Annual Meeting股东大会

2009 Annual Meeting2009 年度股东大会

2009 meeting

Morning session

1. Q&A sessions starts

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren. The hyperkinetic fellow here is Charlie. (Laughter)

And we’re going to go in just a minute to a question and answer section, at least a question section, that will be a little different than last year.

We have a panel — I can’t see very well here — over to the right, of journalists who will ask questions and alternate with the people in the audience.

And we’ll go back and forth. Got a little checklist here that we’ll use as we go back and forth. Here we are. And we should have a pen here someplace to check things off.

2. Board of directors introduced

WARREN BUFFETT: But first, even though we’ll have the formal meeting later on, I would like to introduce our directors. And if they would stand as I announce them and then remain standing until the end.

And if you’ll just hold your applause until the end or even later if you wish — (laughter) — we’ll recognize them. We’ll have a meeting later on to elect them. But if you’ll stand up. And like I say, you can’t see very well here with the lights, but —

There’s me and Charlie, we start off. And then Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman , Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott. Those are the directors of Berkshire Hathaway. (Applause)

3. Money under your mattress beats Treasurys

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we only have one slide, which actually is more than we would usually have. (Laughs)

And — but it does tell you something about what happened last year.

And it also acts as a commercial for our Nervous Nellie mattress with the famous night depository feature. (Laughter)

Last year — and have we got that up on the slide?

Last year, we wrote a ticket on December 19th. And we sold 5 million of Treasury bills. I hope you can see that. It’s — we’ve got the December 19th circled up there.

And those Treasury bills came due, or were to come due, on April 29th of this year. So they were going to come due over four months later.

And the remarkable thing is, and this tells you about what an extraordinary year it was, is that we sold those $5 million of Treasury bills, which were going to pay off at $5 million on April 29th of 2009, in December of 2008 we sold them for five million and ninety dollars and seven cents.

In other words, if the person who bought those from us and paid us five million and ninety dollars, instead had bought the Nervous Nellie mattress and had put their money under the mattress, they would’ve been $90 better off at the end of four months, than by buying Treasury bills.

If the U.S. Treasury had just sold 5 trillion of these, they could’ve made an easy $90 million and Tim Geithner could’ve put the money under a Nervous Nellie mattress and we all would’ve been better off.

Negative yields on U.S. Treasury bills are really an extraordinary thing. You’ve got less on — less for your money from the U.S. Treasury than you got from sticking it under a mattress.

I’m not sure you’ll see that again in your lifetime. But it’s been a very extraordinary year.

4. Panel of journalists introduced

WARREN BUFFETT: We have with us, the journalists. We have Carol Loomis of Fortune. We have Becky Quick of CNBC. And we have Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times.

They have received questions from shareholders all over the country. Andrew told me that he received a couple hundred just this morning.

And they have selected what they think are — they’re all Berkshire Hathaway-related questions.

We were having a problem in recent annual meetings where we sort of drifted away from Berkshire, into the realm of what people’s children had done in school recently and that sort of thing. (Laughter)

So we wanted to bring it back a little bit to Berkshire.

So they have selected among the best of the Berkshire-related questions that they’ve received. And we will go from — we will start with Carol Loomis. And we will go then to the audience.

We have 13 sections, 12 in this room, one in an overflow room. And we have selected the people in each of the audience sections by a raffle system, half an hour to an hour ago. And we’ll go back and forth. And with that, we’ll start it off with Carol.

5. Carol Loomis comments

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I come first because Loomis outrakes — outranks — the others alphabetically. But this gives me a chance to just have a few sentences to tell you that — about the questions that we received.

We conferred this morning. Andrew definitely got more than any, either Becky or me. We got almost 5,000 questions, which I think even will surprise Warren. Because I don’t think he knew that it’d run that high.

And the main thing I wanted to say is that an awfully lot of them were very good. And we had a real problem trying to get them down to the number that we’re probably going to be able to ask. We don’t even know what that is for sure.

But we want to apologize to anybody who sent us a Berkshire-related question, because we did have to cut out some because they weren’t that, and whose question we didn’t get asked. And maybe in another year, it will work.

6. Our stock index derivatives aren’t dangerous

CAROL LOOMIS: So, my first question, “Warren and Charlie, Warren particularly.

“You have referred to derivatives, this is famous, as weapons — financial weapons — of mass destruction.

“In the 1964 movie, ‘Dr. Strangelove,’ Major T.J. Kong, nicknamed ‘King’ Kong and played by Slim Pickens, rides a weapon of mass destruction out of the bomb bay of his B-52.

“As a long-term Berkshire shareholder, I’m feeling a little like Slim today. I understand that despite the dramatic decline in the stock market, there is a good probability we could make money on our derivatives, taking into account the return on our premiums.

“But given the amount of accounting equity and statutory capital, and, I would argue, market value —” this is the questioner saying this — “that these derivatives have destroyed, at least temporarily, do you think these large derivative positions are appropriate for a highly-rated insurance company?

“And if so, you do you think you will be adding to these positions?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say this. The questioner to some extent answers his own question.

I don’t know whether he anticipates as strongly as I do that, net, these positions will make money.

But over — you know, our job is to make money over time at Berkshire Hathaway. It does not impinge on capital. We have arranged them so that the collateral posting requirements, which are one of the big dangers in the derivatives field, that we have very, very minimal exposure to that.

Even on March 31st, at a time when the market was down very substantially from when we entered into these transactions, we had posted collateral of a little less than 1 percent of our total marketable securities.

So they have no — they pose no — they pose problems to the world, generally. And that’s why I referred to them on a macro basis, in the 2002 report, as being financial weapons of mass destruction.

But I also said in that report, that we use them in our own business regularly when we think they’re mispriced.

And we think our shareholders are intelligent enough that if we explain the transactions, as we try to do in the annual report, and explain why we think we will make money — there’s no guarantee we’ll make money, but our expectancy is that we will make money — we think that as long as we explain them, that the financial consequences to our shareholders far outweigh any accounting consequences.

We explained in earlier reports that because of mark-to-market, that these things can swing billions of dollars as an accounting liability.

But the only cash that has taken place, for example, in our equity put options, we have received $4.9 billion roughly. And we hold that money. Originally, the terms of these were 15 to 20 years. So we have the use of $4.9 billion for 15 to 20 years.

And then markets have to be lower at that time than they were at the time of inception. So I personally think that the odds are extremely good that on the equity put options, we will make money.

I think on the high-yield index, credit default swaps we’ve written, I think that we will probably lose money before figuring the value of the money we’ve held.

Now, I told you a year ago, I thought we would make money on those. But we have run into far more bankruptcies in the last year than is normal.

We’ve, in effect, had a financial hurricane. We insure against natural hurricanes. And we insure against a financial hurricane. And we have been in a bit of a financial hurricane.

So I would expect those contracts, before investment income, would show a loss, and perhaps, after investment income. The bigger contracts are the equity put contracts. And I think the odds are very high that we make money on those.

Now, it would be nice if we were writing with current prices. But we probably couldn’t write them without getting into collateral posting requirements now. So we have a very favorable position on those.

In fact, in the last week, we modified two equity put contracts, one that had a strike price of 1514. That has been reduced to 994 on the S&P 500. Now, we shortened it up eight years. But it still has about 10 years to run.

So merely for reducing the term from 18 years to about 10 years, we still have the use of the money for 10 years, we reduced the strike price from 1514 to 994.

So I think those are going to be very advantageous contracts. I think our shareholders are intelligent enough to, if they’re explained properly, to realize how advantageous they are. And we’ll continue to hold them. And we’ll continue to explain them.

And they have no impact on our financial flexibility. And we are far more than an insurance company. I mean, we have earnings coming in from many areas. We have lots of cash sitting at the parent company. We have lots of cash in the subsidiaries. We have no significant debt maturities of any kind.

So we’re ideally suited to hold this sort of instrument.

And Charlie, what would you say?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would agree with the questioner that there is some limit to the amount of those things we should do. But I think we stayed well short of the limit.

7. Financial literacy problem could help Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Scott Slaybee (PH). I’m from Denver, Colorado.

First off, I’d like to thank Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger for having us out here today. I appreciate you bringing us out here so thank you very much.

WARREN BUFFETT: And thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And it’s great that you answer our questions.

I’m a former teacher. Or I’m a teacher. I shouldn’t say former. Being a former teacher yourself, I see a problem with financial literacy with our future generations.

And I’m curious what you think future generations should know and if there’s anything that needs to be in school curriculums to teach younger people financial literacy as we move forward?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think there’s a problem with financial literacy with our current generation. (Laughter)

There’s a — Andy Heyward, who has helped us with the cartoon, has a — will have a — he sold his company last year, but he has a new company.

And he will have a program coming out that works on that question. And that I play a very small part in.

ABC has a program coming up with a number of well-known personalities in it that will deal with the question of financial literacy.

And it’s, you know, it is a tough sell in a world of credit cards and, you know, a world that depends on calculators rather than people sitting down and doing actual arithmetic and all of that, to teach people. But in the end, I think we make progress over time. I mean, I hope our annual reports contribute to that sort of thing.

But you’re going to have people doing very foolish things with money.

I remember on my honeymoon. I was 21 and my wife was 19. And we drove west. I’d never been west. And we went through Las Vegas. And it was 1952. And we stopped at the Flamingo. And people were better dressed in the casinos then.

And there were a bunch of Omaha fellows that actually owned part of the Flamingo at that time, terribly nice to us.

But I looked around at that casino and I saw all kinds of well-dressed people who had traveled thousands of miles to do something very dumb. And I thought this is a country where you’re going to get very rich. (Laughter)

If people are going to get on a plane in New York and fly a couple thousand miles to stand there and do things with a mathematical expectation that’s negative on every action they take, that is a world of opportunity. So — (Laughter)

I, you know, I recommend that you and — you work with your students. I started teaching at the University of Omaha, you know, when I was 21. And you work with your students to make them literate. And they will have a terrific advantage.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a world where legalized gambling is now conducted by a great many states in the form of lotteries where people are encouraged to bet against the odds and a world where we have a vast overuse of high-cost credit card debt, it needs a lot more financial litery. I would argue — literacy.

I think we’ve been going in the wrong direction. So I don’t think you can teach people high finance who can’t use a credit card — (laughter) — intelligently.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you’re — I talk to students about that. If you’re willing to pay 18 or 21 percent on a credit card —

And the credit cards companies need it, incidentally, currently, because you have losses running close to 10 percent. So with expenses, they may need that.

But there’s no way that you’re going to financially come out borrowing money at those kind of rates. And I wouldn’t know how to do it. And it’s too bad. On the other hand, it’s probably good for our business.

I mean, one of — you know — we are looking for things that are mispriced. And the more people think that borrowing money on credit cards is intelligent, they probably will not think that doing long-term equity put contracts is intelligent. And we’ll go our way and they’ll go their way.

8. Buffett “commends” DC’s response to credit crisis

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: Warren, first of all, we’ve been asked to pass on a message that the attendance today is 35,000.

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. (Applause) Now —

BECKY QUICK: This —

WARREN BUFFETT: Now if they all just spend appropriately, it’ll be a big day. (Laughter)

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from James Lewis (PH) from Logan, Ohio, who said it was OK to use his name and city.

He says, “One of the substantial investments of Berkshire is Wells Fargo. The chairman of Wells Fargo supposedly indicated that he did not want to take TARP funds from the federal government.

“He, furthermore, recently said that some of the programs of the federal government to reinvigorate the banks were asinine.

“Mr. Munger, do you agree with the chairman of Wells Fargo? And please explain why you do or do not agree. And Mr. Buffett, do you agree with Mr. Munger?” (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: When a government is reacting to the biggest financial crisis in 70 years, which threatens important values in the whole world, and the decisions are being made hurriedly and under pressure and with good faith, I think it’s unreasonable to expect perfect agreement with all of one’s own ideas.

I think the government is entitled to be judged more leniently when it’s doing the best it can under trouble.

Of course, there’s going to be some reactions that are foolish. And I happen to share one of the troubles of some of the Wells Fargo executives, in that I’m pretty blunt.

I happen to think that the accounting principle that says your earnings go up as your credit is destroyed — because if you had any money left, you could buy your own debt back at a discount — I happen to think that’s insane accounting.

And I think the people who voted it into effect ought to be removed from the accounting board. So a man who talks like that has to have some sympathy with the people at Wells Fargo.

WARREN BUFFETT: He usually gets to hang them by their thumbs, but he held back this morning.

The government, in mid-September last year, really did — they were facing a situation that was as close to a total meltdown throughout the financial system as I think you can imagine.

You had a couple hundred billion dollars move out of money market funds in a couple of days. You had the commercial paper market freeze up, which meant that companies all over the country that had nothing to do with the financial world, basically, were going to have trouble meeting payrolls.

We were — we really were looking into the abyss at that time. And a lot of action was taken very promptly. And overall, I commend the actions that were taken.

So as Charlie says, to expect perfection out of people that are working 20-hour days and are getting hit from all sides by new information, bad information, that one weekend with Lehman going, AIG going, Merrill would’ve gone, in my view, unless the BofA had bought it.

I mean it was — when you’re getting punched from all sides and you have to make policy and you have to think about congressional reaction and the American people’s reaction, you know, you’re not going to do everything perfectly.

But I think overall, they did a very, very good job.

I’m sympathetic — that remark was made by Dick Kovacevich, who came in second last year to Charlie in the plain speaking contest around the world. (Laughter)

And it’s true that Dick Kovacevich was called on a Sunday at a little after noon, as I understand it, and told would be in Washington the next day at 1- or 2 o’clock, without being told what it was about.

And there were 11 bankers there and some officials. And they were told that they were going to take TARP money. And they were going to take loans from the government and preferred stock. And that they only had an hour or two to sign it and they didn’t get to consult with boards.

But that’s the nature of an emergency. You know, it — I think you — well, you’re going to have some decisions that later can be looked back at and somebody will say, “I could’ve done it a little bit better.” But, by and large, the authorities, in my view, did a very good job.

And all banks aren’t alike by a long shot. And in our opinion, Wells Fargo is a — among the large banks particularly — it’s a fabulous bank and has some advantages that the other banks don’t have.

But in a time like that, you’re not dealing in nuances.

Incidentally, I would recommend to all of you, that you go to the internet and read Jamie Dimon’s letter to his shareholders. Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase. It’s a fabulous letter. It talks about a point that Charlie made there.

But it — Jamie did a great job of writing about what caused this and what might be done in the future. It’s as good a shareholders letter that I’ve ever seen. So by all means, look it up. It’s long, but it’s worth reading.

9. Higher mathematics can be dangerous for investing

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to area 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Rick Franklin (PH). I’m from St. Louis, Missouri. I’d like to follow up on the microphone 1′s question on financial literacy. And my own question from two years ago on your discount rate.

But before I do that, I hope you’ll indulge me. Torstol’s (PH) wife, Rosemary Coons (PH), if you could come to section 222. I found your husband. (Laughter)

You can come to microphone 2, if that’s easier.

WARREN BUFFETT: You get a little of everything here. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So my question is, free cash flow: sell-side analysts like to do a 10-year discounted cash flow analysis with a terminal value.

Even some of the books written about your style — “The Warren Buffett Way”, “Buffettology” — imply that you go through that exercise.

But I know you’re famous for not using computers or calculators. I’m wondering if those type of exercises fall into the “too hard” file, and you just do a simple free cash flow — normalized free cash flow — over a discount rate?

And if you care to augment the answer with your numerical analysis of Coke, I’d appreciate that. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that investing — all investing is, is laying out cash now to get more cash back at a later date. Now, the question is how much do you get back, how sure are you of getting it, when do you get it? It goes back to Aesop’s fables. You know, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”

Now, that was said by Aesop in 600 B.C. He was a very smart man. He didn’t know it was 600 B.C. But I mean, he couldn’t know everything. (Laughter)

But the — but that’s what’s being taught in the finance — you got a Ph.D. now and you do it more complicated, and you don’t say, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” because you can’t really impress the laity with that sort of thing.

But the real question is, how many birds are in the bush? You know you’re laying out a bird today, the dollar. And then how many birds are in the bush? How sure are you they’re in the bush? How many birds are in other bushes? What’s the discount rate?

In other words, if interest rates are 20 percent, you got to get those two birds faster than if interest rates are 5 percent and so on.

That’s what we do. I mean, we are looking at putting out cash now to get back more cash later on.

You mentioned that I don’t use a computer or a calculator. If you need to use a computer or a calculator to make the calculation, you shouldn’t buy it.

I mean, it should be so obvious that you don’t have to carry it out to tenths of a percent or hundredths of the percent. It should scream at you.

So if you really need a calculator to figure out that it’s — the discount rate is 9.6 percent instead of 9.8 percent — forget about the whole exercise. Just go onto something that shouts at you. And essentially, we look at every business that way.

But you’re right, we do not make — we do not sit down with spreadsheets and do all that sort of thing. We just see something that obviously is better than anything else around, that we understand. And then we act.

And Charlie, do you want to add to that?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d go further. I’d say some of the worst business decisions I’ve ever seen are those that are done with a lot of formal projections and discounts back.

Shell Oil Company did that when they bought the Belridge Oil Company. And they had all these engineers make all these elaborate figures.

And the trouble is you get to believe the figures. And it seems that the higher mathematics, with more false precision, should help you. But it doesn’t.

The effects, averaged out, are negative when you try and formalize it to the degree you’re talking about. They do that in business schools because, well, they got to do something. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s a lot of truth to that. I mean, if you stand up in front of a class and you say, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” you know, you’re not going to get tenure. (Laughter)

It’s very important if you’re in the priesthood to look, at least, like you know a whole more lot more than the people you’re preaching to.

And if you come down and just — if you’re a priest, and you just hand down the 10 Commandments and you say, “This is it,” and we’ll all go home, you know, it just isn’t the way to progress in the world.

So, the false precision that goes into saying that this is a two standard deviation event or this is a three standard deviation event, and therefore we can afford to take this much risk and all that, it’s totally crazy.

I mean, you saw it with Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. You’ve seen it time and time and time again.

And it only happens to people with high IQs. You know, those of you who are — have 120 IQs are all safe. (Laughter)

But if you have a very high IQ, and you’ve learned all this stuff, you know, you feel you have to use it. And the markets are not that way.

The markets of mid-September last year, when people who ran huge institutions were wondering how they were going to get funding the next week, you know, that doesn’t appear on a — you can’t calculate the standard deviation with — that that arises at.

It’s going to arise much more often than people think, in markets that are made by people that get scared and get greedy. And they don’t observe the laws of flipping coins, it’s — in terms of the distribution of results.

And it’s a terrible mistake to think that mathematics will take you a long place in investing. You have to understand certain aspects of mathematics. But you don’t have to understand higher mathematics.

And higher mathematics may actually be dangerous and it will lead you down pathways that are better left untrod.

10. Moody’s wasn’t alone in making mistakes

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew, one of those 200 questions from this morning? Or what are —

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This one’s not from this morning, but it relates to Moody’s. And we’ve probably received about 300 questions, at least, on this topic.

This question, which is representative of many, comes from Aaron Goldsmeizer (PH). And the question is the following:

“Given the role of rating agencies in the current economic crisis — their conflict of interest, their reliance on, quote, ‘flawed history-based models,’ as you described in this year’s letter to shareholders, and the likelihood that a loss of credibility and/or regulatory reforms could force drastic changes in their business models or earning streams — why do you retain such a large holding in Moody’s?

“And more important, why didn’t you use your stake to try to do something to prevent conflicts of interest and reliance on these flawed history-based models?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think the conflict of interest question was the — was the biggest —by anywhere close to the major cause of the shortcomings of the rating agencies in foreseeing what would happen with CDOs and CNBSs and all sorts of instruments like that.

Basically, five years ago, virtually everybody in the country had this model in their mind, formal or otherwise, that house prices could not fall significantly.

They were wrong. Congress was wrong. Bankers were wrong. People that bought the instruments were wrong. Lenders — the borrowers were wrong.

But people thought that if they were going to buy a house next year, they better buy it this year because it was going to be selling for more money the following year.

And people who lent them money said it doesn’t make any difference if they’re lying on their application or they don’t have the income because houses go up, and if we have to foreclose we won’t lose that much money. And besides, they can probably refinance next year and pay.

So there was an almost total belief — and there was always a few people that disagreed — but there was almost a total belief throughout the country that house prices would certainly not fall significantly, and that they would probably keep rising.

And the people at the rating agencies, one way or another, built that into their system.

And I don’t — I really don’t I think it was primarily the payment system that created the problem. I think they just didn’t understand the various possibilities of what could happen in a market— or in a bubble, really — where people leveraged up enormously on the biggest asset that most Americans possess, their house.

And so you had a $20 trillion asset class in a $50 trillion of total assets of American families that got leveraged up very high. And then once it started melting down, it had self-reinforcing aspects on the downside.

So I say that they made a major mistake in terms of analyzing the instruments. But they made a mistake that a great, great, great many people made.

And that probably if they had taken a different view of residential mortgages four or five years ago, they would’ve been answering to Congressional committees that would be saying, “How can you be so un-American as to deny all these people the right to buy houses simply because you won’t rate these securities higher?”

So I — they made a huge mistake. But the American people made a huge mistake. Congress made a huge mistake.

Congress presided over the two largest mortgage companies. And they were their creatures. And they were supervised by them. And, you know, they’re both in conservatorship now.

So I don’t think they were unique in their inability to spot what was coming.

In terms of us influencing their behavior, I don’t think I’ve ever made a call to Moody’s.

But it’s also true that I haven’t made it to, or made — maybe made one or two — to other companies in which we’re involved.

I mean, we don’t tell, you know, the Burlington Northern what safety procedures to put in.

We don’t tell American Express who to cut off on credit cards and, you know, what they’re — who they should lend to and who they shouldn’t.

We are — when we own stock, we are not there to try and change people.

Our luck in changing them is very low, anyway. In fact, Charlie and I have been on boards of directors where we’re the largest shareholders. And we’ve had very little luck in changing behavior.

So, we think that if you buy stock in a company, you know, you better not count on the fact that you’re going to change their course of action.

And in terms of selling the stock, the odds are that the rating agency business is probably still a good business. It is subject to attack. And who knows where that leads? And who knows what Congress does about it?

But it’s a business with very few people in it. It’s a business that affects a large segment of the economy. I mean, the capital markets are huge. I think there will probably be rating agencies in the future. And I think that it’s a business that doesn’t require capital. So it has the fundamentals of a pretty good business.

It won’t be doing the volume in the next — probably for a long time in certain areas of the capital markets. But capital markets are going to grow over time.

We have said in this meeting in the past, many times, that Charlie and I don’t pay any attention to ratings. I mean, we don’t believe in outsourcing investment decisions.

So we — if we buy a bond, the rating is immaterial to us, except to the extent if we think it’s rated more poorly than it should, it may help us buy it at an attractive price.

But we do not think that the people at Moody’s, or Standard and Poor’s, or Fitch, or anyplace else, should be telling us the credit rating of a company. We figure that out for ourselves. And sometimes we disagree with the market in a major way. And we’ve made some money that way.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the rating agencies, being good at doing mathematical calculations, eagerly sought stupid assumptions that enabled them to do clever mathematics. It’s an example of being too smart for your own good.

There’s an old saying, “To a man with hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail.” And that’s — (laughter) — what happened in the rating agencies.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the interesting things about all those triple-As, is the people that created them ended up owning a lot of them. So they believed their own baloney, themselves. Every — the belief was enormous.

So you had these people stirring up the Kool-Aid and then they drank it themselves. And they — (laughter) — you know, they paid a big penalty for it. But I don’t think it was — I think it was stupidity and the fact that everybody else was doing it.

I send out a letter to our managers, only every couple of years. But the one reason you can’t give at Berkshire, as far as I’m concerned, for any action, is that everybody else is doing it.

You know, and just — if that’s the best you can come with, you know, something’s wrong. But that happens in security markets all the time.

And of course, it’s — when Charlie and I were at Salomon or someplace like that, it’s very difficult to tell a huge organization that you shouldn’t be doing something that people, well-regarded competitors, are doing. And particularly when there’s a lot of money in it.

And so it’s very hard to stop these things once you get sort of a industry acceptance of behavior. And you know, we were very unsuccessful, Charlie and I, at Salomon at saying, “Well, we just don’t want to do this sort of thing.”

We couldn’t even get them — initially, when we got in there at first, they were doing business with Marc Rich. And we said, “Let’s stop doing business with Marc Rich.”

You know, that’s like saying in the ’30s, “Let’s stop doing business with Al Capone,” or something. And they said, “But it’s good business. If he doesn’t do it with us, he’ll do it with somebody else.” And they felt that way. And I think we won that one. But it wasn’t easy.

You remember that, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I certainly do.

11. Housing markets are beginning to improve

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to area 3. (Laughter)

OK, zone 3, are we on?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Laurie Gould (PH) from Berkeley, California.

Where do you see the residential real estate market headed nationally, particularly in California, over the next year or two?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t know what real estate is going to do. We didn’t know what it was going to do a few years ago. We thought it was getting kind of dangerous in certain ways. But it’s very hard to tell.

I would say this. From what we’re — from what I’m seeing, and I do see a lot of data — there’s — and California, incidentally, is a very big — I mean, there are many markets within California. Stockton is going to be different than San Francisco and so on.

But, in the last few months, you’ve seen a real pickup in activity, although at much lower prices. But you’ve seen — I think you’ve seen something in the medium- to lower-priced houses. And medium means a different thing in California than it does in Nebraska.

But you’ve seen, in maybe $750,000 and under houses, you’ve seen a real pickup in activity, many more bidders. You haven’t seen it bounce back in price. Prices are down significantly and it varies by the area.

But it looks as if — you know, you had a foreclosure moratorium for a while. And so get into distortions because of that.

But what it looks like, looking at our real estate brokerage data — and we have the largest real estate brokerage firm in Southern California, in Orange County, Los Angeles County, and San Diego in Prudential of California that’s owned by MidAmerican — we see something close, I would say, to stability at these much-reduced prices in the medium to lower group.

If you’ve got a $5 million or $3 million house, that still looks like a very — erratic — it’s a market in which there still isn’t a lot of activity.

But in the lower levels, there’s plenty of activity now. Houses are moving. Interest rates, of course, are down so it’s much easier to make the payments.

The mortgages being put on the books every day in California, are much better than, you know, the mix that you had a few years earlier.

So it’s improving. And I don’t know what it’ll do next month or three months from now.

The housing situation is pretty much this way. You can look at it this way.

We create about 1,300,000 or so households a year. It bounces around some. But — and it tends to — in a recession, it tends to be fewer because people postpone matrimony and so on to some extent.

But if there’s 1,300,000 households created in a year and you create two million housing starts annually, you are going to run into trouble. And that’s what we did. We just created more houses than the demand was — the fundamental demand — was going to absorb.

So we created an excess of houses. How much excess is there now? Perhaps a million and a half units. We were building two million units a year. That’s down to 500,000 units a year.

Now, if you create 500,000 units a year and you have a 1,300,000 households created, you are going to absorb the excess supply.

It will be very uneven around the country. South Florida’s going to be tough for a long, long time. So it isn’t like you can move a house from one place to another if there’s demand in one place and not another.

But we are eating up an excess inventory now. And we’re probably eating it up at the rate of 7- or 800,000 units a year. And if we have a million and a half excess, that takes a couple of years. There’s no getting away from it.

You have three choices. You could blow up a million and a half houses, you know. And if they do that, I hope they blow up yours and not mine, but that’s a — (Laughter)

We could get rid of it. We could try to create more households. We could have 14-year-olds start getting married and having kids, and — (Laughter)

Or we can produce less than the natural demand increase. And that’s what we’re doing now.

And we’re going to eat up the inventory. And you can’t do it in a day. And you can’t do it in a week. But it will get done.

And when it gets done, then you’ll have a stabilization in pricings. And then you will create the demand for more housing starts. And then you go back up to a million and a quarter, and then our insulation business and our carpet business and our brick business will all get better.

Exactly when that happens nobody knows. But it will happen.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think in a place like Omaha, which never had a really crazy boom in terms of housing prices, with interest rates so low if you’ve got good credit, that if I were a young person wanting a house in Omaha, I would buy it tomorrow. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: We own the largest real estate brokerage firm in Omaha. So — (laughter) — Charlie will be — if he qualifies, we will give him a mortgage application.

If is true that 4 1/2 million houses will change hands. There’s about 80 million houses in the country. Twenty-five million of those do not have a mortgage. About a third of the houses in the country do not have a mortgage. You’ve got about 55 million, or a little less, that have a mortgage. And five or six million of those are in trouble one way or another.

But we’re selling 4 1/2 million houses every day. And by and large, they’re going into stronger hands. The mortgages are more affordable. The down payments are higher. We’re — the situation is getting corrected.

But it wasn’t created in a day or a week or a month. And it’s not going to get solved in a day or a week or a month. We are on the road to solution.

12. 2008 wasn’t great for investment manager candidates

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol?

CAROL LOOMIS: Perhaps I should have said one other thing at the beginning. Those of you who read the annual report carefully know that Charlie and Warren were to be given no clue as to what any of the three of us were going to ask. So don’t think that they have gotten a little list. They have seen nothing.

This question, I got many versions of this question. This one happened to come from Jonathan Grant of New York City. It concerns the four investment managers you have said are in the wings as possible successors to you.

“Can you please tell us, without naming names, but preferably in both quantitative and qualitative terms, how each of the four did in 2008 with the money they are managing — they were managing — for their clients.

“You said you hoped to pick people who would be able to anticipate things that had never occurred before. While the world has seen credit crises before, there were a lot of things that happened in 2008, especially in the last few months of the year, that few were predicting and that you, yourself, have described as almost unprecedented.

“How would you rate the way that these managers — these four managers — did in managing against these low-probability risks? Are all four still on the list?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is all four are still on the list. Let me just make one point first, though, because it got misreported a little bit.

We have three candidates for the CEO position. And this is always a major subject of discussion at our director’s meetings. All of them are internal candidates. You should know that.

That’s been said before. But it got misreported here once or twice. And it got confused, I think, because of the four possibilities for the investment job. And you could have all four come to work for us in that case.

We won’t have three CEOs or two CEOs. But we might have multiple investment managers after I’m not around. Or we might just have one. That would be up to the board at that time.

They are both inside and outside the organization. And we don’t preclude anything in terms of where they come from. So we could have a whole big list from outside the organization.

That will not be true about the CEO position. The person that follows me will come from within Berkshire Hathaway.

The four, I don’t have precise figures from them, although I’ve got a fair amount of information on some of them. I would say they did no better than match the S&P last year, which was minus 37 after adding back dividends.

So I would say that in terms of 2008, by itself, you would not say that they covered themselves with glory. But I didn’t cover myself with glory, either. So I’m very tolerant of that in 2008. (Laughter) They —

Charlie, you know some of the records pretty well. Wouldn’t you say that’s true?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. What’s interesting to me is that practically every investment manager that I know of in America, and regard as intelligent and disciplined and with a unusual record of past success, they all got creamed last year. (Scattered laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: The group — I don’t hear a lot of laughter about that. (Laughter)

I think you’re hitting a nerve out there, Charlie.

The four have a better-than-average record over time. If you’d asked me at the start of the year, if you’d said, “There’s going to be a minus 37 percent year, will this group do better than average?” I would’ve said yes.

But I think I would’ve been wrong. And like I said, I haven’t got audit returns from every one of them. But I would say I would be wrong.

I would say that their record over 10 years has been, in each case, has been anywhere from modestly to significantly better than average. And I’d be willing to be that would be the case over the next 10 years.

But certainly, last year, you know, there were a lot of things that didn’t work. And our group was not exempt from them.

I have not changed the list. That doesn’t mean that we’re always looking with the idea of finding more people to add to it.

And as opposed to the CEO job, you know, if I dropped dead tonight, the board needs to put somebody in as a CEO tomorrow morning. And they will do so. And they know who it is. And they feel very good about it.

Not too good, I hope, but — (Laughter)

But on the investment officers — one or more, and it could easily be more — they don’t need to do something the next day or the next week.

I mean, the portfolio isn’t — everything doesn’t stop because of that. So that can be a somewhat more leisurely decision they’ll have. And it will be made, in an important way, in consultation and agreement with the new CEO.

So that is something that you shouldn’t expect the next day to hear an announcement on the investment managers. But you should expect to hear, you know, within a month or something like that.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we would want a manager who thought he could just go to cash based on macroeconomic notions and then hop back in when it was no longer advantageous to be in cash. Since we can’t do that ourselves —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we think it’s impossible if we can’t do it ourselves.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right. (Laughs)

So we’re not looking for a type who went to cash totally.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that would — in fact, we would leave out anybody that did that.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we would exclude them.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That —

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re not dumb enough for us. (Laughter)

13. Munger expects public/private hybrid health care system

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to zone 4.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Vern Cushenbery. I’m from Overland Park, Kansas.

I wonder if you might share your thoughts on the likelihood of a nationalized health care system, what that might look like and the effects on your portfolio?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m going to let Charlie answer that one since I don’t know how to. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Personally, I think something more like Europe will come to the United States in due course. And I think it’ll be supplemented by a private system, which is the equivalent of private school competition for public education.

And, although I’m a Republican, I’m not horrified by that probable development. Personally, I wish they’d put it off for a year while we solve the economic problems. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would say that in terms of its impact on Berkshire, you know, we have a broad cross section of companies — we have 246,000 people working for us — that we will adjust, like American business generally will adjust, to any developments along that line.

It won’t pose special problems for us. It won’t offer us special opportunities. We’ll see what the national sentiment is, as expressed through Congress. And we’ll behave accordingly.

14. Why we’re not training or naming our next CEO

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This is a question that follows up on the succession question. This one is a, in particularly, though, addressed to the three candidates for CEO. It comes from Irving Fenster who writes:

“Running Berkshire is very complex and complicated. Give us some insight for your reluctance to bring in your replacement to give him the benefit of your training, instead of his having to tackle the myriad of problems of the transition on his own.

“The benefits for Berkshire, your replacement, and you, are so compelling your reluctance is puzzling. Having him on board may relieve some of the stress on you and help add many, many more years of good health for you.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Irving is a friend of mine in Oklahoma. Went in in my partnership 40 years ago, Irving and Irene. And he’s been writing me on this for 30 or 40 years. And he’s had — (laughter) — he’s had no luck with me. So he decided to write Becky, apparently. (Laughter)

If we had a good way to inject somebody into some role that was — would make them a better CEO of Berkshire, we would try it.

But the truth is that the candidates we have are running businesses. They’re making capital allocation decisions. They’re doing things every day of an operating nature. And these are major businesses.

And to sit around headquarters while I’m sitting in there reading and on the phone and, you know, who knows what else, they — it — there just is — there wouldn’t be anything to do.

I mean, we could meet every hour. You know, I could say, “Here’s what I’m thinking about now. What do you think about this?” and — (Laughter)

It’d be a waste of talent. It’d be ridiculous.

And Irving has this notion that somehow, that they would be absorbing all these things that I’m doing. I just throw The Wall Street Journal to him after I’m done reading it, and I’d throw him The New York Times and I’d throw him the FT. (Laughs)

And these are people that know how to run big businesses. They run businesses that make many, many, many millions, or even billions, of dollars.

So, they are ready for the job right now. I wouldn’t be happy unless we have — they are 100 percent ready. They know how to allocate capital.

The biggest job they’ll have is the fact that they will have to develop relationships with potential sellers of businesses, with the world, generally, with you, the shareholders, with other managers. That takes some time, not an extraordinary time.

But that — you know, they will have to become acquainted with people. But — different constituencies. But that — there’s, you know, that is nothing that really needs to be hastened along. It’s nothing terribly important.

I mean, they know how to run businesses. And they would do many things much better than I would. The biggest — probably the biggest challenge, because we have all of those talented managers that you saw during the movie.

And those people have different styles. And they have different needs to some degree. They have different ways of operating. They’re all successes.

But you know, some of them bat left-handed. Some of them bat right-handed. Some of them stand deep in the box. You know, some of them crowd the plate. I mean, they all have a little bit of variation. But they all hit terrifically.

And for the CEO of Berkshire, it does require some knowledge of the individual personalities. And which ones like to run by themselves totally and which ones like to check in occasionally and all that.

But that is no reason to take a talent that’s now running a business very successfully and building value and to have them sit in an office next to me and have us chew over the day’s events.

I mean, Charlie and I worked together now for decades. And I’ve learned a lot from Charlie. But I haven’t done it by, you know, having him sit next door and have hourly meetings or anything of the sort.

What do you think, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think, averaged out, you’re more likely to be qualified to be a CEO by running a subsidiary with an enormous amount of discretion than you are to being around headquarters watching somebody else do it his way.

A lot of the models that have worked well in the world, like Johnson & Johnson, are quite Berkshire-like, in that they’re decentralized and they let these people pop up from the subsidiaries. They don’t try and just create CEOs in a hothouse in headquarters.

WARREN BUFFETT: We have an unusual situation at Berkshire that most of the people at the top, virtually all of them, are doing what they want to do. I mean, they like running their businesses.

That’s what they came in expecting to do. And that’s what they’re doing, and we’re letting them do it the way they like to do it.

And so we don’t have 50 people that all think they’re on some pyramid to get to the top. And Irving would like me to name — he’s talked to me about it. He would like to me name who it would be. But that could change in the future. It could create some possible —

Well, we saw it at General Electric, I mean, when Jeff Immelt got appointed from among three, the other two left. And I don’t really see any advantage in having some crowned prince around. But Irving will keep writing me, I can promise you that. (Laughter)

15. Buffett’s business school: only two courses

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 5.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. That’s a little loud, sorry. Hi. My name’s Sarah. And I’m from Omaha, Nebraska.

I’d like to know if you could explain your strategies, namely value investing, in regards to cultivating the next generation of investors. How will you teach this young group?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I had 49 — mostly universities, a few colleges — that came to Omaha this year. We do them in clumps of six. And then the last one, we had an added university. So we had eight sessions, full-day sessions.

And they asked me what — sometimes they asked me what I’d do if I was running a business school, teaching investments.

And I’d tell them I’d only have two courses. One would be how to value a business, and the second would be how to think about markets.

And there wouldn’t be anything about modern portfolio theory or beta or efficient markets or anything like that. We’d get rid of that in the first 10 minutes. The —

But if you know how to value a business — and you don’t have to know how to value all businesses. On the New York Stock Exchange, I don’t know, there’s 4- or 5,000, probably, businesses and a whole lot more on NASDAQ.

You don’t have to be right on 4,000 or 5,000. You don’t have to be right on 400. You don’t have to be right on 40.

You just have to stay within the circle of competence, the things that you can understand. And look for things that are selling for less than they’re worth, of the ones you can value.

And you can start out with a fairly small circle of competence and learn more about businesses as you go along.

But you’ll learn that there are a whole bunch of them that simply don’t lend themselves to valuations and you forget about those.

And I think if — accounting helps you in that, you need to understand accounting to know the language of business, but accounting also has enormous limitations. And you have to learn enough to know what accounting is meaningful and when you have to ignore certain aspects of accounting.

You have to understand when competitive advantages are durable and when they’re fleeting.

I mean, you have to learn the difference between a hula hoop company, you know, and Coca-Cola. But that isn’t too hard to do.

And then you have to know how to think about market fluctuations and really learn that the market is there to serve you rather than to instruct you.

And to a great extent, that is not a matter of IQ. If you have — if you’re in the investment business and you have a IQ of 150, sell 30 points to somebody else, ’cause you don’t need it.

I mean, it — (laughter) — you need to be reasonably intelligent. But you do not need to be a genius, you know. At all. In fact, it can hurt.

But you do have to have an emotional stability. You have to have sort of an inner peace about your decisions. Because it is a game where you get subjected to minute-by-minute stimuli, where people are offering opinions all the time.

You have to be able to think for yourself. And, I don’t know whether — I don’t know how much of that’s innate and how much can be taught.

But if you have that quality, you’ll do very well in investing if you spend some time at it. Learn something about valuing businesses.

It’s not a complicated game. As I say — said many times — it’s simple, but not easy.

It is not a complicated game. You don’t have to understand higher math. You don’t — you know, you don’t have to understand law. There’s all kinds of things that you don’t have to be good at. There’s all kinds of jobs in this world that are much tougher.

But you do have to have sort of an emotional stability that will take you through almost anything. And then you’ll make good investment decisions over time.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you do have the basic problem that exactly half of the future investors of the world are going to be in the bottom 50 percent.

In other words — (laughter) — you’re always going to have more skill at the top than you have at the bottom. And you’re never going to be able to homogenize the investment expertise of the world.

There is so much that’s false and nutty in modern investment practice, and in modern investment banking, and in modern academia in the business schools, even in the Economics departments, that if you just reduce the nonsense, that’s all I think you should reasonably hope for.

WARREN BUFFETT: Beyond a certain basic level, though, of skill, wouldn’t you say your emotional make-up’s more important than the — than some super high degree of skill?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. And if you think your talent — if you think your IQ is 160 and it’s 150, you’re a disaster. (Laughter)

You know, much better a guy with a 130 that’s operating well within himself.

