give your name.
Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, my partner Charlie Munger, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer.
And that is the board of directors at Berkshire. (Applause)
4. Berkshire’s Q1 earnings summary
WARREN BUFFETT: We have just a couple of slides and then we’ll move right into the questioning, which will go on until roughly at noon.
We’ll take a break at noon and come back about 1:00, and then we’ll continue till 3:30, at which point we’ll adjourn and then have the annual meeting at 3:45.
But, there are just a couple slides. We released our earnings yesterday.
And I’ve always emphasized — we try to release our earnings always after the market’s closed, and, preferably, after the market’s closed on a Friday, so that people will have a full weekend to digest the information, because there’s a lot of information about Berkshire every quarter. And it’s contained, primarily, in a 10-Q that we make available for you to read over the full weekend.
So we always urge you not to just look at the summary figures, but take a look at the 10-Q. It’s great reading. And absorb all that by Monday morning.
But here we have the summary for the first quarter.
And as you can see, our operating earnings were down a bit. And that was more than accounted for in insurance underwriting. And you should understand that insurance underwriting from quarter to quarter really doesn’t mean that much.
For one thing, it can be quite affected by changes in foreign exchange, which really don’t have anything to do with our insurance business. But — or at least in the reality of interim results.
Our insurance business now has a float of $77 billion. And that $77 billion is ours to invest. And whether it costs us anything or not is determined by whether we have an underwriting profit.
So even though our underwriting profit in the first quarter was quite satisfactory, but nevertheless down from the first quarter of last year, the insurance business is marvelous for us.
And if we even break even, that $77 billion, which is subtracted from net worth, I mean, it’s a liability on the balance sheet, but if it’s cost free, it really does us about as much good as net worth itself does. So it’s a very remarkable business.
And frankly, if we average an underwriting profit over the years, I’ll be very happy and you should be very happy with what our insurance business does for us.
But it was down in the first quarter. And, like I said, that more than accounted for the decline in earnings.
We always advise you to pay little — pay no attention, really — to quarterly or even annual realized gains or losses in securities because we make no attempt to time the sales of securities to produce earnings in any given quarter.
We just try to manage the money as well as we can. And we let the chips fall where they may, in terms of whether those actions produce gains or losses in the short term.
We hope that they produce a lot of gains over the longer term, and they have.
But they should be ignored in attempting to interpret our shorter-term earnings.
5. Buffett praises shareholders for rejecting dividend proposal
WARREN BUFFETT: With that, I would like to give you a little preview of a vote that has taken place and which we will talk more about when we get the shareholders meeting.
But it’s so remarkable, that I wanted to put it up for all of you to look at now.
As you know, we had a shareholder resolution. Yeah, it’s up there.
We had a shareholder resolution, rather elegantly stated, that suggested that we pay a dividend. And with the sort of subliminal suggestion that we weren’t paying it because I was so rich that I could live in this grand style to which I’ve become accustomed, without a dividend, but that the shareholders were out there essentially bereft of the necessities of life because we were holding all the money here in Omaha. (Laughter)
So this gentleman put this on the ballot. And if we’ll go to the next slide, you’ll see some remarkable figures.
Bear in mind that, you know, you people get these proxies at your home or at your office. And you can mark anything you want.
We hire no proxy solicitation firms. So we are making no calls. We make no attempt to influence how anybody votes. We just count them as they come in.
And as you’ll see at the top, among the Class A shares, the vote was roughly 90-plus-to-one, against the dividend. But you might suspect that I stuffed the ballot box, which I did. (Laughter)
And so I took my vote out. And you’ll see down below, the vote was a little less than 40-to-one among the untainted shareholders of A against receiving a dividend.
And then you may say to yourself, “Well, you know, those are Warren and his rich friends, all the plutocrats. And easy for them to say.”
So let’s go onto the next slide. And you will see there that among the B shareholders — and we believe we may have as many as a million B shareholders. We don’t know the exact number. We don’t even know an approximate number very well. But it’s not a bad guess that we have a million or so shareholders.
And remarkably, by a vote of 45-to-one — these are people — we’re not making any phone calls to get their vote or anything — by 45-to-one, our shareholders said, “Don’t pay us a dividend.”
I’m not sure that there’s any company in the world that would get quite that vote.
And now you go to one more slide and that’ll be the end.
But this is the rather disturbing part of that vote. If you go to the next page, you’ll see again, among the B shareholders, that — I’ve got that same vote up there — and if you look down below, you will notice that almost the same number of people voted against, or withheld their vote for me, as voted for having a dividend.
So from that you can only deduce that if the shareholders are ever forced with the choice — or I should say, if the directors are ever forced with the choice — of paying a dividend or getting rid of me, it’s a close vote. (Laughter)
So you can see why I’m rather reluctant to bring up the dividend question with the directors.
The vote, actually, up until two days earlier, before these final figures, the vote was actually just virtually a dead heat.
The number of people that wanted to have a dividend and the number of people that wanted me to get out of the place were running neck in neck. So it — again, it’s a rather unusual voting arrangement.
6. Q&A begins
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that we’re going to do the questioning, as we always do.
We have journalists on this side. We have financial analysts on this side. And we’ve got a wonderful group of shareholders in the audience.
So we’re going to alternate among these groups. And we will keep doing that until noon. And then we’ll pick up where we left off at 1 o’clock, then continue doing it.
And we will start off with Carol Loomis of Fortune Magazine.
CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I’ll make my two or three sentence introductory remarks.
First, Becky and Andrew and I get hundreds, if not thousands, of questions, and we can only ask a few. So, if we didn’t get to your question, please excuse us.
Secondly, Warren and Charlie got no hint of what we were going to ask.
Though they read the news like we do, and that may explain that they would sometimes get a thought about what they were going to get asked. And that will explain my first question.
7. Buffett defends abstaining on “excessive” Coca-Cola compensation
CAROL LOOMIS: The question is from Will Elridge (PH) of New York City.
And he says, “Mr. Buffett, this is a question about Berkshire’s holdings in Coca-Cola.
“This spring, Coke asked shareholders to approve a magnanimous stock option program for its executives.
“Asked about it by the press after the vote, you said the program was excessive. Yet, you did not tell the world prior to the Coke shareholders meeting that you believed the program to be excessive, a disclosure that, had it been made earlier, might’ve made shareholders vote against it.
“And in fact, you did not vote Berkshire’s shares against the plan. You only abstained in the voting.
“I guess you had your reasons. I must say, I don’t expect to agree with them. And I cannot see how they can stand up under examination.
“But I still would like to know why you engaged in this very strange, un-Buffett-like behavior.
“So why did you abstain rather than voting no against a corporate action that deserved to be shouted down?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, some people, incidentally, think that strange and un-Buffett-like are really not quite right. Strange is frequently Buffett-like. (Laughter)
The proposal was made by a shareholder who’d owned shares for a long time and was opposed to the option program.
His calculations — and I probably should explain this in a minute — but his calculations of the dilution were wildly off. And we did not care to get into a discussion of that or anything else.
But we did talk — or I did talk — to Muhtar Kent. And I informed him that we were going to abstain.
I told him that we admired, enormously, the Coca-Cola Company. We admire the management.
And we thought the compensation plan, although it was very similar to a great many plans, was excessive.
And Muhtar and I had a very good discussion right here in Omaha, as a matter of fact, as well as a couple of telephone discussions. And then immediately after the vote, I announced that we had abstained, and gave the reasons that we thought the plan was excessive.
And I think that in terms of having an effect on the Coca-Cola compensation practices, as well as maybe having an effect on some other compensation practices, that that is the most effective — was the most effective — way of behaving for Berkshire.
We made a very clear statement about the excessiveness of the plan. And at the same time, we, in no way, went to war with Coca-Cola. We have no desire to go to war with Coca-Cola.
And we did not endorse some calculations that were wildly inaccurate, and joined forces with someone that I had really no contact with him. I received several letters in the mail after they’d first been given to the press.
So, I think you have to be — I don’t think going to war is a very good idea in most situations. And I think if you’re going to join forces in going to war with somebody, you’d better be very sure about what that alliance might mean.
So, I think the best result for the Coca-Cola Company was achieved by our abstention. And we will see what happens in terms of compensation between now and the next meeting with Coke.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you handled the whole situation very well. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie remains vice chairman. (Laughter)
Charlie, incidentally, was the — Charlie was the only one with whom I talked over the vote before — or the abstention — before I did it.
I called Charlie. And told him about the plan. And we agreed on the course of action.
I should point out one thing. And in fairness to David Winters who may — who led the war — he took figures from the Coca-Cola proxy statement. So it’s hard to fault him for that.
But for those of you who would really — would like to know how to think about calculating dilution, Coca-Cola has regularly repurchased the shares that are issued through options.
And the share count has, thereby, come down just a small bit at Coca-Cola. Not anywhere near as much as if they hadn’t issued as many shares, though, in repurchased shares.
But Coca-Cola has a plan that involves 500 million shares. And they say in the annual report that they expect to issue these over approximately four years. And then they have a further calculation between performance shares and option shares, but I’ll leave that out. Make this a little simpler.
And that’s a lot of shares.
Let’s assume for the moment that Coca-Cola’s selling around $40 a share now, which it is. And that when — and that all the options are issued at $40. And that the — when they’re exercised, we’ll say the stock is $60.
Now, at that point, there has been a $10 billion transfer of value. Twenty dollars a share times 500 million shares, a $10 billion transfer of value.
Now, the company, when that is done, gets a tax deduction — and at the — for 10 billion — and at the present tax rates, that would result in 3 1/2 billion less tax.
So if you take 20 billion of proceeds from exercise of the options, and you add 3 1/2 billion of tax savings, the Coca-Cola Company receives 23 1/2 billion.
And if they should buy in the stock at $60 a share, which it would be selling for then, they would be able to buy 391,666,666 shares.
So, in effect, the Coca-Cola Company, net, would be out a little over eight — 108 million shares. And that’s on a base of four-billion-four.
So the dilution — assuming all the proceeds from the option exercise and the tax refund were used to buy shares — the dilution would be 108 million shares on 4.4 billion, or about 2 1/2 percent.
And I don’t like dilution and I don’t like 2 1/2 percent dilution. But it’s a far cry from the numbers that were getting tossed around.
It’s a long explanation, but I’ve never seen the math written about. I mean, I’ve seen people throwing out claims and all of that.
And you can change my supposition from 55 — 60 to 55 — or 65. It doesn’t change things very much.
8. Berkshire likely to team with 3G again despite different styles
WARREN BUFFETT: Jon Brandt
JONATHAN BRANDT: Hi, Warren. Thanks again for having me back.
My first question is as follows: Berkshire has a track record of buying successful companies and leaving them alone.
3G has a more hands-on strategy with its acquisition. Its zero-base budgeting would seem to offer the potential to improve margins at any non-insurance business.
Is there a way for Berkshire to use 3G’s methods to boost profits without violating promises made to selling shareholders or breaking faith with Berkshire’s decentralized culture?
Would it be consistent with Berkshire’s culture to hire a 3G alumnus to run a Berkshire subsidiary after an existing manager retired? Or alternatively, how hard would it be for a non-3G alumnus to learn and implement their management process? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think the two blend very well.
But I do think that we — I think 3G does a magnificent job of running businesses. And I’ve watched them in the past from afar and I’ve watched them more recently up close.
And there’s no question that it’s a different style than Berkshire. And I don’t think it would pay to try and blend the two.
But I certainly think that we will see more opportunities to partner with 3G. And we’re very likely to jump at those opportunities, because I think they’re as able as anybody I’ve seen in the management of businesses.
And to get a chance to join with them — and in addition to that, they’re marvelous partners. They’re more than fair in everything they do with us.
So we will, as I’ve put in the past, I think we’re very likely to partner with them, perhaps in things that are very large.
But I do not think a blending of the two would work very well. We’ve got a system, works very well for us.
And managers, when they join Berkshire, are joining into a large business that’s unlike virtually any large business that’s around. They really can’t find a home exactly like Berkshire.
And that’s a huge corporate asset. It’s one that’s grown over time. It’ll continue to grow. And we want to maintain that with a very clear message that it goes well beyond my lifetime.
But we welcome the chance to join with 3G.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we’ve ever had a policy that loved overstaffing. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would only slightly disagree with that.
We certainly never had a policy that allows for overstaffing at the home office.
We only feel happy when people are sitting in other people’s laps. I mean, you have to understand this.
But the — but we have not enforced, or attempted to enforce, nor would wish to enforce, a strong discipline on every subsidiary as to whether they have a few too many people or not.
A great many don’t. In fact, I mean, most of them are — overwhelmingly — they’re managed on a lean basis.
But that’s not true of everyone we’ve been involved in over the years. And it probably won’t be true of everyone in the future.
We encourage — I mean, we encourage, just by example. But we do not encourage it by edicts, particularly.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think a lot of great businesses spill a little just because they don’t want to be fanatic.
And that’s all right. I don’t think you have to have the last nickel out of the staffing cost.
9. Corporate taxes aren’t holding back businesses
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to the shareholder in station 1, up on my far right.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, hello. My name is Doug Merrill (PH). I’m from Denver, Colorado, the home of Peyton Manning.
WARREN BUFFETT: Omaha, Omaha. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Awesome.
The president’s approval rating is at 40 percent. Steve Wynn said, “Obama is the biggest wet blanket to the economy.” Other countries are lowering taxes and reducing debt.
You have Obama’s ear. The train’s going in the wrong direction. Can you conduct Obama to change the train’s direction? (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Doug, I think I’ll let you communicate with him directly. (Laughter)
I don’t agree with a number of things you’ve said there. American business is doing extraordinarily well. (Applause)
The — many of the American people are not. And, you know, and I think Obamacare is more about doing something for them than many other people would.
But we’re going to have a difference of opinion on politics. And I’m not going to convince you, and you’re not going to convince me.
But I will say that anybody that thinks American business is doing — is not doing well — should just look at corporate profits.
Anybody that thinks our corporate taxes are too high should look at a chart of corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP since World War II, and it’s come down from 4 percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP, while many other forms of taxes have, obviously, increased.
And American business earnings on net tangible assets, which is the way to measure profitability overall, you know, it’s basically the envy of the world. I mean, we have extraordinary returns on tangible assets — net tangible assets — in this country.
And our tax rates now for corporations are far lower than when Charlie and I were operating. And American business actually was doing pretty good then.
But for much of our life, taxes were at — corporate taxes — were at either 52 percent or 48 percent.
But I don’t want to try and convince you because I don’t want you to try and convince me. So we’ll call a truce on that and I’ll let Charlie comment. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m going to avoid this one. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: And people complain about me abstaining. (Laughter)
10. Berkshire underperforms when stock market is strong
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky Quick.
BECKY QUICK: This question is from Manolo Salseda (PH).
And I’ll preface it by saying he says that he is “a true admirer of Buffett and what he stands for, so please don’t confuse my bluntness and straightforwardness with a lack of admiration or empathy with this amazing person and his master creation.” With that disclaimer —
WARREN BUFFETT: “But.” (Laughter)
BECKY QUICK: But. His question is, “You’ve stated several times in the past that if management, you, wasn’t capable of delivering a better return than the index, than management wasn’t doing the job.
“Then you said that the yardstick should be any five-year period. You’ve just missed your five-year period comparison.
“How come you didn’t tackle the issue in your annual shareholder letter? Are you changing the yardstick, and what’s next?”
WARREN BUFFETT: No, we’re not changing the yardstick.
But I would point out that we said, actually, in the 2012 report — and it’s in the upper half of the first page — we pointed out how we do worse in very strong years and better in poor years.
And I said then, “If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.”
I didn’t say it might end, or could end, or anything. It was obvious that if you have five strong years in a row, we will not beat the S&P. And that will be true in the future, for sure.
And of course, last year was — I think there were two years in the last 40 or so that the market was up more than it was last year. So, despite the things mentioned about President Obama, the stock market seems to have done quite well.
We will underperform in very strong up years. We’ll probably, more or less, match in moderate up years. We’ll do better than average in even years or down years.
And I have said, and I’ll continue to say, and it’s been true that over any cycle, we will — I think we will overperform. But there’s no guarantee on that.
But it was clearly said — like I say, on the first page of the 2012 report — that if the market went up, we would have a five-year streak of underperformance. And that’s exactly what happened.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we should remember that Warren’s standard talks about net worth of Berkshire increasing, after full corporate taxes, at roughly 35 percent. And the indexes aren’t paying any taxes.
And so, Warren has set a ridiculously tough standard and has so far met it over a long period of time.
In the last couple of years, the net worth of Berkshire, after full corporation income taxes, went up, what, 60?
WARREN BUFFETT: Something like that, yeah —
CHARLIE MUNGER: $60 billion —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Pre-tax, probably 90 billion in —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And so, if this is failure, I want more of it. (Laughter and applause)
11. “Eager” to buy back shares at 120% of book value
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay Gelb.
JAY GELB: Warren, this question is on Berkshire’s intrinsic value.
In the annual letter, you appear to strongly signal that Berkshire’s shares are undervalued, especially relative to intrinsic value.
Aside from share buybacks, what actions can Berkshire take to narrow the discount between the current share price and intrinsic value? For example, would you ever consider an IPO of Berkshire’s individual operating units?
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to the last part is no.
But the — I think we try to explain —my guess is I’ve never seen an annual report that uses the term, “intrinsic value,” or even talks about the intrinsic value of its units or business, as much as Berkshire does.
So, Charlie and I really devote considerable effort to explaining which of our businesses — where there’s really a significant discrepancy between what carrying value is, or book value — call it carrying value — and the true value, or the intrinsic value, of the business.
And I got very specific in the case of GEICO in the past year, for example.
And I said that GEICO, which is carried at about 1 billion over tangible assets, may be worth as much as 20 billion over tangible assets. And I wouldn’t be surprised if five years or ten years from now that that figure itself will be a lot larger.
So we’ve talked about it. We said we are willing to buy — not only willing, but eager to buy — stock at 120 percent of book value.
Well, with book value being close to 230 billion now, that obviously means we think that at $45 billion, roughly, over that figure, we are getting a bargain, in relation to intrinsic value.
But we’re never going to try and put out an exact number because we don’t know an exact number.
And it’s — A, it changes from day to day. And — although not a lot day to day, but certainly changes, you know, over the quarters and over the years.
And the second reason is, if you ask Charlie and me to write down a figure as we sit here as to the intrinsic value of Berkshire, we’d probably be within 5 percent of each other.
But we might very — we probably would not be within 1 percent of each other.
And so we will continue to try to give shareholders information about the important units.
It isn’t — the small ones are not unimportant to us, but they are — they do not have a big impact on the overall intrinsic value.
We’ve got a few businesses. I mean, we have some businesses that may be carried at a few hundred million that might be worth a billion or maybe 2 billion, even.
But that isn’t where the big, undisclosed by the balance sheet, values are.
You know, they’re in the railroad, they’re in the insurance business, they’re in our utility business.
And we — they add up to some pretty big numbers. We try to tell you exactly the numbers and, really, and use the words that we use when we’re thinking about those businesses ourselves, in terms of estimating their value. But we don’t want to go further than that.
The 120 percent, obviously, is a loud shoutout as to a figure that we think is very significantly below intrinsic value, or we wouldn’t use it to repurchase shares.
We only believe in repurchasing shares when we can do so at a significant discount from intrinsic value.
Some companies talk about — Coca-Cola does — they talk about buying in shares to cover options. That actually isn’t the best reason to buy in shares.
I mean, the stock could be overpriced, and even though you issued on options, you shouldn’t be buying it in.
But that’s become sort of a mantra throughout corporate America, that if you buy shares to cover the option exercises that you’ve negated the dilution to shareholders.
But again, if you buy shares — if you buy a dollar bill for 90 cents, you’re doing your shareholders a favor. And if you buy it for $1.10, you are doing them no favor at all.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t believe we’ve ever wanted to get the stock way over intrinsic value so that we can issue it to other people and get an advantage for ourselves and a disadvantage for them.
And, I think the people that want the stock up very close to intrinsic value, or higher, really want egg in their beer. It’s okay if it’s a little below.
And we’re not in the game of ballooning our stock up as high as we can get it so we can issue it more at a profit to ourselves.
I think over the long term, our system will work pretty well. And I think the stock will eventually go above intrinsic value, whether we like it or not.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we have — we really watched a lot over the years of certain managers attempting to get their stock to sell for way more than it was worth, so they could use it to trade for other companies. I mean, that was all the rage in the late ’60s.
One of the reasons that I wound up my partnership was that that activity was going on so much and it affected all other values.
And it was really a game. And it was a game that some people played sort of halfway honestly, and other people really cheated like crazy, because if you’re trying to get your stock to be overpriced, you’re very likely to cheat on your earnings and cheat on projections. Cheat on everything.
And it works, incidentally. It doesn’t work indefinitely, but it works.
Some companies, whose names you know, were, to some extent, built on that principle.
That’s a game that we not only don’t want to play, we really found it very distasteful, because we saw a lot of these people in action.
And it comes in waves. And we just — we don’t want to come close to playing it.
Unless I’m careful, Charlie will name names, so we’d better move on to shareholders. (Laughter)
12. Why sellers trust Berkshire with the companies they’ve built
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s go to station number 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett—
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and Mr. Munger.
My name is Masato Luso (PH) and I’m from Los Angeles, California.
Berkshire is known to buy into whole companies for many, many years. But earlier in your careers, that was not known.
And typically, acquisitions of other companies is very disruptive. Employees fear losing their jobs as a redundancy. And managers really have to think twice and be diligent about it.
So my question is, what do you do to gain the trust of founders or owners of the companies you have bought out in the past?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve kept our word to them.
And now we have to be very careful about what we promise, because we can’t promise, for example, never to have a layoff in a business we buy, because who knows what the world holds.
But we can promise that we won’t sell their business, for example, if it turns out to be disappointing, as long as it doesn’t run into the prospect of continuing losses or having significant labor problems.
But we keep — we are keeping — certain businesses that you would not get a passing grade at business school on if you wrote down our reasons for keeping them.
But the reason is, we made a promise.
And we put that — we not only make the promise, we put it in the back of the annual report now — we’ve done it for 30 years or so — where we list the economic principles.
And we put it there because we believe it. But we put it there, also, so that the managers who sell us their— the owners who sell us their business — know they can count on it.
And if we behave differently, you know, the word would get around. And it should get around.
So, we can make promises. We can’t make promises we’ll never change employment. We can’t even make a promise that we’ll keep a business forever.
But we can promise what we do promise, which is that if it turns out to be somewhat disappointing on earnings, but does not promise, sort of, unending losses, or if we have labor problems, we can keep that promise.
And we have kept that promise. We’ve only had to get rid of a few businesses, including our original textile business.
We promise the managers, you know, that they are going to continue to run their businesses.
And believe me, if we didn’t do it, the word would get around on that very quickly. But we’ve been doing it now for 49 years.
And we’ve put ourselves in a class that is hard for other people to compete with, if that’s important to the seller of a business.
A private equity firm is going to be totally unimpressed by what’s in the back of our annual report. They don’t care. And that’s — there’s nothing wrong with that. That’s their business.
But for somebody that’s built up their company over 20 or 30 or 40 years — and maybe their father or grandfather built it up even before that — some of those people care about where their businesses go.
They’re very rich, they’ve accomplished all kinds of things in life. And they don’t want to build up something which somebody else tears apart very quickly believe they handing it over to a few MBAs who want to show their stuff.
So, we do have a unique — close to a unique — asset at Berkshire. And as long as we behave properly, we will maintain that asset. And really, no one else will have much luck in competing with us.
But it doesn’t solve all problems, but — and it — and frankly, it’s the way we want to operate anyway.
So it’s — we’re comfortable with it. The sellers that do come to us that care about their businesses are comfortable with it. And I think it’ll continue to work well.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, obviously, we behave the way we do because we like doing it. And number two, it’s worked pretty well and we’re unlikely to stop.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)
You can tell that he doesn’t get paid by the word. (Laughter)
13. “Social dynamics” weaken oversight by corporate boards
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren. This is a tough corporate governance question. I probably received about a dozen of them this week, some polite and some less polite. This —
WARREN BUFFETT: Use one of the polite ones.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This is probably one of the more polite ones.
“Your son Howard serves on the board of Coke and voted to support its CEO pay package proposal, which you have said was excessive and you were against.
“You have said Howard will become non-executive chairman of Berkshire after you step down, as its, quote, ‘protector of culture,’ to uphold the morals that you and we all hold so dear.
Given his role in the Coke vote, how can we count on Howard to defend the culture of Berkshire and ensure that the future management of Berkshire does not benefit at the expense of its shareholders?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I think, as I mentioned in at least one interview, I voted for not — I’m not referring to Coke here necessarily — but as a director of various companies, I not only voted for comp plans that were far from what I would’ve come up myself, but I voted for acquisitions that I didn’t think make much sense.
I voted against a few. And they attracted a lot of attention. But they were big ones, where I really think — where I thought — it really made a difference.
But the nature — and this is something worth exploring, generally, because the nature of boards is such that they’re part business organizations and part social organizations. And people behave in some ways with their business brain and they behave to some extent with their social brain.
And I would say — and I said this — that in 55 years of being on corporate boards, and 19 companies aside from Berkshire, I don’t think I’ve ever seen a comp committee report come in and get a dissenting vote.
And the social reason for that is that the board organizes itself in a way whereby certain activities are delegated to a smaller portion of the board, one being a compensation committee.
And that committee presumably meets for a few hours the day before the meeting, or maybe the morning of the meeting. And then they go into a board meeting. And the comp committee reports on its activities. And you’ve delegated that activity, as a board member, to that group.
It’s almost unheard of to question that. I’m not saying that maybe it shouldn’t be questioned, but I’m just saying that that is the way it works.
Now bear in mind that the so-called independent directors on such a board are probably receiving maybe $200,000 a year, maybe $300,000 a year. Believe me, they are not independent.
They’re independent as measured by some standards, perhaps, at the SEC, but they — you know, how would you feel about having a job that required you to go to work four or six times a year, pleasant company, you know, certain amount of prestige attached with it, and on top of it, you get paid maybe $300,000 a year and you kind of hope to get another job like that? That is not independence.
So, you get a group coming in like that from the comp committee. And in those 19 boards, I was put on the comp committee exactly once. Charlie might be able to tell you exactly what the result was that time. They do not look for Dobermans. (Laughter)
They look for cocker spaniels. And then they make sure that the tails are wagging. (Laughter)
But that is — don’t condemn it too much because you and I are doing similar things in other parts of our lives.
You know, the social dynamics are important in board actions. My son Howard — in fact, my other two children as well, if they were involved — you know, they would have a dedication, and do have a dedication, to the culture of Berkshire, which is clearly defined. It’s one of the reasons I want it clearly defined. And it’s reinforced by the behavior and it’s reinforced by results.
And, incidentally, their job would not be to set the compensation. I mean, the non-executive board chairman is not there to select the compensation of the CEO or others. He’s not there to select the CEO.
He is there to facilitate a change if the board of directors decides a change is needed. And that can be important. Very, very, very unlikely to be important in the case of Berkshire.
But it’s a nice, little, extra safety valve. And Howie’s the perfect guy to carry that out.
And like I say, I voted for comp plans at various places, including way back, you know, at Coke that were far from what I would’ve designed myself. And the ones I designed myself would have worked.
But that is the way boards work.
I was made chairman of one comp committee, and Charlie can tell you a little about that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)
Warren was totally voted down at Salomon Inc. In fact, people acted like, what in the hell is he doing? How could he be disapproving compensation on Wall Street?
And I think the general idea that a person should just shout disapproval all day long of everything he disapproves of is very suspect. In the world in which we inhabit, people accomplish more if they pick their spots for public disapproval.
And knowing both Howie and Warren Buffett, I don’t think you have to worry that they’re going to go crazy or be soft and foolish just because they don’t shout all the time about everything they disapprove of. If we all did that, we wouldn’t be able to hear each other.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)
If you — if you’re in any social organization and you keep belching at the dinner table, you’ll be eating in the kitchen before very long. (Laughter)
And people won’t pay any attention to you.
I mean, you really have to — you not only have to pick your spots, you have to pick how you do it.
I mean, you — that could even be — I mean, sure, Charlie gives the marital advice around here, as you noticed, in the movie, but it’s not even a bad thought to keep in mind in marriage, I mean, in terms of — of attempting to change the behavior of others, which is — you’ll have a very limited ability to do, in any event. It’s not helped by shouting a lot.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I offend more people than you do. And I’m quite satisfied with your level of disapproval. (Laughter)
14. Everyone else is wrong on cost of capital
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Gregg, welcome.
GREGG WARREN: Thank you. Warren and Charlie, on behalf of Morningstar, I want to thank you for having us on the panel this year.
I may not be an accredited bear, but hopefully, I ask probing questions that add value for shareholders.
My first question relates to the measurement of management performance.
For Morningstar, the ultimate measure of success is not just whether or not a firm can earn more than its cost of capital, but whether or not it can do so for an extended period of time.
Berkshire has historically done a good job of generating outsized returns. But as you’ve noted in the past, the sheer size of the firm’s operations, which continue to grow, will ultimately limit the returns that Berkshire could generate.
With that in mind, what do you believe Berkshire’s cost of capital is? How much do you think that this hurdle rate is increased as you’ve acquired more capital intensive, debt-heavy firms?
And how much confidence do you have that future capital allocators at Berkshire will be able to generate returns in excess of the firm’s cost of capital, acknowledging, of course, the fact that Berkshire’s days of outsized returns are most likely behind it?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s no question that size is an anchor to performance. And we intend to prove that up to the point where it starts really biting.
But it — we cannot earn the returns on capital with well over 200 — well, with a market cap of 300-plus billion. It just isn’t doable.
Archimedes, he said he could move the world if he had a long enough lever, didn’t he, or something like that, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, he did.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish I had his lever because we don’t have that lever at Berkshire.
So we — well, we’ll answer two questions there.
In terms of cost of capital, Charlie and I always figure that our cost of capital is the — is what could be produced by our second best idea. And then our best idea has to exceed that.
We think — I have listened to so many nonsensical cost of capital discussions, that —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve never heard an intelligent one.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. (Laughter)
It’s really true. I mean, and there’s — that’s another thing. I’ve been on boards and the CFO comes in and explains why we’re doing this and it always gets down to, you know, it exceeds our cost of capital.
And he doesn’t know what the hell his cost of capital is, and I don’t know. And — but I don’t embarrass him, you know?
So I just sit there and listen to this stuff and apply my own thing, and then still end up voting for it, probably, if I don’t like it, although there have been a few exceptions to that.
The real test, you know, over time, is whether the capital we retain produces more than a dollar of market value as we go along.
And if we keep putting billions in and those billions, in effect, are worth, in terms of present value terms, in terms of what they add to the value of the business, more than what we’re putting in, you know, we’ll keep doing it.
We bought a company day before yesterday, I guess it was. And we are spending close to $3 billion U.S. It’s a Canadian company.
And we think we will be better off financially because we did that and we thought it was the best thing that we could do with the $3 billion on that day. And those are the yardsticks that we have.
And what I do know is that I’ve never seen a CEO who wanted to do a deal where the CFO didn’t come in and say it exceeded the cost of capital.
It’s just — it’s a game, as far as we’re concerned.
And we think we can evaluate businesses. And we know the capital we have available. And we have things that we can sell to buy. Not businesses, but marketable securities that we can sell to buy businesses if we like.
And we are constantly measuring that opportunity cost that Charlie talked about in the movie. It’s an important subject. And one that I think has had more nonsense written about it than about anything.
But I’ll turn it over to Charlie to go over —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a phrase like “cost of capital,” which means different things to different people, and often means silly things to people who teach in business schools, we just don’t use it.
Warren’s definition of behaving in a corporation, so that every dollar retained tends to create more than a dollar of market value for the shareholders, is probably the best way of describing cost of capital. That is not what they mean in business schools.
The answer’s perfectly simple. We’re right and they’re wrong. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: I look good compared to him, don’t I? (Laughter)
15. Buying Nebraska Furniture Mart from the Blumkins
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Jonathan Fye (PH) and I’m from Denton, Texas, just up the road from the new Nebraska Furniture Mart that’s going to be located in The Colony.
My question relates to your original acquisition of that business from the Blumkin family in 1983.
Based on the data you provided in this year’s annual report, it appears you were able to purchase this business for roughly 85 percent of book value, or roughly two times earnings.
Can you comment on the factors or the environment in Omaha that enabled you to purchase this wonderful business for such a wonderful price?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish we had bought it that cheap, Jonathan, but no — we paid at the time, as I remember, probably 11 or 12 times after-tax earnings. It was not a discount from book value.
I’m not sure where those numbers come. Well, we bought 80 percent of the company. It was bought on the basis, as I remember, of 100 —of $60 million of purchase price.
So we —actually there was a second transaction involved in it. But 60 million was 100 percent value. We ended up with 80 percent.
The 60 million would’ve been more than book at the time. Not way more, but more than book.
And it would’ve been a multiple of 11 or 12 times earnings, as I remember. The sales were about 100 million. Pre-tax margins were in the 7 percent range.
So, it was about 7 million pre-tax. And, you know, 4 ½, probably, after-tax. That’s ballpark.
So, it was not a bargain purchase. It was a great business. It was a wonderful opportunity to join as fine a family as I’ve ever met.
But it was — and incidentally, there was another company, I believe, from Germany, that was trying to buy it at the time.
And believe it or not, Erskine Bowles, of Simpson-Bowles, was representing them, my friend Erskine — I didn’t know this at the time.
And then I went out on my birthday, August 30th, 1983. And had that contract, which is in the annual report.
And I gave it to Mrs. B. And — and she didn’t read, but Louie, her son, told her what was in it.
And I never asked her for an audit. I just asked her if she owed any money. And I asked her if she owned the building. And she said yes. And we made the deal. But it was not a bargain purchase.
Now, if you want to talk about bargain purchases, we should talk about going out to the Nebraska Furniture Mart. (Laughter)
So far, in the three — we —in the days of this annual meeting, our sales, which were a record 40 million for the week last year, are up about — I think they’re up about 7 percent now. And last year, of course, it was a record.
And on Tuesday, which was the first day, we did 7.8 million.
And Berkshire owns the largest home furnishing store in Sacramento, California. We own the largest one in Boise, Idaho. We own the largest one in Salt Lake City. We own the largest one in Las Vegas. Largest one in Reno.
Our sales at the Furniture Mart on Tuesday were larger than the monthly sales of any one of those stores I’ve just named, being the largest ones in places like Sacramento. So it is a remarkable organization. (Applause)
And the good news is there’s still time for you to avail yourself of those prices. (Laughter)
I would like to put in a plug for the Dallas store, where — I was down there a week ago. And it’s a plot of land like you wouldn’t believe. It’s a store like you wouldn’t believe. It is 1,800,000 square feet under one roof. Over 40 acres.
It will do more volume, I predict, than any other home furnishing store in the world. And I wouldn’t be surprised if I could add to that by a factor of at least two.
It’s a remarkable store. And I toured around it. And we’re, you know, we’re putting in streets. We’re — site preparation, utilities, racking, all these things. This wonderful woman, Michelle, who showed me around.
And the Blumkins later told me that she had started — worked for Nebraska Furniture Mart as a cashier, and she is in charge of this, you know, many hundreds of millions of dollar project. It’s really — it’s the good thing about America.
And at the end of the tour, she’d had this number two person working — walking around with us, who — she was explaining some things to us, too. And I learned at the end of the tour that number two was Michelle’s husband. (Laughter)
Interesting pillow talk, you know? “How many cubic yards did you move today, honey,” you know? (Laughter)
16. Why Buffett recommends an index fund for his wife’s inheritance
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.
CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Jason Rothman (PH) of Oklahoma City, who was the first shareholder to ask a question that subsequently was framed by a number of other shareholders as well.
In my mailbox, this was the most popular question asked.
“Mr. Buffett, you state in your annual letter to shareholders that in your will you have given instructions to the trustee who will be acting for your wife’s benefit to put 10 percent of the cash given her in short-term government bonds and 90 percent in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund.
“My question is why are you advising the trustee to put 90 percent of the cash into an S&P 500 index fund instead of into Berkshire shares?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
CAROL LOOMIS: “This might imply that you expect the index fund to outperform Berkshire in the future when the company is run by a new CEO and chairman. Please clarify.”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ll be glad to clarify. That letter didn’t come from Vanguard, by any chance, did — (Laughter)
When I die, incidentally, then all the Berkshire shares I have at that point will go to five different foundations. Every single share. I mean, there are no shares that have not been designated, mentally, to charity. A good many of them have been designated specifically to — in numbers and all that.
But — and they will be distributed over the ten years after my estate is closed. So figure over 12 years.
And I tell my — I tell the trustees that will be holding these shares, you know, “Don’t sell any Berkshire shares until they have to be sold.”
So my views, on Berkshire at least through 12 years after my death are as bullish as anybody could possibly come up with.
And incidentally, without those kind of instructions, anybody would say, “You know, you’re crazy to keep many, many billions of dollars all in one stock.” I can’t think of anything better to do it over those 12 years.
In terms of my wife’s situation, you know, that is not a question of maximizing capital. It’s just a question of total, 100 percent peace of mind on something that cannot get a bad result.
And, like I said, there’s way more money for her than she’ll ever use. As a matter of fact, those of you who know her, you know, may feel that I’ve added about three zeros too many.
But it is not designed for her to get even larger amounts of capital. And there’ll be capital, loads of capital left over on that part of it.
On the part that I care about maximizing, I have instructed the three trustees to not sell a single share until it has to be sold. So, that’s good for 12 years after I die, as to my best advice as to what I want them to hold.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren is a little peculiar in the way he distributes money in the family. And I think he’s entitled to do what he damn pleases. (Applause)
Speaking —
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I — do I hear my — children applauding? Do I hear my children applauding? (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I’ve never had this feeling I had to starve the family down to a few trifles.
And Warren really — and Susie, when she was alive, was the same way.
He really is a meritocrat. He’s really quite extreme in wanting to let most of his money go back to the civilization in which it was earned.
I like being associated with it. (Applause)
17. BNSF service problems are hurting earnings
WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?
JONATHAN BRANDT: The BNSF has done very well since Berkshire acquired it in 2010.
But its western competition of Union Pacific has actually grown its earnings more. And at the moment, the UP seems to be operating more smoothly for its customers.
Could you shed some light on the service challenges Burlington has experienced recently and perhaps discuss any differences between the two railroads in end markets, geography, and strategy that may have led to the divergent result?
Would it be fair to say that, in trying to aggressively sign up new business volume last year, that the railroad did not allow for a sufficient margin of safety in terms of what its capacity could handle, should there be a harsher than normal winter or other adverse circumstances?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It — we’ve handled more volume, actually, than in the past. I mean, in 2006, we had a peak of 219,000 carloads. That was in the late fall.
But no question that we’ve had a lot of service problems, particularly on our northern route.
We have been spending more money than Union Pacific, and they spend a lot, in terms of attempting to anticipate the kind of problems that can occur when you get a big increase in volume, on that one route particularly, from the boom in the — particularly the Bakken shale oil.
We’ve got a lot of unit trains that are running over those lines that weren’t running five years ago.
I think I’ve got Matt Rose here — right — I think somewhere in the front. And he might address some of the problems of cold weather. I mean, want to get — there were a lot of days where it was 15 below or worse.
And in terms of sending people out to work on problems, under those circumstances, it can be really — it can be life threatening.
But Matt, do you have — oh, there he is. OK. Could you shine a light down on him, please, too? So he’s right here in the front. In the front.
MATT ROSE: Warren. So last year, the industry grew at about 820,000 units. BNSF handled 53 percent of all those units.
And it’s not what we wanted to take or what we didn’t want to take. Quite frankly, it’s the geographic nature of our franchise. And the oil came a lot faster than we were expecting and we’ve been spending money at a rapid clip to try and build into it.
The second issue was, you know, I had previously, prior to this past year, been in the CEO role for 13 years, and I have never seen a weather — a winter weather — like that.
We had 83 inches of snow in Chicago. We had multiple days, over 30 days, where it didn’t get to zero in the Minnesota area.
So, you know, we know this is an outdoor sport. We get it, on the weather. But quite frankly, when we get to about 0 to 10 degrees below, things just don’t work.
The weather’s getting better. Last week, we handled 206,000 units. No other railroad has ever handled 205,000 units.
So the railroad’s coming back. And we’re making the significant investments to be able to handle all the business that’s out there.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Matt. (Applause)
We will spend $5 billion on the railroad this year. No railroad’s ever spent that kind of money, or even very close to it.
But I got a call — or I got a letter — from a fellow in North Dakota. And they were having a problem getting fertilizer. And I called and talked to him. And they sent it down to Matt.
But we’ve now put on — I think we’re going to have 52 unit trains of fertilizer. And they will get there in time for the planting. And that’s important. I mean, we take it seriously.
But cold in winter or floods in the summer, I mean, we’re now really functioning a lot better and our earnings will be, in my view, are very likely to be a lot better.
But the thing that could disrupt that is, if for some reason, you had incredible floods. You’re dealing with 22,000 miles of track. And if you get weak links, one of which, always, for all four big railroads, is Chicago, because that’s where things get interchanged and that’s where a lot of bottlenecks have been this year, and that’s where weather was tough as well.
But you’re right, Jon, in the comparative financials in recent months. And believe me, Matt’s paying a lot of attention to them and Carl’s paying a lot of attention to them, and I even pay a little attention to them.
So I have a feeling that they will be getting better over the remainder of the year.
18. Generating electricity with natural gas
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 4.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Rosal Kerkhove (PH). I’m from Omaha, Nebraska. My question relates to our company’s use of natural gas to generate electricity.
This past winter, natural gas in storage has declined substantially.
In the future, how do our companies assure that they have an adequate supply of natural gas to generate electricity?
And if the price of natural gas increases in multiples, how do our companies assure that they can sell the electricity at a satisfactory return on investment? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have — I’m going to ask Greg Abel to be more specific on this.
But we are the largest alternative generator of — using alternative sources — I think, in the country. And I think by the end of 2015, we will be capable of producing 40 percent of our needs in Iowa through wind, which will be unlike any other company you can find in the country. (Applause)
But I think I’ll have Greg answer the specifics of any natural gas-dependent generating units we have.
I’m not worried about that thing, but I — about what you raised —but Greg would know a lot more about the mix on natural gas and the opportunity to shift to coal. And exactly the profile of the generating capacity.
Greg? Now, let’s get a light down on him, if you can. He —
GREG ABEL: I think it’s — okay, there it is.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there we go —
GREG ABEL: Yup. Sorry. So like Matt touched on, obviously, we had a very cold winter in the Midwest.
So our systems, for the first time, were challenged in a significant way. But very proud of how the resources were managed.
So if you look at the question around natural gas, and specifically the gas availability, there was substantial gas available to be utilized both to heat homes and produce the energy, because ultimately, we’re worried about both, the — keeping the furnaces on and, equally, keeping the lights on.
So when you looked at the balance of supply, there was gas there.
But clearly, we have to continue to look at the unique situation as we continue to move towards using more gas in the United States.
Warren touched on an important point. This past year, as he highlighted — he highlighted 2015 — but if you look at just what we produced on the renewable side in Iowa, that was 39 percent renewable, i.e. wind. And that’ll only get larger.
So as we continue to manage these multiple resources, there’s clearly a way to meet the needs of our customers. And we’re meeting it in an extremely cost-effective fashion.
I’d also highlight that when you think through the cost recovery side of it, we’ve got very unique mechanisms within our utilities.
When the underlying cost of gas goes up, where we have to purchase more than we had anticipated, we’ve got clear pass-throughs back to our customers. And we’ve negotiated those across each of our states.
So we’re well positioned to service our customers long term, and equally protect the fundamental financials of the underlying businesses.
WARREN BUFFETT: The —
GREG ABEL: Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: The company that Greg runs has many subsidiaries. And our gas pipeline subsidiaries move about 8 percent of the gas in the United States.
And I think you said you were from Omaha. And the gas that comes into this area comes through a pipeline that we own. And we just renamed the company to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, from MidAmerican Energy. We changed it to Berkshire Hathaway Energy.
But, it’s a point of some pride to us that that company, Northern Natural Gas, which originally came from Omaha, when we bought that from Enron a decade or so ago — actually, Dynegy had it in between — but its origin then was Enron.
You know, they’d skimped on maintenance, done all kinds of things. And it was ranked number 42 out of the 42 ranked pipelines in the United States at that time. And last year it was ranked number one.
So it went from last to first under Greg’s management. And I tip my hat to him. (Applause)
And number two was our other pipeline — current pipeline. So we’re running one, two at the moment.
19. Two heads running Berkshire are better than one
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Fred Ireman (PH) in Richmond, Virginia, and it’s addressed to you, Warren.
He says that, “During the past several years, much has been written and many have speculated about your successor. I shall not even go down that path, as it would cause you to repeat yourself.
“However, has there been any discussion at your board meetings about a replacement for your partner, longtime friend, and co-chairman, Charlie Munger?
“Has it been determined Berkshire will continue to be led by a similar dynamic duo? Two magnificent investor minds, each providing a unique point of view, have been a major reason the business has performed magnificently over the decades and has delighted the shareholders.”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie is my — he’s my canary in the coal mine. (Laughter)
Charlie turned 90. And I find it very encouraging how well he’s handling middle age. (Laughter)
So I hope to be able to do the same thing myself.
No — you raised a point, which is — I hadn’t thought about, but I’m a little sensitive now that you raised it.
They always talk about replacing me, but they never talking about replacing Charlie.
I do think — I think it’s very likely, incidentally, that whoever replaces me as CEO probably has, over the years certainly, developed — they’ll never be able to develop another Charlie — but they’ll develop somebody that they work with very closely. It’s a great way to operate.
Berkshire is better off because the two of us have worked together than if either one of us had been working individually, there’s no question about that. (Applause)
And —but I do think, you know, we saw it with Roberto Goizueta and Don Keough at Coke, we saw it with Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities. I mean, these were magnificent companies.
And I think that in both cases that I just named, I think that they accomplished far more because they had two incredible people running them who admired and worked well with the other. And they were complimentary, in terms of the talents they brought.
In many ways, it’s a great way to operate. You can’t will it to somebody.
But I would be very surprised if, a few years after my successor takes over, or maybe sooner, that there isn’t some relationship, a partnership, that enhances the CEO’s not only — not only achievements — but the fun they have.
And — but so far, nobody’s brought up, in the meeting, any successor to Charlie.
And frankly, I have a lot of trouble thinking of anybody that could be a successor to Charlie. (Laughs)
Charlie, you want to comment? I’ve got to give you a chance. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think the world has much to worry about. Most 90-year-old men are gone soon enough. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the canary has spoken. OK. (Laughter)
20. Subsidiary shuffles aren’t related to Berkshire succession plans
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay?
JAY GELB: I have a question on succession planning, as well.
Matt Rose recently shifted his role from CEO of the Burlington Northern unit, to executive chairman of Burlington. Does this change affect who will be the next CEO of Berkshire? And what is the succession plan for Ajit Jain at Berkshire’s reinsurance unit?
WARREN BUFFETT: The only succession for Ajit would be reincarnation. (Laughter)
We will not get another Ajit. But fortunately, we won’t have to for a very, very long time.
The situation with Matt, which was at Matt’s suggestion, was designed to fit specifically the succession situation at BNSF and the wishes of certain people. It doesn’t have any implications for Berkshire.
I have letters from every one of our managers telling me what I should — I keep — these are private, I don’t share these with the board, even — telling me what I should do if something happens to them tonight.
So I have their ideas. In some cases, they talk about more than one person. In some cases, they tell me the strengths and weaknesses of the people.
But the — I would not try to make any judgments about the succession plans at the parent company from what is done in terms of succession planning at any of the subsidiaries.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I always say, I’m not the least bit worried about it. If I — I wish my main problem in life was the fear about succession problems at Berkshire. I think we’re in very good shape.
21. “Great” question, but no answer
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Bill Melby from Northfield, Minnesota.
At the 2009 annual meeting, Mr. Buffett, you said that if you were required to invest your total net worth in one company, that that company would be Wells Fargo.
So in 2014, I ask the same company — or the same question. If you were required to invest your total net worth in one company, what would that be?
WARREN BUFFETT: When the question was asked in 2009, did you exclude Berkshire? Because I think I would’ve answered Berkshire. (Laughs)
But I wouldn’t quarrel with Wells Fargo as a marketable security outside of Berkshire at that time.
Well, I guess he’s checking his notes on — the — well —
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The question is other than Berkshire —
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, other than Berkshire.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: —what would you invest in today?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s a great question, but it’s not going to get an answer. (Laughter)
Charlie, do you want to answer?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, I think you’ve given exactly the right answer. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’m sorry to disappoint you, but we’ve disappointed others when they’ve asked that question.
22. Shareholders aren’t helped by rule requiring CEO pay disclosure
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. This question comes from Dave Hitchy (PH) from Auburn.
It’s a long question. He says, “As a shareholder for about a dozen corporations in addition to Berkshire, I always see a number of proxy statements each year. In all, except Berkshire, the summary compensation table has the compensation listed for at least five or more of the highest paid executives. Berkshire lists three, Warren, Charlie and Mark.
“I assume that since Berkshire is a holding company structure, that’s the way it is. I think it would be instructive to include at least two of the highest paid executives from the wholly-owned subsidiaries in the summary table, Ajit, Tony, or Greg, or Matt, to give the shareholders, your partners, a sense of how Berkshire compensates its strongest and highest-paid leaders, as other companies do.
“This would be particularly valuable since two-thirds of the current listees, Warren and Charlie, only receive nominal salaries of $100,000 per year, a figure that is vastly below the value they bring to the company.
“Would you, in the spirit of transparency, be willing to add at least two of the highest-paid subsidiary officers in the table in future years? And how much do you think the next CEO of Berkshire should be paid?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to the last is he certainly will be entitled to pay — get paid a lot. But their decision as to how much they accept is another question.
But I’m going to write about that very end question next year in the annual report because it has a lot of interesting ramifications.
We, obviously, are following the SEC rules, which I can’t recite, in terms of the officers required to be in the proxy statement as to their pay.
But, you know, Andrew, in my sporting mood, I would say that Comcast probably has some people in the employ that make a lot more money — not at CNBC, we’re not —but — that would exceed the salaries of the people that they list in the proxy statement, as well.
And there’s a real question as to whether it’s in the interests of the shareholders of the company to start listing, you know, how much the person who’s the anchor of the nightly news or whomever it might be, gets paid because it might have a very negative effect, in terms of negotiating salaries with other people within the organization.
I would say that the — I would say the shareholders of Comcast would be hurt, actually, if you published the five highest salaries paid at the subsidiaries or at Comcast itself.
And certainly, if you carried it to every subsidiary there was. I mean, if you were to publish the five highest salaries at CNBC, I don’t think the salaries overall would go down the following year.
So, I think that is a — I think that’s a good reason for not — for us not publishing the salaries of, you know, say, our top ten managers of the company.
At Salomon — we mentioned that a little earlier — everybody — virtually everybody — was dissatisfied with what they were getting paid. And they were getting paid enormous amounts of money.
But they were disappointed, not because of the absolute amount. They were disappointed because they looked at somebody else in the place and it drove them crazy.
And as a matter of fact, the first big crisis we had in compensation was when the management made a — what was regarded as a secret deal, with the arb group, as I remember — whereby, John Meriwether and his crew got paid a lot of money, which I would argue they earned. I mean, I think they deserved it.
But as soon as that happened, it made compensation, which had always been a terrible problem, an even greater problem because of the jealousy that broke out among the people that weren’t in John Meriwether’s group.
I think it’s been — I think it’s very seldom that publishing compensation accomplishes much for the shareholders.
In fact, you can argue that much of what’s going on in corporate America — well, I would put it this way: corporate CEOs, as a group, would be being paid a lot less money if proxy statements hadn’t revealed how much other people were getting paid.
It is only human to look at a whole bunch of proxy statements and say, “Well, I’m worth more than that guy,” and negotiate that way. And a comp committee is going to respond to that.
So, American shareholders are paying a significant price for the fact that they get to look at that proxy statement every year and see how much those top five officers are earning.
Charlie? (Scattered applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: In the spirit of transparency, you’re asking for something that wouldn’t be good for the shareholders. And it’s not going to happen unless the SEC makes it happen.
We’re way better off without adding to the culture of envy in America.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s no one that looks at —there’s no CEO that looks at other proxy statements and comes away thinking, “I should get paid less.” I mean, that — you know? (Laughter)
We haven’t seen — have we ever seen them?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
WARREN BUFFETT: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I —
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re not old enough.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say that envy is doing the country a lot of harm. And our practices are envy dampeners.
23. Why Berkshire maintains $20B cash cushion
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Greg. (Applause)
GREGG WARREN: Thank you. As you know, Berkshire’s cash balances are an issue for some investors. Especially with excess cash being in the 25 to $30 billion range the last couple of years, and Berkshire having a more difficult time than it’s had historically reinvesting capital as quickly as it comes in.
Although Berkshire did provide $3.5 billion of the $3.6 billion of cash that was used to acquire NV Energy last year, with MidAmerican funding the remainder with debt, was there something that kept Berkshire from providing all of the capital for the acquisition, perhaps via inter-company debt?
And on a separate note, can you provide with us some insight into the decision to allow MidAmerican to retain all of its earnings, while Burlington Northern, which spent $3 billion on capital expenditures last year and is on pace to spend $5 billion this year, continues to pay a distribution to Berkshire, all while it takes on additional debt to help fund capital spending?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. MidAmerican, now renamed Berkshire Hathaway Energy — we’ll call it BH Energy — will have multiple opportunities, I hope, and we’ve seen two of them in the last 12 months, to buy other businesses.
And, as you noted, we spent a substantial amount of money on NV Energy and two days ago we agreed to buy transmission lines in Alberta.
So, we will — we hope we will — and so far we’ve been able to — come up with really large businesses to buy at BH Energy.