WARREN BUFFETT: I get to see the students that come by. I loved a fellow from the University of Chicago, one of the students. And the first question that was asked of me was, “What are we learning that’s most wrong?” That’s the kind of — I mean, I wish they’d ask that sort of thing of the panel here.

CHARLIE MUNGER: How do you handle that in one session?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

But it was holy writ 25 years ago, efficient market theory. You know, I never understood how you could even teach it.

I mean, if you walked in in the first five minutes, you said to the students, “Everything is priced properly,” I mean, how do you kill the rest of the hour?

But — (Laughter) — they did it. And they got Ph.D.s for doing it well. You know, and the more Greek symbols they could work into their, you know, their writings, you know, the more they were revered.

It’s astounding to me and I — that may have even given me a jaundiced view of academia generally — is the degree to which ideas that are nutty take hold and get propagated.

And then I read a quote the other day that may have partially explained it. Max Planck was talking, the famous physicist.

Max Planck was talking about the resistance of the human mind, even the bright human mind, to new ideas. And particularly the ones that had been developed carefully over many years, and were blessed by others of stature, and so on.

And he said, “Science advances one funeral at a time.” And I think there’s a lot of truth to that. Certainly been true in the world of finance.

16. Ajit Jain’s successor won’t have the same broad authority

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. We have a succession question. However, this one has a twist, coming from Ben Knoll.

“You famously said, quote, ‘You should invest in businesses that a fool can run, because someday a fool will.’ (Laughter)

“Given your reinsurance company’s capacity and inclination for big financial bets, can you provide us more reassurance about the risk once Ajit is gone?

“Do you have a succession plan for him?”

Ben says, “The Titanic-like ending at AIG, once Greenberg was gone, has me spooked.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that it would be impossible to replace Ajit. And we wouldn’t try. And, therefore, we wouldn’t give the latitude, in terms of size of risk or that sort of thing, that we give to Ajit.

No, we’ve got a unique talent, in my view there, and I think in Charlie’s. And so, when you get somebody like that, you give enormous authority to them after you firmly establish in your mind that that’s who you’re dealing with.

But that doesn’t mean that the authority goes with the position. The authority goes with the individual. And we would not — giving your pen away in insurance, as they say, is extraordinary dangerous.

And we have in this town, we have Mutual of Omaha, which in the 1980s, had been built up carefully over, probably, 75 years by that time, and become the largest health and accident association in the world, I believe.

And they got the idea that they should be writing property-casualty reinsurance. So they gave a pen to somebody within the place. And probably nobody had even heard the guy’s name, you know.

And in just signing a few contracts, they lost half their net worth in a very short period of time. And they were worried that they might have lost more than that.

So you can do enormous damage in the insurance business with a pen. And you’d better — have to be very careful about who you give your pen to. And we’ve given our pen to Ajit in a way that we wouldn’t give it to anyone else.

Now, it just so happens that I enjoy hearing about the kind of things he does. So we talk daily. But we don’t talk daily because he needs my approval on anything. We talk daily because I find it very interesting.

When he says, “How much should we charge to insure Mike Tyson’s life for a couple of years?” I mean, that’s the kind of thing I can get kind of interested in. I — (Laughter)

I asked him whether there was an exclusion in case he got shot by a woman that felt unhappy about her treatment or something, but —

And it makes a difference in the price, but —

I enjoy that sort of thing. But I’m not needed. And Ajit is needed. And we won’t find a substitute for him. And you know, there’s some things that have to be faced that way.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. What that quotation indicates is sometimes, stated differently, you say if it won’t stand a little mismanagement it’s not much of a business. Of course, you prefer a business that will prosper pretty well, even if it’s not managed very well.

But that doesn’t mean you don’t like even better when you get such a business that’s managed magnificently. And both factors are quite important.

We’re not looking for mismanagement. We like the capacity to stand it, if we stumble into it. But we’re not looking for it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will not do things that we think are — we will not assign tasks to people that we think are beyond their capabilities. And it just so happens that Ajit has enormous capabilities.

So he gets assigned some very unusual things. But you don’t see that prevailing throughout our insurance operation. And our managers don’t expect to operate that way.

That’s a one-off situation with Ajit. And he’s in good health. And, you know, we send him all the Cherry Coke or fudge that he wants. (Laughter)

17. Berkshire was “cheaper” at the end of 2008

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 6. I recommend this fudge, incidentally. It’s terrific. I’m having a good time. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Steve Fulton (PH) from Louisville, Kentucky. I gave up box tickets to the Kentucky Derby this afternoon to come out and ask you this question. Thank you for this opportunity.

My question relates to how you view, or what your view is of the market’s valuation of Berkshire’s shares.

You commonly comment that Berkshire has two primary components of value: the investments that they own — the stocks, the bonds, and similar — and the earnings from the non-insurance operating companies that you’ve got.

And when you compare 2007 to 2008, the investments were down about 13 percent. And the earnings were down about 4 percent. But the value that the market was placing on the shares was down about 31 percent. And I was curious as to your comments on that valuation.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I think you put your finger on something.

We do think that the — we think, obviously, the investments are worth what they’re carried for, or we wouldn’t own them.

In fact, we think they’re worth more money than they’re carried for at any given time because we think, on balance, they’re underpriced. So we have no problem with that number.

We define our earning power — we leave out insurance underwriting profit or loss, on the theory that insurance is — if it breaks even — will give us float, which we will invest. And on balance, I actually think that insurance probably will produce some underwriting profit. So I think we even understate it a little bit in that respect.

But we think the earning power of those businesses was not as good last year as normal. It won’t be as good this year as normal.

But we think those are pretty good businesses overall. A few of them have got problems. And — but most of them will do well. And I think a few of them will do sensationally.

So, I think it’s perfectly reasonable to look at Berkshire as the sum of two parts. A lot of liquid marketable securities — or maybe not so liquid, but at least fairly priced, or maybe even undervalued, securities — and a lot of earning power, which we are going to try and increase over time.

And if you look at it that way, you would come to the conclusion that Berkshire was cheaper in relation to its intrinsic value at the end of 2008 than it was at the end of 2007. But you would also come to the conclusion that was true of most securities. In other words, the whole level of securities.

And every stock is affected by what every other stock sells for. I mean, if the value of ABC stock goes down, XYZ, absent any other variables, but XYZ is worth less.

If you can buy stocks at eight times earnings, good companies, you know, or nine times earnings, you know, they — it reduces the value of Berkshire, as opposed to when stocks were selling, well, at 18 or 20 times earnings. I’m pulling those numbers out of the air.

But everything is affected by everything else in the financial world.

When you say a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, you’re comparing it — you’ve got to compare that to every other bush that’s available.

So, you’re correct that Berkshire was cheaper in relation to intrinsic value at the end of 2008, than 2007, at least in my opinion.

And that that those two variables will count. We’ll report them to you regularly. And over time, we would hope that both increase.

And we particularly hope the operating earnings aspect increases, because that’s our major focus. We would like to move money into good operating businesses over time and build that number a lot.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that last year was a bad year for a float business. It was naturally going to make the owner of the float appear, briefly, to be at a disadvantage.

But long-term, having a large float, which you’re getting at a cost of less than zero, is going to be a big advantage. And I wouldn’t get too excited about the fact that the stock goes down.

I happen to know that there was one buyer there who rather inartistically bought about 10,000 shares when Berkshire was driven to its absolute peak. And how much significance does that have in the big scheme of things over the long term?

What matters are things like this: our casualty insurance business is probably the best big casualty business in the world — our utility subsidiary, well, if there’s a better one, I don’t know it — and if I had to bet on one carbide cutting tool business in the world, I’d bet on ISCAR against any other comer.

And I could go down the list a long way. I think those things are going to matter greatly over the long term. And if you think that it’s easy to get in that kind of a position, the kind of position that Berkshire occupies, you are living in a different world from the one I inhabit. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, our insurance business now, it is a remarkable business. And it’s got some remarkable managers.

18. How GEICO benefited from the financial crisis

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one interesting thing that’s happened. In September, when we had a financial meltdown and, really, almost the ultimate — it was almost the China Syndrome-type thing — Americans started behaving differently.

Probably people around the world, but I certainly know in terms of our businesses, it was like a bell had been rung. And one manifestation of it was kind of interesting.

Whereas it hurt very much our jewelry business, our carpet business, it hurt NetJets, it hurt all the businesses. Hurt American Express, for example. You know, the average ticket went down almost 10 percent.

I mean, it just was like that, that people’s behavior changed. But one of the things it did, was it also caused the phones to start ringing even more at GEICO.

And we didn’t change our advertising, particularly. Our price advantage, relative to other companies, didn’t change that much. But all of a sudden, just — it was remarkable. Thousands and thousands and thousands of more people came to our website or phoned us every week.

So, it — all of a sudden, saving $100 or $150 or whatever it might be, became important. Not only the people who were watching our ads that day, but just with the people that it was lurking in the back of their minds. They went to geico.com.

So in the first four months of this year — last year, we added about 665,000 policy holders. That’s a lot of people. It made us, by far, the fastest growing auto insurer among the big companies.

First four months of this year, we’ve added 505,000 in four months. It’s the behavioral changes. And that franchise, that competitive advantage, has been built up over decades.

And Tony Nicely has nurtured it like nobody else could, just day after day, office after office, associate after associate. But then it just pays off huge when the time comes.

Because we can — we are the low-cost producer among big auto insurance companies. That means we can offer the best value. And now people are value conscious.

So these things are going on all the time with our subsidiaries, with those managers. And it’s — it builds a lot of value over time.

I mean, every GEICO policy holder is a real asset to the company. I could give you an estimated value. But I don’t think it’d necessarily be smart. But they’re worth real money.

And, we are now the third largest auto insurer in the country. I think we’ll end up the year maybe at 8 1/2 percent of the market.

And it was 2 and a small fraction percent back in 1993 when Tony took charge of the business. And the fundamentals are in place — (applause) — to take us much higher.

19. 2008 was tough, but still no plans for dividend

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Quietly) Can you reach that peanut brittle?

CAROL LOOMIS: I promise you, this question did not come from Susan Lucci. However, it does concern dividend policy. It came from Peter Sargent of Yardley, Pennsylvania.

And to ask that, he quotes from principle number 9 of the “Owner’s Manual.” And Warren wrote there, quote:

“We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention over time delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met.” Now, this was written some time ago.

“We will continue to apply it on a 5-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.”

So I’m now quoting the questioner here:

“The recent annual report made me think about the performance of both the company and the stock price. Berkshire seems to have done quite well in the past few years. But the stock price seems to have not quite kept pace.

“So I looked at the last five years of earnings per share. They’re on page 26 of the annual report. And they add up, in total, to $29,207.

“As you probably know, the closing price of Berkshire on December 31st, 2008 was 84,250. If you add the 29,207 per share of retained earnings to this, you come up with a, quote, ‘minimum market value of 113,457.’

“Since Berkshire closed on 12/31/2008 at 96,600” — oh, wait, I have read something wrong here.

“The closing price of Berkshire on 12/31/2003 was 84,250.

“And since Berkshire closed on 12/31/2008 at 96,600, and it’s been lower than that since, and is now around that now, it would seem that the market value has not increased for each $1 retained.

“Assuming my analysis is correct, it raises the question of whether or not Berkshire will pay a dividend in the coming year or not.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll now have a short quiz on that program — (laughter) — on the question.

The earnings, incidentally, of the 5-year period would include gains from things that were listed in unrealized appreciation at the end of the period.

In other words, some of those were actually built into the asset value at the time, but then become realized.

But the truth is if you take all of the money we earned in the five years, and the stocks, bonds, businesses purchased, and you sold them for cash on December 31st, 2008, we would not have — we would’ve had a loss on that, I mean, under the conditions that existed on December 31st, 2008.

I think that’s probably true of almost all capital programs that were (inaudible) — if you really measured it by what you could’ve sold, the businesses we bought — we love those businesses.

But there was no market to speak of for many businesses at that time. And security values were down significantly.

So I would say that he’s absolutely right, that measured on the value on December 31st, 2008, that the reinvested earnings had not produced a dollar market value at that particular market point.

Now, I would say this, that we also say we measure our business performance against the S&P. And we use book value as a conservative proxy for intrinsic business value.

We think intrinsic business value is higher, but we use that as a proxy. And we’ve done that consistently throughout the history of Berkshire.

And during that 5-year period — or during any — we’ve never had a 5-year period when we’ve under-performed the S&P, in terms of the — what I would call the intrinsic value measure of Berkshire.

And, as I said a few years ago, it’s — as we get larger, it’s much harder to do that, and we’ll settle for a couple of points better.

But so far, that test has been made — been met. And it’s been met while we reinvested all earnings.

So I think that we still have got the burden of — we still should have to prove by the fact that Berkshire will sell above the earnings we’ve retained. Berkshire sells above it — every dollar that’s been retained at Berkshire translates even today into more than a dollar of market value.

But I would certainly say that if you took the five years and just sold all the things we bought during that period at that price, that there would be a loss.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t get too excited about these oddball things that happen once every 50 years.

If you’re reasonably prepared for them and you’re dented a little on the bottom tick, and other people are suffering a lot more, and unusual opportunities are coming to you that you don’t see under other conditions, I don’t think we deserve any salt tears.

20. Wells Fargo’s stock price plunge shouldn’t spark selling

CHARLIE MUNGER: Take Wells Fargo. I think Wells Fargo’s going to come out of this mess way stronger. The fact that the stock at the bottom tick scared a lot of people, I think will prove to be a very temporary phenomenon.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Wells Fargo got down below — actually, ticked below $9 a share at a time when spreads on business were never better, when depositing flows were never better, when their advantage in relation of costs of funds versus other large banks had never been better.

But you know, in a market that was terrified, it — literally, I had a class meeting that day, and it was the only time any of those classes have ever got me to name a stock. But they actually pushed me.

And somebody there with a BlackBerry, or whatever those instruments are that they carry around these days, checked the price and it was below $9. And I said, if I had to put all my net worth in one stock, that would’ve been the stock.

The — their business is — you know, the business model is fabulous.

And it, you know, when would you get a chance to buy something like Wachovia, which had the fourth largest deposit base in the United States, and bring that in? And then start getting the spread on assets versus liabilities that Wells gets and build the relationships they have. It’s a great business opportunity.

Wells Fargo will be better off — unless they have to issue a lot of shares, which they shouldn’t — Wells Fargo will be a lot better off a couple of years from now, than if none of this had happened.

And I think that’s true of some of other businesses as well. But you — you know, you have to be prepared. You can’t let somebody else get you in a position where you have to sell out your position.

Leverage is what causes people trouble in this world. So you don’t — you never want to be in a position where somebody can pull the rug out from under you. And you also never want to be emotionally in a position where you pull the rug out from under yourself.

I mean, you don’t want to have other people force you to sell and you don’t want to let your own fears or emotions to cause you to sell at the wrong time.

I mean, why anybody sells Wells Fargo at $9 a share when they owned it at $25 and the business is better off, is one of the strange things about the way markets behave. But people do it. And they get very affected by looking at prices.

If they own a farm like I do, you know, 30 miles from here, they don’t get a price on it every day. You know, they —

I bought that farm 25 years ago. And you look to the production of corn. You look to the production of soy beans and prices and cost of fertilizer and a few things. And you look to the asset itself to determine whether you made an intelligent investment. You have your expectations about what the asset will produce.

But people in stocks tend to look at the price. So they let the price tell them how they should feel or — that’s kind of crazy in our view.

We think you should look at the business just like you’d look at the apartment house that you bought or the farm you want. They let the fact that a quote is available every day turn into a liability rather than an asset.

And all I would say there is you better go back and read chapter 8 of “The Intelligent Investor,” where it tells you how to think about the market. And it will do you more good than learning what modern portfolio theory is all about.

21. Big stimulus spending bound to have some “slop”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jim Powers (PH). I’m from West Newton, Massachusetts. My question has to do with this stimulus bill by the federal government.

I’ve read that only 8 percent of the money is intended to go to infrastructure. When you invest money, you normally look at the asset you’re getting for the money.

With the country going into so much debt, don’t you think it would be better if a great percentage of the money invested by the federal government go to solid assets, as it did during the Great Depression with the Tennessee Valley Authority, Hoover Dam, other facilities, that are still making money today, and paying back the original investment by the government many times over, while putting numerous people to work?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that one. Yes. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: I would certainly agree. I mean the ’30s — a lot of really wonderful things were done with the money that was used to then to stimulate the economy. And that should be the goal and a model.

I can’t evaluate perfectly what the current stimulus bill will do. I know that I — I did get a notice the other day from the Social Security Administration telling me I’m getting $250 more. That ought to last me 6 or 7 months. (Laughter)

Charlie will make his last longer, I’m sure. (Laughter)

But you know, that’s the stimulus that the Buffett household has received at the present time.

Obviously, you want to use the money as intelligently as possible.

Obviously, also, anytime the federal government does anything on a massive scale — any time any big organization, a church or a business or anything, you know, throws all kinds of resources at something, usually there’s a fair amount of slop.

I think that the intent — but by the time it gets through Congress and everything, I can’t guarantee how the result comes out — but I think the intent is to get the money into action quickly and to end up having it utilized in intelligent ways.

But if the day after Pearl Harbor happened, you know, if you’d attached 5 or 6 thousand earmarks to the declaration of war, you know, it would not have been a pretty sight.

I mean, it — we have a system now where — that doesn’t seem to be perfectly effective, I would say, in detaching the interests of particular legislators away from the common goal.

I mean, I get distressed when I look at what gets attached to some of these bills. And that certainly was a case in point. So I’ll go along with Charlie on the answer.

But I think the intent of the administration is the right thing. When the American public pulls back like they have, government does need to step in.

It will have consequences. We are doing things on a scale — we’re doing the conventional things, but we’re doing them in unconventional amounts.

And we will see consequences from what we are doing now. I think we should be doing it. But I don’t think we should think it’s a free ride.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have one big no-brainer on the list of infrastructure investments that can be made. And that is a hugely improved nationwide electricity grid. The chances that that won’t help us are zero.

And that, when it happens, will enormously benefit Berkshire’s utility subsidiary. But that isn’t the reason I’m raising it. I would be making this argument if we didn’t have a utilities subsidiary.

WARREN BUFFETT: We might make it a little more strongly if we had the utilities subsidiary, however. (Laughter)

22. Hard to compete with government-guaranteed debt

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Rita Addison (PH), who says, “How does Berkshire’s strong balance sheet and credit rating help take advantage of buying opportunities when even weak financial companies can now borrow more cheaply than Berkshire by using U.S. government guarantees of their debt?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, as I pointed out in the annual report, we are at a significant disadvantage in any financing-type business where we are competing against people who are getting their funding and their financing with a government guarantee.

Our raw material costs us a lot more money. And that’s particularly applicable at Clayton where we have 10- or $11 billion of, really, mortgage paper on mostly manufactured homes.

And it’s exceptionally good quality portfolio. Kevin Clayton and the people at Clayton Homes have done a great job in terms of lending responsibly. Our borrowers have behaved very well.

But the raw material to fund that portfolio — money — costs us a whole lot more than some bank that’s in trouble.

And that’s a real problem for us. And it’s forcing us to try to come up with various other sources of funding that portfolio where, one way or another, we get people with government guarantees involved in the program.

That’s just a fact of life with us now. There are the blessed who have government guarantees. And there’re the ones that aren’t.

And of course, you see that dramatically, in the case of some companies that have a government guarantee for part of their money and then sell other money — and then sell other bonds — that aren’t guaranteed.

I mean, just the other day, as I remember, I may be wrong on this, but I think Goldman Sachs sold something with a 400 basis point spread that wasn’t guaranteed. Whereas their guaranteed paper would be hundreds of basis points underneath that.

General Electric sold something earlier this year that wasn’t guaranteed. And the spread between the guaranteed and the un-guaranteed was huge.

We don’t have anything guaranteed to sell, so we are not in that favored class in any way. And we can’t become a bank holding company. So as long as the situation goes on, we have to figure out ways that we adjust.

We only really use borrowed money — we use it in our utility business. But other utilities are not in this favored class. I mean, the utility industry generally.

So our utility borrows money quite well, compared to most utilities. MidAmerican’s credit is regarded as very good.

And generally speaking, we’ve raised our money at a lower rate, which benefits our customers in the utility business.

We don’t use much money in the rest of our businesses, except for the financing at Clayton. And we won’t use much money.

So we get our money by float, basically. And our float is — it was $58 billion. I mentioned a little while ago, that Wells Fargo raises its money in the first quarter at, I think, 1.12 percent — 112 basis points — which is very cheap.

But our money’s cheaper. We can’t get as much of it as Wells does. But we do have 58 billion — in fact, we have more now — that you would think will cost us less than zero over time, although there will be given periods when we have a cost to it.

But we don’t have an answer for going head-to-head against a government-sponsored business that gets — can raise money with a government guarantee. We do not have a way of going head-to-head with them at any business, no matter how prudently we conduct our operations.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course we’re at a funding disadvantage. But on the other hand, we aren’t regulated like a bank or a bank holding company.

I think we’d be pretty ungrateful if we took this one disadvantage that has come to us and obsessed on it.

WARREN BUFFETT: I get those kind of lectures all the time. (Laughter)

23. Graham would probably agree with us on derivatives

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 8.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. Hi, Mr. Munger. My name is Mary Kimble (PH) from New York City.

In getting back to basics, what do you think Ben Graham would have said about derivatives?

WARREN BUFFETT: He would not have liked them. I think he probably would’ve said pretty much what I said back in 2002, that they pose a real risk to the system.

They cause leverage to run wild. They cause counterparties to sign up for things that may be difficult to achieve under certain circumstances. That they place an already fragile economic system — added strains on them — which can pop up in unpredictable ways.

But he would probably also say if he saw some that were mispriced, he would act accordingly. But he wouldn’t get himself in a position where the problems of the people who didn’t act prudently could cause him any problems. And I think that probably would be the answer.

The — one of the — one basic problem on derivatives — well, there are several problems.

I mean, back in — after 1929, Congress met — there was a Pecora committee and so on— and they decided that it was very dangerous to let people borrow a lot of money against securities and that it contributed to the Great Depression.

And therefore, they said the Federal Reserve should regulate how much people could borrow against securities. And it was important for society.

And the Federal Reserve started requiring margin — they had margin requirements. Those requirements still exist. You are not supposed to be able to borrow more than 50 percent against your securities.

Actually, during one period, they went to where they didn’t — the Federal Reserve allowed no borrowing whatsoever. They went to a hundred percent margin.

But derivatives came along and just turned that into a — made those rules a laughingstock. You have what they call “total return swaps,” which means you can borrow a hundred percent against what you own. That goes way beyond anything that existed in 1929.

So derivatives became a way around regulation of leverage in markets, which like I say, Congress felt was important and the Federal Reserve still has a responsibility for enforcing.

Derivatives also meant that settlement dates got pushed out. One of the problems in securities markets comes about when you have a trade today, if you had — didn’t have to settle it for a year, you’d find it very hard sometimes to find the person on the other side.

And derivatives allow these very long settlement periods. Whereas security markets demand them in three days. There’s a reason they demand them in three days.

As you extend out periods, you get more and more defaults. So they’re a danger — they are a danger to the system. There’s no question about that.

We have a book in The Bookworm called “The Great Crash” by Galbraith. It’s one of the great books. You really ought to buy it. It tells the story of the ’29 and it gets into margin requirements, so…

Ben Graham would not like a system that used derivatives heavily. But he would — I don’t think he would have been above — if he saw something that looked way out of line and he knew he could handle it himself — I think he would have been quite willing to buy or sell one that was mispriced.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there’s been a deeper problem in the derivative business. The derivative dealer takes two advantages of the customer.

One, there’s croupier-style mathematical advantage equivalent to the house advantage in Las Vegas.

And two, the derivative dealer is playing in the same game with his own clients, with the advantage of being a better player. So —

WARREN BUFFETT: And having knowledge of what they’re doing.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and having knowledge of what the clients are doing.

This is basically a dirty business. And you’re really selling things to your clients who trust you, that are bad for the clients.

We don’t need more of this kind of thing in America. We need less. (Applause)

24. Bailouts shouldn’t hurt senior debt holders

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Well, this question came in this morning. And it’s a timely, philosophical one, given the results of the stress test that will coming out next week. And it relates to your stakes in Wells, U.S. Bancorp and Goldman Sachs. And the question is the following:

“The government’s proposed restructuring plans for Chrysler and GM require creditors, as well as common shareholders, to bear losses.

“Yet, with the banks, the government’s actions, to date, have not required concessions from holders of preferred stock and debt. The government has merely required the dilution of common stock holders.

“To what extent should holders of preferred stock and debt share losses in the bank rescue plans or in the resolution of a major bank holding company? And do you expect to be diluted in any of your holdings?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say this. That’s very institution specific. With Freddy and Fannie, the preferred was gone. I mean, there was no equity. And the preferred got — in effect, it’s gotten wiped out along with the common stock.

With U.S. Bancorp or Wells, those are companies making lots of money. There’s lots of equity there. So there’s no reason to go up to senior securities and say that they should give up anything when there’s lots of common equity underneath.

It’d be like if I have a mortgage on my house and it’s 70 percent against its current value, saying, just because other people are having trouble in the neighborhood paying their mortgages because they got much higher mortgage or something, your saying my mortgage holder with 70 percent mortgage, that he should give up something and increase my equity even further.

There’s lots of equity there, which there is at Goldman, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo. There’s lots of equity, lots of earning power. There’s really no reason for senior debt to give up anything.

You know, you could make an argument at Freddy and Fannie, about the subordinated debt, whether they should’ve suffered as well as the preferred stock and the common. But I don’t see it as applying to earning institutions with lots of future earning power.

I would love to buy all of U.S. Bancorp. You know, or I’d love to buy all of Wells if we could do it. You know, we’re not allowed to do it because it’d make us a bank holding company. But those businesses, there’s no reason for the creditors to suffer.

Now, you get into Chrysler or something of that sort, you know, there is no — I mean, they’re losing money all of time and they do not have a competitive advantage. You know, whether they’ve got a sustainable business model under any circumstances is open to question.

Whether there’s any common equity there is not open to question. You know, there isn’t any common equity. Nobody would pay a dollar, you know, if they had to take on Chrysler and all its debts.

Lots of people would pay billions of dollars to take on U.S. Bancorp or Goldman Sachs, you know, with all their debt. So those are different situations. I —

If you get into a situation where the common equity is wiped out, then you get into a question of — then you get into the proper allocation of things within the capital structure — who gives up so much, and the senior debt may give up something, and so on.

But I don’t see it as applying at all to businesses that are worth a lot of money, where the equity’s worth a lot money.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

25. Ignore original cost when reviewing your portfolio

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 9.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. Sorry, about that. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name’s Kelly Cardwell from Warrenville, Illinois.

Guys, if either of you were starting a smaller investment fund today, let’s say in Warrenville, Illinois, $26 million fund called Central Square Capital — hypothetically?

WARREN BUFFETT: What? You’ll get billed for a commercial later on. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: With this smaller asset base, what would you do differently, both in terms of the number of positions and frequency of turnover?

For example, if you owned a portfolio of 10 stocks and five of them doubled in a short time period, would it make sense to actively manage the portfolio and take profits in the five that had doubled and redeploy the proceeds into your positions, into the ones that had not moved higher, where, presumably, more upside exists and the odds are more dramatically stacked in your favor? Or would you favor the strategy of sitting on your hands in the name of long-term investing?

WARREN BUFFETT: We would own the half of dozen or so stocks we like best. Their — and it wouldn’t have anything to do with what our cost on them was.

It would only have to do with our evaluation of their price versus value. It doesn’t make any difference what the cost is.

And incidentally, if they went down 50 percent, we would say the same thing. I — you know, and using your illustration, I don’t know whether that fund has actually had something that went up or went down.

So, we would — our cost basis, except in rare cases — and we actually have a situation like this at Berkshire now, which I may explain a little later. But the cost basis doesn’t have anything to do the fund.

When Charlie and I ran funds, we didn’t worry about whether something was up or down. We worried about what it was worth compared to what it was selling for.

And we tried to have most of our money in a relatively few — very few — positions which we thought we knew very well. We do the same thing now. We’d do the same thing a hundred years from now.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, he’s tactfully suggesting that you adopt a different way of thinking. (Laughter and applause)

26. Berkshire’s competitive advantage no longer requires us

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Michael Welter (PH) of Portland, Oregon.

“You’ve often said that two things you look for in an investment are a sustainable competitive advantage and a simple, easy to grasp business model. Berkshire’s sustainable competitive advantage is arguably you, Warren and Charlie. And that obviously is not sustainable over the long term.”

WARREN BUFFETT: I reject that. Defeatism. (Laughs)

CAROL LOOMIS: I knew you would.

“While at this point, Berkshire does not have a simple, easy to grasp business model. So if the two of you were outside investors, is it possible that, no matter what combination of intrinsic value and price Berkshire offered, you would not invest in it today?”

WARREN BUFFETT: No, our sustainable competitive advantage is we have a culture and a business model, which people are going to find very, very difficult to copy, even semi-copy.

We have an unusual group of shareholders. We have a business that’s owned by people where the turnover on our stock, even allowing for all the double-counting and everything like that, may be something like 20 percent a year, when virtually every stock in the S&P 500 turns over a hundred percent a year.

So we have a different shareholder base. We have people that understand their business differently.

And we have a business that can offer, to people who own private businesses, the chance to keep running their businesses as they have in the past and get rid of the problems of lawyers and bankers and all kinds of things like that.

And I don’t see any other company in the United States that has the ability to do that now, or probably the ability to adopt that model in any big way.

So I would say we have sort of an ultimate — and it’s not peculiar to me and Charlie. We may have helped create it. But it is a deeply embedded culture which any CEOs that follow are going to be well-versed in when they come into the job, and dedicated to, and able to continue in the future.

And you can’t — I don’t want to name names about other companies — but you can’t do that elsewhere.

So I think anybody wanting to copy Berkshire is going to have a very hard time. And I think the advantages we have are going to be very, very long lasting. And they’re not peculiar to the fact that Charlie and are I sitting up here anymore. They may have been, originally. But no longer.

Our culture, our managers join that culture. Our shareholders join that culture. It gets reinforced all the time. They see that it works.

You know, it’s something that I don’t know how I would copy it, if I were running, you know, some other company.

And it’s meaningful. Because there will be businesses, just as there was with ISCAR awhile back, just as the management at GEICO felt back in the mid-’90s in terms of what they wanted to do, there will be people that want to join up with us. And they really won’t have a good second choice. They’ll be plenty that don’t, too. But that’s OK.

We just need to have the right ones — some of the right ones — join us. And it can go on a long, long time.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. I might state that a little differently. A lot of corporations in America are run stupidly from headquarters, as they try and force the divisions to come up with profits for every quarter that are better than the profits from the same quarter in the previous year.

And a lot of terrible decisions and terrible practices creep into those businesses. In the Berkshire model, that doesn’t happen.

So while Warren and Charlie will soon be gone — not too soon in my case, but I’m a little worried about Warren (laughter) — the stupidity of management practice in the rest of the corporate world will likely remain ample enough to give this company some comparative advantage way into the future. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to — it’s very important isn’t it, to watch what you eat, as you — (laughter) — in terms of preserving longevity. So we watch it for hours up here at a time. (Laughs)

27. We don’t keep every stock, but we do keep every business

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and Mr. Munger. My name is Aznar Midolf (PH). I’m from (Inaudible) organization, San Francisco.

And my question is from one of financial blogs. How do you justify holding stocks forever when the fundamentals have permanently changed?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is we don’t. You know, and — if we lose confidence in the management, if we lose confidence in the durability of the competitive advantage, if we recognize we made a mistake when we went into it — we sell plenty of times. So it’s not unheard of.

On the other hand, if you really get a wonderful business with outstanding management — but mostly the wonderful business part of it — when in doubt, keep holding. But it’s no inviolable rule.

Now, among the businesses we own, not just securities we own, we have an attitude, which we express in our economic principles, that when we buy a business it’s for keeps.

And we make only two exceptions: when they promise to start losing money indefinitely or if we have major labor problems. But otherwise, we are not going to sell something just ’cause we get offered more money for it, even than it’s worth.

And that’s a peculiarity we have. And we want our partners to know about that.

We do think it probably helps us in terms of buying businesses over time. It’s also the way we want to run our business.

But with stocks, bonds, we sell them. But we’re more reluctant to sell them than most people. I mean, if we made the right decision going on, we like to ride that a very long time. And we’ve owned many — we’ve owned some stocks for decades.

But if the competitive advantage disappears, if we really lose faith in the management, if we were wrong in the original analysis — and that happens — we sell. Or if we find something more attractive —

Normally we have plenty of money around. But in September of last year, late September, we had committed to put 6.6 million — billion — in Wrigley. We — and then Goldman Sachs needed 5 billion, GE needed 3 billion.

I sold a couple billion dollars’ worth of J&J just because I didn’t like getting our cash level down below a certain point, under the circumstances that existed then.

That not was a negative decision on J&J. It just — it meant that I wanted a couple billion more around. And I saw an opportunity to do something that I probably wouldn’t see too much later. Whereas, I could always buy J&J back at a later date. But that’s an unusual situation.

28. We run Berkshire as if we owned all of it

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to go back to one point on the earlier question, too.

I always — I frequently ask CEOs of companies what they would do differently if they owned the whole place themselves.

You know, when I’m talking to, either companies where we’ve invested in, sometimes other companies, friends of mine run them. You know, “What would you do different if this was a hundred percent owned by you and your family?”

And they give me a list of things. There is no list at Berkshire. You know, we basically run this place the same way we’d run if we owned a hundred percent of it.

And that is a difference that — in terms of people joining in with us. They don’t have to adjust their lives to a bunch of rules that are kind of self-imposed, in terms of how people think about public companies, in terms of earnings, predictions, and all of that sort of thing.

And there are certain people that would prefer to be associated with an enterprise like that. And also —following through on this rule I just explained — know that they’ve made a one decision on where that business that they built up over decades and cherish and everything — they make one decision on where it’s going to go, and they’re not going to get surprised later on.

They’re not going to get some management consultant come in and say, “You ought to have a pure player, Wall Street’s saying, so you ought to spin this off or sell it,” or anything like that.

And they know we’re not going to leverage it up. So they know they’re really going to get to do what they love the most, which is to continue to run their business, not bothered by bankers or lawyers or public expectancies or anything of the sort.

And that is a — like I said earlier, that’s a real advantage.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, in the show business, they say the show has legs if it’s going to last a long time. I think Berkshire Hathaway’s system has legs.

29. Why the annual meeting isn’t webcast

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that, we’ll go to Becky. (Laughter)

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Humin Timadin (PH) in Seattle, Washington. He’s got a two-part question. But he says, “From time to time, you purchase shares of public companies.

“Presumably, you feel that those shares are a better investment than Berkshire shares at the time, since you never buy back Berkshire shares.

“If Berkshire shareholders can purchase shares in the same companies for the same price as you, why shouldn’t they shell — sell their Berkshire shares and buy what you are buying?”

And secondly, he wants to know why, because he, “like thousands of other shareholders, is unable to attend the annual meeting, how come Berkshire does not webcast the meeting? I am aware of the irony that I will not hear your answer.” (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, our meeting does get written up, at least it gets written up a lot with various blogs and everything else. It gets written up pretty well in its entirety by Outstanding Investor Digest.

And there are others that prepare extensive reports. And they pop up on the internet. So he will, in all likelihood, find out the answer.

We could webcast. I get asked the same question about webcasting the meetings I have with students. You know, why not do that? It’s so much easier and everything.

I think there is something gained by personal contact. I certainly know that when I was studying and all of that, I gained a lot by personal contact.

Even though I’d read Ben Graham’s books, just going and being with him. And I follow that practice in teaching. And I think that —

I like the turnout we get. I like our partners to show up and see the products we sell and all of that. This is not something where we’re going to go and hide and hold our meeting, you know, in some hamlet, you know, in western Nebraska or something to discourage attendance.

We’ve got a different attitude. And I think that that — I hope that comes across. And I think that if we webcast it, you know, it was something like turning on a television show, I don’t think it would be quite the same.

30. No “quarrel” with copycats

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of the first part of the question about buying the securities we buy, plenty of people do that. And some of them — but they — incidentally, they’re not buying it with free float that’s available from insurance.

So if they have $58 billion that they can get interest-free, they will be in the same position we are in buying those securities. But they are — on the other hand, they have some tax advantages we don’t have. So I don’t quarrel with people who do that.

We have to publicize to some extent what we own. Some things they wouldn’t be able to buy because we make direct purchases.

They wouldn’t be able to buy into the businesses we own. But they might very well do better piggybacking us in some way. And they’re certainly free to do it.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, generally, I think it’s quite smart to do what you’re talking about — is to identify some investors you regard as very skilled, and carefully examine everything they’re buying, and copy what you please. I think you have a very good idea. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I used — when I was 21 years old, I had to mail away to the SEC in those days — and you had these crummy copies about a week later and paid a lot per page to get them — but I used to get the semi-annual reports of Graham-Newman Corp before I went to work there.

And I would look at every security that was listed there. And I got some of my ideas that way. So it’s a — there’s nothing wrong with that.

31. Your best inflation protection

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sam Alter (PH). I’m 11 years old and I’m from Westminster, New Jersey.

My question is, how will inflation affect my generation? And how is Berkshire investing to prepare for this time? (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that was about inflation, right? How inflation was going to affect him?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. How is inflation —?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, inflation is going to affect you. You know, the — it’s certain we will have inflation over time.

Paul Volcker got very upset the other day and spoke out about three weeks ago, I guess, when he read that a majority of the Federal Open Market Committee had sort of targeted 2 percent inflation as the number.

And Volker, who came in when inflation was raging and saw the problems of stopping it when it got a momentum of its own, said, “You know, 2 percent sounds great, but in a generation it cuts away purchasing power by 50 percent.”

He was — kind of a long generation, there — but he was right in that once you start thinking about a couple percent, you are on something of a slippery slope.

And we are following policies in this country now to stimulate things, which — stimulate business — which are bound to have some inflationary consequences.

And to the extent that we borrow money from the rest of the world, it would be very human on the part of politicians in the future to decide that they would rather pay the rest of the world back in dollars that are worth far less than the dollars they borrowed.

I mean, it’s the classic way of reducing the impact and cost of external debt. And we’re building up a lot of external debt.

I always find it interesting when politicians now talk about using the taxpayer’s money to do this and the taxpayer’s money to do that and how the taxpayers are paying the bonuses at AIG.

We haven’t raised taxes at all in this country. You know, I mean, taxpayers are paying nothing beyond what they were paying a couple years ago.

Matter of fact, the federal revenues this year, which were close to 2.6 trillion a couple years ago, you know, maybe more like 2.3 trillion. So we are taking less money from the taxpayers.

The people who are really paying for the things we’re doing now will probably be the people who are buying fixed-dollar investments, much of it from the U.S. government, and who will find the purchasing power when they go to redeem those investments to be far less.

So you can — you might say that the AIG bonus is — probably the Chinese have — are the people that are ultimately paying the most in terms of the loss of purchasing power they will have with their holdings of government bonds, U.S. government bonds, many years down the road. But it sounds better to say the taxpayer than to say the Chinese are paying for it.

It’s an interesting situation. I read that comment everyday about how the taxpayers are doing this and that. And, you know, I haven’t had my taxes raised. You haven’t had your taxes raised. They’re giving me $250 bucks back here pretty soon.

The taxpayers haven’t paid anything so far. And my guess is that the ultimate price of much of this will be paid by a shrinkage in the value of — the real value — of fixed-dollar investments down the road.

And that will be the easiest thing to do. And if it’s the easiest thing to do, it’s the most likely thing to have happen.

So you will see plenty of inflation. Now, the best protection against inflation is your own earning power.

If you’re the best teacher, if you’re the best surgeon, if you’re the best lawyer, you know, whatever it may be, you will command a given part of other people’s production of goods and services no matter what the currency is, whether it’s seashells, or reichsmarks, or dollars.

So your own earning power is the best, by far. If you’re the best journalist, whatever it may be, you will get your share of the national economic pie, regardless of the value of whatever the currency may be, as measured against some earlier standard.

The second best protection is a wonderful business. You know, if you own the Coca-Cola, trademark, Company, you will get a given portion of people’s labor 20 years from now and 50 years from now for your product.

And it’s doesn’t make any difference what’s happened to the price level, generally. Because people will give up three minutes of labor, whatever it may be, to enjoy, you know, 12 ounces, you know, of a product they like.

So those are the — and — those are the great assets, your own earning power first, and then the earning power of a wonderful business that does not require heavy capital investment.

If it requires heavy capital investment, you get killed in inflation. And with those guidelines, I would tell you the best thing to do is invest in yourself.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. The young man should become a brain surgeon and invest in Coca-Cola instead of government bonds. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I get paid by the word. He doesn’t. (Laughter)

32. Newspapers are fading but we’re keeping the Buffalo News

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. This question comes to us from Dennis Wallace (PH) in Waldorf, Maryland. We got a lot of these. And I’m selfishly interested in the answer.

Given the current economic conditions in the newspaper and publishing business, can you please provide some of your thoughts on its impact on Berkshire? Given that our investee, the Washington Post Company, has had a substantial decline in its stock value, is it still a good use of capital?

And given the, quote, “cheap trading prices of newspapers in the current climate,” would Berkshire considering — consider purchasing additional newspapers to add to the Buffalo News and Washington Post properties?

At what price does it become compelling to invest in the newspaper business? Or is there no price at which it becomes compelling in today’s environment?

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say, it isn’t today’s environment. I mean, it’s an evolutionary development.

But — so the current economic environment has accentuated the problems in newspapers. But it is not the basic cause.

Newspapers are, to the American public as a whole — Charlie and I — I read five a day. Charlie probably reads five a day. We’ll never give them up.

But we’ll also be the last guys reading a newspaper while having a landline phone, you know, by our side. (Laughter)

So, you don’t want to judge consumer preferences by what we do. The newspaper — no. The answer is, for most newspapers in the United States, we would not buy them at any price.

They have the possibility, and in certain places, they’ve already hit it, but they have the possibility of just going to unending losses.

And they were absolutely essential to a very high percentage of the American public, you know, 20, 30, 40 years ago. They were the ultimate business.

It was a business where only one person won, basically, in almost every town in the country. There were 1,700 papers in the United States. And about 50 of those, 20 years ago, existed in a city where there were multiple papers.

So they were a product that had pricing power, that was essential to the customer, essential to the advertiser. And they’ve lost that essential nature.

They were primary 30 years or 40 years ago if you wanted to learn sports scores or stock prices or even news about international affairs.

And then that nature, what Walter Annenberg used to call “essentiality,” I don’t know whether it’s in the dictionary or not, but it started eroding. And then the erosion has accelerated dramatically.

And they were only essential to the advertiser as long as they were essential to the reader. And you know, nobody liked buying ads in the paper. It was just that they worked.

And that has — that is changing. It’s changing every day. And I do not see anything on the horizon that causes that erosion to end.

We — you know, at the Buffalo News, Stan Lipsey would greet me 10 years ago. And he would say, “Warren, you should — on an economic basis — you should sell this paper.” And I said, “I agree 100 percent. But we’re not going to do it.”

And you know, we could’ve sold the Buffalo News for many hundreds of millions of dollars some years back. And we couldn’t sell it, you know, for remotely anything like that now.

And that’s one of the policies. We have a union that’s been very cooperative — unions, a bunch of unions — have been quite cooperative with us in recent months in trying to have an economic model that will at least keep us making a little money.

And as I put in the annual report, in our economic principles, that as long as we don’t think we face unending losses or have major union problems, we will stick with the businesses, even though it would be a mistake if you were acting as a trustee for, you know, a bunch of crippled children or something of the sort. And that’s just our policy at Berkshire.

The Post has a very good cable business. It has a very good education business. But it does not have answers on the newspaper business, as Don Graham wrote in the annual report. Nor does anyone else.

Now, we all keep looking around for somebody that will find the model. But there — I think there are about 1,400 daily papers now in the United States, and nobody yet has found the model.

We are as well-positioned in Buffalo, believe it or not, I think, to play out the game as anyone else. But whether we find something before the lines get so that we’re inexorably in the red, whether the situation gets so we’re inexorably in the red, I don’t know.

But we will play it out as long as we can. It’s not what they teach you in business school. But it’s the way we run Berkshire.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s all 100 percent right. And it’s really a national tragedy. The — these monopoly daily newspapers have been an important sinew of our civilization.

And, by and large, they were impregnable from advertiser pressure. And by and large, they were desirable editorial influences. And by and large, they kept government more honest than it would otherwise be.

So as they disappear, I think what replaces it will not be as desirable as what we’re losing. But this is life.

33. Expect weak consumer spending for “quite a bit longer”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Marc Rabinov, from Melbourne Australia.

I’m wondering if I could ask you how retailing, manufacturing, and service businesses have been severely impacted by the recession given the way consumer spending has changed. Is it likely the results will still be 20 percent below 2007 levels in three years’ time?

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know about three years’ time. Certainly those areas you named, to varying degrees, have been hit very hard.

Some of the manufacturing would tie in with residential construction. If we hold housing starts at 500,000 a year, you know, my guess is that in a couple of years at most, we would get something close to equilibrium in housing. Maybe quite a bit sooner. Nobody knows the figures with precision.

But if you keep forming households at a million-3, or something like that, a year, and you create 500,000 new units and a few of the old ones burn down, and a few — you will reach equilibrium at a point that’s not ridiculously far in the future.

And that will make a big difference in our carpet business, and brick business, and insulation business, and paint business, and so on.

Retailing has been hit very hard. The higher the end of it, generally speaking, the harder it’s been hit.

There’s been a big change in consumer behavior. And I think it will last quite a bit longer.

I think for years, government was telling people to save. And now that they’re saving, they’re unhappy about it.

But I think that — I think the experience of the last couple years, I don’t think will go away very fast. I think it could last quite a long time.

So I would not think our retailing businesses would do great for a considerable period of time.

And I would say that in retail real estate, I would think that that would be a tough field to be in for quite a period.

I think the shopping centers will be seeing vacancies that will be hard to fill. I think that the retailers will be struggling in many cases. And of course, the supply of real estate doesn’t go away.

So, that could be — the shopping center business, which was selling at, you know, these premiere cap rates of 5 percent or even less sometimes. I think that is going to look very silly before all of this is done. In fact, it already is looking that way. So I wouldn’t count — I wouldn’t —

The service businesses are generally the better businesses. They require less capital and they can be more specialized in the markets they serve, in general.

But I would not look for any quick rebound in the retail manufacturing service businesses. We’ve got a ways to go on that.

And we’ve got a ways to go on the ones that are construction related. But at least there, you can sort of see the math of when it’ll work out. And you can get a lot of information on what’s going on in real estate markets.

South Florida, I think, will be — for example, I think that’s going to be a problem for a long, long time.

I hope it isn’t. But I just think the math of it is pretty devastating, in terms of the number of units you have and net household formation down there. You’ve got a lot to wade through.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.

34. We’ll never buy back Berkshire shares at a “silly” price

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Carol.

CAROL LOOMIS: I got lots of question sent in to me about the possibility of Berkshire buying its own shares. And here’s what one said:

“You recently described Berkshire’s policy regarding share repurchase as self-defeating, because before repurchase, you said, you would write a letter to shareholders explaining why we are going to do it.

“You said the letter would, by necessity, tell investors that the stock price was at a substantial discount to intrinsic value, which would cause the stock price to rise.

“The letter would be, in essence, a buy recommendation, though as a matter of policy, you don’t make those.

“In the past, you have emphatically endorsed share repurchase by other companies and criticized managers who would not buy when the price was right.

“You have said no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases. Your previous views suggest little patience for a manager with a self-defeating policy.

“You’ve said when you have a manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases when these are clearly in the interest of owners, he reveals more than he knows of his motivations. So — and the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him.

“Would it not be rational to conclude that the market will appropriately discount Berkshire’s share price unless and until you abandon your self-defeating policy and engage in repurchases of shares?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, the — and this important, actually — the comments I made about repurchasing, overwhelmingly, those go back a lot of years when stocks generally were — frequently were — cheap in relation to intrinsic value. I did not make that —

You haven’t seen me writing about that in the last 10 years or so. Because I would say most of the repurchasing done in recent years, I’ve thought has been foolish, because people have been paying too much.

And companies got, in many cases — they would never acknowledge this — but they were buying because they were basically liked — they were trying to give out a buy recommendation when it wasn’t justified.

In the ’70s and early ’80s, Charlie and I would frequently urge people to repurchase shares because it was so much more attractive than other things they could do with their money.

The only time we felt strongly that Berkshire should repurchase its shares was in roughly 2000, whenever it was, that we thought it was demonstrably below intrinsic business value. And we wrote we would do it, and it did become self-defeating.

There’s clearly a point where if we thought it was demonstrably below — conservatively estimated — intrinsic business value and we notified the stock holders we were going to do it, we would do it. I think again, it would largely be self-defeating.

I don’t think that situation exists now. I think — I won’t give any buy or sell recommendations. But I think it ought to be quite compelling.

Like I say, I don’t — I think, probably 90 percent of the repurchase activity I’ve seen in the last five years, I did not think was serving the cause of the shareholder.

I thought it was being done because management thought it was the thing to do, and their investor relations department told them it was the thing to do, and they were actually buying stock at kind of silly prices.

And that was not the case when Charlie and I looked at Teledyne or the Washington Post or Cap Cities Broadcasting doing it many years ago. But I haven’t seen situations like that in recent years.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that, either.

WARREN BUFFETT: Number — it’s interesting how many companies were buying in their stock at twice present prices that aren’t buying it now. I mean, there are lots of those.

We will never buy in our stock at a silly price. We may make a mistake by not buying it at a cheap price. But we’ll never make a mistake, I don’t think, by buying it at a silly price.

And we think a significant percentage of corporate America has done that in recent years, including a few stocks that we’ve owned ourselves.

35. Crisis made opportunity cost calculations difficult

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 13.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jack Benben (PH) from Haworth, New Jersey. First, I’d like to thank you. This is — I’ve been to about a dozen meetings. This is probably the best one.

So thank you very much for the new format. And thank you very much to the journalists who’ve really helped out a lot. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: At past meetings, you and Mr. Munger have talked at great length about opportunity cost. Excuse me. The past year has presented you with many unusual opportunities.

Can you discuss some of the more important opportunity cost decisions of the past year? And were those decisions at all affected by the macroeconomic picture? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly opportunity cost has been much more in the forefront of mind in the last 18 months.

When things are moving very fast, when both prices are moving, and in certain cases, intrinsic business value is moving at a pace that’s far greater than we’ve seen for a long time, it means that in terms of calibrating A versus B, versus C, it’s tougher.

It’s more interesting. It’s more challenging. But it’s — and it can be way more profitable, too. But it’s a different task then when everything was moving at a more leisurely pace.

And I described earlier, you know, we face that problem. And it’s a good problem to have. We faced that problem in September and October. Because we want to always keep a lot of money around.

We have all kinds of levels — extra levels of safety — that we follow at Berkshire. And we will never get so we’re dependent on banks or other people’s money or anything else. We’re just not going to run the company that way.

So we were seeing things happen. I mean, we got a call — we got lots of calls. But, most of them, we ignored. But the calls that we got that we ignored helped us calibrate the calls that we paid attention to, too.

And if we got a call from a Goldman Sachs, I think it was on a Wednesday, maybe, you know, that was a transaction that couldn’t have been done the previous Wednesday and might not be done the next Wednesday.

And we’re talking real sums, 5 billion in that case. And we had certain commitments outstanding. We had a $3 billion commitment out on Dow Chemical. I think at that point, I could be wrong exactly on the day when we made it.

We had a $5 billion commitment out on Constellation Energy. We had 6 1/2 billion we were going to have to come up with in early October on the Wrigley-Mars deal. So we were faced with opportunity cost-type considerations.

And as I said earlier, we actually sold something that under normal circumstances we wouldn’t have thought about selling if it was 10 or 15 points higher, in Johnson & Johnson. But we just didn’t want to get uncomfortable.

So you are faced, in a chaotic market, particularly where people needs large sums — so you’re not talking about buying a hundred million dollars’ worth of something that, you know, one day and a hundred million the next day — but all of a sudden you’re called on for billions, if you’re going to play at all.

We faced that opportunity cost calculation frequently during that period. I mean, when we decided to commit to buy Constellation Energy, we had to be willing to come up with $5 billion seven or eight months down the line. And you didn’t know exactly when because it would be subject to public utility commission approval.

But if something chaotic happened in the market next week, we would get phone calls. Or we would see stocks selling or bonds selling at prices we liked. And if the relative values, against what we held, were interesting, we might sell things.

Now, it’s harder to sell things in huge quantities than it is to buy things in huge quantities during a period like that. So you have to measure whether you can actually get the offsetting transaction done to move from one to another.

We have a much — if we’re going to move billions from one to another, it’s much different than the problem you may have in moving hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands of dollars from one holding to another. We really can have big transactional costs unless we’re careful.

But that’s the kind of calculation we go through. And we love the fact we get the opportunity to make those calculations. It’s a sign of opportunity around.

And you know, we’ll — we haven’t had the flurry of activity like we had last year for a long time. So it was the first time we really faced the question, you know, can we raise a couple billion dollars in a hurry, to be sure that we’ve offset the cash needs of what we’re committing to on the purchase side.

On the Johnson & Johnson we sold, we actually made a deal where we got — I had a floor price on what we sell that for, just because the markets were so chaotic, that we wanted to be absolutely sure that we would not end up a couple billion dollars less than comfortable when we got all through.

Our definition of comfortable is really comfortable. We want to have billions and billions and billions around. And then we’ll think about what we do with the surplus.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Again, I’ve got nothing to add.

36. GEICO spends millions on advertising and will “never stop”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from someone named Yem (PH) in Columbus, Ohio. It’s —

WARREN BUFFETT: That narrows it down.

BECKY QUICK: Yeah. Very company specific. It says, “GEICO has been spending around 400 to $600 million on media advertising a year in the last few years. What are the deciding factors into how much to spend? And how could one estimate the net return on such spending?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a question people have been asking themselves since the beginning of advertising.

And, you know, I’m not sure whether it was Marshall Field or John Dorrance at Campbell Soup, or something, one of those fellows said that, you know, when asked whether they didn’t waste a lot of money on advertising, he said, “Yeah, we waste half of it, but we don’t know which half.” (Laughter)

And that is the nature of advertising. Although, we can measure it better with GEICO than most companies.

We will spend about $800 million on advertising. We spend far more — even though we’re the third largest company — we’ve spent far more than State Farm or Allstate. And we will spend more and more and more. I mean, we will never stop.

We were spending $20 million a year, a little over that, when we bought control of it in 1995.

But we want everybody in the world to — well, everybody in the United States. We’re not going to be selling insurance in China or someplace very soon.

But we want everybody in the United States to have in their mind the fact that there’s a good chance they can save money by picking up the phone or going to geico.com and checking it out. And important money.

And when we get that message in people’s minds, you never know when it’s going to pay off later down the line. Because, as I mentioned earlier, starting in — around September 30th, we saw a big difference in the propensity of people to come to us to save $100 or $200, whereas they might not have cared about saving that before. So, we want —

Here’s auto insurance. Everybody has to buy it. Nobody likes to buy it. But they like to drive. And if you like to drive, you need auto insurance.

And so it’s going to sell. And you’re going to buy it from somebody. And if you care about saving money, you’re going to check with us. And we want to make sure everybody understands that.

And we won’t — you know, we will spend more money on it, I will guarantee you, three years from now.

Now, we’re getting more for our money in buying advertising this year. So 800 million this year buys more than 800 million would’ve bought a couple of years ago. So we’re getting more exposure for the money.

But we love spending money on advertising at GEICO. And we want to be in everybody’s mind.

Coca-Cola’s in everybody’s mind around the world. You know, he started in 1886. And they just kept associating Coca-Cola with moments of pleasure and happiness. And billions and billions of billions of people have that in their mind.

And they don’t have anything in their mind about RC Cola, you know. You know, or — they just — you say RC Cola to somebody around the globe and they give you a blank stare. You say Coca-Cola and it means something.

And a brand is a promise. We’re getting our — we’re getting that promise in people’s minds that there’s a good chance they can save money if they check with GEICO. And we’ll never stop.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s interesting.

If GEICO would remain more or less the same size if we didn’t advertise so healthy, and if the new subscribers are worth more than the $800 million we’re spending advertising, then, in an important sense, GEICO is earning $800 million more pre-tax in a way that doesn’t even show.

That’s the kind of thing we like to see within Berkshire Hathaway.

WARREN BUFFETT: The value of GEICO goes up by far more than the earnings every year, if we keep adding these people, as Charlie says.

And we could maintain, I’m sure, we can maintain for a very long time our present policy holder count and probably spend $100 million a year, maybe less.

But we are getting more than our money’s worth for the — for what we spend. We probably waste some. But overall, we’re getting at terrific return on it.

And if I thought we could get anything like the same return by spending 2 billion next year, we’d spend 2 billion. I mean, it — it’s a very attractive business. And I don’t see how you create anything like it.

I mean, we are the low-cost producer. And if you’re the low-cost producer in something people have to buy and is roughly a $1,500 item, I mean, you’ve got a terrific, terrific business. And we have durable competitive advantage there.

37. Wells Fargo is better than many other banks

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll to go to number 1. And I think then we’ll break for lunch. Number 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Hello Warren, Charlie. Felton Jenkins from Savannah, Georgia, a long-time shareholder and partner.

Just want to make a quick comment about something that was a big deal the last couple of years about PacifiCorp. There was some controversy.

But I’m glad that PacifiCorp has agreed to work with the Native Americans and fishing communities on the West Coast to remove the uneconomic and harmful dams on the Klamath River.

So I want to encourage PacifiCorp management to move quickly, close the deal, and open the river soon. But thanks for their improved efforts over the last year.

My question is, you mentioned Wells Fargo got to $9. And that was a great deal, it looks like, at that price.

But what about Washington Mutual, AIG, Wachovia, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, even some Irish banks that I think you were involved with?

Those went through $9. And probably a lot of people thought they were still good deals or mispriced at $9.

And now you’ve got very expensive toilet paper, essentially, out of those stock certificates. So I mean, how would you know on the way down?

And looking at something like Bank of America, that was on the 13F sometime recently, what’s a likely outcome for a Bank of America and how would you analyze what might happen? Thanks.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s some you can’t analyze. And on the Irish banks, I couldn’t have been more wrong.

But it isn’t a matter of whether they go through $9 or anything like that. It’s really what their business model is and what kind of competitive advantage they have.

I would say that Wells, among the large banks, has, by far, the best competitive position, you know, of any — of the really large banks in the country.

And essentially, if you look at the four largest, they each have somewhat different models. But the model of Wells is more different from the other three than any one of the other three would be from the remaining group.

But I was wrong on the Irish banks in a very big way. I simply didn’t understand. And I should’ve understood.

It was available for me to understand, the incredible exposure they’d got into in more land development-type loans — not property loans, in terms of completed properties — but all kinds of land development loans.

It was extraordinary. For a country with 4 and a fraction million people, you know, they had money lent for developing properties, homes, that would extend just forever in the future.

It was the terrible mistake by me. Nobody lied to me, nobody gave me any bad information. I just plain wasn’t paying attention. The —

If you talk about the WaMus — I don’t want to go through all the names on them, because it’s specific to some companies.

But there were a lot of signs that they were doing things that a highly leveraged institution shouldn’t be doing. And that could cause trouble if this model of ever-rising housing prices turned out to be a false model.

You can get in a lot of trouble with leverage. I mean, it’s — you start creating $20 of assets, or something like that. You know, for every dollar of equity, you better be right.

And some of those big institutions did some very — what, in retrospect, for certain here — were foolish things, which, if they hadn’t been so highly leveraged, would not have hit them as badly.

And I would say most of them, if you read the 10-Ks and 10-Qs and did some checking, you could spot differences in them. Certainly, you can spot —

There’s no comparison, if you take Wells Fargo versus a WaMu or something like that. I mean, you don’t have to have an advanced level of sophistication about banking to compare those two.

They’re two different kinds of businesses. It’s like comparing a copper producer whose costs are $2.50 a pound with a copper producer whose costs are $1 a pound.

Those are two different kinds of businesses. One is going to go broke at a buck-fifty a pound. And the other one’s going to still be doing fine.

And banking has real difference in it. But people don’t — they don’t seem to look at them. The figures are available. And — but they don’t seem to look at them very carefully.

When Wells reported the other day, they have an item of expense of over $600 million in a quarter for the amortization of core deposits. That it not a real expense.

I mean, the core deposit figure will be up over time. And they are entitled under the tax law to put up, I don’t know, $15 billion or so, and they get to amortize that, which is an advantage.

But I didn’t see one newspaper article or any commentator that mentioned that that $600 million charge is in there, which is entirely different than looking at any other bank. But it just — it goes unnoticed.

So the figures are there. And the information’s there. And I think with Freddy and Fannie, for example, I think it was pretty clear what was going to happen.

Now, the interesting thing is, the government was telling them to go out and raise some more money for investors. And if those investors had put the money in, it would’ve been gone. It was already gone, actually, within a month or two, so —.

We had calls on that, people trying to — investment bankers — trying to place billions of dollars with us on something, on those two institutions. And you just could take one look at them and you could tell they were in big, big trouble.

You do have to know a little bit about — you have to know something about banking and what’s going on in the various kinds of lending and everything.

And I would say that generally speaking, for people that don’t spend a lot of time on their investments, they’re going to have trouble separating financial institutions.

I think it’s much easier to come to a conclusion on something like Coca-Cola or Procter & Gamble than it is for a person who is spending only a limited amount of time on investing to make a decision on whether to own bank A, or bank B, or bank C.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there’s another problem. Generally accepted accounting principles allow a conservative, sensible bank to show vastly increased earnings if it changes its practices to make a lot of extremely dumb loans in large volumes.

Generally accepted accounting principles should not be constructed to allow this result. It’s — that what seduces so many of these bankers into this ghastly decision-making.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, when we bought Gen Re, they had a financial products division. It was named similarly to the AIG one. It was called Gen Re Financial Products — AIG Financial Products.

And it produced numbers regularly that were always satisfactory numbers. But, you know, when we looked at that, you know, it looked like all kinds of trouble to us.

It cost us over 400 million to get out of. And a black box like that can produce — that’s why managements love them to some degree, they can produce numbers.

They don’t necessarily produce cash. And they sure as hell can produce all kinds of problems if you have to start posting collateral and doing things of that sort.

And I would say it is tough for, you might say, the passive investor, the one who’s not spending very much time on it. I would say it’s difficult for them to discern when that’s going on.

So I — it’s not a bad area to just say, “This one’s too tough,” and go onto something else that’s a lot easier.

I think you can analyze a utility operation easier or, you know, some premier consumer company or something of the sort.

I don’t think I would look for the tough situations to differentiate tough industries in which to differentiate things.

But there are huge differentiations. And again, I urge to read the JP Morgan Chase — Jamie Dimon’s letter. Because you’ll learn a lot by reading that.

CHARLIE MUNGER: But a lot of the new regulation that is coming wouldn’t have even been needed if accounting had done a better job, particularly in banking.

And yet, I have yet to meet an accountant from any of the big firms who has said, “I’m ashamed of my own profession.”

That’s a mistake in accounting. If they don’t have shame, they’re not thinking right.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that happy thought, we will — (laughter) — we will go to lunch now.

We’ll reconvene about — let’s reconvene about a quarter of one. We’ll start at that time with Andrew and move onto section 2 when we come back.

Afternoon session

1. Quarterly earnings release schedule

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s get back to work.

I should mention one thing, because it’s appeared in the press recently — a bit.

We will — our goal is to issue every quarterly report on the last Friday — after the close — prior to the expiration of the 40-day period after the end of a quarter that we have for reporting to the SEC.

The SEC says 40 business days — or 40 calendar days — unless it ends on a weekend. Forty calendar days after the end of the quarter — that you have to file.” If it comes on a weekend, then it’s the Monday following that.

That usually means — because we hold the meeting, usually, on the first Saturday in May — it usually means that the last Friday possible will be the day before the annual meeting.

This year, because the meeting is early on a calendar basis, because of Saturday falling on May 2nd, the last Friday will fall on May 8th. And that — our policy —

We like to get it out on a Friday afternoon, if possible, because we want people to have the whole weekend to read it before the market opens. It takes time to — I think it takes time, anyway — to digest the report.

And we’d like — we don’t want some headline to determine market prices. We want, as much as possible, a thorough reading of the report.

So we will always, unless something comes up, makes it unfeasible, we will issue our quarterly reports on the last Friday before the expiration of the 40-day period. And that’s what we’ll do this quarter. And so we have not changed anything.

2. Preliminary Q1 earnings

WARREN BUFFETT: I can tell you some preliminary figures, which then we have to file an 8-K on, because then the information I give you has to be in the public domain before the market opens.

But our — what I call our operating earnings, which would be the earnings before any gains or losses from securities or derivatives or any other transactions of that sort, the operating earnings will be about, after-tax, about 1.7 billion against 1.9 billion last year.

And — as I told you, we’re lucky to be — in this particular period — we’re lucky to be in the insurance and utility business. They’re relatively unaffected by the recession. Whereas most of our other businesses are anywhere from significantly to drastically affected by the recession.

We had an underwriting profit, in our insurance business. It was a little larger than last year.

Our float increased a couple of billion. That was primarily due to a transaction that was announced with Swiss Re, which occurred in March, in which they bought what’s known as an “adverse loss development cover” — and gave us 2 billion Swiss francs for that.

Now, that’s very, very long float. And the probability is that we will not pay out on that, probably, for at least 15 years and maybe quite a bit longer. So that’s long-duration float. And that’s what accounts for the 2 billion— roughly — $2 billion gain in float.

The utility business — earnings are reported down somewhat. But there were two items that account for that. One is that, on our Constellation Energy deal, which blew up last year, and we reported a significant gain on it, we got a bunch of Constellation stock.

And that is a mark-to-market and goes through our income account, every day, in theory, but certainly every quarter. And Constellation was down somewhat during the quarter. So that got charged against the utility earnings.

And then a larger item was a payment, and the final payment, in terms of options that were issued 10 years ago, which had the effect of increasing Berkshire’s interest in MidAmerican, which we like.

But we wrote a check, a significant check, with MidAmerican to buy out the option. So — and that got recorded as an expense in the first quarter.

But the utility earnings are more than satisfactory with those two items in it.

Then when you get into all of our other businesses, with just a couple of exceptions — those businesses are basically down. I mean, they’re all getting hit to varying degrees by the recession. So — that’s basically the operating earnings story.

Our book value per share went down about 6 percent in the first quarter, which is a combination of security markets, and the fact that the credit default swaps, which — I’m the one responsible for writing them — that experience has turned worse, even since I wrote the annual report, in terms of bankruptcy.

So that loss — or potential loss — we’re actually still funds ahead by a substantial margin — but that potential loss — and, I would say, expectable loss — is reflected in the first quarter figures. And of course, there’s been some bounce-back since March 31st. But that’s pretty much the story of the first quarter.

We ended the quarter with cash equivalence of about 22.7 billion, excluding any cash at the utility or at the finance company operation.

But we spent 3 billion of that the next day on a Dow Chemical preferred. So we actually ended, effectively, one day later, the quarter with a little less than 20 billion in cash.

We always keep a significant amount of cash at the parent company, not at the regulated subsidiaries, so that — whatever comes along, we’re prepared for.

And that’s pretty much the story of the first quarter. And I wouldn’t be surprised — I mean, I guess I would almost be surprised if the opposite happened, if the world changed much — over the remainder of the year.

I think that we will continue, barring some huge natural catastrophe, we will do quite well on insurance. And we will do in the utility operation. And we won’t do well in most of the other operations.

But we will have significant operating earnings, which I mentioned is about a billion-seven the first quarter.

If you look at our operating earnings, a billion, or a little more, that comes from MidAmerican — from our energy business, basically — we’re going to leave in that business. I mean, there’s all kinds of opportunities to do things even within our present subsidiaries. There’s lots of projects that promise decent returns.

So you should not think of that billion or so as being available to us at the parent. It would be, if we wanted it to be. But as a practical matter, we’re going to leave it all in.

The rest of the earnings are available to us in cash, plus or minus any change in the float, to do anything interesting that comes along.

So that’s an abbreviated summation of the first quarter. We will put out the 10-Q next Friday after the close. And we’ll continue to follow that policy.

3. “Value” investments? What other kind are there?

WARREN BUFFETT: With that, we’ll go to Andrew.

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Excellent. This question actually just came across the BlackBerry before lunch from what I think is an audience member.

Josh Wolfe (PH) of New York writes the following: “BYD appears to be more like a venture capital speculative investment than a value investment. Would you both explain that investment, your logic behind it, and your expectations for it?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’m going to turn that over to Charlie in just one second. But Charlie and I think there is no other kind of investment than a value investment.

In other words, we don’t know how anybody would invest in a non-value investment. So we’ve always been puzzled by the term, “value,” and saying that contrasts with growth or anything.

Value relates to getting a lot for the expectable flow of cash in the future, in terms of what you’re laying out today.

So we — we’ve always — every time somebody characterizes us as value investors, we always ask them, what other kind can there be?

4. Munger: Electric car maker BYD is a “damn miracle”

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie is our team leader here on BYD. And he gets very excited. So I may have to control him. But go to it, Charlie. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, well, of course, BYD, although its founder is only 43 years old, is not some early-stage venture capital company.

BYD is one of the main manufacturers to the world of the rechargeable lithium battery. And it achieved that position from a standing start at zero under the leadership of the founder, Wang Chuanfu.

And — they went on into cell phone components and developed a huge position.

And then, finally, not satisfied with having worked a couple of miracles, Wang Chuanfu decided he would go into the automobile business.

As nearly as I can tell, it was zero experience in automobiles. And from a standing start at zero and with very little capital, he rapidly was able to create the best-selling single model in China.

And that’s against competition that was Chinese joint ventures with all the major auto companies of the world, technological marvels with way more capital and so on.

This is not some unproven, highly speculative activity. What it is, is a damn miracle. And — (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I warned you. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: And of course, Wang Chuanfu has hired 17,000 engineering graduates. And those engineering graduates are selected from a billion, 300 million people in China.

And he’s hiring at the top of the classes. And — so you get a remarkable aggregation of human talent.

And then you’ve got the basic quality of the Chinese people. Which, when unfettered from the wrong kind of government — for instance, the wrong kind of emperor — the Chinese people succeed mightily.

When they came to this country as “coolies” — slaves — they would leave and soon be the most important people in the town.

So this is a very talented group of people. And, in a sense, this particular period may be Chinese — the Chinese day.

And of course, these batteries, these lithium batteries, are totally needed in the future of the world. We need them in every utility company in America. We need them in every utility company in the world.

And we have to use the direct power of the sun. And we can’t do that without marvelous batteries. And he’s in the — BYD is in the sweet spot on that stuff.

And I know it looks like a miracle. And it looks like Warren and I have gone crazy. But I don’t think we have.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, one of us, at most. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that car you’re going to see in the annex — I think they make everything in that car except the glass and the rubber. There may be a couple of small exceptions.

That’s unheard of. Whoever went into the automobile business and made every part, and made the automobile a best-settle — best-selling — thing? This is not normal. I mean, this is very unusual.

And I regard it as a privilege to have Berkshire associated with a company that is trying to do so much that’s so important for humanity, when you get right down to it. Because it may be a small company, but its ambitions are large.

And I don’t want to bet against 17,000 Chinese engineers led by Wang Chuanfu, plus 100,000 more talented Chinese in a brand-new area — constructed the way they want it. I will be amazed, if great things don’t happen here.

I don’t think, given the size, it can be all that important to Berkshire, financially. But I have never, in my life, been more — felt more privileged to be associated with something than I feel about BYD.

WARREN BUFFETT: BYD was Charlie’s last year. The Irish banks were mine. So he’s — (laughter) — the winner.

BYD, incidentally, does $4 billion a year of business. I mean, so it is not a small business. And it will probably get a lot larger.

5. U.S. dollar will buy less in the future

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to the — area 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Dan Lewis (PH). I’m from Chicago.

My question has to do with the U.S. dollar versus other major currencies. You spoke a little bit already about the — government policy and its effect on inflation in the future.

And just by itself, you’d think inflation would hurt the dollar. But obviously, there’s a lot of other factors at play. So I’m kind of interested in knowing your latest outlook on the dollar.

I know you’ve been bearish. But given everything that’s been thrown up in the air in the last six months, how you think these various things will come together, trade deficit, budget deficits, and how it will affect the dollar?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s pretty unpredictable. But the — I will guarantee you that the dollar will buy less, you know, five, 10, 20 years from now. And it may be — it may buy very, very substantially less.

But I don’t know that, obviously. But we are doing things that will hurt the purchasing power of the dollar.

On the other hand, the same thing is happening in countries around the world. So it’s very difficult to say whether the dollar versus the pound or the dollar versus the euro, et cetera — how that will behave.

Because, you know, the British will run a deficit this year of 12 and a fraction percent of GDP. And even the Germans, with their, you know, long-time fear of inflation, will probably run a deficit of 6 and a fraction percent of GDP.

So you’ve got governments around the world all electing to run — and I think properly so — electing to run very material deficits, in some cases, you know, close to unprecedented except in wartime — electing to do that in order to offset this contraction of demand by their citizenry.

And how that plays out in relative exchange rates, I can’t tell you. How it will play out in terms of the value of their currencies’ purchasing power in the future versus now, I think, is fairly easy to say, and that’s that it’s going to cause units of currency to buy a lot less over time.

That isn’t going to happen in the next year or two. But that doesn’t mean that markets won’t start anticipating it at some point. And it’s going to be a very, very interesting future.

I mean, we are doing things that we haven’t seen in the past. And policymakers do not know the outcome of that. I don’t know the outcome of it. You do know it will have consequences. And — you can bet on inflation.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — I was raised here in Omaha. And I well remember the two-cent first class stamp and the five-cent hamburger. And so, in my life, there’s been a lot of inflation.

And in my life, I think I’ve had the most privileged era of all history in which to live. So a little inflation is not going to ruin the lives of any of us.

The trick is to avoid the runaway inflation. That is a problem Warren and I are going to quitclaim to the younger people. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Here is a product, though. Six and a half ounces of this product, 100 years ago, cost a nickel plus a two-cent deposit. And it’s hardly gone up in price at all. It’s very interesting. And wheat hasn’t gone up that much or oats or things of that sort.

And on the other hand, a newspaper that cost a penny 100 years ago costs a dollar now and they lose money turning it out. So it gets very uneven, in terms of its impact.

6. Buffett “irritated” by the loss of triple-A rating

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?

CAROL LOOMIS: Warren, Charlie — this question, I got a good many of these. This one comes from — who does it come from? Well, it comes from Mr. Kempton (PH) — Kempton Lam or Lam Kempton (PH) — one of the two — from Calgary, Canada.

And the question is, “How would you quantify the financial impact and damage of Berkshire losing its triple-A credit rating — which increased the cost of capital of Berkshire, which was surely a competitive advantage for the company?

“And Warren, what are you doing actively to try to restore Berkshire’s triple-A rating? Do you think that Berkshire will be able to regain it?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it won’t regain it soon, because I don’t think rating agencies will turn around like that, even if they should. We have a triple-A from Standard & Poor’s, but it’s provisional. And they’re going to look at it in about — I think they said about 12 months.

Moody’s affirmed the rating early in January. Then we issued a bond at one point, where it was — well, that was right after the rating changed.

And actually, in terms of our credit default swaps, which is a metric you can use for credit acceptance — although, I’ll tell you, in a second, an interesting aspect of that — that spread came down, actually.

It makes very, very little difference in our borrowing costs. I mean, very little. And it never has, incidentally. I mean, double-As versus triple-As, the spread has always been very small.

And people would argue, in finance classes and all that, it wasn’t worth paying the price to have a triple-A because you didn’t save that much on debt. And it costs you, in terms of return on equity.

I never subscribed to that. And I very much liked having a triple-A from both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. I was disappointed when Moody’s downgraded us. We didn’t really think that was going to happen, but it did.

And — it doesn’t have any material effect on borrowing costs. It does cause us to lose some bragging rights around the world in terms of our insurance promise, although nobody ranks ahead of us, that’s for sure.

But, it will not change back in a hurry. I mean, people don’t make decisions in committees that they reverse very quickly. It’s just not human nature.

We’re still a triple-A in my mind. And actually, we’re a triple-A in Standard & Poor’s’ mind, till we hear something differently.

We certainly think, and we run it in a way, that there can be no stronger credit than Berkshire.

It’s difficult for a rating agency, if they have a checkbox system of ratios and such, to measure something like the attitude of management toward creditors.

But I will assure you that Berkshire has a management that regards meeting its obligations as sacred and a lot more important than increasing earnings per share or anything of the sort.

I mean, we have obligations to people in something like workers’ compensation that go 50 years out in the future. I mean, this is somebody that’s been injured severely and they get a check every month from Berkshire.

And you know, that’s a lot more important than whether we earn X, or X plus a tenth, or a couple of tenths, percent on equity. And we conduct ourselves, or we try to — certainly try to conduct ourselves — so that not only will people get those checks, but they’ll never have to even worry about getting those checks.

And that’s very difficult for a rating agency to quantify that attitude on the part of the management of Berkshire. But believe me, it exists.

And — I would say that the triple-A change at Moody’s is not going to be material in the future of Berkshire. But it still irritates me.

Charlie? (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at least they showed a considerable independence. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Who knows? That may have entered into it, too.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. My attitude is quite philosophical. I think the next change at Moody’s will be in the opposite direction. And I think that will happen because we deserve a higher rating and they’re smart. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie and I disagree, and we do disagree a lot. We never argue, but we disagree.

And Charlie, when he gets to the point where he really wants me to do something, like buy the BYD interest or something, he always says to me, “Well,” he says, “in the end, you’ll see it my way. Because you’re smart, and I’m right.” (Laughter)

7. “Crazy” prices for Berkshire credit default swaps

WARREN BUFFETT: I will — I can’t resist pointing out one item that is, maybe, a little technical to most of you. But there are some people here who will find it quite interesting. And it actually even enters into credit ratings to a great extent, the credit default swaps enter into it.

When we write a, let’s take an equity put option, and we get paid for writing a billion dollar put, somebody pays us $150 million, we get the $150 million of cash that day.

And we set up a liability for 150 million the first day, for the value or the — that we — our appraisal of what it’s going to cost us to meet that obligation. I mean, that’s the market price for it.

The other guy takes 150 million out of his cash and sets up a $150 million receivable that day.

Now, these receivables and payables change over time. But the first day, no profit, no loss, just cash changing hands. One guy sets up an asset, the other guy — we set up a liability.

Now, as the world has developed in the last couple of years, the value of that asset to the other fellow has increased in a mark-to-market basis.

And he reports that through earnings. So his asset goes up. Our liability goes up. And we report that through earnings as a loss.

But we’ve got the cash and he’s got an asset from us that comes due in 15 years or something like that.

And in the last couple of years, the — his auditors — his credit department — has said, “Gee, you’ve got a receivable from Berkshire that comes due in 15 years. And, they don’t have to post collateral. So you have to go out and buy a credit default swap to protect yourself against that receivable going bad.”

Now, that has two effects. A, he’s laying out money every year to buy something that doesn’t cost us anything but costs him real money. So the — and the more he shows us a profit, the more of the credit insurance he has to buy, so the more money it costs him every year.

And that has driven up the demand for credit default swaps at Berkshire, which made for some crazy prices. So at one point, our credit default swaps were costing that guy five percent a year.

So if he was showing, say, a $200 million asset, he was laying out $10 a year, and he was going to have to lay it out for 15 years, just because of these — this credit department’s requirements.

And it made it very unpleasant for the people on the other side of our transactions, even though they keep writing up the profits. It doesn’t cost us anything. But it does result in kind of a crazy market in the credit default swaps.

I realize that that has not been a burning issue with many of you. But it is an unusual — it’s something I didn’t anticipate.

And it explains why, to some extent, people may want to modify their contracts with us. And if they — with us — and if they want to modify them enough, we’ll answer the phone. But in the meantime, we’re sitting with the money. (Laughter)

8. MidAmerican working with Iowa on wind farms

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 3.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jim Hadden (PH), a Cornhusker in Davenport, Iowa.

On our drive over from Davenport, we noticed two rather large wind farms by MidAmerica Energy.

And my question is, when will be the return on investment of these wind farms? And are Berkshire Hathaway looking at any other alternative energies?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re the largest, in terms of owned capacity in wind, in the country, I believe, of any utility. And Iowa has the greatest percentage of its electricity generated by wind.

But of course, the wind only blows about 35 percent of the time in Iowa, something like that. And we’ve got people here who can be more accurate than that. But — so you can’t count on it for your base load or anything of the sort.

But Iowa has been very, very receptive and, I would argue, progressive, in encouraging us — and we’ve encouraged them, in return — to bring in a lot of wind capacity.

We are a net exporter of electricity in Iowa. Iowa’s far more than self-sufficient in our service area in terms of electric generation. And I think that works to the benefit of the people of Iowa.

And we have an arrangement with Iowa. We — as you may know, we have not increased our rates at all — what — for more than a decade now. And that’s been achieved by efficiencies. It’s been achieved with wind generation.

We have a return that’s built in on that that’s fair to us, fair to the people of Iowa. And part of that return comes in the form of a tax credit — I think it’s 1.8 cents per kilowatt hour — that is given to anybody in the United States that develops wind power generation.

We love the idea of putting in more wind. And we’re doing it. We’re doing it out at PacifiCorp. And I think we’ll continue to be a leader in it.

One advantage we have over, perhaps, some people is that we are a big taxpayer, so that we don’t have to worry about whether the tax credits are useful.

I guess the tax credit could be sold, also. But we don’t need to do that in our particular situation. So you’ll see more and more wind generation by the MidAmerican companies.

When we went into PacifiCorp out on the West Coast, to six states out there, they had virtually nothing — maybe nothing at all — in wind generation. And we’ve developed a lot. And we’ve got more coming on.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think in practically anything that makes sense in utilities, the Berkshire subsidiaries will be leaders. I think we can all be very proud of MidAmerican and its two leaders.