That will not — at BNSF, we will spend a lot of money to have the best railroad possible. But we’re not going to be buying other businesses.
So, we distribute substantial money out of BNSF and we will continue to do so because it’ll earn substantial money. And it can easily handle the debt that it has and will incur.
Whereas, at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we have pretty much the appropriate level of debt at both the subsidiary and the parent company level. So as we buy things, we need not only the retained earnings that we have, but occasionally we need some money from the shareholders.
And there are three shareholders of BH Energy. Berkshire owns 90 percent and then Greg and Walter Scott have the balance.
And so, if we make a large acquisition and we need a little more equity, we will have a pro rata subscription, which the other two shareholders are welcome to participate in. But if they don’t — if they decided not to, it wouldn’t hurt them. They’d still have an improvement in the value of their shares.
So those two companies are quite different that way.
I hope that more possible deals for Berkshire Hathaway Energy come along. And I think they will.
So we may invest many, many, many billions there. We will invest billions at the railroad, but it’ll all be to improve the railroad. It won’t be to buy additional businesses.
So far this year, if you think about it, counting yesterday — now, two of these deals started last year — but we’ve spent 5 billion on acquisitions, roughly.
And, of course, in the first quarter, we spent another 2.8 billion on property, plant, and equipment.
But we are finding — we are finding things to do that tend to sop up the cash.
We always will have $20 billion around Berkshire. We will never be dependent on the kindness of strangers. It didn’t work that well for Blanche DuBois, either.
But in any event, the — we don’t count on bank lines. You know, we don’t count on — we don’t count on anything.
There will be some time in the next 100 years, and it may be tomorrow and it may be 100 years from now, and nobody knows, you know, where we cannot depend on anybody else to keep our own strength and to maintain our operations.
And we spent too long building Berkshire to have that one moment destroy us.
I mean, we lent money, as you probably know, to Harley-Davidson at 15 percent. And we lent it at a time when short-term rates were probably a half a percent.
Well, Harley-Davidson is a fine company — but it, like Goldman Sachs and General Electric and a bunch of other companies —we lent money to Tiffany’s — they — you know, they needed — when you need cash, you know, it’s the thing — it’s the only thing — you need. And it’s because other people aren’t coming up with it.
I’ve always said that, you know, cash is — available cash or credit — is a lot like oxygen: that you don’t notice it — the lack of it — 99.9 percent of the time.
But if it’s absent, it’s the only thing you notice. And we don’t want to be in that position.
So we will keep 20 billion. We will never go to sleep at night worrying about any event that’s taken place that could hurt our ability to keep playing our game.
And above 20 billion, we’ll try to find ways to invest it intelligently. And so far, we’ve generally done it. I mean, right — you know, we always had something above that.
But, you know, we’ve spent a fair amount of money so far this year. We’ll probably spend more later in the year.
So, so far, I feel we could get the cash out at reasonable returns. We never feel a compulsion to use it though, just because it’s there.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’re very lucky to have these businesses that can employ a lot of new capital at very respectable rates.
And if — earlier in the history of Berkshire, we didn’t have such automatic opportunities. And now that we’re so affluent, we really are way better off having these opportunities.
It’s a blessing. I mean, who would want to get rid of MidAmerican and the Burlington Northern Railroad? Nobody in his right mind.
I mean, we love the opportunity to invest more capital intelligently in a world where short-term interest rates are half a percent, or lower.
WARREN BUFFETT: And we love the opportunity to go in with 3G at Heinz and —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
WARREN BUFFETT: —employ significant capital. We’ll get the chances to use capital.
Eventually, you know, compound interest will catch up with us. And it’s certainly dampened things.
But it hasn’t delivered its final blow yet.
24. Buffett and Munger disagree, but never argue
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren, Charlie. John Norwood from West Des Moines, Iowa. Thank you so much for the annual meetings. And please don’t move it to Dallas or some other place. I’ve got my system worked out here.
WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Hey, two quick questions.
One is allocation of capital and how you wrestle with the operating companies and how much cash comes up to the operating companies — or comes up to the mother ship — versus the operating companies.
And you and Charlie, do you ever fight or argue? And any lessons over the years for how you manage your partnership of two? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie and I have never had an argument. We met in 19 — when I was 29. He was 35. We’re a little older now.
And in those years, 55 years, we’ve disagreed on a lot of things. And it’s just never led, and never will, lead to an argument.
We argue with other people. (Laughs)
But it just — it hasn’t occurred.
I called Charlie on the Coca-Cola vote, you know, and then said what the proxy statement said and everything. Said, “What do you think?” And we thought alike, you know?
Sometimes we don’t think alike. And we never go away in the least bit mad if we don’t, or —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Most of the time, we think alike. That’s one of the problems. If one of us misses it, the other is likely to, too. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that — well, there’s no question. If you look at the really bad mistakes we’ve made, I’ve made them.
I’m probably a little more inclined toward action than Charlie. Would you say that’s fair, Charlie? Or —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you once called me the abominable ‘no’ man. (Laughter)
25. Berkshire’s cash cushion is partially held by subsidiaries
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’ve missed — what’s the — what was the first part of the question? (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Capital allocation. How do you decide how much cash comes up from the operating companies —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s —
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — to the mother ship?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s pretty simple, in that we don’t really care too much where that 20 billion minimum is.
We wouldn’t — but we don’t count the money in a regulated — well, in the energy business or the railroad.
So we really count the money that we could make a phone call and get.
With interest rates at these levels, we sit around sometimes with — every one of our companies, I would say, probably has more cash in it than if some other large conglomerate was running the place.
They would probably have sweep accounts and all of that. And we may get around to that at some point, but it just doesn’t make that much difference, because if we had it at the parent company, we’d have it out at five basis points. And if it’s at the — if it’s down at the subsidiary, it’s probably getting five basis points.
So we’re not — it’s not something we think about on a day to day or week to week or month to month basis.
I know where the cash is. And I know when we’re going to need cash and I know what I’m thinking about doing, or may possibly do in the next few months, that maybe something’s a 50/50 probability of happening.
And anything I am committing to do, I know where the cash is coming from.
But it doesn’t mean that we try to get it all in the parent company, day by day or week by week like many companies do. We could change that procedure someday. Maybe a sweep account would make sense at some point. Probably would.
But we’re not big disciplinarians of our subsidiaries day by day. We don’t want them to feel that way.
And there’s one company I’m thinking of, where I’ve never been there. Probably only talked to the fellow who runs it three or four times in ten years. You know, and there’s a lot of cash around. And every now and then, he sends me some.
And if I really need it, I mean, I know where it is. And he’ll give it to me. But there’s — it doesn’t really make much difference, you know, whether it’s sitting there, whether it’s sitting at Berkshire.
I don’t want to encourage to our managers of our other subsidiaries who are listening to this a new way of behaving. But, I sort of adapt to the companies, except when we really need the money, and then I grab it. (Laughter)
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s just fine.
26. Buffett admits he’s “slow to make personnel changes”
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from an astute fellow named Richard Sercer of Tucson, who spotted an opening and is going for it.
And it actually reminds me of a question that you, Warren, or Charlie, could’ve thought up yourself.
“In an interview on April 23rd, 2014 about the Q&A session, Warren said, quote, ‘I hope we will get questions that probe at our weak points.’ My question is, what is our weak points and what can be done to address them?” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that would spoil all the fun for the journalists. (Laughs)
They’re the ones that are supposed to look for the weak points.
We have a lot of weak — we point them out. You know, I’ve just pointed out one.
Probably, I would say if you’d — if we’d — executed a sweep account for all our subsidiaries some years ago, you know, we would have a few more dollars than we have now.
You know, it — who knows what they’re doing with some of those balances in terms of — we wouldn’t — it wouldn’t be because we do riskier things. But we — you know — we are very disciplined in some ways. And by ordinary business standards, we’re sloppy in other ways.
And, oh, well, a clear weak point of mine would be I’m slow to make personnel changes. I mean, I like the managers we have.
And Charlie and I had a wonderful friend who couldn’t have been a greater guy. And, you know, we were slow to make a change there. We loved the guy. And it wasn’t killing us in our business.
And how long would you say we went beyond where somebody else would’ve acted in that case, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know exactly.
But that, turning to the sweep account system, reminds me of a friend I had when I was in the Air Corps and he was a very skinny man. And he decided to give blood. And they put the needle into his arm and the blood stopped flowing.
And the nurse just started stripping his arm as though it were the udder of a cow. And he got the impression that he was going to — they were going to get that blood whether it took all he had. And he fainted.
It was a very unpleasant occurrence. And I don’t think a sweep account is all that pleasant to sit there and just — every little dollar comes in, somebody sweeps it away.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, our —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I like the tone of our business.
WARREN BUFFETT: Our managers are listening here. I mean, don’t give them that illustration to use when I ask for money. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: But, you know, I’ve seen people subject to — Teledyne and Litton, those people, swept every dime every day, basically.
And it was a little more economic, but it created a tone in the company that — which I think is less desirable than ours.
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve waited too long on managers, though, sometimes, Charlie.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sure. You and I participated in taking one man directly from an executive chair into a Alzheimer’s home. There was no — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re hitting a sensitive subject here, Charlie. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d arranged that he could do no harm, and we loved him well enough so that we just made it easy for him.
I’ve never regretted it, have you?
WARREN BUFFETT: No. Not —
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
WARREN BUFFETT: Not at all. Not at all. It —
CHARLIE MUNGER: On the other hand, I want to be pretty careful.
WARREN BUFFETT: It — we will be slow. And we — there will be times when what you might call our lack of supervision over subsidiaries, you know, we’ll miss something.
Now, we think that giving our managers the degree of freedom that they enjoy will also accomplish a lot.
So someone will come along someday and say, “If you’d had many more checks and oversight and all of that sort of thing,” you know, something — well, something will happen at Berkshire and they’ll say, “That wouldn’t have happened if you’d followed the procedure that some other company followed.” And they’ll be right.
But what they won’t be able to measure is how much on the positive side we have achieved with dozens and dozens of people because we gave them that same sort of leeway.
I mean, we operate differently in terms of the level of control and supervision. You know, we don’t have a general counsel’s office at Berkshire. We don’t have a human relations department at Berkshire.
And that would be almost unthinkable to other companies. And we’re not saying that’s a 100 percent benefit in all ways. We think — but we think on balance, it’s a benefit.
But when the down side of such a procedure shows up, people will say, “Well, you should of done it differently and you should’ve been spending lots of money over the years and restricting the activities more of your subsidiary managers,” and so on.
And our reaction will be that they are wrong. But we will look bad in that individual case.
Wouldn’t you say that’s true, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The — by the standards of the rest of the world, we over trust. And so far, our results have been way better because we carefully selected people because they were going to be over trusted. And it’s worked very well for us.
And, I think a lot of places work better when they create a culture of deserved trust. And that’s been our system. And some people regard that as a weakness.
And this modern accounting treatment, when everybody’s measured on internal controls, I think it’s going to do more harm than good. (Applause)
27. Trying, and failing, to expand See’s Candies’ geographic market
WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?
JONATHAN BRANDT: See’s Candy is obviously small in the context of Berkshire’s currently expansive operations, but has long been one of your favorite businesses.
And no wonder, given that its pre-tax profits grew consistently from less than $5 million in 1972 when Berkshire acquired it, to $74 million in 1999.
However, since 1999, profit growth appears to have stalled.
Can you explain why See’s was able to grow its profits through the ’70s, ‘80s and ’90s, but not, so far, in this millennium?
Did something change about the business, for instance, the growth and demand for boxed chocolates or its market position?
Could you or Brad Kinstler discuss whether the relatively recent geographic expansion could help reignite See’s growth? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the boxed chocolate business is, basically, not growing.
I mean, if you go back 100 years, the — each city of any size was characterized by lots of candy shops. Chicago was a big leader. New York was a big leader.
Believe it or not, the predecessor company to Pepsi Cola was the — a company with the most — it was a company called Loft’s — that had the most candy shops in New York City.
It was a candy shop company, originally, that a fellow that — what was his name?
CHARLIE MUNGER: [Charles] Guth.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What was it?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Guth.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He acquired Pepsi for a few thousand bucks, stuck it in Loft’s.
And the corporate — the corporate name, if you go all the way back on Pepsi, is Loft’s.
So there were loads of candy shops around everyplace. And including in Omaha.
Boxed chocolates have lost position dramatically. Primarily, I would guess, to salted snacks of one sort or another. Various things.
See’s has done remarkably well, far better than any chocolate company in the country.
Russell Stover did very well for a while. Very well, with a different business model. But, you know, they ran into their problems as well.
So, we can’t do much about increasing the size of the market. And we’ve tried a lot of ways. And we’ve tried moving out of our strong geography, multiple times.
I mean, Charlie and I looked at what we were earning in California in the ’70s and said to ourselves, “If we could do this in 50 states instead of one, you know, we’ll get very rich.”
So we tried it and we didn’t get very rich. It doesn’t travel that well.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. And you figure out whether it’s going to work by trying it.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve tried it many times.
But so far — it’s interesting. Two-thirds — people in the East prefer dark chocolate, two-thirds to one-third. In the West, they prefer milk chocolate, two-thirds to one-third.
They like miniatures in the East. They won’t eat miniatures in the West. There’s a lot of different things.
But in the end, there isn’t a lot of boxed chocolates volume.
And we’ve done very, very, very well in See’s. And it not only has provided us with earnings that we’ve used to buy other businesses, so we’ve added lots of earnings power through See’s, beyond the earning power we’ve added at See’s.
But it opened my eyes to the power of brands and probably you could say that we made a lot of money in Coca-Cola partly because we bought See’s, or at least in my case, bought See’s, because I’d understood brands to some degree, but there’s nothing like owning one, and sort of seeing the possibilities with it as well as the limitations, to educate yourself about things you might do in the future.
And in 1972, we bought See’s. And in 1988 we bought Coca-Cola.
And I wouldn’t be at all surprised, if we had not owned See’s, whether we would’ve owned Coca-Cola later on.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s no question about the fact that its main contribution to Berkshire was ignorance removal. And it’s not the only big contributor to ignorance removal.
If it weren’t for the fact we were so good at removing our ignorance, step by step, Berkshire would be practically nothing today.
What we knew originally wasn’t enough. We were pretty damn stupid when we bought See’s. We were just barely smart enough to buy it.
And if there’s any secret to Berkshire, it’s the fact that we’re pretty good at ignorance removal. And the nice thing about that is we have a lot of ignorance left to remove. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s what happens when I call on him. (Laughter)
28. Buffett explains deal to change Bank of America investment
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ben Ottenhoff and I’m from Washington, D.C.
I was wondering if you could talk — I’ve read recently that the Bank of America investment, you changed it so they can now treat it as tier one capital.
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you explain a little bit why you did that and what benefit, if any, there is to Berkshire’s shareholders?
And also, does it give you any pause that they can’t calculate their tier one capital requirements properly?
WARREN BUFFETT: The — it came about some — really, a good many months ago, that Brian Moynihan called me and asked me whether we would be willing to change our preferred stock, five billion of it, from a cumulative preferred, to a noncumulative preferred.
Now, a non-cumulative preferred has certain defects, obviously, compared to a cumulative preferred. As, for example, the shareholder — the preferred shareholders — of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are finding out.
Noncumulative preferreds — Ben Graham wrote about them in the 1934 edition of “Security Analysis” — they’re a terribly weak form of security.
But, partly because they are that weak form of security, they count different in capital with banks.
So Brian asked me to do that and then he said, “If you will do that” — and this requires approval by their shareholders and everything — but he said, “If you’ll do that, we would be willing to make your preferred noncallable for five years.”
Now, in a world of five-basis money — five-basis-point money — you know, practically nothing — no returns — I was very willing to make that trade-off.
It was — they felt it was good for them and I felt it was good for Berkshire.
So, I get five years at Berkshire of non-call of a 6 percent preferred, which I can always use as payment for the warrants we have.
So, I don’t have a problem of being locked into it forever, into a noncumulative committed preferred, and the BofA gets the benefit of using it in their calculation of capital.
That was all done before this recent — I mean, a long time ago — before the recent, you know, week ago or so when they had the miscalculation involving some structured notes of Merrill Lynch.
That error they made does not bother me. I mean, it — you know, we work on our figures, you know, we’ve got that 20,000 page-plus tax return. We have 10-Ks, 10-Qs, going in and out. You do the best you can.
But I — that error did not affect their GAAP reported numbers or anything of the sort. And they wished they hadn’t made it. And they’ll pay a penalty, in the sense of their capital plan, because they did make it.
But it doesn’t change my feeling about the Bank of America or its management one iota.
And I do think that this — they were going to pay the dividend anyway. You know, I mean, the probabilities that going to non-cumulative hurts us are very, very low. And the probability that making it noncallable for five years is a real plus to us.
So, it was an exchange I was happy to make. And I think that it was good for us and good for them.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
29. NetJets is “satisfactory,” but don’t expect big growth
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Frank Robinson in Madison.
And he asks, “Ten years ago, NetJets was mentioned at the annual meeting each year as an exciting growth opportunity for Berkshire. Five years ago, there were some problems which seem to have been addressed since they’re no longer mentioned.
“What are the current prospects for NetJets? Is it a substantial contributor to growth and revenue and earnings?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s not a big grow — it’s a very — it’s a perfectly decent business.
The number — it peaked in new unit volume more or less coincident with what happened in the stock market in 2007 and ’08.
I mean, there were a fair number of people whose income was dependent on stock market behavior, particularly hedge fund managers. But other — a lot of others.
And they gave us quite a boom in sales. And not only did their demand fall off, but when their contracts ran out — and they tended to run out in, like, 2011 and ’12 — a lot of them did not renew.
Until the last — won’t be totally accurate on this — but until the last six or eight months, net ownership in the U.S. was declining just slightly. And that’s turned around now. Net ownership is growing month by month.
But it is not a huge growth business at all. I mean — it’s a very large-size business. I mean, we are, you know, probably 60-some percent of the industry and there’s nobody remotely close as a second. I mean, we are the premier product.
But I don’t see the market being double or triple the present size.
We are going to China very soon. But that’s a very, very long-range play. We are in Europe and that is not — that still is declining a little bit in unit volume.
Now, the flight hours have picked up a fair amount. So the owners are using the planes more in the last six months to a year, and that fell off a lot in the 2007- 8 period.
So I would not characterize NetJets as a big growth opportunity. But I would — but I’m glad we own it. And I think it’s very — it’s a very satisfactory business.
But it is not one I would expect to see a whole lot of growth out of.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I demonstrated my optimism by buying 25 more hours. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: He was a tough sell, too, I got to tell you that. (Laughter)
I can think of a few more comments, but I won’t make them.
30. Unlikely to use major stock holdings to pay for acquisitions
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay.
JAY GELB: This question is on acquisitions.
How large of an acquisition is Berkshire comfortable targeting currently?
And to what extent are Berkshire’s major equity investments in Wells Fargo, Coke, American Express, and IBM realistically a potential source of funds for deals?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they could be a source of funds. But it’s very unlikely they will be.
But — the — our goal is to buy really good businesses, and big businesses, and businesses where we like the management, and businesses that we think we can grow over time.
I mean, Berkshire is about building earning power. When we buy, as we did a day or two ago, agreed to buy that transmission line in Alberta, I mean, I’m looking at trying to add earning power to Berkshire.
And we try to do that every day or every week or every month. And we don’t get opportunities that often.
But if the opportunities were large enough and we needed to raise some money, you know, we can dip into a huge reservoir of securities and still have, you know, huge investments thereafter.
It hasn’t come to that. You know, when we’ve got 40-some billion of capital — or cash — and I’m willing to take it down to 20, it — you know, we’ve got a fair cushion there.
But if I needed to, we would do something, if it was attractive enough, and big enough, that it required us to.
So, that could happen. Could happen this year, could happen ten years from now. You never know.
Charlie, have you got any thoughts on that?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, no, I think the — our acquisitions have been irregular in the past. They’ll be irregular in the future.
I do think we’ll get more, sort of, automatic, intelligent redeployment of capital from our railroad and our utility subsidiary than we have in the past. And I think that’s good, good for the shareholders.
WARREN BUFFETT: I think people may think that what we get turned on is by finding some stock we’d like to buy. That’s fine.
But what really — there’s no comparison — what really turns us on is finding a business that we want to buy, and that fits well for Berkshire, and that’ll be earning money for Berkshire 10 and 20 and 50 years from now.
That’s what we’re — that’s what we’ve been trying to build for 49 years.
And marketable securities have played a big part in that, because the profits that we’ve made from them have helped do that, and it’s a great place to deploy capital on an — you know, it’s easy to do there.
But if you — what we’re really thinking about, at least Charlie and I — we’ve got Todd and Ted thinking about marketable securities — what we’re really thinking about is buying businesses. And that’s what it’ll continue to be.
We’re in no hurry to sell any of those stocks you mentioned. (Laughs)
They — there probably would be other stocks — if we were going to go out to raise five or 10 billion from stocks, they would not be the names you mentioned.
31. Still reluctant to borrow despite cheap money
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello Warren, Charlie. My name is Stefano Grasso (PH) and I come from Genova, Italy, all the way from there. It’s a pleasure to be here today with you.
I have a question about increasing leverage for Berkshire in this day. This question is really to trigger a discussion and to hear your thoughts on that.
And also, this question was triggered by the fact that following the acquisition of BNSF, few years ago, which was partially financed by Berkshire stock, shortly after, there was plenty of cash around.
There could be different advantages for Berkshire to wisely increase leverage these days. Some generally true for all the companies. Some Berkshire specific.
And the Berkshire specific, most important one for me as a shareholder, is that the investment decision made to invest the funds would be made by the present team, you and the other managers.
Question is then, why not go out and ask for several billions in bonds with a long maturity, and maybe even with some earlier endorsement or callable options embedded at Berkshire discretion, and good — and make a good use of it? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what you say makes great sense.
And it’s the kind of thing Charlie and I used — I think if you’d asked Charlie and me 40 years ago, that if we were looking at the present set of interest rates and we had some wonderful businesses that were making a lot of money, whether we would have gone out and borrowed a whole lot of money for the long term. We would’ve said yes, right, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Wouldn’t have been a hard decision.
WARREN BUFFETT: But, we’ve got several reasons. We — A, we do have a good way of generating funds other than through equity: through float. And we’ve done that to the tune of 77 billion.
And we don’t like the idea of operating a very conservatively-leveraged company, and then changing courses so that the people who bought bonds that were rated double-A, sort of find themselves with much lower rated bonds of the sort.
We don’t have any problem leveraging up the utility or the railroad. They deserve to have even a lot more debt than they do, but we keep it sort of in line with what the rating agencies think should be conventional ratios.
But they’re — if you look — if you analytically look at them — both of them could withstand a fair amount more debt.
At the parent level, we — you know, looking back on the BNSF deal, we borrowed some money that time and we used some equity.
I think using equity helped us make the deal. But it was, you know, it was not a smart thing to do, basically.
I should — and I could’ve always gone to the market and repurchased a bunch of stocks subsequently, and that’s probably what I should’ve done on that.
So I understand your point. I completely — you know, another 30 or 40 billion of debt at Berkshire would be nothing and it would cost very little.
We don’t actually have great places to put it now, as evidenced by the fact that we’ve got 25 billion or so of excess cash.
We’d be — we are reluctant to leverage it up a lot at the parent now, since we have these other sources of money that are really pretty attractive.
We are selling what we call structured settlements, for example, that have a very long duration. And they actually have an interest cost to us of less than if we were to sell bonds.
So we are doing certain things that are along the lines you urge, but not nearly as aggressively as you urge.
And you probably are right. And you’re certainly right if we saw a $50 billion deal and we passed on it for some reason because we were unwilling to take on some debt.
If we see a really good $50 billion deal, we’ll figure out a way to do it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’d welcome it. We’re — even though what you suggest is intelligent, we’re probably not going to do it in advance.
WARREN BUFFETT: You caught the last two words there.
32. Climate change threat doesn’t affect investment decisions
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Question comes from Rory Holscher in Galena, Illinois. This question is about Berkshire’s investments in climate change.
“On one hand, Berkshire’s utilities have large commitments to wind and solar power. Berkshire also has an investment in BYD, an innovative transportation company that may be comparable in some ways to Tesla.
“On the other hand, Burlington Northern hauls a lot of coal. You point out in the 2013 annual report that its profits could shrink if coal burning was curtailed.
And then there’s the reinsurance business.
How do these and other Berkshire investments align with your understanding of the risks and opportunities posed by climate change? How should we think about this as investors?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that you’ve stated the facts on a whole bunch of businesses. And, I mean, if you own a railroad that’s carrying a lot of coal, it’ll carry a lot of coal for a long period. A very long period. But it’ll probably carry less at some point. I don’t think —I think that’s very likely, too.
But, I get all these questions from people who tell me they want me to fill out lots of forms and everything about how it’ll affect our insurance business. It doesn’t — it just doesn’t operate in that — in that time period.
I mean, we are not making — when Ajit and I talk about what we’ll charge for catastrophe insurance, you know, whether it’s hurricanes in Florida, or whether it’s earthquakes in New Zealand, or whatever it may be, the year-to-year change in probabilities on that are, at least in our view, extremely low.
I mean, it doesn’t come close to being anything that affects your prices in any material way in any given year.
And, you know, we will continue to develop alternative sources of energy. We’ll continue to use coal in our coal generation plants until the utility commissions under which we operate tell us that we should do something different. We have no choice about that.
We, incidentally, have no — I mean, we’re happy to carry the coal, but beyond that, we are a common carrier. I mean, we might love to turn away chlorine or ammonia or something like that because of the dangers in carrying it. And we can’t get compensated adequately for that.
But we are a common carrier. So, we — by law, we’re required to carry the freight that is offered to us.
So I — I don’t think in making an investment decision on Berkshire Hathaway, or most companies, virtually all of the companies I can think of, that climate change should be a factor in the decision- making process. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think a lot of the people who think they know how climate change is going to change weather patterns and hurricanes are overclaiming. (Applause)
We’re sort of agnostic. It isn’t that there isn’t some global warming, because there plainly is.
But the people who think they know exactly what’s going to happen and how many people are going to die from tropical diseases and so forth are mostly talking through their hats.
I think there’s a class of people who like the idea they’ve got a calamity to worry about. And —
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but — and when you say it, I mean, just in terms of being an economic variable in making a decision, this —
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. We’re not saying, “How can we structure our whole investment program to take into account what we think we know about climate change?”
But I think we’re very well located long term, no matter what happens.
I think that transmission lines and more or — we’re going to have to produce a lot more electricity directly from the sun or indirectly through things like wind. And, we’re beautifully positioned.
It’s just like GEICO made a lot of money when the internet came along, that they didn’t really plan on, I think we’ll make a lot of money as more and more electricity is produced more directly from the sun.
So I think we’re in a very good shape. But I don’t think we deserve any great credit for it. We just stumbled into it.
33. Praise for portfolio managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler
WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg?
GREGG WARREN: Since Berkshire started to transfer some of the responsibility for the company’s investment portfolio over to Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, the two men have gone from managing around $3 billion each in early 2012, to managing more than $7 billion each earlier this year.
That said, this still represents less than 10 percent of the equity portion of your investment portfolio, with big legacy positions in Wells Fargo, Coca-Cola, American Express, IBM and Proctor & Gamble, overshadowing the rest of the holdings.
Can you give us an update on how much money each of your lieutenants is now running and how much you see that growing into over the next five years?
And given that both men have seemingly been involved in things beyond their roles as portfolio managers the last couple of years, how much do you expect their roles to expand over time?
And on a completely separate note, at what point can we expect to see Todd and Ted join you and Charlie up there on stage to talk about their efforts managing Berkshire’s investment portfolio?
WARREN BUFFETT: I got through college answering fewer questions than that. (Laughter)
They are managing about —it’s a little over 7 billion now. We will change that periodically and it will always be upward. But we don’t change it month by month.
I mean, their portfolios may change in value month by month. But they will be handling more money in the future than they are now.
I think, to some extent, they, as well as I — you know, I’ve had the unpleasant experience of handling more and more money as the years go by — they are seeing that it does get a little more difficult as the sums get larger.
But it’s still far better to keep moving money over to them and away from me as time passes. And that’ll continue to be the case.
They’re both terrific additions to Berkshire, beyond their investment skills in that they know — they each know — a whole lot about business. They know a whole lot about management.
And there are a lot of things that come across the desk at Berkshire that I get an idea on, but I just don’t feel like carrying out myself, because they might involve a lot of time, particularly if they get involved in negotiating small points and that sort of thing.
So Ted and Todd have both, as I mentioned in the report, been very helpful in doing things beyond their investment management duties that have added a significant value to Berkshire. And I think it’s a cinch that that will continue.
They want to do it. They enjoy doing it. They don’t ask for extra compensation, at all, because they do it.
They’re 100 percent attuned to Berkshire. They know how I think. And if I tell them, you know, “Here’s a deal that I think makes sense if you can get it done,” they’ll know why it makes sense, and they’ll know how to get it done, and they’ll spend the time to do it.
So it’s been a big, big plus for Berkshire to bring them onboard. And they’ll be more important factors as the years go by. OK.
Charlie? I’m sorry, I’m —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
CHARLIE MUNGER: How’s that?
34. Praise for Federal Reserve and Chairman Ben Bernanke
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. My name is Jason. I’m from Toronto and my question relates to the general financial markets.
We’ve been in an environment of virtually zero interest rates now for many years. In recent times, prolonged periods of low rates have led to asset bubbles, such as the housing bubble and, potentially, now a bond bubble.
If you were running the Fed, what would be your policy with respect to interest rates? Do you see a need for a hike? And what would be your time horizon for such a change? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, since it’s — you’re right about the — who would’ve guessed five years ago that you’d have had rates this low for this long?
You’re — I would say that I’m surprised at, really, how well things are going.
I don’t think I would be doing much differently. And I particularly say that because it’s worked so well so far. So I would like to say that I would’ve done exactly the same thing and take credit for it.
I’ve been surprised at how well this worked. But as I said last year, this is really an interesting movie because we haven’t seen it before. And what makes it interesting is also we don’t know how it ends. But, I think Ben Bernanke was a hero, both at the time of the crash — or the panic — and subsequently.
I think he’s a very smart man. I think he handled things very well.
What was interesting to me was when the minutes of the Fed from the period in 2007 and 2008 came out, it was interesting to me how a number of the members of the Fed were not getting it, as to what was happening.
That was really fascinating. It wasn’t — there were a lot of them that didn’t really understand, it seems that way, or some of them that didn’t understand just how serious things were.
And so I give particular credit to Bernanke, considering the fact that he was really not getting a cons — certainly not a unanimous view from those surrounding him, that the kind of actions he knew were necessary, were really necessary.
And yet, he went ahead with them. And in my opinion, did a masterful job. And from everything I’ve seen of Janet Yellen, I feel the same way about her.
We will see how this movie plays out. You know, I do not know the answer as to what happens if you keep rates close to zero for a very, very long time. And keep absorbing more and more of the debt issuance of the country because so far, we’ve tapered, but we’re still buying.
I’d be interested to hear Charlie’s thoughts on it.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, nobody, for instance, in Japan would ever have anticipated that interest rates would go way down and stay down for 20 years.
And nobody would’ve expected common stocks to decline by huge amounts and stay down for 20 years.
So strange things have happened. And they’re very confusing to the economics profession.
In fact, if you’re not confused, you really probably don’t understand it very well.
And at Berkshire, what I noticed is there aren’t many long-term bonds being bought.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — well, you know, in 2008, I wrote an article saying, you know, that — everybody was saying cash is king. Well, cash may have been king if you used it, but cash was the dumbest damn thing you could possibly own, you know, if you weren’t going to use it.
And people cling to cash at — usually at the wrong times.
But it is — a zero interest rate policy has had a huge effect, both in rejuvenating the economy and — and in terms of asset prices.
It has not, in my view, produced a bubble. That doesn’t mean it can’t produce one. But this is not — this is not a bubble situation, at all, that we’re living in. But it’s an unusual situation that we’re living in.
Any further thoughts, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’m as confused as you are.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh good. Good. (Laughter)
That’s why we get along so well.
35. How Berkshire benefits from being a conglomerate
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: This question concerns another uncertainty. It’s from Chris Gotcho (PH) of Gotcho Capital Management in New York City.
“You’ve been looking for a credentialed bear to ask questions at this meeting. I’m not it. In fact, selling short on Berkshire would be quite silly.
“However, in the long term, Berkshire has a business model of owning over 70 non- financial, unrelated businesses — bricks and chocolate, for example — which is a model that has almost universally not worked well in the past 100 years of American business.
“The model has worked well for you two, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, who are uniquely talented.
“But the question is, the probabilities do not seem likely to be favorable that their successors will be able to have it continue to work nearly as well.”
So that is my question.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Actually, the — it’s interesting.
The model has worked well for America. I mean, if you look at all these disparate businesses in America, they’ve done extraordinarily well over time.
So if you want to look at the Dow Jones average as one entity — now, it was a changing group of companies over a 100-year period — but, you know, any business unit that goes from 67 — or 66 — to 11,497 while paying you out a fair amount of money every year, actually is a model that’s worked pretty well. But it hasn’t been, of course, under one management.
But owning a group of good businesses is not a terrible business plan. A good many of the conglomerates were put together to perform financial magic of one sort or another.
They were based upon — you know, if you go back to the Litton Industries and the Gulf and Westerns and just — you could name them by the hundreds. They were really put together — Ling-Temp — LTV, and — on the idea of serial issuance of stock, where you issued stock that was selling at 20 times earnings to buy businesses that were at ten times earnings.
And it was the idea that somehow you could fool people into continuously riding along on this chain letter scheme, without the primary thought being given to what you were actually building in the management.
I think our business plan makes nothing but great sense, to own a great group, a group of great businesses, diversified, outstanding managers, conservatively capitalized.
And with one enormous advantage, which people don’t really understand. I mean, capitalism is about, in an important way, it’s about the allocation of capital. And we have a system at Berkshire where we can allocate capital without tax consequences.
So we can move businesses from See’s Candy, to generate surplus capital, to other areas. It doesn’t hurt See’s in the process, and we can move it, as the textbooks say, to places where capital can be usefully employed, like wind farms or whatever it may be.
So we are — you know — there’s nobody else really better situated to do that than Berkshire Hathaway, and it makes perfectly good sense.
But it has to be applied with business-like principles, rather than with stock promotion principles. And I would say a great many of the conglomerates have been — have had, as their underlying premise, stock promotion.
You know, you saw what happened with Tyco or — the serial acquirers were usually interested in issuing a lot of stock.
I think if you had to look at one of the primary indicators of what sort of species you’re viewing, you would see whether somebody’s issuing — if they’re issuing stock continuously, one way or another, they’ve probably got a chain letter game going on. And that does come to a bad end.
I think our method of acquiring for cash, and acquiring good businesses, and building many, many sources of growing earning power, I think, is a terrific model.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’re a couple of differences between us and the people who are generally thought to have failed at a conglomerate model.
One is we have an alternative when there’s nothing to buy in the way of companies. We’ve got more securities to buy in the insurance company portfolios. And that’s an option which most of the other conglomerates didn’t have.
Number two, they were hell bent to buy something or other quite regularly. And we don’t feel any compulsion to buy. We’re willing to just sit until something makes sense.
We’re quite different. We’re a lot more like the Mellon brothers than we are like Gulf and Western. And the Mellon brothers did very, very well for what, 50, 60, 70 years.
And they were willing to own minority interest, they were willing to grow companies, they were a lot like us.
And so I don’t think we’re a standard conglomerate. And I think we’re likely to continue to do very well, sort of like if the Mellon brothers had just kept young forever.
WARREN BUFFETT: Now you’re talking.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)
36. Praise for Forest River’s Pete Liegl
WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.
JONATHAN BRANDT: Forest River is one of Berkshire’s better performing acquisitions. Since Berkshire purchased it in 2005, its sales have grown considerably faster than those of its principle competitor, Thor. And I believe it has taken the number one spot at retail for recreational vehicles.
Can you explain what Forest River is doing differently from Thor? And tell us whether Forest River is accepting lower operating margins than Thor’s 7 percent to gain the share.
Does Forest River have any sustainable, structural advantages over Thor that will help it maintain its number one position?
Also, with three companies now accounting for about 80 percent of the share in the RV market, are there greater barriers to entry than in the past, or can a feisty upstart like Forest River, in its day, still come out of nowhere and gain a lot of share?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We bought a company called Forest River, run by a fellow named Pete Liegl, I’d say about ten years ago or so.
And it’s interesting. Pete, who is not an MBA type at all, he’s a terrific guy, he built up a — (Laughter)
That was not a statement, that was an observation. (Laughter)
Pete built up a very successful, but much smaller, RV business. And he sold it to a private equity firm in the mid-1990s. And they promptly started telling him how to run it. And he, very shortly thereafter, told them to go to hell.
And, not very long after that, it went broke, which is not an unusual — I would’ve predicted that.
So Pete then bought it out of bankruptcy, and rebuilt it, and then came to see me about ten years ago.
And in one afternoon — we went to dinner that night. He brought his wife and his daughter. And we bought the business.
And he made me a couple of promises then. He’s very limited in his promises. I told him what I’d do. And we’ve lived happily ever after.
I’ve never been to Forest River. It’s based in Elkhart, Indiana. I hope it’s there. I mean, maybe they’re just making up these figures — you know?
I could see that. Some guy saying, “What figures shall we send Warren this month, you know, ha, ha, ha.” (Laughter)
Pete does a terrific job of running the company. We made a deal at the time he came, on incentive comp and base comp. He’s never suggested a change, I’ve never suggested a change.
He’s built the company to where it’ll do over — I think it’ll do over $4 billion of business this year.
I’ve probably had three or four phone calls with him in the whole time.
It’s his company. And he does a sensational job.
I don’t know about the Thor-Forest River situation in terms of how tough it is to go in to compete with him. I think it’d be tough to compete with Pete under any circumstances.
His IT department, for a $4 billion business, consists of six people. He just knows what’s going on in the place.
And the important thing is that it’s his company. I couldn’t run an RV company, and we don’t have anybody at headquarters that could run one.
It’s a tough business. And you do work on narrow margins, to get to your point on that, Jonny. The —it’s a business that runs with maybe 11 or 12 percent gross margins, and probably 5 to 6 percent of SG&A. So, you know, your margins are in that 6-or-so percent range.
We have a very good — both from his standpoint and from our standpoint — we worked out an incentive comp. Like I say, we worked it out that afternoon in Omaha when he came by.
And it’s worked for him. It’s worked for us. You know, it couldn’t be a better arrangement. I wish we had 20 like it.
And probably, most of our shareholders don’t even know we own Forest River. But that is a company that will do 4 billion of business this year, and I’ll bet will do more business over time. It’s the leader in its industry. The industry’s not going to go away.
And, you know, maybe we can even sell a little insurance on RVs. So that’s the story on Forest River.
37. Modest impact of Bakken oil shale on Berkshire
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren, Charlie. My name is Vishal Patel (PH). I’m visiting from Toronto, Canada, and my question is about the oil sands.
Can you please share with the audience your view on the oil sands industry and their impact on Berkshire Hathaway?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in terms of —are you thinking of the oil sands or are you thinking of shale production?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m thinking oil sands, Alberta.
WARREN BUFFETT: Alberta, yeah.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Keystone XL.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a huge impact. We have a crane business at Marmon that does a lot of business in oil development, generally. But, certainly, is active in the oil sands.
We will soon have a transmission operation that will cover 85 percent of Alberta. Alberta’s a big place. It’ll have 8,000 miles, or something like that, of transmission lines, for example.
But the oil sands business is — I mean, you know, oil sands are huge. And we own some Exxon Mobil, when they’ve got an operation in the oil sands, obviously.
One thing you might find kind of interesting, you know, we are moving 700,000 barrels a day of crude oil on our railroad. We’ve got — probably got — maybe, nine unit trains — now [BNSF Executive Chairman] Matt [Rose] can correct me on that — you know, that carry 100 cars or so.
And each one has 650 barrels, or so, of oil so that — oil, you may find interesting, not only is there a significant advantage in terms of the flexibility of where you take it, so that spreads are different in different places, and you can move it to refineries that you might otherwise have trouble moving it to. Rail’s flexible that way.
But rail, actually, you know — mentally, you think of oil gushing through pipelines. But rail is probably, I would say, close to twice as fast in moving oil as is — as are pipelines.
But we recently bought a company from Phillips 66. We got it in an exchange for our Phillips stock. We bought a specialty chemicals company.
And its main product is a chemical additive that causes oil to move through pipelines about 10 percent faster than it would otherwise. So it may take a day off of a trip.
So we’re actually in the pipeline business in a small way — the crude pipeline business — in a small way, through that.
I don’t think — I think the oil sands are an important asset for mankind, obviously. There’s a huge amount of oil there. They’re an important asset for mankind, you know, in — over the centuries to come.
But I don’t think there’s — I don’t think it will dramatically change anything at Berkshire.
Matt might have a different view on that. I’ll ask Charlie to talk. And then if Matt would like to say anything, I’d be glad to hear from him, too.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but, a lot of the oil sand production uses natural gas to produce the heavy oil.
So it’s a very peculiar thing. It’s economic only if oil stays at a very high price, and it’s delightfully economic only if natural gas is too cheap.
So it’s a very peculiar business. And it is good for mankind. But whether it’s a great investment or not, I haven’t the faintest idea.
WARREN BUFFETT: Matt, would you — do you have anything to add on the crude situation there?
38. Update on Buffett’s hedge fund bet
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re at noon.
I promised a group — some people — six years ago I made a bet for charity on how a index — Standard and Poor’s 500 index fund — would compare in performance to a group of hedge funds. And a firm in New York took me up on the bet.
And I promised that every year I would give the up-to-date results on how we’re doing. And it’s getting to be more fun to give these results every year. (Laughter)
We’re now six years into the bet. And it’s interesting, because the people who selected these funds are very decent people and smart people. And, obviously, the fund of funds gets paid based on the per — they get paid a fee, naturally.
But they also get paid an additional performance fee based on how the hedge funds they select do. So they have every economic incentive to come up with a wonderful group of hedge funds.
And underneath these fund — five funds of funds that are involved in the bet — there are probably, at least, 200 hedge funds that the fund of fund managers have carefully picked in order to enhance their own income. They got the ultimate motivation going for them.
So we are now five years — six years — into the bet. And the first year, the fund of fund groups, in a down market, did considerably better than the S&P.
But as you can see in the five years subsequently, the S&P has been running away, to some degree.
Interestingly enough, we bought — we each put in 350, or something, thousand dollars, and we bought zero-coupon bonds so there would be a million dollars in ten years.
We bought ten-year Treasurys, zero coupon. And we bought a million dollars principal. We each put up 350.
Well, the way interest rates changed after a few years to practically zero rates, it meant the bonds, even though they had no coupons attached to them, practically went to par.
So, a year or two ago, we sold the bonds at about 95 or 6, we got almost the full million dollars. We put that all in Berkshire stock. I guaranteed them that they would have a million dollars at the end of ten years, no matter what happened.
And so the prize looks like it’s going to be quite a bit more than a million dollars when the ten years comes around, so. So, so far, everyone’s happy.
Afternoon session
1. Record attendance
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s get ready to proceed.
We never get any precise figures, because people come and go from the meeting. But I did know that we sent out about 11,000 more tickets this year than in any other year, and we had all the overflow rooms filled. We’re using space in a room over at the Hilton and everything, so clearly this year we have substantial more attendance than any year in the past, and I hope the spending patterns reflect that. (Laughter)
2. Risk of change to businesses
WARREN BUFFETT: So with that, we’ll go to Becky. Assuming she’s here.
BECKY QUICK: I am, I’m here.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
BECKY QUICK: Let’s see, this is a question that comes, and I hope I pronounce your name correctly, Michael.
It’s Michael — Michael Locheck (PH) and he says, “Energy Future Holdings’ likely bankruptcy is a consequence of unexpected and dramatic decline in prices of natural gas prices caused by a revolution in drilling technology. To what extent do you believe other assets held in Berkshire’s portfolio, debt, equity, et cetera, may be subject to disruptive technological or other changes that erode business models and barriers to entry?”
“For example, changes in consumer behavior and regulation could affect Coca-Cola. Revolution in payment systems could affect American Express, ever-increasing rate of change in technology and competitive landscape could affect IBM, wireless delivery of media content and urbanization could be disruptive to DirecTV.
“Could you also comment on whether participation of some sponsors of Energy Future Holdings, which include the very best of private equity, contributed to your decision to invest? Was it the degree of crowd mentality at play, and what lessons are to be learned from the experience?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. I would be unwilling to share the credit for my decision to invest in Energy Future Holdings with anybody else. I would think that’s very unfair of anyone to insinuate that they had anything to do with that decision.
That was just a mistake on my part. It was a big — it was a significant mistake, and we will make mistakes in the future.
All businesses should constantly be thinking about what can mess up their business model. And with Energy Future Holdings it was a fairly simple assumption that was made that just turned out to be wrong.
I mean, the assumption there was that gas prices would stay roughly as high as they were or go higher, and instead they went a whole lot lower.
And at that point the whole place toppled. They had a lot of reserve holdings and they had some futures positions which kept them alive for a while. But that was a basic error.
We look at all of our businesses as subject to change. A classic case would be GEICO. I mean, GEICO set out in 1936 to operate at low costs and pass on those low costs to the customer through lower prices for something that was a necessity, auto insurance.
And they originally did it by mail offerings, U.S. Postal Service, two people who were government employees. That’s where the name comes from, GEICO, Government Employees Insurance Company.
And they had to adapt over the years, and they adapted first to widening classifications. But they went from the U.S. mail, primarily, to the telephone, and later went to the internet, and onto social media.
But in there they stumbled one time, too, as they went to adapt, and they — when they left the government employees classification, at one point they became too aggressive about expanding and they almost — they really did go broke.
So there’s — change is going on all the time, and it’s going on with all of our businesses. And we want managers that are thinking about change, and what can — what’s going to be needed for their business model in the future. And we know they’re not going look the same five or ten years from now.
I mean, BNSF, something as basic as railroads, is looking big at LNG for its locomotives. Everything is going to change.
Our businesses generally deal from strength and they’re generally not subject to rapid change. But they’re all subject to change, and of course, slow change can be much harder to perceive, and can lull you to sleep easier, sometimes than when rapid change is clearly in sight.
So I would say, in answer to that question, A) I will make mistakes in the future. I mean, when you — that’s guaranteed.
We do not make anything like “bet the company” decisions that will ever cause us real anguish. That just doesn’t happen at Berkshire. But you’re not going to make a lot of decisions without making some significant mistakes.
And occasionally they work out very well. Charlie and I, and Sandy Gottesman, in 1966, bought a department store in Baltimore. Now, there’s probably nothing dumber than buying a department store in the mid-1960s. There were four department stores on the corner of Howard and Lexington Street in Baltimore in 1966, and none of them are there. And the number one store, Hutzler’s, went broke a little later than our store went broke.
But fortunately Sandy did a great job of selling it, so the $6 million invested in that department store became worth about $45 billion in Berkshire Hathaway stock as we did other things with the money as we went along.
So you do have to be very alert to what is going on in your businesses, and we want our managers to do that. But actually, it’s something that Charlie and I, and our directors, are going to think about, as well as our managers. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I spoke earlier about the desirability of removing your ignorance piece by piece, and there’s another trick, which is scrambling out of your mistakes. And we’ve been quite good at both, and it’s enormously useful.
Imagine Berkshire, a textile mill sure to go broke because power costs in New England were about twice as high as they were in TVA country, a sure-to-fail department store, and a trading stamp sure to be forced out of business by change in mode. Out of that comes Berkshire Hathaway. Talk about scrambling out of mistakes, I think of what we might have done if we’d had a better start. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The point was driven home to me — my great-grandfather started a grocery store here in Omaha in 1869. And my grandfather was running it in 1929, and he wrote my uncle who was going to be running it with him.
And the letter started out, this is in 1929, “The day of the chain store is over.” And that is why we ended up with one grocery store, which went out of business in 1969.
It — you really have to face facts around you, and the wish being father to the thought was, unfortunately, what overcame my grandfather.
3. Heinz earning power
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay?
JAY GELB: This question is on the Heinz transaction.
Berkshire’s 50 percent ownership in Heinz is included in Berkshire’s results, which can be meaningful to its earnings over time.
What is Heinz’s current normalized earning power, after the substantial restructuring of the business, and what do you anticipate Heinz could earn within a few years?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Heinz will be filing its own 10-Qs. In fact, I guess its first quarter would be — they went to a calendar year now — first quarter would be about due now. So you’ll get to see Heinz’s figures.
And I will say this, that Heinz was actually a very reasonably run food company with about 15 percent pre-tax margins for many years, and that’s not an unusual operating margin in the food business.
And I would just invite you to look quarter by quarter and maybe next year, too, I think the margins of Heinz will be significantly improved from those historical figures. What Bernardo Hees and his associates have done there is — they’ve just restructured the business model.
And I think that the brands, which are all-important, are as strong as ever. And I think the cost structure is going to be significantly improved without cutting into marketing expenditures.
So I think you’ll see a significant improvement, but I don’t want to name a number on that. You’ll find it out soon enough.
4. Buy companies or stock?
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Dev Contessaria (PH) and I’m a fund manager from Philadelphia.
You’ve touched on some of this already today, but I wanted to ask, if you could expand on how you think about comparing investment opportunity.
In the past, you haven’t been afraid to make a single position a large portion of your portfolio, such as Coca-Cola.
So when there is a chance to buy more of your favorite names, as in 2008 and early 2009, how did the case of buying more of companies like Coca-Cola or even a Moody’s, which had dropped from 75 to 15, as examples, compare with other things that you actually did?
Could Berkshire have achieved its historical returns with a more simple, concentrated portfolio of your favorite names with positive characteristics such as durable competitive advantage, pricing power, strong organic growth, et cetera, versus the larger, more complex collection of businesses which exist today? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, depends which favorite name we might have hit harder back in the 2008 and 2009 period.
In the first instance, I spent a considerable part of our cash reserves too early, looking back, too early in the 2009 panic. The bottom of that was reached early in March in 2009, and that bottom was quite a bit lower than September and October of 2008 when we spent 16 or so billion.
Now, we were committed to finance Mars for 6.6 billion, and that commitment had been made many months earlier, so we didn’t really have much choice in terms of the timing of that.
But we did fine on the expenditures we made during that period, but obviously we didn’t do as well, remotely as well, as if we’d kept all of the powder dry and then just spent it all at once at the bottom.
But we’ve never really figured out how to do that, and we won’t figure out how to do that.
So, the timing could have been improved dramatically. On the other hand, as late as the late fall of October of 2009, when the economy was still in the dumps, really in the dumps, you know, we were able to buy BNSF, which will be an enormous part of our future.
So, overall we did reasonably well going through that period. But looking back, the most money would have been made just by buying a bundle of stocks.
When we were buying Harley Davidson bonds at 15, looking back we should have been buying the stock. But that’ll always be the case.
Overall, we would love the idea — what really we want to do at our present size and scope, and with the objectives we’ve got for our shareholders, is we want to buy big businesses with good management at reasonable prices and then try to build them over time.
I mean, when we start 2014, we’ve got a really good group of businesses, some of them very big. Those businesses will earn more over time, and then the — what we’re trying to do is add onto them and make sure we don’t issue any shares in the process. So it’s not a complicated process.
And looking back we’ll always be able to do it better than we’ve done it. That’s just the nature of things. But I don’t — I feel the game is still a very viable one, and will be for some time. It won’t be forever, it can’t be forever. But it’s still got some juice left in it. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s happened, of course, is the private businesses that we control have gotten to be a bigger and bigger percentage of the thing. For a great many of the early years we had more in common stocks than the total value of the company. And so we were — it was like a big portfolio of common stocks and a lot of businesses thrown in as extras.
And now, of course, the private companies are worth way more than the stocks. And, I would guess that that will continue, wouldn’t you Warren?
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, it’ll continue. And the difference is when we’re right about stocks, it shows up in market value and in net worth.
When we’re right about businesses, it shows up in future earning power, which you can see, but it doesn’t jump out at you the same way changes in stock values do. So it’s a different sort of buildup of value, and one is somewhat easier to see than the other.
But the other is more enduring and does not require going from flower to flower. And they’re both fine, but we’ve moved into phase two. Say that’s fair, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, if you’re just investing moderate amounts of capital in the middle of some panic, you take the bottom tick, it’s a very attractive price. But no significant volume of the shares could have been purchased at that price.
And so when we buy these businesses, we can get huge chunks of money into things. And now if we’d wanted to go much heavier into Moody’s, we couldn’t have bought that much anyway.
WARREN BUFFETT: No, no.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so, we are sort of forced by our own past success, more into these bigger positions represented by the private companies.
But really, that’s in the advantage of all of us, I think.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I love it when we buy transmission lines in Alberta. I don’t think anything horrible is going happen to Alberta. And nor do I think transmissions —
WARREN BUFFETT: If it does, we won’t know it.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right, right. (Laughter)
And — no, I think we’ve adapted pretty well to changes in our circumstances.
And that, again, is part of life. I mean, since change is inevitable, how well you adapt to it is terribly important. And I would say the changes that many of you have watched in Berkshire over the years have been very much in our interest, and then there may be future changes that are just as desirable.
WARREN BUFFETT: We bought a fair amount of Wells Fargo, for example, really over the last few years. And because the economy came back, really, the most money, if you were buying at the bottom, came from buying the banks of lesser quality because they — their weaknesses drove them down even further in price, and they needed a good economy to come back.
But they were kind of like a marginal copper producer or something, that you make more money if copper goes up, not if you buy the best copper company but, usually, if you buy the worst one, because it — they have the highest marginal cost, but that gives it the biggest kick on profits.
To some extent that’s been true, for example, the banks. But we felt 100 percent comfortable buying Wells Fargo, and we might have felt 50 percent comfortable buying some others and so we went where we were comfortable.