9. Constellation and Dynergy deals

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re enormously proud of MidAmerican. And we will do a lot more in utilities over time. Constellation didn’t work out. I wish it had. But we were back there — Constellation, we learned of their troubles on a Tuesday at noon. I mean, we saw it in the stock price and so on.

Dave Sokol and Greg Abel were in Baltimore that evening with a firm, all-cash bid to solve Constellation’s problems. And Constellation was likely to get downgraded within 48 hours, maybe 24 hours.

And they would’ve had posting requirements in connection with various derivative transactions that they probably would not have met. I mean, they were facing bankruptcy.

And we literally went from a phone call that Dave made to me at noon or 1 o’clock to handing them a firm bid that evening in Baltimore. And that’s one of the advantages of Berkshire. That is — I think that’s a durable competitive advantage.

I think there are very few organizations that will act in that manner and that — where you have the talent there that you feel is — as a CEO — you can back them up with that kind of money without worrying about it.

So it’s — that is a plus — for Berkshire, even though it didn’t work out in that case. We will do more in the utility business.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you bought a pipeline, didn’t you, in about two hours?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we did buy a pipeline, and it’s turned out very well.

And, in that particular case, the company, Dynegy, that — this was back in 2002 or so — the company needed the money enormously. They had gotten the pipeline from Enron. It was a very complicated transaction.

But they needed the money. And we needed the Federal Trade Commission approval, the FTC approval, on the deal, as would anybody that was buying it.

And we literally wrote a letter. I wrote a letter to the commission. And I said, you know, “These guys need the money. They need it before the 30-day period is up. And let us go through with this early. And we’ll do any damn thing you tell us, subsequently.”

And Berkshire can make that kind of a transaction. We don’t ask the lawyers before we do it or anything. We just do it.

And that is an advantage. And it was an advantage to Dynegy. It got them through a period that they would’ve — I’m not sure they would’ve gotten through otherwise. So, we can move fast when the time comes.

But the — one of the reasons we — there’s a couple of reasons we move fast. A, we’ve always got the money. You know, but — and we’ve got a mental attitude toward that.

But we also know we’ve got the managers that can deliver on the properties, once we own them. And that’s a huge, huge advantage. Back —

(BREAK IN RECORDING)

10. Foreign ownership rules limit China opportunities

WARREN BUFFETT (IN PROGRESS): — China. We would be restricted by that ownership limitation.

But it’s very hard to imagine that we won’t find more things to do in China over time. I mean, it’s a huge market. We do a lot of things. And some of those are exportable.

And there will also, perhaps, be opportunities to buy more businesses there. We would’ve bought more than 10 percent of BYD, if we could’ve. But, that’s all that they wished to sell us. So we hope that comes about.

11. U.S. trade deficit is actually China’s problem

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of the Chinese dollar holdings, you know, in a way, they can’t get rid of owning more dollar assets. I mean, the nature of it is, if we’re going to run a, as we did a few years ago, or a year or two ago —

If we’re going to run a $250 billion trade deficit with China, I mean, if they’re going to send us goods — and we want those goods — to the tune of $250 billion more than we sell to them, they end up with $250 billion of little pieces of paper.

And they can convert those pieces of paper, called U.S. dollars, they can convert them into — U.S. real estate, into U.S. stocks, U.S. government bonds. They can do all kinds of things.

They can even trade them to the French, you know, and get euros or something in exchange. But then the French have the problem.

So the — Chinese dollar assets are going to build as long as there’s a significant trade surplus with China. And then they have the choice of what to put those dollars into. And they have elected, so far, to put a significant amount — into U.S. government bonds.

And — I think — a major official, about a month ago or so in China, said he wasn’t too happy about the prospect of what’s going to happen in terms of the purchasing power of that money that’s been put in U.S. government bonds. And I would say he’s right.

I mean, he — it — he — anybody that owns dollar obligations outside of this country is, if they hold them a long time, is going to get less back in the way of purchasing power than existed at the time that they took on those dollar obligations.

And it’s a major problem, not the world’s worst problem, but it’s a major problem for a finance minister or a government in China to decide what to do with this buildup that comes about, because they are running a trade surplus.

And — they’ve set up the Chinese Investment Corp, which has a couple hundred billion dollars in it — in terms of deciding to make investments around the world, but —

12. Munger: China’s economic policies are “exactly right”

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s an interesting question, if you made me the finance minister of China, what I would do with the trade surplus, the funds that came in because of the trade surplus.

And I think it’ll take it over to Charlie and ask him what he would do, if he were the finance minister of China.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I (Inaudible) that is a very easy question. I would do exactly what they’re doing.

I think China has one of the most successful economic policies in the world. And China has advanced more rapidly than the rest of the world. And, I would say their policies are exactly right.

And their rate of advance is so great and so meaningful that if they lost a little bit of purchasing power on their dollar holdings, it’s a trifle in the big scheme of things from the viewpoint of China.

So I’ve got nothing but admiration for the way the Chinese have been running their own affairs. And they’re going to be very hard to compete with all over the world. And that is exactly the correct policy for China. That’s the way you get ahead fast is to be very hard to compete with all over the world.

So I think they’re doing it exactly right. And I think that the United States and China should be very friendly nations. Because we’re joined at the hip.

WARREN BUFFETT: So you’d suggest they keep buying U.S. Treasurys at —

CHARLIE MUNGER: You bet.

WARREN BUFFETT: — practically no yield?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Whatever the yield. They’re not no-yield. Because they can buy longer.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ve got some advice for the Chinese government. (Laughter)

13. Deal post-mortems shouldn’t be public

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?

CAROL LOOMIS: “In the past, you have stated that management should —”

This question comes from Ingrid Hendershot.

“In the past, you have stated that management should be required, after several years, to do a post-mortem on acquisitions it makes. Would you each provide us with your post-mortem on Berkshire’s largest acquisition, General Re?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think — I’ll comment on General Re, but I don’t think we generally should make our post-mortems public. I don’t think — I think that, if we acquired —

We do believe in post-mortems. We strongly believe in them. We think they’re conducted at far too few companies. It’s easy to propose a deal and it’s much harder to account for it later on.

And — Charlie is a big fan of rubbing anybody’s nose in their own problems.

And it absolutely should be done. I don’t think it necessarily should be made public.

I don’t think that you attract businesses by — and managers — by pointing out — even though you are the one that made the mistake, as the acquirer, in your projections — pointing out the shortfalls that may have occurred with the managers that are maybe doing a very good job to try and overcome the fact that you made a mistake in buying it in the first place. So I don’t want to — I wouldn’t want to get into that.

14. Buffett: I was “dead wrong” on Gen Re’s reputation

WARREN BUFFETT: Gen Re has worked out well after a terrible, terrible start. And I was dead wrong, in 1998, when I bought it, in thinking that it was the Gen Re of 15 years earlier, which had absolutely the premier reputation in the insurance world.

And some practices, in terms of reserving and underwriting, had changed somewhat. But I’m happy to say that, thanks to the combined work of Tad Montross, who is with us here today, and Joe, that the —

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s Joe Brandon.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Joe Brandon, of course. But Joe and Tad, when they took over in, what, September of 2001, actually — right about the time of the World Trade Center problem — they took after all of the problems. They went right after them, reserving, underwriting, whatever it might be.

And Gen Re is the company now that I thought it was when I purchased it in 1998.

So we’re proud of them. It was a very tough job. It wasn’t one that was going to get done by itself. And that, to some extent, when you tighten up on an organization that has fallen into some lax ways, it can — you know, that is not an easy job.

Both of them, or each of them, they could’ve left for some other place and made just as much money, maybe more money, not had to face the problems that they faced at Gen Re. But they hung in there. And now we have an organization that we feel terrific about and has a great future.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s right. And — but it’s very important that you have an ability to turn your lemons into lemonade.

And we were very, very lucky to have Joe and Tad to help us in the process. It wasn’t pleasant. And it wasn’t pretty. And it was very successful.

And it wasn’t something that ordinary managers would’ve been at all likely to do. You had to be very tough minded to fix General Re. And they really did fix it.

WARREN BUFFETT: When we do the post-mortems, we, in a sense, are looking at our own handiwork. I mean, we make the decisions.

You know, it’s not some strategy department someplace, or vice president in charge of acquisitions, or some management consultant that comes in and tells us we ought to buy this or that. We’re looking at our decisions.

And that’s very important. And we talk about that. And we’ve made some dumb decisions. And most of them have been mine. Because I’m the guy that’s sitting in Omaha, making most of the decisions.

But it would really be a mistake to discuss, in public, my dumb decisions, which might reflect, you know, on some of the managers in some of the arenas. So we will not disclose those. But we will tell you that there are dumb decisions made around Berkshire.

CHARLIE MUNGER: The really brilliant decision in the General Re transaction was made by Joe Brandon. He was the one who decided that Berkshire should buy General Re. And he caused the transaction. And it wouldn’t have happened, I think, if he hadn’t been there. Would you agree with that?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s true.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And Joe was the steward for the General Re shareholders. We got a decent result, and they got a fabulous result. So if capitalism has any heroes in that transaction, why, Joe’s the hero.

15. “We are not big believers in contracts”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to number 6.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Chuck Hosmer (PH) from California.

And you mentioned earlier the union cooperation at the Buffalo newspapers. Without the introduction of unions, how do you view contracts for other employees of BRK subsidiaries?

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m just trying to think whether we have any real contracts.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I hope not.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we are not big believers in contracts. We hand people hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, in some cases, to sell us their business.

And the decision we have to make is, are they going to have the same passion for the business after they hand us the stock certificate and we hand them the money? Are they going to have the same passion that they had beforehand?

And if we’re wrong on that, no contract is going to save us.

We don’t want relationships that are based on contracts. So — I can’t — you know, I’m — I can’t really think of a formal contract that we have.

We have understandings about bonus arrangements and that sort of thing — and that’s not that complicated — with various managers.

I mean, we have — the comp of the top person at each company is basically my responsibility. And we have all kinds of different arrangements, because we have all kinds of different businesses.

Some of our businesses, capital’s an important factor. So you have to put that in the comp arrangement. Some of it, capital doesn’t mean a thing. Some of our businesses are very easy and very profitable. Some of them are very tough. And it takes a genius to, you know, to get a so-so result.

So we have a whole bunch of different arrangements on that. But we don’t try to hold people by contracts. And it wouldn’t work. And we basically don’t like engaging in them. So you’re looking at a company that — can you think of any contracts we have, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Our model is a seamless web of trust that’s deserved on both sides. That’s what we’re aiming for. The Hollywood model, where everyone has a contract, and no trust is deserved on either side, is not what we want at all.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t — we do not want to negotiate the size of the executive bathroom. I mean, that is not our game.

16. How to get yourself thrown out of Buffett’s office

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Edward Donahue (PH) from Belmont, Massachusetts.

“In the spirit of raising partnership value in these times, has Warren given any thought to spinning off as separate companies?

“My thinking is that some of these companies would sell at higher multiples to book value that Berkshire currently does. Further, where appropriate, consolidate companies with similar industries with the wish to save on management costs, administration, and even potential selling costs.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will not be spinning off any companies. We had to — we were a bank holding company, believe it or not, at one time. We became one in 1969. Then we were given 10 years to dispose of our bank, which was in Rockford, Illinois, and we did have a, in effect, a spinoff of that.

But, we — if somebody comes around us and says, “Gee, you can — you’ve got a multiple of X, and you can have a multiple of 1 1/2 times X for this subsidiary, if you spin it off,” you know, we can’t wait to throw them out of the office. I mean, it just doesn’t interest us.

We are not looking for something that gives a, you know, a one-month jump or something like that in market value. If we’ve got a wonderful business, we want to continue it within Berkshire.

We’ve got this ability within Berkshire, which is a real asset, in terms of moving money around into various opportunities without tax consequences. I mean, they’re part of a consolidated return.

So if a See’s Candy is a wonderful business, which it is, but it generates a lot of capital that can’t be used effectively in that business, we can move it to some other business or buy other businesses with it.

And we have a real advantage in allocation of capital that a shareholder, basically, can’t do as tax efficiently as we can do it within the company.

Plus, when we buy businesses from people, we make them a promise. You know, they can read our economic principles in the back of the annual report. And they know that we’re buying for keeps.

You know, it is a marriage that’s going to last. And we’re not going to, because we can get a higher multiple or something for a temporary period of time, spin something off.

On top of it, that — there would be those other costs. But that’s not the determining factor. It’s the basic principle at Berkshire that we buy to keep. And people can trust us to keep our word on that.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the — so many of those spinoffs, because your market cap will be a little higher, Wall Street sells that stuff, so they can get fees.

It isn’t really doing that much for anybody, in the ordinary case.

I suppose the one exception that could happen, if the regulation was crazy enough, you know, you can imagine something that might cause Berkshire to go to two parts. But short of something like that, you’re looking at what you’re going to get.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if it was actually hurting some operation that — because regulation was focused in that, and that tied the hands of other companies in the Berkshire group, you know, we’d have to look at that.

But, as Charlie said, we have listened to presentation after presentation, over a lot of years, about — by investment bankers, you know, basically saying, you know, “If you just do this wonderful thing,” you know, all these — that the market will love you.

And — it — how much is conscious, and how much is subconscious, we’ll never know. But the one thing we do know is there’s always a fee that accompanies it.

17. Don’t know much about student loan business

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Mike Nolan from Montclair, New Jersey.

Until recently, the student loan business in the United States has been a very attractive and successful one. However, proposed changes coming out of Washington have thrown the industry into disarray.

Could you comment on the industry, which is highly reliant on both faith, trust, as well as financing, and talk a little bit about the companies in this business?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know that much about it. Maybe Charlie does.

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t know this much about it, either. There’s been a fair amount of scandal, in terms of the sales methods. Some of the companies in the field got awfully cozy with some of the university administrators and so on.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been a long time since Charlie and I thought about getting a student loan. So we — (laughter) — haven’t checked the regulations too carefully on that one.

CHARLIE MUNGER: But, you know, we don’t know a lot about it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

I actually got approached, I guess it was about a year ago or a year and a half ago, on the deal that fell through, on Sallie Mae.

And I said, at the time, to the fellow that called me, I didn’t understand it that well. And it turned out to be a good thing I didn’t.

18. Earnings “management” at Goldman Sachs and General Electric

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, this question comes from John McDonald (PH).

And he asks, “Warren, in your General Electric and Goldman Sachs investments, do you think you’ve picked attractive businesses or simply attractive securities?

“Ben Graham’s ‘Security Analysis’ suggests that the most frightening things an executive management can do is manage earnings, which it could be argued both of these firms do. What is your reaction to that?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can say that I could argue that a very substantial percentage of American industry over the last 15 years, at one time or another, has managed earnings. And I’ve witnessed it and argued against it and gotten no place.

So, I don’t regard that as a malady that’s limited in its experience. I don’t know anything. I would not get into the specifics of those companies.

I felt good about those companies, in terms of the quality of the businesses they had and the quality of the management. But it was the terms, primarily, that caused us to make those deals.

I mean, those were made in a period when markets were in chaos and you should’ve gotten very good terms for committing money then.

Very people were either willing, or in some — many — most — cases, able to commit major sums on short notice. And it took good terms in order for us to do it. It —

And like I say, I’m not sure there was any second possibility in those cases. It was a really extraordinary period.

We were happy to do it. I feel good about the deals, obviously, because we got a very good coupon. But considering the circumstances under which the deals were made, I don’t think there was an alternative.

So if they wanted 5 billion and 3 billion, respectively, on those deals, I think we were the low bid, in effect. But I also think we made very decent deals.

And you know, could we have done something better with the money at that time? I don’t — as I measured at that time, I could not find anything that I liked better. It was the terms of the deals overwhelmingly, although we obviously liked the businesses.

I know the managers, the CEOs, of both companies very well. And I think they are terrific people. I think they’re smart people.

And I think they’re very — they’ve been very straight with us, straight with us long before we made a deal with them. So we’re very happy with those deals.

Charlie?

19. “Very happy relationship” with Goldman Sachs

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you know, there’s been a lot of criticism of investment banking in this arena, starting with that movie. But Berkshire itself has had marvelous services from all of its investment bankers, which is interesting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Think of what we’d be saying, if we’d been mistreated. (Laughs)

We’ve done a lot of business with Goldman Sachs over the years. And my experience goes back to when I was 10 years old and met Sidney Weinberg, who was running the firm and was a legendary Wall Street — well, he was “Mr. Wall Street” for a long, long time.

And I was a friend of Gus Levy’s. And Gus Levy also did some really nice things for us, including when we had a little nothing company, called Diversified Retailing, which Charlie and I and Sandy Gottesman jointly formed.

Gus came in on an underwriting of a $6 million issue brought by New York Securities, which he wouldn’t have dreamt of coming in, you know, for — in that kind of a deal, under most circumstances. And he had Goldman Sachs join in at that time.

So there have been a lot of things that have made for a very happy relationship with Goldman Sachs. I feel good about them.

And of course, we do lots of business with General Electric. We’ve bought I don’t know how many of those wind turbines from them.

But GE — you know, is a very, very important American institution. We’ll do — we’ll sell them a lot of things. We’ll buy a lot of things from them. And we’ll make money on our investment. So that keeps me happy.

20. Buffett optimistic on America’s standard of living

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Mark Hoffman (PH) from San Diego, California. Just want to thank you for all your wisdom and advice over the years.

Also like to thank the boys at — the Blumkins — the Furniture Mart. They gave us a great tour the other day. I’m from an organization called Eel (PH). And they really showed us the culture at Berkshire and what you guys do.

My question is, looking at the overall world economy, the Berkshire businesses are great. But my question is, is there underlying issues you see in the world economy, like going off the gold standard 40 years ago and fiat currency in countries making money like crazy?

If the Berkshire businesses are great, but the underlying economy is a problem, where do we go from there? What are the questions you’re asking yourself about the world economy? Thanks.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s always a lot of things wrong with the world. Unfortunately, it’s the only world we’ve got. I mean, so we live with it, and we deal with it.

But the beauty of it is this system works very well. I don’t have the faintest idea what’s going to happen in business or markets in the next year or two years.

But the one thing I know is that, over time, people will live better and better in this country. We have a system that works. It unleashes human potential.

I was just thinking, we have, today, about 35,000 people here. That was almost 1 percent of the population of the United States in the first census in 1790. Just 100 groups like this, and you were talking the whole country.

If you look at the — if we had had this room filled, back in 1790, with 35,000 citizens of the United States then, they would’ve been just as smart as we were, natively, their intelligence.

They would’ve lived in a country with resources that, obviously, same fertile soil, the same temperature, the same minerals, all of that. So they were just as able as we are.

But they weren’t turning out anything like we turn out today. I mean, just look at how we live compared to those people several hundred years ago.

So we have had a system that works. It unleashes human potential. And China went, for a long time, without a system that unleashed potential. Now they’ve got a system that’s unleashing human potential.

We haven’t reached the end of that road, by a long shot. I mean, we’re just starting, basically. We will have bad years in capitalism. I mean, it overshoots in markets. It gets overcome by fear and greed and all of that sort of thing.

But if you look at the 19th century, you know, we had a civil war. And we had 15 years or so of bad economic times spread out through that century. We had six panics, as they called them in those days.

And the 20th century had a couple of great wars. And we had plenty of recessions. And we had the Great Depression. So we have these interruptions in the progress of our society.

But overall, we move ahead. And we not only move ahead, we move ahead at a pretty damn rapid rate, when you think about it.

I mean, when, in the 20th century, we had a 7-for-1 improvement in living. And we did that. You know, we had slavery for a long time. We had blacks counted as three-fifths of a person. We didn’t let women vote for 130 years or thereabouts.

I mean, we have — we were wasting human potential. And we still are. But we were doing it more so for centuries. But we do keep moving forward in kind of fits and starts.

And right now, we’re sputtering somewhat, in terms of the economy. But there is no question, in my mind, that there is enormous human potential and that every period, every year we will meet, you can name a bunch of problems.

I mean, it will happen. But the opportunities will win in the end. And you know, your kids will live better than you live. And your grandchildren will live better.

And we will find more and more ways to find easier and better ways to do things that we haven’t even dreamt of yet.

Charlie?

21. Munger optimistic about solar energy

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, now that I’m so close to the age of death, I find myself getting more cheerful about the economic future — (laughter) — which I’m not going to be here to enjoy.

And what I find really cheerful is that we are plainly going to harness the direct energy of the sun. And we’re going to have electrical power all over the world.

And that’s going to enable overpopulated countries to turn seawater into fresh. And it’s going to eliminate a lot of the environmental problems and preserve more of the hydrocarbon resources for future needs in — as chemical feedstocks.

What I see is a final breakthrough that solves the main technical problem of man. And you can see it coming right over the horizon. And of course, MidAmerican and BYD will be participating in it.

So, I think it’s hugely a mistake to think only about your probable misfortunes. You should also think about what’s good about your situation.

And what’s good about our situation now is the main technical problem of mankind is about to be fixed. It’s the — if you have enough energy, you can solve a lot of your other problems.

WARREN BUFFETT: He is getting more optimistic as he gets older. (Laughter)

22. Not concerned about Swiss Re reinsurance deal

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a question about Berkshire’s investment in Swiss Re. “Given that you have no control over Swiss Re’s underwriting, how can you be comfortable with 2.6 billion invested in a relatively junior security in addition to the relatively sizeable common stock position you already have?

“Did the Gen Re acquisition’s problems over the first several years you owned it not make you wary of the potential landmines in reinsurance?

“And isn’t Swiss Re even more likely to continue to make mistakes, given that you have no management control?

“Or has your insight into its underwriting culture, since you entered into the quota share agreement, increased your comfort level with the risks it is taking?

“You have said, in the past, that Berkshire’s float is worth as much or more than equity. Would you say the same about Swiss Re’s float?”

WARREN BUFFETT: About Swiss Re’s what, now?

CAROL LOOMIS: Swiss Re’s float.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. The — we have several arrangements with Swiss Re. One was engaged in a little over a year ago, where we take 20 percent of their property-casualty business, which is reinsurance business, primarily, over a five-year period.

Then we made a — and that started about a year ago. And then, a month or two ago — and at that time, we bought about 3 percent of Swiss Re’s common.

Then, about a month ago, we invested 3 million — 3 billion — Swiss francs in a security which pays us 12 percent a year and which they can call, after two years, at 120 percent of its principal amount. And then if they haven’t called it by the third year, it becomes convertible to 25 Swiss francs a share.

The odds are probably pretty good that it will get called. And if it gets called, we’ll be unhappy, because they only reason they’ll call is if it’s advantageous for them to call it and disadvantageous to us.

But if it does get called, we will get 120 percent of par plus 12 percent a year for it.

We are senior, actually, to the Swiss re-equity of roughly 20 billion Swiss francs. So I would not regard it as a junior security.

Swiss Re’s problems of the last year or so have not come about, in any way, through their insurance underwriting.

Their insurance underwriting has been fine over the years. And we feel fine about having a 20 percent quota share in that. And we feel fine about our investment. So, I would regard —

They develop a large amount — as many reinsurance companies do — they develop a large amount of float per dollar of premium volume.

So we would expect that this 20 percent quota share that we’ve had for a year will develop a very significant amount of float relative to the 3 billion or so of premiums that it represents.

And I think it will turn out to be attractive float. It will be attractive for us. And it’ll even be a little more attractive for Swiss Re. Because in effect, they get — the commission we pay them gives them a little overwrite on that.

I think, like I say, that the most likely thing is that our $3 billion position gets called.

We also have that $2 billion or 2 billion Swiss franc. If I’ve said, “dollar,” I meant Swiss franc. $2 billion — 2 billion Swiss franc — adverse loss cover.

And what that says, essentially, is that, if their reserves — we’ll say, in the property-casualty business, at the end of 2008 — were roughly 60 billion francs — that once they’ve paid out — these are not precise figures — but once they’ve paid out 58 billion, 2 billion less than their carried reserves, that we pay the next 5 billion.

And like I say, it’s very unlikely we would be paying out money before 15 years on that. And if their reserves are accurate, we will pay out only the 2 billion.

So that was a transaction, again, that was made at a time when Swiss Re was under considerable pressure. They were under threat of downgrade, in terms of ratings.

And, I met with the CEO — the then-CEO — of Swiss Re on a Sunday in Washington, D.C., along with his investment adviser. And we arranged a transaction, which their shareholders and their directors later approved. And I think we met their needs. And I think we’ve got an attractive transaction.

There’s nothing wrong — you know, we may prefer Gen Re — but there’s nothing wrong with Swiss Re’s underwriting. It did not cause any of the problems that they have now.

That arose from something akin to the problems of AIG, although not remotely on the scale of AIG, but both in somewhat in financial products and somewhat on the asset side. It did not arise from underwriting.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and that’s a terrible problem. We wish we had more of it. (Laughter)

23. Irrational CEO compensation and incentive systems

WARREN BUFFTT: Area 9, please.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Vishali (PH) from the Philippines. My question is about compensation in a capital-intensive subsidiary.

Now, I am going to take the liberty to assume that the large number of bank failures were caused, in large part, by incentive bias.

If a board of directors makes a mistake with compensation, then the board introduces incentive bias towards earnings manipulation.

So bearing in mind rule number one, which is, “don’t lose money,” and bearing in mind that it’s OK to have losses in the short term if the moat is widened, then how do you develop a fair and intelligent compensation package for a manager of a subsidiary that requires a lot of capital?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you obviously — it’s a very, very good question. It’s one that Charlie and I have both thought about. And we’ve been around so many crazy compensation systems that we’ve spent a lot of time thinking about it and talking about it.

In a capital-intensive business, you have to have something that — you have to have a factor in the compensation arrangement that includes a capital cost element.

We have dozens and dozens of subsidiaries. And we have different arrangements for different businesses.

Because — as you point out —an arrangement for a business that needs no capital, like a See’s Candy or a Business Wire or something of that sort, has to be materially different than something that requires a lot of capital.

We think we’ve got rational compensation systems. We agree with you that incentives are very important.

I would say that I think your question implied, a little bit, that the board sets these things. The truth of the matter is, at least over 40 years of experience and 19 boards that I’ve been on and observing behavior a lot of other places — basically, the board has had relatively little effect on it.

The CEO has managed, in most cases — in a great many cases — to be an important determinant of his own — or her own, usually his — own compensation arrangement. They, you know, they — the human relations — first of all, they pick the comp committee, you know.

So I have been on one comp committee out of 19 boards. I mean, people are not looking for Dobermans. They’re looking for Cocker Spaniels. And then — (Laughter) and they’re looking for Cocker Spaniels that are waving — wagging their table — tails, very friendly.

You know, you — CEOs spend a lot of time thinking about who’s on their comp committee. The audit committee is less important. But the comp committee, they think about plenty.

And the comp committee meets every few months. And a human relations vice president comes in, who is responsible, directly, to the CEO and probably recommends a compensation consultant. And believe me, they don’t go around looking for the ones that are going to upset the apple cart.

So it’s been a system that the CEO has dominated.

And in my experience, boards have done very little in the way of really thinking through, as an owner or as owners’ representatives, what the hell is the proper way to pay these people and how to incent them, not only to do the right thing, but also to incentivize them not to do the wrong thing.

Charlie and I are fairly familiar with a company here in town, the Peter Kiewit Organization. And Pete Kiewit, I don’t know, 50 years ago or more, you know, figured out a very, very logical way to pay people in this business.

And it wasn’t rocket science. And I’ll guarantee he didn’t consult with any compensation consultant on the subject. He just figured it out.

And you would be able to figure out one. I can figure out one. But you have to understand that not every CEO wants a rational compensation system, you know? Who wants rationality, when irrationality pays off more?

So it’s a real problem getting people at the board level — I think the — I don’t think there should be a comp committee. I think the board as a whole actually should thrash this sort of thing out.

So that you don’t get some report from the comp committee, and that’s treated as holy writ, because they’ve debated for a couple of hours the day before, supposedly, and then come in and give some recommendation, everybody rubber stamps it.

I think it ought to be a subject of general discussion. I think it’s very important how you compensate the CEO.

I’ve said, in our annual reports, choosing the right CEO, making sure they don’t overreach, and exercising independent judgement on major acquisitions or divestitures, if the board does that right, you can forget about all this other check the list — checklist stuff. And if they don’t get that right, the other doesn’t make much difference.

So I would say that it can be done. It’s very difficult to have a system where somebody — where the board, thinking as owners or representing owners, care as much about it as the guy on the other side who’s getting compensated.

I do think it’s gotten better in recent years. But it started from a very low base.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are some counterintuitive conclusions in the field that are quite interesting.

I would argue that a liberally paid board of directors in a big American public corporation is — the liberal pay is counterproductive to good management of the company.

There’s a sort of a reciprocation. You know, “You keep raising me, and I keep raising you.” And it gets very club-like. And I think, by and large, the corporations of America would be managed better if the directors weren’t paid at all.

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re working toward that. (Applause)

Well, it is interesting. Because the SEC would define independent directors, you know, as — they would question, you know, my independence, if we would own billions and billions of dollars’ worth of some security, but we would sell them some ice cream at Dairy Queen or something of the sort.

And the — to get real owners’ representatives is very — and knowledgeable, because they’ve got to know business. They have to really have some business savvy.

And the truth is, if you get somebody that’s getting $200,000 a year, $250,000 a year, for being director of a company, and they don’t have that much income outside or net worth, and they would just love to get one more directorship for another $200,000, they are very unlikely to sit there and argue with the CEO and say that the system is rigged in favor of incentive compensation or something of the sort.

There is more baloney in the compensation arrangements —

And now, you have these 100-page proxy statements. If you take 100 pages to explain how you’re paying the people of the place, something is wrong. I mean, you don’t need 100 — we don’t have 100-page, you know, understandings or anything of the sort.

But it’s gotten to be more and more of a game as it’s gone along.

And I would say that, as Charlie — that when compensation is a very important part of a director’s wellbeing, you do not have an independent director.

And the funny thing is, the way it’s — the system has been arranged, those are the very people that tend to be regarded as the independent directors, in most cases.

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s way worse than practically anybody recognizes. Elihu Root, who was the ultimate good Cabinet officer in the United States, used to have a saying that no man was fit to hold public office who wasn’t perfectly willing to leave it at any time.

And of course, the minute he left public office, he went right back to being the leading lawyer of the world. So he didn’t have much to lose by —

But the man who has a lot to lose from his office is going to be very loath to be an independent director.

So the way we do it, at Berkshire Hathaway, is one-tenth of 1 percent of America. And the way everybody else does it is silly. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) I love being up here with him.

24. Worst-case scenario for insurance operation

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky.

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Paula Sauer (PH). And, since Charlie seems to be getting more optimistic, maybe we should ask him this question first. And then Warren, you can try and top it.

But Paula writes in, “What’s the worst-case scenario you could imagine with respect to the insurance business?”

CHARLIE MUNGER: You mean ours or generally?

BECKY QUICK: I believe she means yours in particular.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, the very worst case is some catastrophe where we lose quite a few billions of dollars pretax. Even that, I don’t think, significantly impairs the basic business in place.

So I think we have a marvelous insurance business. I don’t want to trade it for any other that I know. How about you, Warren?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no, it is a fabulous business.

The worst — I used to say we would probably play 4 percent to 5 percent of the industry loss — from any mega-catastrophe.

I’m not sure where Katrina finally came in. I don’t know whether it was 60 billion or something in that area. And we probably did pay close to — we were in that 4 percent to 5 percent range.

We’re lower than that, probably, right now, not necessarily way lower. But if we had $100 billion catastrophe, you know, we would probably pay 3 to 4 percent of that, currently, so that you’d be talking 3 to 4 billion.

You know, the worst — I think the worst situation that could occur is if we ran into so much inflation that people got very, very unhappy with anything that they had to buy in their daily life.

This applies in the utility business, too, but certainly like auto insurance, and in effect, that they express their outrage at inflationary increases and said, “Let’s nationalize the whole thing.” I mean, that would not — that would be a huge asset that would disappear, if that occurred.

I don’t think that’s a high probability. But if you’re asking me to look at worst cases, that’s probably the one I would come up with. I —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that happened. Auto insurance was nationalized somewhere, New Zealand or somewhere.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh sure.

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s not — if you want the absolute worst cases, you found it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we nationalized, to some extent, the annuity business, you know, when we went into Social Security. I think it was a good thing.

But when people get outraged enough about something, you’ve heard talk about the banks. I mean, when the public gets outraged, the politicians will respond.

And inflation would be — wild inflation — would be the most likely cause, it seems to me, if something like that — I don’t think that’s probable — but something like that happening in auto insurance.

It’s a bill that most people pay, you know, every six months, or even more frequently than that. And if they see that bill going up and they don’t want to get rid of their car, they’re going to get mad.

And utility companies are going to get — utility customers — are going to get very mad during inflation. Because they need to turn on the lights. And they hate to see, you know, those monthly bills going up.

It’s the — it’s something they can’t give up. And it’s very visible. And the reaction will be to go to their public representatives and say, “Do something about this.”

And one of the things they can do about it is take it over. So very low probability of that, but it’s not nonexistent.

25. No preset goal for international investments

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, Patrick O’Donoghue (PH) from Cork in Ireland. So I suppose I should start by saying I’m sorry you’ve had such a tough time in my otherwise wonderful little country.

WARREN BUFFETT: I love the Irish. We’ve got some — we’ve had great luck with the Irish. It was my mistake. (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Now, I’d like to grow my investment in Berkshire Hathaway. And I think we’ve established it’s a wonderful company.

So I’m left with a couple of other issues, which, for a foreigner, are maybe a little different for people domestically, the first of which is that any gains in Berkshire Hathaway may be wiped out by a slide in the dollar versus the euro. And we’re talking a long-term investment here, obviously.

The second is, perhaps you could discuss the — your — global acquisitions, which will reduce your dollar dependence and increase your foreign-source income.

I’ve lost the third. If you could discuss those, please.

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, yeah, and if it comes to you, that’ll be fine.

The — predicting the euro versus the dollar, I’m no good at. You —

CHARLIE MUNGER: You did pretty well.

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Yeah, we did make a couple billion. But the — (Laughter)

You could, if you wished — I’m not suggesting this at all — but euro/dollar is an easy thing to hedge. I’m not recommending that. I’m just telling you that that is an option, if you’re worried about a major currency. It’s hard to do with smaller-country currencies.

But when you’re talking the euro/dollar thing, you can keep hedging that, if you want to.

But like I say, we don’t normally do that sort of thing. And that could be a pain in the neck to you.

I would say, in terms of Berkshire’s earnings, we will just keep doing things that make — we think make sense. Now, if we own —

We own over 8 percent, for example, of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola, you know, makes 80 percent or more of its money outside the United States.

We own a lot of Procter & Gamble. They make a lot of their money out of the United States. Kraft makes a lot of money out of the United States.

So we have a lot of indirect sources of earnings. And then we have a lot of direct sources of earnings outside the United States.

ISCAR makes most of its money — it makes money in the United States, but it makes a lot of money elsewhere. And we have other businesses like that.

We do not have a predetermined goal at all of developing X percent of our earnings here or there or that place. We just keep, you know, every day, we go to work.

And we don’t know whether the phone call will come from Israel or from Indiana, in terms of a chance to invest some money.

We want all of our subsidiaries to be looking at opportunities everyplace. And some of them will find them abroad. And some of them won’t. So it — we are not a — we are not heading anyplace, in terms of sources of earnings.

There are a lot of countries we feel comfortable with. And we would be happy to put money into those countries.

But we don’t wake up in the morning saying that we would like to have more money in Germany or Spain or whatever, or that we would want to take money out of those countries.

And Charlie, have any more?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. People look at a modern, liberal democracy. And it’s very easy to conclude that it’s messy and full of defects. And I think that’s a correct view.

But it’s not at all clear to me that the messy defects that we have are worse than the messy defects of Europe.

I am an agnostic about these things. I think there’s plenty wrong and plenty right on both sides of the Atlantic.

26. “Nobody gets any joy” from layoffs

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: So this question comes from three shareholders who happen to be employees of Berkshire portfolio companies. They’ve asked not to be named in the — they ask the following question.

They say, “We are concerned with both the financial condition of the company and the stability of our jobs. Could you discuss your attitude towards the use of layoffs as a means of responding to short-term downturns in company profits?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, these are investee companies or subsidiaries?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: These are — I imagine they are investee companies. They —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: And they are shareholders and employees.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I wouldn’t have a different attitude. I was just clarifying it.

The — there’s no question that business conditions can change such as to necessitate temporary or permanent layoffs.

I mean, there’s — scales of businesses change. We’re fortunate, in a place like GEICO, where our business is expanding. So we’ll probably add at least, I would guess, a thousand jobs, net, at a GEICO.

But at the same time, we probably have close to half of our brick plants closed in the Southwest, because people just aren’t building houses now. Now, that business will come back. And we’ll rehire people.

On the other hand, our textile business never came back. And we employ fewer people at the Buffalo News than we did a year ago. And we are not going to regain those or get back to previous levels.

So there are some businesses that may permanently contract. And you have to face up to that, in terms of layoffs.

There’s other businesses that have severe cyclical-type contractions, and they are going to face significant layoffs.

There are other businesses that are suffering a little bit during a period like this, but very little. And we will resist the idea of having layoffs.

We — you know, nobody gets any joy out of it. And generally, you do it, probably, a little too late, even, because you keep hoping the business will bounce back up or something of the sort.

But, you know, it — if the business changes in a material way, you’d better change your business model. Or, you know, somebody else will. And then you’ll even have more changes facing you.

On balance, we hope we get into businesses that don’t face those kind of problems.

But certainly, in our construction-related businesses — we’ve had layoffs at Shaw, we’ve had layoffs at Johns Manville, we’ve had layoffs at Benjamin Moore, we’ve had layoffs at Acme Brick, and there’s really no alternative. I mean, it — and our competitors all have had also.

And you know, in the textile business, we got into it in 1965. In the end, we laid off everybody. I mean, it — we — it had contracted enormously before we got there. We tried all kinds of things. And we finally gave up.

You know, there — capitalism — you know, is creative destruction. And sometimes, you’re on the short end of that.

This year, in terms of the businesses we have, you know, our employment will probably be reduced even — I’m almost sure it will — even though GEICO will expand.

It will not be reduced dramatically, because it just hits in certain areas. But it will be reduced. And our managers have to look at the reality of the current situation.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Some of our businesses have a shared-hardship model, where they don’t layoff, at least not yet. And the businesses with that model tend to be very strongly placed, economically.

So I guess it shows that Benjamin Franklin was right, when he said, “It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.”

And, so we’re all over the map on that, and so is all of industry. And —

But I do think the — an ideal model would be a business so strong that it could operate in the shared-hardship mode instead of the layoffs.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, some are doing that, where they — you know, you give up hours. And — but a lot of operations don’t lend themselves to that very well, either. So —

CHARLIE MUNGER: ISCAR’s operating that way.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, ISCAR’s operating that way. And, in other cases, you basically have to close down whole plants. I mean —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, sure.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s just the nature of it. It’s better — you really can’t operate every plant at 50 percent and have it work as effectively as shutting down the least-productive plants.

CHARLIE MUNGER: In a world where you sometimes have to amputate a limb to stay alive, you can’t expect that every business can stay exactly as it is.

27. Fight egregious CEO pay with embarrassment, not legislation

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 11.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Ralph Witkin from Greenwich, Connecticut. I was first here in 1995. And I really appreciate the way you handle this meeting. I’ve been to dozens of others. And I know you’re not obligated to do this. And I thank you for it, both of you.

My question is very similar to number 9′s, regarding executive compensation.

Not so much your view on the compensation, but how we, as shareholders, can make some attempt to try to correct this and bring it back into some level of balance. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: I had a senator call me just the other day. And, his constituents, obviously, are enraged about executive comp.

Probably — you know, AIG really had a huge impact, although, you know, you can take the Merrills and all the rest of them, also. But that story was huge with people.

And it was probably — in a certain sense, the outrage was disproportionate to what happened. But in any — it doesn’t make any difference. The people are enraged about it.

So this senator called me. And he said, you know — he was essentially saying, “Tell me about a statute we can enact that will make my constituents happy about executive compensation.”

And my advice to him was that he probably couldn’t, and that the last time Congress got into this was in the early days of the Clinton administration, when they passed a bill that said, as I remember, for the top five officers, that you couldn’t get deductibility for comp in excess of a million dollars annually, unless it was tied to performance in some way.

That was probably the most counterproductive piece of legislation that Congress has ever come up with, which is quite a statement to make in itself. (Laughter)

The net result of that was that when the tax was imposed, of course, the stockholders paid it and the officer didn’t. So it penalized the shareholder, who was already getting penalized by the comp.

It led to all kinds of arrangements that were designed to dance around this, which involved lots of lawyering and lots of consultants and lots of pages of proxy statements, the net effect of which was to ratchet up compensation very dramatically. Compensation increased far more, in my view, because that was put on the books than otherwise.

So I suggested to him that the first thing they would do — should do — is probably repeal that and say, “We were wrong,” and then figure out whether they should do something right. But that did not go over very well. (Munger laughs)

So I would say that — I’ve always proposed this. It never has gone anyplace. But that won’t stop me from continuing to propose it.

All you need in this country is the top half dozen or so investment managers who manage, you know, we’re talking hundreds of billions, trillions, in some cases, of assets.

If they would just speak out on the most egregious cases. Just — you know, there’s a lot of stuff about “say on pay” and everything. But half a dozen of them, they get lots of publicity — they wouldn’t have to worry about getting their views out.

The way they get big shots to change their behavior is to embarrass them, you know, basically. And the press has great opportunities to do that. And — but they need the cooperation of the big investors.

So if you’ve got three or four of the biggest investors, when the XYZ Company comes out with some crazy plan, to step up and just say, “This is outrageous,” it would change behavior. And it would —

The directors don’t like to look foolish. They don’t like their names in the paper looking foolish. And you would see some real changes.

I think that the legislation for it is going to be — I just don’t know how to write the stuff, you know?

I mean, you read the case recently at Chesapeake Energy, you know, $75 million for kind of a re-signing bonus and some — there were some other things involved, too.

I mean, it just — you wonder what people are thinking. You know what the CEO is thinking. And it just — I don’t think you can write the statute that stops it. And like I said, the one they tried to write just screwed everything up royally.

But I do think big institutions — if they spoke out — you’d only need three or four of them that spoke out jointly. And they don’t have to do it on every corporation at all, just when it’s egregious enough.

But if they get a reputation for speaking out when it’s egregious, every now and then, it would act as — I think there would be some restraining factor that might set in in corporate America. Because the restraining factor is not there then — not there now.

I mean, right now, every consultant comes in and brings along what the people at so-called pure companies are making. And they —

Nobody wants to say their CEO is in the bottom quartile or something. So they just keep comparing themselves to the higher quartiles. And then they ratchet up from there.

And, you know, it’s a game that works wonders. I call it the honor system. You know, the shareholders have the honor and the executives have the system. (Laughter)

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I don’t — I’m not too optimistic about fixing it from the big investor standpoint.

The big investor groups contain many an investment manager making $20 million a year for insignificant contributions. He’s like a man in a glass house that starts throwing stones.

And the public pension funds are dominated, in many cases, by left-wing politicians and by labor unions who tend to have an agenda of their own that doesn’t really relate to good management. So, sometimes, the cure is worse than the disease.

28. We don’t hire potentially great managers

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that hopeful note, we’ll move on to Carol. (Laughter)

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a question from Peter Poulson, spelled P-O-U-L-S-O-N.

He says, “When you acquire companies, they come equipped with managers. And in general, Berkshire has done a great job putting the right leaders in the right roles.

“But occasionally, you have to hire someone for an executive spot. Please describe an interview that you might have with a prospective Berkshire operating executive. What do you look for? How do you evaluate a person’s potential to become a great manager?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, usually, we hire people that have already proven they’re great managers. I mean, when we buy a business, very — a very high percentage of the time, the management comes with it.

When we buy an ISCAR, you know, we get the group that had been knocking the ball out of the park for years and years and years.

And the real question we have to ask ourselves is, you know, will they be with us in the future? Will they keep — will they be feeling the same way after the deal as they did the day before the deal?

And we’ve made occasional mistakes on that. But overall, that does come through. So it’s — we’ve had good luck with managers, not perfect.

And, the toughest part is, since we have no retirement age, is when managers lose the abilities that they had at an earlier age.

And that — it doesn’t relate to — there’s no yardstick you can use up and down the line for that. So it’s — people age, at least in business ability, they age in very different ways and at different paces.

And Charlie and I have the problem of figuring out, sometimes, when somebody has — does not have the same managerial ability that they had at an earlier time.

And then we have the responsibility for doing something about it. And we hate it. But it’s —

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, we’ve been slow in those.

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve been slow every time.

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve been slow. If we really love the guy, we’re really slow. (Laughter) We are far from ideal.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it’s very — well, we had a manager, you know, a wonderful — I mean, a guy we both loved at Wesco.

And he got Alzheimer’s. I mean, it — you know, and we didn’t want to face it. We finally did. But it took us probably an extra year, year and a half, didn’t it, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

It’s the only part of my job that I don’t like, basically. I mean, I hate it. But — I’d pay a lot of money not to have to do it. But occasionally, it happens. Fortunately, it doesn’t seem to happen that often at —

We find people who love their businesses, you know? I love Berkshire. I — you know, I go to work every day, and I’m excited about it. And we — you can spot that in people.

I mean, I think most of you would probably realize that that’s the way I feel about it. And I realize that’s the way the managers of our subsidiaries feel about it.

I mean, Tony — Tony Nicely — went to work at GEICO when, you know, he was a teenager. And he’s as excited every day about GEICO as I am. It hit me the first time —

I saw him yesterday at lunch. And the first thing he does is hand me the figure, which he knows I’m waiting for. You know, ”(Inaudible), we’re up 505-thousand,” and he carries it out all the way, “policyholders.”

And, I mean, I get excited about those numbers. He gets excited about them. You know, we talk about state-by-state, whatever it may be. And, you can’t put that into somebody.

But we do recognize it when it’s there. And we do our best to make sure that we don’t do anything that dampens that in any way.

29. Don’t try to time the market

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 12.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. Jimmy Chong (PH) here from Dayton, Ohio.

Mr. Buffett, in October of last year, you wrote, in a New York Times op-ed piece, that you were moving your personal portfolio to a hundred percent U.S. equities.

My question is, is that move complete? If not, are you still buying? And in addition to that, how would you rank the recent market downturn in terms of investing opportunities in stocks during your investment careers?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s certainly not as dramatic as the 1974 period was. Stocks got much cheaper in 1974 than they are now.

But you were also facing a different interest rate scenario. So you could say they really weren’t that much cheaper.

You could buy very good companies at four times earnings or thereabouts with good prospects. But interest rates were far higher then.

That was the best period I’ve ever seen for buying common equities. The country may not have been in as much trouble then as we were back in September. I don’t think it was. But stocks were somewhat cheaper then.

In the recent period, I — you know, I bought some equities. And then corporate bonds looked extraordinarily cheap. The spreads were very, very wide. So I bought some of those, too.

But the cheaper things get, the better I like buying them. I mean, if I was buying hamburgers at McDonald’s, you know, the other day for X, and they reduced the price to 90 percent of X tomorrow — not likely — but if they did, I’m happy.

I don’t think about what I paid yesterday for the hamburger. I think I’m going to be buying hamburgers the rest of my life, you know? The cheaper they get, the better I like it.

I’m going to be buying investments the rest of my life. And I would much rather pay half of X than X.

And, the fact that I paid X yesterday doesn’t bother me, if I get — as long as I know the values in the business.

So on a personal basis, I like lower prices. I realize that that is not the way all of you feel when you wake up in the morning and look at quotes.

But, it just makes sense that when things are on sale, that you should be more excited about buying them than otherwise.

And lately — when I wrote that article in the Times, I did not predict what stocks were going to do. Because I never know what they’re going to do.

But I do know when you’re starting to get a lot for your money. And that’s when I believe in buying.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if stocks go off 40 percent on average, they’re obviously closer to an attractive price than they were before.

And, of course, interest rates have gone down a lot recently, at least short-term interest rates.

It’s nothing like ’73-4. I knew when that happened that that was my time and my only time. I knew I was never going to get another trip to the buy counter like that one.

Unfortunately, I had practically no money available, which is — (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why it happened.

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why those times occur.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, if I were you, I wouldn’t wait for 1973-4.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we don’t try to pick bottoms or you know —

We don’t have an opinion about where the stock market’s going to go tomorrow or next week or next month.

So to sit around and not do something that’s sensible because you think there will be something even more attractive, that’s just not our approach to it.

Anytime we get a chance to do something that makes sense, we do it. And if it makes even more sense the next day, and if we’ve got money, we may do more. And if we don’t, you know, that — what can we do about it?

So picking bottoms is basically not our game. Pricing is our game. And that’s not so difficult. Picking bottoms, I think, is probably impossible, but —

When you get — when you start getting a lot for your money, you buy it. And as I say, after I wrote that, stocks did get cheaper.

Corporate bonds — the corporate bond market got very, very, very disorganized. And we bought some fairly good-sized pieces of bonds for Berkshire. And I also bought a few little things for myself.

But I spend 99 percent of my time thinking about Berkshire. That’s —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, by now, don’t we have our small life insurance companies pretty well full of desirable debt instruments at 10 percent?

WARREN BUFFETT: We certainly have got a lot more of it than we had, yeah. (Laughs)

No, we’ve — we got a chance to buy some corporate bonds very, very cheaply — at least in my view — a few months back.

And we had money in life companies that can’t be used in certain other areas and for which this was an ideal time to just barrel in.

And anytime we like to do something, we really like to do it. I mean, our idea is not to tiptoe into anything. So we buy them as fast as we can, when prices are right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that bond thing didn’t last very long, but —

WARREN BUFFETT: Nope.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — there were perfectly safe bonds that yielded 9 percent or more with very fancy call protection.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And some of those bonds are up 20, 25 percent. So the opportunities are frequently under shell A, when you’re looking at shell B.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We try to look at all the shells.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we look at all the shells.

30. “Decent” rates of return from regulated utilities

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Jim Mitchell from Costa Mesa, California, who wants to know from both of you.

He says, “Years ago, you taught us to beware of capital-intensive businesses, like electric utilities, that may be overstating profits due to understating depreciation.

“Now that you are investing in utilities and gas pipelines, have you discovered the secret of long life for power plants? Or do we need to discount your utility earnings?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the utility earnings, pretty much, come about through a return on equity capital allowed by the jurisdictions in which you operate.

So, for example, if something like pension costs or something of the sort, you get surprises on, you do get to earn that back over time. But you don’t get any bonanzas, either.

So I would say the capital-intensive businesses that scare me more are the ones outside of the utility field, where you just pump in more money without knowing that you’re going, in a general way, to get, more or less — within a range, anyway — a guaranteed return.

So I do not have — there’s no way we get rich on our utility investments. But there’s no way we get poor, either. And we get decent rates of return on the equity that we leave in it.

And we’ll probably get those returns with or without inflation. Now, inflation may diminish the value of getting an 11 or 12 percent return on equity, if you get into very high rates of inflation.

So in that sense, I’d agree with Jim, who I know, incidentally. He used to work with my daughter out there at Century 21. He’s a good investor.

But the — on balance, if you can find a good business that’s not capital intensive, you’re going to be better off than in a capital-intensive business over time.

I mean, the world, they’re hard to find. But the best businesses are the ones that don’t require much capital and, nevertheless, make good money.

They’ve got some moat protecting them, other than the capital required as entry in the business that’s protecting them.

And if you can find those that are durable, you’ve got a great investment and one that will do the best in inflation, which, as we mentioned earlier, seems fairly likely to come along.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, unfortunately, a lot of moats have been filling up with sand lately, you know, the daily newspaper, the network television station, all these castles with their lovely moats. The moats are filling up.

31. Surprise marriage proposal from Buffett’s great-nephew

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that cheery note, we have time for just one more question. And Marc Hamburg, I believe you said there was somebody who wanted to finish this off. Marc, where are you?

MARC HAMBURG: Right here. Right here, Warren.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I can’t — I still can’t see you. But I can hear you.

MARC HAMBURG: He’s right up in front.

WARREN BUFFETT: Right up in front. OK, good. Oh, I see you now.

ALEX ROZEK: Hi, Warren. It’s Alex from Boston.

I just wondered if you could give us some advice on how we could improve the economy, as we leave.

WARREN BUFFETT: What was your name?

ALEX ROZEK: Alex, from Boston.

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah. Well, the obvious thing to do is to do what our government tells us to do, which is to go out and spend.

And as I mentioned, household formations are important to developing — to getting past this overbuild in residential construction. So does — I don’t know whether that gives you any ideas or not. But… (Laughter)

ALEX ROZEK: I think so.

Mimi, you’re my best friend. Would you be my wife? (Applause)

MIMI KRUEGER: Yes? (Applause)

VOICE: Mimi, you’ve got to say yes.

MIMI KRUEGER: I said, yes. Yes!

WARREN BUFFETT: I have just two —

ALEX ROZEK: Thanks, Warren.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I have two comments to make. Alex is my sister Doris’ grandson, my great-nephew. And Mimi is terrific.

So on that note, we’ll end the meeting. And we’ll be back in 15 minutes for the board meeting. Thank you. (Applause)

32. Berkshire Hathaway formal meetings begins

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we’re going to hold an annual meeting.

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 2009 annual meeting of shareholders.

I will first introduce the Berkshire directors that are present in addition to myself. We’ve got Charles Munger. We’ve got Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott.

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning the firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Ms. Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

The main proxyholders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

33. Berkshire shares outstanding and quorum

WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and representing at the meeting?

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 4, 2009 — being the record date for this meeting — there were 1,057,573 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting —

And 14,749,861 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

Of that number, 821,400 Class A shares and 10,298,152 Class B shares are represented at this meeting through proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 30th.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

That number represents a quorum. And we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

34. Last meeting’s minutes

WARREN BUFFETT: First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

VOICE: I second the motion

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion’s been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?

We will vote on this question by voice vote. All those in favor, say, “Aye.”

VOICE: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion’s carried.

35. Election of Berkshire Hathaway directors

WARREN BUFFETT: The first item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles, who will furnish a ballot to you.

Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them?

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

BECKI AMICK: The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 859,366 votes for each nominee. That number of — that number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxyholders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.

36. Shareholder motion on working conditions at Russell Athletic plant

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Berkshire shareholder Joseph Petrofsky.

Mr. Petrofsky’s motion is set forth in the proxy statement and would request Berkshire Hathaway to prepare a sustainability report for shareholders. The directors are recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

We will now recognize, I believe it’s Mr. Billenness — Mr. Petrofsky’s representative — to present the motion.

To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I will ask Mr. Billenness to limit his remarks to five minutes. The microphone at zone 1 is available. Well, we go first to Mr. Billenness.

SIMON BILLENNESS: Thank you very much, Mr. Buffett. My name is Simon Billenness. And I represent Mr. Joseph Petrofsky, the shareholder who filed this year’s resolution asking for a publication of a sustainability report.

I will move that shareholder resolution. Miss Norma Mejía Castellanos (PH) will then second the resolution. And then I will ask for a preliminary count of the shares voted.

As shareholders, we are proud that, in so many ways, our company is a leader. A prime example is the emerging success story on the Klamath River. This may result in the largest river restoration project in U.S. history. And this makes economic sense for PacifiCorp and for us, as shareholders.

However, when it comes to managing environmental and human rights risk, and disclosing those risks to shareholders, our management is sadly a laggard.

Two respected proxy advisory firms, PROXY Governance and RiskMetrics, have advised shareholders to vote in favor of this resolution on the grounds that management badly lags other companies in disclosing these risks to shareholders.

Last week, CalPERS, the California retirement system, announced that it would vote close to half a billion dollars’ worth of stock in favor of this resolution.

Consider the situation today with Russell, the subsidiary of Fruit of the Loom and a Berkshire Hathaway company. Collegiate licensed apparel — sweatshirts bearing university logos, for instance — is a $5 billion a year market.

Russell has admitted to repeatedly committing serious labor rights violations in Honduras. And now, over 50 universities, including Harvard, Stanford, and the entire University of California system, have decided to terminate Russell’s license to make clothing bearing their college logos.

This particular sweatshirt, which I’m holding up right here, is University of North Carolina. This was made in a Berkshire Hathaway factory. But the university has since ended their licensing agreement.

The treatment — the management of Russell, through its actions, has put $5 billion of potential business at risk. The management of Berkshire Hathaway should provide proper disclosure of that risk to us, the shareholders in this company.

Now, I will pass over to Ms. Mejía Castellanos. She is a sewing machine operator who worked in the factory in Honduras that is the center of these problems. And after she has spoken, I will ask for a preliminary vote count for this resolution.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Yo trabajó como operadora de una maquila de costura en la fábrica Jerzees Honduras.

INTERPRETER: I used to work as a sewing machine operator at the factory, Jerzees de Honduras.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: En 2006, cuando Fruit de Loom compró la empresa, las condiciones empeoraron.

INTERPRETER: In 2006, when Fruit of the Loom bought my factory, conditions got much worse.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: La empresa empezó hacer acumulación de personal esto para ahorrarse mas y no pagar renta.

INTERPRETER: Fruit of the Loom began to consolidate personnel in order to save more on rent.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Esto ocasionó mucho molestar de salud en los trabajadores, como ser dolor en la espalda a causa de maquinaria de esta muy cerca, y esto provoca un recalentamiento.

INTERPRETER: This created many conditions in the factory that caused health problems for workers, such as pain in our backs being caused by the heat from the sewing machines, which were now pressed into our backs, because of the limited space.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Esto significa una inseguridad en un momento de evacuación.

INTERPRETER: The close proximity also made it very dangerous in the case of an emergency evacuation.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: En nuestra fabrica, la ventilación era tan mala que esto nos provocaba enfermedades respiratorias como el cáncer del pulmón.

INTERPRETER: In part, because of the overcrowding, as well, the ventilation was so poor that it caused many respiratory illnesses, including lung cancer.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: El agua de los filtros era contaminada.

INTERPRETER: Even the filtered water was dirty.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Trabajamos de la 6:30 de la mañana hasta las 5:30 de la noche, con tan solo 15 minutos para almorzar.

INTERPRETER: We worked from 6:30 in the morning until 5:30 at night with only 15 minutes for lunch.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Nuestros salarios eran demasiado bajos que no nos alcanzaba para pagar una niñera y la empresa no respeta el código de trabajo de nuestro país, porque no brinda guarderías de niños.

INTERPRETER: Our wages were too low to afford childcare. And the management refused to provide onsite childcare, even though it was required by Honduran law.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Por eso, decidimos organizarlos para obligar el gerente que nos escuchara y que respetara nuestros derechos.

INTERPRETER: Because of all of this, we decided to organize to compel management to clean up our factory.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Entonces, fue cuando despidió 145 trabajadores ilegalmente por organizarse a un sindicato.

INTERPRETER: In retaliation, Russell illegally fired 145 workers for organizing a union.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Russell tenía que respetar el sindicato, constituido por la ley. Y entonces, Russell dijo que por causa al sindicato, iba a cerrar la empresa y que nos íbamos a quedar aguantando hambre.

INTERPRETER: After we finally legally established our union, Russell said that because of the union, they would close down the factory and leave the workers to starve.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Fue cuando empezamos hacer amenazados a muerte los directivos.

INTERPRETER: And this is when we started to receive death threats.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Me dejaban mensajes y dibujos en los baños y en el puesto de trabajo, diciéndome que me iban a cortar la cabeza.

INTERPRETER: They would leave me notes and illustrations in the bathroom and at my workstation threatening to cut off my head.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Finalmente, Russell siguió y cumplió con su dicho, y cerro la planta el 30 de enero de este año.

INTERPRETER: Finally, Russell Athletic did follow through with their threat and shut down the factory in January of this year.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Russell sostiene que nos ayudara a encontrar nuevos puesto de trabajo, pero en cambio la lista negra que tiene con nosotros y nos han impedido la búsqueda de nuevos empleos.

INTERPRETER: Now, Russell has been claiming that they will help us find new jobs. But instead, they have blacklisted us, preventing us from finding work elsewhere.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Es por que tantas universidades han cortados su contratos con Russell y porque esto se ha convertido en un problema para esta empresa.

INTERPRETER: This is why so many universities have stopped doing business with Russell and why this has become such a problem for Berkshire Hathaway.

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Y por tanto, yo voto a favor de la resolución y exhortó que a los accionistas voten a favor. Gracias.

INTERPRETER: And therefore, I second this resolution and urge that shareholders vote in favor. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I’d like to ask Mr. John Holland, the CEO of Fruit of the Loom, to respond to the comments just made, and after which, we will act on the motion.

JOHN HOLLAND: First, I need to give you a little background. Russell was a public company listed on the New York Stock Exchange prior to the time that we acquired them in August of 2006. The acquisition consisted of 47 facilities with a little over 14,000 workers.

And, as we began to get involved with the Russell operations and how they were conducted, to integrate those into our operations, we found that there were a couple of plants in Honduras that had some problems.

And we began — we acknowledged the problems. And we began immediately to remedy these problems.

A little later, we had a letter from the WRC, the Workers Rights Commission (Consortium), indicating that there had been some abuses of the employees and that some had been terminated because they were involved in union activities.

We were unaware of the union activities. And we investigated the abuses. But we thought it best to contact an independent third-party organization to do an audit.

And we contacted the Free (Fair) Labor Association, which is kind of a worldwide organization that’s grouped with a group of businesses and the leading universities in the U.S. to try to make certain that workers’ rights are adhered to on a worldwide basis.

We asked them to conduct the audit. And they conducted the audit. And all of the abuses that we had been charged with, they said, through the independent audit — they were nonexistent.

But they did tell us that there were two supervisors who had conducted some abusive language with the employees and, also, that it was very likely that some employees might’ve been terminated due to their union activity.

So as a result, they gave us a list of items that they would like us to follow to remedy the situation. The supervisors, as well as the management of the facilities, were eliminated.

And we have started immediately, progressively, to implement all of the recommendations of the Free Labor Association’s independent audit.

And part of that was that the workers that they felt might have been terminated due to union activities, that we reinstate the workers.

The plant had not been organized at that point. So we voluntarily engaged the union and acknowledged them and accepted the union.

And we rehired all of the workers that we could locate into a facility that was across the street from this particular plant.

And since then, we have followed all of the recommendations of the Free Labor Association. And they have a monitoring process.

And after about three months, there was another audit by the Free Labor Association and the Workers’ Rights Commission, which is another related organization. And they said that the activity that we engaged in, they were very well pleased with the progress.

And as I said previously, we acknowledged the union and began negotiations. There was approximately 48 issues that they wanted to discuss. And we reached agreement on 24 of those.

And we — the union even agreed that we had had very good relationships, that we had approached the negotiations openly and fairly.

There were some other points that they wanted to move to arbitration on that — or mediation — that we could not agree on.

And by that time, the time had passed till we reached the midyear of 2008, when the recession in the apparel industry dramatically affected our particular business.

And over the course of the next few months, we had to close nine of our facilities. One of those was the Jerzees de Honduras plant that they have referred to.

And there was a total of 12,780 employees involved in the plant closures. And out of that group, about 310 people, which has been acknowledged by the union, that were union employees, because in Honduras, under the laws there, only 30 people are required to form a union and be acknowledged as a union.

And up until that time, there had been no indications of any issues that had been brought up by the union that were not solved.

Now, beyond that, I would like to tell you a little about how we conduct business worldwide in our plants.

We have been in Honduras since 1993. All of our plants are air conditioned, excellent ventilation in all of those facilities. Our wages in those plants are 26 percent, on the average, above the minimums in Honduras.

We offer 11 paid holidays. We have paid vacations. We have free life insurance. We have a doctor and nurse in each one of those facilities.

And the reference to the filtered water, when we acquired that plant, that particular plant had its own filtration systems, which was different from all of our other plants, which we used bottled water.

We immediately had that water tested. Although there was some discoloration, it was tested as pure. But we immediately shut down the filtration system and went to bottled water that we have in the other plants.

Now, we have paid maternity leaves, we have a breastfeeding hour, we celebrate the employee birthdays, in fact. And also, the — we have a children’s day.

And that, I think, our benefits, I’m proud to tell you, I think are far and above any that you’ll find in most other apparel facilities throughout the world.

And there have been no death threats. We have tried to conduct our business with honesty, integrity.

And quite frankly, I’ve been with this company, I’m in my 48th year, and I would tell you that I’m very proud of how we operate our particular plants.

We have met with a number of the leading universities to try to tell the other side of the story. We’ve invited those presidents of the universities and the administration to come to see for themselves what our plant facilities are like.

And we’ve had two acceptances that were down this past week, the representatives from Princeton and also from the University of Arizona.

And we welcome putting all of this into an open spotlight. We also have a website. That’s www.russellsocialresponsibility.com — that all of this activity that we’re responding to the recommendations of the Fair Labor Association is posted on that website. It’s there for the world to see.

And we continue — Fair Labor Association has a three-step process of continued monitoring. And then they do independent audits periodically to see what our progress is. And all of that is posted on that website. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, John. The motion is now ready to be acted upon. (Applause)

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxyholders, in response to the proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 49,251 votes for the motion and 702,963 votes against the motion.

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed.

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.

37. Berkshire formal meeting adjourns

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting, before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.

2009年会议

上午场

1. 问答环节开始

巴菲特:早上好。我是沃伦。这位精力旺盛的家伙是查理。(笑)

我们马上就要进入问答环节,至少是提问环节,今年会跟去年有点不一样。

我们请来了一个小组——我这儿看得不太清楚——就在右边,是几位记者,他们会提问,并与现场观众交替进行。

我们会来回进行。这里有个小清单,我们会照着来回勾选。就是它了。我们这儿应该有支笔,可以打勾。

2. 介绍董事会成员

巴菲特:不过在此之前,虽然正式会议要等一会儿才开始,我想先介绍一下我们的董事们。请他们在我念到名字时站起来,然后一直站到最后。

如果大家愿意的话,请把掌声留到最后,或者更晚一点也行——(笑)——我们会一一介绍他们。稍后我们会开会选举他们。请大家起立。就像我说的,这里灯光的缘故大家看得不太清楚,不过——

我和查理先来。然后是霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·戴克尔、比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森,还有沃尔特·斯科特。这些就是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事们。(掌声)

3. 把钱放床垫底下都比买国债强

巴菲特:现在,我们只有一张幻灯片,这其实已经比我们平常用得多了。(笑)

不过——它确实能说明去年发生的一些事情。

它同时也算是给我们“神经兮兮的南希”床垫打个广告,这款床垫有著名的夜间存款功能。(笑)

去年——那张幻灯片放出来了吗?

去年,我们在12月19日开了一张票据。我们卖出了500万美元的国库券。我希望大家能看清楚。我们把12月19日那处圈出来了。

那些国库券将于今年4月29日到期,或者说本应到期。也就是说,它们要在四个多月之后才到期。

了不起的地方在于——这也说明去年是多么不寻常的一年——我们卖出的那500万美元国库券,本应在2009年4月29日按500万美元兑付,而我们是在2008年12月把它们卖出的,卖价是500万零90美元零7美分。

换句话说,如果从我们这儿买下这些国债、付给我们500万零90美元的那个人,当初没有买国库券,而是把钱放进“神经兮兮的南希”床垫底下,那么四个月后,他会比买国库券多赚90美元。

如果美国财政部当初卖出5万亿美元这样的国库券,他们本可以轻松赚到9000万美元,蒂姆·盖特纳本可以把这笔钱放进“神经兮兮的南希”床垫底下,那我们大家都会过得更好。

美国国库券出现负收益率,真是件非同寻常的事。你把钱交给美国财政部,得到的回报还不如把钱塞在床垫底下。

我不确定大家有生之年还会不会再见到这种情况。但这确实是极不寻常的一年。

4. 介绍记者小组

巴菲特:我们请来了几位记者。《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯在这儿。CNBC的贝姬·奎克在这儿。还有《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索金也在这儿。

他们收到了来自全国各地股东的问题。安德鲁告诉我,光是今天早上他就收到了几百个问题。

他们从中挑选出了他们认为——都是和伯克希尔·哈撒韦相关的问题。

最近几年的股东大会上,我们遇到过一个问题,就是话题渐渐偏离了伯克希尔,跑到大家孩子最近在学校做了什么之类的事情上去了。(笑)

所以我们想把话题稍微拉回到伯克希尔上来。

所以他们从收到的问题中挑选出了他们认为最好的、和伯克希尔相关的问题。我们会先从——先请卡罗尔·卢米斯开始提问。然后我们再转向现场观众。

我们一共分了13个区,这个大厅里有12个,还有一个溢流厅。半小时到一小时之前,我们通过抽签的方式,从每个观众区里选出了提问者。我们会来回交替进行。那么,就从卡罗尔开始吧。

5. 卡罗尔·卢米斯的开场话

卡罗尔·卢米斯:早上好。我第一个来是因为按字母顺序,卢米斯(Loomis)排在其他人前面——outranks(占先),不是outrakes。不过这也让我有机会花几句话,跟大家说说我们收到的这些问题。

我们今天早上碰了个头。安德鲁收到的问题肯定比我和贝姬任何一个人都多。我们这边收到了差不多5000个问题,我想这个数字连沃伦都会感到吃惊。因为我觉得他没想到会有这么多。

我想说的主要一点是,这里面有相当多问题都非常好。我们要把它们筛选到我们大概能问出的数量,这真是个大难题。我们自己都还不确定最后能问多少个。

不过我们想向那些给我们发来伯克希尔相关问题、但最终没能被问到的人道个歉,因为我们确实得剔除掉一些和主题不太相关的问题。也许明年情况会好一些。

6. 我们的股指衍生品并不危险

卡罗尔·卢米斯:那么,我的第一个问题是,“沃伦和查理,尤其是沃伦。

“您曾经把衍生品称为——这可是句名言——大规模杀伤性金融武器。

“在1964年的电影《奇爱博士》中,绰号‘金刚’的T·J·孔少校,由斯利姆·皮肯斯饰演,骑着一枚大规模杀伤性武器从他的B-52轰炸机弹舱里一跃而下。

“作为伯克希尔的长期股东,今天我感觉自己有点像斯利姆。我知道,尽管股市大幅下跌,但考虑到我们收到的保费所带来的回报,我们的衍生品仓位很有可能是赚钱的。

“但是考虑到这些衍生品——至少是暂时——摧毁掉的会计权益和法定资本,我认为还有市场价值——”这是提问者自己说的——“您认为,对于一家评级很高的保险公司来说,持有这么大规模的衍生品仓位合适吗?

“如果合适的话,您认为您还会继续增加这些仓位吗?”

巴菲特:是这样。我想这么说吧,提问者在某种程度上已经自己回答了自己的问题。

我不知道他是否像我一样坚信,从净值上看,这些仓位最终会赚钱。

但是——你知道,我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的工作就是随着时间推移赚钱。这不会占用资本。我们把这些合约安排成这样,使得抵押品追加要求——这是衍生品领域最大的风险之一——我们在这方面的敞口非常非常小。

即使在3月31日,市场相较于我们签订这些交易时已经大幅下跌的时候,我们所追加的抵押品也只占我们全部有价证券总额的不到1%。

所以它们并没有——它们不会造成——它们总体上会给世界带来问题。这就是为什么我在2002年的报告里从宏观角度把它们称为大规模金融杀伤性武器。

但我在那份报告里也说过,只要我们认为它们定价错误,我们自己的业务中就会经常使用它们。

我们认为我们的股东足够聪明,只要我们像在年报中努力做的那样解释这些交易,解释我们为什么认为会赚钱——不能保证一定赚钱,但我们的预期是会赚钱——我们认为,只要我们解释清楚,这些交易给股东带来的财务后果,会远远超过任何会计上的后果。

我们在早前的报告中解释过,由于按市值计价,这些东西在会计上作为负债可能会出现数十亿美元的波动。

但真正发生的现金流,比如在我们的股票看跌期权上,我们大约收到了49亿美元。这笔钱我们一直持有。这些合约最初的期限是15到20年。所以我们可以使用这49亿美元长达15到20年。

而且到那时候,市场必须比签订合约时更低才行。所以我个人认为,我们在这些股票看跌期权上赚钱的概率非常高。

至于我们签订的高收益指数信用违约互换,我认为在计入我们所持资金的价值之前,我们很可能会亏钱。

我一年前告诉过大家,我认为我们会在这些合约上赚钱。但过去一年里我们遇到的破产案例比正常情况多得多。

我们实际上经历了一场金融飓风。我们承保自然飓风,我们也承保金融飓风。而我们正处在这场金融飓风之中。

所以我预计,在计入投资收益之前,这些合约会显示亏损,甚至在计入投资收益之后可能也是亏损。规模更大的合约是股票看跌期权合约,我认为我们在这些合约上赚钱的概率非常高。

如果我们能按现在的价格签订这些合约,那当然更好。但现在我们大概没法在不承担抵押品追加要求的情况下签订这些合约了。所以我们目前的处境非常有利。

事实上,就在上周,我们修改了两份股票看跌期权合约,其中一份的执行价原本是1514点,现在标普500指数上的执行价已降到994点。我们把期限缩短了8年,但仍然还有大约10年可以运行。

所以,仅仅是把期限从18年缩短到大约10年,我们仍然可以使用这笔资金长达10年,同时把执行价从1514点降到了994点。

所以我认为这些将是非常有利的合约。我认为我们的股东只要得到恰当的解释,就足够聪明去意识到这些合约有多么有利。我们会继续持有它们,也会继续对外解释它们。

而且它们对我们的财务灵活性没有影响。我们远不止是一家保险公司。我是说,我们有来自很多领域的收益,母公司账上有大量现金,各家子公司也有大量现金,我们没有任何重大的到期债务。

所以我们是持有这类工具的理想主体。

查理,你怎么看?

芒格:嗯,我同意提问者的看法,我们做这类事情应该有个限度。但我认为我们离那个限度还远得很。

7. 金融素养问题或许对伯克希尔有利

巴菲特:好,我们请1区提问。

观众:你好。我叫Scott Slaybee(音)。我来自科罗拉多州丹佛市。

首先,我想感谢巴菲特先生和芒格先生今天邀请我们来这里。感谢你们把我们带到这里,非常感谢。

巴菲特:也谢谢你。

观众:你们能回答我们的问题,真的很棒。

我曾经是一名教师。或者说,我现在还是。我不该说“曾经”。作为一个曾当过教师的人,我发现我们下一代存在金融素养方面的问题。

我很好奇,您认为下一代应该了解些什么?在我们向前推进的过程中,学校课程里是否应该加入一些内容,来教年轻人金融素养?

巴菲特:是的。我认为我们这一代人现在就存在金融素养的问题。(笑)

有一位——安迪·海沃德(Andy Heyward),他帮我们制作了那部动画片,他——他去年把自己的公司卖掉了,但他有一家新公司。

他会推出一个节目,专门探讨这个问题。我在其中也扮演了一个很小的角色。

ABC也有一个即将推出的节目,会请一些知名人士来探讨金融素养这个问题。

而且,你知道,在这样一个到处是信用卡、人们依赖计算器而不是自己坐下来做实际算术的世界里,要教会人们这些确实很难。但归根结底,我认为我们随着时间推移会不断进步。我是说,我希望我们的年报也能为此做出一点贡献。

但总会有人在钱的问题上做非常愚蠢的事情。

我记得我度蜜月的时候。我21岁,我太太19岁。我们开车向西走,我从没去过西部。我们经过拉斯维加斯,那是1952年。我们在Flamingo酒店停留。那时候赌场里的人穿得比现在讲究多了。

当时有一群奥马哈人实际上拥有Flamingo的部分股份,他们对我们非常友善。

但我环顾那家赌场,看到各种衣着光鲜的人,他们千里迢迢跑来做一件非常愚蠢的事情。我当时就想,这真是一个能让你发大财的国家。(笑)

如果人们愿意在纽约登上飞机,飞上几千英里,就为了站在那里做一些数学期望在每一步都是负的事情,那这就是一个充满机会的世界。所以——(笑)

我建议你——你和你的学生们一起努力。我21岁的时候就在奥马哈大学教书了,你知道的。你要和你的学生们一起努力,让他们具备金融素养。他们将因此获得巨大的优势。

查理?

芒格:嗯,如今很多州都以彩票的形式合法开展赌博,鼓励人们逆着概率下注;同时我们又极度滥用高成本的信用卡债务,这个世界需要更多的金融素——我应该说,金融素养。

我认为我们一直在朝着错误的方向走。所以我不认为你能教会一个连信用卡都不会理智使用的人高深的理财知识。(笑)

巴菲特:是的。如果你——我跟学生们谈过这个问题。如果你愿意为信用卡支付18%或21%的利息——

顺便说一句,信用卡公司现在也需要这些利息,因为目前的坏账损失接近10%。算上各项费用,他们可能确实需要这些收入。

但你绝不可能靠借这种利率的钱在财务上得偿所愿。我也不知道该怎么才能靠这个赚钱。这很可惜。不过话说回来,这对我们的业务大概是件好事。

我的意思是——你知道——我们在寻找定价错误的东西。越多人认为用信用卡借钱是明智的,他们大概就越不会认为做长期股票认沽合约是明智的。我们走我们的路,他们走他们的路。

8. 巴菲特“称赞”华盛顿对信贷危机的应对

巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:沃伦,首先,我们被要求传达一个消息,今天的到场人数是35,000人。

巴菲特:很好。(掌声)现在——

贝姬·奎克:这个——

巴菲特:现在如果他们都能适当地消费一下,那今天可就是个大日子了。(笑)

贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自俄亥俄州洛根市的詹姆斯·刘易斯(音),他说可以公开他的姓名和所在城市。

他说:“伯克希尔的重要投资之一是富国银行。富国银行的董事长据说表示他不想接受联邦政府的TARP资金。

“而且,他最近还说联邦政府用来重振银行业的一些计划愚蠢至极。

“芒格先生,您同意富国银行董事长的说法吗?请解释您为什么同意或不同意。巴菲特先生,您同意芒格先生的看法吗?”(笑)

巴菲特:同意。(笑)

芒格:当一个政府正在应对70年来最大的金融危机——这场危机威胁到全世界重要的价值观——而各项决策都是在仓促、压力之下、出于善意做出的时候,我认为期望它和自己的每一个想法都完全一致是不合理的。

我认为,当政府在困境中尽力而为时,理应受到更宽容的评判。

当然,其中有些反应会是愚蠢的。而我恰好和富国银行的一些高管有同样的一个毛病,那就是我说话相当直率。

我恰好认为,那种“你的信用越是被摧毁,你的盈利反而越高”的会计原则——因为如果你还有点钱,你就可以折价买回自己的债务——我恰好认为这是疯狂的会计做法。

我认为投票通过这一做法的人应该被踢出会计准则委员会。所以,说这种话的人,对富国银行的那些人自然会有些同情。

巴菲特:他通常会把人倒吊起来收拾一顿,但今天早上他还是手下留情了。

去年9月中旬,政府确实——他们面对的局面,我认为已经接近整个金融体系彻底崩溃,你能想象到的程度。

几天之内就有好几千亿美元从货币市场基金中撤出。商业票据市场也冻结了,这意味着全国各地那些和金融业基本毫无关系的公司,都要面临发不出工资的问题。

我们——我们当时真的是在直视深渊。很多措施都是非常迅速地出台的。总的来说,我对当时采取的这些行动表示赞赏。

所以正如查理所说,指望那些每天工作20个小时、又不断从四面八方被新信息、坏消息冲击的人做到完美——那个周末,雷曼倒了,AIG快撑不住了,如果不是美国银行收购的话,美林在我看来也会倒——这种期望是不现实的。

我的意思是——当你被从四面八方夹击,还必须制定政策,还得考虑国会的反应和美国民众的反应时,你懂的,不可能事事都做得完美。

但我认为总体而言,他们做得非常、非常好。

我很能理解——那句话是迪克·科瓦切维奇说的,他去年在“说话直率”世界大赛里屈居查理之后,排名第二。(笑)

确实,据我了解,迪克·科瓦切维奇是在一个星期天中午过后不久接到电话,被告知第二天下午一两点要出现在华盛顿,但没被告知是什么事。

当时那里有11位银行家和一些官员在场。他们被告知要接受TARP资金,要接受政府的贷款和优先股。而且他们只有一两个小时的时间签字,根本来不及征求董事会的意见。

但这就是紧急情况的本质。你懂的——我认为你——嗯,事后回头看,会有一些决定,有人会说“这个本来可以做得更好一点”。但总体而言,在我看来,当局做得非常好。

而各家银行绝不是千篇一律的。在我们看来,富国银行——尤其是在各大银行之中——是一家了不起的银行,拥有其他银行所不具备的一些优势。

但在那样的时刻,你没办法照顾到那么多细枝末节。

顺便说一句,我建议大家都去网上找来看看杰米·戴蒙写给股东的信。摩根大通的杰米·戴蒙。那是一封绝妙的信。它谈到了查理刚才提到的一个观点。

杰米在信中出色地阐述了危机的成因,以及未来可以采取哪些措施。这是我所见过的最好的股东信之一。所以无论如何,都值得找来看看。信很长,但值得一读。

9. 高深数学对投资可能是危险的

巴菲特:好,我们转到2号区域。

观众:是的,谢谢,巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫里克·富兰克林(音)。我来自密苏里州圣路易斯。我想接着1号话筒关于金融知识普及的问题问下去,也接着我两年前关于您贴现率的问题问下去。

但在那之前,请容许我先说件事。托斯托尔(音)的妻子罗斯玛丽·库恩斯(音),如果您能到222区就好了。我找到您丈夫了。(笑)

如果方便的话,您也可以到2号话筒来。

巴菲特:在这儿真是什么都能碰上。(笑)

观众:那我的问题是关于自由现金流的:卖方分析师喜欢做那种带终值的十年期贴现现金流分析。

甚至一些写您投资风格的书——《巴菲特之路》、《巴菲特原则》——都暗示您会走这样一套流程。

但我知道您以不用电脑或计算器著称。我想知道这类分析是不是被您归入了“太难”的那一档,而您只是简单地用一个标准化的自由现金流除以贴现率来估算?