Looking back, you can say we should have just bought them all. And in fact, bought the ones that had had the worst record going into 2008 or ’09, because they had the greatest recovery possible, simply because they’d fallen so far. Andrew?
5. Technology and GEICO’s future
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — And it has to do with the future as well, and it relates to GEICO.
And the questioner asked, “Could you, and perhaps Tony Nicely, please explain how you think about usage-based pricing, tracking drivers electronically and charging premiums accordingly, and how that will affect the auto insurance industry in the U.S. in the next decade, and how these changes impact the moat at GEICO?
I’m also sure you’ve studied the potential impact of self-driving cars on GEICO. Google says it’s now five years away. What does this mean to the future of the profit machine that is GEICO, and if the analysis showed a challenging future, would you ever sell?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the answer to the very last question is no.
The usage-based pricing is something that’s popular with some companies that have done a lot of work on it. Probably the one most identified with it is Progressive doing something called “Snapshot.”
And there’s no question that knowing how customers drive, or policy holders drive, and how they use their cars is a valuable input to assessing the proper premium to people.
And insurance is all about comparing the propensity of loss to achieve — or evaluating the propensity of loss to establish the proper premium.
And it’s very easy to understand in life insurance. I mean, if somebody is 90, they’re more likely to die than 20, despite Charlie — situation. (Laughter)
Even at 83 they’re more likely to die than somebody at 20.
The — so you know, that’s obvious. Females live longer. That’s not quite as obvious but it’s been established.
So there are various variables in insurance, and you try to assess those variables and set the proper price for the policy holder. If you lived in a state, for example, where the population of the state was one instead of, you know, 100 million, there’d be a whole lot less chance of an accident, you know, than — because of the lack of density of driving and so on. There’s all kinds of variables.
And through studying usage, by various methods, Progressive being probably the best known on it, they’re attempting to look at some variables and hope they get better information about the propensity of that particular driver to — or the likelihood of that particular driver — to be in an accident.
And we look at lots of variables, they look at lots of variables. We think we’ve got a pretty good system, and so far I think that’s been proven correct. But we’ll continue to look at many variables.
I feel very, very, very good about GEICO, GEICO’s management, and its ability to evaluate risk. And I think there are plenty of other people that are good at it, but I don’t think there’s — in my view, there’s nobody better at it, in terms of auto insurance, than the GEICO people.
So — but we ought to keep asking ourselves, “Can we do it better?” And we do ask ourselves that.
Now, when you get to the self-driving car, that is a real threat to the auto insurance industry. I mean, if that proves successful and reduces accidents dramatically, it will be very good for society and it will be very bad for auto insurers.
So you know, that can happen. I don’t know how to evaluate over how long a period that might take or what percentage of cars might be affected with that. But it certainly could happen and it would not cause us to be thinking for one second about selling GEICO. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, some of these things happen a lot more slowly than you might think. I went to a program at Harvard, oh, at least 30 years ago, describing how color movies were going come to the house on demand, and they were just around the corner.
Well, they’ve come, but it was 30 years later. I have a feeling that self-driving cars having a huge impact on the market may take quite a while. And so I’m not —
WARREN BUFFETT: That would be my guess, but we could be wrong, you know.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it could be wrong.
WARREN BUFFETT: But — (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: But —
WARREN BUFFETT: But if we are wrong, we’ll be wrong together. (Laughs)
It is hard to figure out how it could have a major impact in 10 years, but it may not work at all, who knows?
But GEICO will be doing more business, a lot more business, in my view, five years from now than now, and ten years from now.
You know, 30 years from now, you’re young enough to find out, and I will go away peacefully without knowing.
OK. (Laughter)
6. More international acquisitions?
WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg.
GREGG WARREN: Thank you, Warren.
You’ve been pretty explicit about your acquisition criteria over the years, and some years ago, perhaps around the time of the ISCAR deal, you mentioned at one of the annual meetings that a concerted effort was being made to make non-U.S. companies more aware of Berkshire’s positive attributes as a preferred acquirer.
Yet, despite the higher proportion of large family-owned businesses in places like Europe and the fact that over half of the world’s listed market cap currently comes from outside of the U.S., Berkshire has deployed very little capital outside of the U.S. with just ISCAR, and more recently AltaLink, coming to mind.
Is the U.S. truly that much more attractive a destination for capital, or is there some other reason why the firm has not deployed serious capital outside of the region?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no, we’ve never turned down a chance to make a significant acquisition outside the United States because of any feeling we’d much rather be doing something in the United States. We just — you know, you mentioned the Alberta deal.
But we have not had as much luck getting on the radar screen of owners around the world as we have in the United States.
Our best bet, by far, in buying a business is to buy it from the family of a founder or the founder himself or herself. So we’ve, you know, that’s our strong suit, and in the United States I think almost anybody that fits in that category with a business of size thinks of us. And a fair number would prefer us.
I don’t think that same — I think there’s some recognition outside the U.S. Certainly when we heard from ISCAR, that was in 2006, Eitan Wertheimer said, he wrote me a letter, I’d never heard of him before, I’d never heard of the company. And he said the family had thought about it, and we were the only company to which they wanted to sell, and if they didn’t sell it to us, they weren’t going to sell it.
So, there’s some awareness. But I’ve been a little disappointed in that we haven’t had better luck outside the country. And we’ll keep working at it and see what happens.
Incidentally, I just talked to Jacob Harpaz, who does an incredible job of running ISCAR. I talked to him yesterday when I was touring the exhibition hall.
They set a new record in April. Now, that won’t be the last new record they set. But that may have some slight meaning, in terms of how world business is doing, because they sell, you know, these tiny little cutting tools, and so on, that go into basic industry all over the world.
And people don’t buy those because they — you know, they’re going look pretty in their offices or anything else, they buy them because they’re using them up. And, it was a record in April. March had been extremely good, too. So they are seeing strength in the business that certainly would make it hard to believe there’s weakness going on throughout the industrial world.
ISCAR’s been a wonderful company for us. The people have been sensational. The business is extraordinary. It just is — it fits us so well that I just wish I could find a few more like it out there.
But this year, aside from the one we announced yesterday, we have not been contacted by any significant ones that made sense. We have heard from people over the last five years, I mean, we’ve — fair number. But nothing that really makes sense. But we’ll keep trying.
7. Knowing your “circle of competence”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 1. We’re back at — here we are.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and hello, Mr. Munger. Thank you for being extremely generous with sharing your wisdom. My name is Chander Chawla, and I am visiting from San Francisco.
In the past, you have said that people should operate within their circle of competence. My question is, how does one figure out what one’s circle of competence is? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Good question. (Laughs)
Some of the people in the audience are identifying with it, I can hear them.
The — it’s — you know, it is a question of being self-realistic, and that applies outside of business as well.
And, I think Charlie and I have been reasonably good at identifying what I would call the perimeter of that circle of competence, but obviously we’ve gone out of it.
I would say that in my own case, I’ve gone out of it more often in retail than in any other arena. I think it’s easy to sort of think you understand retail, and then subsequently find out you don’t, as we did with the department store in Baltimore.
You could say I was outside of my circle of competence when I bought Berkshire Hathaway, although I bought it, really, to resell as a stock, originally.
I probably was out of my circle of competence when I decided that I should go in and buy control of the company. That was a dumb decision — which worked out.
The — being realistic in appraising your own talents and shortcomings, I think — I don’t know whether that’s innate, but some people seem a whole lot better at it than the others. And I certainly know of a number of CEOs that I feel have no idea of where their circle of competence begins and ends.
But, we’ve got a number of managers who I think are just terrific at it. I mean, they really know when they’re playing in the game they’re going win in, and they don’t go outside of that game.
The ultimate was Mrs. B, at the Furniture Mart. She told me that she did not want stock, in terms of the Berkshire Hathaway deal. Now, that may sound like it was a bad decision. It was a splendid decision.
She did not know anything about stock, but she knew a lot about what to do with cash. She knew real estate, she knew retailing, and she knew exactly what she knew and what she didn’t know, and that took her a long, long, long, long way in business life.
And that — that ability to know when you’re playing the game in which you’re going to win, and playing outside of that game, is a huge asset.
I can’t tell you the best way to develop a great sense of that about yourself. You might get some of your friends that know you well to offer contributions. Charlie’s given me a few contributions occasionally, saying, “What the hell do you know about that?” That’s one way of putting it, of course. (Laughs)
But Charlie, do — can you help him out?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it’s as difficult to figure out competence as it may appear to you. If you’re five-foot-two, you don’t have much of a future in the National Basketball League. And if you’re 95 years of age, you probably shouldn’t try and act the romantic lead part in Hollywood. (Laughter)
And if you weigh 350 pounds, you probably shouldn’t try and dance the lead part in the Bolshoi Ballet. And if you can hardly count cards at all, you probably shouldn’t try and win chess tournaments playing blindfolded, and so on and so on.
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re ruling out everything I want to do. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: But competency is a relative concept. And what a lot of us need, including the one speaking, is — what I needed to get ahead was to compete against idiots, and luckily there’s a large supply. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol. (Laughter)
8. Comparing Berkshire’s book value to stock index
CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes back a little to a question asked earlier about your annual performance standard that you comparison.
“Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I think of you as running a rational company. But when I look at your annual comparison of Berkshire’s book value per share versus the S&P average, I don’t see any rationality in that at all.”
“What is the logic of comparing a stock market index against the rise in an operating company’s book value? And an operating company is predominantly what Berkshire is these days, so why do you annually make this irrational comparison?”
CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that one.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is you’re totally right, and we do that because Warren wants to make it eccentrically difficult for himself. So if you don’t understand people who like to wear hair shirts, you’ll never figure out why anybody would do such a thing.
It’s a ridiculous way to make a comparison, but it makes it hard for Warren to look good. And he likes to climb mountains that are difficult. But it’s insane, you’re right. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah.
Normally when he goes all wishy washy like that, I like to clarify. But I don’t think I’ll try. (Laughter)
9. ISCAR and Marmon deal valuations
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.
JONATHAN BRANDT: The multiple of pre-tax profit that Berkshire paid for minority interests in Marmon and ISCAR in 2013 were considerably higher than the multiples Berkshire paid for earlier purchases of majority stakes in those two firms.
Can you please explain why the valuation formulas changed, why the multiples weren’t fixed for future increases in Berkshire’s stake, which at least in Marmon’s case were always contemplated, and why Berkshire was willing to accept meaningfully lower returns on the more recent purchases, not so many years after the first purchases?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the multiple with ISCAR was actually determined precisely on the basis of which the original purchase was made. In other words when we made the deal in 2006, we took multiples of earnings and allowed for cash and a few things.
But — and then we took that formula and we stuck that in as both a put and call option for the family or Berkshire. They had the put, we had the call. And we stuck that in to govern things for, you know, between now and judgment day, and so that there’s no variation from the original formula.
We would never — shouldn’t say never, but we had — our style would not be ever to call that from the family, even though we had the right to do it.
The put and call were at the same price, or at the same — following the same formula. But the family elected to put it to us, but they put it to us exactly on the same basis as what was involved in the original purchase of the 80 percent.
The Marmon deal is entirely different. The Marmon deal was an installment sale, and, in effect, to make the deal and buy the originals turned out to be 64 percent, we intended it to be 60 but gave them the option to do more.
That was simply an installment sale, and we looked at the consequences of the formulas being applied in the future. The family would not have sold us the 64 percent, which they did on the original piece, unless they had the formula applying to the second and third piece that was embodied in the contract.
And we looked at that as a single transaction, knowing that if the business improved we would be paying more money, and as the cash position improved, we’d be paying more money later on. But it was all built into the original deal, so one was one — was at exactly the same price, and one was part of a three-step deal, in effect. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: But the price went up because the value went up.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but it was — and because it was built into —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we’d agreed to — that that would be — we’d pay value.
WARREN BUFFETT: In both cases, I should say too, both with the Pritzker family at Marmon and with the Wertheimer family at ISCAR, it couldn’t have been — they couldn’t have behaved better — or the feelings are entirely good, everybody felt good about the transaction. The initial transaction and the subsequent transaction. So it pays to have to have deals in which people feel good when they —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing that happened there is that — we got just an enormous respect for the intelligence of those two families. The more we looked at those businesses, the smarter and better those families looked. It was just amazing what each family had done, wouldn’t you say, Warren?
WARREN BUFFETT: Right, right.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely amazing.
WARREN BUFFETT: And those were two important acquisitions. I mean, they — you know, they add up to lots of intrinsic value. And there, partly because of some accounting peculiarities, but the carrying value of the businesses is well below what the intrinsic business value is now.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, that Union Tank Car that’s within Marmon is John D. Rockefeller’s old business. The first John D. Rockefeller. It’s amazing how some of these good businesses have lasted.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, actually the corporate form it — the original corporation that is Marmon, I’m quite sure, is Rockwood and Company, which I did a cocoa arbitrage with back in 1955 or something, and that’s where I met Jay Pritzker. So it — these things wind their way along.
It — one thing you learn in life, but also learn particularly in business, is that you’re going to meet a lot of people and entities and experiences — in the future that — you may have thought were one shot —one stop shops originally in your life.
10. How to find what you love and do it
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Bung — this — Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Nicholas Erdenberger. I hail from the beautiful Garden State of New Jersey. And I guess the — (laughs) — I guess the question —
WARREN BUFFETT: Withhold your applause, applause. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I guess this is a follow up question to the question before.
I really connect with the idea of not investing in industries you can’t fully understand. Being a young guy who has limited ability to code and who can’t build robots, tech is certainly not an industry I fully understand.
And yet these days, the concept of entrepreneurship is nearly synonymous with tech amongst people my age. So my question to you, Mr. Buffett, is if you were 23-years-old with entrepreneurial tendencies, what non-tech industry would you start a business in and why?
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d probably do just what I did when I was 23. (Laughs)
The — you know, I would go in the investment business. And I would look at lots of companies and I would go and talk to lots of people, and I would try to learn from them what I could about different industries.
One thing I did when I was 23, if I got interested in the coal business, I would go out and see the CEOs of eight or ten coal companies. And the interesting thing was I never made appointments usually or anything, I just dropped in. But they —they felt a fellow from Omaha who looked like me couldn’t be too harmful.
So they’d always see me. And I would — I’d ask them a lot of questions, but one question I’d always ask them, two questions at the end, I would ask them if they had to put all of their money into any coal company except their own and go away for ten years and couldn’t change it, which one would it be and why?
And then I would say, after I got an answer to that, I would say, and if as part of that deal they had to sell short in the equivalent amount of money — in one coal company — which would it be and why?
And if I went around and talked to everybody in the coal business about that, I would know more about the coal companies from an economic standpoint than any one of those managers probably would.
So, I think there’s lots of ways to learn about business. You’re not going learn how to start another Facebook or Google that way, but you can — you can learn a lot about the economic characteristics of companies by reading, personal contact.
You do have to have — you have to have a real curiosity about it. I mean, you — I don’t think you can do it because your mother’s telling you to do it, or something of the sort. (Laughs)
I think you — it really has to turn you on. And I mean, what could turn you on more than running around asking questions about coal companies? (Laughter)
You have to maybe be a little odd, too.
But that’s what I would do. And I might, in the process of doing that, find some industry that particularly interested me, in my case the insurance industry did, and you might become very well equipped, even perhaps, to start your own insurance company, but perhaps to pick the most logical one to go to work for.
If you just keep learning things, something will come along that you’ll find extremely useful to do. I mean, it — but you’ve got to be open to it. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you might try a version of the trick that Larry Bird used. When he wanted an agent to negotiate his new contract, he asked every agent why he should be selected. And if he was not going be selected, whom the agent would recommend. And since everybody recommended the same number two choice, Larry Bird just hired him and negotiated the best contract in history. There’s —
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
CHARLIE MUNGER: — there are a lot of tricks that people use.
WARREN BUFFETT: We did the same thing with Solomon, actually. It was a Saturday morning —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: — when I call —and you were there, Charlie, weren’t you? -
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes —
WARREN BUFFETT: — I wasn’t sure.
I called in, I don’t know whether it was eight or ten of the manager — I had just gotten in there on Friday afternoon, and now it’s Saturday morning and we had to open for business Sunday night in Tokyo, and I had to have somebody to run the place.
So I called in eight people and I said, you know, “Who besides you would be the ideal person to run this, and why?”
One guy told me that there was nobody compared to him. (Laughter)
He was gone from the firm within a few months. (Laughter)
But — the — it’s not a bad system to use.
You can really learn a lot just by asking. I mean, it’s starting to sound a little bit like a Yogi Berra quote or something, but it is — it is literally true that you — if you talk to enough people about something they know something about, and people like to talk. You know, and — here we are talking ourselves. (Laughs)
And you just have to be open to it. And you will find your spot. You may not find it the first day, or the week, or month, but you’ll find what fascinates you.
I was very lucky because I found what fascinated me when I was seven or eight years of age. But — you know, some people find chess or music, you know, fascinates them when they’re four or five.
If you’re lucky you find it early, and sometimes it takes you longer, but you’ll find it.
CHARLIE MUNGER: If it’s a very competitive business, and it plainly requires the qualities that you lack, it should probably be avoided.
I could — when I was at Caltech I took thermodynamics, and Homer Joe Stewart, who was a genius, taught the course. And it was fairly apparent to me that no amount of time or effort would turn me into a Homer Joe Stewart. He was utterly, impossibly more talented than I could be.
Gave up. I immediately said I wasn’t going try and be a professor of thermodynamics at Caltech. And I’ve done that with field after field, and pretty soon there was only one or two left. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I had a similar experience in athletics. (Laughter)
11. Hotel room economics during Berkshire meeting
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Darren Bordemier (PH). He says, “Warren, you’ve commented in the press that you are concerned about the hotel price gauging in the Omaha area during the Berkshire meeting weekend.” (Applause)
Hold your applause, you haven’t heard the rest. “Please elaborate further on that position, as it seems to contradict free market capitalism. Shouldn’t the law of supply and demand apply in this case?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. And so therefore, since we want to increase the demand, the proper thing to do is increase the supply, right? (Laughs)
And that’s why we have encouraged, for example, Airbnb, to come in and — they supplied some rooms this year.
But it’s very logical. If you think about most cities, the big events that come to their convention centers and use their hotels, they size themselves in deciding where to go. If you have a relatively small industry, they can pick a moderate-sized city and they can have their convention there, and they don’t outstrip the supply of rooms.
If you have a very big industry and you’re having a convention, you know, you have to go to some place like Vegas or some place that has a lot of rooms because otherwise you do throw the supply-demand out of whack.
So, if you have an event, which isn’t sized by the people that are scheduling it, can’t be sized by the people that are scheduling it, then you can totally outstrip rational supply of rooms.
I mean, you know, the great case would be something like the Masters tournament. I mean, Augusta can’t size its hotel industry to Augusta, to the Masters, and the Masters isn’t going move any place. Well, there — are certain events like that, but there aren’t very many.
And Omaha cannot size its hotel supply to the Berkshire meeting. It sizes it to the kind of conventions it normally gets and all of that, but the Berkshire meeting has grown beyond what we anticipated.
So fortunately, there’s developed — and for that reason people started putting in — what really bothered me were the three-day minimums. I mean, it — you know, I think there’s something particularly irritating about somebody’s coming in for a one-day event to have to buy — have a three-day minimum. And the prices were getting high.
Incidentally, the Omaha Hilton right across the street, they — they’ve been magnificent throughout this, as have many others. But there were a few that were really pushing things, and we didn’t want to cut down on the demand. We didn’t want to move to Dallas, even though we’re opening a store there next year, it would be kind of fun for that.
But we’re not going move to Dal — I mean, we want — Omaha people love this event, it’s an economic boon for Omaha, but — and people get a good impression of Omaha when they come here, generally.
So it’s — there’s a lot of good things about having the meeting in Omaha, and we can’t expect anybody to build new hotels to take care of three days a year. So, fortunately, something like Airbnb is sort of a flex supply arrangement that seems to me to make a lot of sense for it.
And I think that it will be more developed by next year, and I think that the hotels will do extremely well next year. But I don’t think they can push it to the ultimate extreme of a total scarcity product. And we want them to do well, and that’s why we’ve gone where we have. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
12. Will GEICO eventually overtake State Farm?
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay?
JAY GELB: This question is on GEICO. GEICO continues to gain the most market share of the large auto insurers while delivering attractive margins. It also has the largest advertising budget of the auto insurers while maintaining the advantage of being a low-cost operator.
My question is, will GEICO, with 10 percent market share currently in auto insurance, eventually overtake State Farm, which currently has 19 percent market share in auto insurance, keeping in mind that State Farm is also a major writer of homeowners insurance coverage?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. Well, that’s a good question. Nobody knows the answer to that for sure. But I will tell you this, we passed Allstate this year.
And State Farm is a terrific company, I mean, it’s one of the great histories — has one of the great company histories in America. It was started by a farmer who had no insurance experience to speak of when he was, I think, in his early 40s. There’s a book called “The Farmer from Merna,” I think it is, over in Illinois, and you know, he built this incredible business based on a better business model. And that was done around 1920 or so, I believe.
And then, of course, GEICO came out with an even better model, but State Farm was huge by that time. Allstate was very, very large. And it’s taken us since 1936 to become number two.
Now, I have some projections that if I live to be 100, that we should be number one. And I tell GEICO, I’m going do my part. So the rest is up to them. (Laughter)
We will gain share, in my view. We will gain share month after month, year after year, as long as we never forget that our job is to take extremely good care of the customer, and as long as we can properly rate risks.
We’ve got some basic advantages that will enable us to do that as long as we take care of those two matters. And Tony Nicely has done a job that belongs in, you know, world’s hall of fame, in terms of achieving that objective.
The 15 years prior to Tony coming — taking over — roughly 15 years, maybe 14 years — the market share had hovered around 2 percent. And you know, maybe two-one or two-two. And you know, since he took over in 1993, it’s gone to ten-plus and it will keep going.
But State Farm has got a net worth of probably 70 billion now or there abouts, 60 to 70 billion, and they’ve got a strong presence in homeowners and they’ve got a strong agency force. They’ve got a lot of satisfied customers. So it won’t come fast, but I do think it will come. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, GEICO to me is very much like Costco. And one of the reasons it’s succeeded is that they really feel a holy duty to have a wonderful product at a very low price.
A lot of people talk that game, but very few have it just right down under the body and soul of the company. But GEICO does, and companies like that do tend to grind ahead over time.
WARREN BUFFETT: One thing you’ll find about it, I think this is true about Costco, too, it’s certainly true about GEICO, is that people don’t come and go from there as they — I mean, we have practically no one from the rest of the insurance industry that’s come over to GEICO, and they don’t leave us.
I mean, they really have their own idea about how it should be done, what should be done right. And it becomes very, very reinforced. And, of course, it becomes reinforced by success. Is that true at Costco, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, Costco’s unbelievable. And it reminds me very much of GEICO, and I’m not surprised that both companies keep taking share.
It’s easy to talk the game, but living the game is something else. I mean, it’s against the human nature of many entrepreneurial people to try and get the price down and the service quality up all the time. I mean, it’s like wearing the ultimate hair shirt and yet it works.
13. Has Buffett’s frugality hurt Berkshire?
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 3.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Neil Patel from Chicago. I greatly admire the way you have lived a frugal personal life even with your considerable wealth.
How do you think your frugality has helped Berkshire shareholders over the years? And Charlie, are there any instances where you think that Warren’s frugality has hurt Berkshire and shareholders?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, first of all, let’s ask who is the more frugal between us. Charlie, who do you think — (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in personal consumption, Warren is more frugal. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you care to give an example? (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren lives in the same house he bought for a very modest price, what, in 1950-something?
WARREN BUFFETT: I bought in 1958, and you moved into yours about 1960, didn’t you?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and I paid more. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: But he designed his own —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely, I could get —
WARREN BUFFETT: — he designed his own house.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — he’s more frugal.
WARREN BUFFETT: He did not pay an architect, right?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I did, I paid an architect $1,900. It was as much as 30 percent of the normal price.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Notice how he remembers the details. (Laughter)
No, I would — I have everything in life I want. It’s a very simple thing. If there’s anything that money can buy — there are things money can’t buy, but if there’s anything money could buy that I wanted, I’d do it this afternoon. I wouldn’t have any problem with that at all.
I do not think that standard of living equates with cost of living beyond a certain point. I mean, up to a certain point there’s no question that it does in — in terms of having good housing, good health, good health service, good food, everything. But — good transportation.
But there’s a point I think, if anything, you start getting inverse correlation. My life would not be happier, and it’d be worse, if I had six or eight houses or, you know, a whole bunch of different things I could have. It just doesn’t correlate.
And so I — having everything I have, I mean, you can’t have more than that. And that doesn’t really make any — it makes a difference up to a point. I mean, you could start thinking a lot differently when you got to X, but when you get to ten-X, or a 100-X, or 1,000-X, it just doesn’t make any possible difference. Charlie, can you —?
CHARLIE MUNGER: The frugality, basically, has helped Berkshire. And I look out at this audience and I see a bunch of understated, frugal people, too. We collect you people. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: But forget about it this weekend. (Laughter and applause)
The more you buy the more you save at these prices, folks. (Laughter)
14. Berkshire doesn’t “begrudge” paying taxes
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Azhar Quader who’s in the audience, Queens Court Capital, wants you to know that he’s a Columbia B School grad just like you, Warren.
WARREN BUFFETT: Good.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: The question is the following, “Berkshire paid $8.9 billion in taxes in 2013. Pfizer is currently contemplating an acquisition that would allow it to move its technical holding company overseas and thereby save income tax expense and create shareholder value. Is this something you and Charlie would ever consider if it would create value for Berkshire shareholders?”
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer to that is no. What do you say, Charlie? (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it would be — I think it would be crazy to be as prosperous as Berkshire and get our tax to zero while we remain this prosperous. That would not be a legitimate ideal. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We could not have done Berkshire in any other country except the United States, either. You know, and just look at what we’ve acquired and everything.
America has, in a very, very, very big way helped Charlie and I become very, very, very rich. (Laughs). Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got no complaints. And I look around at this group, I see you at breakfast, it’s a very happy group of people. I don’t think a lot of people are gnashing their teeth that somebody else has a little more.
WARREN BUFFETT: But we don’t pay — I don’t want to make it holier than thou, this stuff. We don’t pay anything beyond that — when we get all through figuring out tax on our 20,000 page-plus return, we just don’t — we don’t add a tip of 20 percent or 15 percent or anything. (Laughter)
And we do certain transactions which are tax driven. We’re in low-income housing tax credits, which actually George Bush 41 congratulated me for. So it’s bipartisan.
We — the wind energy deals we do, the solar deals we do, they are tax driven to — I mean, they won’t make economic sense otherwise.
So we follow the rules. But we don’t begrudge the taxes we pay. We’ve earned a lot of money while paying U.S. taxes. (Applause)
15. Try for Mexico’s rail freight market?
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg.
GREGG WARREN: Warren, Burlington Northern’s main competitor in the west, Union Pacific, generates around 10 percent of its revenue from freight moving to and from Mexico. It also owns a 20 percent stake in the large Mexican railroad, Ferromex.
Given the expectation for strong auto production growth in Mexico with 30 percent more capacity coming online in the next two years, and the potential for additional near-sourcing manufacturing in Mexico, how attractive do you find the Mexican freight market?
And assuming that the answer to that question is positive, would it not be a greater benefit to Burlington Northern to own the smallest Class-I railroad at Kansas City Southern, which generates about half its revenue from its Mexican concession, whether than just receiving cargo from the firm?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Union Pacific has a big edge in terms of Mexico. I mean, their route structure is such, I think they cross the border at six different places. Their route structure is far better than ours in relation to Mexico.
And Kansas — it’s true as you say, that Kansas City Southern has a very significant presence in Mexico.
But, in terms of what we can do with our money and what we see as the prospects — there are good prospects there, but there are good prospects elsewhere for traffic, too.
So it doesn’t make sense for us. But, you know, maybe someday something will, but — the math does not work for Mexico. But we’re continuously thinking about Mexico, but we’re thinking about lots of other markets, too.
There are lots of possibilities for moving more freight on the BNSF over the years. And we won’t forget about Mexico, but we won’t do anything silly, either. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t have anything to say.
You know, it’s awfully easy to imagine combinations that just make you rich with sleight of hand. And, of course, the easiest transaction is buying a competitor. But most of that stuff, when you get to a certain size, you can’t do. So why spend time even thinking about it? I’m afraid Burlington Northern is going have to get ahead on its own from here on.
WARREN BUFFETT: Wouldn’t worry about that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not worried about it.
16. Intrinsic value and the Berkshire model
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. Dan Hua from Los Angeles. My wife, Cora, and I are thrilled to be here.
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re delighted to have you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. You earlier today discussed intrinsic value, and I’m a big fan of Graham and Fisher, especially “Security Analysis.” What differences do you have, if any, for calculating intrinsic value, versus what was said in “Security Analysis?”
And for examples, how does management factor into that? You recently mentioned evaluating management is like dating, and recently you said, also, management does matter.
My second part is, which company do you fear the most? Why is it that no one else has done what you have done? I mean, Coca-Cola has their Pepsi. Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — actually Graham didn’t get too specific about intrinsic value in terms of precise calculations. But intrinsic value has come to be equated with, and I think quite properly, with what you might call private business value.
Now, I’m not sure who was the first one that came up with it, but — well, the first one that came up with it was Aesop, actually. But the intrinsic value of any business, if you could foresee the future perfectly, is the present value of all cash that will be ever distributed for that business between now and judgment day.
And we’re not perfect at estimating that, obviously. (Laughs)
But that’s what an investment or a business is all about. You put money in and you take money out.
Aesop said, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” Now, he said that around 600 B.C. or something like that, but that hasn’t been improved on very much by the business professors now.
Now the question is, you know, how sure are you that there are two in the bush, you know? How far away is the bush? There are all kinds of things. What are interest rates? But I mean, Aesop wanted to leave us something to play with over the next couple thousand years, so he didn’t spell the whole thing out. But that’s what intrinsic value essentially is.
And, we don’t — Graham would say that, Phil Fisher would say that. Phil Fisher would say that in calculating that, he would want to look a lot harder at the qualitative factors of the business in making that estimate of how many birds were in the bush.
Graham would say he would want to see the bush — you know, $2 worth of cash in the bush, you know, and to pay a dollar for it now.
One emphasized quantitative factors and one emphasized qualitative factors, but neither one would have disagreed with the math.
And I started out very influenced by Graham, so I emphasized quantitative factors. Charlie came along and said I was all wrong, and that he’d learned more in law than I’d learned in financial studies and everything, and that I should think more about qualitative factors, and he was right. And Phil Fisher said the same thing.
But that’s what intrinsic value is about, you know. if you buy a McDonald’s franchise, if you buy General Motors, whatever it may be, the real question is, A) are you going to have to put more cash into after you buy it? But it’s really cash in, cash out? When? What discount rate? All the standard stuff.
In terms of — if I had a silver bullet, what company would I shoot as being a threat to us? I don’t really — I don’t see any competitor to Berkshire. I see private equity buying lots of businesses and having an advantage in that they’ll leverage up when we won’t, and also that presently they can borrow money very cheap and all of that.
So I mean, there are always going to be people competing with us to buy businesses. But — which is our main business — main occupation for me and Charlie.
But I don’t see anybody that’s got a model, or trying to build a model, that will essentially go after what we’re trying to achieve, which is to buy wonderful businesses from people that care about where their business goes, and who generally want to keep on running them. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as I’ve said earlier, I think the Berkshire model as now constructed will have — as said in show business, with legs. It will go a long time, and I think it will be quite creditable. And I think it has enough advantage that it will just keep going a long time. And I think most big businesses don’t.
If you stop to think about it, all the great big businesses of yesteryear, how few of them have really gotten big and stayed big.
Of the really old businesses, only one stayed big and that was Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. And so we’re getting up into a territory where very few people keep going well.
But I think what we’ll be more like Standard Oil, than we’ll be like ordinary businesses, because I think we will just keep going. We will keep doing what we’re already doing, and we’ll keep learning from our mistakes.
And the people up here are no longer all that important. The momentum’s in place, the ethos is in place. It’s going to keep going. And to you young people in the audience, I always say, “Don’t be too quick to sell the stock.”
WARREN BUFFETT: Why don’t we get more copycats?
CHARLIE MUNGER: It reminds me of our mutual friend, Ed Davis. He figured out how to do an operation that was so difficult that he operated the bottom of a dark hole with instruments of his own creation. He gave his own shots by Novocain, 87 of them, while he was operating. And it was a better operation. His death rate was 2 percent and everybody else was 20.
And the other surgeons came to copy him, and they watched him. And they just said, “Well, I don’t think I’ll try and copy that.” (Laughs)
I think it looks just too hard to do. There’s — nothing in the American business school teaches people to be like Berkshire.
WARREN BUFFETT: Eddie Davis is the guy that, in effect, introduced the two of us. He was a famous urologist here in Omaha, and —
CHARLIE MUNGER: But people didn’t try and learn his operation. And it doesn’t look all that easy. It’s very different.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s slow, too.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s slow, it’s — yeah, very slow.
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the slowness deters more people than anything else.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And the difficulty with being slow is you’re dead before it’s finished. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s kind of cheerful. (Laughter)
Carol, let’s come up with something a little — (Laughs)
CAROL LOOMIS: Well, for a more cheerful subject, mine is inflation. In it — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Only compared to Charlie can inflation be cheerful. (Laughter)
17. Positive and negative effects of inflation
CAROL LOOMIS: This comes from Larry Pitkowsky and Keith Trauner at the GoodHaven Fund.
“In your 1981 shareholder letter, you discuss returns on equity, interest rates and inflation, and how difficult it was for many companies to function under inflationary conditions. Indeed that Berkshire itself was not immune and would be negatively — could be negatively affected.
“Today it seems like every central banker in the world is desperate to create inflation, something that is generally great for debtors, not so great for creditors, and difficult for owners and managers.
Should investors and business owners be thinking more about inflation and higher interest rates after 30 years of declines in both? How would Berkshire behave differently if it became apparent that the future was turning inflationary?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, inflation would hurt us, but it would hurt most businesses. It doesn’t — there’s certain assets that if highly leveraged, obviously, would benefit from inflation. But, well, it’s just —
We’ll set up an inflationary condition. Let’s just assume tonight that drones are sent up over all of the United States and they happen to drop a million dollars in every household.
Now, the question is would the country be better off? Every individual would now have — or every family would now have a million dollars that they didn’t have the day before.
The one thing I can guarantee you is that Berkshire would be worse off at that point, obviously. And obviously, what I’ve described would be wildly inflationary.
The trick in that circumstance is to find out that you’ve got a million dollars before anybody else finds out that they have, and you’ll do very well if you’re first.
But essentially, you don’t create wealth by inflation or by having — you can move it around, but you don’t create it by inflation, and you don’t — a firm like Berkshire, you know, our earnings per share would go up. The intrinsic value of our business, measured in dollars, would go up. But under lots of inflation, unless we had leveraged those businesses, the value of your investment, in real terms, would go down. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we had a test of hyperinflation in Weimar Germany, and the people who owned stocks in places like Berkshire got through. And they didn’t prosper joyously, but they got through. And everybody else, practically, life insurance policies, bank deposits, you name it, got wiped out.
And, of course, if you create so much misery that you get a Hitler, and a World War, and a Holocaust and so forth, it’s not a good thing to let things go that far.
And so I’m — I don’t like this huge confidence that all you have to do is just keep printing money and spending it. I think there’s some limit to when that will work, and I am never going forget Weimar Germany. And I don’t think any of the rest of us should either.
We can handle a little bit of subpar growth for some stretch or other. But it would be quite dangerous to let the whole damn thing blow up because a bunch of crazy politicians were printing money. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: If you own a home, though, with a very large mortgage, and you have incredible inflation that wipes out the mortgage, then you’ve still got the home. I mean, it’s just —
CHARLIE MUNGER: In Weimar, Germany, they gave you the mortgage back at the end. It was very interesting. That’s the one thing they did right. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s way ahead of me, folks. (Laughs)
18. Why companies make “dumb” deals
WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?
JONATHAN BRANDT: In evaluating the after-tax returns Berkshire earns on its acquisitions of non-insurance businesses, whether it be the utilities, the railroad, or the manufacturing service and retailing business, in terms of choosing a benchmark, what would be your best estimate of the returns on acquisitions earned by an aggregate of all American industry, adjusted, of course, to exclude the impact of accounting write-offs and equalizing for leverage?
WARREN BUFFETT: That sounds too tough for me, but go ahead, Charlie. I’ll be thinking. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, let me summarize. I think the sum total of all acquisitions done by American industry will be lousy. It’s in the nature of corporations that are prosperous to be talked into dumb deals, and bureaucracy tends to feed on itself and create unnecessary costs.
So I think the history of acquisitions is that it’s not an enormous way to wealth. Now, it has been for us, but we’re very peculiar, and luckily a lot of people don’t want to be peculiar in our way.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would — it’s really hard to, you know, come up with a useful answer on that. But I certainly —
CHARLIE MUNGER: But you don’t have a great deal of optimism, do you?
WARREN BUFFETT: When we read that a company we don’t control is going to make an acquisition, I’m much more inclined to cry than to smile.
But on the other hand, we love making acquisitions ourselves, so it’s a little hard to get too harsh just because we don’t like the other guy’s acquisitions.
I have been — I have sat in on, probably, hundreds of acquisition discussions conducted by people I didn’t control, as a director. And most of them have been bad ideas, but there have been some —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Some are mediocre. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: A great case is GEICO. I mean, it’s really a great case study because GEICO had this wonderful business prior to going off the tracks in the early 1970s, but it’d been an incredible business and everybody — it was well known in the financial world.
And then it went off the tracks in its own business, got back on the tracks. And then in the next — after it got back on the tracks, it made a couple of acquisitions. And they weren’t disasters, but they certainly weren’t successes, and they tended to take people’s — I think they took their eyes off the ball in terms of the potential of GEICO itself.
So the accounting costs of those — there were two acquisitions in particular — the accounting costs of those two acquisitions was not — it was poor, but it wasn’t disastrous.
But if you look to secondary effects, it was huge. I mean, there were a dozen years there or so where all kinds of gains could have been made that weren’t. And you don’t get those years back.
Now, that was probably a net plus for Berkshire, you know, in the end, because we’d bought half of the company then we got to buy the other half later on. If they’d done wonderfully, we probably would have never bought the second half. Now, maybe the first half would have been worth that much more.
But it’s human nature, to some degree, to, you know, keep wanting — I mean, normally the people who get to be CEOs are not shrinking violets, you know.
And they have animal spirits, as Keynes talked about, and they like to do things. And the supporting staff certainly senses that they like to do things. I mean, they often have people in charge of strategy or acquisitions, or all of those things.
What do you think those people are going to do? Sit around and suck their thumbs? No, they’re going keep coming up with deals. And the investment bankers will be, you know, calling on them daily.
So there are all these forces that push toward deals, and if you try to push toward deals, you’re going to get a lot of dumb deals.
We try very hard, Charlie and I, not to get eager to do a deal. We’re just eager to do a deal that makes sense.
And that would be a lot harder if we had directors, strategy departments, whatever it might be, all pushing us toward, you know, what have you done in the last three months, or something of the sort.
So the setting in which you operate really can be very important. Charlie, anything further?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but it’s — you know how much more tactful he is.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well the comparison isn’t tough. (Laughter)
19. Prosecute individuals or corporations?
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 5.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Russell Narig (PH) from Neenah, Wisconsin. The — not another Packer fan.
The people in this hall tonight are here because of the invest into your money, in anticipation and hope that you and Charlie would make that investment grow.
We recognize that things go wrong and that we might lose money. But never, ever, has it ever crossed our minds that we’d be cheated out of their money.
Unfortunately, that — that’s not — that’s new — I’m sorry, having problems with this microphone. Unfortunately, particularly in the investment banking business, confidence, my confidence, and I’m sure the confidence of many people in this room, are falling.
Particularly distressing are reports in the “New York Times” in the last week or so about private meetings in the Justice Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fed, and others, about the need or desire, the requirement, perhaps, to bring criminal charges against some of the largest banks dealing business, for, among other things, knowingly laundering billions of Iranian dollars through our U.S. banks, knowingly laundering billions of drug cartel money through U.S. banks, soliciting on U.S. soil deals which would include tax evasion by moving assets offshore, and even fixing the LIBOR.
The problem the Justice Department is having is that they are being told that if they bring criminal charges against those banks, and we can list those banks, they’ve been in the “New York Times,” that those banks would be sorely hurt, may be required to go out of business, and require — and evolve into a new financial crisis of some sort. (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, we can’t —
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question — my question, though, to you is do you believe a financial crisis will be — come about as a result of bringing justice to criminal activity on a large scale? Or have we reached a new point where criminal activity in Wall Street is being institutionalized, sort of allowed to happen because they’re too big to fail, too big to go to jail, and too big to be regulated, to follow the law?
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you’re the lawyer, you take it up. (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think behavior on Wall Street has enormously improved as a result of the trauma we’ve just been through. And so I think the worst of it is behind us.
But you’re never going to have perfect behavior when a bunch of human beings live in a miasma of easy money. It’s just this is always going happen to some extent, and —
WARREN BUFFETT: How do you feel about the prosecution of individuals versus the prosecution of corporations?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’s hardly anything that changes behavior more than prosecuting individuals.
When they took Boy Scout leaders out of Pittsburgh or wherever it was and put them in the federal penitentiary for fixing steel prices, it really changed behavior of American businessmen. So I do think that a few criminal prosecutions do change behavior a lot. And it looks to me like we’ll get a few.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I may be biased a little bit by the experience at Salomon, but — I lean way more toward prosecution of individuals than corporations.
You know, I literally saw, you know, a bad act, or maybe multiple bad acts, by just a couple of people and negligence in reporting by a couple more, you know, come close — certainly upsetting, hurting, and maybe destroying, you know, possibly thousands and thousands of other people’s lives, forgetting about the financial investment.
And it is — it did seem to me, and that’s — had that experience a couple of other times in what I’ve seen, that — that it really — it may be easy — it’s way easier to prosecute the corporation. The corporation’s going write a check, and you know, I mean, it’s somebody else’s money.
And the prosecutor knows he’s going get a win, basically, if he goes against the company, whereas he’s got a way tougher job going against individuals. The company’s going to cave, it’s just their calculus is such that it just doesn’t make sense to fight if they can write a check, whereas the individual is fighting to stay out of jail.
So the prosecutor’s got an easy case, or relatively easy case, and probably a headline-grabbing case, if he goes against the corporation. And he has a grinded-out type of thing, which he can very well lose and which really takes a lot of work, against individuals. So — but I still lean very much — toward going against individuals. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I do, too. That’s what I meant when I said when antitrust violations were regarded as forgivable offenses, menial sins, we had a lot of them, and we still have some now that we prosecute people criminally. But we have really changed behavior on price fixing by the individual prosecutions, and we haven’t had many of those prosecutions in finance yet. And we probably need some more. Don’t you agree with that?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s — absolutely, absolutely.
And I will tell you this: we have 300,000-plus people working at Berkshire. Somebody is doing something wrong now, I mean, that — you know, you cannot have a city of 300,000 people and not have somebody behaving badly.
And that’s the thing — that is the one thing that — I don’t worry about us making money, we’ll figure out a way to do that. And it may be better or worse than we hope for. But it won’t be a disaster, ever.
The disaster is if somebody is doing something wrong that, you know, that actually reflects badly on the whole organization.
And I know that’s, to a degree, out of my hands. I can tell the managers, and they can tell the people that work for them that reputation is more important than anything else. And that’s going to have an effect, and I think it’s going to have more of an effect than having them — giving them some 200-page manual.
But it’s not going cure everything. And what we hope is when there is something wrong that we find it out early, and then it’s up to us to do something about it.
But we will have a problem of some sort, at some time, because it just — you know, 300,000 people are not going to all behave properly every day. It just doesn’t happen.
But the individual prosecution, and I’ve written about that a little bit in the annual report in terms of — the way to change behavior is to have the fear, at least among people who may be doing the wrong things, is to have the fear that somehow it’s going to come home to them and hit them hard.
And if the only fear is that the company’s going have to write a big check, you’re going to get way less change in behavior than if it’ll hit home to the individual. Becky? (Applause)
20. Effect of major railroad accident on BNSF and Berkshire
BECKY QUICK: This comes from Mark Blakley from Tulsa, Oklahoma.
He says there’s been a number of railroad accidents in the past year. In January, the Wall Street Journal published an article highlighting the lack of insurance to cover a worst-case accident scenario.
“Mr. [Matt] Rose of BNSF was mentioned as wanting to set up an insurance fund funded by the railroads to protect the industry in case of an accident, similar to a fund currently set up by nuclear power companies, but that idea has gained no traction.
“How would a worst-case accident scenario impact BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway? And if the industry is lacking insurance for such an event, how can the company protect itself, and what exposure does Berkshire have should a major accident occur?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we’re on both sides of that because Ajit [Jain] has offered the rail industry some very high limits to all the major railroads. But they don’t like his price, presumably. And I would say this, the four major railroads really have the financial capacity to pay a huge award if something really terrible happened.
The most — you know, I don’t know which is the most dangerous — they have what they call hazmat, hazardous materials, and rails have to carry them. You’re a common carrier, you’re forced to carry them. And the railroads would really prefer they didn’t carry them, but they do, they have to. And they probably can’t get enough, ever get enough, in the way of payments per carload to really compensate them for the risk involved.
But the four major railroads, certainly have the — it might be a very, very significant financial hit to them, but I think they have the capability of, if something really drastic happened, I think they do have the financial capability to handle that size — kind of an award.
And if they feel that they don’t, they can buy insurance from Ajit, but so far we haven’t sold any.
The companies have insurance, but they don’t like — they’re not going talk about the amounts that they have or anything of the sort because that becomes a honey pot sometimes, and it’s not advisable to discuss your insurance limits publicly.
But I would — it is true, as the writer mentions, that the nuclear risk — the government decided was too big, as they have with terrorism — decided it was too big to be borne by private industry.
I don’t think the consequences of any conceivable accident — you could probably dream up one — but of any conceivable accident on rails would go beyond the capability of the major railroads to pay. But it could be very, very large, relative to their net worth and relative to their current earnings. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the big surprise for everyone, of course, was British Petroleum.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nobody in their wildest dreams believed that a major oil company, from an accident in one well, would have a loss in so many tens of billions of dollars. And, of course, that’s gotten a lot of attention.
I don’t know about Warren, but after that happened, I would have less enthusiasm for drilling in the Gulf. It was just such a big loss compared to anything.
WARREN BUFFETT: And a gain, possible gain.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And gain — possible gain. And that was a big oil field they tapped into, but it wouldn’t remotely pay for this accident. And so — but I — Matt will know, the biggest rail accident in the history of the rails, has it cost $200 million? Is Matt there?
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think — I don’t think Norfolk Southern has ever announced what that accident cost.
But we are not getting paid enough, I can tell you this, for carrying chlorine or ammonia or something like that. I mean, it — just — you know, to buy appropriate insurance just to cover those kind of products, compared to the revenue, I don’t think it ever would make sense.
But we’re required — they’re going move from one place to another one way or another, either by truck or in some manner. And we are a common carrier.
But it is not — that’s not one that keeps me awake nights from a financial standpoint. The big risk is some form of very effective terrorism or action by a rogue state in terms of nuclear, chemical, biological, or cyber.
And, you know, war acts are excluded in insurance policies. But you could have some kind of a terrorist act that would create damages, whether they’re liable under insurance contracts is another matter, but could create damages like we have never seen. And there’s a, you know, there’s obviously a reasonable probability of that happening sometime in the next 50 years, and what that probability is I don’t know. But it’s not insignificant. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we saw what one pilot could do recently in this Malaysian airplane.
I think we live in a world where there are always going be big events, and I think we’re lucky, to some extent, that we have some big corporations that can have elaborate safety programs and that can handle the losses when they occur. I don’t think we’d be better off if we had a bunch of little Flivvers going around the airplanes.
21. Is commercial property-casualty insurance expansion too late?
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay?
JAY GELB: — question is on Berkshire’s primary commercial property-casualty insurance business.
Berkshire plans to substantially expand the Berkshire Hathaway specialty insurance unit and has also become a major insurer of Lloyd’s business through an Aon-brokered facility.
Why is Berkshire increasing its presence in commercial property-casualty insurance when pricing has peaked?
WARREN BUFFETT: We — it’s the first one that’s more important.
We entered the commercial insurance field the middle of last year, and we had some wonderful talent that wanted to join us. And we have a great amount of capital, a very, very good reputation, and we think we have the ability to both underwrite more intelligently than most, to keep larger limits than anybody, and to operate at costs significantly below average.
So if you put those elements together, and you throw in Ajit Jain overseeing the operation, I think it’s a terrific opportunity.
And I think you will — and it wouldn’t make any difference when we entered it. I mean, we entered it because we had the availability of some terrific people. That was the reason for the timing of it.
And we’ll have — we’ve added to that group significantly. Peter Eastwood runs it, and I think we will build a very, very significant commercial insurance operation over time. And I believe that that operation will operate with better underwriting results than the great majority of our competitors.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s a very logical thing for us to do. And, of course, when something is logical we don’t hold back because we think the business cycle might possibly be a little better. It’s a long-term play.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not going away based on the little short-term troubles.
WARREN BUFFETT: No, it’s a forever play. And — when we see a chance to enter a business we like, basically, with outstanding people and with some very fundamental competitive advantages, we’re going to play the game and we’re going to play the game hard.
22. Buy a sports team or sports equipment company?
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Ed Boyle (PH) and I’m from Chicago. My question’s for Warren and Charlie.
Do you ever have any plans, or would you be interested, in buying a professional sport team —(laughter) — or sports equipment manufacturing company, being that we’re — sports is in a global world today? Or is this out of the Berkshire game?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren’s already done it.
WARREN BUFFETT: I owned a quarter of a major — a minor-league team, but it’s not responsible for my position on the Forbes 400. (Laughter)
The answer to your question about buying a sports team is no. In fact, if — Charlie and I — if you read that either one of us is buying a sports team, it may be time to talk about successors. (Laughter)
We are — we do — sports equipment has generally not been a very good business, although, you know, obviously Nike’s done incredibly well in its overall operation.
But — we own Spalding. We own Russell. And you know, Spalding has been around a long, long time. A.G. Spalding, I forget when the hell he was — I think he was trying to take baseball to the rest of the world back in the, I don’t know, the 1880s or something like that.
But it’s — generally speaking, if you look at the people that have made golf equipment, footballs, helmets particularly, baseball gloves, baseballs, it’s not been a particularly profitable business.
And certain aspects of it, like helmets, you know — the last thing Berkshire should do is own a helmet company. A helmet company should be owned by some guy that owes about a million dollars and doesn’t have a dime to his name, because, you know, he is not going to be a target. And we would be the ultimate target.
That’s the reason — we used to be involved in Pinkerton, but we’d had no interest in — and we got offered the chance to buy the whole place, and the idea of owning a business that provided guards at airports, you know, when anything went wrong, you know, you’re going to say that it was the guard’s fault. And here’s this super-rich corporation around there that is a perfect target.
I mean, a guard company at airports, again, should be owned by somebody whose net worth does not get out to two figures. (Laughter)
So, you won’t see much of us in the sports arena.
But Charlie here, are you looking at the Clippers or —? (Laughter)
Now I’m worried that he is. No — (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Whatever Warren thinks about sports teams ownership, I like it less. (Laughter)
23. Secrecy, Bill Ackman, and activist investors
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, Warren. You have long advocated for transparency and disapproved of greenmailers. Bill Ackman compared his amassing his stake in Allergan in stealth ahead of Valeant’s bid to your purchase of Coca-Cola in the 1980s.
Is that right? What do you make of the covert tactic Ackman is using from a policy perspective for the markets?
And just as important, what do you make of the larger trend of activism in corporate America?
WARREN BUFFETT: I hadn’t heard that about Coca-Cola. I’m really not sure how that would come about. I mean, we bought stock in the open market, we never used a derivative transaction or any sort in buying it, or anything. I mean, and we certainly haven’t taken it over yet. The — so I — I’m not sure — can you elaborate, Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I don’t have more from the —
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — the question. I believe Bill Ackman went on television at one point, had commented that using his stake, or buying the stake, rather, he did it covertly, and I think he was perhaps suggesting that, I don’t know, maybe I will adjust the question.
There have been times in the past when you have bought stakes in other companies and used specific rules through the SEC to do so with — to give you some room without disclosing. Maybe, will that adjust the question?
WARREN BUFFETT: It —
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Or you could just go to the activism question.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and tell me the activism question again, because we have never used derivatives or anything that would get us around the rules of reporting, I mean, it’s that simple.
But what’s the second part?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I think that the second part is what do you make of the larger trend of activism in corporate America, given that it’s in the news so much today?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think it’ll go away, and I think it scares the hell out of a lot of managers. (Laughs)
The — there are cases — certainly cases where corporate management should be changed. I mean, you can’t have thousands of corporations without that being the case.
I think, generally speaking, that the — you know, the activists, if they get the price of the stock up one way or another, you know, that’s going to end their interest in the business, so I don’t think they’re looking for — often they’re not looking for permanent changes for the better in the business. But they’re looking for a specific event that will result in a big price change, and —
They’re certainly attracting more and more money. In other words, the funds flowing to activist hedge funds and so on is — multiply them, sure, by a significant factor, and that means they can play the game on a bigger scale.
And anything in Wall Street that looks like it’s successful will generate a funds flow that will, you know, go on until it’s no longer successful. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re right that the activism is causing more of a stir in corporate management than anything has in years. Practically nobody feels immune.
When an activist comes into a company, 20 or 30 percent of the stock can change hands rather rapidly, and management that seemed entrenched is — suddenly is threatened. And, of course, that sort of thing causes a lot of anguish.
And on the other side, the activists, by and large, are making a fair amount of money. And, of course, in the culture we live in, most people don’t care how the money is earned, they just care whether they get it or not.