如果您愿意用可口可乐的数字分析来补充一下答案,我会非常感激。(笑)

巴菲特:好,答案是这样的:投资——所有的投资,无非就是现在拿出现金,以求日后拿回更多现金。那么问题就在于,你能拿回多少,你有多大把握能拿到,以及什么时候能拿到?这可以追溯到伊索寓言。你知道的,“双鸟在林,不如一鸟在手。”

这话是伊索在公元前600年说的。他是个非常聪明的人。他自己并不知道那是公元前600年。但我的意思是,他不可能什么都知道。(笑)

但是——但这正是金融学里教的那套东西——你如今拿了个博士学位,把它搞得更复杂了,你不会说“双鸟在林,不如一鸟在手”,因为这种说法没法真正让外行人对你刮目相看。

但真正的问题是,树丛里有几只鸟?你知道,你今天付出的是手中的一只鸟,一美元。那么树丛里有几只鸟?你有多大把握它们真的在那儿?还有多少鸟在别的树丛里?折现率又是多少?

换句话说,如果利率是20%,你就得比利率是5%时更快地拿到那两只鸟,诸如此类。

这就是我们在做的事。我是说,我们看的是现在拿出现金,以便日后拿回更多现金。

你提到我不用电脑或计算器。如果你需要用电脑或计算器才能算出来,那你就不该买它。

我是说,这应该明显到不需要你精确到十分之一或百分之一的百分点。它应该是冲着你大喊大叫的。

所以如果你真的需要计算器才能算出折现率是9.6%而不是9.8%,那就干脆放弃这整件事吧。去找那种会向你大喊大叫的东西。基本上,我们看待每一门生意都是这样。

但你说得对,我们不会——我们不会坐下来做表格,搞那一整套东西。我们只是看到某个东西,明显比我们理解的其他任何东西都好。然后我们就出手。

查理,你要补充点什么吗?

芒格:我要说得更进一步。我见过的一些最糟糕的商业决策,恰恰是那些做了大量正式预测和折现计算的决策。

壳牌石油公司收购贝尔里奇石油公司的时候就是这么干的。他们让这些工程师做了一大堆精心设计的数字。

问题在于你会开始相信那些数字。而且似乎那种更高深的数学,带着更多虚假的精确性,应该能帮到你。但它没有。

平均下来,当你试图把事情形式化到你说的那种程度时,效果是负面的。商学院会这么做,因为,呃,他们总得做点什么。(笑声与掌声)

巴菲特:这话有很多道理。我是说,如果你站在课堂前说,“双鸟在林不如一鸟在手”,你知道的,你是拿不到终身教职的。(笑)

如果你是在神职人员这一行,看起来至少要比你在向之布道的人懂得多得多,这一点非常重要。

如果你走下讲台,直接——如果你是个牧师,你直接把十诫发下去,说“就是这样”,然后我们就都回家了,你知道,这不是在这个世界上取得进步的方式。

所以,那种说这是一个两个标准差的事件,或者这是一个三个标准差的事件,因此我们能够承担这么多风险之类的虚假精确性,是完全疯狂的。

我是说,你在1998年的长期资本管理公司身上就见识过这个。你一次又一次、一次又一次地见识过。

而且这种事只发生在智商高的人身上。你们知道,那些智商120的人都很安全。(笑)

但如果你智商非常高,又学了这么一整套东西,你知道,你会觉得非用不可。而市场不是那样运作的。

去年9月中旬的市场,那时候,那些执掌巨型机构的人正在琢磨他们下周该怎么弄到融资,你知道,那种情况不会出现在——你根本没法算出那会出现在哪个标准差上。

这种情况出现的频率,会比人们想的高得多,因为市场是由那些会害怕、会贪婪的人造出来的。他们不遵守抛硬币的规律——就结果分布而言。

认为数学能带你在投资上走很远,这是一个可怕的错误。你必须理解数学的某些方面。但你不需要理解高深的数学。

而高深的数学实际上可能是危险的,它会把你引上那些最好别踩的路。

10. 犯错的不止穆迪一家

巴菲特:好。安德鲁,今天上午那两百个问题里的一个?还是——

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个不是今天上午的,但和穆迪有关。我们大概至少收到了300个关于这个话题的问题。

这个问题很有代表性,来自Aaron Goldsmeizer(音)。问题是这样的:

“考虑到评级机构在当前经济危机中扮演的角色——它们的利益冲突,它们对你在今年致股东信中所说的、引用原话,‘有缺陷的基于历史的模型’的依赖,以及信誉丧失和/或监管改革很可能迫使它们的商业模式或盈利来源发生剧烈变化——你为什么还持有穆迪这么大的仓位?

“更重要的是,你为什么不利用你的持股,去尝试做点什么,以防止利益冲突和对这些有缺陷的基于历史的模型的依赖?”

巴菲特:是的,我不认为利益冲突问题是——是评级机构未能预见CDO、CNBS之类各种工具会发生什么的最主要原因,甚至连接近主要原因都算不上。

基本上,五年前,这个国家几乎每一个人的脑子里,不管是正式的还是非正式的,都有这么一个模型:房价不可能大幅下跌。

他们错了。国会错了。银行家错了。购买这些工具的人错了。放贷人——借款人也错了。

但人们认为,如果他们打算明年买房子,最好今年就买,因为明年它会卖出更高的价钱。

而借钱给他们的人说,他们在申请表上撒不撒谎、有没有收入都无所谓,因为房子会涨,就算我们不得不止赎,也不会亏太多钱。再说了,他们明年很可能能再融资还上。

所以,几乎是全民相信——虽然一直有少数人不同意——但几乎整个国家都相信,房价肯定不会大幅下跌,而且很可能还会继续上涨。

而评级机构的人,不管以何种方式,都把这一点写进了他们的体系里。

而且我并不——我真的不认为主要是付费方的制度造成了这个问题。我认为他们只是不理解在一个市场——或者说真的是在一个泡沫——中可能发生的各种情况,在那种泡沫里,人们对大多数美国人拥有的最大一项资产,也就是他们的房子,加了巨大的杠杆。

于是,在美国家庭总共50万亿美元的资产里,就有一个20万亿美元的资产类别被加了极高的杠杆。而一旦开始崩塌,它在下行时就带有自我强化的特性。

所以我说,他们在分析这些工具上犯了一个重大错误。但这是一个非常非常非常多人都犯过的错误。

而且很可能,如果他们在四五年前对住宅抵押贷款采取了不同的看法,他们本该在向国会委员会作证时被质问:“你们怎么能这么不爱国,仅仅因为你们不肯给这些证券更高的评级,就剥夺所有这些人买房的权利?”

所以我——他们犯了一个巨大的错误。但美国民众也犯了一个巨大的错误。国会也犯了一个巨大的错误。

国会主管着两家最大的抵押贷款公司。它们就是国会的产物。也是由国会监管的。而你知道,它们现在都处于接管状态。

所以我不认为他们在未能察觉即将到来的事情上是独一无二的。

至于我们对它们行为的影响,我想我从没给穆迪打过电话。

但同样,我也没给——或者说,也许给一两家我们参与投资的其他公司打过电话——这也是事实。

我是说,我们不会告诉,你知道,伯灵顿北方要采用什么安全规程。

我们不会告诉美国运通该给谁停掉信用卡,你知道,该借给谁、不该借给谁。

我们——当我们持有一家公司的股票时,我们不是去那里改变别人的。

我们改变他们的运气本来就很差。事实上,查理和我曾经在一些我们是最大股东的公司董事会里任职。而我们在改变行为方面运气非常差。

所以我们认为,如果你买了一家公司的股票,你知道,你最好别指望能改变他们的行动路线。

至于卖出这只股票,评级机构这门生意八成还是一门好生意。它正受到攻击。谁知道会走向何方?谁知道国会会拿它怎么办?

但这是一门参与者极少的生意。这是一门影响经济中很大一部分的生意。我是说,资本市场是巨大的。我认为未来大概率还会有评级机构。而且我认为这是一门不需要资本的生意。所以它具备一门相当不错生意的基本面。

在资本市场的某些领域,它接下来——可能在很长一段时间里都不会有那么大的业务量了。但资本市场会随时间而增长。

我们在这个会议上过去说过很多次,查理和我不看重评级。我是说,我们不相信把投资决策外包出去。

所以我们——如果我们买一只债券,评级对我们来说无关紧要,除非我们认为它被评得比该有的更差,那可能有助于我们以有吸引力的价格买进它。

但我们不认为穆迪、标准普尔、惠誉,或者别的什么地方的人,应该来告诉我们一家公司的信用评级。这个我们自己会算。而且我们有时候会在很大程度上与市场意见不合。我们也靠这个赚过一些钱。

查理?

芒格:是的,我认为评级机构,由于很擅长做数学计算,就热衷于找一些愚蠢的假设,好让他们能施展精巧的数学手法。这是一个聪明反被聪明误的例子。

有句老话说,“在一个只有锤子的人眼里,什么问题看起来都差不多像钉子。”而那——(笑)——就是评级机构里发生的事。

巴菲特:是的,关于那些三A评级,有意思的地方在于,创造出它们的人最后自己也持有了一大堆。所以他们自己也相信了自己编的胡话。那种——那种信念是巨大的。

所以是这些人自己在搅那锅酷爱饮料(Kool-Aid),然后自己又把它喝了。而他们——(笑)——你知道,他们为此付出了很大的代价。但我不认为那是——我认为那是愚蠢,再加上大家都在这么干这个事实。

我每隔几年会给我们的经理人们发一封信。但就我而言,在伯克希尔,对任何行动,你不能给出的一个理由,就是“别人都在这么做”。

你知道,如果那就是你能想出来的最好理由,那说明哪里出问题了。但这种情况在证券市场里一直在发生。

当然了,当查理和我在所罗门或者类似的地方时,很难告诉一个庞大的组织,说你们不该做那些备受尊敬的竞争对手都在做的事情。尤其是当那里面有大把的钱可赚的时候。

所以,一旦某种行为在业内获得了普遍认可,就很难阻止这些事情。你知道,我们在所罗门说“我们就是不想做这种事”这件事上,查理和我是非常不成功的。

我们甚至连——最初,我们刚进去的时候,他们正在跟马克·里奇做生意。我们说,“我们别跟马克·里奇做生意了。”

你知道,那就好比在三十年代说,“我们别跟阿尔·卡彭做生意了”之类的。而他们说,“但这是好生意。如果他不跟我们做,他会跟别人做。”他们就是这么想的。而我认为我们那次赢了。但那并不容易。

你还记得那事吗,查理?

芒格:当然记得。

11. 房地产市场开始好转

巴菲特:好,我们转到3号区。(笑)

好,3号区,麦克风开着吗?

观众:我是来自加利福尼亚州伯克利的劳里·古尔德(音)。

您认为全国的住宅房地产市场,尤其是加州的,在未来一两年里会走向何方?

巴菲特:嗯,我们不知道房地产接下来会怎么样。几年前我们也不知道它会怎么样。我们当时觉得它在某些方面变得有点危险了。但这非常难说。

我可以这么说。从我们所看到的情况——从我所看到的情况来看,我确实看了很多数据——顺便说一句,加州是一个非常大的——我是说,加州内部有许多个市场。斯托克顿会和旧金山不一样,等等。

但是,在过去几个月里,你已经看到活动确实有所回升,尽管价格低了很多。但你会看到——我认为你会在中低价位的房子上看到一些迹象。而“中等”在加州和在内布拉斯加州是完全不同的概念。

但你会看到,在大概75万美元及以下的房子里,活动确实明显回升了,出价人多了很多。你还没有看到价格反弹。价格明显下跌了,而且各地区情况不同。

但看起来——你知道,此前有过一段止赎冻结期。所以由此产生了一些扭曲。

但从我们的房地产经纪数据来看——我们在南加州拥有最大的房地产经纪公司,在橘郡、洛杉矶郡和圣地亚哥,也就是由中美能源旗下持有的加州保德信——我们看到,在中低价位那一档,在这些大幅下降后的价格水平上,情况已经接近,我可以说,趋于稳定了。

如果你有一栋500万美元或300万美元的房子,那看起来仍然非常——不稳定——那是一个至今仍没有多少交易活动的市场。

但在较低价位上,现在有大量的交易活动。房子在成交。当然了,利率下降了,所以还款也容易多了。

加州现在每天新增的抵押贷款,比几年前的那种组合要好得多。

所以情况在改善。至于下个月或者三个月后会怎样,我不知道。

住房状况大体是这样的。你可以这样来看。

我们每年大约新增130万户家庭。这个数字会有些波动。而且——在经济衰退时期,这个数字往往会更少一些,因为人们在一定程度上会推迟结婚等等。

但如果一年新增130万户家庭,而你每年新开工200万套住房,那你就要出问题了。而这正是我们当时干的事。我们造出的房子,超过了需求——基本面需求——所能吸纳的量。

于是我们造出了过剩的房子。现在过剩多少呢?也许有150万套。我们当时一年建200万套。现在降到了一年50万套。

那么,如果你一年造50万套,而每年又新增130万户家庭,你就会把过剩的供应消化掉。

这种情况在全国各地会很不均衡。南佛罗里达的日子会很难过,而且会持续很长很长一段时间。所以这不像是你可以把一栋房子从一个地方搬到另一个地方,哪里有需求就搬到哪里去。

但我们现在正在消化过剩库存。而且我们消化的速度大概是每年70万到80万套。如果我们有150万套过剩,那得花上两年时间。这是躲不掉的。

你有三种选择。你可以把150万栋房子炸掉,你知道的。如果他们真这么干,我希望他们炸的是你的房子,不是我的,不过那是——(笑)

我们可以想办法消耗掉它。我们可以试着创造更多的家庭。我们可以让14岁的孩子开始结婚生子,然后——(笑)

或者我们可以让生产量低于自然需求增长量。这就是我们现在正在做的事。

我们要把库存消化掉。这不是一天能做到的事,也不是一周能做到的事。但它终究会做到。

等到做到那一天,价格就会趋于稳定。然后就会催生出更多住房的新需求。接着新开工数就会回升到125万套,那时我们的隔热材料业务、地毯业务和砖块业务都会好转。

具体什么时候会发生,没人知道。但它一定会发生。

查理?

芒格:哦,我认为像奥马哈这样的地方,房价从来没有真正疯狂地暴涨过,现在利率又这么低,如果你信用良好,要是我是个想在奥马哈买房的年轻人,我明天就会去买。(掌声)

巴菲特:我们拥有奥马哈最大的房地产经纪公司。所以——(笑)——查理要是符合条件,我们会给他办抵押贷款申请的。

如果说今年会有450万套房子易手,那是真的。这个国家大约有8000万套房子。其中2500万套没有抵押贷款。全国大约三分之一的房子是没有抵押贷款的。剩下大约5500万套或略少一些的房子有抵押贷款。其中五六百万套正以这样那样的方式陷入困境。

但我们每天都在卖出450万套房子[原文如此]。而且总体来说,这些房子正在落到更强健的买家手中。抵押贷款变得更负担得起了,首付比例也更高了。我们——这个局面正在得到纠正。

但这个问题不是一天、一周或一个月造成的。它也不会在一天、一周或一个月内解决。我们正走在解决问题的路上。

12. 2008年对投资经理候选人来说并不是个好年景

巴菲特:好,卡罗尔?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:也许我一开始就该说一件事。你们当中仔细读过年报的人都知道,查理和沃伦事先完全不知道我们三个人会问什么问题。所以别以为他们拿到了什么小抄。他们什么都没看过。

这个问题,我收到了很多版本。这一个恰好来自纽约市的乔纳森·格兰特(Jonathan Grant)。它是关于你说过将来可能接替你的那四位投资经理的。

“能否请你在不点名的情况下,最好是从量化和质化两方面告诉我们,这四位经理在2008年管理——他们当时正在管理——客户资金的表现如何。

“你说过,你希望挑选出能够预见到前所未有之事的人。虽然世界以前也经历过信贷危机,但2008年发生了很多事,尤其是那一年最后几个月里,很少有人预料到,而你自己也称之为几乎前所未有的情况。

“你如何评价这几位经理——这四位经理——在应对这些低概率风险方面的表现?这四位是否都还在名单上?”

巴菲特:嗯,答案是,四位都还在名单上。不过让我先澄清一点,因为这一点之前被报道得有点走样了。

我们有三位CEO职位的候选人。这一直是我们董事会会议上一个主要的讨论话题。他们都是内部候选人。你们应该知道这一点。

这之前已经说过了。但这里被误传了一两次。我想是因为和那四位投资岗位候选人的事混在一起了,所以搞混了。而在投资岗位那件事上,这四位是可以全部都来我们这里工作的。

我们不会有三个CEO,也不会有两个CEO。但在我不在的时候,我们可能会有多位投资经理。或者也可能只有一位。到时候由董事会决定。

他们既可能来自公司内部,也可能来自公司外部。就他们的来源而言,我们不排除任何可能性。所以在投资岗位上,我们完全可以有一份来自公司外部的一长串名单。

CEO职位的情况就不是这样了。接替我的人将来自伯克希尔·哈撒韦内部。

这四位,我手头没有他们精确的数字,不过对其中一些人我掌握了相当多的信息。我想说,去年他们的表现顶多是和标普指数打平,而标普去年加回股息后是负37%。

所以就2008年这一年而言,我想说,你不能说他们的表现光彩照人。不过我自己在2008年也没有表现得光彩照人。所以对这一点我非常宽容。(笑)他们——

查理,你对其中一些人的业绩记录相当了解。你是不是也这么认为?

芒格:是的。让我感兴趣的是,几乎我所知道的、在美国被认为聪明、自律、而且过去有着不凡业绩的每一位投资经理,去年都被打得很惨。(零星笑声)

巴菲特:这群人——我没听到多少笑声呀。(笑)

我想你这话戳中了在场不少人的痛处,查理。

这四位长期以来的业绩记录是优于平均水平的。如果你在年初问我,说:“如果这一年会跌37%,这个群体的表现会不会好于平均?”我会说是的。

但我想我当时的判断可能是错的。就像我说的,我还没拿到他们每个人经审计的收益数据。不过我想我确实是判断错了。

我想说,他们十年来的业绩记录,在每一个案例中,都比平均水平要好,程度从略好到明显好不等。而且我愿意打赌,未来十年也会是这样的情况。

但不可否认,去年确实有很多东西都不奏效了。而我们这个群体也未能幸免。

我没有改动这份名单。但这不意味着我们没有一直在物色更多人选,考虑把他们加进来。

而与CEO这份工作不同的是,你知道,如果我今晚突然去世,董事会明天早上就得让某个人接任CEO。他们会这么做的。而且他们知道那个人是谁。他们对此感觉非常好。

我希望别好过头了,不过——(笑)

但在投资主管这件事上——一位或多位,很可能是多位——他们不需要在第二天或下一周就做出决定。

我是说,投资组合并不会——不会因为这件事一切就都停摆了。所以在这方面他们可以做得相对从容一些。而且这个决定,在很大程度上,会是在与新任CEO商量并取得一致的情况下做出的。

所以这是一件你们不该指望第二天就听到投资经理人选公布的事。但你们应该会在大约一个月左右的时间内听到消息。

芒格:我不希望我们要一位这样的经理,他觉得自己可以基于宏观经济判断就把仓位全部换成现金,等到不再适合持有现金的时候再跳回来。既然我们自己都做不到这一点——

巴菲特:是的,如果我们自己都做不到,我们就认为这是不可能做到的事。

芒格:是的,没错。(笑)

所以我们要找的不是那种把资产全部换成现金的人。

巴菲特:是的,那样的话——事实上,我们会把这么做的人排除在外。

芒格:是的,我们会把他们排除掉。

巴菲特:是的。那——

芒格:他们还不够蠢,够不上我们的标准。(笑)

13. 芒格预计公立/私立混合医疗体系

巴菲特:好,我们去4号区。

观众:您好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我叫弗恩·库申贝里(Vern Cushenbery)。我来自堪萨斯州的欧弗兰帕克。

我想请教一下,你们对建立全国性医疗体系的可能性有什么看法?它可能会是什么样子?又会对你们的投资组合产生什么影响?

巴菲特:这个嘛,我打算让查理来回答这个问题,因为我不知道该怎么答。(笑)

芒格:就我个人而言,我认为迟早会有一种更接近欧洲模式的体系在美国出现。而且我认为它会由一个私营体系来补充,这就相当于私立学校对公立教育形成的那种竞争关系。

而且,尽管我是共和党人,但我并不为这种可能出现的发展感到恐慌。就个人而言,我倒希望他们能先把这件事推迟一年,让我们先把经济问题解决了。(掌声)

巴菲特:至于这对伯克希尔的影响,我想说,我们旗下有各行各业、种类繁多的公司——我们有24.6万名员工——我们会像美国企业界普遍会做的那样,去适应这方面的任何发展变化。

这不会给我们带来特殊的问题,也不会给我们带来特殊的机会。我们会看国会所反映出的全国民意走向如何,然后相应地采取行动。

14. 我们为什么不培训或指定下一任CEO

巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:这个问题是接着接班人问题来的。不过这一个是特别针对三位CEO候选人提出的。这是欧文·芬斯特(Irving Fenster)写来的问题,他写道:

“经营伯克希尔非常复杂、非常繁琐。请给我们讲讲,你为什么不愿意提早把接班人招进来,让他能受益于你的培训,而不是让他日后独自去应付转型过程中数不清的难题?”

“这样做对伯克希尔、对你的接班人、对你本人来说,好处都是显而易见的,你的这种不情愿实在令人费解。让他提早到位,或许还能减轻你的一些压力,帮你多保持很多年的健康。”

巴菲特:欧文是我在俄克拉何马州的一位朋友。40年前,欧文和艾琳夫妇就加入了我的合伙企业。他就这个问题给我写了三四十年的信了。而他一直——(笑)——他一直没能说服我。所以他显然是决定改写信给贝姬了。(笑)

如果我们有什么好办法,能把某个人安插进某个角色——从而能让他成为一个更出色的伯克希尔CEO,我们是会去尝试的。

但事实是,我们现在的候选人都在经营着实实在在的企业。他们每天都在做资本配置的决策,做各种经营性质的事务。而且这些都是大型企业。

要是让他们整天待在总部,看着我坐在那儿看书、打电话,谁知道还干些什么,他们——这——那样的话根本没什么事可让他们做。

我是说,我们可以每小时开一次会。我可以说,“我现在在想这个,你怎么看?”然后——(笑)

那简直是浪费人才,太荒唐了。

欧文有这样一种想法,觉得他们不知怎么就会吸收我正在做的这一切。我看完《华尔街日报》就把它扔给他,我也会把《纽约时报》扔给他,把《金融时报》扔给他。(笑)

而这些人都是懂得如何经营大企业的人。他们经营的企业能赚很多很多百万美元,甚至几十亿美元。

所以,他们现在就已经准备好接手这份工作了。除非他们百分之百地准备就绪,否则我是不会满意的。他们懂得如何配置资本。

他们最大的任务,是要与潜在的企业出售方、与外界、与你们这些股东、与其他经理人建立起关系。这需要一些时间,但不是特别长的时间。

但那——你知道,他们得去认识各种各样的人,接触不同的群体。但那——这些事情其实并不需要刻意去催促加快,也并不是特别重要的事。

我是说,他们懂得如何经营企业,而且在很多事情上他们会做得比我好得多。最大的——可能最大的挑战在于,我们有你们在电影里看到的那些才华横溢的经理人。

这些人各有各的风格,在某种程度上也各有各的需求,他们的经营方式各不相同。但他们都是成功人士。

但是你知道,他们有的是左打者,有的是右打者,有的站在打击区靠后的位置,有的则紧贴本垒板。我是说,他们各有各的细微差别,但他们打起球来都非常厉害。

而对伯克希尔的CEO来说,确实需要了解这些人各自的个性——哪些人喜欢完全自行其是,哪些人喜欢偶尔汇报一下情况,诸如此类。

但这并不能成为理由,把一个眼下正成功经营着一家企业、正在创造价值的人才拉过来,让他坐在我隔壁的办公室里,跟我一起没完没了地讨论当天发生的事情。

我是说,查理和我共事已经几十年了。我从查理身上学到了很多东西。但我并不是靠让他坐在隔壁办公室、每小时开一次会之类的方式学到的。

你怎么看,查理?

芒格:嗯,我认为,平均而言,通过在拥有极大自主权的情况下经营一家子公司,你更有可能成长为一名合格的CEO,而不是待在总部里看着别人按他自己的方式做事。

世界上很多行之有效的模式,比如强生公司(Johnson & Johnson),其实都很像伯克希尔——它们实行分权管理,让这些人才从子公司里脱颖而出,而不是试图在总部的温室里硬造出一批CEO来。

巴菲特:伯克希尔有一种不寻常的情况,就是我们大多数——几乎是全部——高层人士,做的都是他们自己想做的事。我是说,他们喜欢经营自己的企业。

那正是他们加入时所期望做的事。而他们现在做的也正是这件事,我们让他们按自己喜欢的方式去做。

所以我们这里不存在那种有50个人都觉得自己正在往金字塔顶端爬的情况。欧文希望我能指定——他跟我谈过这个——他希望我能指名道姓地说出接班人是谁。但这个人选将来是可能会变的。这可能会造成一些可能的——

嗯,我们在通用电气就见过这种情况,我是说,当杰夫·伊梅尔特(Jeff Immelt)从三名候选人中被选中之后,另外两人就离开了。我实在看不出身边留一个“加冕王子”式的人物有什么好处。不过欧文肯定还会继续给我写信,这一点我可以向你保证。(笑)

15. 巴菲特的商学院:只需两门课

巴菲特:好,5号区。

观众:你好,沃伦。有点大声,抱歉。你好,我叫萨拉,来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈。

我想知道,您能否谈谈您的策略——也就是价值投资——在培养下一代投资者方面的作用?您打算怎么教育这一年轻群体?

巴菲特:这个,今年大概有49所——主要是大学,也有一些学院——到奥马哈来。我们通常六所六所地分批接待。最后一批多加了一所大学,所以总共办了八场,都是全天的活动。

他们问我——有时候他们会问,如果我来主持一所商学院、教投资课程,我会怎么做。

我会告诉他们,我只会开两门课。一门是如何给企业估值,另一门是如何看待市场。

课程里不会有任何现代投资组合理论、贝塔系数或有效市场之类的东西。这些我们头十分钟就打发掉了。

但如果你懂得怎么给企业估值——你不需要懂得给所有企业估值。在纽约证券交易所,大概有四五千家企业,纳斯达克上的还要更多。

你不需要在四五千家上都判断正确,四百家上正确都不需要,四十家上正确也不需要。

你只需要待在能力圈之内,也就是你能理解的那些东西。然后在你能估值的那些公司里,去找那些卖价低于其价值的。

你可以从一个相当小的能力圈开始,随着不断学习,逐渐扩大对企业的了解。

但你会发现,有一大批企业根本不适合估值,那些你就干脆放弃、不去理会。

我认为——会计能帮到你,你需要懂会计,才能读懂商业的语言,但会计也有很大的局限性。你必须学到足够多,才能知道哪些会计信息是有意义的,哪些方面又必须忽略。

你必须懂得,什么时候竞争优势是持久的,什么时候只是昙花一现。

我是说,你得学会分辨呼啦圈公司和可口可乐之间的区别。不过这并不难。

然后你还得懂得如何看待市场波动,真正明白市场是用来为你服务的,而不是用来指挥你的。

而在很大程度上,这与智商无关。如果你从事投资这一行,智商有150,把其中30分卖给别人吧,因为你用不上。

我是说——(笑)——你需要有相当的智力,但你不需要是天才,完全不需要。事实上,那反而可能有害。

但你必须有情绪上的稳定性,对自己的决定要有一种内在的平静。因为这是一场你每分每秒都会受到刺激的游戏,人们随时都在向你灌输各种意见。

你必须能够独立思考。我也说不清,这种能力多少是天生的,多少是可以后天教会的。

但如果你具备这种素质,只要肯花时间学一学如何给企业估值,投资上你就会做得很好。

这不是一个复杂的游戏。我说过很多次——它很简单,但并不容易。

它不是一个复杂的游戏。你不需要懂高等数学,你不——你知道,你不需要懂法律。有很多事情你不必擅长。这个世界上有各种各样比这难得多的工作。

但你确实需要有一种情绪上的稳定,能带你渡过几乎一切风浪。这样,随着时间推移,你就能做出好的投资决策。

查理?

芒格:是的,你确实面临一个基本的问题:世界上未来的投资者,恰好有一半会处于后50%之列。

换句话说——(笑)——顶尖那部分的水平永远会比垫底那部分更高。你永远无法把全世界的投资水平拉平。

现代投资实践、现代投资银行业,乃至现代学术界的商学院——甚至经济系——都充斥着大量荒谬和错误的东西,如果你能减少这些废话,我觉得那已经是你合理能期望达到的目标了。

巴菲特:不过,超过某个基本水平之后,你是不是也认为,一个人的情绪构成,比某种超高的技巧水平更重要?

芒格:绝对是这样。而且如果你以为自己智商有160,其实只有150,那你就完蛋了。(笑)

你知道,一个智商130、但能在自己能力范围内游刃有余操作的人,要好得多。

巴菲特:我有机会见到来访的学生。我特别喜欢芝加哥大学来的一位学生。他向我提的第一个问题是:“我们学到的东西里,哪些是最错误的?”这才是那种——我是说,我倒希望这里的与谈人也能被问到这种问题。

芒格:这种问题你一节课怎么回答得完?

巴菲特:是啊。(笑)

但在25年前,有效市场理论可是神圣不可侵犯的教条。我一直搞不懂,那东西怎么能拿来教。

我是说,如果你一上课头五分钟就跟学生说,“一切都定价合理”,那接下来那一个小时你要怎么撑下去?

可是——(笑)——他们做到了。而且做得好的还能拿到博士学位。你知道,他们的著作里能塞进的希腊字母越多,就越受人推崇。

这让我感到不可思议——这大概也让我对整个学术界产生了一种偏见——荒谬的想法竟然能站稳脚跟并广泛传播,到了这种程度。

后来有一天我读到一句话,或许能部分解释这个现象。是那位著名物理学家马克斯·普朗克说的。

马克斯·普朗克谈到,人类的头脑——哪怕是聪明的头脑——对新观念有一种抵触,尤其是那些经过多年精心打磨、又得到有威望的人士背书的旧观念。

他说:“科学是一次葬礼一次葬礼地向前推进的。”我觉得这话很有道理,在金融界尤其如此。

16. 阿吉特·贾因的继任者不会拥有同样广泛的权限

巴菲特:好,安德鲁?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:好的。我们有一个关于接班的问题,不过这个问题有点特别,来自本·诺尔。

“您有句名言,原话是,‘你应该投资那种连傻瓜都能经营的企业,因为总有一天真会有个傻瓜来经营它。’(笑)

“鉴于贵公司再保险业务的规模及其对大额金融押注的偏好,等阿吉特不在了之后,您能否给我们多一些关于风险方面的保证?

“你有没有为他制定继任计划?”

本说:“AIG在格林伯格离开后那种泰坦尼克式的结局,让我心里发毛。”

巴菲特:是的,我得说,要替代阿吉特是不可能的。我们也不会尝试那么做。因此,我们不会给别人像给阿吉特那样的自由度,无论是在承保风险规模上,还是其他类似方面。

不,我认为他是一位独一无二的人才,我这么看,查理也这么看。所以,当你遇到这样的人,你在心里确认了对方就是这样的人之后,就会给予他极大的权力。

但这不意味着权力是跟着职位走的。权力是跟着这个人走的。而在保险业,把你的“笔”随便交给别人,是极其危险的,正如人们常说的那样。

在我们这座城市,有一家叫Mutual of Omaha的公司,到20世纪80年代时,它经过大概75年的悉心经营,我相信已经成为世界上最大的健康与意外保险协会。

结果他们突然想要开始承做财产险再保险业务。于是他们把“笔”交给了公司里的某个人。可能当时几乎没人听过这个人的名字。

结果仅仅签了几份合同,他们就在很短的时间里损失了一半的净资产。而且他们还担心可能损失得更多。

所以在保险业务里,一支笔就能造成巨大的破坏。你必须非常小心,把笔交给谁。而我们把笔交给阿吉特的方式,是我们不会交给其他任何人的。

碰巧的是,我很喜欢听他做的这些事情。所以我们每天都会聊。但我们每天聊天,不是因为他需要我批准什么,而是因为我觉得这非常有意思。

当他说:“我们该收多少钱来给迈克·泰森的性命上两年的保险?”我是说,这种事情我会很感兴趣。我——(笑)

我问他,如果他被某个对自己所受待遇不满的女性开枪打死,保单里有没有除外条款,不过——

这会影响到价格,不过——

我喜欢这类事情。但我不是不可或缺的。而阿吉特是不可或缺的。我们找不到替代他的人。有些事情,你就得这样去面对。

查理?

芒格:是的。那句话的意思是,换个说法,如果一门生意经不起一点点差劲的管理,那它就算不上是什么好生意。当然,你更希望拥有一门就算管理得不太好,也能相当兴旺的生意。

但这不意味着,当你遇到一门管理得极为出色的这类生意时,你不会更喜欢它。这两个因素都相当重要。

我们并不是在找管理不善的公司。我们喜欢的是,万一我们不小心碰上了这种情况,公司也能扛得住。但我们并不是在刻意寻找这种情况。

巴菲特:是的,我们不会去做我们认为——我们不会把我们认为超出他们能力范围的任务交给别人。而恰好阿吉特有着极强的能力。

所以他会被分配一些非常不寻常的任务。但你不会看到这种情况在我们整个保险业务里普遍存在。我们的经理们也不指望以那种方式运作。

那是阿吉特这个一次性的特殊情况。而且他身体很好。你知道的,我们会把他想要的所有樱桃可乐或软糖都寄给他。(笑)

17. 伯克希尔在2008年底“更便宜”了

巴菲特:好,第6区。顺便说一句,我推荐这款软糖。它非常棒。我玩得很开心。(笑)

观众:早上好。我是来自肯塔基州路易维尔的史蒂夫·富尔顿(音)。为了今天来这里问您这个问题,我放弃了下午肯塔基德比赛马的包厢票。谢谢您给我这个机会。

我的问题是关于您如何看待,或者说您对市场给伯克希尔股份估值的看法。

您常说伯克希尔的价值主要有两个组成部分:一是他们持有的投资——股票、债券及类似资产;二是您旗下非保险经营业务的盈利。

当您比较2007年和2008年时,投资下跌了大约13%,盈利下跌了大约4%。但市场给股份的估值却下跌了大约31%。我很想知道您对这个估值的看法。

巴菲特:是的,我觉得你说到点子上了。

我们确实认为——显然,我们认为这些投资的价值就是它们的账面价值,否则我们不会持有它们。

事实上,我们认为在任何给定时刻,它们的实际价值都比账面价值更高,因为我们认为总体而言它们被低估了。所以我们对这个数字没有异议。

我们定义我们的盈利能力时——我们把保险承保的盈亏排除在外,理论依据是,只要保险业务打平,它就能给我们提供浮存金,我们会拿去投资。而总体而言,我其实认为保险业务大概率会产生一些承保利润。所以在这方面,我认为我们其实还多少低估了这个数字。

但我们认为,这些业务去年的盈利能力不如正常水平好。今年也不会有正常水平那么好。

但我们认为总体而言这些都是相当不错的生意。其中有几家出了些问题。但大多数都会表现良好。而且我认为其中有几家会表现得非常出色。

所以,我认为把伯克希尔看作两部分之和是完全合理的:一大块是流动性很好的有价证券——或者说不一定那么有流动性,但至少定价合理,甚至可能被低估的证券;另一大块是盈利能力,我们将努力随着时间的推移把它提升上去。

如果你这样看待它,你会得出这样的结论:相对于其内在价值而言,伯克希尔在2008年底比在2007年底更便宜。但你也会得出结论,说这对大多数证券来说都是成立的。换句话说,是整个证券市场的水平都是如此。

每一只股票都会受到其他每一只股票售价的影响。我是说,如果ABC股票的价值下跌了,在没有其他变量的情况下,XYZ的价值也会随之降低。

如果你能以八倍市盈率、九倍市盈率买到好公司的股票,那——这会降低伯克希尔的价值,相比之下,如果股票是以,比如说,18倍或20倍市盈率交易,情况就不同了。我这些数字只是随口举例。

但在金融世界里,万事万物都会相互影响。

当你说“一鸟在手胜过二鸟在林”时,你是在做比较——你必须把它和所有其他可选的“林子”比较。

所以,你说得对,相对于内在价值而言,伯克希尔在2008年底比2007年底更便宜,至少在我看来是这样。

而且这两个变量都很重要。我们会定期向大家汇报这两个数字。随着时间推移,我们希望两者都能增长。

我们尤其希望经营性盈利这一块能够增长,因为那是我们的主要着力点。我们希望随着时间的推移把资金投入到优质的经营性企业中,把这个数字大幅做大。

查理?

芒格:嗯,我要说,去年对一门以浮存金为基础的生意来说是艰难的一年。这自然会让浮存金的拥有者短期内显得处于劣势。

但从长期来看,拥有大量成本低于零的浮存金,将会是一大优势。我不会因为股价下跌就太过激动。

我碰巧知道有一位买家在伯克希尔股价被推到绝对高点时,颇为笨拙地买了大约1万股。从长远的大局来看,这件事又有多大意义呢?

真正重要的是这样的事:我们的财产险业务可能是世界上最好的大型财产险业务——我们的公用事业子公司,如果有比它更好的,我还不知道——如果非要我押注全世界哪家碳化物切削工具企业最好,我会押ISCAR,胜过任何其他竞争者。

我还能这样一路列举下去。我认为从长远看,这些东西的分量会非常重。如果你觉得要达到伯克希尔现在这样的地位很容易,那你活在一个和我不一样的世界里。(掌声)

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我们现在的保险业务,是一项了不起的业务。而且它拥有一些了不起的经理人。

18. GEICO如何从金融危机中受益

沃伦·巴菲特:有一件很有意思的事情发生了。9月份,我们遭遇了金融体系的崩溃,而且真的,几乎是那种终极意义上的——差不多就是「中国综合症」那种情形——美国人的行为方式开始变了。

也许全世界的人都是如此,但就我们的业务而言,我确实知道,那感觉就像被敲响了一记警钟。而这带来的一种表现,还挺有意思的。

这件事严重伤害了我们的珠宝业务、地毯业务,也伤害了NetJets,伤害了所有的业务。比如说,也伤害了美国运通。你知道,平均客单价下降了近10%。

我的意思是,情况就是这样,人们的行为改变了。但它带来的影响之一,是GEICO的电话也开始响得更多了。

我们并没有特别改变我们的广告投放。我们相对于其他公司的价格优势,也没有太大变化。但突然之间——就是这么不可思议。每周有成千上万、成千上万、又成千上万的人多了起来,访问我们的网站或者打电话给我们。

于是,突然之间,省下100美元、150美元,或者不管是多少钱,都变得重要起来了。不仅是那天正好看到我们广告的人,也包括那些心里一直隐隐惦记着这件事的人。他们都上了geico.com。

所以在今年头四个月——去年,我们新增了大约66.5万名投保人。这是相当多的人。这让我们成为了大公司中增长遥遥领先的汽车保险商。

今年头四个月,我们四个月里新增了50.5万人。这是行为方式变化的结果。而那种特许经营权,那种竞争优势,是历经数十年积累起来的。

托尼·纳斯利培育它的方式,无人能及,就是日复一日、一个办事处接一个办事处、一位同事接一位同事地做下去。而到了这个时候,它就带来了巨大的回报。

因为我们——我们是大型汽车保险公司中成本最低的生产商。这意味着我们能提供最好的性价比。而现在人们正是精打细算、注重价值的时候。

所以这些事情,在我们的子公司里、在那些经理人身上,一直都在发生。而它——随着时间推移,会创造出大量的价值。

我是说,每一位GEICO的投保人,对公司来说都是一项实实在在的资产。我可以给你一个估算的价值。但我认为那样做未必明智。不过,他们确实值真金白银。

而且,我们现在是全国第三大汽车保险商。我想今年结束时,我们的市场份额也许能达到8.5%左右。

而在1993年托尼接手这项业务的时候,这个数字还只是2%出头一点点。基本面已经具备——(掌声)——足以带我们走得更高。

19. 2008年很艰难,但仍无派息计划

沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?