And so that — that just grows like some — I don’t know, the beanstalk of Jack. And so I think we have a very significant effect.
And some of the stuff — you’ll find an activist who is not what you’d want to marry into the family, going after a company you would never buy into. And when that happens, it reminds me of Oscar Wilde’s definition of fox hunting. He said, “The pursuit of the uneatable by the unspeakable.” (Laughter)
And I think we’re seeing some of that. It’s — I don’t think it’s good for America, what’s happening —
WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think —
CHARLIE MUNGER: — averaged out.
WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think it’ll be three years from now?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Bigger.
WARREN BUFFETT: Wow.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s stopping it?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If it’s bigger three years from now, it’ll be a lot bigger. I mean, just the compounding of numbers.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s really serious.
24. Buy smaller companies instead of waiting for an “elephant?”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg. (Laughter)
GREGG WARREN: If Berkshire’s size is expected to be an ongoing constraint for growth, does it make more sense for the firm to target a larger collection of smaller companies that are growing faster and can do so for a longer period of time, rather than looking to bag a big elephant that is in all likelihood already reached maturity, leaves the firm to sit on larger-than-normal cash balances for a longer period of time, even if it means paying a higher price for the growth?
And if the answer is no, then what is the opportunity cost to Berkshire shareholders for keeping a lot of excess cash on hand until the right deal comes along?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to the first is one doesn’t preclude the other. You know, we’d be delighted to buy some company for 2 or 3 billion that we thought would do very well over time.
But that applies to one for 20 or 30 billion. Now, if you get down to buying one for a couple hundred million, that may fit one of our subsidiaries to do that that knows the business.
But — we’re not passing up anything of any size that can have any real impact on Berkshire. And like I say, our subsidiaries made 25 tuck-ins last year, and they’ll keep making more. They’ll see things that fit them.
But one, you know, one $30 billion deal is ten $3 billion deals, and a hundred $300 million deals. So, in terms of the reality of how we build a lot more earning power into Berkshire, which is what we’re trying to do, our main emphasis should be on bigger deals. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. The idea of buying hundreds and hundreds of small businesses —
WARREN BUFFETT: Not worth a damn.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — not as bolt-ons for what we already have, it would be anathema.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s lots of competition for the small deals. I mean, private equity is going after all kinds of small deals. In fact they just keep selling them to each other to some degree.
We don’t feel envious when we look at what they’re doing, in the least. But that doesn’t mean we can’t find an occasional small business that fits in and that will do well.
It’s not going be the future of Berkshire, though. But I want to emphasize one does not preclude the other.
25. The most intelligent question you’ve been asked?
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Willy Larsen (PH) from San Francisco.
You both mingle with the smartest investors in the country, something that I don’t have the opportunity to do. So to my question, what is the most intelligent question you have been asked recently on investing, and what was your answer to that question? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you can go first on that while I think.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve already done that when I answered the young gentleman who said he couldn’t understand why Warren compared his — or Berkshire’s book value increase to stock market index performance.
In other words there are a lot of interesting questions that don’t get much attention where there’s a lot of irrationality.
WARREN BUFFETT: The question you asked, I get that frequently from the college students that come out. They say, “What’s the most intelligent question that you’ve gotten in the past.” And I never come up with a good answer, and I’m not coming up with one today —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t like the question, do you?
WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughter)
That’s why we changed —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s quite fair.
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why I let you go first. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
26. MidAmerican energy return on assets
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we’ve hit 54 questions. So now we start going around to the stations in order. All of the journalists of each had six apiece, so we’ll go to station 8.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Philip Case, Manchester, New Hampshire.
My question pertains to the MidAmerican Energy segment. On page 64 of our annual report, you provide us with segment data for each business.
For the MidAmerican Energy segment, when I take earnings before interest and taxes and add back depreciation expense and subtract capex, the result is negative operating cash flow.
When I repeat that exercise for each of the past five years, in its best year the segment generates $308 million of operating cash flow. When I divide that by tangible assets, the result is a return on tangible assets of 0.86 percent.
Why are we allocating capital to a business that in its best year generates a return on tangible assets of less than 1 percent?
WARREN BUFFETT: You were doing great until you got to return on tangible assets. The — we love the math that you just described, as long as we are going to get returns on the added capital investment. And we are in businesses, whether it’s wind energy in Iowa or whether with PacifiCorp after we bought it, there were lots of opportunities for capital investment. And the energy which we bought, we’re looking forward to putting more capital in because as long as we get treated fairly by the regulators in the states that we operate, we will get appropriate returns on that.
And the return is not measured by the cash minus the increased capital investment we’re making. It’s measured by the operating earnings after depreciation. And there will be times in our businesses where no net investment may be required. But we actually prefer the ones where net — in the utility business — where net investment is required because we like the idea of getting more capital out at reasonable returns.
Now, the bet we are making is that regulatory authorities will treat us fairly in the future. And we’ve got every reason to believe that’s true in the jurisdictions in which we operate. And one of the reasons we believe it’s true is because we’ve done so much better than, really, the great majority of utilities in delivering electricity at lower rates than are charged by most utilities.
We have a situation in Iowa, for example, where there is one stockholder-owned competitive utility, and some other municipal-owned ones, and if you look at our rates, they are significantly below those of our competitors.
And in fact, one of our directors has a farm where he buys from two different sources, one being us. And his rate from us is dramatically lower than the one from the cooperative arrangement that exists.
So, we have a deserved good reputation with the regulators that we’re dealing with. We’ve improved the operations, including safety, incidentally, dramatically from the conditions that existed before we purchased the utilities. That’s why they welcome us when we come to new states.
And so if we can put more money into useful projects in those states, we’ve got every reason to believe we will get returns that are appropriate.
But if you compute net cash generated from those, you will see nominal or negative figures for a considerable period as we add to our investment and we make those utilities even more useful for people in those jurisdictions. I think we’ll get a fair return.
We have somewhat similar situation at the railroad, too. But we’re very happy about both of those businesses. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, if the numbers you recited came from a declining department store, we would just hate it. But when it comes from a growing utility, we like it because we have such confidence that the reinvested money is going to do exceptionally well. It’s just that simple.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
Greg —
CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re two different kinds of businesses.
WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? Is Greg here? You want to — you might be able to give him a few figures that I don’t remember off the top of my head in terms of comparative — how our prices compare, and give him a little more of a flavor on how the utility commissions do regard us and how they treat us fairly.
GREG ABEL: Sure. When you look at our rates across each of the regions, effectively we’re generally the low-cost provider, or in the low quartile.
Your example, Warren, in Iowa was a great example. The last time we had a rate increase there was 1998. We’ve just currently had one this past year, so it’s the first one in the past 16 years. And we don’t see another one in the foreseeable future. And when you create that type of model with our regulators, obviously they’re very supportive of the various projects we’ve introduced.
So this past year we introduced a project in Iowa, it’s a 1,000 megawatt project, $1.9 billion being incurred. And if you go to the gentleman’s comment, yes, we’re going put the — we’ll deploy that $1.9 billion over the coming two years, but we’ll earn 11-and-a-half percent — 11.6 percent return on it.
Generally when we look at our utilities, we do pay attention to our capital, we try to keep it very close to our depreciation. That’s what we put back into the business. We’ll even earn on that capital, but the reality is the lion’s share of our capital right now is growth capital. And we earn a very nice return on that.
WARREN BUFFETT: Greg, you might comment, just a minute, I think they’d find it interesting, on what’s happening in Iowa with the tech companies, simply because of what we’re doing in the electric field. Or not simply, but in part because of what we’re doing in the field of electricity.
GREG ABEL: Right. So when you look at the tech companies and the data centers that exist, if you just go across the river, we service Google in Council Bluffs.
They’ve got a site that was initially a relatively small data center. They’re looking at taking it to 40 to 50 megawatts, which is a small size of a power plant. But the reality is they’re talking about ultimately building that to 1,000 megawatts. And we’re seeing that replicated time after time in the state.
And it’s really due to two things. One, we’ve got these exceptionally low rates. And then the fact that a significant portion of our energy, as Warren highlighted earlier and I touched on, comes from renewable energy. They want those credits, they want to be associated with a utility that’s producing green power.
27. Education market’s future in U.S. and China
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9, please. (Applause)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Gao Ling Yun and I came from Shanghai, China. I focus on the education investment.
Today, my co-worker, Yi Nuo Education Company and I have a question. What do you think about the education market in America and China in future? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I didn’t catch those last two words. In what?
WARREN BUFFETT: He wanted to know what we thought of the education market in U.S. and China, but he didn’t —
CHARLIE MUNGER: But in what? He said in some — is it health care?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In future.
CHARLIE MUNGER: In the future, I see.
Well, we certainly are getting the easy questions late in the day. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think America —
WARREN BUFFETT: Whatever he says, I agree with. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think America made a huge mistake when they allowed the public schools, and many particularly big school systems, to just go to hell. (Applause)
And I think the Asian cultures are less likely to do that. So to the extent that Asian cultures are avoiding some of our mistakes, why, I just wish we were more like them.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)
28. Buffett’s joke about Munger’s hearing
WARREN BUFFETT: I probably shouldn’t tell you this. When Charlie was having a little trouble there on those last two words — I get a little worried about Charlie, don’t know whether I should talk about this, but — (Laughter)
I thought maybe he was losing his hearing and I didn’t want to confront him with it. I mean, we’ve been pals for a long time, so I went to the doctor and I said, “Doc, I’ve got this wonderful partner, but I think maybe his hearing is going on him.
“And I want to talk to him about it. I mean, how do you say that to somebody you’ve known that long? And what should I do?” He says, “Well, you stand across the room, talk to him in normal course of — tone of voice, and let me know what happens.”
So the next time I was with Charlie, I stood across the room and I said, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?” Not a flicker.
I go halfway across the room. I say, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?” Nothing.
Get right next to him, in his ear, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?”
He said, “For the third time, yes.” (Laughter and applause)
So speak up, speak up. (Laughs)
29. Is housing lending reform needed?
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, this is — Glen Green (PH) from Chicago.
First of all, I want to thank you for allocating capital so well all these years, very much appreciated.
The question has to do with housing and housing reform more specifically, and there’s clearly legislation in Washington, D.C. right now talking about reforming the GSEs, specifically Fannie and Freddie. Do you think we need housing reform? What would be a reasonable approach to do it, and if private participants were involved, would that make sense for Berkshire given Ajit’s actuarial skills and your ability to allocate capital?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that — and Charlie may disagree with me on it, I think that the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is a terrific boon to home owners.
It’s not necessarily such a great instrument to own as an investor, but I think it’s done a lot for home ownership. May have been abused in some cases, but overall it’s done a terrific job for home ownership in the country. Let people get into homes earlier than they might have been able to otherwise, kept costs down to quite a degree.
And so I would hope that — and the government guarantee part of it does keep the cost down. Nobody — no private organizations can do it. I mean, home mortgages are an 11 trillion-or-so dollar market, and there’s not the insurance capacity, or remotely the insurance capacity, for private industry to do the job, and the rates would be much higher.
So I think you keep the government in the picture. Now, the question is how you keep the government in the picture without keeping politics in the picture? And we’ve found some of the problems with that, in terms of not only Fannie and Freddie being — doing a lot of dumb things on their own, but being prodded into doing some of those things by politicians.
And I think there could be a way — I wrote an article 20, or 30 or — probably 30 years ago, an op-ed piece that appeared, I think, in the “Washington Post,” when the F-D-I — well, when FSLIC, the savings and loan guarantee operation was essentially falling apart, and suggesting for the FDIC some way to get the private sector into pricing and evaluating the risk, in that case, of banks, but essentially the government being the main insurer.
There could be — there could well be a way that that model, and it’s being explored now, that model works in terms of home mortgage insurance.
I don’t think we would likely be a player, because I think that other people would be more optimistic than we would be in setting rates.
In the end, the government would have to be the main insurer. You might have a situation where private industry priced 5 percent of it and the government took the other 95 percent and, in turn, even guaranteed the 5 percent by the private industry once the private investors went broke.
But I do think it’s very important to get housing, the mortgages for homes — to get that a correct national policy. I know it’s being worked on. And I think, you know, I think it’s very unlikely that Berkshire Hathaway would play any part in it.
Charlie, what are your thoughts?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when private industry was allowed to take over pretty much the whole field, we got the biggest bunch of thieves and idiots that you can imagine screwing up the whole system and threatening all of us. So I’m not very trustful of private industry in this field.
And so, as much as I hate what politicians frequently do, I think the existing system is probably pretty sound.
At the moment, Fannie and Freddie are being pretty conservative and they’re making almost all the home loans. I think that’s OK, and I’m not anxious to go back to where the investment banks were in a big race to the bottom, in terms of creating phony securities.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and I think — one question is whether you let Fannie and Freddie just run off as is, and I don’t know —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Instead of keep doing just what they’re doing.
WARREN BUFFETT: But I think — I think you may — I think certainly one of the things that led Fannie and Freddie astray was the desire to serve two masters and increase earnings at double-digit ranges. And to do that, they started doing big portfolio activities.
I think if Freddie and Fannie had stuck to insuring mortgages and not become the biggest hedge funds in the country, because they did have this capability of borrowing very cheap, very long, and therefore could get a reasonable — what looked like a reasonable spread on a huge portfolio action. I think that was a big contributing factor to —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they became, in effect, private corporations. But they’re not anymore, Warren. They’re —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — and they are at the moment being fairly conservative.
WARREN BUFFETT: There are people who want them to return to being private corporations, though.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but I think that’s a mistake because when they really got lousy, it’s because the private companies were taking over the whole mortgage market as bad lending drove out good. And Fannie May and Freddie Mac, to hold up their volumes, joined in the rush to laxity and fraud and folly. And so —
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you let them have portfolio activities at all?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t see any need for it.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t either. And I think that did get them into quite a bit of trouble. And I think those were done in order to keep the earnings per share game going.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think that particular experiment in privatization was a total failure. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11, and —
CHARLIE MUNGER: And we made a billion dollars out of it, if you remember.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wasn’t going mention that. (Laughter)
30. “Fortunate” to partner with 3G and Jorge Paulo Lemann
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Whitney Tilson, shareholder from New York City.
I’ve just started reading “Dream Big,” the book recently released about your new Brazilian partners and I’m really enjoying it. Their track records are unbelievable, and as a long-time Berkshire shareholder I’m delighted that you’ve partnered with them, and hope that Heinz is the first of many elephants that you bag together.
WARREN BUFFETT: Can I interrupt you just for one second, Whitney? I appreciate that sentiment, and that book is available in — (Laughter)
I should have mentioned it earlier. The book was written in Portuguese and it was a best seller in Brazil for the last year. But it just got translated very, very, very recently and it is available at the Bookworm. So — Whitney, you can go on from there, but I did want to mention it’s available.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Why would you assume that all of our shareholders don’t read Portuguese? (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ll also mention that it is only available on Amazon via Kindle. The only hard copies in the world in English that I’m aware of are available downstairs, so that will create quite a run on the book, I think.
WARREN BUFFETT: We will raise the price. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I have two questions related to this. First, I know you’ve known these gentlemen probably for a couple decades, and I’d love to hear your observations on what’s their secret sauce? It’s got to be more than zero-based budgeting, which we all hear about. What are the key things they do that produces such extraordinary returns?
And secondly, when I look at some of the biggest, best deals that you’ve done in recent years, important factors seem to be your longtime personal relationships, for example, with Jorge Paulo Lemann in the Heinz deal, or your brand name.
The Warren Buffett stamp of approval mattered a lot to some of the deals you did with, for example, Goldman or GE during the financial crisis. And I just wonder what your thoughts are on whether your successors will have the same opportunities to do wonderful deals like this?
WARREN BUFFETT: It will become the Berkshire brand. I mean, the first year or so people will wonder about it, but the person that follows me will bring the same qualities, including the ability to write a very big check. But other things besides that, and it will be a Berkshire brand that may have started with me, but that will continue.
Going on to our Brazilian friends, they’re very smart, they’re very focused, they’re very hardworking and determined. They’re never satisfied.
And as I said earlier, when you make a deal with them you’ve made a deal with them. They don’t overreach, they don’t overpromise. They’ve got a lot of good qualities. And if you read the book, I think you’ll probably learn a lot more about the qualities that made them what they are.
But we are very fortunate to be associated with them, and we’re very fortunate to be associated with a number of the managers that have joined us, too.
We want to be a good partner ourselves because it attracts good partners. And that is a reputation that Berkshire deserves. I mean, Charlie and I do our part toward keeping that reputation intact, but that takes a lot of other people also behaving in a way that causes people to want to join them, causes people to want to trust them. And that will be part of a Berkshire brand. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I always say the way to get a good spouse is to deserve one. And the way to get a good part —
WARREN BUFFETT: What’s your second way? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: — and the other — well, but to get a good partner you deserve a good partner. It’s an old-fashioned way of getting ahead. And the interesting about it is it still works in these modern times. Nothing changes, if you just behave yourself correctly, it’s amazing how well it works. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: You have any further thoughts on the Brazilians?
CHARLIE MUNGER: On what?
WARREN BUFFETT: On the success of Jorge Paulo and his associates, beyond what I laid out?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there — you can’t skirt the fact that they’re very good at removing unnecessary costs.
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I do not consider that in any way immoral or wrong or something.
WARREN BUFFETT: Not in the least.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think removing unnecessary costs is a service to civilization. And I think it should be done with some — what do they call it? Mercy, really.
WARREN BUFFETT: Sensitivity.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, sensitivity. But I don’t think it’s good for our system to have a lot of make-work and what have you. So —
WARREN BUFFETT: If it was, we’d love government, right?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and so, generally speaking, I think they’re an interesting example to all of us.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re learning from them.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Everybody is.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Some reluctantly.
31. We’ll decide what to do with “too much” cash when we get there
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is Walter Chang (PH) and I came from Taiwan for this meeting.
Seven years ago, I named my first-born son after you, Warren, so the second one hasn’t come yet —
WARREN BUFFETT: How’s he — how’s he —
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — so sorry —
WARREN BUFFETT: — how’s he — how’s he doing?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: He’s doing great.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So he says hi. He always says, “Warren Buffalo,” so, sorry — (Laugher) — sorry about that.
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been called — I’ve been called worse. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is for both of you. We wish you continued good health, and when both of you break Mrs. B’s record of working to 103 years old, that will be 20 years from now.
If Warren — or sorry, if Berkshire breaks that record and basically doubles over the next ten years and doubles again, you’ll have a market cap of $1.2 trillion.
What do you think Berkshire will look like at that time and can you get there sooner? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: We may have to. Your original hypothesis may not hold up.
I do plan on writing about that next year, but there’s no question that at some point we will have more cash than we can intelligently deploy. And then — in the business — and then the question is what do we do with the excess? And that will depend on circumstances at the time.
I mean, if the stock can be bought in at a price that makes sense for continuing shareholders, in other words that their value is enhanced by the repurchase, you know, if I were around at that time I would probably be very aggressive about repurchasing shares. But who knows what the circumstances will be. Who knows what the tax law will be then, you know.
What I do know is that we will have more cash than we can intelligently invest at some point in the future. That’s built into what we’re doing, and I hope that isn’t real soon, and I don’t think it probably will be.
But it’s not on a distant horizon. I mean, the numbers are getting up to where we will not be able to deploy intelligently everything that’s coming in.
But then we can deploy — it may be that we can deploy very intelligently and repurchase the shares. Who knows what the circumstances will be?
All I can tell you is that whatever is done will be done in the interest of the shareholder. That, you know, that is what every decision starts from, from that principle. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not a tragedy to succeed so much that future returns go down. That’s success, that’s winning.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’ll name his next child after you. (Laughter) OK.
32. Uber, Airbnb, and the “disruptive” sharing economy
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Afternoon. My name’s Michael Sontag (PH) and I’m from Washington, D.C.
My question’s about the sharing economy. What larger implications do you expect companies like Uber and Airbnb to have on their sectors, and do you think this business model is here to stay?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they are obviously trying to disrupt some other businesses, and those businesses will fight back in competitive ways, and they may try to fight back through legislation.
You know, when anybody’s threatened, or any business is threatened, it tries to fight back.
If you go back to when State Farm came on the scene in 1921, that the — or ’20, or whenever it was, the agency system was sacrosanct, in terms of insurance. It’d been around forever and the big companies were in Hartford or New York and they fought over having the number one agency in town.
So if you came to Omaha and you were at Travelers or Aetna, or whomever it might be, your objective was to get the agent. And the policy holder really wasn’t being thought about.
And then State Farm came along and they had a better mouse trap, and then GEICO came along with a better mouse trap yet.
And so, every — the industries originally — the insurance companies fought back in a lot of ways. But one of the ways they tried to do it was to insist, you know, on various state laws involving what agents could do and what could not be done in insurance without agents and all that.
It’s — that’s standard. And you’ll see that, and in the end the better mouse trap usually wins. But the people with the second or third-best mouse trap will try to keep that from happening.
The ones you name, I don’t know anything about. I mean, I know what they do, but I don’t their specific prospects, which is why we kind of stay away from that sort of thing because we don’t — we know there’ll be change, and we don’t know who the winners will be. And we try to stick with businesses where we know the winners.
We know — and there are energy companies that — a railroad. A lot of our businesses are very, very, very likely to be winners, and that doesn’t mean they don’t have some change involved with them, but they’re going to be winners.
And then there’s other fields where we can’t pick the winners, and so we just sit and watch. We find them interesting but we don’t get tempted. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the new technology is going to be quite disruptive to a lot of people. I think retailing, in particular, is facing some very significant threats.
And you heard Greg Abel talk about a power plant in Iowa that was huge to serve one Google server farm. When you get computer capacity all over the world on this scale, it is changing the world. I mean, you’re talking about —
WARREN BUFFETT: Fast, too.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, fast. So — and I think it’s going to hurt a lot of people just as all the past technology investments hurt a lot of people. I think Berkshire, by and large, is in pretty good shape.
WARREN BUFFETT: Where do you think we’re most vulnerable?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think I want to name them.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughs)
Now you’ve got them all wondering, Charlie. (Laughs)
33. Teach financial literacy to children in school?
WARREN BUFFETT: Section 3.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Diane Wilen, and I’m from Hollywood, Florida.
I’ve worked in public education for over 35 years. My concern is that I think that we need to do more to proactively prepare our children and youth to be financially literate, especially in light of the serious financial stresses many adults in our society face on a daily basis.
My question is, do you think that financial literacy should be a standard part of the curriculum in our nation’s schools and, if so, how early do you think it should begin and what do you think some of the most important learning goals would be?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly the earlier the better. I mean, habits are such a powerful force in everyone’s life, and certainly good financial habits.
You know, I see it all the time. I get letters every day from people that have committed some kind of financial lunacy or another, but they didn’t know it was lunacy and, you know, they didn’t get taught that. Their parents didn’t teach it to them.
And digging yourself out of the holes that financial illiteracy can cause, you know, you can spend the rest of your lifetime doing it. So I’m very sympathetic to what you’re talking about.
We’ve done a little bit. I don’t know whether you saw our “Secret Millionaire’s Club” exhibit in the exhibition hall.
And you want to talk to people at a very young age. Charlie and I were lucky. I mean, we got it in our families so that, you know, we were learning it at the dinner table when we were — before we knew what we were learning. And that happens in a lot of families, and in a lot of families it doesn’t happen.
And, of course, you mention about childhood financial literacy. Then there’s a big problem with adulthood, adult financial illiteracy. And it’s harder to be smarter or have better habits than your parents unless the schools intercede or —probably, you know, the schools are your best bet, but it can be done — a lot can be done on television or through the internet.
But it is really important to have good financial habits, and I think anything you can do very early through the school system, you know, would certainly have my vote. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m not sure if the schools are at fault. I would place most of the fault with the parents. I think the most powerful example (applause) is the behavior of the parent, and so if you’re —
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I agree with — the most important thing is the parents, but not everybody gets the right parents.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, it’s very hard to fix people who have the wrong parents. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s just say you have the job of fixing people that have the wrong parents. What would you do about it?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s the — if you had the job of living forever, what would you do about it? It gets to be so impractical. (Laughter)
Who would ever believe that I would have any ability to fix all the people that have the wrong parents?
WARREN BUFFETT: How about a few? (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I’m good at that, either. The only thing I’ve ever been slightly good at in my life is raising the top higher. It’s just — they left the talent out of me.
I don’t scorn it. I think it’s a noble work. I just — I’m no good at it.
I don’t think you’re so hot, either. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: If he hadn’t been in public, it would have been stronger. (Laughs)
Stop by our “Secret Millionaire’s Club,” though. You may get some ideas.
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, the main troubles with education in this field are probably not in the grade schools. They’re probably in the colleges.
There’s a lot of asininity taught in the finance courses at the major universities, and even the departments of economics have much wrong with them. So, if you really want to start fixing the world, you shouldn’t assume that when it gets highfalutin, it’s a lot better.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (Applause)
There was certainly a period of at least 20 years, I would say, when I think the net utility of knowledge given to finance majors was negative in major universities. I think maybe it’s getting better now, but it is a —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine it. Net utility was negative. It was (unintelligible) asinine.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I wish you’d use normal English. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m worried about what English you’re going to use. (Laughter)
I don’t want to egg him on.
The — it was — frankly, it was fascinating to me because here was something I understood.
And to watch — I mean extraordinary universities that, essentially, were teaching people some very, very dumb things. And where even to obtain the positions in the departments of those schools, you had to subscribe to this orthodoxy, which made no sense at all.
And it got stronger and stronger, and then — now it’s changing to quite a degree. But it may have soured my feeling on higher education to an unwarranted degree because that — you know, it may have been particularly bad in the area that I was familiar with, but it was bad.
Have I got — is my language okay, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: You would have liked academics better if you’d have taken physics instead of finance. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’m glad I didn’t. (Laughs)
34. “There’s no advantage to breaking Berkshire into pieces”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 4.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. First of all, great party last night. I stood there for half an hour and still couldn’t get a drink, so great crowd. Oh, by the way this is Zhang Xiaozhu (PH) from Ottawa, Ontario.
My question relates to the age-old question about dividends and also valuation. I think you guys are penalized by the great success of your enormously successful company. It’s huge, so no one knows how to properly valuate it, and also because of your yardstick you picked, which is not quite fair.
Every year I see some of the old shareholders, and they are waiting to get a dividend, using some of the monies to supplement their retirements.
I do not feel it’s essentially fair for them to sell their shares. I remember the case study you had in last year’s letter to the shareholders. You did a case study comparing issuing dividends or having the shareholders selling their shares directly.
Because of the shares are so depressed, I do not feel it’s very fair. So I’m wanting to ask, is there a practical way for you to break up the company into four logical groups, as you report in every year’s AGM, and unlock some of the values and still allow you to allocate the capital freely, please?
WARREN BUFFETT: We would lose — we would not unlock value. We would lose significant value if we were to break it into four companies.
There are large advantages in both capital allocation, occasionally in the tax situation. There’s — Berkshire is worth more as presently constituted than in any other form that I can conceive of unless we engaged in something to de-tax the whole place, which we’re not going to do and which would probably be impossible anyway, but even if it was possible, we wouldn’t be doing it.
But the — we did have this vote, and it’s now time to adjourn and then we’ll come back in a few minutes for the annual meeting. But we did have a vote, and unfortunately we — there’s not a way to deliver a dividend to a few shareholders and not to others, although — whereas there is a way to — for shareholders to maintain an even and greater dollar investment in Berkshire, in terms of the underlying assets, and still cash out annually some portion of their investment, just like they would with a partnership, and incur fairly little tax in the matter. And I wrote about that last year and you’ve read that.
But there’s no advantage to breaking Berkshire into pieces. It would be a terrible mistake. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally I think that you’re not being deprived when the stock goes from 100 to 200, and you didn’t get a dividend that year.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it isn’t going to go up every year, though. I mean, it’s going to —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Or two years or whatever it was.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We had, by a 45-to-1 vote, we had people — which actually surprised me. We had people say that they prefer the present policy to a change in that policy, so it would be a big mistake to change.
And with that we will end the Q-and-A session. We’ll be back in about ten or so minutes, and we’ll have an annual meeting. Thank you. (Applause)
35. Berkshire’s formal annual meeting
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll take your seats, we’ll get on to the meeting.
OK. I have a script here that I’ll read from and make sure everything’s proper.
The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company, and I welcome you to the 2014 annual meeting of shareholders.
This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present. Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
Sharon Heck is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway. She will make a written record of the proceedings.
Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify that the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motion to be voted upon at the meeting.
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
SHARON HECK: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 5, 2014, there were 857,848 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at this meeting and 1,179,267,338 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at this meeting. Of that number, 601,494 Class A shares and 682,365,717 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 1.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will, therefore, directly proceed with the meeting.
36. Approval of last year’s minutes
WARREN BUFFETT: First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place the motion before the meeting.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?
We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.” Opposed? The motion is carried.
37. Election of Berkshire directors
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting. Please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisle so that you can receive a ballot.
I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? The nominations are ready to be acted upon.
If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the election of directors and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.
Ms. Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 660,619 votes for each nominee.
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.
Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.
38. Advisory vote on executive compensation
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of the regulation S-K, including the compensation discussion and the analysis and the accompanying compensation tables and the related narrative discussion in the company’s 2014 annual meeting proxy statement.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.
Is there any discussion? I believe there may be on this. Do we have anyone?
OK. Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
BECKI AMICK: The report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 666,751 votes to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.
The motion to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers is passed.
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the frequency of a shareholder advisory vote on compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company determine, on an advisory basis, the frequency, whether by annual, biannual, or triannual, with which they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers as set forth in the company’s 2014 annual meeting proxy statement.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that shareholders of the company determine the frequency with which they have an advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers with the options being every one, two or three years. Is there any discussion? I believe on this one there is a — somebody wishes to speak? Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Boston, Massachusetts. I suggest a vote of one year in order to change the policy of named executives.
In addition to Warren, Charlie, and Marc, the company should report Ajit Jain’s salary. He is irreplaceable, and Warren works integrally with him in setting insurance rates.
Since —five — there should be five members of management, either another insurance manager or someone from the capital-related industries group, from BNSF or MidAmerican, should also be added.
You are so lean at corporate, the group managers should be named. Two should be named, but at least Ajit should be added.
The CEOs of former Fortune 500s used to disclose what is their compensation now. There is no retirement age at Berkshire, which is fine, but there should be more depth of disclosure, and this should be done next year, not three years from now.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone else that — doesn’t appear to be.
I personally actually agree with a one-year frequency on this, normally, but it does seem in the case of Berkshire that considering what’s required and considering what the numbers are and everything, that it probably doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. But I generally feel one year is not a bad idea.
I do not think it’s a good idea to start selecting people among the managers to give compensation for the reasons discussed earlier.
OK. Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 113,530 votes for a frequency of every year, 2,412 votes for a frequency of every two years, and 552,309 votes for a frequency of every three years of an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.
Shareholders of the company determined, on an advisory basis, that they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers every three years.
39. Proposal to set greenhouse gas reduction goals
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Meyer Family Enterprises, LLC, a Berkshire shareholder represented by Brady Anderson and Linda Nkosi.
The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion directs Berkshire Hathaway to establish quantitative goals for reduction of greenhouse gases and other air emissions at its energy generating holdings and publish a report to shareholders on how it will achieve those goals.
The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.
I will now recognize Brady Anderson and Linda Nkosi to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask them to limit their remarks to five minutes.
LINDA NKOSI: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Linda Nkosi from Swaziland, and this is Brady Anderson from Iowa.
We are students of economics and finance at Wartburg College in Iowa and are here representing a delegation of students who manage a $1.2 million portfolio that includes shares of Berkshire Hathaway. We very much appreciate the opportunity to take part in this celebrated event.
We stand to represent Investor Voice SPC of Seattle on behalf of the Meyer Family Enterprises to move Item 4 on page 12 of the proxy, a proposal that Berkshire establish goals for greenhouse gas reduction at its energy holdings.
We applaud Berkshire Hathaway Energy for having the largest renewable energy portfolio in the country.
That said, it is also true that BH Energy generates close to half its power by burning coal, which makes BH Energy a huge emitter of greenhouse gas. Given these facts, it would benefit BH Energy to have a carbon reduction plan.
Sixty-six percent of U.S. electric utilities have greenhouse gas reduction goals. Berkshire Hathaway Energy is not among them, despite stating on its website, “We will set challenging goals and assess our ability to continually improve our environmental performance.”
As shareholders are aware, climate disruption creates profound financial risk for the global economy as well as for Berkshire. The Investor Network on Climate Risk, whose members manage more than $11 trillion, and the Carbon Disclosure Project, representing more than $80 trillion in assets globally, have called on companies to disclose risks related to climate change, as well as to take steps to reduce that risk.
BRADY ANDERSON: The SEC has stated that climate risks are financially material and that they must be disclosed. This is because a high-carbon approach creates risk, whereas a low-carbon approach avoids risk, both now and into the future.
Without planning and a set of forward-looking goals, neither management nor investors can truly know where they stand.
In addition, Berkshire’s core businesses are vulnerable to climate disruption. Why? Because many of the most negative financial impacts of climate disruption are borne by insurance companies.
Berkshire’s GEICO took its single largest loss in history from Superstorm Sandy, a $490 million loss due to claims on more than 46,000 flooded vehicles.
Berkshire’s reinsurance business is likely to bear significantly more risk from the trends towards increasingly extreme weather.
For a time, some portion of these costs may be pushed onto customers in the form of higher premiums, but it is a prudent — it is (not) a prudent or sustainable long-term strategy to impose on customers the cost of not planning for the greenhouse gas reductions that climate scientists agree are urgently needed.
In summary, hundreds of the world’s largest institutional investors, representing trillions of dollars of invested assets, call on companies to set greenhouse gas reduction goals. Such goals are key tools for reducing the profound business risk that climate change creates.
More than two-thirds of United States utilities already have such goals, and institutional proxy advisory firms repeatedly recommend voting for goal setting and disclosure of this sort.
Therefore, please join us in voting for this common sense proposal, which not only benefits the planet, it will preserve, if not boost, Berkshire profits by avoiding risk.
Thank you for this truly amazing opportunity to share our concerns.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, and thank you. (Applause)
I assume that the fact the lights went off, there’s nobody additionally that would like to speak on the motion for or against?
Hearing nothing, I’ll say that the motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.
Ms. Amick, when you’re ready, you can give your report.
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 49,553 votes for the motion and 561,642 votes against the motion.
As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick. The proposal fails.
40. Shareholder proposal to pay a dividend
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forward by David Witt. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion requested the board of directors consider payment of a dividend. The directors have recommended the shareholders vote against the proposal.
Mr. Witt available?
As neither Mr. Witt nor his representative is present to present their proposal for action, the motion fails.
41. Meeting adjourned
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
VOICE: I second the motion to adjourn.
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.
2014年股东大会
上午场
1. 巴菲特与歌手保罗·安卡的“第二职业”
巴菲特:谢谢大家。(掌声)
早上好。在我们开始之前,我想介绍两位非常特别的嘉宾,请他们站起来。
第一位,虽然他正在巡演途中,但他特地绕道来到奥马哈,今天到场。有请我的朋友、[创作型歌手] 保罗·安卡(Paul Anka)起立。保罗?(掌声)
鉴于外界一直在议论我的接班人问题,我想,跟一位名人搭上线、给自己谋个第二职业的机会,大概是个不错的主意。(笑)
所以呢,婚礼、葬礼、犹太成人礼,我们都接活。(笑)
前几天我们还真接到一个邀约。我觉得这有点侮辱人。他们出价 1,000 美元。我是说,对我和保罗来说,这报价实在有点荒唐。
我把这话跟那些人说了,他们回道:「好吧。如果只来保罗一个人,我们出 10,000 美元。」(笑)
2. 介绍伯克希尔的凯莉·索瓦
巴菲特:好,现在我们还有另一位非常特别的嘉宾。
这样的盛会可不是凭空自己办成的。
有这样一位年轻女士,她在 9 月份生了个宝宝,是个小男孩,名叫布雷迪(Brady)。她召集了我们旗下各家公司 400 多号人,办成了你们今天所看到的这场演出。
我只想特别感谢这位我们大家都爱、尤其是我特别爱的女士——凯莉·索瓦(Carrie Sova)。凯莉?(掌声)
请站起来。她在那儿。(掌声)
3. 介绍伯克希尔董事们
巴菲特:好。现在我们要介绍一些次要角色了,我们来介绍一下董事会成员。(笑)
我们将——我们将开董事会——我该说是股东大会——在问答环节之后举行,问答会在 3:30 结束。然后我们休会 15 分钟。3:45 时,重新开始——或者说正式召开——股东大会。
但对于你们当中那些 3:45 不会留在现场的人,我希望你们现在就有机会见一见各位董事。
所以,我会一位一位地介绍他们,请他们起立。尽管这可能有点难,但请先憋住掌声,等他们全部都站起来之后,你们再尽情鼓掌。
那么,按字母顺序来,我念到你的名字时请你起立。
霍华德·巴菲特(Howard Buffett)、史蒂夫·伯克(Steve Burke)、苏·德克尔(Sue Decker)、比尔·盖茨(Bill Gates)、桑迪·戈特斯曼(Sandy Gottesman)、夏洛特·盖曼(Charlotte Guyman)、唐·基奥(Don Keough)、我的搭档查理·芒格、汤姆·墨菲(Tom Murphy)、罗恩·奥尔森(Ron Olson)、沃尔特·斯科特(Walter Scott),以及梅丽尔·威特默(Meryl Witmer)。
这就是伯克希尔的董事会。(掌声)
4. 伯克希尔第一季度财报摘要
巴菲特:我们就放几张幻灯片,然后就直接进入提问环节,提问会一直进行到大约中午。
我们中午休息一下,1:00 左右回来,然后继续到 3:30,到那时我们就散会,接着在 3:45 召开年度股东大会。
不过,就只有几张幻灯片。我们昨天发布了业绩。
我一直强调——我们总是尽量在收市之后发布业绩,而且最好是在周五收市之后,这样大家就有一个完整的周末来消化这些信息,因为伯克希尔每个季度都有大量信息。这些信息主要包含在一份 10-Q 报告里,我们把它提供给你们,让你们整个周末都能仔细阅读。
所以我们总是力劝你们不要只看那些汇总数字,而要好好读一读 10-Q。它读起来很精彩。请在周一早上之前把这些都吸收消化。
那么这里就是第一季度的汇总情况。
如你们所见,我们的营业利润略有下滑。而这一下滑主要、甚至超额地体现在保险承保业务上。你们应该明白,保险承保业务逐季之间的波动其实并没有太大意义。
首先,它可能会受到外汇变动的相当大的影响,而外汇变动跟我们的保险业务其实毫无关系。不过——至少在中期业绩的现实呈现上是这样。
我们的保险业务现在拥有 770 亿美元的浮存金。这 770 亿美元归我们去投资。它对我们究竟有没有成本,取决于我们是否有承保利润。
所以,尽管我们第一季度的承保利润相当令人满意,但毕竟比去年第一季度有所下降,保险业务对我们而言依然是极好的生意。
而且,即便我们只是做到盈亏平衡,那 770 亿美元——它是从净资产中扣减掉的,我是说,它在资产负债表上是一项负债——但如果它是零成本的,那它给我们带来的好处,几乎和净资产本身一样大。所以这是一门非常了不起的生意。
坦白说,如果我们能在多年里平均下来取得承保利润,那我会非常高兴,你们也应该为我们的保险业务为我们所做的一切感到非常高兴。
但它在第一季度是下滑的。而且,正如我所说,这一下滑足以、甚至超额地解释了利润的下降。
我们总是建议你们对证券每季度、甚至每年度的已实现收益或亏损少加关注——其实是别去关注——因为我们从不试图为了在某个特定季度做出利润而去择时卖出证券。
我们只是尽我们所能把资金管理好。至于这些操作在短期内是产生收益还是亏损,我们就顺其自然。
我们希望它们在较长期内能产生大量收益,而事实上它们也确实做到了。
但在试图解读我们的短期利润时,这些收益或亏损应该被忽略。
5. 巴菲特赞扬股东们否决分红提案
巴菲特:说到这儿,我想给你们预先透露一项已经完成的投票结果,等到我们开股东大会时还会更多地谈到它。
但这结果实在太了不起了,所以我想现在就把它展示出来给你们大家看一看。
如你们所知,我们收到了一项股东提案。对,就在那上面。
我们收到了一项股东提案,措辞颇为雅致,建议我们派发股息。其中还带着一种潜移默化的暗示,意思是我们之所以不派股息,是因为我已经富得流油,不靠股息也能维持我习以为常的这种奢华生活方式,而股东们却因为我们把所有的钱都攥在奥马哈这里,基本上沦落到了缺衣少食的地步。(笑)
于是这位先生把这项提案列入了投票表决。如果我们看下一张幻灯片,你们就会看到一些了不起的数字。
请记住,你们知道的,你们这些人会在家里或办公室收到这些委托投票书。你们想怎么填都可以。
我们没有雇佣任何代理投票征集公司。所以我们没有打任何电话。我们不会试图去影响任何人怎么投票。我们只是把投票收上来后如实点数。
正如你们将在最上方看到的,在 A 类股当中,投票结果大约是 90 多比 1,反对派发股息。不过你们或许会怀疑我往票箱里塞了票,而我确实塞了。(笑)
于是我把我自己的票剔除掉了。你们会在下方看到,在那些「未受污染」的 A 类股股东当中,反对领取股息的投票结果是略低于 40 比 1。
然后你可能会对自己说:「嗯,你知道,那是沃伦和他那些有钱的朋友,全是大富豪。他们说起来当然轻松。」
那我们看下一张幻灯片。你会看到,在 B 类股股东当中——我们相信我们的 B 类股股东可能多达一百万人。我们不知道确切数字,连一个大致的数字都没什么把握。但猜我们有一百万左右的股东,应该不算太离谱。
而了不起的是,以 45 比 1 的投票结果——这些都是普通人——我们没有给任何人打电话去拉票什么的——以 45 比 1,我们的股东说:「别给我们分红。」
我不确定世界上有哪家公司能得到这样的投票结果。
现在再看一张幻灯片,就到此为止了。
但这次投票里有一部分让人挺不安。如果你翻到下一页,你会再次看到,在 B 类股股东当中——我把同样那个投票结果放在了上面——而如果你往下看,你会注意到,投票反对我、或者对我投弃权票的人数,几乎和投票赞成分红的人数一样多。
所以由此你只能推断出:如果股东们将来被迫面临选择——或者我应该说,如果董事们将来被迫面临选择——要么分红,要么把我赶走,那将会是一次势均力敌的投票。(笑)
所以你能明白,为什么我相当不愿意去跟董事们提分红这个问题。
实际上,直到两天前,也就是在这些最终数字出来之前,这次投票几乎是不分胜负的平局。
想要分红的人数,和想让我滚蛋的人数,势均力敌、难分高下。所以这——再说一遍,这是一种相当不寻常的投票安排。
6. 问答环节开始
巴菲特:好,接下来我们就开始提问环节,跟我们一向的做法一样。
这边是记者。那边是金融分析师。而台下我们还有一群了不起的股东。
所以我们会在这几组之间轮流提问。我们会一直这样进行到中午。然后下午 1 点,我们再从中断的地方接着来,继续这样进行。
我们先从《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯开始。
卡罗尔·卢米斯:早上好。我先说两三句开场白。
首先,贝姬、安德鲁和我收到了成百上千、甚至上千个问题,而我们只能挑出几个来问。所以,如果我们没有问到你的问题,请多包涵。
其次,沃伦和查理事先完全不知道我们要问什么。
不过他们跟我们一样会读新闻,这或许能解释为什么他们有时候会对自己将被问到什么有点预感。而这也正好可以引出我的第一个问题。
7. 巴菲特为在可口可乐“过高”薪酬案上投弃权票辩护
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自纽约市的威尔·埃尔里奇(音译)。
他说:「巴菲特先生,这是一个关于伯克希尔所持可口可乐股票的问题。
「今年春天,可口可乐请股东批准一项对其高管极为慷慨的股票期权计划。
「投票之后,媒体就此事问你时,你说这项计划过头了。然而,在可口可乐股东大会召开之前,你并没有向外界表明你认为这项计划过头了——而这样一项披露,如果早一点做出来,本来或许会让股东们投票反对它。
「而事实上,你并没有用伯克希尔的股份去投票反对这项计划。你在投票中只是弃权。
「我想你有你的理由。我得说,我并不指望自己会赞同这些理由。而且我看不出它们经得起推敲。
「但我还是想知道,你为什么会做出这种非常奇怪、一点也不像巴菲特作风的举动。
「所以,对于一项本该被大声否决的公司行为,你为什么选择弃权,而不是投反对票?」
巴菲特:是啊。嗯,顺便说一句,有些人认为「奇怪」和「不像巴菲特作风」其实不太准确。奇怪往往就很像巴菲特作风。(笑)
这项提案是由一位持股很久的股东提出的,他反对这个期权计划。
他的计算——我大概应该花一分钟解释一下——但他对稀释程度的计算大错特错。而我们也不想卷入对这一点或别的什么的讨论。
但我们确实谈过——或者说我确实谈过——跟穆塔尔·肯特(Muhtar Kent)。我告诉他我们打算弃权。
我告诉他,我们对可口可乐公司极其钦佩。我们钦佩它的管理层。
而我们认为,这项薪酬计划尽管和许许多多别的计划非常相似,但确实过头了。
事实上,穆塔尔和我就在奥马哈这里进行了一次很好的交谈,另外还有几次电话沟通。然后投票一结束,我就宣布我们弃权了,并给出了我们认为这项计划过头的理由。
而我认为,就对可口可乐的薪酬做法产生影响——以及或许对其他一些公司的薪酬做法产生影响——而言,对伯克希尔来说,这是最有效的——是当时最有效的——做法。
我们对这项计划的过分之处做了非常明确的表态。与此同时,我们丝毫没有跟可口可乐开战。我们无意跟可口可乐开战。
而且我们也没有去认可那些大错特错的计算,更没有去跟一个我其实根本没有接触过的人结成同盟。在那些材料先被交给媒体之后,我才收到了几封寄来的信。
所以,我觉得你得——我认为在大多数情况下开战都不是个好主意。而且我认为,如果你打算跟某人联手去开战,你最好对那个同盟可能意味着什么非常清楚。
所以,我认为对可口可乐公司来说,最好的结果正是通过我们的弃权实现的。至于薪酬方面,从现在到下一次可口可乐股东大会之间会发生什么,我们就拭目以待。
芒格?
芒格:我觉得整件事你处理得非常好。(笑)
巴菲特:而查理仍然是副董事长。(笑)
顺便说一句,查理是——在我投票——或者说弃权——之前,查理是唯一一个我跟他商量过这次投票的人。
我给查理打了电话,把这项计划告诉了他。我们就采取什么样的行动达成了一致。
我应该指出一点。而且,公平地说,对于戴维·温特斯(David Winters)——他领头发起了这场「战争」——他用的是可口可乐委托投票说明书里的数字。所以很难因为这一点去责怪他。
但对于你们当中真心——真心想知道该如何思考稀释计算的人来说:可口可乐一直在定期回购通过期权发行出去的那些股票。
因此,可口可乐的股本数量只下降了很小一点。不过,要是他们没有为回购而发行那么多股票,下降幅度本可大得多。
但可口可乐有一项涉及 5 亿股的方案。他们在年报里说,预计大约会在四年内发行这些股票。然后他们还在业绩股和期权股之间做了进一步的测算,不过我就不说那部分了,把问题弄简单一点。
那可是相当多的股票。
我们姑且假设可口可乐现在每股卖 40 美元左右,事实上也确实如此。再假设所有期权都按 40 美元发行。而且——等到行权的时候,我们假设股价是 60 美元。
那么到那个时点,就发生了 100 亿美元的价值转移。每股 20 美元乘以 5 亿股,就是 100 亿美元的价值转移。
而当这一切发生时,公司会获得一笔税收抵扣——按 100 亿美元计——以现行税率,这会减少 35 亿美元的税款。
所以,如果你把行权所得的 200 亿美元,加上 35 亿美元的税收节省,可口可乐公司一共收到 235 亿美元。
如果他们以每股 60 美元——也就是当时的股价——买回股票,他们就能买回 391,666,666 股。
所以,实际上可口可乐公司净增的股本只是略多于 8——1.08 亿股。而这是建立在 44 亿股的基数之上的。
所以这种稀释——假设行权所得和退税款全部用来回购股票——稀释幅度就是在 44 亿股的基础上多出 1.08 亿股,约为 2.5%。
我不喜欢稀释,我也不喜欢 2.5% 的稀释。但这跟外面到处乱传的那些数字相差甚远。
解释起来很长,但我从没见过有人把这笔账算出来写下来。我是说,我只见过人们抛出各种说法之类的。
你也可以把我的假设从 55——从 60 改成 55——或者 65。这并不会让结果有太大变化。
8. 尽管风格不同,伯克希尔很可能再次与3G合作
巴菲特:乔恩·布兰特。
乔纳森·布兰特:你好,沃伦。再次感谢你请我回来。
我的第一个问题如下:伯克希尔一向的做法是收购成功的企业,然后放手不管。
3G 在收购方面采取的是一种更亲力亲为的策略。它的零基预算似乎有可能提升任何一家非保险业务的利润率。
伯克希尔有没有办法在不违背对出售股东所做承诺、也不背离伯克希尔去中心化文化的前提下,运用 3G 的方法来提升利润?
在某位现任经理人退休之后,聘请一位出身 3G 的人来管理伯克希尔的子公司,是否符合伯克希尔的文化?又或者,一个并非出身 3G 的人,要学习并实施他们那套管理流程,难度有多大?谢谢。
巴菲特:是的。我认为这两者并不太能融合在一起。
但我确实认为我们——我认为 3G 在经营企业方面做得非常出色。过去我从远处观察他们,最近我又近距离观察了他们。
毫无疑问,那是一种与伯克希尔不同的风格。我认为去尝试把两者融合并不划算。
但我当然认为,我们将会看到更多与 3G 合作的机会。而且我们很可能会抓住这些机会,因为我觉得在经营企业方面,他们和我所见过的任何人一样能干。
能有机会与他们携手——而且除此之外,他们还是非常出色的合作伙伴。他们在与我们的一切往来中都做得不止公道。
所以正如我过去所说的,我认为我们很可能会与他们合作,或许是在一些规模非常大的事情上。
但我并不认为把两者融合会运作得很好。我们有一套体系,对我们来说运作得非常好。
而经理人加入伯克希尔时,加入的是一家庞大的企业,它几乎不同于现存的任何一家大企业。他们真的找不到一个跟伯克希尔一模一样的归宿。
那是一笔巨大的企业资产。它是随着时间逐渐积累起来的,而且还会继续增长。我们希望传递一个非常清晰的信息来维护它,那就是它会远远延续到我的有生之年之后。
但我们欢迎有机会与 3G 携手。
芒格?
芒格:我可不觉得我们曾经有过什么钟爱人浮于事的政策。(笑)
巴菲特:嗯,我只是稍微有点不同意这个说法。
我们在总部确实从来没有过允许人员冗余的政策。
只有当大家挤得都快坐到别人腿上时,我们才会觉得高兴。我是说,你得理解这一点。
但是——但我们并没有强制、也没有试图强制、更不愿意强制,对每一家子公司在人员是否略微偏多这件事上施加严格的纪律。
很多子公司并没有人浮于事。事实上,我是说,它们绝大多数——是以精简的方式来经营的。
但这些年来我们涉足过的每一家公司并非都是如此。将来也很可能不会每一家都是如此。
我们鼓励——我是说,我们仅仅通过以身作则来鼓励。但我们并不通过发号施令来鼓励,尤其不会那样。
芒格?
芒格:我认为很多伟大的企业会有那么一点点浪费,只是因为他们不想变得偏执。
那也无妨。我不认为你非得把人力成本里的最后一个子儿都抠出来不可。
9. 企业税并未拖累企业经营
巴菲特:好。我们去我最右边 1 号提问台的那位股东那里。
观众:是的,你好。我叫道格·梅里尔(音)。我来自科罗拉多州丹佛市,佩顿·曼宁的故乡。
巴菲特:奥马哈,奥马哈。(笑)
观众:太棒了。
总统的支持率只有 40%。史蒂夫·韦恩说:「奥巴马是经济头上最大的一盆冷水。」其他国家都在降税、减债。
您说得上话,能影响奥巴马。这列火车正开错方向。您能不能引导奥巴马掉转车头?(掌声)
巴菲特:道格,我想这件事还是让你直接跟他沟通吧。(笑)
你刚才讲的好几点,我都不认同。美国企业的表现好极了。(掌声)
很多美国民众过得并不好。你知道,我认为「奥巴马医改」更多是为这些人做点事,而很多其他政策并没有为他们着想。
但在政治问题上,我们注定看法不同。我说服不了你,你也说服不了我。
不过我得说,任何认为美国企业表现不好的人,只要看看企业利润就明白了。
任何认为我们企业税太高的人,都该去看一看二战以来企业税占 GDP 比重的走势图——它已经从占 GDP 的 4% 降到了 2%,而与此同时,许多其他形式的税显然是上升了。
美国企业在净有形资产上的盈利能力——这才是衡量整体盈利水平的方式——基本上是全世界都羡慕的。我是说,在这个国家,我们的有形资产、净有形资产回报率高得惊人。
如今我们的企业税率,比当年查理和我经营企业时低得多。而那时候美国企业其实也干得相当不错。
但在我们人生中的很长一段时间里,企业税要么是 52%,要么是 48%。
不过我不想去说服你,因为我也不想你来说服我。所以在这件事上我们就休战吧,让查理来说几句。(笑)
芒格:这个问题我就回避不答了。(笑)
巴菲特:人家还总抱怨我弃权呢。(笑)
10. 股市走强时伯克希尔表现会逊色
巴菲特:好,贝姬·奎克。
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自马诺洛·萨尔塞达(音译)。
我先念一段开场白,他说自己是「巴菲特及其所代表理念的真正仰慕者,所以请不要把我的直率和不绕弯子,误解为对这位了不起的人物及其杰作缺乏敬佩或共情」。有了这段免责声明——
巴菲特:「但是」。(笑)
贝姬·奎克:但是。他的问题是:「您过去多次表示,如果管理层——也就是您——无法交出比指数更好的回报,那就说明管理层没尽到职责。」
「然后您又说,衡量的标尺应该是任意一个五年期。而您刚刚在五年期的比较中落败了。」
「为什么您没有在年度致股东信里正面处理这个问题?您是要更换标尺吗?接下来会怎样?」
巴菲特:不,我们不会更换标尺。
但我要指出,其实我们在 2012 年的年报里就说过——就在第一页上半部分——我们指出,在大涨的年份我们表现较差,而在表现不佳的年份我们反而更好。
我当时就说:「如果市场在 2013 年继续上涨,我们连续五年期跑赢的纪录就会终结。」
我没有说「可能终结」或者「也许会终结」之类的话。这是显而易见的:如果连续五年都是强劲上涨,我们就跑不赢标普 500。而且未来也必定如此。
当然,去年——我想在过去 40 来年里,市场涨幅超过去年的年份只有两个。所以,尽管有人提到奥巴马总统那些事,股市看起来还是表现得相当不错。
在大涨的年份里,我们会跑输。在温和上涨的年份里,我们大致会持平。而在平淡或下跌的年份里,我们会做得高于平均水平。
我过去说过,今后也会继续说,而且事实也确实如此:在任何一个完整周期里,我们都会——我认为我们会跑赢。但这一点没有保证。
但当时已经讲得清清楚楚——就像我说的,在 2012 年报的第一页上——如果市场上涨,我们就会出现连续五年跑输的纪录。而事情恰恰就是这样发生的。
芒格?
芒格:嗯,我们应该记住,沃伦的标准说的是伯克希尔的净值,在缴足企业所得税之后,要以大约 35% 的幅度增长。而那些指数是不缴任何税的。
所以,沃伦给自己定了一个高得离谱的标准,而到目前为止,他在很长一段时间里都达到了这个标准。
在过去这一两年里,伯克希尔的净值,在缴足企业所得税之后,增长了——多少来着,60?
巴菲特:差不多吧,是的——
芒格:60 亿美元——
巴菲特:对。税前的话,大概有 900 亿——
芒格:对。所以,如果这都算失败,那我可还想多来一点这样的「失败」。(笑声与掌声)
11. “渴望”以账面价值120%回购股票
巴菲特:好。杰伊·盖尔布。
杰伊·盖尔布:沃伦,这个问题是关于伯克希尔的内在价值的。
在年度致股东信中,您似乎强烈暗示伯克希尔的股票被低估了,尤其是相对于内在价值而言。
除了回购股票之外,伯克希尔还能采取哪些行动,来缩小当前股价与内在价值之间的折价?比如说,您是否会考虑把伯克希尔旗下某些运营单元单独 IPO 上市?
巴菲特:最后这部分的答案是:不会。
但是——我想我们已经尽力解释了——我猜,我从没见过哪份年报像伯克希尔这样,如此频繁地使用「内在价值」这个词,甚至如此频繁地谈论各业务单元或业务的内在价值。
所以,查理和我确实下了相当大的功夫去解释,我们旗下哪些业务——也就是那些账面价值、或者说账面记载价值——姑且称之为账面记载价值——与该业务真实价值、或者说内在价值之间,存在显著差异的业务。
举例来说,在过去这一年里,我就专门针对 GEICO 讲得非常具体。
我当时说,GEICO 在账面上的记账价值只比其有形资产高出约 10 亿美元,但它的价值可能比有形资产高出多达 200 亿美元。而且,如果五年或十年之后这个数字本身变得大得多,我也不会感到意外。
所以我们讨论过这件事。我们说过,我们愿意——不仅是愿意,而且是迫切地想要——以账面价值的 120% 来回购股票。
那么,既然账面价值现在已接近 2300 亿美元,这显然意味着,在大约高出这个数字 450 亿美元的水平上,相对于内在价值而言,我们认为自己买到了便宜货。
但我们永远不会去给出一个精确的数字,因为我们自己也不知道精确的数字是多少。
而且——其一,它每天都在变化。虽然每天变化不大,但你知道,随着一个个季度、一年年地过去,它肯定是会变的。
第二个原因是,如果你要查理和我此刻坐在这里写下伯克希尔内在价值的数字,我俩写出来的大概会相差不到 5%。
但我们很可能——大概率不会相差在 1% 以内。
所以我们会继续努力,向股东提供关于那些重要业务单元的信息。
并不是说——那些小的业务对我们不重要,而是它们——它们对整体内在价值没有太大影响。
我们有一些业务。我是说,我们有一些业务,账面上可能记着几亿美元,但实际价值可能高达 10 亿,甚至 20 亿美元。
但那些没有在资产负债表上披露出来的大头价值,并不在这些地方。
你知道,它们在铁路业务里,在保险业务里,在我们的公用事业业务里。
而我们——这些加起来是相当大的数字。我们尽量准确地告诉你这些数字,而且,确实如此,并且用我们自己在思考这些业务、估算它们价值时所用的那些措辞来告诉你。但我们不想比这走得更远。
这 120% 显然是一个响亮的信号,表明这是一个我们认为远远低于内在价值的数字,否则我们不会用它来回购股票。
我们只相信在能以相对内在价值有显著折扣的价位时才回购股票。
有些公司会谈到——可口可乐就是这样——他们谈到回购股票来对冲期权。其实那并不是回购股票的最佳理由。
我是说,股票可能被高估了,那么即便你发行了期权,你也不应该去回购它。
但这已经成了整个美国企业界的某种口头禅,即如果你回购股票来覆盖期权行权,你就抵消了对股东的稀释。
但话说回来,如果你回购股票——如果你用 90 美分买一张一美元的钞票,你就是在为股东做好事。而如果你用 1.10 美元去买,那你对他们根本没有任何好处。
芒格?
芒格:嗯,我不相信我们曾经想过把股价拉到远高于内在价值,好把它发行给别人,从而让我们自己占便宜、让他们吃亏。
而且,我认为那些希望股价非常接近内在价值、甚至更高的人,其实是想白占便宜、得寸进尺。股价略低于内在价值是没关系的。
我们不玩那种把自己股价尽可能吹得高高的游戏,好让我们能更多地发行股票、为自己牟利。
我认为从长远来看,我们这套体系会运转得相当好。而且我认为,不管我们喜欢与否,股价最终都会涨到高于内在价值的水平。
巴菲特:是的。但这些年来,我们确实——我们真的见过很多管理者试图让自己的股票以远高于其真实价值的价格交易,好用它去换取别的公司。我是说,那在 60 年代末是风靡一时的做法。
我之所以结束我的合伙公司,原因之一就是那种活动当时太盛行了,它影响了所有其他的估值。
那真的是一场游戏。这场游戏,有些人玩得多少还算诚实,另一些人则疯狂地作弊,因为如果你试图让自己的股票被高估,你就很可能在盈利数字上作弊,在预测上作弊,在一切事情上作弊。
而且顺便说一句,这一套是管用的。它不会一直管用,但它确实管用。
有些公司——你们都知道它们的名字——在某种程度上就是建立在这个原则之上的。
那是一种游戏,我们不仅不想玩,而且真的觉得它非常令人反感,因为我们亲眼见过很多这种人在行动。
而且它是一波一波出现的。我们就是——我们连碰都不想碰这种游戏。
我要是不小心点,查理就要指名道姓了,所以我们最好还是回到股东提问环节吧。(笑)
12. 为什么卖家愿意把自己一手创办的公司托付给伯克希尔
巴菲特:好,我们去 2 号提问台。
观众:您好,巴菲特先生——
巴菲特:您好。
观众:——还有芒格先生。
我叫 Masato Luso(音译),来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。
伯克希尔以收购整家公司并持有许多许多年而闻名。但在你们职业生涯的早期,这一点还不为人所知。
而且通常来说,收购别的公司是非常具有破坏性的。员工会担心因岗位冗余而丢掉工作。管理者也确实不得不再三斟酌、对此格外审慎。
所以我的问题是,你们做了些什么,来赢得过去那些被你们收购的公司的创始人或所有者的信任?
巴菲特:嗯,我们对他们信守了承诺。
而如今,我们必须非常小心自己许下什么承诺,因为我们没法承诺,比如说,绝不在我们收购的某家企业里进行裁员,因为谁知道这世界会怎样呢。
但我们可以承诺,比方说,即便一家企业的表现令人失望,我们也不会把它卖掉——只要它没有陷入持续亏损的前景,或者出现严重的劳资问题。
但我们一直在保留——我们正在保留——某些业务,如果你把我们保留它们的理由写下来交到商学院,是拿不到及格分的。
但理由就是,我们许下过一个承诺。
我们把这一点——我们不仅做出承诺,现在还把它写进年报的后面——我们这样做大概有 30 年了——我们在那里列出了经济原则。
我们把它放在那里,是因为我们相信它。但我们把它放在那里,也是为了让那些把企业卖给我们的经理人——把企业卖给我们的所有者——知道他们可以指望这一点。
如果我们的行为不一致,你知道,话很快就会传开。而且这话也应该传开。
所以,我们能够做出承诺。我们不能承诺永远不会改变雇佣关系。我们甚至不能承诺会永远持有一项业务。
但我们能够兑现我们确实做出的承诺,那就是:如果某项业务在盈利上有点令人失望,但并不意味着会无休止地亏损,或者如果我们遇到劳工问题,我们都能信守那个承诺。
而我们确实信守了那个承诺。我们只不得不放弃过寥寥几项业务,包括我们最初的纺织业务。
我们向这些经理人承诺,你知道,他们将继续经营自己的业务。
相信我,如果我们做不到这一点,这话很快就会传开。但我们这样做已经有 49 年了。
我们已经让自己进入了一个其他人很难与之竞争的层次——如果这一点对企业的卖家来说很重要的话。
一家私募股权公司对我们年报后面写的东西完全不会有任何感觉。他们不在乎。而这——这没什么不对。那是他们的生意。
但是对于那些用 20 年、30 年或 40 年时间打造起自己公司的人——也许他们的父辈或祖辈在更早之前就已经把它建立起来了——其中有些人是在乎自己的企业将走向何方的。
他们非常富有,他们在人生中已经成就了各种各样的事情。他们不希望辛苦建立起来的东西,被别人很快拆解掉——以为是交给了几个想要露一手的 MBA。
所以,伯克希尔确实拥有一项独特的——接近独特的——资产。只要我们行为得当,我们就能保有这项资产。而且说真的,别人想要跟我们竞争,不会有太多运气。
但它并不能解决所有问题,不过——而且——坦白讲,这本来也是我们想要的经营方式。
所以——我们对此很自在。那些真正来找我们、在乎自己企业的卖家,对此也很自在。我想这种方式会继续运作良好。
芒格?
芒格:嗯,显然,我们之所以这样做,是因为我们喜欢这样做。其次,它的效果一直相当好,我们不太可能停下来。
巴菲特:好。(掌声)
你们可以看出来,他不是按字数拿报酬的。(笑)
13. “社交动态”削弱了公司董事会的监督
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:沃伦。这是一个棘手的公司治理问题。这一周我大概收到了十几个这样的问题,有些客气,有些不那么客气。这个——
巴菲特:挑一个客气的来问。
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个大概算是比较客气的一个。
「你的儿子霍华德在可口可乐董事会任职,并投票支持了它的 CEO 薪酬方案——而你说过这个方案过高、你是反对的。
「你说过,在你卸任之后,霍华德将成为伯克希尔的非执行董事长,作为它的——引用原话——『文化的守护者』,来维护你和我们大家都如此珍视的道德准则。
鉴于他在可口可乐那次投票中的表现,我们怎么能指望霍华德去捍卫伯克希尔的文化,并确保伯克希尔未来的管理层不会以牺牲股东利益为代价来谋取私利呢?」
巴菲特:是的。嗯,我想,正如我至少在一次采访中提到过的,我投过赞成票——我这里不一定是在说可口可乐——但作为多家公司的董事,我不仅投票赞成过那些与我自己会设计的方案相去甚远的薪酬计划,我还投票赞成过我认为没多大意义的收购。
我也投过几次反对票。它们引起了很多关注。但那些都是大事,在那些事情上,我真的认为——我当时认为——确实事关重大。
但这种性质——这一点总体上值得探讨,因为董事会的性质就是这样:它既是商业组织,又是社交组织。人们在某些方面用他们的商业头脑行事,在某种程度上又用他们的社交头脑行事。
我得说——我也确实说过——在我担任公司董事的 55 年里,除了伯克希尔之外还在 19 家公司任过职,我想我从未见过哪份薪酬委员会的报告递交上来时会遭到反对票。
其中的社交原因是:董事会会以某种方式自我组织,把某些事务委托给董事会中较小的一部分人去做,其中之一就是薪酬委员会。
而那个委员会大概会在会议前一天,或者也许在开会当天上午,开上几个小时的会。然后他们进入董事会会议。薪酬委员会汇报它的工作。而作为董事会成员,你已经把那项事务委托给了这个小组。
对此提出质疑几乎是闻所未闻的。我并不是说也许不该质疑它,我只是说,事情就是这么运作的。
现在请记住,这样一个董事会里所谓的独立董事,每年大概能拿到 $200,000,也许 $300,000。相信我,他们并不独立。
按照某些标准来衡量,也许是按照 SEC 的标准,他们算是独立的,但他们——你知道,你会怎么看待这样一份工作:它要求你一年去上四到六次班,同伴愉快,你知道,还附带一定的声望,而且最重要的是,你每年大概能拿 $300,000,你还有点儿指望再得到另一份这样的工作?这可不叫独立。
所以,薪酬委员会就这样过来汇报。而在那 19 个董事会里,我恰好只有一次被安排进薪酬委员会。查理也许能确切地告诉你那一次的结果是怎样的。他们不会去找杜宾犬。(笑)
他们找的是可卡犬。然后他们还要确保那尾巴是摇着的。(笑)
但是这——别把它谴责得太狠,因为你我在生活的其他方面也在做类似的事情。
你知道,社交动态在董事会的行动中是很重要的。我的儿子霍华德——其实,如果我另外两个孩子也参与进来的话,他们同样——你知道,他们会对伯克希尔的文化怀有一种执着,而且他们确实怀有这种执着,这种文化是被清晰界定的。这也是我希望把它清晰界定下来的原因之一。它被行为所强化,也被结果所强化。
另外顺便说一句,他们的工作并不是去制定薪酬。我是说,非执行董事长坐在那儿,并不是为了去挑选 CEO 或其他人的薪酬。他坐在那儿,也不是为了去挑选 CEO。
他坐在那儿,是为了在董事会决定需要变动时去促成这种变动。而这可能很重要。不过对伯克希尔而言,这非常非常非常不太可能会变得重要。
但它是一个很好的、小小的、额外的安全阀。而霍伊正是执行这件事的完美人选。
而且就像我说的,我在各种地方都投票赞成过薪酬计划,包括很久以前在可口可乐——那些方案与我自己会设计的相去甚远。而我自己设计的那些方案本来是会奏效的。
但董事会就是这么运作的。
我曾被任命为某个薪酬委员会的主席,查理可以跟你们讲一点那件事。
芒格:是啊。(笑)
沃伦在所罗门公司(Salomon Inc.)那边完全是被否决的。事实上,当时大家的反应就好像,他这到底是在搞什么名堂?他怎么能在华尔街反对发薪酬呢?
而且我觉得,一个人就该整天对自己看不惯的一切大声表达不满——这种泛泛的想法非常值得怀疑。在我们所处的这个世界里,谁要是懂得挑选时机来公开表达反对,谁就能成就更多。
以我对霍华德(Howie)和沃伦·巴菲特两人的了解,我觉得你大可不必担心他们会犯糊涂,或者会变得软弱愚蠢,仅仅因为他们没有整天对自己看不惯的一切大喊大叫。要是我们都那么干,我们就谁也听不见谁说话了。
巴菲特:是啊。(掌声)
我是说,要是你在任何一个社交团体里,老是在餐桌上打嗝,那你用不了多久就得到厨房里去吃饭了。(笑)
而且人们也不会再搭理你。
我是说,你真的得——你不仅要挑选时机,还得挑选方式。
我是说,你——这甚至也适用——我是说,没错,正如你们注意到的,在那段影片里查理是这儿专门给婚姻出主意的人,不过这个念头放在婚姻里也算不上是个坏主意,我是说,就试图改变别人的行为这件事而言——反正你在这方面的能力也极其有限。光靠大喊大叫,是没什么帮助的。
芒格:我得罪的人比你多。而且我对你这个程度的不满相当满意。(笑)
14. 别人在资本成本问题上都错了
巴菲特:好。下面是晨星公司(Morningstar)的格雷格·沃伦(Gregg Warren)。格雷格,欢迎你。
格雷格·沃伦:谢谢。沃伦、查理,我代表晨星公司,感谢你们今年请我们上这个提问席。
我也许算不上一名够格的「空头」,但希望我提的问题足够犀利,能为股东们带来价值。
我的第一个问题与管理层业绩的衡量有关。
对晨星来说,衡量成功的终极标准不只是一家公司能否赚到超过其资本成本的回报,而是它能否在很长一段时间里持续做到这一点。
伯克希尔历来很擅长创造超额回报。但正如你们过去所指出的,公司经营规模本身——而且还在持续增长——最终会限制伯克希尔所能创造的回报。
有鉴于此,你们认为伯克希尔的资本成本是多少?随着你们收购了更多资本密集、负债沉重的公司,你们觉得这个门槛收益率被抬高了多少?
还有,你们有多大的信心相信,伯克希尔未来的资本配置者能够创造出超过公司资本成本的回报?当然,这是在承认这样一个事实的前提下提出的:伯克希尔创造超额回报的好日子很可能已经成为过去。
巴菲特:是的。嗯,毫无疑问,规模是业绩的一只锚。而我们打算一直把它证明到它真正开始拖累我们的那一刻为止。
但是——在资本超过2000——嗯,在市值3000多亿美元的情况下,我们是没法赚到那样的资本回报率的。这压根就办不到。
阿基米德(Archimedes),他说过只要给他一根足够长的杠杆,他就能撬动地球,对吧,差不多是这意思吧,查理?
芒格:对,他说过。
巴菲特:唉,我真希望我有他那根杠杆,因为我们伯克希尔可没有那根杠杆。
所以我们——好,我们就在这儿回答两个问题。
就资本成本而言,查理和我一向认为,我们的资本成本就是——就是我们第二好的点子所能产生的回报。然后我们最好的那个点子,就必须超过它。
我们觉得——我听过太多关于资本成本的胡扯讨论了,简直——
芒格:我就从没听过一场聪明的。
巴菲特:是啊,是啊。(笑)
这是千真万确的。我是说,而且还有——那是另一回事了。我当过一些公司的董事,财务总监(CFO)进来解释我们为什么要做这件事,到头来归结的总是那句话,你懂的,它超过了我们的资本成本。
可他根本不知道自己的资本成本到底是多少,我也不知道。可是——但我也不会让他下不来台,你懂吧?
于是我就坐在那儿,听着这套说辞,套用我自己的那一套,最后多半还是投票赞成,哪怕我不喜欢——尽管这中间也有过几次例外。
你懂的,真正的检验,是看长期下来,我们留存下来的资本,能不能随着时间推移创造出超过一美元的市场价值。
如果我们不断地投入数十亿美元,而这些数十亿美元,按现值计算,按它们给企业价值带来的增量来算,实际上超过了我们投进去的钱,那么,你懂的,我们就会一直这么干下去。
前天,我想应该是前天吧,我们买下了一家公司。我们花了将近30亿美元。那是一家加拿大公司。
我们认为,正因为做了这件事,我们的财务状况会变得更好;我们当时认为,在那一天,这是我们用这30亿美元所能做的最好的事。这些就是我们所用的标尺。
而我确实知道的是,我从没见过哪位CEO想做一笔交易时,财务总监进来会说它没有超过资本成本的。
这就——在我们看来,这就是一场把戏。
而我们认为我们能够评估企业。我们也知道自己手头有多少可用的资本。我们还有一些东西可以卖掉去买入——不是卖企业,而是一些有价证券,需要的话,我们可以把它们卖掉去收购企业。
我们一直在不断衡量查理在影片里提到的那个机会成本。这是个重要的话题。而且在我看来,关于这个话题写出来的胡话,比关于任何其他话题写的都要多。
不过我把话筒交给查理,让他来讲一讲——
芒格:嗯,像「资本成本」这样一个说法,它对不同的人意味着不同的东西,而且对那些在商学院教书的人来说,它往往意味着一些蠢得很的东西,所以我们干脆就不用它。
沃伦给出的那个在公司里行事的准则——即让留存下来的每一美元,都倾向于为股东创造出超过一美元的市场价值——大概是描述资本成本的最好方式。可这并不是他们在商学院里所讲的那个意思。
答案再简单不过了。我们是对的,他们是错的。(笑)
巴菲特:跟他一比,我显得挺像那么回事的,是吧?(笑)
15. 从布朗金家族手中收购内布拉斯加家具城
巴菲特:好。3号提问台。
观众:早上好。我叫 Jonathan Fye,来自德克萨斯州的 Denton,就在那家即将落户 The Colony 的全新内布拉斯加家具城(Nebraska Furniture Mart)旁边。
我的问题是关于你们 1983 年从布鲁姆金(Blumkin)家族手中收购那家企业的事。
根据你们在今年年报里提供的数据,看起来你们当时是以大约账面价值的 85% 买下这家企业的,或者说大约是利润的两倍。
你能不能谈谈,是奥马哈当地的哪些因素或环境,让你们能以如此美妙的价格买下这家如此美妙的企业?
巴菲特:嗯,Jonathan,我倒真希望我们买得有那么便宜,但事实并非如此——按我的记忆,我们当时付的价格大概是税后利润的 11 倍或 12 倍。它并不是从账面价值打了折扣。
我不太清楚那些数字是从哪儿来的。是这样,我们买的是公司 80% 的股份。按我的记忆,交易是按 100——按 6,000 万美元的收购价做的。
所以我们——实际上里头还牵涉到第二笔交易。但 6,000 万对应的是 100% 的价值。我们最终拿到的是 80%。
这 6,000 万在当时会高于账面价值。不是高出很多,但确实高于账面。
而且按我的记忆,这相当于 11 倍或 12 倍的利润。当时的销售额大约是 1 亿。税前利润率在 7% 上下。
所以税前利润大约是 700 万。税后嘛,大概 450 万。这是个大致的数。
所以那不是一笔捡便宜的收购。它是一门了不起的生意。能与我所见过的最优秀的家族携手共事,是一个绝佳的机会。
不过那是——顺便说一句,我记得当时还有另一家公司,应该是来自德国的,也想买下它。
而且信不信由你,「辛普森—鲍尔斯」(Simpson-Bowles)里的那位 Erskine Bowles,正是代表他们出面的,就是我的朋友 Erskine——这事我当时还不知道。
然后我在我生日那天,1983 年 8 月 30 日,跑了一趟。手里拿着那份合同,年报里就有它。
我把它交给了 B 太太。而——她不识字,但她儿子 Louie 把里头写了什么念给她听。
我从没向她要过审计。我只是问她有没有欠什么钱。我还问她那栋楼是不是她的。她说是。于是我们就成交了。但那不是一笔捡便宜的收购。
现在,要是你想聊聊捡便宜的买卖,那我们应该聊聊去逛逛内布拉斯加家具城。(笑)
到目前为止,在这三天里——我们——在本届年会这几天里,我们的销售额,去年那一周创下了 4,000 万的纪录,现在大约——我想现在大约上涨了 7%。当然,去年本身就是个纪录。
而周二,也就是第一天,我们做了 780 万。
伯克希尔在加州萨克拉门托(Sacramento)拥有当地最大的家居用品店。我们在爱达荷州博伊西(Boise)拥有当地最大的一家。我们在盐湖城拥有最大的一家。我们在拉斯维加斯拥有最大的一家。在里诺(Reno)也是最大的一家。
我们家具城周二一天的销售额,比我刚才点到的那些门店中任何一家整个月的销售额都还要大,而那些可都是萨克拉门托这类地方最大的门店。所以这是一个了不起的机构。(掌声)
而好消息是,你们还来得及去享受这些价格。(笑)
我想替达拉斯那家店打个广告,我一周前去了那里。那片地大得让你不敢相信。那家店也大得让你不敢相信。整个一个屋顶下足有 180 万平方英尺。超过 40 英亩。
我预言,它的销售额会超过世界上任何一家家居用品店。而且如果我说它能再翻上至少一倍,我也不会感到意外。
那是一家了不起的店。我在里头转了一圈。我们正在,你知道的,我们正在铺设道路。我们在做场地平整、铺管线、装货架,所有这些活儿。带我四处参观的是一位了不起的女士,叫 Michelle。
布鲁姆金一家后来告诉我,她当初是——在内布拉斯加家具城从收银员做起的,而如今她负责这个,你知道的,好几亿美元的项目。这真是——这正是美国的好处所在。
参观快结束时,她身边有这么一位二把手一直跟着——和我们一起走来走去,他——她也向我们解释了一些事情。参观结束时我才知道,这位二把手是 Michelle 的丈夫。(笑)
很有意思的枕边话,对吧?「亲爱的,你今天搬了多少立方码土啊?」对吧?(笑)
16. 为什么巴菲特给妻子的遗产建议配置指数基金
巴菲特:好。Carol。
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自俄克拉荷马城的 Jason Rothman,他是第一个提出这个问题的股东,后来还有许多其他股东也以各种方式提出了同样的问题。
在我收到的邮件里,这是被问得最多的一个问题。
「巴菲特先生,您在致股东的年度信中说,您在遗嘱里给那位将为您太太利益行事的受托人留下了指示:把留给她的现金中 10% 投入短期政府债券,90% 投入一只费用极低的标普 500 指数基金。
「我的问题是,您为什么建议受托人把这 90% 的现金投入标普 500 指数基金,而不是投入伯克希尔的股票?」
巴菲特:这个嘛——
卡罗尔·卢米斯:「这是不是意味着,您预计在这家公司由一位新任 CEO 兼董事长执掌时,这只指数基金未来的表现会跑赢伯克希尔?请您澄清一下。」
巴菲特:是的,我很乐意澄清。那封信该不会碰巧是先锋(Vanguard)寄来的吧?(笑)
顺便说一句,等我去世时,我那时手里持有的所有伯克希尔股票,都将归入五家不同的基金会。每一股都不例外。我的意思是,没有哪一股不是在心里已经划归慈善用途的。其中相当一部分已经具体指定好了——多少股,归哪里,全都安排妥当。
不过——而且这些股票将在我的遗产了结之后的十年里陆续分发出去。所以算下来差不多是 12 年。
我告诉我的——我告诉那些将持有这些股票的受托人,你知道的,「在不得不卖之前,一股伯克希尔都别卖。」
所以,至少对我去世后这 12 年里的伯克希尔,我的看法是没人能比我更看多的。
而且顺便说一句,要是没有这类指示,任何人都会说,「你知道吗,你把好几十亿美元全押在一只股票上,简直是疯了。」可在那 12 年里,我想不出有什么比这更好的安排了。
至于我太太的那部分情况,你知道,那不是一个把资本最大化的问题。那纯粹是一个图个彻彻底底、百分之百安心的问题,要在一件不会有坏结果的事情上求得安心。
而且,就像我说的,留给她的钱远远超过她这辈子用得完的。事实上,你们当中认识她的人,可能会觉得我多加了大概三个零。
但那部分的设计本意,并不是要让她拿到更多更多的资本。而那一块到头来还会剩下资本,剩下一大堆资本。
至于我真正在意要最大化的那部分,我已经吩咐三位受托人,在不得不卖之前,一股都别卖。所以,对我去世后这 12 年里我希望他们持有什么,这就是我能给出的最佳建议。
芒格?
芒格:嗯,沃伦在家族内部分配财产的方式有点特别。我觉得他爱怎么做就怎么做,完全是他自己的事。(掌声)
说起——
巴菲特:我是不是——我是不是听到我的孩子们在鼓掌?我是不是听到我的孩子们在鼓掌?(笑)
芒格:而我从来没觉得非得把家里人压缩到只剩点零碎才行。
沃伦真的——还有苏茜,她在世的时候,也是一样的做派。
他真的是个崇尚才能、唯才是举的人。他在这一点上其实相当极端——他想把自己绝大部分财富回馈给那个让他赚到这笔钱的文明社会。
我很乐意跟这件事联系在一起。(掌声)
17. BNSF铁路的服务问题正在拖累盈利
巴菲特:乔纳森?
乔纳森·勃兰特:自伯克希尔于 2010 年收购 BNSF 以来,这家公司表现非常好。
但它在西部的竞争对手联合太平洋(Union Pacific),其盈利增长实际上更快。而且目前看来,联合太平洋在为客户提供服务方面运营得更顺畅。
你能不能谈一谈伯灵顿(Burlington)最近遇到的服务方面的挑战?也许还可以聊聊这两家铁路公司在终端市场、地理布局和战略上有哪些差异,从而导致了这种分化的结果?
这样说是否公平:去年这家铁路公司在积极争揽新的运量业务时,并没有在自身运力所能承受的范围内留出足够的安全边际,以应对比往常更严酷的冬季或其他不利情况?
巴菲特:是的。其实我们处理的运量比过去还要多。我的意思是,2006 年我们曾创下 219,000 车次的高峰。那是在晚秋时节。
但毫无疑问,我们确实遇到了很多服务上的问题,尤其是在我们的北线上。
我们一直在花的钱比联合太平洋还多——而他们花的也不少——这些钱用于试图预先应对那种问题,也就是当运量大幅增加时可能出现的问题,尤其是在那一条线路上,那是因为——特别是巴肯(Bakken)页岩油的繁荣带来的。
我们现在有大量的单元列车跑在那些线路上,而五年前这些列车还没有在跑。
我想马特·罗斯(Matt Rose)今天就在这儿——对吧——我想就在前排某个地方。他也许能讲一讲严寒天气带来的一些问题。我的意思是,想说的是——有很多天气温降到零下 15 度甚至更低。
而在那种情况下派人出去处理问题,可能真的会——可能会危及生命。
不过马特,你有没有——哦,他在那儿。好。能不能也给他打束灯光?他就在这儿,前排。在前排。
马特·罗斯:沃伦。去年,整个行业增长到大约 820,000 个单元(units)。而 BNSF 处理了所有这些单元中的 53%。
这并不是我们想接或不想接的问题。坦率地说,这是由我们这张特许经营网络的地理特性决定的。而石油来得比我们预期的要快得多,我们一直在以很快的速度投钱,试图把运力建上去。
第二个问题是,你知道,在过去这一年之前,我已经担任 CEO 13 年了,我从来没见过那样的天气——那样的冬季天气。
芝加哥下了 83 英寸的雪。我们有连续好多天,超过 30 天,明尼苏达地区的气温都没能升到零度以上。
所以,你知道,我们清楚这是一项户外运动。我们认了,在天气这件事上。但坦白说,当气温降到大约零度到零下 10 度之间时,很多东西就是没法正常运转。
天气正在好转。上周我们处理了 206,000 个单元。以前从来没有哪家铁路公司处理过 205,000 个单元。
所以这家铁路公司正在恢复。我们正在进行大笔投资,以便能够承接外面所有的业务。
巴菲特:谢谢你,马特。(掌声)
今年我们将在铁路上花费 50 亿美元。从来没有哪家铁路公司花过这种规模的钱,甚至连接近都谈不上。
不过我接到过一个电话——或者说一封信——来自北达科他州的一位先生。他们在弄到化肥方面遇到了麻烦。我打电话跟他聊了。然后他们把这事转给了马特。
但我们现在已经投入——我想我们会有 52 列化肥单元列车。它们会在播种季到来之前及时送达。这很重要。我的意思是,我们对这件事是认真对待的。
但无论是冬天的严寒还是夏天的洪水,我的意思是,我们现在的运行确实顺畅多了,而在我看来,我们的盈利很有可能会好很多。
但有可能打乱这一切的是,如果出于某种原因,发生了难以置信的大洪水。你要应对的是 22,000 英里的轨道。而一旦出现薄弱环节——对所有四大铁路公司来说,其中一个永远是芝加哥,因为那是各条线路交汇换装的地方,也是今年很多瓶颈出现的地方,而那里的天气同样很严酷。
但乔恩,你说得对,就最近几个月的财务对比而言。相信我,马特对这些数据非常关注,卡尔(Carl)也非常关注,连我都会稍微关注一点。
所以我有种感觉,今年剩下的时间里,它们会越来越好。
18. 用天然气发电
巴菲特:好,4 号提问台。
观众:罗萨尔·克尔克霍夫(音)。我来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈。我的问题和我们公司用天然气发电有关。
刚刚过去的这个冬天,储备中的天然气大幅下降。
今后,我们的公司如何确保拥有充足的天然气供应来发电?
而如果天然气价格成倍上涨,我们的公司又如何确保能以令人满意的投资回报率把电卖出去?谢谢。
巴菲特:是的。我们有——这个问题我打算请格雷格·阿贝尔来讲得更具体些。
但我们是——我想是全国最大的替代能源发电商——也就是使用替代能源的发电商。而且我认为,到 2015 年底,我们将有能力在爱荷华州通过风能满足我们 40% 的用电需求,这将是全国任何一家公司都做不到的。(掌声)
不过我想还是请格雷格来回答具体的问题,也就是我们有哪些依赖天然气的发电机组。
我并不担心那件事,但我——关于你提的那一点——格雷格会比我清楚得多,包括天然气在我们能源结构中的占比,以及转向用煤的机会。还有发电产能的确切构成情况。
格雷格?现在,麻烦的话给他打束灯光。他——
格雷格·阿贝尔:我想是——好的,出来了。
巴菲特:对,这就好了——
格雷格·阿贝尔:好。正如马特刚才提到的,很明显,今年中西部经历了一个非常寒冷的冬天。
所以我们的系统第一次受到了重大的考验。但我对这些资源的调配管理感到非常自豪。
所以,如果你看一下关于天然气、特别是天然气供应的那个问题,当时有大量的天然气可供使用,既能给家庭供暖,又能发电,因为说到底,这两件事我们都要操心——既要让炉子烧着,同样也要让灯亮着。
所以当你看供需平衡时,天然气是有的。
但很显然,随着我们在美国越来越多地使用天然气,我们必须持续关注这个独特的局面。
沃伦提到了一个重要的点。过去这一年,正如他强调的——他强调的是 2015 年——但如果你只看我们在爱荷华州可再生能源这边的产量,那是 39% 的可再生能源,也就是风能。而且这个比例只会越来越大。
所以随着我们继续管理这些多种能源资源,显然有办法满足客户的需求。而且我们是以一种极具成本效益的方式来满足它的。
我还想强调一点,当你仔细想想成本回收这一面,我们在公用事业业务内部有非常独特的机制。
当天然气的基础成本上涨、我们不得不采购超出预期的量时,我们有明确的成本转嫁机制,把这部分成本转回给客户。而且我们已经和我们经营的每一个州都谈妥了这些机制。
所以我们处在一个很有利的位置,既能长期服务客户,同样也能保护这些底层业务的基本财务状况。
巴菲特:那个——
格雷格·阿贝尔:谢谢。
巴菲特:格雷格掌管的这家公司有很多子公司。我们的天然气管道子公司输送了全美国大约 8% 的天然气。
我想你说过你是奥马哈人。进入这一带的天然气,是通过一条我们拥有的管道输送过来的。我们刚刚把这家公司从中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)改名为伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源(Berkshire Hathaway Energy)。我们把它改成了伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源。
但有一件让我们颇为自豪的事,那就是这家公司——北方天然气(Northern Natural Gas),它最初就源自奥马哈——我们大约十来年前从安然(Enron)手里把它买下来的——其实中间它一度归戴纳基(Dynegy)所有——但它的源头是安然。
你知道,他们在维护上偷工减料,干了各种各样的事。当时它在全美 42 条参与排名的管道里排第 42 名。而去年它排到了第一名。
所以在格雷格的管理下,它从倒数第一变成了第一。我向他脱帽致敬。(掌声)
排第二的是我们另一条管道——我们现在的另一条管道。所以此刻我们包揽了第一和第二。
19. 两个人共同执掌伯克希尔胜过一个人
巴菲特:贝基?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自弗吉尼亚州里士满的弗雷德·艾尔曼(音),是向你提的,沃伦。
他说:「过去这几年,关于你的接班人,写了很多文章,也有很多人猜测。我连这个话题都不会去碰,因为那只会让你把已经说过的话再重复一遍。
「然而,在你们的董事会会议上,有没有讨论过你的搭档、多年挚友、联席董事长查理·芒格的接替人选?
「是否已经确定,伯克希尔会继续由一对类似的黄金搭档来领导?两位卓越的投资头脑,各自提供独到的视角,正是这家企业几十年来表现卓越、让股东们欢欣鼓舞的一个主要原因。」
巴菲特:嗯,查理是我的——他是我在煤矿里的报警金丝雀。(笑)
查理满 90 岁了。我发现他应对中年的方式实在让人很受鼓舞。(笑)
所以我也希望自己能做到同样的事。
不过——你提出了一个我没想过的点,但现在你提了出来,我倒有点敏感了。
他们总是在谈论替换我,却从来不谈替换查理。
我确实认为——顺便说一句,我觉得非常有可能的是,无论是谁接替我做 CEO,多年下来他们大概都会培养出——他们永远没法再培养出另一个查理——但他们会培养出一个能与之非常紧密合作的人。这是一种很好的运作方式。
因为我们两个人一起共事,伯克希尔比我们任何一个人单打独斗都要好,这一点毫无疑问。(掌声)
而且——但我确实认为,你知道,我们在可口可乐的罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔(Roberto Goizueta)和唐·基奥(Don Keough)身上看到过这一点,我们在大都会(Cap Cities)的汤姆·墨菲(Tom Murphy)和丹·伯克(Dan Burke)身上也看到过。我是说,这些都是了不起的公司。
而且我认为,在我刚才点到名的这两个例子里,他们之所以成就远超常人,正是因为有两位了不起的人在掌舵,彼此欣赏、合作默契。而且他们在各自带来的才干上是互补的。
在很多方面,这是一种很好的运作方式。但你没法把它当作遗产指定给某个人。
但如果在我的接班人接手几年之后——或者也许更早——还没有出现某种关系、某种伙伴搭档,能让这位 CEO 不仅在成就上、而且在乐趣上都得到提升,那我会非常吃惊。
而且——但到目前为止,在会上还没有人提出过查理的任何接班人选。
而且坦白说,我实在很难想出有谁能当查理的接班人。(笑)
查理,你想说两句吗?我得给你个机会。(笑)
芒格:我觉得这个世界没什么好担心的。大多数 90 岁的老头很快就会离场。(笑)
巴菲特:好吧,金丝雀已经发话了。好。(笑)
20. 子公司人事调整与伯克希尔的接班计划无关
巴菲特:杰?
杰伊·盖尔布:我也有一个关于接班规划的问题。
马特·罗斯最近把自己的角色从伯灵顿北方(Burlington Northern)部门的 CEO 转为了伯灵顿的执行董事长。这一变动会影响谁将成为伯克希尔下一任 CEO 吗?另外,伯克希尔再保险部门的阿吉特·贾因的接班规划又是怎样的?
巴菲特:阿吉特唯一的接班方式就是转世投胎。(笑)
我们不会再有第二个阿吉特了。但幸运的是,在很长很长一段时间里,我们都不需要再找一个。
马特那边的情况,是按马特自己的建议来安排的,专门是为了适应BNSF当时的接班状况,以及某些人的意愿。这跟伯克希尔本身的接班安排没有任何关系。
我们每一位经理人都给我写过信,告诉我如果他们今晚出了什么事,我该怎么办——我一直留着这些信——这些是私人性质的,我甚至不会拿给董事会看——信里写明了万一发生意外我该怎么做。
所以我手上有他们的想法。有些情况下,他们会提到不止一个人选。有些情况下,他们会告诉我这些人选各自的优点和不足。
但是——我不会试图从各家子公司的接班规划中,去对母公司的接班计划做任何判断。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我一直说,我一点都不担心这个问题。要是我人生中最大的问题就是担心伯克希尔的接班问题,那我求之不得。我认为我们的状况非常好。
21. “好”问题,但没有答案
巴菲特:好。5号台。
观众:我是比尔·梅尔比,来自明尼苏达州诺思菲尔德。
在2009年的年度股东大会上,巴菲特先生,您说过如果要求您把全部身家投入一家公司,那家公司会是富国银行。
所以到了2014年,我想问同一家公司——或者说同一个问题。如果要求您把全部身家投入一家公司,会是哪一家?
巴菲特:2009年被问到这个问题的时候,你把伯克希尔排除在外了吗?因为我想我当时的答案会是伯克希尔。(笑)
但如果是伯克希尔之外的可交易证券,我当时不会反对富国银行这个答案。
嗯,我猜他在查笔记——那个——嗯——
观众:问题是除了伯克希尔以外——
巴菲特:哦,除了伯克希尔。
观众:——您今天会投资什么?
巴菲特:是啊。嗯,这是个好问题,但不会有答案的。(笑声)
查理,你想回答吗?
芒格:不,不,我觉得你给出的正是正确答案。(笑声)
巴菲特:是的。嗯,很抱歉让你失望了,但我们让别人问这个问题时也同样失望过。
22. 要求披露CEO薪酬的规定对股东没有帮助
巴菲特:好,安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:谢谢你,沃伦。这个问题来自奥本市的戴夫·希奇(音)。
这是个很长的问题。他说:“作为除伯克希尔之外大约十几家公司的股东,我每年都会看到很多份委托书。在所有公司里,除了伯克希尔,薪酬汇总表里都列出了至少五位或更多薪酬最高的高管的薪酬。伯克希尔只列了三位,沃伦、查理和马克。
“我猜这是因为伯克希尔是控股公司结构,所以才这样。我觉得如果能在汇总表里至少加入两位来自全资子公司的最高薪酬高管——阿吉特、托尼,或者格雷格,或者马特——会很有启发意义,能让股东,也就是你们的合伙人,了解伯克希尔是如何给它最强、薪酬最高的领导者付薪的,就像其他公司那样。
“这一点尤其有价值,因为目前所列名单里三分之二的人,沃伦和查理,只领取每年10万美元的象征性薪水,这个数字远远低于他们给公司带来的价值。
“本着透明的精神,您是否愿意在未来几年的表格里至少加入两位薪酬最高的子公司高管?另外您认为伯克希尔下一任CEO应该拿多少薪水?”
巴菲特:嗯,最后那个问题的答案是,他当然有资格拿——拿很多钱。但他愿意接受多少,那是另一个问题。
不过我打算明年在年报里专门写写最后这个问题,因为它牵涉到不少有意思的后续影响。
我们显然是在遵循SEC的规定行事,具体条文我背不出来,就是关于哪些高管的薪酬必须列入委托书。
但是,你知道的,安德鲁,我开个玩笑说,康卡斯特雇的人里,可能有些人赚的钱比他们在委托书里列出的那些人还多得多——不是在CNBC,我们不是说——但是——很可能超过委托书里列出那些人的薪水。
而且这里确实有一个问题,就是公开列出比如说晚间新闻主播或者随便谁拿多少钱,是否符合公司股东的利益,因为这可能会带来非常负面的影响,体现在跟公司内部其他人谈薪水的时候。
我想说的是——我想说如果你公布了子公司或者康卡斯特本身薪酬最高的五个人,其实康卡斯特的股东会因此受损。
而且如果你把这套做法推广到每一家子公司,情况肯定如此。我是说,如果你要公布CNBC薪酬最高的五个人,我不认为第二年整体薪酬水平会因此下降。
所以,我认为这是——我认为这是我们不公布,比如说,公司前十名高管薪酬的一个很好的理由。
在所罗门——我们前面稍微提到过——几乎每个人——几乎每一个人——都对自己拿到的薪水不满意。而他们拿到的可是天文数字般的钱。
但他们感到失望,并不是因为绝对数额的问题。他们失望是因为他们看到公司里别的什么人拿多少,这让他们抓狂。
事实上,我们在薪酬问题上遇到的第一次大危机,是管理层和套利团队达成了一笔——按当时的说法算是秘密协议——据我记得,约翰·梅里韦瑟和他的团队因此拿到了一大笔钱,我倒觉得那是他们挣来的。我是说,我认为他们值得拿这个钱。
但这件事一发生,就让薪酬问题——原本就一直是个棘手的问题——变得更加棘手,因为在约翰·梅里韦瑟团队之外的人当中,爆发出了嫉妒情绪。
我认为——我认为公布薪酬很少能给股东带来什么好处。
事实上,你可以说,美国企业界现在的很多状况——嗯,我这么说吧:如果委托书当初没有披露别人拿多少钱,企业CEO们作为一个群体,拿到的薪水会少得多。
看一大堆委托书然后说,“嗯,我比那家伙更值钱”,然后照这个思路去谈判,这是人之常情。而薪酬委员会也会顺着这种心理作出回应。
所以,美国的股东们为了每年能看一眼那份委托书、看看那五位最高管理层拿了多少钱,付出了不小的代价。
查理?(零星掌声)
芒格:本着透明的精神,你要求的这个东西其实对股东并不好。而且除非 SEC 强制推行,否则这事不会发生。
我们最好不要再助长美国这种嫉妒文化了。
巴菲特:是啊,没有哪个——没有哪个 CEO 看了别家的委托书之后会觉得,“我应该少拿点钱”。我是说,那个——你懂的?(笑)
我们从没见过——我们见过这种情况吗?
芒格:没有。
巴菲特:没有。
芒格:没有,我——
巴菲特:呃,我们还不够老。
芒格:我要说,嫉妒正在给这个国家带来很大的伤害。而我们的做法是在抑制嫉妒。
23. 伯克希尔为何保留200亿美元的现金缓冲
巴菲特:好。格雷格。(掌声)
格雷格·沃伦:谢谢。您知道,伯克希尔的现金余额对一些投资者来说是个问题。尤其是过去这几年,超额现金一直维持在250亿到300亿美元的区间,而且伯克希尔把资本再投资出去的速度,比历史上任何时候都要慢。
虽然去年收购 NV Energy 所用的36亿美元现金里,伯克希尔提供了35亿,剩下的由中美能源以举债方式筹措,但是不是有什么原因,使得伯克希尔没有为这笔收购提供全部资金,比如通过公司间借款的方式?
另外还有一点,能不能跟我们讲讲,为什么决定让中美能源把利润全部留存,而伯灵顿北方(去年资本支出30亿美元、今年预计要花到50亿美元)却仍在继续向伯克希尔分红,与此同时它还要额外举债来帮助资助资本支出?
巴菲特:好。中美能源,现在改名叫伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源了——我们就叫它 BH Energy 吧——我希望它今后会有很多收购其他企业的机会,过去12个月里我们已经见到了两次这样的机会。
正如你提到的,我们在 NV Energy 上花了一大笔钱,而两天前我们又同意收购阿尔伯塔的输电线路。
所以我们会——我们希望会——而且到目前为止我们一直能够——在 BH Energy 那边找到真正大规模的收购标的。
但在 BNSF 那边情况不一样——我们会花很多钱把它打造成最好的铁路公司,但我们不会去收购别的企业。
所以,我们会从 BNSF 分出可观的资金,而且还会继续这样做,因为它会赚到可观的利润,也完全能够应付它现有以及未来将产生的债务。
而在伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源那边,无论是子公司层面还是母公司层面,我们的负债水平基本上都恰到好处。所以我们在收购的时候,不光需要留存利润,有时候还需要股东再投入一些资金。
BH Energy 有三个股东。伯克希尔持股90%,剩下的由格雷格和沃尔特·斯科特持有。
所以,如果我们要进行一笔大收购、需要再多一点股本,我们会按比例向股东增发,另外两位股东可以自愿参与认购。但如果他们不参与——如果他们决定不参与——也不会对他们造成损害,他们所持股份的价值照样会提升。
所以这两家公司在这一点上是很不一样的。
我希望伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源今后能有更多可能的交易出现。我认为会有的。
所以我们可能会在那边投入很多、很多、很多十亿美元。我们也会在铁路上投入数十亿美元,但那全部是用来改善铁路本身,而不是用来收购其他企业。
今年到目前为止,算上昨天——虽然其中两笔交易是去年就启动的——我们大概已经花了50亿美元用于收购。
当然,第一季度我们还在物业、厂房和设备上又花了28亿美元。
但我们确实在不断找到——找到能吸纳现金的用途。
伯克希尔手头会一直保有200亿美元。我们绝不会依赖陌生人的善意。这一点,对白兰琪·杜波依斯来说都没能奏效。
但不管怎样,我们——我们不指望银行授信额度。你知道的,我们什么都不指望。
在未来100年里的某个时刻——可能是明天,也可能是100年之后,没人知道——会出现我们无法依靠任何人来维持自身实力、维持我们运营的情况。
而我们花了这么长时间才建立起伯克希尔,不能让某一个瞬间就把它毁掉。
我是说,你们可能知道,我们曾以15%的利率借钱给哈雷戴维森。而我们放这笔款的时候,短期利率大概只有0.5%。
哈雷戴维森是家好公司——但它和高盛、通用电气,还有一大堆其他公司一样——我们也借钱给了蒂芙尼——它们——你知道的,它们需要——当你需要现金的时候,你知道,那就是唯一——唯一你需要的东西。而这正是因为别人拿不出这笔钱来。
我一直都说,现金——手头的现金或者信贷额度——很像氧气:99.9%的时候你根本不会注意到它的存在,或者说不会注意到它的缺失。
但一旦它没了,那就是你唯一会注意到的东西。而我们不想陷入那种境地。
所以我们会一直留着200亿美元。我们绝不会因为担心某个已经发生、可能损害我们继续玩下去的能力的事件,而夜不能寐。
而超过200亿美元的部分,我们会想办法明智地把它投出去。到目前为止,我们基本上都做到了。我是说,确实——你知道的,我们手头一直都留有超出这个数字的部分。
不过,你知道,今年到目前为止我们已经花了不少钱。这一年里剩下的时间可能还会花更多。
所以,到目前为止,我觉得我们能以合理的回报把现金投出去。不过我们从来不会因为手上有钱,就觉得非用不可。
查理?
芒格:我觉得我们非常幸运,能拥有这些可以用相当可观的回报率消化大量新增资本的业务。
早年伯克希尔历史上,我们并没有这么多这种自动出现的机会。现在我们这么富裕了,有这些机会真的让我们处境好得多。
这是一种福气。我是说,谁会想放弃中美能源和北伯灵顿铁路?没有一个头脑正常的人会。
我是说,在一个短期利率只有0.5%甚至更低的世界里,我们非常喜欢有机会把更多资本明智地投出去这件事。
巴菲特:我们也很喜欢有机会跟3G一起投资亨氏,还有——
芒格:是的。
巴菲特:——投入大量资本。我们会有机会用掉这些资本的。
最终,你知道,复利会追上我们的。而且它确实已经让事情有所减弱了。
但它还没有给出最后一击。
24. 巴菲特和芒格会有分歧,但从不争吵
巴菲特:6号台。
观众:你好,沃伦、查理。我是约翰·诺伍德,来自爱荷华州西得梅因。非常感谢你们举办这些年度股东大会。请不要把会址搬到达拉斯或者别的什么地方。我已经在这里把我的一套流程都摸熟了。
巴菲特:我们不会搬的。
观众:谢谢。嘿,两个简短的问题。
第一个是关于资本配置的,就是你们如何权衡各家经营子公司,以及有多少现金会从经营子公司上交——或者说上交到'母舰'——相对于留在经营子公司里的比例。
还有,你和查理,你们有没有吵过架或者争论过?这么多年来,在管理你们二人合伙关系方面有没有什么心得?谢谢。
巴菲特:有。查理和我从来没有吵过架。我们是在19——我29岁的时候认识的。他那时35岁。我们现在都老一点了。
在这些年里,55年间,我们在很多事情上意见不一致过。但那从来没有、以后也不会演变成争吵。
我们会跟别人吵架。(笑)
但那种事——在我们之间就是没发生过。
我给查理打电话谈可口可乐那次投票的事,你知道,把委托声明书上说的内容跟他说了一遍。问,'你怎么看?'结果我们的想法一样,你知道吗?
有时候我们想法不一样。就算不一样,我们也从来不会带着一丝一毫的怒气分开,或者——
芒格:大多数时候,我们想法是一致的。这其实是个问题所在。如果我们俩当中一个人看漏了什么,另一个人也很可能一样看漏。(笑声)
巴菲特:是的。我要说——嗯,这是毫无疑问的。如果你看看我们犯过的那些真正严重的错误,都是我犯的。
我大概比查理更倾向于行动一些。你觉得这么说公平吗,查理?还是——
芒格:嗯,你曾经叫我'万恶的说不先生'。(笑声)
25. 伯克希尔的现金缓冲有一部分是由子公司持有的
巴菲特:现在我们把——问题的第一部分是什么来着?(笑声)
观众:资本配置。你们怎么决定有多少现金从经营子公司上交——
巴菲特:对,那个——
观众:——交到'母舰'?