查理·芒格:(小声地)你能把那盘花生脆糖递给我吗?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:我向你保证,这个问题不是苏珊·露西提出的。不过,它确实涉及股息政策。它来自宾夕法尼亚州雅德利市的彼得·萨金特。

为了提出这个问题,他引用了《股东手册》第九条原则中的一段话。沃伦当时写道,原文是:

「我们认为,应当定期用实际成果来检验那些良好的初衷。我们通过评估留存收益随时间推移是否为每留存1美元至少为股东创造1美元的市场价值,来检验留存利润这一做法是否明智。到目前为止,这项检验都已通过。」这段话是在一段时间以前写下的。

「我们将继续按5年滚动的方式来应用这条标准。随着我们净资产的增长,要明智地运用留存利润,会变得更加困难。」

现在我要引述提问者的原话了:

「最近这份年报让我思考起公司业绩和股价表现之间的关系。过去几年里,伯克希尔的表现似乎相当不错。但股价似乎没能完全跟上步伐。

「所以我查看了过去五年的每股收益。它们列在年报第26页上。加总起来,一共是29,207美元。

「你可能也知道,伯克希尔在2008年12月31日的收盘价是84,250美元。如果把每股29,207美元的留存利润加到这个数字上,你会得到,姑且这么说,一个『最低市场价值』113,457美元。

「既然伯克希尔在2008年12月31日的收盘价是96,600美元」——哦,等等,这里我念错了一个地方。

「伯克希尔在2003年12月31日的收盘价是84,250美元。

「既然伯克希尔在2008年12月31日的收盘价是96,600美元,而且此后一直比这个数字更低,现在也大约是这个水平,那么看起来,市场价值并没有为每留存的1美元而相应增加。

「假设我的分析是正确的,这就带出一个问题:伯克希尔在未来一年是否会派发股息。」

沃伦·巴菲特:好吧,我们现在要就这个节目——针对这个问题——来一场小测验了。(笑)

顺便说一句,这五年期间的收益里,包含了一些在这段期间末计入未实现增值的项目所带来的收益。

换句话说,其中有一些其实在当时就已经体现在资产价值里了,只是后来变成了已实现的收益。

但事实是,如果你把我们这五年赚到的所有钱,连同购入的股票、债券、企业,都在2008年12月31日变现成现金,我们不但没有——我们其实会因此产生亏损,我是说,按照2008年12月31日当时的情况来算。

我认为,这大概适用于几乎所有当时在(听不清)的资本运作——如果你真的按照当时能卖出的价格来衡量的话,我们买下的那些企业——我们很喜爱那些企业。

但在那个时候,很多企业根本没什么像样的市场可言。而证券价值也大幅下跌了。

所以我要说,他说得完全正确,就2008年12月31日那个时点的价值来衡量,再投资的收益在那个特定的市场时点上,确实没有产生一美元的市场价值。

不过,我要说的是,我们也说过,我们是拿标普指数来衡量我们的业务表现的。我们用账面价值作为内在业务价值的一个保守替代指标。

我们认为内在业务价值更高,但我们用账面价值作为一个替代指标。而且我们在伯克希尔的整个历史上,始终如一地这样做。

而在那5年期间——或者说在任何一个——我们从来没有出现过跑输标普指数的5年期,就伯克希尔的内在价值这个衡量标准而言。

而且,正如我几年前说过的,随着我们规模变大——这会变得更难做到,我们只能满足于比标普好上那么几个百分点。

但到目前为止,这个考验已经——已经通过了。而且是在我们把所有盈利都留存下来的情况下通过的。

所以我认为,我们仍然背负着证明的责任——我们仍然应该以事实来证明伯克希尔的股价会高于我们留存的收益。伯克希尔的股价确实高于这个数字——直到今天,每留存一美元在伯克希尔,都转化为超过一美元的市值。

但我确实要说,如果你把过去五年里我们买的那些东西全部按照那个价格卖掉,那会是亏损的。

查理?

芒格:是的,我对这些五十年一遇的怪事不会太激动。

如果你为此做了合理的准备,即便在最低点你受了点小伤,而别人受的苦比你多得多,而且不寻常的机会正找上门来,这在其他情况下是看不到的,那我认为我们没什么好流泪的。

20. 富国银行股价暴跌不应引发抛售

芒格:拿富国银行来说。我认为富国银行会从这场乱局中变得更加强大。股价在最低点吓住了很多人,我认为这将被证明只是一种非常短暂的现象。

巴菲特:是的。富国银行的股价跌到了——实际上跌破了每股9美元,而当时它的业务利差从未这么好过,存款流入从未这么好过,它相对于其他大银行的资金成本优势从未这么好过。

但你知道,在一个惊恐万分的市场里——真的,那天我恰好有一堂课,那是那些课里唯一一次有人让我说出一只具体的股票。他们真的逼我说了。

当时有人拿着黑莓手机,或者他们现在随身带的那种设备,查了下价格,是低于9美元。我说,如果我必须把全部身家都押在一只股票上,那就会是这只股票。

他们的业务——你知道,这个商业模式简直棒极了。

而且,你知道,你什么时候能有机会买到像美联银行(Wachovia)这样的东西呢?它当时是美国存款规模第四大的银行,把它并进来。然后开始享有富国银行在资产和负债之间的利差,并建立起他们那样的客户关系。这是一个绝佳的商业机会。

富国银行的处境会更好——除非他们不得不大量增发股票,而他们不应该这样做——几年之后,富国银行的状况会比根本没发生这一切时还要好得多。

我认为其他一些企业也是如此。但你——你知道,你必须做好准备。你不能让别人把你逼到一个不得不卖出仓位的境地。

杠杆是这个世界上给人惹麻烦的根源。所以你——你永远不想处在一个别人能把你脚下地毯抽走的境地。而且你也永远不想在情绪上把自己逼到自己把地毯从自己脚下抽走的境地。

我的意思是,你不想让别人逼你卖出,你也不想让自己的恐惧或情绪促使你在错误的时候卖出。

我是说,为什么有人会在9美元的时候卖出富国银行,而他们是在25美元时买入的,而且这家公司的基本面变得更好了,这是市场行为中一件很奇怪的事情。但人们就是会这么做。他们看价格看得受影响太大。

如果他们像我一样拥有一个农场——就在这儿30英里外——他们不会每天都拿到一个报价。你知道,他们——

我25年前买了那个农场。你看的是玉米的产量。你看的是大豆的产量、价格、化肥的成本,还有一些其他因素。你看的是这个资产本身,来判断你是否做了一笔明智的投资。你对这个资产将会产出什么,是有预期的。

但人们在股票上却往往只盯着价格看。于是他们让价格来告诉自己该有什么感受——在我们看来,这有点疯狂。

我们认为,你应该像看待你买的公寓楼或者想买的农场那样去看待这门生意。人们让每天都能拿到报价这件事,变成了一种负担,而不是一种资产。

我唯一想说的是,你最好回去读一读《聪明的投资者》第八章,它告诉你该如何看待市场。这对你的帮助,会比去学现代投资组合理论大得多。

21. 巨额刺激支出难免会有些“浪费”

巴菲特:好,7号提问。

观众:我叫吉姆·鲍尔斯(音译)。我来自马萨诸塞州西牛顿。我的问题跟联邦政府的这项刺激法案有关。

我读到,这笔钱里只有8%打算用于基础设施建设。当你投资一笔钱的时候,通常你会看你用这笔钱换来了什么资产。

在这个国家背负这么多债务的情况下,你不觉得联邦政府投入的资金里,应该有更大比例用于扎实的资产吗?就像大萧条时期做的那样,比如田纳西河流域管理局(Tennessee Valley Authority)、胡佛水坝,以及其他一些设施,它们至今仍在盈利,并把政府最初的投资连本带利地偿还了很多倍,同时还提供了大量的就业岗位?

芒格:这个问题我来回答。是的。(笑声与掌声)

巴菲特:我当然同意。我是说,30年代——用来刺激经济的那笔钱,做成了很多真正了不起的事情。这应该成为目标,也应该成为一个范本。

我没法完美地评估当前这项刺激法案到底会带来什么效果。我知道我——前几天我确实收到了社会保障署的通知,说我会多拿250美元。这笔钱大概能让我撑个六七个月。(笑)

查理会把他那份花得更久,我敢肯定。(笑)

不过你知道,这就是巴菲特家目前收到的“刺激”。

显然,你希望尽可能明智地使用这笔钱。

显然,任何时候,只要联邦政府大规模地做任何事情——任何时候,任何一个大型组织,无论是教会、企业,还是别的什么,一旦把各种资源一股脑地砸向某件事,通常都会有相当一部分浪费掉。

我认为这个初衷是好的——但等它走完国会那一套流程之后,我没法保证结果会是什么样——但我认为它的初衷是要尽快把钱投入运转,并最终以明智的方式加以利用。

但如果珍珠港事件发生的第二天,你在对日宣战的法案上附加了五六千条“夹带私货”的条款,你知道,那画面可不会好看。

我是说,我们现在的这套体制——似乎并不能非常有效地把个别议员的利益,从共同的目标中剥离出来。

我是说,每当我看到这些法案上附带了些什么东西时,我都会感到不安。这次的情况正是如此。所以在这个问题上,我同意查理的回答。

但我认为政府的初衷是对的。当美国民众像现在这样收缩开支时,政府确实需要出手介入。

这会带来后果。我们在做的这些事情——我们做的是常规的事,但我们是以非常规的规模在做。

我们会看到我们现在所做之事带来的后果。我认为我们应该这样做。但我不认为我们应该觉得这是免费的午餐。

芒格:是的,在基础设施投资清单里,有一项是显而易见、无需多想的。那就是大幅改善全国的电网。这不会对我们有帮助的可能性,几乎为零。

而且,一旦这件事发生,会给伯克希尔的公用事业子公司带来巨大的好处。但这不是我提出这一点的原因。就算我们没有公用事业子公司,我也会提出这个论点。

巴菲特:要是我们真有公用事业子公司的话,我们说这话可能会更理直气壮一点。(笑)

22. 很难与政府担保的债务竞争

沃伦·巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自丽塔·艾迪逊(音译),她说:“伯克希尔强劲的资产负债表和信用评级,如何帮助抓住投资机会?毕竟现在即便是弱势的金融公司,也能借助美国政府对其债务的担保,以比伯克希尔更低的成本借钱。”

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,正如我在年报中指出的那样,在任何融资类业务中,只要我们的竞争对手能拿到政府担保的资金和融资,我们就处于明显的劣势。

我们的“原材料”——也就是资金——成本要高出许多。这在克莱顿房屋公司体现得尤为明显,我们那里有大约100亿到110亿美元的按揭票据,主要是针对预制房屋的。

而且这是一个质量非常好的投资组合。凯文·克莱顿和克莱顿房屋公司的员工在负责任放贷方面做得非常出色,我们的借款人表现也很好。

但用来支撑这个投资组合的“原材料”——也就是资金——成本却比一些陷入困境的银行要高得多。

这对我们来说是个真实存在的问题,也迫使我们想方设法为这个投资组合寻找其他各种资金来源,想办法让获得政府担保的机构以某种方式参与到这个项目中来。

这就是我们现在必须面对的现实。有一批“受眷顾者”享有政府担保,还有一批没有。

当然,你会在一些公司身上戏剧性地看到这一点,它们一部分资金有政府担保,另一部分——则是发行没有担保的债券。

我记得——如果记错了请见谅——就在前几天,高盛发行了一批没有担保的债券,利差达到400个基点。而他们有担保的票据利率要比这低出好几百个基点。

通用电气今年早些时候也发行过一批没有担保的债券,有担保和无担保之间的利差非常巨大。

我们没有任何带担保的东西可卖,所以我们完全不属于那个“受眷顾”的阶层。而我们又不能变成银行控股公司。所以只要这种局面持续下去,我们就得想办法去适应。

我们真正会用到借款的地方,只有公用事业业务。但其他公用事业公司并不享有这种“受眷顾”的地位——我是说整个公用事业行业普遍如此。

所以相比大多数公用事业公司,我们的公用事业公司借款情况相当不错。中美能源的信用被认为是非常好的。

总体来说,我们能以较低的利率筹到资金,这对我们公用事业的客户是有好处的。

除了克莱顿的融资业务外,我们其他业务用不了多少借款,将来也不会用很多。

所以我们的资金基本上来自浮存金。我们的浮存金——达到了580亿美元。我刚才提到,富国银行第一季度筹资的利率大约是1.12%——也就是112个基点,非常便宜。

但我们的资金更便宜。我们没法像富国银行那样筹到那么多,但我们确实有580亿美元——实际上现在更多了——从长期来看,你会发现这笔钱的成本低于零,尽管在某些特定时期,我们也会为此付出一定成本。

但要正面对抗一家能以政府担保筹资的、由政府支持的企业,我们没有答案。无论我们的经营多么审慎,在任何一项业务上,我们都没有办法与它们正面较量。

查理?

查理·芒格:当然,我们在融资上处于劣势。但另一方面,我们又不像银行或银行控股公司那样受到监管。

我觉得,如果我们抓住这一个降临到我们头上的劣势不放,耿耿于怀,那就有点不知感恩了。

沃伦·巴菲特:这种教训我可是没少听。(笑)

23. 格雷厄姆大概会认同我们对衍生品的看法

沃伦·巴菲特:好,8号问题。

观众:您好,巴菲特先生。您好,芒格先生。我叫玛丽·金布尔(音译),来自纽约市。

回到基本问题上来,您认为本·格雷厄姆会怎么看待衍生品?

沃伦·巴菲特:他不会喜欢的。我想他大概会说出和我2002年说过的差不多的话,那就是衍生品对整个体系构成了真实的风险。

它们会导致杠杆失控,会导致交易对手签下一些在某些情况下很难兑现的承诺,会给一个本已脆弱的经济体系增添额外的压力,而这些压力可能以难以预料的方式突然爆发。

但他大概也会说,如果他看到有哪个定价错了,他会采取相应行动。只是他不会让自己陷入这样的境地:别人不审慎行事所带来的问题,反过来给他惹上麻烦。我想这大概就是答案。

衍生品的一个——其实是好几个——基本问题之一是这样的。

我是说,回到1929年之后,国会开会——成立了佩科拉委员会等等——他们认定,任由人们大量借钱去买证券是非常危险的,而且这助长了大萧条。

因此他们规定,美联储应该对人们能借多少钱去买证券进行监管,这对社会来说很重要。

于是美联储开始要求保证金——设立了保证金要求。这些要求至今仍然存在。按规定,你借的钱不能超过你所持证券价值的50%。

实际上,在某一段时期,美联储完全不允许任何借款,把保证金比例定到了百分之百。

但衍生品出现了,把这些规定变成了一个笑话。有一种叫“总收益互换”的东西,意味着你可以借到相当于你所持资产百分之百的钱,这远远超出了1929年时存在过的任何情形。

所以衍生品成了绕开市场杠杆监管的一种手段,而正如我说的,国会当年认为这种监管很重要,美联储至今仍负有执行这项监管的责任。

衍生品还意味着结算日期被推后了。证券市场的一个问题就在于:如果你今天成交一笔交易,却要等一年才结算,你有时会发现很难找到交易对手方。

而衍生品允许这种非常长的结算周期,相比之下,证券市场要求三天内结算。它们要求三天内结算是有原因的。

随着结算周期的延长,违约会越来越多。所以它们是一种危险——它们确实对整个体系构成了危险,这一点毫无疑问。

我们的“书虫书店”里有一本书,叫《大崩盘》,作者是加尔布雷思。这是一本了不起的书,你们真该买来读一读。它讲述了1929年那场崩盘的故事,也谈到了保证金要求,所以……

本·格雷厄姆不会喜欢一个大量使用衍生品的体系。但我也不认为他会完全不屑于——如果他看到某个东西明显定价离谱,而他知道自己能应付得了,我想他会很乐意去买进或卖出一个定价错误的衍生品。

查理?

查理·芒格:我认为衍生品业务中存在一个更深层的问题。衍生品交易商会在两方面占客户的便宜。

第一,存在一种类似拉斯维加斯庄家优势的、发牌人式的数学优势。

第二,衍生品交易商是在和自己的客户玩同一场游戏,而且他还占有身为更高明玩家的优势。所以——

巴菲特:而且他还知道客户在做什么。

芒格:——而且知道客户在做什么。

这基本上是一门肮脏的生意。你其实是在向信任你的客户兜售一些对他们不利的东西。

美国不需要更多这类东西,我们需要的是更少。(掌声)

24. 救助不应该让优先债权人受损

巴菲特:安德鲁?

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:好的,这个问题是今天早上收到的。这是一个很应景的、带点哲学意味的问题,因为下周就要公布压力测试的结果了。它和你们持有的富国银行、美国合众银行和高盛的股份有关。问题是这样的:

“政府为克莱斯勒和通用汽车提出的重组方案,要求债权人以及普通股股东都承担损失。

“然而,对于银行,政府迄今为止的行动并未要求优先股和债券持有人做出让步,政府只是要求稀释普通股股东的权益。

“在银行救助方案,或者一家大型银行控股公司的清算处置中,优先股和债券持有人应该在多大程度上分担损失?而你预期你所持有的任何股份会被稀释吗?”

巴菲特:是这样的,我要说,这非常取决于具体机构。对于房地美和房利美,优先股已经没了。我是说,那里已经没有权益了。而优先股实际上也和普通股一起被清零了。

对于美国合众银行或富国银行,那些都是在大把赚钱的公司。那里有大量的权益。所以没有理由去找优先证券的持有人,说他们应该放弃点什么,因为下面还垫着大量的普通股权益。

这就好比,如果我的房子有一笔按揭,按揭金额是房屋现值的70%,然后有人说,就因为邻居里其他人由于按揭更高之类的原因还不上按揭,你就要说,我这笔按揭比例只有70%的贷款人,应该放弃点什么,好让我的权益进一步增加。

那里有大量的权益,高盛、美国合众银行、富国银行都是如此。那里有大量的权益,大量的盈利能力。优先债权人真的没有理由放弃任何东西。

你可以对房地美和房利美的次级债提出这样的论点,说它们是不是也该像优先股和普通股一样遭受损失。但我不认为这适用于那些仍有大量未来盈利能力的、还在盈利的机构。

我很愿意买下整个美国合众银行。你知道,或者我很愿意买下整个富国银行,如果我们能做到的话。但我们不被允许这么做,因为那会让我们变成一家银行控股公司。但这些企业,债权人没有理由受损。

而如果你说的是克莱斯勒之类的公司,那就完全不同了——我是说,它们一直在亏钱,而且没有竞争优势。你知道,它们在任何情况下是否拥有一个可持续的商业模式,都还是个疑问。

至于那里是否还有任何普通股权益,这倒不是个疑问。你知道,根本没有普通股权益。没有人会愿意花一美元去接手克莱斯勒和它的所有债务。

很多人会愿意花几十亿美元去接手美国合众银行或高盛,连同它们所有的债务一起。所以这是不同的情况。我——

如果情况变成普通股权益被清零了,那你就要面对一个问题——那你就要面对如何在资本结构内部合理分配的问题——谁该放弃多少,优先债权人是不是也该放弃一些,等等。

但我认为这完全不适用于那些价值很高的企业,那些权益本身价值很高的企业。

查理?

芒格:我没有什么要补充的。(笑)

25. 审视你的投资组合时,忽略原始成本

巴菲特:好的,9号提问者。

观众:你好,巴菲特先生。抱歉,刚才那样。巴菲特先生、芒格先生,我叫凯利·卡德维尔,来自伊利诺伊州沃伦维尔。

两位,如果你们今天要在——比方说伊利诺伊州沃伦维尔——创办一只规模较小的投资基金,一只名叫“中央广场资本”、规模2600万美元的基金——假设一下?

巴菲特:什么?你这是要为你的广告拉活儿吧,等会儿再算账。(笑)

观众:以这样更小的资产规模,你们在持仓数量和换手频率方面会有什么不同的做法?

举个例子,如果你持有一个由10只股票组成的投资组合,其中5只在短时间内翻了一倍,那么主动管理这个组合、把那5只翻倍的股票获利了结、再把资金重新配置到还没上涨的那些股票上——因为按理说那些股票有更大的上涨空间、赔率也明显更有利于你——这样做是否合理?还是说你更倾向于按兵不动、坚持长期投资的策略?

巴菲特:我们会持有我们最看好的那六只左右的股票。它们——这和我们买入它们的成本没有任何关系。

这只和我们对它们价格相对价值的评估有关。成本是多少根本无关紧要。

而且顺便说一句,如果它们跌了50%,我们还是会这么说。我——你知道,用你举的例子来说,我都不知道那只基金实际上是涨了还是跌了。

所以,我们的——我们的成本基础,除了极少数情况以外——我们现在在伯克希尔其实就有这样一个情况,我可能等会儿会稍微解释一下。但成本基础和这只基金没有任何关系。

查理和我以前管理基金的时候,我们不去担心某样东西是涨了还是跌了。我们担心的是,相对于它的售价,它到底值多少钱。

我们尽量把大部分资金都放在相对少数——非常少数——我们自认为非常了解的仓位上。我们现在做的还是同样的事。就算再过一百年,我们做的也还会是同样的事。

查理?

芒格:是的,他这是在很委婉地建议你换一种思维方式。(笑声与掌声)

26. 伯克希尔的竞争优势已不再需要依赖我们

巴菲特:卡罗尔?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自俄勒冈州波特兰的迈克尔·韦尔特(音译)。

“你常说,你在一项投资中寻找的两样东西是可持续的竞争优势,以及简单、容易理解的商业模式。伯克希尔可持续的竞争优势可以说就是你,沃伦和查理。而这显然是无法长期持续下去的。”

巴菲特:我不同意这种说法。这是失败主义。(笑)

贝姬·奎克:我就知道你会这么问。

“目前伯克希尔并没有一个简单、易于理解的商业模式。所以,如果你们两位是外部投资者,有没有可能,无论伯克希尔的内在价值与价格是何种组合,你们今天都不会投资它?”

巴菲特:不,我们的可持续竞争优势在于,我们拥有一种文化和一种商业模式,人们会发现这很难、很难复制,甚至连半复制都做不到。

我们有一批不同寻常的股东。我们这家公司的所有者,即使算上所有的重复计算等因素,我们股票的换手率一年大概也就20%左右,而标普500指数里几乎每一只股票一年的换手率都是100%。

所以我们有不同的股东基础。我们的股东以不同的方式理解他们所拥有的这门生意。

而且我们的公司能够为那些拥有私营企业的人提供一个机会:让他们像过去一样继续经营自己的企业,同时摆脱律师、银行家之类的各种麻烦事。

我认为美国没有其他任何一家公司现在具备这样的能力,也很可能没有能力在很大程度上采用这种模式。

所以我想说,我们拥有一种终极的——这并非我和查理特有的东西。我们可能帮助创造了它。但这是一种根深蒂固的文化,任何接任的CEO在上任时都会深谙此道,并致力于此,能够在未来将其延续下去。

你不能——我不想指名道姓说其他公司——但你在别处做不到这一点。

所以我认为,任何想要复制伯克希尔的人都会非常困难。而且我认为我们所拥有的这些优势将会持续非常非常久。它们不再取决于查理和我是否还坐在这台上了。也许最初是这样的。但现在不再是了。

我们的文化,我们的经理人加入这种文化。我们的股东加入这种文化。它一直在被不断强化。他们看到了它是行得通的。

你知道,这是件我不知道该如何复制的东西,如果我在经营,比如说,其他某家公司的话。

而且这很有意义。因为将来会有一些企业,就像不久前的ISCAR那样,就像上世纪90年代中期GEICO的管理层在考虑他们想做什么时那样,会有人想要加入我们。而且他们其实没有一个好的次优选择。当然也会有很多企业不愿意加入,那也没关系。

我们只需要有合适的企业——一些合适的企业——加入我们就够了。而这可以持续很长很长的时间。

查理?

芒格:是的。我可能会换一种说法。美国很多公司的总部经营方式很愚蠢,他们试图强迫各个部门在每个季度都拿出比上一年同期更好的利润。

于是很多糟糕的决策和糟糕的做法就悄悄渗入了这些企业。在伯克希尔的模式下,这种事不会发生。

所以,虽然沃伦和查理很快就不在了——我这边还不算太快,但我有点担心沃伦(笑)——企业界其他地方管理层实践中的愚蠢行为很可能会长期充裕地存在下去,从而在未来相当长的时间里给这家公司带来一些相对优势。(掌声)

巴菲特:好。我们接着来——注意饮食真的很重要,对吧,你——(笑)——为了延年益寿。所以我们在台上一坐就是好几个小时地注意着这个。(笑)

27. 我们不会永远持有每一只股票,但我们会永远保留每一家企业

巴菲特:10号。

观众:您好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫Aznar Midolf(音)。我来自(听不清)组织,旧金山。

我的问题来自一个财经博客。当基本面已经发生永久性变化时,您如何为永久持有股票辩护?

巴菲特:嗯,答案是我们不会这样做。你知道,如果我们对管理层失去信心,如果我们对竞争优势的持久性失去信心,如果我们意识到当初买入是个错误——我们会卖出,而且卖出的次数不少。所以这并非闻所未闻的事。

另一方面,如果你真的拥有一家出色的企业,加上出色的管理层——但主要还是那家出色企业本身——那么,如果拿不准,就继续持有。但这不是一条不可违背的规则。

现在,在我们所拥有的企业当中——不仅仅是我们持有的证券——我们有一种态度,我们在我们的经营原则中表达过:当我们买下一家企业,就是要永远持有它。

我们只有两个例外:当它们承诺会无限期地持续亏损下去,或者我们遇到重大的劳资问题。但除此之外,我们不会仅仅因为有人出价更高——哪怕高于其真实价值——就卖掉它。

这是我们的一个特点。我们希望我们的合伙人了解这一点。

我们确实认为,从长远来看,这可能有助于我们收购企业。这也是我们希望经营公司的方式。

但对于股票、债券,我们会卖出。只不过我们比大多数人更不愿意卖出。我的意思是,如果我们当初做出了正确的决定,我们喜欢一直持有很长时间。我们持有过很多——我们持有过一些股票几十年之久。

但如果竞争优势消失了,如果我们真的对管理层失去了信心,如果我们最初的分析是错的——这种情况会发生——我们就会卖出。或者如果我们发现了更有吸引力的东西——

通常我们手头有充裕的资金。但去年9月,9月下旬,我们承诺向箭牌(Wrigley)投入6.6万——是十亿——美元。我们——然后高盛需要50亿,通用电气需要30亿。

我卖掉了价值约二十亿美元的强生(J&J)股票,只是因为在当时那种情形下,我不想让我们的现金水平降到某个点以下。

那并不是对强生的负面判断。这只是意味着我想多留出个二十亿美元左右。而且我看到了一个机会去做一件我可能不久之后就看不到的事。而反过来,我随时都可以在以后把强生买回来。但那是一种不寻常的情况。

28. 我们经营伯克希尔,就像我们拥有它的全部一样

巴菲特:我想就前面那个问题再补充一点。

我总是——我经常问各公司的CEO,如果他们自己拥有整个公司,他们会有什么不同的做法。

你知道,当我在跟——不管是我们投资的公司,有时候是其他公司,我的朋友们在经营的公司——交谈时。你知道,“如果这家公司百分之百归你和你的家族所有,你会有什么不同做法?”

他们会给我列出一长串东西。在伯克希尔,这份清单是不存在的。你知道,我们经营这个地方的方式,基本上就跟我们百分之百拥有它时经营的方式一样。

这是一个差异——就吸引人们加入我们而言。他们不必让自己的生活去迁就一堆自我强加的规则,这些规则是人们在考虑上市公司时,关于盈利、预测之类事情所惯常抱有的。

有些人会更愿意与这样一家企业结缘。而且,还有——延续我刚才解释的这条规则——他们知道,对于自己花了几十年心血打造、无比珍视的企业将何去何从,他们只需要做一个决定,而以后不会再有什么意外发生。

不会有什么管理顾问跑来跟他们说:“你该做个纯粹的专业化公司,华尔街是这么说的,所以你应该把这部分分拆出去或者卖掉”之类的话。

而且他们知道我们不会给它加杠杆。所以他们知道自己真的可以去做他们最热爱的事,那就是继续经营自己的企业,不受银行家、律师或公众预期之类东西的打扰。

这就是——就像我之前说的,这是一个真正的优势。

查理?

芒格:是的,在演艺圈,他们说如果一出戏能长演不衰,那就叫“有腿”。我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的这套体系是有腿的。

29. 为什么股东大会不做网络直播

巴菲特:好。接下来我们请贝姬提问。(笑)

贝姬·奎克:这是来自华盛顿州西雅图的胡明·蒂马丁(音译)的问题。他的问题分两部分。他说:“您时不时会买入一些上市公司的股票。

“想必您觉得那些股票是比伯克希尔股票更好的投资,因为您从来不回购伯克希尔的股票。

“如果伯克希尔的股东能以和您一样的价格买入那些公司的股票,他们为什么不干脆卖掉伯克希尔的股票,去买您正在买的东西呢?”

其次,他想知道,既然他“和成千上万其他股东一样,没法来参加股东大会”,那伯克希尔为什么不做网络直播?“我意识到这问法挺讽刺,因为我根本听不到您的回答。”(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,我们的会议确实会被记录下来,至少有很多博客等各种渠道会做记录。《杰出投资者文摘》(Outstanding Investor Digest)会相当完整地把整场会议记录下来。

还有其他人也会准备详尽的报告。这些内容都会出现在网上。所以他很有可能会知道答案的。

我们其实可以做网络直播。我给学生开会时也常被问到关于网络直播的同样问题。你知道,为什么不这么做呢?那样方便多了,诸如此类。

我觉得亲身接触是能带来一些东西的。我很清楚,当年我在求学的时候,亲身接触让我收获很大。

尽管我读过本·格雷厄姆的书,但真正去和他相处,还是不一样。我在教学中也遵循这个做法。而且我认为——

我喜欢我们现在这样的出席规模。我喜欢我们的合伙人来现场,看看我们卖的产品之类的东西。我们不是那种要躲起来、把会议开在内布拉斯加州西部某个小村子里、故意让人不方便来的做法。

我们的态度不一样。我希望这一点是能传达出来的。而且我认为,如果我们做网络直播,把它弄成像打开电视看个节目一样,我觉得味道就不一样了。

30. 对“跟风者”没有“意见”

巴菲特:关于问题的第一部分,说到买我们买的那些证券——很多人都在这么做。他们中有些人——不过顺便说一句,他们不是用保险业务提供的免费浮存金去买的。

所以,如果他们能拿到580亿美元的免息资金,他们买这些证券的处境就会和我们一样。不过另一方面,他们也有一些我们没有的税收优势。所以我对这么做的人没有任何意见。

我们在某种程度上必须公开我们持有什么。有些东西他们没法买到,因为我们是直接收购的。

他们没法买进我们所拥有的那些企业。但他们跟着我们做,在某些方面很可能做得还不错。而他们当然也完全有自由这么做。

查理?

芒格:是的,一般来说,我觉得你说的那种做法相当聪明——找出你认为很有本事的一些投资者,仔细研究他们买的每一样东西,然后挑你喜欢的照着买。我觉得你这个想法很不错。(笑)

巴菲特:是的,我用过这个办法——我21岁那年,那个年代得写信去美国证券交易委员会(SEC)申请——大概一周后才能拿到那些质量很差的复印件,而且每页都要付不少钱——但在我去格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作之前,我一直在拿他们的半年度报告来看。

我会把上面列出的每一只证券都研究一遍。我的一些想法就是这么来的。所以,这种做法没什么不对的。

31. 你对抗通胀的最佳保护

巴菲特:11号。

观众:我叫萨姆·奥尔特(音译)。我11岁,来自新泽西州威斯敏斯特。

我的问题是,通货膨胀会怎样影响我们这一代人?伯克希尔又是如何投资来为此做准备的?(掌声)

巴菲特:嗯,是问通货膨胀的问题,对吧?问通胀会怎么影响他?

芒格:是的。通胀会怎么——?

巴菲特:嗯,通胀是会影响到你的。你知道,可以肯定的是,随着时间推移我们会经历通货膨胀。

保罗·沃尔克前几天很生气,我记得大概是三周前吧,他公开表态,说他看到联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)的多数成员,把2%的通胀率定成了目标数字,这让他很不满。

沃尔克是在通胀肆虐时上任的,亲眼见过一旦通胀有了自己的势头,要遏制它有多难,他说:“你知道,2%听起来挺美,但一代人下来,它会把购买力削掉50%。”

他说的“一代人”算是比较长的一段时间了——但他说得没错,一旦你开始觉得百分之二算不了什么,你就已经站在一个相当滑的坡上了。

而我们这个国家目前正在推行一些旨在刺激经济、刺激企业的政策,这些政策必然会带来一定的通胀后果。

而且,就我们向世界其他地方举债这部分而言,未来的政治家们很可能会——这也是人之常情——决定用价值远低于当初借入时的美元来偿还世界其他地方的债务。

我是说,这是削减外债影响和成本的经典办法。而我们正在积累大量的外债。

我一直觉得挺有意思的是,现在政客们老是把“用纳税人的钱做这个、用纳税人的钱做那个”挂在嘴边,说纳税人在为AIG的奖金买单。

我们这个国家根本就没有加过税。你知道,我是说,纳税人现在缴的钱,并不比几年前多一分。

事实上,今年的联邦财政收入,几年前接近2.6万亿美元,现在可能更接近2.3万亿美元。所以我们从纳税人那里拿走的钱是变少了的。

真正为我们现在所做的这些事情买单的人,很可能是那些购买固定美元投资的人,其中很大一部分是从美国政府那里买的,等他们将来把这些投资兑现的时候,会发现购买力已经大打折扣了。

所以你可以说,AIG奖金这件事——最终为购买力损失付出最大代价的,很可能是中国人,他们持有的美国政府债券,多年以后购买力会大幅缩水。但是说“纳税人”买单,总比说“中国人”买单听起来好听。

这情形挺有意思的。我每天都能读到关于纳税人在为这个那个买单的评论。可你知道,我的税没涨,你的税也没涨。他们还马上要退给我250美元呢。

到目前为止,纳税人一分钱都还没付出。我猜,这一切最终的代价,大部分会通过固定美元投资未来价值——实际价值——的缩水来支付。

而这将是最容易走的一条路。而如果这是最容易的做法,那它就是最有可能发生的事。

所以你会看到相当程度的通货膨胀。而对抗通胀,最好的保护就是你自身的赚钱能力。

如果你是最好的老师,如果你是最好的外科医生,如果你是最好的律师,你知道,不管是什么职业,你都能换来别人生产的商品和服务中相应的一份,不管货币是什么,无论是贝壳,还是马克,还是美元。

所以你自己的赚钱能力才是迄今为止最好的资产。如果你是最好的记者,不管做什么,你都会得到你在国民经济这块大蛋糕中应得的份额,而不管以往某个标准衡量下货币的价值如何。

第二好的保护,是拥有一家出色的企业。你知道,如果你拥有可口可乐这个商标、这家公司,20年后、50年后,你依然能换来人们劳动成果中相应的一部分,来购买你的产品。

而且,总体上说,物价水平发生了什么变化并不重要。因为人们愿意付出,比方说,三分钟的劳动,去享用12盎司他们喜欢的产品。

所以这些——这些就是最好的资产:首先是你自身的赚钱能力,其次是一家不需要大量资本投入的优秀企业的盈利能力。

如果一门生意需要大量资本投入,那你在通货膨胀中就会吃大亏。基于这些原则,我要说,最好的做法就是投资你自己。

查理?

芒格:是的。这位年轻人应该去当脑外科医生,然后把钱投在可口可乐上,而不是政府债券上。(笑)

巴菲特:我是按字数拿钱的,他不是。(笑)

32. 报纸行业在衰落,但我们会继续留着《布法罗新闻报》

巴菲特:安德鲁?

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:好的。这个问题来自马里兰州沃尔多夫的丹尼斯·华莱士(音)。我们收到了很多类似的问题。我个人也很想知道答案。

鉴于报纸和出版业目前的经济状况,您能否谈谈这对伯克希尔的影响?鉴于我们投资的《华盛顿邮报》公司股价大幅下跌,这笔投资是否仍然是资本的良好用途?

另外,鉴于目前报纸交易价格“低廉”,伯克希尔是否会考虑再收购一些报纸,加入到《布法罗新闻报》和《华盛顿邮报》旗下?

投资报纸行业,到什么价格才会变得有吸引力?还是说,在当今的环境下,无论什么价格都不再有吸引力了?

巴菲特:我要说,这与当前的经济环境关系不大。我是说,这是一种渐进演变的结果。

但是——当前的经济环境的确加剧了报纸行业的问题,但它不是根本原因。

报纸——对美国公众整体而言——查理和我——我每天读五份报纸,查理大概也读五份。我们永远不会放弃读报纸。

但我们大概也会是最后一批一边读报纸、一边身边还放着座机电话的人了。(笑)

所以,你不能拿我们的习惯来判断消费者的偏好。报纸——不。答案是,对美国大多数报纸而言,不管什么价格,我们都不会去买。

它们有可能——而且在某些地方已经出现了——陷入无止境的亏损。

而在20年、30年、40年前,报纸对绝大多数美国公众来说是绝对不可或缺的。它们曾是终极的好生意。

这基本上是一种在全国几乎每个城镇都只有一家赢家的生意。美国当时有1700家报纸。而20年前,其中只有大约50家所在的城市还存在多家报纸并存的局面。

所以它们曾是拥有定价能力的产品,对读者来说必不可少,对广告商来说也必不可少。而如今,它们已经失去了那种不可或缺性。

如果你在30年前或40年前想知道体育比分、股票价格,甚至国际事务的新闻,报纸就是主要的信息来源。

而那种性质——沃尔特·安嫩伯格过去常称之为“不可或缺性”,我不知道这个词是不是收录进了词典——开始被侵蚀,而且侵蚀的速度已经急剧加快。

它们对广告商而言之所以不可或缺,也只是因为它们对读者而言不可或缺。你知道,没人真的喜欢在报纸上打广告,只是因为它管用。

而这一点正在改变,每天都在变化。我看不到有任何迹象表明这种侵蚀会停止。

在《布法罗新闻报》,斯坦·利普西十年前见到我时会说:“沃伦,从经济角度讲,你应该把这份报纸卖掉。”我说:“我百分之百同意。但我们不会那么做。”

你知道,几年前我们本可以把《布法罗新闻报》卖出好几亿美元。而现在,别说卖出那样的价钱了,我们根本卖不出去。

这也是我们的政策之一。我们的工会一直非常配合——好几个工会——最近几个月一直在跟我们密切合作,努力找出一种至少能让我们维持一点点盈利的经济模式。

正如我在年报中写到的经营原则那样:只要我们认为不会面临无止境的亏损,也没有严重的工会问题,我们就会继续坚守这些业务,尽管如果你是在为一群残疾儿童之类的对象做受托管理,这样做可能是个错误。但这就是我们在伯克希尔的政策。

《华盛顿邮报》公司有非常出色的有线电视业务,也有非常出色的教育业务。但正如唐·格雷厄姆在年报中所写,它对报纸业务没有答案。其他任何人也没有。

现在,我们都还在四处寻找能够找到出路的人。但我想,美国目前大概还有1400份日报,还没有人找到出路。

信不信由你,我认为,我们在布法罗的处境和其他任何人相比,都算得上有利,足以把这场博弈继续玩下去。但我们能否在局面变得无可挽回地陷入亏损之前找到出路,我不知道。

但我们会尽可能地把这场游戏进行下去。这不是商学院教你的那一套,但这就是我们经营伯克希尔的方式。

查理?

芒格:嗯,我认为这话百分之百正确。这确实是一场国家级的悲剧。这些具有垄断地位的日报,一直是我们文明社会重要的纽带。

总的来说,它们不受广告商压力的左右;总的来说,它们提供了值得称道的社论影响力;总的来说,它们让政府比原本更加诚实。

所以,随着它们的消失,我认为取而代之的东西不会像我们正在失去的这些一样令人满意。但这就是生活。

33. 预计消费支出疲软还将持续“相当长一段时间”

巴菲特:12号。

观众:早上好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫马克·拉比诺夫,来自澳大利亚墨尔本。

我想请教一下,鉴于消费者支出方式的变化,零售、制造和服务类企业受到这次经济衰退的严重冲击,您能否谈谈这方面的情况?三年后,这些行业的业绩是否仍有可能比2007年的水平低20%?

巴菲特:三年后的情况我说不好。当然,你提到的这些领域,都在不同程度上受到了非常严重的冲击。

有些制造业会跟住宅建筑挂钩。如果新屋开工数维持在每年50万套,你知道,我猜最多两年内,我们就能让住房市场达到接近均衡的状态。也许会更快一些。没有人能精确地知道这些数字。

但如果家庭形成速度保持在每年130万左右,而我们只新建50万套,再加上有些旧房子被烧毁之类的损耗——你会在不算太远的将来达到均衡点。

这会给我们的地毯业务、砖块业务、隔热材料业务、油漆业务等等带来很大的变化。

零售业受到了非常沉重的打击。总体来说,档次越高,受到的打击就越重。

消费者行为发生了很大的变化。我认为这种变化还会持续相当长一段时间。

我觉得多年来,政府一直在告诉人们要储蓄。而现在他们真的开始储蓄了,却又不高兴了。

但我认为——我觉得过去这两年的经历不会很快消失。我觉得它可能会持续相当长的时间。

所以我不认为我们的零售业务在相当长一段时间内会表现得很好。

我还想说,在零售地产领域,我认为那会是一个相当艰难的领域,而且会艰难一段时间。

我认为购物中心会出现难以填补的空置率。我认为零售商在很多情况下都会举步维艰。当然,房地产的供应量并不会消失。

所以,这可能会——购物中心业务,之前是以5%甚至更低的顶级资本化率出售的。我认为在这一切结束之前,这看起来会非常可笑。事实上,现在已经看起来是这样了。所以我不会指望——我不会——

服务型企业总体上是更好的生意。它们需要的资本更少,而且总体而言,在它们所服务的市场上可以做得更专业化。

但我不会指望零售、制造、服务这些行业会有什么快速反弹。我们在这方面还有很长的路要走。

我们在跟建筑相关的行业上也还有很长的路要走。但至少在那方面,你能大致看清楚这道数学题什么时候能算清。而且你能获得大量关于房地产市场动态的信息。

举个例子,我认为南佛罗里达——那会是一个长期的问题。

我希望不是这样。但我只是觉得,考虑到那里的房屋存量数字和净家庭形成数量,这道数学题相当惨烈。你们有很多东西要消化。

查理?