巴菲特:对,那其实很简单,因为我们并不太在意那最低的200亿美元究竟放在哪里。
我们不会——但我们不会把受监管业务里的钱算进去——就是能源业务或者铁路那边的钱。
所以我们真正计算在内的,是那种我们打个电话就能拿到的钱。
在目前这种利率水平下,我们有时候就坐在那儿——我敢说我们旗下几乎每一家公司持有的现金,都比换成别的大型企业集团来经营的话要多。
换了别人,他们大概会用资金归集账户之类的安排。我们以后可能也会考虑这么做,但这其实没多大区别,因为如果这笔钱放在母公司,我们拿到的也就是五个基点的利息。如果放在子公司那边,大概也是拿五个基点。
所以这不是——这不是我们会按天、按周或者按月去操心的事情。
我知道钱在哪儿。我也知道我们什么时候会需要用钱,还知道我正在考虑做的事,或者未来几个月可能会做的事——也许某件事有五五开的可能性会发生。
而只要是我承诺要做的事,我都清楚钱从哪里来。
但这不意味着我们会像很多公司那样,一天一天、一周一周地把钱都归集到母公司。我们哪天也可能改变这个做法。也许在某个时候设立一个归集账户是有道理的。很可能会这样做。
但我们对子公司并不是那种事无巨细的管家式管理。我们不希望它们有那种被管着的感觉。
我想到有一家公司,我从没去过那儿。十年里大概只跟经营那家公司的人通过三四次话。你知道,那儿有不少现金。他时不时会给我送一些过来。
如果我真的需要,我是说,我知道钱在哪儿。他会给我。但其实,钱是放在那儿还是放在伯克希尔,并没有太大区别。
我不想给正在听这场大会的其他子公司的经理们,鼓励出一种新的行事方式。不过,我基本上是顺应各家公司的情况——除非我们真的需要钱,那时候我就会去拿。(笑)
查理?
芒格:这样挺好。
26. 巴菲特承认自己“在人事变动上动作太慢”
巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自图森一位精明的人,理查德·塞瑟,他发现了一个切入点,打算好好利用一下。
而且这个问题其实让我想起,沃伦,你或者查理,你们自己也可能会想出这样的问题。
“在2014年4月23日一次关于问答环节的采访中,沃伦说,原话是,‘我希望大家能提一些直戳我们弱点的问题。’我的问题是,我们的弱点是什么,又能采取什么措施来解决?”(笑)
巴菲特:这样的话,记者们的乐趣可就全没了。(笑)
找弱点本来就该是他们的工作。
我们有很多弱点——我们自己也会指出来。你看,我刚刚就指出了一个。
我想说的是,如果我们——如果我们几年前就给所有子公司都设立了资金归集账户,我们现在手头的钱可能会比现在多一点。
你知道,谁知道他们拿那些结余的钱在做些什么——倒也不是说我们会因此去做更冒险的事。但我们——你知道——我们在有些方面非常严谨自律,而按普通商业标准来看,在另一些方面又相当松散。
还有,哦,对了,我一个明显的弱点是在人事变动上动作太慢。我是说,我喜欢我们现有的这些经理们。
查理和我曾经有一位非常要好的朋友,人再好不过了。你知道,那件事上我们做出改变的动作很慢。我们太喜欢那个人了。而且那也没有拖垮我们的生意。
查理,你觉得那件事上我们比别人该采取行动的时间晚了多久?
芒格:这个,我说不准确切时间。
不过说到归集账户这个话题,倒让我想起我在陆军航空队时的一个朋友,他是个特别瘦的人。他决定去献血。他们把针扎进他的胳膊,结果血流不出来。
护士就开始像挤奶牛的乳房一样,一路往下捋他的胳膊。他当时的感觉是,他们非要把血榨出来不可,不管要用掉他全身多少血。结果他晕过去了。
那可真是件挺不愉快的事。我觉得归集账户这种做法,坐在那儿眼看着每一块小钱一进来就被人扫走,也没那么令人愉快。
巴菲特:查理,我们的——
芒格:我喜欢我们做生意的这种基调。
巴菲特:我们的经理们正在听着呢。我是说,别把这个例子教给他们,等我下次找他们要钱的时候拿来用。(笑)
芒格:不过,你知道,我见过一些公司,像特利丹和利顿那些人,基本上每天一分钱不剩地都扫走。
从经济效率上讲那样是好一点,但那也在公司里造就了一种氛围,我觉得那种氛围不如我们这种来得让人舒服。
巴菲特:不过话说回来,查理,我们在经理人问题上有时候确实等得太久了。
芒格:这个,那是当然。你我都曾经参与过,眼看着一个人直接从高管的位子上,被送进了阿尔茨海默病疗养院。当时完全没有——(笑)
巴菲特:查理,你这是在戳我的痛处啊。(笑)
芒格:我们当时安排好了,让他不至于造成什么损害,而且我们真的很喜欢他,所以就尽量让他过得轻松一点。
我从没后悔过那样做,你呢?
巴菲特:没有。不——
芒格:没有。
巴菲特:完全没有。完全没有。这——
芒格:不过,另一方面,我还是想格外谨慎一点。
巴菲特:这——我们会慢慢来。而且我们——会有一些时候,你可以说是我们对子公司缺乏监督,你知道,我们会漏掉一些东西。
不过,我们认为,给予我们的经理人他们所享有的这种自由度,也会带来很多好处。
所以有一天会有人跳出来说,“如果你们有更多的检查、监督之类的东西,”你知道,某件事——嗯,伯克希尔会发生点什么事,然后他们会说,“如果你们照别的公司那套流程做,这事就不会发生了。”而他们是对的。
但他们没法衡量的是,正因为我们给了几十个、几十个的人同样的这种自由度,我们在正面所取得的成就有多大。
我是说,在管控和监督的程度上,我们的运作方式跟别人不一样。你知道,伯克希尔没有法务总顾问办公室。伯克希尔也没有人力资源部门。
这在别的公司几乎是不可想象的。我们不是说这在所有方面都是百分之百的好处。我们认为——但我们认为总体上,这是个好处。
但当这种做法的负面出现的时候,人们会说,“嗯,你们本该采取不同的做法,这些年本该花更多的钱、对子公司经理人的活动加以更多限制,”等等。
而我们的反应会是,他们错了。但在那个具体案例中,我们会显得很难看。
查理,你说是不是这样?
芒格:是的。按照世界上其他地方的标准,我们信任过头了。而到目前为止,我们的结果反而好得多,因为我们精心挑选人,正是因为他们会被过度信任。这种做法对我们很管用。
而且,我认为很多地方,如果营造一种“应得的信任”的文化,会运作得更好。这就是我们的体系。有些人认为这是一种弱点。
而现代这套会计处理方式,人人都要以内部控制来衡量,我认为这弊大于利。(掌声)
27. 尝试而未能扩大喜诗糖果的地理市场
巴菲特:乔纳森?
乔纳森·布兰特:喜诗糖果放在伯克希尔如今庞大的业务版图里,显然规模很小,但一直是你最喜欢的业务之一。
这也难怪,因为它的税前利润持续增长,从1972年伯克希尔收购时的不到500万美元,增长到1999年的7400万美元。
然而,自1999年以来,利润增长似乎停滞了。
你能不能解释一下,为什么喜诗能在70年代、80年代和90年代持续增长利润,但到目前为止在这个千年里却没有?
这门生意是不是发生了什么变化,比如说,盒装巧克力的需求增长情况,或者它的市场地位?
你或者布拉德·金斯特勒能不能谈谈,最近相对较新的地域扩张,能否帮助重新点燃喜诗的增长?谢谢。
巴菲特:是的,盒装巧克力这门生意,基本上,是不增长的。
我是说,如果你回溯100年,那时候——任何一个有点规模的城市都有一个特点,就是有很多糖果店。芝加哥曾是个大龙头。纽约也是个大龙头。
信不信由你,百事可乐的前身公司——那家在纽约市拥有最多糖果店的公司,叫作Loft's。
它原本是一家糖果店公司,后来有个人——他叫什么名字来着?
芒格:[查尔斯]·古斯(Guth)。
巴菲特:对。叫什么?
芒格:古斯。
巴菲特:对。他花了几千块钱收购了百事可乐,把它塞进了Loft's里。
而且,如果你一路往回追溯百事可乐的公司名称,就是Loft's。
所以那时候到处都有一大堆糖果店。包括在奥马哈。
盒装巧克力的地位大幅下滑了。我猜主要是输给了这样那样的咸味零食。还有各种各样别的东西。
喜诗做得非常出色,比全国任何一家巧克力公司都要好得多。
拉塞尔·斯托弗(Russell Stover)曾有一段时间做得非常好。非常好,用的是不同的商业模式。但是,你知道,他们后来也遇到了自己的问题。
所以,我们没办法对扩大市场规模做太多事情。我们已经尝试了很多种办法。我们也多次尝试走出我们的强势地理区域。
我是说,查理和我看着我们在70年代于加州赚的钱,跟自己说,“如果我们能在50个州都做到这样,而不只是一个州,你知道,我们会变得非常富有。”
于是我们尝试了,结果并没有变得非常富有。这生意不太好复制到别的地方。
芒格:嗯,有时候行得通,有时候行不通。你只有试了才知道行不行。
巴菲特:是的。我们已经试过很多次了。
但到目前为止——有意思的是。东部人喜欢黑巧克力,比例是三分之二比三分之一。西部人喜欢牛奶巧克力,也是三分之二比三分之一。
东部人喜欢迷你装。西部人根本不吃迷你装。这里头有很多不同的东西。
但归根结底,盒装巧克力的销量并不大。
而我们在喜诗身上做得非常、非常、非常成功。它不仅给我们提供了用来收购其他企业的利润,所以我们通过喜诗增加了大量的盈利能力,这还不算喜诗自身增加的盈利能力。
但它让我看到了品牌的力量,也许可以说,我们在可口可乐上赚了很多钱,部分原因是我们买了喜诗——至少就我个人而言是这样——因为我已经在一定程度上理解了品牌,但没有什么能比得上亲自拥有一个品牌,去看到它的可能性以及局限性,从而让你学到未来可以做的事情。
1972年,我们买下了喜诗。1988年,我们买下了可口可乐。
我一点也不会感到奇怪,如果我们当初没有拥有喜诗,我们后来是否还会拥有可口可乐。
查理?
芒格:是的。毫无疑问,它对伯克希尔的主要贡献是消除无知。而它并不是消除无知的唯一大贡献者。
如果不是因为我们如此善于一步一步地消除自己的无知,伯克希尔今天几乎什么都不是。
我们最初知道的东西远远不够。我们买喜诗的时候相当愚蠢。我们只是勉强聪明到足以买下它。
如果说伯克希尔有什么秘诀的话,那就是我们很擅长消除无知。而美妙的是,我们还有大量的无知有待消除。(笑)
巴菲特:是啊,这就是我叫他发言的结果。(笑)
28. 巴菲特解释改变美国银行投资的交易
巴菲特:7号台。
观众:我叫本·奥滕霍夫,来自华盛顿特区。
我想请您谈谈——我最近读到,你们改变了对美国银行的投资方式,使得他们现在可以将其计入一级资本。
巴菲特:对。
观众:您能解释一下为什么这么做,以及这对伯克希尔的股东有什么好处吗?
另外,他们连一级资本要求都算不准确,这有没有让您感到担忧?
巴菲特:这件事——说来话长,好几个月以前,布莱恩·莫伊尼汉给我打电话,问我们是否愿意把我们的优先股,五十亿美元那部分,从累积优先股改为非累积优先股。
非累积优先股,与累积优先股相比,显然有一些缺陷。比如说,房地美和房利美的优先股股东现在就正在体会到这一点。
非累积优先股——本·格雷厄姆在1934年版的《证券分析》里写过——它们是一种极其弱势的证券形式。
但正是因为它是一种较弱的证券形式,它在银行的资本计算中计入方式就不同。
所以布莱恩要求我们这么做,然后他说,“如果你们愿意这么做”——这需要经过他们股东的批准等等——但他说,“如果你们愿意这么做,我们愿意让你们的优先股在五年内不可赎回。”
那么,在一个五个基点利率的世界里——五个基点的钱,你知道的——几乎没有——没有回报——我非常愿意做这笔交换。
他们觉得这对他们有利,我也觉得这对伯克希尔有利。
所以,我在伯克希尔得到了五年内一笔6%优先股不可赎回的保证,而这笔优先股我随时都可以用来支付我们持有的认股权证。
所以,我不必担心永远被锁定在一笔非累积的承诺优先股里,而美国银行则得到了在资本计算中使用它的好处。
这一切都是在最近这件事之前完成的——我是说,很久以前——在大约一周前他们在美林一些结构性票据上出现计算失误之前。
他们犯的那个错误没有让我感到困扰。我是说——你知道,我们也在处理自己的数字,你知道,我们有那份两万多页的纳税申报表。我们有10-K、10-Q,进进出出。你尽力而为就是了。
但我——那个错误并没有影响他们按公认会计准则报告的数字或类似的东西。他们也希望自己没有犯这个错误。而且他们会因为犯了这个错误,在资本计划的意义上付出代价。
但这丝毫没有改变我对美国银行或其管理层的看法。
而且我确实认为——反正他们本来就打算派息。我是说,改为非累积股对我们造成损害的可能性非常、非常低。而使其五年内不可赎回,对我们来说是实实在在的好处。
所以,这是一笔我很乐意做的交换。我认为这对我们和对他们都有好处。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我同意你的看法。
巴菲特:好的。(笑)
29. NetJets“令人满意”,但别指望有大幅增长
巴菲特:贝基?
贝基·奎克:这个问题来自麦迪逊的弗兰克·罗宾逊。
他问道:“十年前,NetJets在每年的股东大会上都被提到,是伯克希尔一个令人兴奋的增长机会。五年前,出现了一些问题,但后来似乎得到了解决,因为此后就不再被提起了。”
「NetJets目前的前景如何?它对增长、营收和利润的贡献大吗?」
巴菲特:是的,它不是一个高速增长的——它是一个非常——它是一门相当不错的生意。
那个数字——它的新单位销量在2007年和2008年股市发生的事情前后达到顶峰,大致同步。
我是说,有相当一部分人的收入依赖于股市表现,尤其是对冲基金经理。但还有——很多其他人也是。
他们给我们带来了相当大的销售热潮。不仅他们的需求下降了,而且当他们的合同到期时——那些合同往往在2011年和2012年左右到期——很多人都没有续约。
直到最近——我这么说不会完全准确——但直到最近六到八个月,美国的净拥有量一直在小幅下降。而现在这个趋势已经扭转了。净拥有量正在逐月增长。
但它绝不是一个高速增长的业务。我是说——它是一个规模非常大的业务。我是说,我们大概占了行业的百分之六十几,没有任何一家能接近我们成为第二名。我是说,我们是最顶级的产品。
但我不认为这个市场会翻一番或翻两番。
我们很快就要进军中国了。但那是一个非常、非常长期的布局。我们在欧洲也有业务,那边的单位销量还在小幅下滑。
不过,飞行小时数已经回升了不少。所以在过去六个月到一年里,机主们更多地使用飞机了,而这个数字在2007到2008年那段时间大幅下滑过。
所以我不会把NetJets定性为一个巨大的增长机会。但我——但我很高兴我们拥有它。我认为它是一门非常——非常令人满意的生意。
但它不是一个我预期会有很多增长的业务。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我用多买了25个小时的行动证明了我的乐观。(笑)
巴菲特:我得告诉你们,他可不是那么好说服的。(笑)
我还能想到几句评论,但我不说了。
30. 不太可能用主要股票持仓来支付收购款
巴菲特:杰伊。
杰伊·盖尔布:这个问题是关于收购的。
伯克希尔目前愿意考虑的收购规模有多大?
伯克希尔在富国银行、可口可乐、美国运通和IBM上的主要股权投资,在多大程度上现实地可能成为交易资金的来源?
巴菲特:嗯,它们可以成为资金来源。但这种可能性非常小。
但是——我们的——我们的目标是买真正优秀的企业,规模大的企业,我们喜欢其管理层的企业,以及我们认为能够随着时间增长的企业。
我是说,伯克希尔是关于建立盈利能力的。就像我们一两天前做的那样,同意收购阿尔伯塔的那条输电线路,我是说,我在着眼于为伯克希尔增加盈利能力。
我们每天、每周或每月都在尝试这么做。但我们不常能遇到这样的机会。
但如果机会足够大,我们需要筹一些钱,你知道,我们可以动用那一大池的证券储备,之后仍然还有巨额的投资。
还没到那一步。你知道,我们手头有四百多亿的资本——或者说现金——而我愿意把它降到两百亿,这——你知道,我们有相当宽裕的缓冲空间。
但如果我需要的话,只要那笔交易足够有吸引力、足够大,需要我们这么做,我们就会去做。
所以,这有可能发生。可能今年发生,也可能十年后发生。你永远不知道。
查理,你在这个问题上有什么想法吗?
芒格:嗯,没有,我认为我们的收购在过去一直是不规律的。未来也会是不规律的。
我确实认为,相比过去,我们会从铁路和公用事业子公司那里获得更多那种自动的、明智的资本再配置。我认为这是好事,对股东有利。
巴菲特:我想人们可能会以为,让我们兴奋的是找到某只我们想买的股票。那当然也不错。
但真正让我们兴奋的——完全没法相提并论——是找到一家我们想买的企业,一家很适合伯克希尔的企业,一家在未来10年、20年、50年都会为伯克希尔赚钱的企业。
那才是我们——那才是我们49年来一直在努力构建的东西。
可交易证券在其中扮演了重要角色,因为我们从中赚到的利润帮助我们实现了这一点,而且那是一个部署资本的好去处——你知道,在那里操作很容易。
但如果你——我们真正在思考的,至少查理和我在思考的——我们有托德和泰德在思考可交易证券——我们真正在思考的是购买企业。而这一点会一直持续下去。
我们并不急于出售你提到的那些股票中的任何一只。(笑)
它们——如果我们打算从股票里套现五十亿或一百亿,可能会是其他的股票,而不是你提到的那几只。
31. 尽管资金成本低廉,仍不愿借贷
巴菲特:好。8号台。
观众:你好,沃伦,查理。我叫斯特凡诺·格拉索(音),从意大利热那亚远道而来。今天能来到这里跟你们在一起真是荣幸。
我有一个关于伯克希尔如今是否应该增加杠杆的问题。这个问题其实是想引发一场讨论,听听你们的想法。
这个问题也是被这样一个事实触发的:几年前收购BNSF时,部分是用伯克希尔的股票支付的,而在那之后不久,公司手头就积累了大量现金。
如今伯克希尔明智地增加杠杆,可能会有不同的好处。有些是对所有公司普遍成立的,有些是伯克希尔特有的。
对我这个股东来说,伯克希尔特有的、也是最重要的一点是:把这笔资金投出去的决策,会由现在这个团队——你和其他管理者——来做出。
那么问题是,为什么不出去发行几十亿美元的长期债券,甚至可以嵌入一些提前赎回条款或者由伯克希尔自行决定的可赎回期权,好好利用这笔钱呢?谢谢。
巴菲特:嗯,你说的很有道理。
这也是查理和我曾经想过的事情——我想如果40年前你问查理和我,如果我们看着当时的利率水平,同时手上又有一些赚钱能力很强的好生意,我们会不会出去借一大笔长期债务,我们会说会的,对吧,查理?
芒格:那不会是一个艰难的决定。
巴菲特:但是,我们有几个原因。第一,我们确实有一种比股权融资更好的方式来筹集资金:浮存金。而且我们已经用这种方式筹集了770亿美元之多。
而且我们不喜欢这样的做法:一直非常保守地运营一家杠杆很低的公司,然后突然改变路线,让那些买了双A评级债券的人,忽然发现自己手里的债券评级低了很多。
我们对给公用事业公司或铁路公司加杠杆没有任何意见。它们本该承担比现在多得多的债务,但我们让它们的负债水平大致符合评级机构认为合理的常规比例。
但如果你从分析的角度去看它们——这两家公司都能承受相当多的额外债务。
在母公司层面,我们——你知道,回头看BNSF那笔交易,我们当时借了一些钱,也用了一些股权。
我认为用股权支付帮我们促成了那笔交易。但基本上说,这不是一个明智的做法。
我本应该——而且我原本随时都可以到市场上去,事后回购一批股票,那大概才是我当时应该做的事情。
所以我理解你的观点。我完全同意——你知道,伯克希尔再多背上三四百亿美元的债务根本不算什么,而且成本也很低。
只是我们现在其实没有什么特别好的地方可以把这笔钱投出去,这一点从我们手头有大约250亿美元的过剩现金就能看出来。
我们现在不太愿意在母公司层面大幅加杠杆,因为我们还有其他一些相当划算的资金来源。
比如说,我们在出售所谓的结构化保险给付(structured settlements),这类业务的期限非常长。而且它们给我们带来的实际利息成本,甚至比我们直接发行债券还要低。
所以我们确实在做一些沿着你所建议方向走的事情,只是没有你建议的那么激进。
你很可能是对的。如果我们看到一笔500亿美元的交易,却因为不愿意背上一些债务而放弃了它,那你就绝对是对的。
如果我们看到一笔真正好的500亿美元交易,我们会想办法把它做成。
查理?
芒格:我想我们会乐见其成。虽然你的建议很明智,但我们大概不会提前主动这么做。
巴菲特:你听到了他最后那两个字——「提前」。
32. 气候变化的威胁不会影响投资决策
巴菲特:安德鲁。
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个问题来自伊利诺伊州加利纳的罗里·霍尔舍。是关于伯克希尔在气候变化方面的投资的。
「一方面,伯克希尔旗下的公用事业公司在风能和太阳能方面有大量投入。伯克希尔还投资了比亚迪,这是一家创新型交通公司,在某些方面或许可以与特斯拉相提并论。
「另一方面,伯灵顿北方铁路运输了大量的煤炭。你在2013年年报中指出,如果燃煤受到限制,它的利润可能会缩水。
还有再保险业务。
这些以及伯克希尔的其他投资,与你对气候变化所带来的风险和机遇的理解,是如何契合的?作为投资者,我们该如何看待这个问题?」
巴菲特:嗯,我认为你把很多业务的事实都说清楚了。我是说,如果你拥有一条运输大量煤炭的铁路,它还会长期继续运输大量煤炭。是很长的一段时期。但到了某个时候,它运的煤炭大概会减少。我不认为——我认为这也很有可能发生。
但是,我收到很多人的提问,他们希望我填一大堆表格,说明这一切会如何影响我们的保险业务。它不会——它根本不会在那种——那种时间尺度上起作用。
我是说,当阿吉特和我商量巨灾保险该收多少保费的时候,不管是佛罗里达的飓风,还是新西兰的地震,或者别的什么,至少在我们看来,这些风险发生概率的逐年变化是极其微小的。
我是说,这根本谈不上会在任何一年里对你的定价产生什么实质性的影响。
而且,你知道,我们会继续开发替代能源。我们会继续在我们的燃煤发电厂使用煤炭,直到我们所在辖区的公用事业委员会告诉我们应该做点别的事情为止。对此我们没有选择的余地。
顺便说一句,我们没有——我是说,我们乐意运输煤炭,但除此之外,我们是一家公共承运人。我是说,我们可能很想拒绝运输氯气、氨之类的东西,因为运输这些东西很危险。而我们又无法为此获得足够的补偿。
但我们是公共承运人。所以按照法律规定,我们必须承运客户交给我们的货物。
所以我——我不认为在对伯克希尔·哈撒韦做投资决策时,或者说对大多数公司、我能想到的几乎所有公司做投资决策时,气候变化应该成为决策过程中的一个因素。查理?
芒格:是的,我觉得很多自认为知道气候变化会如何改变天气模式和飓风的人,其实是在夸大其词。(掌声)
我们算是不可知论者。并不是说没有一点全球变暖,因为显然是有的。
但那些自认为确切知道将会发生什么、有多少人会死于热带疾病之类的人,大多是在信口开河。
我认为有一类人就喜欢有个大灾难可以去操心。而且——
巴菲特:好吧,但是——你这么说的时候,我是说,就把它当作做决策时的一个经济变量而言,这个——
芒格:不。我们不是在说,“我们该如何调整整个投资计划,把我们自认为了解的气候变化因素考虑进去?”
但我认为无论发生什么,从长远看我们的处境都非常好。
我认为输电线路以及——我们将不得不更多地直接利用太阳能,或者间接通过风能之类的方式来发电。而我们的位置得天独厚。
这就像 GEICO 在互联网出现时赚了很多钱一样,他们其实并没有真的做过这方面的规划,我想随着越来越多的电力直接由太阳能产生,我们也会赚很多钱。
所以我认为我们的处境非常好。但我不认为我们在这方面值得什么大的赞誉。我们只是恰好撞上了而已。
33. 对投资组合经理托德·库姆斯和泰德·韦施勒的赞扬
巴菲特:格雷格?
格雷格·沃伦:自从伯克希尔开始把公司投资组合的部分责任转交给托德·库姆斯和泰德·韦施勒以来,这两人管理的资金已经从 2012 年初的每人大约 30 亿美元,增长到今年早些时候的每人超过 70 亿美元。
尽管如此,这仍然只占你们投资组合中股票部分不到 10% 的比例,富国银行、可口可乐、美国运通、IBM 和宝洁这些大的历史持仓仍然盖过了其余的持仓。
你能不能给我们介绍一下,你的两位得力干将现在各自管理多少资金,以及你预计在未来五年里这个数字会增长到多少?
而且鉴于这两人在过去几年里似乎都参与了超出投资组合经理职责范围之外的事情,你预计他们的职责会随着时间推移扩展到什么程度?
还有一个完全不相关的问题,我们要到什么时候才能看到托德和泰德和你、查理一起坐在台上,来谈谈他们管理伯克希尔投资组合的工作?
巴菲特:我读完大学时被问到的问题都没这么多。(笑)
他们现在管理的资金——现在略高于 70 亿美元。我们会定期调整这个数字,而且总是会往上调。但我们不会每个月都去调整它。
我是说,他们管理的投资组合的价值可能每个月都会变化。但未来他们管理的资金会比现在更多。
我想,在某种程度上,他们和我一样——你知道,这些年来我一直有着管理越来越多资金的不太愉快的经历——他们也发现,随着资金规模变大,事情确实会变得更难一些。
但随着时间推移,把资金不断转移给他们、从我这里挪走,仍然要好得多。而且这种情况会一直持续下去。
他们两位都是伯克希尔了不起的补充力量,不仅仅体现在他们的投资技能上,还在于他们各自都非常懂经营,非常懂管理。
在伯克希尔,经常会有一些事情摆到我桌面上,我有想法,但我自己并不想去执行,因为这些事情可能要花很多时间,尤其是如果涉及去谈判一些细枝末节之类的事情。
所以正如我在报告里提到的那样,泰德和托德在投资管理职责之外做的事情,一直很有帮助,给伯克希尔增添了不少价值。而且我相信这种情况肯定会继续下去。
他们愿意去做。他们乐在其中。而且他们完全不会因为做这些事而要求额外的报酬。
他们百分之百地和伯克希尔同心同德。他们了解我的思路。如果我告诉他们,你知道,“这是一笔我认为只要能谈成就有意义的交易”,他们会明白为什么这笔交易有意义,也知道该怎么把它谈成,并且愿意花时间去做。
所以把他们招进来对伯克希尔来说是个大大的加分项。而且随着岁月推移,他们会成为越来越重要的力量。好了。
查理?抱歉,我——
芒格:没什么要补充的。
巴菲特:好。
芒格:这样如何?
34. 对美联储和主席本·伯南克的赞扬
巴菲特:9 号台。
观众:早上好,沃伦和查理。我叫杰森,来自多伦多,我的问题跟总体金融市场有关。
这些年来,我们一直处于一个利率几乎为零的环境中。近来,长期的低利率已经导致了资产泡沫,比如房地产泡沫,而且现在可能正在形成一个债券泡沫。
如果由你来执掌美联储,你在利率方面会采取什么政策?你认为有加息的必要吗?你预计这样的调整会在多长的时间跨度内发生?谢谢。
巴菲特:好,既然——你说得对,关于——五年前谁能猜到利率会这么低、持续这么久呢?
你说的是——我想说,我确实感到惊讶,事情进展得这么顺利。
我不觉得我会有什么不同的做法。我特别这么说是因为到目前为止效果这么好。所以我很想说我当初就是这么打算的,然后把功劳都揽在自己身上。
这件事进展得这么顺利,我是感到惊讶的。但就像我去年说的,这真是一部很有意思的电影,因为我们以前从没见过这样的剧情。有意思的地方还在于,我们不知道结局是什么。不过,我认为本·伯南克是个英雄,无论是在崩盘——或者说恐慌——发生的当时,还是在那之后。
我认为他是个非常聪明的人。我认为他处理得非常好。
让我感兴趣的是,2007年到2008年那段时间美联储的会议记录公布出来之后,我发现有相当一部分美联储成员当时其实并没有搞清楚到底发生了什么,这一点很有意思。
这真是很吸引人。倒不是——他们当中有不少人其实并没有真正理解,看起来是这样的,或者说他们当中有些人并不明白事情究竟有多严重。
所以我特别要给伯南克记一功,考虑到他其实并没有从周围的人那里得到一致的看法——肯定算不上一致——来支持他认为必要的那些行动确实是必要的。
可他还是坚持去做了。在我看来,他做得非常出色。而从我看到的珍妮特·耶伦的一切表现来看,我对她也有同样的感觉。
我们且看这部电影会怎么演下去。你知道,如果把利率长期维持在接近零的水平,同时不断吸纳越来越多的国家债务发行,会发生什么,我并不知道答案。因为到目前为止,我们已经在缩减购债规模,但仍然在买。
我很想听听查理对此的看法。
芒格:嗯,比如说,在日本,没有人会预料到利率会大幅下降,而且一降就是20年。
也没有人会预料到普通股会大幅下跌,而且一跌就是20年。
所以,奇怪的事情发生了。这些事情让整个经济学界都感到非常困惑。
实际上,如果你不感到困惑,那你大概率是没有真正理解这件事。
而在伯克希尔,我注意到的是,我们买的长期债券并不多。
巴菲特:是的。我们——嗯,你知道,2008年的时候,我写过一篇文章,说,你知道,当时所有人都在说现金为王。现金如果你真拿去用了,那也许算得上为王,但如果你不打算用它,那现金就是你能持有的最愚蠢的东西了,你知道的。
而人们往往在最不该抱紧现金的时候,紧紧抱住现金不放。
但零利率政策确实产生了巨大的影响,既在提振经济方面,也在资产价格方面。
在我看来,它并没有制造出泡沫。这不代表它不可能制造出泡沫。但我们现在所处的绝不是一个泡沫的局面。不过,我们现在所处的确实是一个不同寻常的局面。
查理还有什么补充吗?
芒格:没有了,我和你一样困惑。
巴菲特:哦,好,好。(笑)
这就是为什么我们俩相处得这么融洽。
35. 伯克希尔如何从多元化经营中获益
巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题涉及另一种不确定性。这是纽约 Gotcho Capital Management 的 Chris Gotcho(音)提出的。
「你们一直在这次大会上寻找一位有资历的看空者来提问。我不是这样的人。事实上,做空伯克希尔会是相当愚蠢的行为。
「不过,从长期来看,伯克希尔的商业模式是持有70多家彼此不相关的非金融企业——比如砖块和巧克力——这种模式在过去100年的美国商业史上,几乎普遍都没有奏效过。
「这种模式在你们两位,巴菲特先生和芒格先生身上奏效了,因为你们拥有独一无二的才能。
「但问题是,从概率上看,你们的继任者似乎不太可能让这套模式继续同样出色地运转下去。」
这就是我的问题。
巴菲特:好。其实——这个问题很有意思。
这种模式在美国是奏效的。我是说,如果你看看美国所有这些五花八门、彼此不相关的企业,从长期来看,它们的表现是非常出色的。
所以,如果你把道琼斯指数看作一个整体——当然,在这100年里,成分公司一直在变——但是,你知道,任何一个业务单元,能从67——或者说66——涨到11497,同时每年还给你派发相当可观的钱,这实际上是一个运转得相当不错的模式。当然,这并不是在同一个管理层之下完成的。
但持有一批优秀的企业,并不是一个糟糕的商业计划。相当多的企业集团被组建起来,是为了施展这样那样的财技。
它们的做法建立在——你知道,如果你回顾一下利顿实业(Litton Industries)和海湾西方公司(Gulf and Western),还有——这样的例子可以举出几百个。它们真正的组建方式——林—坦普——也就是 LTV——靠的是连续不断地发行股票,用市盈率20倍的股票去收购市盈率10倍的企业。
其想法就是,你可以某种程度上一直忽悠住投资者,让他们不断搭上这个连环信式的把戏,而根本没有真正花心思去考虑管理层实际上在打造的是什么。
我认为我们的商业计划是非常合理的——持有一批优秀的企业,业务多元化,管理者出色,资本结构保守。
而且还有一个巨大的优势,人们其实并不真正理解这一点。我是说,从一个重要的角度看,资本主义就是关于资本配置的。而我们在伯克希尔有一套体系,可以在不产生税负后果的情况下配置资本。
所以我们可以把资金从喜诗糖果这样能产生盈余资本的业务,调配到其他领域。这个过程并不会伤害喜诗糖果本身,我们可以把资金,就像教科书上说的那样,调配到资本能被有效利用的地方,比如风电场,或者别的什么。
所以我们——你知道——真的没有谁比伯克希尔·哈撒韦更适合做这件事了,这完全说得通。
但这必须用商业化的原则来运用,而不是用股票推销的原则。我要说,很多企业集团骨子里的出发点,都是股票推销。
你知道的,你看到泰科(Tyco)发生的事了——那些连环收购者通常都热衷于不停地发行股票。
我觉得,如果你要找一个判断你面对的是哪种物种的主要指标,那就看有没有人在不停地——如果他们以这种或那种方式持续发行股票,那他们大概率是在玩一场连锁信游戏。而那种游戏的结局通常都不好。
我认为我们用现金收购、收购优质企业、建立起许多个不断增长的盈利能力来源,这套方法,我认为,是一个了不起的模式。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我认为我们和那些被普遍认为在企业集团模式上失败的人之间,有几点不同。
第一,当没有公司可买的时候,我们还有别的选择。我们在保险公司的投资组合里还有更多证券可以买。而这是大多数其他企业集团都没有的选项。
第二,他们几乎是不顾一切地要频繁地买点什么。而我们不觉得有任何非买不可的压力。我们愿意就这么等着,直到出现说得通的机会。
我们和他们很不一样。我们更像梅隆兄弟(Mellon brothers),而不像海湾+西方公司(Gulf and Western)。梅隆兄弟做得非常、非常好,做了大概50年、60年、70年。
而且他们愿意持有少数股权,愿意让公司慢慢成长,他们在很多方面都跟我们很像。
所以我不认为我们是一个标准的企业集团。我认为我们很可能会继续做得非常好,有点像是梅隆兄弟如果能一直保持年轻的话会怎样。
巴菲特:这话我爱听。
芒格:是啊。(笑)
36. 对森林河(Forest River)皮特·利格尔(Pete Liegl)的赞赏
巴菲特:乔纳森。
乔纳森·布兰特:森林河是伯克希尔表现较好的收购之一。自伯克希尔2005年收购它以来,其销售额的增长速度明显快于它的主要竞争对手索尔(Thor)。而且我相信它在房车零售领域已经拿下了第一的位置。
您能解释一下森林河跟索尔相比,做了哪些不一样的事情吗?还有,请告诉我们,为了抢份额,森林河是不是接受了比索尔7%更低的营业利润率?
森林河有没有什么可持续的、结构性的优势,能帮助它维持住第一的位置,相对于索尔而言?
另外,现在有三家公司加起来大约占了房车市场80%的份额,是不是说进入这个行业的壁垒比过去更高了?还是说,像当年的森林河那样一个生猛的新秀,仍然有可能从无到有、抢下很大的份额?
巴菲特:是的。我们收购了一家叫森林河的公司,经营者是一位叫皮特·利格尔的人,我记得大概是十年前左右的事。
这事挺有意思的。皮特这个人完全不是MBA那种类型,他是个了不起的人,他一手建立起了一家——(笑)
那不是一句评价,那只是一个客观描述。(笑)
皮特建立起了一家非常成功、但规模小得多的房车公司。他在1990年代中期把它卖给了一家私募股权公司。而那家公司很快就开始对他指手画脚,告诉他该怎么经营。没过多久,他就让他们滚蛋了。
然后,没过太久,那家公司就破产了,这并不算意外——我本来就能预测到这个结果。
于是皮特把它从破产中买了回来,重新把它建了起来,然后大概十年前来找我。
就在一个下午之内——我们那天晚上一起吃了顿饭。他带上了他的太太和女儿。我们就把这家公司买下来了。
他当时向我做了几个承诺。他很少做承诺。我告诉了他我会怎么做。从那以后我们就一直过得很愉快。
我从没去过森林河。它总部在印第安纳州的埃尔克哈特(Elkhart)。我希望它真的在那儿。我是说,说不定他们只是在瞎编这些数字——你知道吧?
我完全能想象那个画面。有个人说,“这个月我们该给沃伦报什么数字啊,哈哈哈。”(笑)
皮特把这家公司经营得非常出色。他刚来的时候,我们就定下了一套激励薪酬和基本薪酬的方案。他从没提出要改,我也从没提出要改。
他把这家公司做到了——我想今年它的营业额会超过40亿美元。
这么长时间以来,我大概就跟他通过三四次电话。
这是他的公司。他干得非常出色。
至于索尔和森林河之间的竞争状况,要跟他竞争到底有多难,我不太清楚。我觉得,不管在什么情况下,要跟皮特竞争都不容易。
对于一家40亿美元的企业来说,他的IT部门只有六个人。他就是清楚公司里正在发生什么事。
重要的是,这是他的公司。我没法去经营一家房车公司,我们总部也没有任何人能经营这样的公司。
这是个很艰难的行业。而且,说到你那个利润率的问题,乔尼,你确实是在很窄的利润空间里做生意。这个行业的毛利率大概是11%到12%,销售管理费用大概占5%到6%。所以,你知道,净利润率大概就在6%左右这个区间。
我们有一套非常好的方案——不管从他的角度还是从我们的角度来看都是——我们定下了一套激励薪酬方案。就像我说的,就是他来奥马哈拜访我的那个下午,我们把这事定下来的。
这个方案对他管用,对我们也管用。你知道,这安排简直不能更好了。我真希望我们能有20个这样的安排。
而且可能我们大多数股东根本都不知道我们拥有Forest River。但这家公司今年的业务量将达到40亿美元,而且我敢打赌,随着时间推移业务量还会增加。它是这个行业的领头羊。这个行业不会消失。
而且,你知道,也许我们甚至可以卖一点房车保险。这就是Forest River的故事。
37.巴肯页岩油对伯克希尔的影响有限
巴菲特:10号台。
观众:你好,沃伦,查理。我叫Vishal Patel(音)。我从加拿大多伦多来,我的问题是关于油砂的。
能不能请你和大家分享一下你对油砂行业的看法,以及它对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的影响?
巴菲特:嗯,就——你说的是油砂,还是页岩产油?
观众:我说的是油砂,阿尔伯塔的。
巴菲特:阿尔伯塔,好的。
观众:Keystone XL管道。
巴菲特:影响不大。我们在Marmon旗下有一家吊车业务,在石油开发领域总体上做了不少生意。而且,确实,也活跃在油砂领域。
我们很快将拥有一项输电业务,将覆盖阿尔伯塔85%的地区。阿尔伯塔是个很大的地方。举个例子,这项业务将有大约8000英里的输电线路。
但油砂这门生意——我是说,你知道,油砂的规模是巨大的。而我们持有一些埃克森美孚的股票,它们在油砂领域显然也有业务。
你可能会觉得挺有意思的一件事是,我们现在用我们的铁路每天运送70万桶原油。我们大概有——可能有——九列单一商品列车(unit train),现在[BNSF执行董事长]马特[·罗斯]可以纠正我这个数字——你知道,每列大概载100节车厢左右。
每节车厢大概装650桶左右的原油,所以——关于原油,你可能会觉得有意思的是,不仅在运输目的地的灵活性方面有明显优势,因为不同地方的价差不同,你可以把油运到那些原本很难运到的炼油厂去。铁路在这方面很灵活。
但铁路,实际上,你知道——从直觉上讲,人们会想到石油通过管道汹涌流动的画面。但铁路运油的速度,我会说,大概是管道的将近两倍快。
但我们最近从菲利普斯66收购了一家公司。我们是用我们持有的菲利普斯股票换来的。我们收购了一家特种化学品公司。
它的主要产品是一种化学添加剂,可以让原油在管道中的流动速度提高大约10%。所以这可能会让运输时间缩短一天。
所以,通过这个,我们其实也算是以一种小规模的方式进入了管道业务——原油管道业务——规模不大。
我不认为——我认为油砂显然是人类的一项重要资产。那里有大量的石油储量。在未来的几个世纪里,它们对人类来说都是重要的资产。
但我不认为——我不认为这会给伯克希尔带来什么翻天覆地的变化。
马特可能有不同的看法。我先请查理说说。然后如果马特愿意说点什么,我也很乐意听听他的意见。
芒格:嗯,是这样,很多油砂生产是用天然气来提炼重质原油的。
所以这是件很特殊的事情。只有当油价维持在很高的水平时,它才划算;而只有当天然气便宜得离谱时,它才特别划算。
所以这是一门很特殊的生意。而且它对人类是有好处的。但它到底是不是一项好投资,我一点头绪都没有。
巴菲特:马特,你——关于那边的原油情况,你有什么要补充的吗?
38.巴菲特对冲基金赌局的最新进展
巴菲特:好。我们到中午了。
六年前,我向一群人——一些人——承诺,为慈善做一个赌局,赌一个指数基金——标准普尔500指数基金——与一组对冲基金相比,业绩表现如何。纽约的一家公司接受了我的赌局。
而且我承诺,每年我都会公布最新的比赛结果。而每年公布这些结果也变得越来越有意思了。(笑)
我们现在进入了这个赌局的第六年。有意思的是,挑选这些基金的人都是非常正派、非常聪明的人。而且,很显然,基金中的基金(fund of funds)是按业绩收费的,他们自然会收取一笔管理费。
但他们还会根据他们所挑选的对冲基金的表现,额外收取一笔业绩提成。所以他们有充分的经济动机去挑选出一组出色的对冲基金。
而在参与这个赌局的这五只基金中的基金背后,基金中的基金的经理们为了提高自己的收入,精心挑选了至少大概200只对冲基金。他们的动力可以说是拉满了。
所以我们现在进入了这个赌局的第五年——第六年。第一年,在下跌的市场中,基金中的基金这一组的表现明显好于标普指数。
但正如你们能看到的,在随后的五年里,标普指数在某种程度上已经遥遥领先了。
有意思的是,我们买了——我们每人投入了35万美元左右,然后我们买了零息债券,这样十年后就能拿到100万美元。
我们买了十年期国债,零息的。我们买的本金是100万美元。我们每人出了35万。
结果,几年之后利率变化到几乎为零的水平,这意味着这些债券,虽然没有附带任何票息,但价格几乎涨到了面值。
所以,一两年前,我们以大概95、96的价格卖掉了这些债券,几乎拿到了全部100万美元。我们把这笔钱全部投入了伯克希尔的股票。我向他们保证过,不管发生什么情况,十年结束时他们都能拿到100万美元。
所以看起来,等十年期满的时候,这笔奖金很可能会大大超过100万美元,所以。所以,到目前为止,大家都挺高兴。
下午场
1. 记录出席人数
巴菲特:好,我们准备继续。
我们从来拿不到精确的数字,因为大家会在会议期间进进出出。但我确实知道,今年我们比以往任何一年都多发出了大约一万一千张门票,而且所有的溢流会议室都坐满了。我们还用上了希尔顿酒店那边的场地,所以很明显,今年的到场人数比过去任何一年都多得多,我希望大家的消费模式也能反映这一点。(笑)
2. 企业面临的变化风险
巴菲特:那好,我们请贝基提问。假设她在场的话。
贝基·奎克:我在,我在这儿。
巴菲特:好。
贝基·奎克:我看看,这个问题来自——希望我念对你的名字,迈克尔。
他叫迈克尔——迈克尔·洛切克(音),他说:“未来能源控股公司(Energy Future Holdings)很可能破产,这是天然气价格因钻探技术革命而出现意外剧烈下跌所致。您认为伯克希尔投资组合中持有的其他资产——债券、股票等等——在多大程度上也可能受到颠覆性技术变革或其他变化的影响,从而侵蚀其商业模式和进入壁垒?”
“比如说,消费者行为和监管的变化可能影响可口可乐;支付系统的变革可能影响美国运通;技术和竞争格局日益加快的变化速度可能影响IBM;媒体内容的无线传输和城市化可能对DirecTV造成冲击。”
“另外,能否请您谈谈,未来能源控股的部分发起方——其中包括最顶尖的私募股权机构——参与其中,是否影响了您的投资决策?当时是否存在从众心理在起作用?从这次经历中又能吸取什么教训?”
巴菲特:是这样,我不太愿意把投资未来能源控股这个决定的“功劳”和别人分享。要是有人暗示他们在这个决定里起了什么作用,我觉得那对他们很不公平。
那纯粹是我自己犯的错误。一个大错误,一个重大的错误,而且我们将来还会犯错误。
所有企业都应该不断思考,什么因素可能搞垮它们的商业模式。就未来能源控股来说,当时做了一个相当简单的假设,结果这个假设错了。
我是说,当时的假设是天然气价格会维持在大致原有的高位,或者更高,结果价格却大幅走低。
到那个时候,整个局面就崩塌了。他们有大量的储备资产,还有一些期货头寸,靠这些又撑了一阵子。但根本上说,那是一个基本的判断错误。
我们把我们所有的业务都看作是可能发生变化的。一个经典的例子是GEICO。GEICO在1936年创立时,目标就是以低成本运营,并把这种低成本通过更低的价格让渡给客户,销售的是一种必需品——汽车保险。
他们最初是靠邮寄方式来做业务的,通过美国邮政系统,创始人是两位政府雇员。这也是GEICO这个名字的由来——Government Employees Insurance Company(政府雇员保险公司)。
多年来他们一直在适应变化,最开始是扩大了承保对象的范围。后来他们主要从邮寄转向电话,再后来又转向互联网,再到社交媒体。
但在这个适应过程中,他们也曾经栽过一次跟头——当他们不再局限于政府雇员这一类别、开始变得过于激进地扩张时,公司差点——真的差点破产。
所以说——变化一直在发生,我们所有的业务都在经历变化。我们希望管理者们能持续思考变化,思考未来他们的商业模式将需要什么。我们知道,这些业务在五年或十年后不会是现在这个样子。
就说BNSF吧,铁路这么基础的业务,现在也在认真考虑给机车用液化天然气(LNG)。一切都会变化。
我们的企业总体上都占据着优势地位,通常不会面临剧烈的变化。但它们全都会经历变化,而且,缓慢的变化往往更难察觉,有时比明摆着的剧烈变化更容易让人放松警惕、麻痹大意。
所以对这个问题,我的回答是:第一,我将来还会犯错误。这是必然的,可以保证的。
我们不会做那种“押上整个公司”、会让我们真正痛苦不堪的决定,这在伯克希尔从来不会发生。但只要你做了很多决定,就不可能不犯一些重大错误。
而有时候事情又会出乎意料地顺利。1966年,我、查理,还有桑迪·戈特斯曼,在巴尔的摩买下了一家百货公司。要说有什么事比在1960年代中期买百货公司还蠢,那还真不多。1966年,巴尔的摩霍华德街和列克星敦街的街角上有四家百货公司,如今一家都不在了。排名第一的赫兹勒百货(Hutzler's),比我们那家公司破产得还晚一点。
但幸运的是,桑迪把它卖得很成功,所以投在那家百货公司里的600万美元,随着我们后来用这笔钱不断做其他事情,如今变成了价值大约450亿美元的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票。
所以你确实必须对自己企业里正在发生的事情保持高度警觉,我们也希望我们的管理者们做到这一点。但实际上,这也是查理和我,还有我们的董事们,会去思考的事情,管理者们同样如此。查理?
芒格:是的,我之前讲过,一点一点地消除自己的无知是很值得追求的,此外还有一个诀窍,就是从错误中挣脱出来。这两件事我们都做得相当不错,而且非常有用。
设想一下伯克希尔当初的样子:一家几乎注定要破产的纺织厂——因为新英格兰地区的电力成本大约是田纳西河谷管理局(TVA)辖区的两倍;一家注定要失败的百货公司;还有一家因经营方式变化而注定要被淘汰出局的贸易印花公司。伯克希尔·哈撒韦就是从这些东西里脱胎而来的。要说从错误中挣脱出来,我常想,要是我们当初的起点更好一点,我们又会做出什么样的成绩呢。(笑)
巴菲特:是的。这一点我自己也深有体会——我曾祖父1869年在奥马哈这里开了一家杂货店。我祖父在1929年经营着这家店,他给我叔叔写了封信,我叔叔当时打算和他一起经营这家店。
那封信一开头就是——这是1929年的事了——“连锁店的时代已经结束了”。这也就是为什么我们最后只剩下一家杂货店,而它在1969年也关门大吉了。
你真的必须正视周围的现实。不幸的是,我祖父当时正是被“愿望即是想法之父”这种心理给蒙蔽了。
3. 亨氏的盈利能力
巴菲特:好,杰?
杰·盖尔布:这个问题是关于亨氏(Heinz)这笔交易的。
伯克希尔持有亨氏50%的股权,这部分计入了伯克希尔的业绩,长期来看会对其盈利产生实质性影响。
在经历了大规模的业务重组之后,亨氏目前的正常化盈利能力是多少?您预计亨氏在未来几年能实现多少盈利?
巴菲特:好的。亨氏将会自行提交自己的10-Q季报。实际上,我想他们的第一季度报告——他们现在已经改成了日历年度——第一季度报告现在应该差不多快到期了。所以大家会看到亨氏自己的数字。
我要说的是,亨氏其实一直是一家经营得相当合理的食品公司,多年来税前利润率大约在15%,这在食品行业里并不是一个不寻常的经营利润率。
我只是想请大家逐季度地观察一下,也许明年也是,我认为亨氏的利润率会比这些历史数字有显著改善。贝尔纳多·希斯(Bernardo Hees)和他的团队所做的,就是重新调整了业务模式。
我认为那些至关重要的品牌,其实力一如既往地强大。而且我认为成本结构会在不削减营销支出的情况下得到显著改善。
所以我认为你们会看到显著的改善,但我不想在这里说出一个具体数字。你们很快就会知道的。
4. 买公司还是买股票?
巴菲特:好的。11号台。
观众:您好,巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫戴夫·康特萨里亚(音译),是费城的一名基金经理。
您今天已经谈到了一些这方面的内容,但我想请您进一步谈谈,您是如何思考比较投资机会的。
过去,您并不害怕让单一持仓占到投资组合的很大比例,比如可口可乐。
所以当有机会加仓您最青睐的那些股票时,比如在2008年和2009年初,加仓可口可乐这样的公司,或者比如从75跌到15的穆迪,这种做法与您当时实际采取的其他做法相比如何?
伯克希尔是否本可以通过一个更简单、更集中的投资组合——只持有那些拥有持久竞争优势、定价能力、强劲内生增长等特质的您最青睐的公司——来实现其历史回报,而不是像今天这样持有更庞大、更复杂的企业集合?谢谢。
巴菲特:嗯,这要看在2008年和2009年那段时期,我们本可以更重仓押注哪个最青睐的名字。
首先,回过头看,我在2009年恐慌期把相当一部分现金储备花得太早了。那次的底部是在2009年3月初触及的,而那个底部比2008年9月、10月我们花掉大约160亿美元时的水平还要低不少。
当时我们已经承诺为收购玛氏(Mars)提供66亿美元的融资,那个承诺是好几个月前就做出的,所以在时机上我们其实没什么选择余地。
但我们在那段时期所做的投入表现还不错,只是显然不如把所有弹药都留着、然后在底部一次性全部投出去那样好,差得还不是一星半点。
但我们从来没真正搞清楚该怎么做到那一点,以后也不会搞清楚。
所以,时机的把握本可以大幅改进。另一方面,晚到2009年10月深秋,经济仍然一片低迷,真的是非常低迷的时候,我们却能够收购伯灵顿北方圣塔菲铁路(BNSF),这将成为我们未来的重要组成部分。
所以总体而言,我们在那段时期的表现还算不错。但回过头看,赚钱最多的做法其实就是买一篮子股票。
当我们以15的价格买入哈雷戴维森(Harley Davidson)债券的时候,回过头看我们本应该买它的股票。但这种事总会发生。
总体而言,我们很喜欢这个想法——以我们目前的规模和体量,加上我们为股东设定的目标,我们真正想做的是,以合理的价格买入由优秀管理层经营的大公司,然后随着时间推移把它们做大。
我是说,我们在开始2014年的时候,手上有一批非常优秀的企业,其中一些规模非常大。这些企业会随着时间推移赚得更多,而我们正在努力做的,就是不断往上加,同时确保在这个过程中不增发任何股份。所以这并不是一个复杂的过程。
而且回过头看,我们总是能做得比我们已经做过的更好。这就是事情的本质。但我不——我觉得这个游戏依然是非常可行的,而且还会持续一段时间。它不会永远持续下去,也不可能永远持续下去。但它仍然还有些油水可挖。查理?
芒格:嗯,发生的变化当然是,我们控股的私营企业在整体中所占的比例越来越大。在早年的很多年里,我们持有的普通股价值比公司总价值还要多。所以我们那时候——它更像是一个庞大的普通股组合,外加一堆作为附加品的企业。
而现在,当然,这些私营企业的价值远远超过了那些股票。而且我猜这种趋势会继续下去,你说是吧,沃伦?
巴菲特:当然,会继续下去的。区别在于,当我们在股票上判断正确时,它会体现在市值和净资产上。
而当我们在企业判断上正确时,它会体现在未来的盈利能力上,这个你是能看到的,但它不会像股票价值的变化那样一下子跳出来给你看。所以这是价值积累的两种不同方式,一种比另一种更容易看出来。
但另一种更持久,也不需要像蝴蝶一样从一朵花飞到另一朵花。这两种方式都很好,但我们已经进入了第二阶段。这样说公平吗,查理?
芒格:是的,嗯,如果你只是在某次恐慌当中投入适度数量的资金,抓住了最低点,那价格确实很有吸引力。但在那个价位上,是买不到多少股票的,成不了什么规模。
所以当我们买这些企业的时候,我们能把巨额资金投进去。而现在,就算我们想在穆迪上加更多仓,我们也根本买不到那么多。
巴菲特:是的,是的。
芒格:是的,所以,我们某种程度上是被自己过去的成功推着,更多地转向了这些由私营企业所代表的大仓位。
但说真的,我认为这其实对我们所有人都有利。
巴菲特:是的。
芒格:我很喜欢我们在艾伯塔省收购输电线路这件事。我不认为艾伯塔省会发生什么可怕的事情。我也不认为输电线路——
巴菲特:就算发生了,我们也不会知道。
芒格:是的,没错,没错。(笑)
而且——不,我认为我们已经很好地适应了我们所处环境的变化。
这也是生活的一部分。我是说,既然变化不可避免,你适应变化的能力就变得极其重要。我要说,你们很多人这些年来看到伯克希尔发生的那些变化,都是非常符合我们利益的,而未来可能还会有同样值得欢迎的变化。
巴菲特:比如说,我们在过去这几年里买入了相当多的富国银行。因为经济复苏了,实际上,如果你是在底部买入的,赚钱最多的做法是买那些质量较差的银行,因为它们的弱点让它们的股价跌得更深,而它们需要经济复苏才能反弹回来。
但它们有点像一个边际铜矿生产商之类的东西,如果铜价上涨,你赚的钱更多的不是因为你买了最好的铜业公司,而通常是因为你买了最差的那家,因为它——它们的边际成本最高,但这也让它在利润上获得了最大的弹性。
在某种程度上确实如此,比如说银行股。但我们百分之百放心地买入了富国银行,而对其他一些银行我们可能只有50%的把握,所以我们就在自己觉得放心的地方下手了。
回过头来看,你可以说我们本应该把它们都买下来。事实上,应该买那些在2008年或2009年之前记录最差的银行,因为它们跌得最惨,所以反弹的空间也最大。安德鲁?
5. 科技与GEICO的未来
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:——这个问题也和未来有关,和GEICO有关。
提问者问道:“您能不能,或许还可以请托尼·耐斯利一起,解释一下您怎么看待基于使用情况的定价,即通过电子方式追踪司机的驾驶行为并据此收取保费,这在未来十年将如何影响美国汽车保险行业,以及这些变化将如何影响GEICO的护城河?
我也相信您已经研究过自动驾驶汽车对GEICO可能产生的影响。谷歌说现在还有五年的时间。这对GEICO这台盈利机器的未来意味着什么,如果分析显示未来充满挑战,您会考虑卖掉它吗?”
沃伦·巴菲特:好。最后一个问题的答案是:不会。
基于使用情况的定价,是一些在这方面下了很大功夫的公司很推崇的做法。可能最有代表性的就是前进保险公司(Progressive),他们搞了个叫“快照”(Snapshot)的东西。
毫无疑问,了解客户,或者说保单持有人,是怎么开车的、怎么用车的,对于评估应该收取多少保费是很有价值的信息。
保险的本质就是比较损失发生的可能性——或者说评估损失发生的可能性,从而确定合适的保费。
这一点在人寿保险里非常好理解。我是说,如果一个人90岁了,他比一个20岁的人更有可能去世,尽管查理的情况——(笑)
即使是83岁,也比20岁的人更有可能去世。
所以——这是显而易见的。女性寿命更长,这一点没那么显而易见,但已经被证实了。
所以保险里有各种各样的变量,你要评估这些变量,然后给保单持有人定出合适的价格。比如说,如果你住在一个州,这个州的人口是1个人而不是1亿人,那出事故的概率就会小得多,因为车流密度不一样,等等等等。变量非常多。
通过各种方法研究使用情况——前进保险公司大概是这方面最有名的——他们试图观察一些变量,希望能更好地了解某个特定司机发生事故的可能性,或者说倾向性。
我们会看很多变量,他们也会看很多变量。我们认为我们的体系相当不错,到目前为止我认为这一点已经得到了证明。但我们会继续研究许多变量。
我对GEICO、GEICO的管理层,以及它评估风险的能力,感觉非常非常非常好。我认为还有很多其他人也很擅长这个,但在我看来,在汽车保险这件事上,没有人比GEICO的人做得更好。
所以——但我们应该不断地问自己:“我们能做得更好吗?”我们也确实这样问自己。
现在说到自动驾驶汽车,这对汽车保险行业来说确实是一个真正的威胁。我是说,如果这项技术取得成功,大幅减少事故,那对社会来说是件大好事,但对汽车保险公司来说就很糟糕了。
所以,这种情况有可能发生。我不知道该怎么评估这需要多长时间,或者会有多大比例的汽车受到影响。但这确实有可能发生,不过这不会让我们有哪怕一秒钟考虑卖掉GEICO。查理?
查理·芒格:是的,有些事情发生的速度比你想象的要慢得多。我记得至少30年前去哈佛参加过一个讲座,说彩色电影将来会随时随地送到家里,说得好像马上就要实现了。
结果,这事儿是实现了,但是30年之后才实现。我有种感觉,自动驾驶汽车真正对市场产生巨大影响,可能还要等相当长的时间。所以我不——
沃伦·巴菲特:我的猜测也是这样,不过我们也可能猜错,你懂的。
查理·芒格:是的,也可能是错的。
沃伦·巴菲特:不过——(笑)
查理·芒格:不过——
沃伦·巴菲特:不过如果我们错了,那我们也是一起错的。(笑)
很难想象它怎么可能在10年内产生重大影响,但也可能根本行不通,谁知道呢?
但在我看来,五年之后、十年之后,GEICO的业务量都会比现在大得多,大得多。
至于30年之后会怎样,你还年轻,能够看到答案,而我到时候会安安静静地离开,什么都不会知道了。
好了。(笑)
6. 会有更多的海外收购吗?
沃伦·巴菲特:格雷格。
格雷格·沃伦:谢谢,沃伦。
这些年来,您对自己的收购标准一直讲得很明确,几年前,大概是在收购ISCAR那段时间,您在一次股东大会上提到,公司正在着力让非美国企业更多地了解伯克希尔作为一个理想收购方的种种优点。
然而,尽管像欧洲这样的地方有更高比例的大型家族企业,而且目前全球上市公司市值中有超过一半来自美国以外,伯克希尔在美国以外投入的资本却非常少,能想到的也就是ISCAR,以及最近的AltaLink。
美国真的是那么更具吸引力的资本目的地吗?还是说有别的原因,导致公司没有在这个区域以外投入大量资本?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,不是的,我们从来没有因为觉得更愿意在美国国内做点什么,而放弃过在美国以外进行重大收购的机会。我们只是——你提到了艾伯塔那笔交易(AltaLink)。
但是在进入全世界企业主的视野这件事上,我们的运气不如在美国国内那么好。
我们收购一家企业最好的机会,遥遥领先地,就是从创始人的家族,或者创始人本人手里买下来。所以,这是我们的强项,在美国,我认为几乎任何符合这个条件、有一定规模的企业都会想到我们。而且相当一部分会更愿意选择我们。
我不认为是这样——我认为在美国以外也有一些认可度。当然,我们收到ISCAR的消息时,那是2006年,Eitan Wertheimer说,他给我写了一封信,我之前从没听说过他,也没听说过这家公司。他说他们家族考虑过这件事,我们是他们唯一愿意卖给的公司,如果不能卖给我们,他们就不会卖了。
所以,是有一些认知度的。但我有点失望的是,我们在美国以外没有更好的运气。我们会继续努力,看看结果如何。
顺便说一句,我刚跟Jacob Harpaz谈过,他把ISCAR经营得非常出色。我昨天在参观展览大厅时跟他聊过。
他们在四月创下了新纪录。当然,那不会是他们创下的最后一个纪录。但这可能有一点意义,能说明世界商业的运行状况,因为他们卖的,你知道,是那些小小的切削工具之类的东西,这些东西被用于全世界的基础工业。
人们买这些东西不是因为——你知道,不是因为摆在办公室里好看什么的,而是因为他们要把它们用掉、耗损掉。而四月份创下了纪录。三月份也非常好。所以他们看到了业务上的强劲势头,这确实让人很难相信整个工业世界正在出现疲软。
ISCAR对我们来说一直是一家很棒的公司。那里的人非常出色。这门生意也很不寻常。它跟我们太契合了,我真希望能再多找到几家这样的公司。
但今年,除了我们昨天宣布的那一笔之外,我们没有接到任何说得过去的重大收购接洽。过去五年里我们听到过不少人找上门来,数量还不少。但没有真正说得通的。不过我们会继续努力。
7. 认识你的“能力圈”
巴菲特:好的,1号台。我们又回来了——到这儿了。
观众:您好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生您好。谢谢你们如此慷慨地分享你们的智慧。我叫Chander Chawla,从旧金山来的。
过去,您说过人应该在自己的能力圈内行事。我的问题是,一个人要怎么弄清楚自己的能力圈是什么?(笑)
巴菲特:好问题。(笑)
观众里有些人对这个问题深有同感,我能听到他们的反应。
这——你知道,这是一个能否对自己保持现实认知的问题,这一点在商业之外也同样适用。
我认为查理和我在判断我称之为能力圈边界这件事上做得还算不错,但显然我们也曾越出过这个边界。
我想说,就我自己而言,我在零售领域越出能力圈的次数比其他任何领域都多。我觉得人很容易觉得自己懂零售,然后才发现自己其实不懂,就像我们在巴尔的摩那家百货公司上的经历一样。
你可以说我在买伯克希尔·哈撒韦的时候是在能力圈之外,虽然我买它其实最初是想把它当作一只股票转手卖掉。
我决定要去买下这家公司的控制权时,可能是在我的能力圈之外。那是一个愚蠢的决定——不过后来结果不错。
要现实地评估自己的才能和短板,我认为——我不知道这是不是天生的,但有些人似乎确实比其他人更擅长这一点。我确实知道有不少CEO,我觉得他们完全不清楚自己的能力圈从哪里开始、到哪里结束。
但我们有一些经理人在这方面做得非常出色。我是说,他们真的清楚自己在玩的是能赢的那场比赛,而且他们不会跑到那场比赛之外去。
最极致的例子就是B夫人,家具卖场那位。她告诉我,就伯克希尔·哈撒韦这笔交易而言,她不想要股票。这听起来可能像是个糟糕的决定。其实这是个绝妙的决定。
她对股票一无所知,但她非常清楚现金该怎么用。她懂房地产,她懂零售,而且她非常清楚自己懂什么、不懂什么,这一点让她在商业生涯中走了很长很长很长很长的路。
而这种能力——知道自己在玩哪场能赢的比赛,以及什么时候是在那场比赛之外——是一笔巨大的财富。
我说不出培养这种自我认知能力的最佳方法。你可以找一些了解你的朋友,请他们给你提提意见。查理偶尔也会给我提点意见,说,“你到底懂那玩意儿个什么劲儿?”这当然是其中一种说法。(笑)
不过查理,你能——你能帮他解答一下吗?
芒格:嗯,我不认为搞清楚自己的能力所在有你想象的那么难。如果你身高五尺二寸,你在NBA是不会有什么前途的。如果你已经95岁了,你大概也不该去好莱坞演浪漫爱情片的男主角。(笑)
如果你体重350磅,你大概也不该去跳波修瓦芭蕾舞团的领舞。如果你连数牌都数不明白,你大概也不该去尝试蒙眼下棋赢得国际象棋比赛,诸如此类,等等。
巴菲特:你把我想干的事全都排除掉了。(笑)
芒格:但能力是个相对的概念。我们很多人需要的东西,包括眼前这位说话的人在内——我当年要出人头地,需要的就是去跟一群蠢货竞争,幸运的是,这种供给量很大。(笑)
巴菲特:好的,卡罗尔。(笑)
8. 把伯克希尔的账面价值与股票指数相比较
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题跟之前有人问过的关于你们年度业绩比较标准的问题有点关联。
“巴菲特先生、芒格先生,我一直认为你们经营的是一家理性的公司。但当我看到你们每年把伯克希尔的每股账面价值与标普指数平均值做比较时,我完全看不出这里面有什么理性可言。”
“拿一个股票市场指数去跟一家经营性公司账面价值的增长做比较,这在逻辑上是什么道理?而伯克希尔如今主要就是一家经营性公司,那你们为什么每年都要做这个不理性的比较?”
芒格:让我来回答这个问题。
巴菲特:好的。(笑)
芒格:答案是你完全说对了,我们这么做是因为沃伦想让自己刻意面对一个古怪的高难度挑战。如果你不理解那种喜欢穿粗布苦行衣的人,你永远搞不懂为什么会有人干这种事。
这是一种很荒唐的比较方式,但它让沃伦很难显得业绩出色。他就是喜欢挑难爬的山去爬。但这确实是疯狂的,你说得对。(笑声和掌声)
巴菲特:是啊,是啊。
通常他这样支支吾吾的时候,我都想澄清一下。但这次我想我还是不澄清了。(笑)
9. ISCAR 和 Marmon 交易的估值
巴菲特:好。乔纳森。
乔纳森·布兰特:2013 年伯克希尔为收购 Marmon 和 ISCAR 少数股权所支付的税前利润倍数,比伯克希尔早年收购这两家公司多数股权时所支付的倍数要高出不少。
能否请你解释一下,为什么估值公式变了?为什么这个倍数没有为伯克希尔未来增持股份而固定下来——至少在 Marmon 的案例中,增持一直是双方设想中的事?以及为什么伯克希尔愿意在初次收购后没过几年,就接受明显更低的回报率去做后续收购?
巴菲特:嗯,是这样的,ISCAR 的倍数其实和最初收购时用的倍数是完全一致的。换句话说,我们在 2006 年做那笔交易的时候,用的是盈利的倍数,并对现金和其他一些因素做了调整。
而且——然后我们把那个公式写进了合同里,作为家族一方和伯克希尔双方的售出期权和买入期权。他们有售出权,我们有买入权。我们把这个写进去,用来约束从现在到——你懂的——审判日之间的事情,所以不存在跟原始公式有任何偏差的情况。
我们从来不会——不该说“从来不会”,但我们的风格是,即便我们有权这么做,也不会去对家族一方行使那个买入权。
售出权和买入权的价格是一样的,或者说遵循的是同一套公式。但家族选择把股份卖给我们,而且他们卖给我们时用的正是当初收购那 80% 股份时所用的同一套基础。
Marmon 的交易完全是另一回事。Marmon 那笔交易是分期付款式的收购,实际上,为了促成交易,我们最初买下的股份变成了 64%,我们本来打算是 60%,但给了他们多卖一些的选择权。
那就是一笔分期付款式的出售,我们当时是把公式在未来适用的后果都考虑进去了的。如果不是合同里已经把适用于第二笔、第三笔股份的公式写进去,家族是不会把那 64% 卖给我们的——就像他们在最初那笔交易里做的那样。
我们把它看作一笔完整的交易,当时就知道,如果生意好转,我们以后要多付钱;如果现金状况改善,我们以后也要多付钱。但这些都已经写进了最初的那笔交易里,所以一笔交易的价格自始至终是同一个价格,而另一笔实际上是一个分三步走的交易的一部分。查理?
芒格:但价格上涨是因为价值上涨了。
巴菲特:是的,不过那是——而且那是因为它已经写进了——
芒格:对,而且我们已经同意——就是——我们会按价值付钱。
巴菲特:我也应该说一下,在这两个案例里,无论是 Marmon 的普利兹克家族,还是 ISCAR 的沃特海默家族,他们的表现都不能更好了——双方的感觉完全是好的,大家对这笔交易都感觉良好,无论是最初那笔交易还是后续那笔。所以,交易能做到让大家都感觉良好,是很值得的,这样人们才会——
芒格:那里发生的一切让我们对这两个家族的智慧产生了极大的敬意。我们越是深入研究这些生意,就越觉得这两个家族聪明、出色。他们各自所做的事情实在令人惊叹,你说是吧,沃伦?
巴菲特:对,对。
芒格:绝对令人惊叹。
巴菲特:这是两笔重要的收购。我是说,它们——你知道的——加起来贡献了大量的内在价值。而且,部分是因为一些会计上的特殊处理,这些业务的账面价值远低于它们现在真正的内在业务价值。
芒格:而且,顺便说一句,Marmon 旗下的 Union Tank Car 是老约翰·D·洛克菲勒的公司,就是第一代那个约翰·D·洛克菲勒。真是令人惊叹,这些优秀的企业能延续这么久。
巴菲特:是的,其实那个公司形式——我很确定 Marmon 最初的那家公司实体,是 Rockwood and Company,我大概在 1955 年左右和他们做过一笔可可豆的套利交易,也是在那儿认识了杰伊·普利兹克。所以,这些事情就是这样兜兜转转、相互关联下去的。
人生中你会学到一件事,尤其是在商业中会体会得更深,那就是你未来会遇到很多人、很多机构、很多经历——而这些你原本以为在你人生中只是“一次性”的东西,其实并非如此。
10. 如何找到你所热爱的事并投身其中
巴菲特:2 号台。
观众:邦……这个——巴菲特先生,芒格先生,我叫尼古拉斯·厄登伯格。我来自美丽的“花园之州”新泽西。我想——(笑)——我想这个问题——
巴菲特:先别鼓掌,鼓掌先忍住。(笑)
观众:那我想这是接着前一个问题的追问。
我非常认同不要投资于自己无法完全理解的行业这个理念。作为一个编程能力有限、也不会造机器人的年轻人,科技显然不是我完全理解的行业。
然而如今,在我这个年纪的人当中,创业这个概念几乎就等同于科技。所以我想问巴菲特先生的是,如果你现在 23 岁,有创业的冲动,你会选择哪个非科技行业去创业,为什么?
巴菲特:我大概会做和我 23 岁时一样的事。(笑)
我会——你知道的——我会进入投资这一行。我会去看很多很多公司,我会去和很多很多人聊天,努力从他们身上尽可能多地了解不同的行业。
我 23 岁时做过一件事,如果我对煤炭行业产生了兴趣,我就会去拜访八到十家煤炭公司的 CEO。有意思的是,我通常不预约,就是直接登门。但他们——他们大概觉得一个从奥马哈来、长得像我这样的家伙不会有什么害处。
所以他们总会见我。然后我会——我会问他们一大堆问题,但最后我总会问两个问题,我会问他们,如果要求他们把自己所有的钱都投进除了自家公司以外的某一家煤炭公司,然后离开十年不能改变主意,他们会选哪家,为什么?
等他们回答完这个问题之后,我会接着问,如果作为这笔交易的一部分,他们还必须用等值的钱去做空另一家煤炭公司——他们会选哪家,为什么?
如果我这样把煤炭行业里的每个人都问一遍,我大概会比这些经理人里的任何一个人,更懂得从经济角度看这些煤炭公司到底怎么样。
所以,我认为了解一门生意的方法有很多种。这样你学不会怎么去创办下一个 Facebook 或者谷歌,但你可以——你可以通过阅读、通过与人接触,学到很多关于公司经济特性方面的东西。
你必须——你必须对此有真正的好奇心。我是说,你——我不认为你能仅仅因为你妈妈让你这么做就做成这件事,或者诸如此类的原因。(笑)
我认为你——这件事真的必须让你打心眼儿里兴奋。我是说,还有什么比到处跑去问人家关于煤炭公司的问题更让人兴奋的呢?(笑声)
你可能还得有点儿“怪”才行。
但那就是我会做的事。而且在这个过程中,我可能会发现某个特别让我感兴趣的行业——就像我自己的情况,保险业就是这样——那样你或许就能装备得很好,甚至有可能自己去开一家保险公司,或者至少能挑一个最合理的公司去上班。
如果你一直在学习,总会有些东西出现,你会发现做起来非常有意思。我是说——但你得对此保持开放。查理?
芒格:嗯,你可以试试拉里·伯德用过的一招。他要找代理人谈他的新合同时,问每个代理人为什么应该选他。如果不选他,那这个代理人会推荐谁。结果每个人推荐的第二人选都是同一个人,于是拉里·伯德就直接雇了那个人,谈成了史上最好的合同。这——
巴菲特:嗯——
芒格:——人们会用很多这类小窍门。
巴菲特:我们对所罗门也是这么干的,其实。那是个星期六早上——
芒格:是的。
巴菲特:——我打电话的时候——你也在那儿,查理,是不是?
芒格:是的——
巴菲特:——我记不太清了。
我叫了进来,我不记得是八个还是十个经理——我星期五下午才刚到那儿,然后星期六早上,而我们星期天晚上就得在东京开门营业,我得找个人来管理那个地方。
所以我叫来了八个人,我说,你知道的,“除了你之外,谁最适合来管这件事,为什么?”
有一个人告诉我,没人能跟他比。(笑)
几个月之内他就离开了公司。(笑)
但是——这——这不失为一个好办法。
光靠问,你就能学到很多东西。我是说,这听起来有点像尤吉·贝拉的名言,但这确实——确实是真的,如果你和足够多懂某件事的人聊,而人们喜欢说话。你知道的,而且——我们现在不就在这儿聊着嘛。(笑)
你只需要对此保持开放。你会找到属于你的位置。也许不是第一天、第一周或第一个月就能找到,但你会找到让你着迷的东西。
我很幸运,因为我七八岁的时候就找到了让我着迷的东西。但是——你知道的,有些人四五岁的时候就发现国际象棋或者音乐让他们着迷。
如果幸运的话,你会早早找到它,有时候则需要更长时间,但你终会找到它。
芒格:如果那是个竞争非常激烈的行业,而它明显需要你所欠缺的那些素质,那大概就应该避开它。
我——我在加州理工的时候上过热力学课,是霍默·乔·斯图尔特教的,他是个天才。我很快就明白了,不管花多少时间和精力,我都不可能变成霍默·乔·斯图尔特那样的人。他的天赋高得让我望尘莫及,完全不是一个量级的。
我放弃了。我当即就说,我不会去争取当加州理工的热力学教授了。之后我在一个又一个领域都这么做了,很快就只剩下一两个领域了。(笑)
巴菲特:是的,我在体育方面也有过类似的经历。(笑)
11. 伯克希尔股东大会期间的酒店房价经济学
巴菲特:好,贝基。
贝基·奎克:这个问题来自达伦·博德米尔(音)。他说,“沃伦,你在媒体上说过,你对伯克希尔股东大会周末期间奥马哈地区酒店哄抬房价的做法感到担忧。”(掌声)
先别急着鼓掌,你还没听完呢。“请进一步阐述一下这个立场,因为它似乎与自由市场资本主义相矛盾。难道这种情况下不应该适用供求规律吗?”
巴菲特:当然应该适用。所以既然我们想增加需求,那正确的做法就是增加供给,对吧?(笑)
这也是为什么我们鼓励,比如说,Airbnb 进入这个市场——他们今年提供了一些房源。
但这其实很符合逻辑。如果你想想大多数城市的情况,那些去会展中心、住酒店的大型活动,在选择举办地点的时候是会衡量自身规模的。如果你的行业规模相对较小,他们可以选一个中等规模的城市开会,不会把当地的客房供给挤爆。
如果你的行业规模很大,要开大会,那你就得去像拉斯维加斯这样客房数量充足的地方,不然供需就会严重失衡。
所以,如果一场活动的规模不是由主办方来决定的、也没法由他们来决定,那这场活动的需求就完全可能超出合理的客房供给。
我是说,你知道的,最典型的例子大概就是大师赛(高尔夫)了。奥古斯塔没法把自己的酒店业规模调整到匹配大师赛的需求,而大师赛也不会挪到别的地方去办。嗯——确实有这样的一些活动,但并不多。
而奥马哈没法把自己的酒店供给规模调整到匹配伯克希尔股东大会。它的规模是按照平时通常承接的那类会议来定的,而伯克希尔的股东大会已经发展到远超我们当初预期的规模了。
所以幸运的是,出现了——真正让我恼火的是那种最低三晚起订的规定。我是说——你知道的,我觉得有件事特别让人恼火,那就是一个人明明只来参加一天的活动,却不得不——被要求最低订三晚。而且价格也在走高。
顺带一提,马路对面的奥马哈希尔顿酒店,他们——他们在这整件事上表现得非常好,其他很多酒店也是。但确实有那么几家把事情做得太过分了,而我们并不想因此打压需求。我们不想把会议搬到达拉斯去,尽管我们明年会在那儿开一家新店,搬过去也挺好玩的。
但我们不会搬去达拉——我是说——我们希望——奥马哈人很喜欢这个活动,这对奥马哈来说是一大经济利好,而且——人们来到这里以后,通常对奥马哈的印象都很好。
所以——在奥马哈开这个会有很多好处,我们也不能指望有人专门为了一年三天的需求去盖新酒店。所以,幸运的是,像 Airbnb 这样具备弹性供给能力的安排,在我看来对这件事很有意义。
我认为明年这种模式会进一步发展,我也认为明年这些酒店的生意会非常好。但我不认为他们能把它逼到彻底稀缺产品的极端地步。我们希望他们生意兴隆,这也是我们一直这样处理的原因。查理?
芒格:没什么要补充的。
12. GEICO 最终会超过州立农业保险(State Farm)吗?
巴菲特:杰伊?
杰伊·盖尔布:这个问题是关于 GEICO 的。GEICO 在大型汽车保险公司中持续获得最多的市场份额,同时保持着有吸引力的利润率。它的广告预算也是汽车保险公司里最大的,同时还保持着低成本运营商的优势。
我的问题是,GEICO 目前在汽车保险市场的份额是10%,它最终会不会超过目前市场份额为19%的State Farm?要知道,State Farm同时也是房屋保险的主要承保商。
巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。没有人能确切知道答案。但我可以告诉你,我们今年超过了Allstate。
State Farm是一家了不起的公司,我是说,它是美国伟大公司历史中的一个——拥有最伟大公司历史之一。它是由一个农民创办的,这个人在他四十出头的时候,可以说毫无保险从业经验。有一本书叫《来自Merna的农夫》,我记得是这个名字,讲的是伊利诺伊州的事,你知道的,他凭借一个更好的商业模式,打造了这个不可思议的企业。我相信那是在1920年前后的事。
然后,当然,GEICO带着一个更好的模式出现了,但那时候State Farm已经很庞大了。Allstate当时也非常、非常大。而我们从1936年到现在,才成为第二名。
现在,我有一些预测,如果我能活到100岁,我们应该会成为第一名。我跟GEICO说,我会做好我这部分的。剩下的就看他们的了。(笑)
在我看来,我们会不断获得份额。只要我们永远不忘记,我们的工作是极其用心地照顾好客户,并且只要我们能够恰当地为风险定价,我们就会一月又一月、一年又一年地获得份额。
只要我们做好这两件事,我们就有一些基本优势能让我们做到这一点。而托尼·奈斯利在实现这个目标方面所做的工作,完全够得上,你知道的,世界名人堂级别。
在托尼接手之前的15年——大约15年,也许14年——市场份额一直徘徊在2%左右。你知道的,也许是2.1%、2.2%。而自从他1993年接手以来,份额已经涨到了10%以上,而且还会继续涨。
但State Farm现在的净资产大概是700亿,或者说600到700亿之间,他们在房屋保险方面有很强的存在感,也有强大的代理人队伍。他们有大量满意的客户。所以这不会来得很快,但我确实认为它会到来。查理?
芒格:嗯,在我看来,GEICO非常像Costco。它成功的原因之一,是他们真的把提供物美价廉的产品当作一种神圣的责任。
很多人嘴上都会这么说,但真正把这一点刻进公司的骨子里和灵魂里的却很少。但GEICO做到了,而这样的公司往往会随着时间推移不断向前推进。
巴菲特:你会发现的一件事,我想这在Costco身上同样成立,在GEICO身上更是如此,那就是人们不会在那里来来去去——我是说,我们几乎没有从保险业其他公司跳槽过来的人,而他们也不会离开我们。
我是说,他们真的有自己的一套理念,关于事情应该怎么做、什么才是正确的做法。而这种理念会变得非常、非常牢固。当然,成功也会进一步强化它。Costco是不是也是这样,查理?
芒格:哦,Costco简直不可思议。它让我想起GEICO,我一点都不惊讶这两家公司都在不断抢占份额。
嘴上说说容易,身体力行却是另一回事。我是说,对很多有企业家精神的人来说,一直不断地把价格压低、把服务质量提高,这是违背人性的。我是说,这就像一直穿着最刺人的苦修衣,可它却真的管用。
13. 巴菲特的节俭有没有损害伯克希尔?
巴菲特:好,3号台。
观众:巴菲特先生,我叫尼尔·帕特尔,来自芝加哥。我非常钦佩您即便坐拥可观的财富,仍然过着节俭的个人生活。
您认为这些年来,您的节俭对伯克希尔股东有什么帮助?还有,查理,您觉得有没有哪些情况,是沃伦的节俭反而损害了伯克希尔和股东的利益?
巴菲特:好,首先,我们来问问我们俩谁更节俭。查理,你觉得——(笑)
芒格:嗯,在个人消费上,沃伦更节俭。(笑)
巴菲特:你愿意举个例子吗?(笑)
芒格:沃伦住的还是他当年花很少的钱买下的那栋房子,那是什么时候,1950年代吧?
巴菲特:我是1958年买的,你大概是1960年左右搬进你那栋的,对吧?
芒格:对,而且我付的钱更多。(笑)
巴菲特:但他自己设计了自己的——
芒格:没错,我本可以——
巴菲特:——他自己设计了自己的房子。
芒格:——他更节俭。
巴菲特:他没有请建筑师,对吧?
芒格:我请了,我付了建筑师1900美元。这几乎是正常价格的30%。
巴菲特:是啊。你看他连细节都记得这么清楚。(笑)
不,我会——我这辈子想要的东西都已经有了。这其实很简单。如果有什么是钱能买到的——当然有些东西钱买不到——但如果有什么是钱能买到、而我又想要的,我今天下午就会去买。我完全不会有任何问题。
我不认为生活水准在超过某个点之后还会和生活开销划等号。我是说,到某个点为止,毫无疑问是这样的——在拥有良好的住房、良好的健康、良好的医疗服务、良好的食物这些方面,都是如此。还有——良好的交通。
但我认为,过了那个点之后,如果说有什么变化的话,那就是开始出现反向关系了。如果我拥有六栋、八栋房子,或者一大堆各种各样的东西,我的生活不会因此更快乐,反而会更糟。这根本不成正比。
所以我——拥有我现在拥有的一切,我是说,你不可能比这更多了。而这真的不会带来什么差别——它在到达某个点之前会有差别。我是说,当你达到X的时候,你可能会开始想很多不一样的事情,但当你达到十倍X,或者一百倍X,或者一千倍X的时候,那就完全没有任何可能的差别了。查理,你能不能——?
芒格:节俭,从根本上说,是帮助了伯克希尔的。我看看在座的这些观众,我看到一群低调、节俭的人。我们把你们这样的人都吸引过来了。(笑)
巴菲特:不过这个周末就把这茬儿忘了吧。(笑声与掌声)
买得越多,省得越多,伙计们,就是这个价。(笑)
14. 伯克希尔纳税从不「心疼」
巴菲特:好。安德鲁。
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个问题来自坐在观众席的阿扎尔·夸德尔,来自 Queens Court Capital,他想让您知道,沃伦,他和您一样也是哥伦比亚商学院毕业的。
巴菲特:很好。
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:问题是这样的,「伯克希尔 2013 年缴纳了 89 亿美元的税。辉瑞目前正考虑一项收购,这项收购能让它把技术控股公司迁到海外,从而节省所得税支出并创造股东价值。如果这样做能为伯克希尔股东创造价值,您和查理会考虑这么做吗?」
巴菲特:我认为答案是不会。你怎么看,查理?(掌声)
芒格:我认为——我认为,像伯克希尔这样兴旺发达,却在依然如此兴旺的情况下把税率降到零,那简直是疯了。那不是一个正当的理想。(掌声)
巴菲特:是的。我们也不可能在美国以外的任何其他国家做成伯克希尔这样的事业。你们看看我们收购的这一切,还有其他种种。
美国以一种非常、非常、非常大的方式,帮助查理和我变得非常、非常、非常富有。(笑)查理?
芒格:我没什么可抱怨的。我环顾这群人,在早餐时看着你们,这是一群非常快乐的人。我不觉得有很多人在那儿咬牙切齿,因为别人比自己多一点。
巴菲特:不过我们也不会多缴——我不想把这事说得道貌岸然。我们不会在应缴的税之外再多缴——我们把两万多页的纳税申报表算完之后,我们不会——我们不会额外再加个 20% 或 15% 的小费什么的。(笑)
我们确实会做一些出于税务考量的交易。我们参与了低收入住房税收抵免项目,老布什总统还为此表扬过我。所以这是两党都认可的。
我们做的风能项目、太阳能项目,都是出于税务考量的——我是说,如果没有税务因素,这些项目在经济上根本说不通。
所以我们遵守规则。但我们从不心疼我们缴的税。我们在缴纳美国税款的同时,已经赚了很多钱。(掌声)
15. 要不要进军墨西哥铁路货运市场?
巴菲特:好,格雷格。
格雷格·沃伦:沃伦,伯灵顿北方在西部的主要竞争对手联合太平洋,大约有 10% 的收入来自往返墨西哥的货运。它还持有墨西哥大型铁路公司 Ferromex 20% 的股份。
考虑到墨西哥未来两年汽车产能预计将增加 30%,汽车生产有望强劲增长,再加上近岸制造进一步向墨西哥转移的可能性,您觉得墨西哥货运市场有多大吸引力?
假设这个问题的答案是肯定的,那么对伯灵顿北方来说,收购堪萨斯城南方铁路——这家美国最小的一级铁路公司,大约一半收入来自其墨西哥特许经营权——是不是比仅仅从它那里接收货物更有利?
巴菲特:是的,联合太平洋在墨西哥方面有很大优势。我是说,它们的线路布局是这样的,我记得它们在六个不同的地点跨越边境。相比我们,它们的线路布局在墨西哥方向要好得多。
正如你所说,堪萨斯城南方铁路在墨西哥确实有非常重要的业务存在。
但是,就我们能用这笔钱做什么、以及我们看到的前景而言——那边确实有不错的前景,但其他地方的货运业务也有不错的前景。
所以这对我们来说没有意义。但是,你知道,也许有一天情况会不一样,但——目前墨西哥这笔账算不过来。不过我们一直在考虑墨西哥,同时我们也在考虑很多其他市场。
BNSF 未来几年在增加货运量方面还有很多可能性。我们不会忘记墨西哥,但我们也不会做傻事。查理?
芒格:我没什么好说的。
你知道,想象一些能让你靠耍花招一夜暴富的组合方案是很容易的。当然,最简单的交易就是收购竞争对手。但大多数这类操作,到了一定规模之后,你根本做不了。那何必花时间去想它呢?恐怕伯灵顿北方从现在起得靠自己往前走了。
巴菲特:不用为此担心。
芒格:我不担心这个。
16. 内在价值与伯克希尔模式
巴菲特:4 号站。
观众:您好,沃伦和查理。我是来自洛杉矶的丹·华。我和我的妻子科拉能来这里非常激动。
巴菲特:我们也很高兴你们能来。
观众:谢谢。您今天早些时候谈到了内在价值,我是格雷厄姆和费雪的忠实粉丝,尤其喜欢《证券分析》。您计算内在价值的方法,和《证券分析》里说的相比,有什么不同吗(如果有的话)?
再举个例子,管理层在其中起什么作用?您最近提到过,评估管理层就像谈恋爱一样,而且您最近也说过,管理层确实很重要。
我的第二个问题是,您最害怕哪家公司?为什么没有其他人做到您所做到的事情?我是说,可口可乐还有百事可乐这个对手呢。谢谢。
巴菲特:是的——其实格雷厄姆并没有就内在价值的精确计算给出太具体的说法。但内在价值后来逐渐等同于——我认为这样理解相当恰当——你可以称之为私人企业价值的东西。
我不确定最早是谁提出这个概念的,不过——其实,最早提出这个概念的人是伊索,真的。任何一门生意的内在价值,如果你能完美地预见未来,就是从现在到审判日之间,这门生意将要分配出去的所有现金的现值。
显然,我们对此的估算并不完美。(笑)
但这就是投资或者做生意的全部意义所在。你把钱投进去,再把钱取出来。
伊索说过,“双鸟在林,不如一鸟在手。”他大概是在公元前600年左右说这话的,但直到现在,商学院教授们也没怎么把这个道理改进多少。
那么问题就是,你怎么知道林子里真的有两只鸟?林子有多远?这里面有各种各样的因素。利率是多少?但我的意思是,伊索想给我们留点东西,让我们在接下来的几千年里去琢磨,所以他没有把话说全。但这基本上就是内在价值的含义。
我们不——格雷厄姆会这么说,费雪也会这么说。费雪会说,在计算的时候,他会想更深入地研究企业的定性因素,来估计林子里到底有多少只鸟。
格雷厄姆则会说,他想亲眼看到那片林子——也就是说,林子里得有价值2美元的现金,你才愿意现在花1美元去买。
一个强调定量因素,一个强调定性因素,但两人在数学逻辑上都不会有分歧。
我一开始深受格雷厄姆的影响,所以我强调定量因素。后来查理出现了,说我完全错了,说他在法律上学到的东西比我在金融研究上学到的还多,说我应该多想想定性因素,他是对的。费雪也说过同样的话。
但这就是内在价值的含义。如果你买下一家麦当劳加盟店,或者买下通用汽车,不管是什么,真正的问题是:第一,你买下之后还需要再投入现金吗?但归根结底就是现金流入、现金流出的问题?什么时候流入流出?用什么折现率?都是些标准的东西。
至于——如果让我拿一颗银弹,去射向哪家公司作为对我们的威胁,我其实——我看不出伯克希尔有什么真正的竞争对手。我看到私募股权在大量收购企业,他们的优势在于,他们会加杠杆,而我们不会;而且他们现在借钱的成本非常低,诸如此类。
所以我是说,总会有人在收购企业这件事上跟我们竞争。但——这确实是我们的主业——是我和查理的主要工作。
但我没看到有谁拥有一套模式,或者正在打造一套模式,能真正去追求我们所追求的东西,那就是从真正关心自己企业未来走向、而且通常还想继续经营下去的人手里,买下优秀的企业。查理?
芒格:嗯,就像我之前说过的,我认为伯克希尔现在这套模式,用演艺圈的话说,会“很有生命力”。它会走很长的路,而且我认为它会相当体面。我认为它有足够的优势,能一直这样走下去。而我认为,大多数大企业做不到这一点。
如果你停下来想一想,过去所有那些了不起的大企业,真正做大之后还能一直保持强大的,少之又少。
在那些真正历史悠久的企业里,只有一家一直保持强大,那就是洛克菲勒的标准石油。所以我们正在走进一个很少有人能一直做得好的领域。
但我认为我们会更像标准石油,而不是像普通企业那样,因为我认为我们会一直这样走下去。我们会继续做我们正在做的事情,并且会不断从错误中吸取教训。
而坐在这上面的人已经不再那么重要了。势头已经形成,气质已经确立。它会一直走下去。对于台下的年轻人,我总是说:“不要太急着卖掉这只股票。”
巴菲特:为什么我们没有更多的模仿者呢?
芒格:这让我想起我们共同的朋友,埃德·戴维斯。他想出了一种做法,可以完成一种极其困难的手术:在一个漆黑的洞底部,用他自己发明的器械做手术。他自己给自己打87针局部麻醉,一边打一边做手术。而且手术效果更好。他的死亡率是2%,而其他人是20%。
其他外科医生都跑来想学他,也在旁边看他做。可他们看完之后就说:“嗯,我看我还是不学这个了。”(笑)
我觉得这看起来就是太难了。美国的商学院里,没有任何东西是教人怎么变得像伯克希尔的。
巴菲特:埃迪·戴维斯,其实就是把我们俩介绍认识的那个人。他是奥马哈很有名的一位泌尿科医生,而且——
芒格:但人们并没有真的去学他的手术方法。而且这看起来一点也不容易,非常与众不同。
巴菲特:而且很慢。
芒格:是很慢,是——对,非常慢。
巴菲特:我觉得,这种“慢”比其他任何因素都更能让人望而却步。
芒格:而“慢”的难处在于,你可能还没等它做完就已经死了。(笑声)
巴菲特:嗯,这话说得可真够振奋人心的。(笑声)
卡罗尔,我们换个稍微——(笑)
卡罗尔·卢米斯:好吧,说个更让人开心点的话题吧,我这个问题是关于通货膨胀的。这个问题——(笑声)
巴菲特:也只有跟查理比起来,通货膨胀才算得上让人开心。(笑声)
17. 通货膨胀的正面与负面影响
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自GoodHaven基金的拉里·皮特科夫斯基和基思·特劳纳。
“在您1981年致股东的信中,您讨论了净资产收益率、利率和通货膨胀,以及许多公司在通胀环境下经营是多么困难。而且您也提到,伯克希尔自身也并非豁免,也可能受到负面影响。
“如今,似乎全世界的央行行长都在拼命想制造通货膨胀,而这种东西通常对债务人非常有利,对债权人就没那么有利了,对企业主和管理者来说也很棘手。
在利率和通胀双双下降了30年之后,投资者和企业主是否应该更多地考虑通货膨胀和更高利率的问题?如果未来明显转向通胀,伯克希尔的行为方式会有什么不同?”
巴菲特:嗯,通货膨胀会伤害我们,但它会伤害大多数企业。它不——当然,某些高杠杆的资产,显然会从通胀中受益。但,嗯,这只是——
我们不妨设定一个通胀情形。就假设今晚,无人机飞过整个美国上空,给每一户人家都空投了一百万美元。
那么问题来了,这个国家会因此变得更好吗?每个人——或者说每个家庭——现在都拥有了前一天还没有的一百万美元。
有一件事我可以向你保证,那就是到那时伯克希尔的处境显然会变得更糟。而且很明显,我刚才描述的情形会带来极其猛烈的通货膨胀。
在那种情况下,诀窍就在于,要在别人发现自己也有一百万美元之前,先发现你自己有一百万美元,如果你是第一个知道的人,你就会做得非常好。
但从本质上说,你并不能靠通货膨胀来创造财富,你可以靠它把财富挪来挪去,但你无法靠通胀来创造财富,而且——像伯克希尔这样的公司,你知道,我们的每股收益会上涨。以美元计量的我们企业的内在价值也会上涨。但在高通胀之下,除非我们给这些企业加了杠杆,否则你的投资以实际价值计算,反而会下降。查理?
芒格:我们在魏玛德国经历过一次恶性通胀的测试,那些持有像伯克希尔这样的公司股票的人挺过来了。他们没有过得多么风光,但他们挺过来了。而几乎其他所有人——人寿保险单、银行存款,不管是什么——都被抹得一干二净。
当然,如果你制造了那么多的苦难,最后出来一个希特勒、一场世界大战、一场大屠杀之类的东西,那让事情走到那一步就绝不是件好事。
所以我——我不喜欢这种巨大的自信,觉得只要不停地印钱、不停地花就行了。我认为这种做法迟早是有极限的,我永远不会忘记魏玛德国。我认为我们其他人也都不应该忘记。
我们可以承受一段时期内低于正常水平的增长。但要是因为一帮疯狂的政客不停印钱,就任由整件事彻底爆掉,那是相当危险的。(掌声)
巴菲特:不过,如果你有一套房子,背着一笔很大的房贷,然后出现了不可思议的通胀,把房贷都给抹平了,那你还是拥有那套房子。我是说,这就是——
芒格:在魏玛德国,他们最后把房贷还给你了。这一点很有意思。那是他们唯一做对了的一件事。(笑)
巴菲特:他比我想得远多了,各位。(笑)
18. 公司为什么会做出“愚蠢”的交易
巴菲特:乔纳森?
乔纳森·布兰特:在评估伯克希尔收购非保险类业务——不管是公用事业、铁路,还是制造、服务和零售业务——所获得的税后回报时,如果要选一个基准,你认为整个美国产业界在收购上获得的综合回报大概是多少?当然要剔除会计冲销的影响,并且要对杠杆做出调整。
巴菲特:这个问题对我来说太难了,查理你先说吧。我一边想。(笑)
芒格:好吧,让我总结一下。我认为美国产业界所有收购的总和会是很糟糕的。经营状况好的公司天生就容易被说动去做一些愚蠢的交易,而官僚体系往往会自我膨胀,制造出不必要的成本。
所以我认为收购的历史表明,这并不是一条通往财富的康庄大道。对我们来说确实是行得通的,但我们非常特殊,而且很幸运的是,很多人并不想像我们这样特殊。
巴菲特:是啊,我——这个问题真的很难给出一个有用的答案。但我确实——
芒格:但你并不怎么乐观,对吧?
巴菲特:当我们看到一家我们不控制的公司要做一桩收购时,我更多的反应是想哭,而不是想笑。
但另一方面,我们自己特别喜欢做收购,所以对别人的收购也不好太苛刻,就因为我们不喜欢人家的做法。
我以董事的身份,大概旁听过几百场由我不控制的人主持的收购讨论。其中大多数都是烂主意,但也有一些——
芒格:有一些是平庸的。(笑声)
巴菲特:一个很好的案例是 GEICO。我是说,这真是个很棒的案例研究,因为 GEICO 在上世纪70年代初脱离正轨之前,一直是一门非常出色的业务,而且大家——在金融界都很出名。
后来它在自身业务上脱离了正轨,之后又重新走上正轨。回到正轨之后,它又做了几桩收购。这些收购不算是灾难,但肯定也算不上成功,而且它们往往让人——我认为让管理层的注意力偏离了 GEICO 自身的潜力。
所以那些收购在账面上的成本——尤其是有两笔收购——那两笔收购的账面成本不算——是不理想,但也不算是灾难性的。
但如果你看它的次生影响,那就大了。我是说,那大概有十几年的时间,本可以取得各种收获,结果都没有取得。而那些年头是要不回来的。
不过,那件事最终对伯克希尔来说大概是净有利的,因为我们先买下了这家公司的一半,后来又得以买下另一半。如果他们当初做得非常出色,我们大概就永远不会去买下另一半了。当然,也许第一半的价值原本会高得多。
但这在某种程度上是人之常情,就是会不停地想要——我是说,通常能当上首席执行官的人都不是那种畏畏缩缩的人。
他们有凯恩斯所说的那种“动物精神”,他们喜欢做事情。而且下面的支持团队也肯定能感受到他们喜欢做事情。我是说,公司里常常设有专门负责战略或收购之类事务的人。
你觉得那些人会干什么?坐在那儿吸手指头吗?不会的,他们会不断地拿出交易方案来。而投资银行家们也会天天打电话给他们。
所以有这么多股力量都在推着你去做交易,如果你顺着这股力量走,就会做出很多愚蠢的交易。
查理和我都非常努力地不让自己急于做成一笔交易。我们只是热切地想做一笔说得通的交易。
如果我们有一帮董事、战略部门之类的人,天天推着我们,问你们过去三个月做了什么之类的话,那这件事就会难得多。
所以你所处的环境真的非常重要。查理,还有什么要补充的吗?
芒格:没有了,不过——你知道他比我圆滑多少。
巴菲特:是啊,这个对比也不算难。(笑声)
19. 起诉个人还是起诉公司?
巴菲特:5号台。
观众:我是来自威斯康星州尼纳的拉塞尔·纳里格(音)。——不是另一个包装工队球迷。
今晚在座各位来到这里,是因为我们把钱投给了你,怀着期望和希望,希望你和查理能让这笔投资增值。
我们知道事情有时会出岔子,我们可能会亏钱。但我们从来、从来没有想过,我们的钱会被骗走。
不幸的是,那——那不是——那是新——抱歉,这个话筒有点问题。不幸的是,尤其是在投资银行这个行业,我的信心,我相信在座很多人的信心,都在下降。
尤其令人不安的是,过去一周左右《纽约时报》的报道,说司法部、证券交易委员会、美联储等部门内部举行了一些私下会议,讨论有没有必要或有没有意愿,也许是有没有要求,对一些从事相关业务的大银行提起刑事指控,原因包括:明知故犯地通过美国银行系统洗白数十亿伊朗资金,明知故犯地通过美国银行系统洗白数十亿毒品集团的资金,在美国境内招揽通过把资产转移到境外来逃税的交易,甚至操纵伦敦银行同业拆借利率(LIBOR)。
司法部现在的难处在于,有人告诉他们,如果他们对那些银行提起刑事指控——我们可以列出那些银行,它们都上过《纽约时报》——那些银行会受到重创,可能被迫倒闭,并且——演变成某种新的金融危机。(掌声)
芒格:那么,我们不能——
观众:我的问题——不过我的问题是,你是否相信,如果对大规模的犯罪行为进行法律追究就会引发金融危机?还是说我们已经到了一个新的阶段,华尔街的犯罪行为正在被制度化,某种程度上被允许发生,因为它们大到不能倒、大到不能坐牢、大到不能被监管、不用遵守法律?
巴菲特:查理,你是律师,你来回答。(掌声)
芒格:嗯,我认为经过我们刚刚经历的这场创伤,华尔街的行为已经有了极大的改善。所以我认为最糟糕的部分已经过去了。
但当一群人生活在轻易赚钱的迷雾之中时,你永远不可能得到完美的行为。这种情况在某种程度上总会发生,而且——
巴菲特:你怎么看对个人的起诉与对公司的起诉相比?
芒格:嗯,我认为几乎没有什么比起诉个人更能改变行为的了。
当他们把匹兹堡还是哪里的童子军领袖抓起来,因为操纵钢铁价格把他们关进联邦监狱的时候,这确实改变了美国商人的行为。所以我确实认为,少数几起刑事起诉就能极大地改变行为。而在我看来,我们会有一些这样的案例。
巴菲特:是的。我可能因为在所罗门的经历而有点偏见——但我更倾向于起诉个人而不是公司。
你知道,我确实亲眼见过,一个恶劣的行为,或者说也许是多个恶劣行为,只是由一两个人所为,再加上另外几个人在报告上的疏忽,这些行为几乎——当然是令人不安的、伤害人的,甚至可能摧毁,你知道,可能成千上万其他人的生活,这还不算金融投资本身的损失。
而且在我看来——这确实——我在别的地方也有过一两次类似的经历——起诉公司实际上可能容易得多。公司会开一张支票,而且你知道,那毕竟是别人的钱。
而检察官知道,如果他起诉公司,基本上就能赢,而对付个人则要艰难得多。公司会屈服,因为按照他们的算计,如果能靠开支票解决,那就没必要去抗争,而个人则是在为了不坐牢而抗争。
所以检察官如果起诉公司,案子相对容易,而且很可能是能上头条的案子。而对付个人则是那种磨人的事情,他很可能会输,而且确实需要下很大功夫。所以——但我仍然非常倾向于——去起诉个人。而且——
芒格:我也是。这就是我说的意思,当反垄断违法行为被视为可以原谅的过错、微不足道的罪过时,我们就有很多这样的案子,现在我们仍然会对一些人提起刑事诉讼。但我们确实通过对个人的起诉,极大地改变了操纵价格方面的行为,而在金融领域,我们目前还没有太多这样的起诉。我们可能需要更多一些。你不同意吗?
巴菲特:是的,绝对,绝对同意。
我要告诉你:我们在伯克希尔有30多万名员工。现在肯定有人在做错事,我是说,你知道,你不可能拥有一个30万人口的城市,却没有人做出不良行为。
而这就是——这是我唯一——我不担心我们赚不到钱,我们会想办法做到的。可能比我们期望的更好或更差。但那永远不会是一场灾难。
真正的灾难是,如果有人做了错事,而这件事确实会对整个组织造成不良影响。
而我知道这在某种程度上是我无法掌控的。我可以告诉经理们,他们也可以告诉为他们工作的人,声誉比任何事情都更重要。这会产生效果,而且我认为这比给他们一本200页的手册更有效果。
但这并不能治愈一切。我们所希望的是,当出现问题时,我们能尽早发现,然后由我们来采取行动。
但我们总会在某个时候遇到某种问题,因为——你知道,30万人不可能每天都表现得完全得体。这是不可能发生的事。
但个人起诉——我在年报里也稍微写过一点——改变行为的方法,是让那些可能做错事的人心存恐惧,让他们害怕这件事迟早会追到自己头上,狠狠地打击他们。
如果唯一的恐惧只是公司要开一张大支票,那你得到的行为改变会远远小于当这件事真正打击到个人本身的时候。贝奇?(掌声)
20. 重大铁路事故对BNSF和伯克希尔的影响
贝奇·奎克:这个问题来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的马克·布莱克利。
他说过去一年发生了多起铁路事故。今年一月,《华尔街日报》发表了一篇文章,指出目前缺乏覆盖最坏情况事故的保险。
“文章提到BNSF的马特·罗斯先生希望由各铁路公司出资设立一个保险基金,以保护整个行业免受事故影响,类似于目前核电公司设立的基金,但这个想法一直没有取得进展。
“最坏情况的事故会对BNSF和伯克希尔·哈撒韦造成怎样的影响?如果整个行业缺乏针对此类事件的保险,公司该如何保护自己?如果发生重大事故,伯克希尔又会面临怎样的风险敞口?”
巴菲特:是的,这件事我们两头都占,因为阿吉特(贾恩)已经向所有主要铁路公司提供了非常高额度的保险承保。但他们大概不喜欢他的价格。我要说的是,四大主要铁路公司确实有财务能力,能够在真正发生可怕事故时支付一笔巨额赔偿。
最——你知道,我不知道哪种是最危险的——他们有所谓的危险品,危险材料,铁路必须运输这些东西。你是公共承运人,你被迫要运输它们。铁路公司其实更希望不用运这些东西,但他们必须运,不得不运。而且他们大概永远也无法从每车皮的运费中,获得足以真正补偿其所承担风险的报酬。
但四大主要铁路公司确实有——对他们来说可能是非常非常重大的财务打击,但我认为,如果真的发生了非常严重的事情,我认为他们确实有财务能力来应对这种规模的赔偿。
如果他们觉得自己没有这个能力,他们可以向阿吉特购买保险,但到目前为止我们还没有卖出过。
这些公司都有保险,但他们不愿意——他们不会谈论自己保险额度之类的具体数字,因为这有时会变成一个诱饵,公开讨论自己的保险限额是不明智的。
但我要说的是——确实如提问者所说,核风险——政府认定这个风险太大了,就像对待恐怖主义一样——认定这个风险大到不能由私营行业来承担。
我不认为任何可以想见的铁路事故所造成的后果——你或许能想出某种极端情形——会超出主要铁路公司的支付能力。但相对于它们的净资产和当前的盈利而言,这个金额可能会非常非常巨大。查理?
芒格:是的,当然,让所有人都大吃一惊的是英国石油公司(BP)的例子。
巴菲特:是的。
芒格:没有人做梦也想到,一家大型石油公司,仅仅因为一口油井发生的事故,损失竟然会高达几百亿美元。当然,这件事引起了极大的关注。
我不知道沃伦怎么想,但那件事发生之后,我对在墨西哥湾钻探的热情就减少了。相比其他任何事情,那都是一笔太大的损失了。
巴菲特:而且是收益,可能的收益。
芒格:而且是收益——可能的收益。那是他们钻到的一大片油田,但那根本不够赔付这次事故的损失。而我——马特会知道的,铁路史上最大的一次事故,成本达到2亿美元了吗?马特在吗?
巴菲特:我不认为——我不认为诺福克南方铁路曾经公布过那次事故的成本。
但我可以告诉你,我们承运氯气、氨或类似物品得到的报酬是不够的。我是说——就是——你知道,跟营收比起来,光是买足以覆盖这类产品的适当保险,我认为永远都不划算。
但我们是被要求承运的——这些东西反正得以某种方式从一个地方运到另一个地方,要么用卡车,要么用别的方式。而我们是公共承运人。
但这不是——从财务角度讲,这不是那种让我夜不能寐的风险。最大的风险是某种非常有效的恐怖主义行动,或者某个流氓国家采取的核、化学、生物或网络攻击行动。
而且,你知道,战争行为在保险单里是被排除在外的。但可能会发生某种恐怖袭击,造成我们从未见过的损失,至于这些损失在保险合同下是否需要赔付是另一回事,但损失规模可能是我们从未见过的。而且,你知道,显然在未来50年里发生这种事情有一个合理的概率,这个概率是多少我不知道。但它不是可以忽略不计的。查理?
芒格:嗯,我们最近在那架马来西亚飞机上就看到了一个飞行员能做出什么事。
我认为我们生活在一个总会发生重大事件的世界里,而且我认为我们某种程度上是幸运的,因为我们拥有一些大型企业,它们能够建立完善的安全项目,并且在损失发生时能够承受得住。我不认为如果换成一堆开着小破车到处飞的小公司,我们会过得更好。
21. 商业财产意外险业务扩张是否为时已晚?
巴菲特:杰?
杰·盖尔布:——问题是关于伯克希尔的主要商业财产意外险业务。
伯克希尔计划大幅扩张伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险部门,并且已经通过怡安经纪的一个业务平台,成为劳合社业务的主要承保商之一。
在定价已经见顶的情况下,为什么伯克希尔要加大在商业财产意外险领域的布局?
巴菲特:我们——先说第一点,这更重要。
我们是去年年中进入商业保险领域的,当时有一些很棒的人才想加入我们。而且我们拥有大量的资本、非常非常好的声誉,我们认为我们有能力比大多数人更明智地承保,能够保持比任何人都高的承保限额,并且能以显著低于平均水平的成本运营。
所以,把这些要素放在一起,再加上阿吉特·贾恩来监督这项业务,我认为这是一个绝佳的机会。
而且我认为你会看到——不管我们什么时候进入都不会有什么区别。我是说,我们进入是因为我们有机会得到一些了不起的人才。这才是我们进入时机的原因。
而且我们还会——我们已经大幅充实了那个团队。彼得·伊斯特伍德负责这项业务,我认为随着时间推移,我们会建立起一个非常非常庞大的商业保险业务。而且我相信,那项业务的承保业绩会好于我们绝大多数的竞争对手。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我认为这对我们来说是非常合乎逻辑的事情。而且,当然了,当一件事合乎逻辑的时候,我们不会因为觉得商业周期可能会变得稍微好一点就按兵不动。这是一个长期的布局。
巴菲特:是的。
芒格:我们不会因为一点短期的小麻烦就打退堂鼓。
巴菲特:不会,这是一个永久性的布局。而且——当我们看到有机会进入一个我们喜欢的行业时,基本上只要有杰出的人才,并且具备一些非常根本性的竞争优势,我们就会参与这场游戏,而且我们会全力以赴地玩这场游戏。
22. 会不会收购一支体育队或体育器材公司?
巴菲特:6号话筒?
观众:我叫埃德·博伊尔(音),来自芝加哥。我的问题是问沃伦和查理的。
你们有没有计划,或者会不会有兴趣,收购一支职业体育队——(笑)——或者一家体育器材制造公司,毕竟我们——如今体育已经是全球性的了?还是说这不属于伯克希尔的游戏范围?
芒格:沃伦已经这么干过了。
巴菲特:我曾经拥有过一支——一支小联盟球队四分之一的股权,但这跟我登上《福布斯》400强榜单没什么关系。(笑)
对于你问的收购一支体育队的问题,答案是不会。事实上,如果——查理和我——如果你读到我们俩中任何一个人在收购一支体育队,那可能就该讨论接班人的问题了。(笑)
我们是——我们确实——体育器材总体上不是一门很好的生意,尽管,你知道,显然耐克在整体运营上做得非常出色。
但是——我们拥有斯伯丁。我们拥有罗素。而且你知道,斯伯丁已经存在很久很久了。A.G.斯伯丁,我忘了他到底是什么时候——我记得他大概是在19世纪80年代之类的时候,就在努力把棒球推广到世界其他地方。
但总的来说,如果你看看那些制造高尔夫球具、橄榄球、头盔——尤其是头盔——棒球手套、棒球的公司,这不是一门特别赚钱的生意。
而它的某些方面,比如头盔,你知道——伯克希尔最不该做的事情之一就是拥有一家头盔公司。头盔公司应该由那种大概欠了一百万美元、名下一分钱都没有的家伙来拥有,因为,你知道,他不会成为被告的目标。而我们会成为最理想的被告目标。
这也是为什么——我们过去参与过平克顿保安公司,但我们对此没什么兴趣——后来有人给了我们机会把整个公司买下来,可我一想到要拥有一家在机场提供保安服务的公司,你知道,一旦出了什么岔子,你知道,大家肯定会说是保安的过错。而旁边就站着这家超级富有的公司,简直是完美的被告目标。
我是说,机场保安公司,同样地,应该由那种净资产连两位数都凑不齐的人来拥有。(笑)
所以,你们不会在体育领域里看到我们太多身影的。
不过查理,你在考虑收购快船队还是——?(笑)
现在我倒担心他是认真的。不是——(笑)
芒格:无论沃伦对拥有体育队怎么想,我更不喜欢。(笑)
23. 保密性、比尔·阿克曼与维权投资者
巴菲特:好。安德鲁。
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:好的,沃伦。你一直主张透明度,不赞成绿票讹诈者的做法。比尔·阿克曼把他在瓦兰特收购艾尔健之前秘密建仓的做法,比作你在上世纪80年代收购可口可乐的做法。
这个说法对吗?从市场政策的角度,你怎么看阿克曼使用的这种隐秘手法?
同样重要的是,你怎么看美国企业界维权主义这一更大的趋势?
巴菲特:我还没听说过关于可口可乐的这个说法。我真不确定这是怎么来的。我是说,我们是在公开市场上买的股票,从来没有用过任何形式的衍生品交易,也没用别的手段。我是说,而且我们当然到现在也没有把它收购下来。所以我——我不太确定——安德鲁,你能再详细说说吗?
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个问题我手头没有更多信息了——
巴菲特:哦,好。
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:——就这些。我记得比尔·阿克曼有一次上电视,说他是秘密建立的这个仓位,或者说秘密买入的股份,我想他也许是在暗示,我不太清楚,也许我该调整一下问题。
过去也有过这样的时候,你买入其他公司的股份时,用了美国证交会的特定规则,让你在不用披露的情况下有一些操作空间。也许这样问,能调整一下这个问题?
巴菲特:这个——
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:或者你也可以直接回答关于维权主义的问题。
巴菲特:好,那再跟我说一遍关于维权主义的问题,因为我们从来没有用过衍生品或者任何能绕开披露规则的手段,我是说,就这么简单。
但第二部分是什么?
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:我想第二部分是,鉴于维权主义如今在新闻里出现得这么频繁,你怎么看美国企业界这个更大的趋势?
巴菲特:这个,我不认为它会消失,而且我觉得它把很多管理层吓得够呛。(笑)
确实有一些案例——确实有公司管理层应该换人的情况。我是说,你不可能有成千上万家公司,却不存在这种情况。
我认为,总体来说,这些维权者,如果他们用某种方式把股价推高了,你知道,那他们对这家公司的兴趣也就到头了,所以我不认为他们是在寻求——他们往往不是在寻求让企业长期变得更好的改变。他们寻求的是能带来股价大幅变动的特定事件,然后——
他们肯定是在吸引越来越多的资金。换句话说,流向维权对冲基金之类的资金——把它们乘以一个相当大的倍数,肯定是这样,这意味着他们能在更大的规模上玩这个游戏。
华尔街上任何看起来成功的东西都会引来资金流入,你知道,这种情况会一直持续,直到它不再成功为止。查理?
芒格:这个,你说得对,维权主义在企业管理层中引发的震动,比这些年来任何事情都大。几乎没人觉得自己能幸免。
当一个维权者进入一家公司时,20%到30%的股份可能会很快易手,原本看似根基牢固的管理层——突然就受到了威胁。当然,这种事情会引发大量的痛苦。
而在另一边,这些维权者,总体上是在赚相当多的钱。当然,在我们生活的这种文化里,大多数人不在乎钱是怎么赚来的,他们只在乎自己能不能拿到。
所以这件事——就那样疯长,像是——我不知道,就像杰克的魔豆藤一样。所以我认为我们正在看到一个相当显著的影响。
这里面有些东西——你会发现有些维权者,是那种你绝不希望嫁进自家的人,专挑你绝不会去买的公司下手。每当发生这种事,我就会想起奥斯卡·王尔德对猎狐的定义。他说,“那是不可言说之人对不可食用之物的追逐。”(笑)
我想我们正在看到一些这样的情况。我不认为——平均下来——这对美国是件好事——
巴菲特:你觉得——
芒格:——平均下来。
巴菲特:你觉得三年之后这个情况会怎样?
芒格:更严重。
巴菲特:哇。
芒格:这个,有什么能阻止它呢?
巴菲特:是啊。如果三年后它变得更严重,那到时候会严重得多。我是说,就是数字的复利效应。
芒格:这事真的很严重。
24. 与其等一头“大象”,不如买更多小公司?
巴菲特:好。格雷格。(笑)
格雷格·沃伦:如果伯克希尔的规模预计会持续制约它的增长,那么对公司来说,把目标放在数量更多、成长更快、并且能在更长时间里保持增长的小公司组合上,是不是比等着猎捕一头很可能已经成熟的“大象”更合理?后者会让公司在更长时间里持有超出正常水平的现金余额,即便这意味着要为增长付出更高的价格。
如果答案是否定的,那么对伯克希尔的股东来说,在合适的交易出现之前,手握大量闲置现金的机会成本是什么?
巴菲特:这个,第一个问题的答案是,二者并不互斥。你知道,如果有一家我们认为长期表现会很好的公司,只需要花20亿或30亿美元,我们会很乐意买下来。
但那适用于200亿或300亿美元的收购。现在,如果你要买一笔几亿美元的,那可能适合我们某家熟悉这门生意的子公司去做。
但是——我们不会放过任何对伯克希尔有真正影响的规模的收购机会。就像我说的,我们的子公司去年做了25笔补强收购,而且他们还会继续做下去。他们会发现适合自己的东西。
但是,你知道,一笔300亿美元的交易相当于十笔30亿美元的交易,也相当于一百笔3亿美元的交易。所以,就我们如何为伯克希尔建立更多盈利能力这个实际问题而言——这正是我们在努力做的——我们的主要精力应该放在更大的交易上。查理?
芒格:嗯,我同意这个看法。买几百几百家小企业的想法——
巴菲特:一钱不值。
芒格:——如果不是作为我们现有业务的补强收购,那简直是大忌。
巴菲特:是的,小交易的竞争非常激烈。我是说,私募股权到处在抢各种小交易。事实上,他们在某种程度上就是不停地把这些公司卖来卖去。
看着他们在做的事情,我们丝毫不会感到羡慕。但这不代表我们找不到偶尔适合的小企业,而且做得不错。
不过这不会是伯克希尔的未来方向。但我想强调,这两者并不互相排斥。
25. 你们被问过的最有见地的问题?
巴菲特:7号台。
观众:我是来自旧金山的Willy Larsen(音)。
你们俩都会和全国最聪明的投资者打交道,这是我没有机会做的事。所以我的问题是,你们最近被问到的最有见地的投资问题是什么,你们当时是怎么回答的?(笑)
巴菲特:查理,你先说吧,我想想。
芒格:嗯,我刚才其实已经回答过了,就是我回答那位年轻先生的时候——他不明白为什么沃伦要把他——或者说伯克希尔的账面价值增长和股市指数表现做比较。
换句话说,有很多有意思的问题没有得到足够的关注,那些地方存在大量的非理性。
巴菲特:你问的这个问题,我经常从来访的大学生那里听到。他们会问,“你过去遇到过的最有见地的问题是什么?”我从来没想出一个好答案,今天也想不出来——
芒格:我不喜欢这个问题,你呢?
巴菲特:不喜欢。(笑)
这就是为什么我们改了——
芒格:我觉得这个问题不太公平。
巴菲特:这就是为什么我让你先说。(笑)
芒格:是啊。
26. 中美能源的资产回报率
巴菲特:好,现在我们已经问了54个问题。所以现在我们开始按顺序轮流回到各个提问台。每位记者各有六个问题,所以我们现在转到8号台。
观众:我是来自新罕布什尔州曼彻斯特的Philip Case。
我的问题涉及中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)这个板块。在我们年报第64页,你们给出了每项业务的分部数据。
对于中美能源这个分部,当我用息税前利润加回折旧费用、再减去资本支出时,得到的结果是经营现金流为负。
当我对过去五年每一年都重复这个计算时,表现最好的一年,该分部产生了3.08亿美元的经营现金流。当我用这个数字除以有形资产时,得到的有形资产回报率是0.86%。
为什么我们要把资本配置到一个即便在最好的年份,有形资产回报率也不到1%的业务上?
巴菲特:你说到有形资产回报率之前,一直讲得挺好。我们喜欢你刚才描述的那种算法,前提是我们能从新增的资本投入中获得回报。我们所处的业务——不管是爱荷华州的风能,还是我们收购PacifiCorp之后的业务——都有大量的资本投资机会。我们收购的这家能源公司,我们期待着投入更多资本,因为只要我们经营所在州的监管机构对我们公平对待,我们就会从中获得合理的回报。
而且回报的衡量方式不是现金减去我们新增的资本投入,而是折旧后的经营利润。在我们的业务中,有些时候可能不需要净投资。但实际上,在公用事业这门生意里,我们更喜欢那些需要净投资的业务,因为我们喜欢以合理的回报把更多资本投出去这个想法。
现在,我们下的赌注是,监管机构未来会公平对待我们。而且我们有充分的理由相信,在我们经营的这些辖区里确实如此。我们相信这一点的原因之一是,我们在以低于大多数公用事业公司的价格供电这件事上,做得比绝大多数同行都要好得多。
比如在爱荷华州,那里有一家股东所有的竞争性公用事业公司,还有一些市政所有的公司,如果你看看我们的电价,会发现明显低于我们的竞争对手。
事实上,我们有一位董事有个农场,他从两个不同的电力来源购电,其中一个就是我们。他从我们这里拿到的电价,比从现有的合作社安排那里拿到的电价要低得多。
所以,我们在和监管机构打交道的过程中赢得了应有的良好声誉。顺便说一句,我们也让运营状况大幅改善,包括安全方面,相比我们收购这些公用事业公司之前的状况有了巨大提升。这就是为什么我们进入新的州时会受到欢迎。
所以,如果我们能把更多的钱投入到这些州的有用项目中,我们有充分的理由相信会得到合理的回报。
但如果你去计算这些业务产生的净现金,在相当长一段时间里,你会看到微薄甚至为负的数字,因为我们在不断增加投资,让这些公用事业公司为所在辖区的人们提供更多价值。我认为我们会得到合理的回报。
我们的铁路业务也有类似的情况。但我们对这两项业务都非常满意。查理?
芒格:是啊,如果你刚才说的这些数字是来自一家正在衰落的百货公司,我们会非常厌恶。但当它来自一家正在成长的公用事业公司时,我们反而喜欢,因为我们非常有信心,再投入的资金会有出色的表现。就这么简单。
巴菲特:是的。
格雷格——
芒格:这是两种不同类型的业务。
巴菲特:格雷格?格雷格在吗?你能不能——你或许可以给他讲一些我一时想不起来的数字,关于比较一下——我们的价格怎么比较,再多讲讲公用事业委员会是怎么看待我们的,他们是怎么公平对待我们的。
格雷格·阿贝尔:好的。如果你看看我们在各个地区的电价,实际上我们通常是成本最低的供应商,或者说处在最低的四分之一区间。
沃伦,你举的爱荷华的例子就非常典型。我们上一次在那里提价是1998年。我们刚刚在过去这一年里提了一次价,所以这是过去16年来的第一次。而且我们预计在可预见的未来不会再有下一次提价。当你和监管机构建立起这种模式时,很明显他们会非常支持我们推出的各种项目。
所以在过去这一年里,我们在爱荷华推出了一个项目,那是一个1000兆瓦的项目,投入19亿美元。回到那位先生的提问,是的,我们会投入——我们会在未来两年内部署这19亿美元,但我们会在这上面赚取11.5%——11.6%的回报率。
总的来说,当我们审视我们的公用事业业务时,我们确实很关注我们的资本投入,我们尽量让它接近我们的折旧额,那部分是我们投回业务里的。我们甚至能在那部分资本上赚到回报,但现实是,我们目前资本的绝大部分是增长型资本。而我们在那上面赚取的回报非常可观。
巴菲特:格雷格,你能不能花一分钟讲讲,我想他们会觉得很有意思,就是爱荷华那边科技公司正在发生的事情,恰恰是因为我们在电力领域所做的。或者不完全是因为,但部分是因为我们在电力领域所做的事。
格雷格·阿贝尔:好的。当你看看那些科技公司和现有的数据中心,如果你就过河看看,我们为Google在Council Bluffs供电。
他们那个场地最初是一个相对较小的数据中心。他们正考虑把它扩建到40到50兆瓦,这只是一个小型电厂的规模。但现实是,他们谈到最终要把它建到1000兆瓦。而我们在这个州看到这种情况一次又一次地重演。
这确实要归因于两件事。第一,我们的电价异常低廉。第二,正如沃伦之前强调、我也提到过的,我们相当大一部分能源来自可再生能源。他们想要那些额度,他们想和一家生产绿色电力的公用事业公司挂上钩。
27. 美国和中国教育市场的未来
巴菲特:好的。请9号台发言。(掌声)
观众:下午好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫高凌云,来自中国上海,专注于教育投资。
今天,我和我的同事,易诺教育公司的同事,有一个问题。您怎么看未来美国和中国的教育市场?谢谢。
巴菲特:查理?
芒格:呃,最后那两个词我没听清。在什么领域?
巴菲特:他想知道我们怎么看美国和中国的教育市场,但他没有——
芒格:但是在什么领域?他说的是某个——是医疗保健吗?
观众:是未来。
芒格:未来,我明白了。
嗯,我们今天这么晚了倒是碰上了个简单问题。(笑)
巴菲特:是啊,是啊。(笑)
芒格:我认为美国——
巴菲特:不管他说什么,我都同意。(笑)
芒格:我认为美国犯了一个大错,就是任由公立学校,尤其是很多大的学区系统,彻底烂掉。(掌声)
而我认为亚洲文化不太可能这样做。所以就亚洲文化能避免我们犯的这些错误而言,我倒是希望我们能多向他们学习。
巴菲特:好的。(掌声)
28. 巴菲特拿芒格的听力开玩笑
巴菲特:我可能不该跟你们说这个。刚才查理在最后那两个词上有点没听清的时候——我有点担心查理,不知道该不该讲这个,不过——(笑)
我当时想他可能是听力下降了,我又不想直接跟他挑明。我是说,我们做了这么多年的搭档,所以我就去看了医生,我说,“大夫,我有个特别好的搭档,但我觉得他的听力可能出问题了。
“我想跟他谈谈这事儿。我是说,跟认识了这么久的人,这话该怎么说呢?我该怎么办?”他说,“这样吧,你站到房间对面,用平常说话的语气跟他讲话,然后告诉我结果怎么样。”
所以下次我和查理在一起的时候,我站在房间对面,说,“查理,我觉得我们应该以35块钱买入通用汽车,你同意吗?”一点反应都没有。
我走到房间中间。我说,“查理,我觉得我们应该以35块钱买入通用汽车,你同意吗?”没反应。
走到他身边,凑到他耳朵边,“查理,我觉得我们应该以35块钱买入通用汽车,你同意吗?”
他说,“这是第三遍了,我同意。”(笑声和掌声)
所以大声点,大声点。(笑)
29. 住房信贷改革有必要吗?
巴菲特:10号台。
观众:是的,我是——格伦·格林(音),来自芝加哥。
首先,我想感谢你们这些年把资本配置得这么好,非常感激。
我的问题跟住房和住房改革有关,更具体地说,华盛顿特区现在显然正在讨论改革政府支持企业(GSE),特别是房利美和房地美的立法。你认为我们需要住房改革吗?合理的做法应该是什么?如果私营部门参与其中,这对伯克希尔来说是否合理,考虑到阿吉特的精算能力和你配置资本的能力?
巴菲特:嗯,我认为——查理在这一点上可能不同意我,我认为30年期固定利率抵押贷款对房主来说是一大福音。
作为投资者来持有它未必是件多好的工具,但我认为它为住房拥有率做出了很大贡献。在某些情况下可能被滥用了,但总体上,它对这个国家的住房拥有率起到了极大的推动作用。让人们比原本能够做到的更早买房,也在相当程度上压低了成本。
所以我希望——政府担保的那部分确实压低了成本。没有任何私营机构能做到这一点。我是说,住房抵押贷款是一个大约11万亿美元的市场,私营行业根本没有——远远没有——足够的保险能力来完成这项工作,而且利率会高得多。
所以我认为应该让政府留在其中。现在的问题是:如何在让政府留在其中的同时,把政治排除在外?我们已经发现了其中的一些问题,不仅是房利美和房地美自己做了不少愚蠢的事情,还有它们被政治人物怂恿去做的一些事情。
我认为可能有一种办法——我大概30年前写过一篇文章,一篇专栏评论,好像发表在《华盛顿邮报》上,当时联邦存款保险公司——嗯,当时是联邦储蓄贷款保险公司,储贷担保机构基本上正在崩溃,我建议联邦存款保险公司找到一种方法,让私营部门参与定价和评估风险,那次说的是银行的情况,但基本原则是政府仍是主要的承保方。
可能——很可能有一种方式,让那个模式,而且现在正在被探讨,那个模式适用于住房抵押贷款保险。
我不认为我们会参与其中,因为我认为其他人在定价上会比我们更乐观。
最终,政府将不得不成为主要的承保方。可能会出现这样一种情况:私营行业为其中5%定价,政府承担另外95%,而且反过来,一旦私人投资者破产,政府甚至还要为私营行业那5%提供担保。
但我确实认为,让住房、住房抵押贷款方面——形成一个正确的国家政策非常重要。我知道这方面工作正在进行。而且我认为,你知道,我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦不太可能在其中扮演任何角色。
查理,你怎么看?
芒格:嗯,当私营行业被允许几乎接管整个领域的时候,我们看到了你能想象到的最大一群骗子和蠢货把整个体系搞得一团糟,威胁到我们所有人。所以我对私营行业在这个领域并不怎么信任。
所以,尽管我很讨厌政治人物经常干的事,但我认为现有体系大概还是相当稳健的。
目前,房利美和房地美相当保守,它们承做了几乎所有的住房贷款。我认为这样挺好,我并不急于回到投资银行大搞制造虚假证券的恶性竞争的那个年代。
巴菲特:是的,我认为——一个问题是,你是不是就让房利美和房地美这样自然地收缩下去,我也不知道——
芒格:而不是继续做它们现在正在做的事。
巴菲特:不过我认为——我认为你可能——我认为,让房利美和房地美误入歧途的原因之一,肯定是它们想同时服务两个主人,还想让盈利保持两位数增长。为了做到这一点,它们开始搞起大规模的投资组合业务。
我认为,如果房地美和房利美一直坚持只做抵押贷款保险,而不是变成全国最大的对冲基金——因为它们有能力以非常低的成本、非常长的期限借钱,因此能在一个巨大的投资组合业务上获得看起来合理的利差——我认为这是导致——的一个重大因素。
芒格:嗯,它们实际上变成了私营公司。但它们现在不是了,沃伦。它们——
巴菲特:是的。
芒格:——而且它们目前表现得相当保守。
巴菲特:不过有人希望让它们重新变回私营公司。
芒格:是的,但我认为那是个错误,因为当它们真正变得很糟糕的时候,正是因为私营公司正在接管整个抵押贷款市场,劣币驱逐良币。房利美和房地美为了维持自己的业务量,也加入了这场滑向草率、欺诈和愚蠢的狂奔。所以——
巴菲特:你会允许它们做任何投资组合业务吗?
芒格:我看不出有这个必要。
巴菲特:是的,我也这么想。我认为那确实给它们带来了不少麻烦。而我认为这么做是为了维持每股收益增长的游戏。
芒格:不,我认为那次私有化实验彻底失败了。(掌声)
巴菲特:好。11号台,还有——
芒格:而且我们从中赚了十亿美元,如果你还记得的话。
巴菲特:嗯,我本来不打算提这个的。(笑)
30.「幸运地」与3G资本和豪尔赫·保罗·雷曼合作
观众:下午好。惠特尼·蒂尔森,来自纽约市的股东。
我刚开始读《远大梦想》(Dream Big),这本最近出版的关于你们新的巴西合作伙伴的书,我读得很享受。他们的业绩记录令人难以置信,作为伯克希尔的长期股东,我很高兴你们能和他们合作,也希望亨氏是你们一起猎获的众多「大象」中的第一头。
巴菲特:我能打断你一秒钟吗,惠特尼?我很感激这份心意,那本书可以在——(笑)
我本该早点提到的。这本书是用葡萄牙语写的,去年在巴西是畅销书。但它最近才刚刚翻译出来,现在在书虫书店(Bookworm)有售。所以——惠特尼,你可以继续问下去,不过我想提一下这本书有货。
芒格:你怎么会以为我们所有股东都不懂葡萄牙语呢?(笑)
观众:我还想提一句,这本书目前只能在亚马逊上通过Kindle买到。据我所知,全世界仅有的英文纸质版就在楼下有售,所以我想这会引发一波抢购热潮。
巴菲特:那我们要涨价了。(笑)
观众:我有两个相关的问题。首先,我知道你认识这两位先生大概有几十年了,我很想听听你对他们的“秘诀”有什么看法?肯定不只是我们常听说的零基预算这么简单。他们做了哪些关键的事情,能带来这么惊人的回报?
第二,我看你们近年做的一些最大、最好的交易,一个重要因素似乎是你长期的私人关系,比如在亨氏交易中和豪尔赫·保罗·雷曼的关系,或者是你的品牌名声。
在金融危机期间你和高盛或通用电气做的一些交易中,沃伦·巴菲特这块金字招牌起了很大作用。我想知道你怎么看,你的继任者是否也能有同样的机会去做这样精彩的交易?
巴菲特:这会变成伯克希尔品牌。我是说,头一年左右大家可能会有疑问,但接替我的人会带来同样的品质,包括开出一张非常大的支票的能力。除此之外还有别的东西,而且这将是一个伯克希尔品牌,也许是从我开始的,但会一直延续下去。
说到我们的巴西朋友,他们非常聪明,非常专注,非常勤奋、有决心。他们永不满足。
正如我之前说的,你和他们做成一笔交易,那就真的做成了。他们不会得寸进尺,也不会过度承诺。他们有很多优秀的品质。如果你读了那本书,我想你会对造就他们这些品质的原因了解更多。
但我们非常幸运能和他们合作,我们也非常幸运能和很多加入我们的经理人合作。
我们自己想成为一个好的合作伙伴,因为这样才能吸引好的合作伙伴。这是伯克希尔应得的名声。我是说,查理和我尽自己的一份力去维护这个名声,但这也需要很多其他人以一种能让别人愿意加入、愿意信任的方式行事。这将是伯克希尔品牌的一部分。查理?
芒格:是的,我总是说,得到一个好配偶的方法就是让自己配得上一个好配偶。而得到一个好的合伙——
巴菲特:你的第二个方法是什么?(笑)
芒格:——还有另一个——好吧,但要得到一个好的合作伙伴,你得让自己配得上一个好的合作伙伴。这是一种老派的成功之道。有意思的是,在这个现代社会里它依然管用。什么都没变,只要你行事得当,效果好得惊人。(掌声)
巴菲特:你对巴西人还有什么别的想法吗?
芒格:关于什么?
巴菲特:关于豪尔赫·保罗和他的同事们的成功,除了我刚才说的那些?
芒格:这个嘛——有一个事实你绕不过去,那就是他们非常擅长削减不必要的成本。
巴菲特:没错。
芒格:而我丝毫不认为这有什么不道德或者不对的地方。
巴菲特:一点也不。
芒格:我认为削减不必要的成本是对文明社会的一种贡献。而且我认为做这件事的时候应该带着一些——那个词怎么说来着?怜悯之心,说真的。
巴菲特:分寸感。
芒格:对,分寸感。但我不认为搞一大堆无用功之类的东西对我们的制度有好处。所以——
巴菲特:要是那样的话,我们不就该喜欢政府了吗?
芒格:是啊,所以总的来说,我认为他们对我们所有人来说都是一个很有意思的榜样。
巴菲特:是的,我们在向他们学习。
芒格:所有人都在学。
巴菲特:好——
芒格:有些人是不情不愿地学。
31. “太多”现金的问题,到时候再决定怎么办
巴菲特:好。1号提问台。
观众:你好,沃伦。你好,查理。我叫沃尔特·张(音译),我从台湾特地来参加这次大会。
七年前,我给我的大儿子取名叫沃伦,跟你的名字一样,我第二个孩子还没出生——
巴菲特:他怎么样——他怎么样——
观众:——非常抱歉——
巴菲特:——他怎么样——他过得好吗?
观众:他很好。
巴菲特:好。
观众:他让我向你问好。他老是叫你“沃伦水牛”,所以,抱歉——(笑)——对此感到抱歉。
巴菲特:我被叫过更难听的外号呢。(笑)
观众:我的问题是问你们两位的。我们祝愿你们俩身体一直健康,等你们俩打破B夫人工作到103岁的纪录时,那将是二十年后的事了。
如果沃伦——或者说,如果伯克希尔打破那个纪录,并且在接下来的十年里翻一番,再翻一番,那你们的市值将达到1.2万亿美元。
你觉得到那个时候伯克希尔会是什么样子,你能提前实现吗?(笑)
巴菲特:我们可能不得不这样。你原来的假设也许站不住脚。
我确实打算明年写写这个问题,但毫无疑问,在某个时点上,我们手头的现金会多到我们无法明智地运用。然后——在业务上——问题就变成了我们该拿这些多余的钱怎么办?这要看到时候的具体情况。
我的意思是,如果能以对留下来的股东有意义的价格回购股票,也就是说回购能提升他们的价值,那么,如果到那时候我还在,我可能会非常积极地回购股票。但谁知道到时候情况会是什么样呢。谁知道那时候税法会是什么样,你知道的。
我知道的是,在未来某个时点,我们手头的现金会多到我们无法明智地投资出去。这是我们所做事情内在决定的,我希望那不会很快到来,我觉得大概率也不会。
但那也不是遥不可及的事。我的意思是,数字正在增长到一个地步,我们将无法把流入的每一分钱都明智地运用出去。
但那时候我们可以运用——也许我们能非常明智地运用,回购股票。谁知道到时候情况会是什么样呢?
我只能告诉你,无论我们做什么,都会是从股东的利益出发。你知道,那正是每一个决策的出发点,那个原则。查理?
芒格:因为太成功了,导致未来回报下降,这不是什么悲剧。那是成功,那是赢。
巴菲特:好吧,他会用你的名字给他下一个孩子命名的。(笑)好了。
32. 优步、爱彼迎与“颠覆性”共享经济
巴菲特:2号台。
观众:下午好。我叫迈克尔·桑塔格(音),来自华盛顿特区。
我的问题是关于共享经济的。你预计像优步和爱彼迎这样的公司会给它们所在的行业带来什么更大的影响,你认为这种商业模式会长久存在下去吗?
巴菲特:嗯,它们显然是在试图颠覆其他一些业务,而那些业务会以竞争的方式反击,它们也可能试图通过立法来反击。
你知道,当任何人受到威胁,或者任何业务受到威胁时,它都会试图反击。
如果你回顾一下1921年——还是1920年,不管是哪一年——州立农业保险公司(State Farm)刚出现的时候,代理人制度在保险业里被视为神圣不可侵犯的东西。它已经存在了很久,那些大公司都在哈特福德或纽约,它们争的是谁能拿下城里排名第一的代理商。
所以如果你来到奥马哈,你是旅行者保险(Travelers)或安泰(Aetna)之类公司的人,你的目标就是拿下代理商。而投保人其实根本没有被真正考虑在内。
然后州立农业保险公司出现了,他们造出了一个更好的捕鼠器,接着GEICO又出现了,造出了一个更好的捕鼠器。
所以,这整个行业——最初——那些保险公司想方设法地反击。但其中一种方式,就是坚持推动各种州法律,规定代理人能做什么、不通过代理人在保险业里能做什么、不能做什么,诸如此类。
这——这很正常。你会看到这种情况,而最终,往往是更好的捕鼠器获胜。但那些拿着次好或第三好捕鼠器的人,会努力阻止这种情况发生。
你提到的那些公司,我并不了解。我是说,我知道它们是做什么的,但我不知道它们具体的前景,这也是为什么我们会远离这类东西,因为我们不——我们知道会有变化,但我们不知道谁会是赢家。我们尽量坚持在我们知道赢家是谁的业务上。
我们知道——有些能源公司——一家铁路公司。我们的很多业务都非常非常非常有可能是赢家,这不代表它们不会经历一些变化,但它们会是赢家。
然后还有一些领域,我们没法挑出赢家,所以我们就坐着旁观。我们觉得它们很有意思,但不会心动。查理?
芒格:嗯,我认为新技术将会对很多人造成相当大的颠覆。我认为零售业尤其面临着一些非常重大的威胁。
你们听格雷格·阿贝尔讲过爱荷华州的一座发电厂,规模巨大,就是为了给谷歌的一个服务器农场供电。当你看到全世界的计算能力达到这样的规模时,它正在改变这个世界。我是说,你在谈论的是——
巴菲特:而且很快。
芒格:是的,很快。所以——我认为这会伤害到很多人,就像过去所有的技术投资伤害了很多人一样。我认为伯克希尔总体上处境相当不错。
巴菲特:你觉得我们最脆弱的地方在哪儿?
芒格:嗯,我不想点名。
巴菲特:好吧。(笑)
现在你把大家都弄得胡思乱想了,查理。(笑)
33. 在学校教孩子们金融素养?
巴菲特:3号区。
观众:下午好。我叫黛安·威伦,来自佛罗里达州好莱坞市。
我在公共教育领域工作了35年多。我担心的是,我认为我们需要做更多的事情,主动地让我们的孩子和青少年具备金融素养,尤其是考虑到我们社会中许多成年人每天都面临着严峻的经济压力。
我的问题是,你认为金融素养教育是否应该成为我们国家学校课程体系的标准组成部分?如果是的话,你认为应该从多早开始,你认为一些最重要的学习目标会是什么?
巴菲特:嗯,当然是越早越好。我是说,习惯在每个人的生活中都是一种非常强大的力量,良好的财务习惯当然也不例外。
你知道,我一直都能看到这种情况。我每天都会收到人们的来信,他们做过某种财务上的荒唐事,但他们并不知道那是荒唐的,你知道,没有人教过他们。他们的父母没有教过他们。
而把自己从金融文盲造成的坑里挖出来,你知道,可能要花掉你的余生去做这件事。所以我非常理解你所说的这些。
我们做了一点点。我不知道你们有没有看到我们展厅里的“少年富豪俱乐部”展台。
你得从很小的年纪就开始跟人谈这个。查理和我很幸运。我是说,我们是在家庭里学到这些的,还在餐桌上就开始学了——那时候我们都还不知道自己在学什么。很多家庭都是这样的,但也有很多家庭做不到这一点。
你刚才还提到了儿童理财素养的问题。而成年人的理财文盲问题更严重。要比你的父母更聪明或有更好的习惯是很难的,除非学校介入进来——大概学校是你最好的机会,但也可以通过电视或互联网做很多事情。
但拥有良好的理财习惯确实非常重要,我认为在学校教育体系中越早开始做任何相关的事情,我都举双手赞成。查理?
芒格:嗯,我不确定学校是不是有问题。我觉得大部分的问题在于父母。我认为最有力的示范(掌声)就是父母的行为,所以如果你——
巴菲特:嗯,我同意——最重要的是父母,但不是每个人都能有对的父母。
芒格:是啊。要纠正那些有着不合格父母的人是非常难的。(笑)
巴菲特:好吧,那就假设你的工作就是纠正那些父母不合格的人。你会怎么做?
芒格:那,如果你的工作是长生不老,你会怎么做?这问题变得太不切实际了。(笑)
谁会相信我有能力去纠正所有父母不合格的人呢?
巴菲特:纠正一小部分呢?(笑)
芒格:我觉得我在这方面也不擅长。我这辈子唯一稍微擅长的事情,就是把顶端拔得更高一点。他们造我的时候,把这方面的天赋落下了。
我并不轻视这件事。我认为这是一项崇高的工作。我只是——我不擅长做这个。
我觉得你在这方面也没那么厉害。(笑)
巴菲特:如果他没在公众场合说这话,这句话的分量会更足。(笑)
不过还是去我们的“少年富豪俱乐部”看看吧,你可能会得到一些启发。
芒格:顺便说一句,这个领域教育的主要问题大概不在小学阶段,而是在大学里。
各大名校的金融课程里教了不少愚蠢至极的东西,连经济学系也有很多问题。所以,如果你真想着手改变这个世界,不要以为一件事听起来越高深,它就一定越靠谱。
巴菲特:嗯——(掌声)
我认为确实有过至少20年的时期,在那段时间里,各大名校教给金融专业学生的知识,其净效用是负的。我想现在可能情况在好转,但——
芒格:你想想看,净效用居然是负的。那真是(听不清)愚蠢。
巴菲特:是啊。
芒格:我倒希望你能用点正常的英语。(笑)
巴菲特:我更担心的是你接下来要用什么样的英语。(笑)
我可不想再撺掇他了。
说实话,这件事让我觉得很有意思,因为这正是我懂的东西。
眼看着——我是说那些非常优秀的大学,本质上却在教给学生一些非常、非常蠢的东西。而且,要想在这些学校的相关院系里谋得一个职位,你还必须信奉这套完全说不通的正统理论。
这种情况一度愈演愈烈,不过现在已经有了相当大的改变。但这段经历可能让我对高等教育的看法变得不公道地负面了——因为,你懂的,可能只是在我熟悉的那个领域情况特别糟糕,但它确实很糟糕。
我说得——我的用语还过关吗,查理?
芒格:如果你当年学的是物理而不是金融,你会更喜欢学术界的。(笑)
巴菲特:是啊。还好我没学。(笑)
34.“把伯克希尔拆分成几块并没有好处”
巴菲特:好。4号麦克风区。
观众:巴菲特先生和芒格先生,你们好。首先,昨晚的派对太棒了。我站了半个小时都没能拿到一杯饮料,人真是太多了。哦对了,我是来自安大略省渥太华的张晓竹(音)。
我的问题跟股息和估值这个老问题有关。我觉得你们是被自己公司的巨大成功给“惩罚”了。公司规模太大了,所以没人知道该怎么给它做出恰当的估值,而且因为你们选的那个衡量标准,也不太公平。
每年我都看到一些老股东,他们都在等着拿股息,想用这些钱来补贴退休生活。
我觉得让他们卖出股票并不算公平。我记得去年致股东信里你们做过一个案例研究,比较了发放股息和让股东直接卖股票这两种方式。
因为股价被压得这么低,我觉得这样对他们不太公平。所以我想问,有没有一种切实可行的办法,把公司拆分成四个逻辑板块——就像你们每年股东大会上汇报的那样——从而释放出一部分价值,同时仍然能让你们自由地配置资本?
巴菲特:我们不会——我们不会因此释放出价值。如果把公司拆成四家公司,我们反而会损失掉相当可观的价值。
无论是在资本配置上,还是偶尔在税务处理上,(保持整体)都有很大的优势。伯克希尔按目前的架构存在,其价值要高于我能想到的任何其他形式,除非我们采取某种手段把整个公司“去税化”,但我们不会那么做,而且那大概本来也不可能做到,不过即便真能做到,我们也不会去做。
但是——我们确实进行了这次表决,现在是休会的时候了,我们过几分钟就回来开股东大会。但我们确实进行了表决,很不幸,我们——没有办法只给部分股东发股息而不给其他股东,然而——却有一种办法,能让股东在标的资产层面维持一份相等甚至更高的美元投资,同时每年还能像合伙企业那样,将投资的一部分变现,而且在这个过程中所承担的税负相当少。我去年写过这个,你们也读过了。
但是把伯克希尔拆成几块是没有任何好处的。那将是一个可怕的错误。查理?
芒格:嗯,总的来说,我认为当股票从100涨到200,而你那一年没拿到股息的时候,你并没有被剥夺什么。
巴菲特:是的。不过它不会每年都涨的。我是说,它会——
芒格:或者两年,不管是多长时间。
巴菲特:是的。我们以45比1的投票结果——这实际上让我很意外。有人表示他们更倾向于维持现行政策而不是改变它,所以改变这项政策将是一个大错误。
那么问答环节到此结束。我们大约十分钟后回来,届时将召开股东大会。谢谢大家。(掌声)
35. 伯克希尔正式股东大会
巴菲特:好。如果大家都就座了,我们就开始开会。
好。我这里有一份讲稿,我会照着念,确保一切都合乎规范。
现在会议正式开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特,本公司董事会主席,欢迎大家参加2014年度股东大会。
今天上午,我介绍了到场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事们。今天与我们同在的还有德勤会计师事务所(Deloitte & Touche)的合伙人,他们是我们的审计师。就他们事务所对伯克希尔账目的审计工作,如果各位有任何合适的问题,他们都可以解答。
Sharon Heck是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书。她将对本次会议的议程做书面记录。
Becki Amick被任命为本次会议的计票监察员。她将对董事选举以及本次会议上须表决的动议的投票结果进行认证。
本次会议指定的代理持有人是Walter Scott和Marc Hamburg。
巴菲特:秘书是否已准备好关于伯克希尔已发行、有表决权、以及在本次会议上有代表出席的股份数量的报告?
SHARON HECK:是的,我准备好了。正如随本次会议通知一并寄送给全体在册股东(截至2014年3月5日)的委托书声明中所述,伯克希尔·哈撒韦A类普通股已发行857,848股,每股在本次会议所审议的动议中拥有一票表决权;B类普通股已发行1,179,267,338股,每股在本次会议所审议的动议中拥有万分之一票的表决权。其中,通过截至5月1日周四晚间收到的委托书,共有601,494股A类股和682,365,717股B类股在本次会议上获得代表。
巴菲特:谢谢。这一数字已构成法定人数,因此我们将直接进行本次会议。
36. 上次会议纪要的批准
巴菲特:第一项议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议纪要。我请Walter Scott先生向大会提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT:我提议,免于宣读上次股东大会的会议纪要,并批准该纪要。
巴菲特:有人附议吗?
VOICE:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:该动议已被提出并获得附议。有任何意见或问题吗?
我们将以口头表决的方式对本动议进行表决。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。反对的?动议通过。
37. 伯克希尔董事的选举
巴菲特:下一项议程是选举董事。如果在场股东未曾寄回委托书,或希望撤回此前寄送的委托书,可以就董事选举及本次会议将审议的其他事项亲自投票。请到过道上向会务人员表明身份,以便领取选票。
我请Walter Scott先生就董事选举向大会提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT:我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、Howard Buffett、Stephen Burke、Susan Decker、William Gates、David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough、Thomas Murphy、Ronald Olson、Walter Scott以及Meryl Witmer为董事。
巴菲特:有附议吗?
VOICE:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:该动议已被提出并获得附议,内容为选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、Howard Buffett、Stephen Burke、Susan Decker、William Gates、David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough、Thomas Murphy、Ronald Olson、Walter Scott以及Meryl Witmer为董事。
还有其他提名吗?有需要讨论的吗?各项提名现已可以付诸表决。
如果有股东要亲自对董事选举投票,现在应在选票上做标记,并将选票交给过道上的会务人员。
Amick女士,准备好后请报告。
BECKI AMICK:我已经准备好了。截至上周四晚间收到的委托书中,代理持有人所投的选票中,每位被提名人所获得的赞成票均不少于660,619票。
这一数字远远超过了全部已发行A类股和B类股总票数的多数。特拉华州法律所要求的确切票数认证,将交给秘书随本次会议纪要一并存档。
巴菲特:谢谢你,Amick女士。
沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、Howard Buffett、Stephen Burke、Susan Decker、William Gates、David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough、Thomas Murphy、Ronald Olson、Walter Scott以及Meryl Witmer已当选为董事。
38. 高管薪酬咨询性投票
巴菲特:议程上的下一项是就伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的咨询性投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生就本项动议提交给大会。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议,公司股东以咨询方式批准根据 S-K 条例第 402 项披露的、支付给公司指定高管人员的薪酬,包括薪酬讨论与分析、附带的薪酬表以及公司 2014 年年度股东大会委托书中相关的叙述性讨论。
巴菲特:有没有附议?
声音:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:现已有人提议并附议,公司股东以咨询方式批准支付给公司指定高管人员的薪酬。
有没有讨论?我想这一项可能会有。有人要发言吗?
好的。阿米克女士,准备好的时候,请报告结果。
贝基·阿米克:报告已经准备好了。代理持有人截至上周四晚上收到的委托书投票结果显示,至少有 666,751 票赞成以咨询方式批准支付给公司指定高管人员的薪酬。
这一票数远远超过 A 类和 B 类股票在外流通总票数的多数。特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书,与本次会议的会议记录一并存档。
巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克女士。
以咨询方式批准支付给公司指定高管人员薪酬的动议获得通过。
巴菲特:议程上的下一项是就伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬股东咨询投票频率的咨询性投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生就本项动议提交给大会。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议,公司股东以咨询方式决定他们对公司指定高管人员薪酬进行咨询投票的频率——是每年一次、每两年一次,还是每三年一次,具体如公司 2014 年年度股东大会委托书中所述。
巴菲特:有没有附议?
声音:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:现已有人提议并附议,公司股东决定对指定高管人员薪酬进行咨询投票的频率,选项为每一年、两年或三年一次。有没有讨论?我想这一项有人——有人想发言吗?有,请讲。
观众:——来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。我建议投票选择一年一次,以便能够改变指定高管的政策。
除了沃伦、查理和马克之外,公司还应该披露阿吉特·贾恩的薪酬。他是不可替代的,沃伦在制定保险费率时和他密切配合。
既然——五个——应该有五名管理层成员,应该再加一位保险业务经理,或者一位来自资本相关产业集团的人,来自BNSF或MidAmerican,也应该被纳入。
你们总部人手这么精简,那几位集团经理的名字应该被披露。应该披露两位,但至少阿吉特应该被加进去。
过去财富500强的CEO们过去都会披露他们现在的薪酬。伯克希尔没有退休年龄,这没问题,但披露应该更深入,而且这件事明年就该做,不该拖到三年后。
巴菲特:还有别人吗——看起来没有了。
我个人其实通常是赞成一年一次的频率的,但考虑到伯克希尔的具体要求、具体的数字以及方方面面,这样做似乎意义不大。不过我总的来说觉得一年一次不是个坏主意。
我不认为在管理层中挑出个别人来单独披露薪酬是个好主意,理由前面已经说过了。
好的。阿米克女士,准备好的时候,请报告结果。
贝基·阿米克:我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人截至上周四晚上收到的委托书投票结果显示,就公司指定高管人员薪酬咨询投票的频率而言,有113,530票支持每年一次,2,412票支持每两年一次,552,309票支持每三年一次。特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书,与本次会议的会议记录一并存档。
巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克女士。
公司股东以咨询方式决定,他们将每三年就公司指定高管人员的薪酬进行一次咨询投票。
39. 关于设定温室气体减排目标的提案
巴菲特:下一项议程是由伯克希尔股东迈耶家族企业有限责任公司提出的动议,代表人是布雷迪·安德森和琳达·恩科西。
该动议在委托书中已列明。该动议要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦为其发电类资产设定温室气体及其他大气排放物减排的量化目标,并向股东发布报告,说明将如何实现这些目标。
董事会建议股东投票反对这项提案。
现在我请布雷迪·安德森和琳达·恩科西陈述这项动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东都有机会表达意见,我请他们把发言限制在五分钟以内。
琳达·恩科西:下午好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生,女士们先生们。我叫琳达·恩科西,来自斯威士兰,这位是来自爱荷华州的布雷迪·安德森。
我们是爱荷华州瓦尔特堡学院经济与金融专业的学生,代表一个管理着120万美元投资组合(其中包含伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票)的学生代表团来到这里。我们非常感谢有机会参与这场盛会。
我们代表西雅图的Investor Voice SPC,受迈耶家族企业委托,提出委托书第12页上的第4项议案,提议伯克希尔为其发电类资产设定温室气体减排目标。
我们为伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司拥有全美最大的可再生能源资产组合而感到赞赏。
话虽如此,事实也是,BH能源近一半的电力来自燃煤发电,这使得BH能源成为温室气体的一个巨大排放源。鉴于这些事实,BH能源如果有一个碳减排计划,将会从中受益。
美国66%的电力公用事业公司都设有温室气体减排目标。伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司并不在其中,尽管它在自己的网站上声明:“我们将设定具有挑战性的目标,并评估我们持续改善环境绩效的能力。”
正如各位股东所知,气候紊乱给全球经济以及伯克希尔本身都带来了深远的财务风险。管理着超过11万亿美元资产的气候风险投资者网络,以及在全球代表着超过80万亿美元资产的碳信息披露项目,都已呼吁企业披露与气候变化相关的风险,并采取措施降低这些风险。
布雷迪·安德森:美国证券交易委员会(SEC)已经表态,气候风险在财务上是重大的,必须予以披露。这是因为高碳路径会制造风险,而低碳路径则能规避风险,无论是现在还是未来都是如此。
如果没有规划和一套前瞻性目标,无论是管理层还是投资者,都无法真正了解自己所处的位置。
此外,伯克希尔的核心业务很容易受到气候紊乱的冲击。为什么?因为气候紊乱造成的最负面的财务影响,很大一部分是由保险公司承担的。
伯克希尔旗下的 GEICO 在“桑迪”超级风暴中遭受了历史上单次最大的损失,因超过 46,000 辆汽车被淹而产生理赔,损失高达 4.9 亿美元。
随着极端天气日益增多的趋势,伯克希尔的再保险业务很可能会承受远比以往更大的风险。
在一段时间内,这些成本中的一部分或许可以通过提高保费转嫁给客户,但让客户为公司不去规划气候科学家一致认为亟需推进的温室气体减排买单,这并不是——这不是一个审慎或可持续的长期策略。
总而言之,代表着数万亿美元投资资产的数百家全球最大机构投资者,都在呼吁企业设定温室气体减排目标。这类目标是降低气候变化所带来的深远商业风险的关键工具。
美国三分之二以上的公用事业公司已经设定了此类目标,机构代理顾问公司也一再建议投票支持此类目标设定与信息披露。
因此,请与我们一起为这项合情合理的提案投票,它不仅有利于地球,还能通过规避风险来维持甚至提升伯克希尔的利润。
感谢大家给予我们这个真正难得的机会来分享我们的关切。
巴菲特:好的,谢谢你。(掌声)
灯光熄灭了,我想这是不是意味着没有其他人要就这项动议发言了,无论是赞成还是反对?
既然没有人发言,我宣布这项动议现在可以付诸表决了。如果有股东是现场投票,请现在在动议上标记你们的选票,并把选票交给过道上的会务人员。
阿米克女士,你准备好的时候,可以报告结果了。
贝基·阿米克:我已经准备好了。截至上周四晚间收到的代理投票中,代理人投票的结果是:49,553 票赞成该动议,561,642 票反对该动议。
由于反对票数超过了全部 A 类和 B 类股票总票数的多数,该动议未获通过。按照特拉华州法律要求的精确计票认证,将交给秘书存档,作为本次会议记录的一部分。
巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克女士。该提案未获通过。
40. 关于派发股息的股东提案
巴菲特:下一项议程是大卫·维特提出的一项动议。该动议已在委托书声明中列明。该动议要求董事会考虑派发股息。董事们已建议股东投票反对该提案。
维特先生在场吗?
由于维特先生本人及其代表均未到场陈述该提案,该动议未获通过。
41. 会议闭幕
巴菲特:好的。在我们闭会之前,还有人有其他事项要提交本次会议讨论吗?如果没有,我请斯科特先生向大会提出一项动议。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议本次会议到此闭幕。
巴菲特:有人附议吗?
一个声音:我附议闭会动议。
巴菲特:闭会动议已被提出并获得附议。我们将以口头表决方式进行。