芒格:我没有什么要补充的。

巴菲特:好的。

34. 我们绝不会以「愚蠢」的价格回购伯克希尔股票

巴菲特:我们来问卡罗尔。

卡罗尔·卢米斯:我收到了很多关于伯克希尔可能回购自家股票的问题。这是其中一个问题:

「你最近把伯克希尔的股票回购政策形容为自我挫败式的,因为你说过,在回购之前,你会给股东写一封信,解释我们为什么要这么做。

「你说过,这封信必然会告诉投资者,股价相对于内在价值存在较大折价,而这会导致股价上涨。

「这封信本质上就是一个买入建议,尽管作为一项原则,你并不会给出这类建议。

「过去,你曾极力赞同其他公司进行股票回购,并批评那些在价格合适时不肯回购的管理层。

「你说过,没有任何其他行动能像回购一样,如此确定地让股东受益。你以前的观点表明,你对采取自我挫败式政策的管理层没什么耐心。

「你说过,当一位管理者在回购明显符合股东利益的情况下,却一贯拒绝回购,他所暴露出的动机,比他自己意识到的还要多。所以——市场也会相应地对由他掌管的资产打折扣。

「那么,得出以下结论是不是合理的:除非并且直到你放弃这种自我挫败式的政策、开始回购股票,否则市场将会适当地对伯克希尔的股价打折扣?」

巴菲特:是的,顺便说一句——这一点其实很重要——我以前谈到回购的那些话,绝大多数是很多年前说的,那时候股票相对于内在价值来说,普遍——经常——是便宜的。我没有——

你们在过去十年左右应该没怎么看到我写这方面的东西。因为我认为近年来的大部分回购,我觉得是愚蠢的,因为人们付出的价格太高了。

而公司在很多情况下——他们永远不会承认这一点——但他们回购基本上是因为他们受到了追捧,他们其实是想在不合理的情况下发出一个买入建议。

在70年代和80年代初,查理和我经常敦促人们回购股票,因为相比他们能用这笔钱做的其他事情,回购要划算得多。

我们唯一一次强烈认为伯克希尔应该回购自己股票的时候,大概是在2000年左右,不管具体是哪一年吧,当时我们认为股价明显低于内在业务价值。我们写信说我们会这么做,结果确实变成了自我挫败。

显然存在这样一个临界点:如果我们认为股价明显低于——保守估计的——内在业务价值,并且我们告知股东我们打算这么做,我们就会去做。我认为,那样做很大程度上还是会变成自我挫败的。

我不认为目前存在那种情况。我——我不会给出任何买入或卖出建议。但我认为那种情况理应是相当有说服力的。

就像我说的,我不——我认为,过去五年里我所看到的回购活动,大概有90%都不是在为股东的利益服务。

我认为那样做,是因为管理层觉得这是该做的事,投资者关系部门也告诉他们这是该做的事,结果他们其实是在以相当愚蠢的价格买入股票。

而多年前,查理和我看特励达(Teledyne)、《华盛顿邮报》或大都会广播公司(Cap Cities Broadcasting)这么做的时候,情况并不是这样。但近年来我没有再见过那样的情形。

查理?

芒格:这个我也没什么要补充的。

巴菲特:说起来——有意思的是,有多少公司当初以现在两倍的价格在回购自己的股票,如今却不买了。我是说,这样的例子有很多。

我们绝不会以愚蠢的价格回购我们的股票。我们可能会因为没有在便宜的价格买入而犯错。但我认为,我们绝不会因为以愚蠢的价格买入而犯错。

我们认为,近年来相当一部分美国企业界都是这么做的,其中也包括我们自己曾经持有过的少数几只股票。

35. 危机使机会成本的计算变得困难

沃伦·巴菲特:第13个问题。

观众:我是来自新泽西州霍沃思的杰克·本本(音)。首先,我想谢谢您。这——我已经参加过大概十几次股东大会了。这次可能是最好的一次。

所以非常感谢您采用新的形式。也非常感谢那些真的帮了大忙的记者们。(掌声)

巴菲特:好,谢谢。

观众:在过去的股东大会上,您和芒格先生曾详细讨论过机会成本的问题。不好意思。过去这一年给了你们许多不同寻常的机会。

您能谈谈过去一年里一些比较重要的机会成本决策吗?这些决策是否受到宏观经济形势的影响?谢谢。

巴菲特:嗯,确实,在过去18个月里,机会成本这个问题在我脑子里想得比以前多得多。

当事情变化非常快的时候,当价格都在变动,而且在某些情况下,企业内在价值的变动速度比我们很长时间以来所见过的都要快得多,这就意味着在权衡A和B、和C的时候,会更难一些。

这更有意思,更有挑战性。而且也可能利润更丰厚得多。但这和一切都以更从容的节奏进行时相比,是一项不同的任务。

我前面也说过,你知道,我们面对过这个问题。而这是个好问题。我们在9月和10月就面对了这个问题。因为我们一直想手头留有大量现金。

我们在伯克希尔有各种各样的、额外层级的安全保障,我们一直遵循这些原则。而且我们永远不会让自己依赖银行或别人的钱,或别的什么。我们就是不会那样经营这家公司。

所以我们眼看着事情在发生。我是说,我们接到了电话——我们接到了很多电话。但其中大多数,我们都没理会。可是那些我们没理会的电话,也帮我们校准了我们真正重视的那些电话。

如果我们接到高盛打来的电话——我想是在一个星期三吧——那笔交易在前一个星期三是没法做成的,也可能在下一个星期三就做不成了。

而且我们说的是真金白银,那个案子是50亿美元。而且我们当时还有一些未完成的承诺在外面。我们当时对陶氏化学有30亿美元的承诺。我想那时候——具体是哪天我可能记不准确。

我们对星座能源有50亿美元的承诺在外面。我们在10月初还要为箭牌—玛氏那笔交易凑出65亿美元。所以我们当时就面临着机会成本类型的考量。

正如我前面说过的,我们实际上卖出了一样东西,如果换在正常情况下,哪怕价格再高出10到15个点,我们也不会考虑卖掉的,那就是强生。但我们就是不想让自己感到不舒服。

所以在一个混乱的市场中,尤其是当有人需要大笔资金的时候,你面对的处境是——你说的不是今天买一亿美元的什么东西、明天再买一亿美元——而是突然之间,如果你还想继续玩下去的话,人家找你要的是几十亿美元。

在那段时期里,我们经常面对这种机会成本的计算。我是说,当我们决定承诺收购星座能源的时候,我们必须愿意在七八个月之后拿出50亿美元来。而且你并不确切知道具体是什么时候,因为这要看公用事业委员会的批准情况。

但如果下周市场上又发生了什么混乱的事情,我们就会接到电话。或者我们会看到股票或债券以我们喜欢的价格在卖。如果相对价值——相对于我们已持有的东西——很有吸引力,我们可能就会卖出一些东西。

现在,在那样一个时期,要大量卖出东西,比大量买入东西要难得多。所以你得衡量一下,你是不是真的能把那笔用来对冲的交易做成,把资金从一处挪到另一处。

如果我们要把几十亿美元从一处挪到另一处,那和你可能要把几十万或几万美元从一个持仓挪到另一个持仓,是完全不同的问题。如果不小心的话,我们真的可能付出很大的交易成本。

但这就是我们要经历的那种计算。而我们很享受能有机会去做这样的计算。这本身就是机会存在的一个标志。

而且你知道,我们——已经很久没有像去年那样密集的活动了。所以这是我们第一次真正面对这样的问题:我们能不能很快地筹到二十亿美元,以确保我们能够对冲掉我们在买入端所承诺的现金需求。

在我们卖出强生的那笔交易上,我们实际上做了这样一个安排:我给卖出价格设了一个底价,就是因为当时市场太混乱了,我们想绝对确保,等一切都尘埃落定的时候,我们不会发现自己比预想中少了几十亿美元、变得不舒服。

我们对“舒服”的定义,是真正的舒服。我们希望手头有一大笔又一大笔的钱。然后我们再考虑怎么处理这些盈余。

查理?

芒格:还是那句话,我没什么要补充的。

36. GEICO在广告上花费数百万美元,而且“永远不会停”

巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:这是俄亥俄州哥伦布市一位名叫叶姆(音)的人提的问题。这是——

巴菲特:这范围可缩小了不少。

贝姬·奎克:是啊。是个非常针对具体公司的问题。他说:“GEICO这几年每年在媒体广告上花费大约4亿到6亿美元。决定花多少钱的因素是什么?又该如何估算这种支出的净回报?”

巴菲特:嗯,这是自打有广告这行当以来,人们就一直在问自己的问题。

你知道,我不确定是马歇尔·菲尔德,还是坎贝尔汤公司的约翰·多兰斯,还是别的哪位,反正是这些人当中的一个,据说他被问到是不是在广告上浪费了很多钱时,他说:“是啊,我们浪费了一半,但我们不知道是哪一半。”(笑)

这就是广告的本质。不过,比起大多数公司,我们对GEICO的广告效果能衡量得更准确一些。

我们将在广告上花费大约8亿美元。尽管我们只是第三大的公司,我们的花费却远远超过State Farm或者好事达。而且我们还会花得越来越多、越来越多。我是说,我们永远不会停下来。

1995年我们买下它的控制权时,我们每年花在广告上的钱是2000万美元多一点。

但我们希望世界上每一个人——好吧,是希望美国的每一个人——都能想到这件事。我们不会很快就跑到中国之类的地方去卖保险的。

但我们希望美国的每一个人心里都能记住:他们很有可能通过打个电话,或者上geico.com查一查,来省下一笔钱。而且是一笔不小的钱。

而一旦我们把这个信息植入到人们心里,你永远不知道它什么时候会在将来某个时刻发挥作用。因为,正如我前面提到的,从9月30日前后开始,我们看到人们愿意主动来找我们、想省下100或200美元的这种倾向,出现了很大的变化,而在此之前他们可能根本不在乎省这点钱。所以,我们希望——

就说汽车保险吧。每个人都得买。没有人喜欢买。但大家都喜欢开车。而如果你喜欢开车,你就需要汽车保险。

所以它一定会卖出去。而你也一定会从某个人那里买。而如果你在乎省钱,你就会来找我们看看。我们希望确保每个人都明白这一点。

而我们不会——你知道,我可以向你保证,三年以后我们在这上面花的钱只会更多。

现在,我们今年花在买广告上的钱,性价比更高了。所以今年的8亿美元,比几年前的8亿美元能买到更多的东西。所以我们花同样的钱,能获得更多的曝光。

但我们就是喜欢在GEICO的广告上花钱。我们希望能出现在每一个人的脑海里。

可口可乐在全世界人的心里都有位置。要知道,它是1886年创立的。他们一直不断地把可口可乐和快乐、幸福的时刻联系在一起。数以十亿计、数以十亿计、数以十亿计的人心里都有这种印象。

而他们心里对RC可乐可什么印象都没有。你要是跟全球随便什么人提RC可乐,他们只会一脸茫然地看着你。可你说可口可乐,那就意味着点什么。

品牌就是一种承诺。我们正在人们心里建立这样一种承诺,就是他们只要去GEICO咨询一下,就很有可能省钱。而且我们会一直这么做下去,永不停歇。

查理?

芒格:对,这很有意思。

如果没有我们这么大力气的广告投放,GEICO的规模也大致会维持不变;而如果新增的这些投保人带来的价值,超过我们花掉的8亿美元广告费,那么从一个重要意义上说,GEICO其实在税前多赚了8亿美元,只不过这一点在账面上根本看不出来。

这正是我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦内部喜欢看到的那种事情。

巴菲特:如果我们照查理说的这样,继续增加这些客户,那么GEICO每年的价值增长,会远远超过它的盈利增长。

而且我确信,我们可以在维持目前保单持有人数量的情况下,把广告开支维持很长时间在每年可能一亿美元,甚至更少。

但就我们目前花的钱而言,我们得到的回报是物超所值的。我们大概也浪费了一些钱。但总体上,我们从中获得了非常可观的回报。

而且,如果我认为明年花20亿美元也能得到差不多的回报,我们就会花20亿美元。我是说,这是一门非常有吸引力的生意。我实在看不出还有什么办法能再造出这样一门生意。

我们是低成本生产商。而如果你是一个人们必须购买的东西——一个大约1500美元的商品——的低成本生产商,那你就有了一门非常、非常出色的生意。而且我们在这一点上拥有持久的竞争优势。

37. 富国银行比许多其他银行都更胜一筹

巴菲特:好,我们来到第一区。我想之后我们就该休息吃午饭了。第一区?

观众:好的。你好,沃伦,查理。我是费尔顿·詹金斯,来自佐治亚州萨凡纳,是一位老股东、老搭档。

我想就过去两年里一件挺大的事情简单说两句,关于PacifiCorp。当时有一些争议。

但我很高兴PacifiCorp已经同意与美洲原住民和西海岸的渔业社区合作,拆除克拉马斯河上那些不经济且有害的水坝。

所以我想鼓励PacifiCorp的管理层加快步伐,尽快促成协议,让这条河早日重新开放。也要感谢他们过去一年里在这方面付出的努力。

我的问题是,你提到富国银行的股价跌到了9美元。从当时的价格看,那似乎是一笔很划算的交易。

但华盛顿互惠银行、美国国际集团、美联银行、花旗集团、房利美,甚至你曾涉足的一些爱尔兰银行呢?

这些公司的股价都跌破了9美元。而且很可能当时很多人也觉得,就算跌到9美元,那还是很划算的交易,或者说定价还是偏低。

可现在你手里拿着的那些股票凭证,说白了,基本上就是非常昂贵的手纸。那么我想问,人在下跌途中要怎么判断呢?

再看看美国银行这样的例子,最近的13F报告里出现过它,那对美国银行而言可能的结果是什么?你会怎么分析可能发生的情况?谢谢。

巴菲特:嗯,有些东西是没法分析的。就爱尔兰那几家银行来说,我犯的错误再明显不过了。

但问题的关键不在于它们的股价是不是跌破了9美元之类的。真正重要的是它们的商业模式是什么,以及它们拥有什么样的竞争优势。

我要说,在各大银行里,富国银行的竞争地位是迄今为止最好的,在真正的那几家大银行当中,遥遥领先。

而且基本上,如果你去看排名前四的银行,它们各自的模式都不太一样。但富国银行的模式,比起另外三家彼此之间的差异,跟它们的差别要大得多。

但在爱尔兰那几家银行的问题上,我犯了一个很大的错误。我根本没有理解到位。而我本应该理解到位的。

这些信息本来是可以让我了解到的,也就是它们在土地开发类贷款上承担了多么惊人的风险敞口——不是那种针对已建成物业的房产贷款,而是各种各样的土地开发贷款。

这实在是不可思议。对于一个人口只有400多万的国家来说,他们贷出去用于开发地产、建房子的钱,简直没完没了,仿佛可以一直延伸到未来。

这是我犯下的一个很严重的错误。没有人骗我,也没有人给我什么错误的信息。我就是压根儿没留意。这个——

如果你要说华互这些公司,我不想把这些名字一个个都过一遍,因为那涉及具体的公司。

但有很多迹象表明,它们在做一些一家高杠杆机构不该做的事情。而如果房价永远上涨这种模式最终被证明是错的,那就可能给它们带来麻烦。

杠杆用得高,是会惹上大麻烦的。我是说,你要是每一美元的股权就撑起20美元左右的资产,你最好把判断做对了。

这些大机构里有些做了一些事情,现在回过头看,可以肯定地说,那是相当愚蠢的行为;要是它们没有加那么高的杠杆,本不至于被打击得这么惨。

我要说,如果你去读它们的10-K和10-Q,再做一些核查,你是能看出它们之间的差别的。当然,你是能看出来的——

如果拿富国银行跟华互之类的银行比较,那根本没得比。我是说,你不需要什么高深的银行专业知识,就能比较出这两者的差别。

它们是两种完全不同的生意。这就好比拿一个成本是每磅2.5美元的铜生产商,跟一个成本是每磅1美元的铜生产商相比较。

这是两种截然不同的生意。一个在铜价跌到一块五一磅的时候就会破产,另一个还能好好地经营下去。

银行业里确实存在真正的差异。但人们不太——他们似乎没有去关注这些差异。相关的数据是公开的。可是——他们似乎并没有仔细去看这些数据。

富国银行前几天公布财报的时候,有一项超过6亿美元的季度费用,是核心存款的摊销。那并不是一项真正的费用。

我是说,核心存款这个数字会随着时间推移而增加。而根据税法,他们有权计提大概150亿美元左右,并对其进行摊销,这是一项优势。

但我没看到有哪家报纸的文章,或者哪位评论员,提到过那6亿美元的费用其实包含在里面,而这一点跟看待其他任何银行的方式完全不同。可它就是这么被忽略过去了。

所以这些数据都是摆在那儿的,信息也是公开的。而且我认为,就拿房地美和房利美来说,会发生什么,其实是相当清楚的。

有意思的是,政府当时却在告诉它们,要出去向投资者多筹一些钱。而如果那些投资者真把钱投进去了,那笔钱早就没了。实际上,一两个月之内,那笔钱就已经没了,所以——

当我们看那些电话时,人们试图——投资银行家——试图把数十亿美元的东西放到我们手上,针对那两家机构。你只要看一眼就能看出它们麻烦大了,非常大。

你确实需要懂一点——你需要了解一些银行业务,以及各种放贷业务在发生什么。

我想说,总的来讲,对于那些不花很多时间研究投资的人来说,他们会很难分辨金融机构之间的差别。

我认为,对于一个只花有限时间来投资的人来说,判断可口可乐或宝洁这类公司要比判断该持有A银行、B银行还是C银行容易得多。

查理?

芒格:是的,还有另一个问题。公认会计准则允许一家保守、稳健的银行,只要改变做法、大量发放一大堆极其愚蠢的贷款,就能显示出大幅增长的盈利。

公认会计准则不应该被设计成能产生这种结果。正是这一点诱惑了这么多银行家做出这种可怕的决策。

巴菲特:是的,我们收购通用再保险(Gen Re)的时候,它有一个金融产品部门。名字跟AIG那个很像。它叫通用再保险金融产品公司——AIG金融产品公司。

它经常报出令人满意的数字。但是,你知道,我们仔细看过之后,觉得那里面全是麻烦。

我们花了4亿多美元才把它处理掉。像这样的一个黑箱可以制造出——这也是为什么管理层在某种程度上喜欢它们,它们能制造出数字。

它们不一定能创造现金。而且如果你不得不开始追加抵押品之类的操作,它们绝对能制造出各种各样的麻烦。

我想说,对于一个被动投资者,也就是那种不花很多时间在这上面的人来说,这是很难的。我想说,他们很难看出这种情况正在发生。

所以我——这不是一个坏的方式,就是说“这个太难了”,然后转向别的容易得多的东西。

我认为分析一家公用事业公司,或者某家一流的消费品公司之类的,要容易得多。

我不认为我会去找那些难以区分的困难行业来做区分。

但确实存在巨大的差异。我再次建议大家去读一读摩根大通——杰米·戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)的信。因为读那封信你会学到很多东西。

芒格:但如果会计做得更好一点,尤其是在银行业,现在很多新出台的监管其实根本没有必要。

然而,我还没见过哪家大会计师事务所出身的会计师说过“我为自己的这个行业感到羞愧”。

那是会计上的一个错误。如果他们没有羞愧感,那他们的想法就是不对的。

巴菲特:好,带着这个愉快的想法——(笑)——我们现在去吃午饭吧。

我们大概——就一点差一刻左右再重新开始吧。到时候我们会从安德鲁那儿开始,回来后接着讲第二部分。

下午场

1. 季度财报发布时间安排

巴菲特:好,我们继续吧。

我应该提一件事,因为最近媒体上有一点报道。

我们——我们的目标是,在季度结束后我们向美国证券交易委员会(SEC)报告所允许的40天期限届满之前的最后一个星期五——收盘后——发布每一份季度报告。

美国证券交易委员会规定是40个工作日——或者说40个日历日——除非到期日落在周末。是季度结束后的40个日历日内必须提交。”如果到期日落在周末,那就顺延到下一个星期一。

这通常意味着——因为我们通常在5月的第一个星期六举行股东大会——这通常意味着最后可能的那个星期五就是股东大会的前一天。

今年,因为按日历算股东大会时间较早,由于星期六正好落在5月2日,最后一个星期五会落在5月8日。而那——我们的政策是——

我们希望尽可能在星期五下午发布,因为我们希望大家在市场开盘前有整整一个周末的时间来阅读它。消化这份报告是需要时间的——我想不管怎样都是需要时间的。

而且我们希望——我们不希望某个新闻标题来决定市场价格。我们希望,尽可能地,让大家能够仔细通读这份报告。

所以我们总是会——除非出现让这个安排行不通的情况——我们会在40天期限届满前的最后一个星期五发布季度报告。这个季度我们也会这么做。所以我们并没有做任何改变。

2. 第一季度初步盈利情况

巴菲特:我可以告诉大家一些初步数字,不过我们随后必须提交一份8-K表格,因为这样我给大家的信息才能在市场开盘之前进入公开领域。

但我们的——我所说的营业利润,也就是在扣除任何证券或衍生品或其他此类交易的收益或损失之前的盈利——营业利润税后大约会是17亿美元,而去年同期是19亿美元。

而且——就像我告诉大家的那样,在目前这段时期,我们很幸运身处保险和公用事业行业。这两个行业相对不受经济衰退的影响。而我们其他大部分业务则从受到显著影响到受到剧烈冲击不等。

我们的保险业务实现了承保利润。比去年略高一些。

我们的浮存金增加了大约二十亿美元。这主要是由于3月份宣布的一笔与瑞士再保险(Swiss Re)的交易,他们买下了所谓的“不利损失发展保障”——为此付给我们20亿瑞士法郎。

那是非常非常长期的浮存金。而且我们很可能至少15年、甚至可能更久都不需要为此支付出去。所以那是长期限的浮存金。这就是浮存金增加约——大约——20亿美元的原因。

公用事业业务——报告的盈利有所下降。但有两项因素导致了这一点。一是我们在星座能源(Constellation Energy)那笔去年告吹的交易上,当时我们报告了一笔可观的收益,我们得到了一批星座能源的股票。

那部分股票是按市值计价的,理论上每天都要计入我们的损益账户,但至少每个季度肯定要计入。而星座能源股票在本季度有所下跌。所以这就冲抵了公用事业的盈利。

然后还有一项更大的支出,是十年前发行的期权的一笔付款,也是最后一笔付款,这笔期权的效果是增加了伯克希尔在中美能源(MidAmerican)的权益,这是我们很喜欢的事情。

但我们向中美能源开出了一张支票,一张数额可观的支票,用来买断那份期权。所以——这笔钱被记为第一季度的一项支出。

但即便算上这两项因素,公用事业的盈利仍然相当令人满意。

然后再看我们其他所有业务,除了极少数几个例外——这些业务基本上都在下滑。我是说,它们都在不同程度上受到经济衰退的冲击。所以——这基本上就是营业利润的情况。

我们每股账面价值在第一季度下降了约6%,这既有证券市场的原因,也因为信用违约互换——那是我负责签订的——从破产情况看,即便在年报写完之后,情况也变得更糟了。

所以那笔损失——或者说潜在损失——我们其实仍然大幅领先,资金上还是绰绰有余的——但那笔潜在损失,我要说,也是可以预料到的损失——反映在第一季度的数字里了。当然,从3月31日以来已经出现了一些反弹。但这基本上就是第一季度的情况了。

我们在季末的现金及等价物约为227亿美元,不包括公用事业公司或金融公司业务持有的现金。

但第二天我们就花了30亿美元买了陶氏化学的优先股。所以实际上,一天之后,我们季末的现金实际上就少于200亿美元了。

我们总是在母公司层面保留相当数量的现金,而不是放在受监管的子公司里,这样无论出现什么情况,我们都做好了准备。

这基本上就是第一季度的情况了。而且我不会感到意外——我是说,如果情况相反,如果这个世界在今年余下的时间里发生了很大变化,我倒是会感到几乎意外。

我认为,除非发生某种巨大的自然灾害,我们在保险业务上会继续表现得相当好。公用事业业务也会表现良好。而我们在其他大多数业务上不会表现得好。

但我们会有可观的营业利润,我提到过第一季度大约是17亿美元。

如果你看看我们的营业利润,其中有10亿美元多一点来自中美能源——基本上是我们的能源业务——我们打算把这些钱留在这项业务里。我是说,即便在我们目前的这些子公司内部,也有各种各样可以做的事情。有很多项目都有望带来不错的回报。

所以你们不应该认为那10亿美元左右的钱是可以供母公司随时动用的。如果我们想要,它是可以动用的。但实际上,我们打算把这笔钱全部留在里面。

其余的利润,加上浮存金的增减变化,是我们可以用来做任何有意思的事情的现金。

这就是第一季度情况的简要总结。我们会在下周五收盘后公布10-Q报告。我们会继续遵循这一惯例。

3.“价值”投资?还能有别的什么投资吗?

沃伦·巴菲特:好了,我们把话筒交给安德鲁。

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:太好了。这个问题刚好是午餐前从黑莓手机上发来的,我想是一位现场观众提出的。

来自纽约的乔希·沃尔夫(音)写道:“比亚迪看起来更像是一项风险投资式的投机性投资,而不是价值投资。二位能不能解释一下这项投资,你们背后的逻辑,以及你们对它的预期?”

沃伦·巴菲特:好的。我马上就把这个问题交给查理。但查理和我都认为,除了价值投资之外,没有别的投资。

换句话说,我们不知道有谁能投资于一种“非价值”投资。所以我们一直对“价值”这个词感到困惑,说它与成长或别的什么形成对比。

价值关乎的是,相对于你今天付出的代价,能得到未来预期现金流的多少。

所以我们——每次有人把我们称作价值投资者,我们总会反问他们,还能有别的什么投资?

4. 芒格:电动车制造商比亚迪是个“该死的奇迹”

沃伦·巴菲特:不过查理才是我们在比亚迪问题上的团队负责人。他一说起这个就会非常兴奋。所以我可能得控制一下他。不过,说吧,查理。(笑)

查理·芒格:好的,当然了,比亚迪——虽然它的创始人才43岁——并不是什么早期阶段的风险投资公司。

比亚迪是全球可充电锂电池的主要制造商之一。而且它是在创始人王传福的带领下,从零开始白手起家,取得这个地位的。

然后——他们又进入了手机零部件领域,并在那里发展出了巨大的市场地位。

然后,最终,并不满足于已经创造了几个奇迹,王传福决定要进入汽车行业。

据我所知,他在汽车方面的经验几乎为零。而他从零开始,资本也很少,却迅速做到了在中国推出销量第一的单一车型。

而与他竞争的,是那些与世界主要汽车公司合资的中国企业——技术上的奇迹,拥有多得多的资本,等等。

这不是什么未经证实的、高度投机性的行为。它就是一个该死的奇迹。而且——(笑)

沃伦·巴菲特:我警告过你们了。(笑)

查理·芒格:当然了,王传福已经雇用了17,000名工科毕业生。而这些工科毕业生是从13亿中国人中挑选出来的。

他招的都是各个班级里最顶尖的人才。所以——你就得到了一个了不起的人才集群。

再加上中国人本身的基本素质。当他们摆脱了错误类型的政府——比如说,摆脱了错误的皇帝——中国人就能取得巨大的成功。

当他们作为“苦力”——也就是奴隶——来到这个国家时,他们会离开,然后很快就成为镇上最重要的人物。

所以这是一群非常有才华的人。从某种意义上说,这个特殊的时期,或许正是属于中国人的时代。

当然,这些电池,这些锂电池,是未来世界完全需要的东西。我们在美国的每一家公用事业公司都需要它们。我们在世界上的每一家公用事业公司都需要它们。

我们必须利用太阳的直接能量。而没有出色的电池,我们做不到这一点。而他——比亚迪——正好处在那个甜蜜点上。

我知道这看起来像个奇迹。也看起来沃伦和我都疯了。但我不认为我们疯了。

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,最多是我们其中一个疯了。(笑)

查理·芒格:而你们即将在附馆看到的那辆车——我认为除了玻璃和橡胶之外,其他所有部件都是他们自己做的。可能有一两个小例外。

这是前所未闻的。有谁进入汽车行业,制造了每一个零部件,又让这辆车成为最畅销的产品?这不正常。我是说,这非常不寻常。

我认为,能让伯克希尔与这样一家公司联系在一起,是一种荣幸——归根结底,这家公司正在努力做一些对人类如此重要的事情。因为它可能是一家小公司,但它的抱负是巨大的。

我不想去赌,由王传福带领的17,000名中国工程师,再加上10万多名在一个全新领域里、按照自己意愿建立起来的更多有才华的中国人,会一事无成。如果这里没有发生伟大的事情,我会感到非常惊讶。

我认为,就规模而言,它对伯克希尔的财务重要性不会有多大。但我这辈子从来没有像对比亚迪这样,感到能与之产生联系是一种更大的荣幸。

沃伦·巴菲特:比亚迪是查理去年的最爱。爱尔兰银行是我的。所以他——(笑)——是赢家。

顺便说一句,比亚迪一年的营业额是40亿美元。所以,这不是一门小生意。而且它可能会变得大得多。

5. 美元未来会贬值

沃伦·巴菲特:我们来听——2区的问题。

观众:您好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫丹·刘易斯(音译)。我来自芝加哥。

我的问题跟美元对其他主要货币的汇率有关。您刚才已经稍微谈到了政府政策及其对未来通胀的影响。

单看这一点,你会觉得通胀应该会伤害美元。但显然还有很多其他因素在起作用。所以我很想知道您对美元的最新看法。

我知道您一直看空美元。但考虑到过去六个月里发生的种种变化,您认为贸易赤字、财政赤字等这些因素会如何相互作用,又会如何影响美元?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这很难预测。但我可以向你保证,美元的购买力会在五年、十年、二十年后变得更低。而且很可能——很可能会大幅度地降低。

但这一点我当然说不准。不过,我们正在做的一些事情,确实会损害美元的购买力。

另一方面,世界各国也在发生同样的事情。所以美元对英镑、美元对欧元等等汇率会如何变化,是很难说的。

因为你知道,英国今年的财政赤字会达到GDP的12%多一点。就连德国人,尽管他们长期以来对通胀心存恐惧,赤字也可能达到GDP的6%多一点。

所以你会看到世界各国政府都在选择——而我认为这样做是恰当的——选择制造非常可观的赤字,在有些情况下,几乎是和平时期前所未有的水平——之所以这样做,是为了抵消民众需求收缩带来的冲击。

至于这会如何影响各国货币之间的相对汇率,我说不出来。但至于未来这些货币的购买力相对于现在会如何变化,我认为倒是相当容易预测的:随着时间推移,单位货币能买到的东西会大大减少。

这不会在未来一两年内发生。但这不代表市场不会在某个时点开始提前预期这一点。未来会非常、非常有意思。

我是说,我们正在做一些过去从未见过的事情。政策制定者并不知道这会带来什么结果。我也不知道结果会是什么。但你知道这一定会有后果。你可以押注通胀会到来。

查理?

芒格:嗯——我是在奥马哈这里长大的。我至今还清楚记得两美分的一等邮票和五美分的汉堡。所以在我这一生中,经历了大量的通胀。

而在我这一生中,我认为自己活在整个历史上最优越的时代。所以一点点通胀不会毁掉我们任何人的生活。

关键在于要避免失控的恶性通胀。这个问题,沃伦和我打算“无担保转让”给年轻一代去处理了。(笑)

沃伦·巴菲特:不过这里有个产品可以说明问题。100年前,六盎司半的这种产品卖五美分,再加两美分押金。而它的价格几乎没怎么涨过。这很有意思。小麦、燕麦之类的东西涨得也不多。

而另一方面,一份100年前只卖一美分的报纸,现在卖一美元,而且他们出版报纸还在亏钱。所以,通胀对不同东西的影响是很不均衡的。

6. 巴菲特对失去三A评级感到“恼火”

沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:沃伦、查理——这个问题,我收到了不少类似的。这一个是谁提的?嗯,是坎普顿先生(音译)——坎普顿·林还是林·坎普顿(音译),两个名字选一个——来自加拿大卡尔加里。

问题是:“您如何量化伯克希尔失去三A信用评级带来的财务影响和损失——这提高了伯克希尔的资本成本,而三A评级本来无疑是公司的一项竞争优势?

“沃伦,您现在正在采取哪些积极措施来恢复伯克希尔的三A评级?您认为伯克希尔能够重新获得这一评级吗?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,短期内不会恢复,因为我不认为评级机构会那么快改变立场,即使他们应该这样做。我们从标准普尔那里仍有一个三A评级,但那是临时性的。他们会重新审视——我记得大概是12个月后。

穆迪在一月初重申了原有评级。后来我们在某个时点发行了一笔债券,那正好是在评级变动之后。

而实际上,就我们的信用违约互换(可以用来衡量市场对信用的接受程度)而言——不过我马上会告诉你其中一个有趣的地方——那个利差其实还收窄了。

这对我们的借款成本几乎没有任何影响。我是说,几乎没有。而且顺便说一句,一直以来都是如此。双A和三A之间的利差,一直都非常小。

人们在金融课堂上会争论说,为拿到三A评级付出的代价不值得,因为你在债务成本上省不了多少钱。而且从净资产收益率的角度看,这还要花你不少代价。

我从来不认同这种说法。而且我一直很喜欢同时拥有穆迪和标准普尔的三A评级。当穆迪下调我们的评级时,我很失望。我们本来真的没想到会发生这种事,但它确实发生了。

这对借款成本没有实质性影响。但它确实让我们在全球范围内、在保险承诺方面失去了一些吹嘘的资本,尽管肯定没有谁能排在我们前面。

但是,这不会很快改回来。我是说,人们在委员会里做出的决定,不会那么快就反悔。这不是人的天性。

在我心目中,我们仍然是三A。而实际上,在标准普尔的评估体系里,我们也仍然是三A,直到我们听到不同的说法为止。

我们当然认为——而且我们经营公司的方式也确实是——不可能有比伯克希尔更强的信用。

如果评级机构用的是一套打钩式的比率体系,那对他们来说,要衡量诸如管理层对待债权人的态度这种东西,是很困难的。

但我可以向你们保证,伯克希尔的管理层把履行自身的义务看得神圣不可侵犯,比提高每股收益或类似的东西重要得多。

我是说,我们在诸如工伤赔偿这类事情上承担的义务,可能会延续到未来50年。我是说,这是某个受了重伤的人,他们每个月都会收到伯克希尔寄来的支票。

而你知道,这比我们的净资产收益率是X,还是X加零点几个百分点,重要得多。我们经营公司的方式——或者说我们努力做到——不仅要让人们能拿到这些支票,还要让他们根本不必为能不能拿到这些支票而担心。

而这种态度,对评级机构来说是很难量化的。但相信我,它确实存在于伯克希尔的管理层之中。

而且——我想说,穆迪的三A评级变动,对伯克希尔的未来不会有实质性影响。但它仍然让我恼火。

查理?(笑)

芒格:嗯,至少他们表现出了相当的独立性。(笑声)

沃伦·巴菲特:谁知道呢?也许这也是原因之一。

芒格:是的。我的态度相当豁达。我认为穆迪下一次评级调整会是反方向的。而且我认为那一定会发生,因为我们理应得到更高的评级,而他们很聪明。(笑)

巴菲特:查理和我意见不合的时候——我们确实经常意见不合。我们从不争吵,但我们会有分歧。

每当查理真的想要我做某件事的时候,比如买入比亚迪的股权之类的,他总是会对我说,“好吧,”他说,“到最后你会赞同我的看法的。因为你很聪明,而我是对的。”(笑)

7. 伯克希尔信用违约互换价格“疯狂”

巴菲特:我——有一件事我实在忍不住要指出来,对你们大多数人来说可能有点技术性。但在座有些人会觉得这非常有意思。而且它实际上在很大程度上也和信用评级有关,信用违约互换也牵涉其中。

当我们卖出一份股票看跌期权,比如说卖出一份10亿美元的看跌期权,有人付给我们1.5亿美元,我们当天就拿到那1.5亿美元现金。

我们在第一天就为这1.5亿美元设立一项负债,代表其价值——也就是我们对将来履行这项义务所需成本的估计。我的意思是,那就是这份合约的市场价格。

对方那天则从他的现金里拿出1.5亿美元,并设立一项1.5亿美元的应收款。

这些应收款和应付款会随时间变化。但在第一天,没有利润,也没有亏损,只是现金易手而已。一方设立了一项资产,另一方——也就是我们——设立了一项负债。

而随着过去这一两年市场行情的变化,对方所持有的那项资产按市值计价后价值有所上升。

他会通过盈利把这一变化反映出来。所以他的资产上升了。而我们的负债也随之上升。我们则把这体现为一项亏损计入盈利。

但我们手里有现金,而他手里的是一笔15年后到期、从我们这里拿到的应收款。

过去这一两年里,他那边的——审计师——他的信用部门——就说了,“天哪,你有一笔来自伯克希尔、15年后到期的应收款。而且他们不需要提供抵押品。所以你必须去买一份信用违约互换,来保护自己免受这笔应收款出问题的风险。”

这样一来就产生了两个后果。第一,他每年都要掏钱去买一样东西,这东西对我们来说不花一分钱,但对他来说却是实实在在的花费。所以——而且他给我们展示的盈利越多,他就得买越多的信用保险,于是每年花的钱也就越多。

这就推高了对伯克希尔信用违约互换的需求,也造成了一些疯狂的价格。所以有段时间,我们的信用违约互换每年要让对方付出5%的成本。

所以,如果他手上显示的是一笔比如说2亿美元的资产,他每年就要付出1000万美元,而且这笔钱他得连付15年,仅仅是因为信用部门的这些要求。

这让和我们做交易的另一方感到非常不快,尽管他们不断把利润往上记。这对我们来说不花一分钱。但它的确在信用违约互换市场上造成了一种相当疯狂的局面。

我知道这对你们中的许多人来说并不是什么迫切的问题。但这是一件不同寻常的事——是我没有预料到的事情。

这也在一定程度上解释了为什么有些人可能想要修改与我们的合约。如果他们——想和我们——如果他们想要做出足够的修改,我们会接电话的。但与此同时,我们就这么拿着这笔钱坐着。(笑)

8. 中美能源与爱荷华州合作开发风电场

巴菲特:我们到第三区提问吧。

观众:我是吉姆·哈登(音),爱荷华州达文波特人,内布拉斯加大学的球迷(Cornhusker)。

我们从达文波特开车过来的路上,注意到中美能源公司有两个相当大的风电场。

我的问题是,这些风电场什么时候能收回投资?伯克希尔·哈撒韦有没有在关注其他的替代能源?

巴菲特:是的,我相信就自有风电装机容量而言,我们是全国规模最大的公用事业公司。而爱荷华州的电力中,靠风能发电的比例是全国最高的。

不过当然,爱荷华州的风大概只有35%的时间在刮,差不多是这个数字吧。这里有些人可能比我说得更准确。但——所以你不能指望它来承担基荷负载之类的功能。

但爱荷华州一直非常欢迎我们,我甚至可以说,在鼓励我们大量引进风电装机方面表现得很有前瞻性——而我们也以同样的方式回报了他们。

我们在爱荷华州是电力净输出方。爱荷华州在我们的服务区内,就发电而言远远超过自给自足的水平。我认为这对爱荷华州的居民是有利的。

我们和爱荷华州之间有一项安排。我们——你们可能知道——十多年来我们一直没有上调过电价,一次也没有。而这是通过提高效率、通过风力发电实现的。

我们在这上面有一个内置的合理回报,对我们公平,对爱荷华州的居民也公平。这份回报的一部分,来自税收抵免——我记得是每千瓦时1.8美分——这是美国境内任何开发风力发电的人都能获得的。

我们很喜欢多投入风电这个想法。我们也正在这么做。我们在太平洋电力公司(PacifiCorp)那边也在做。而且我认为我们会继续在这个领域保持领先。

我们相对于某些其他人可能有一个优势,那就是我们是一个纳税大户,所以我们不必担心这些税收抵免是否有用。

我想这些税收抵免也是可以出售的。但在我们这种特定情况下,我们不需要这样做。所以你们会看到中美能源旗下的公司会有越来越多的风力发电。

我们进入西海岸六个州的太平洋电力公司时,他们几乎没有——也许根本就没有——任何风力发电。而我们已经开发了很多,而且还有更多在建。

查理?

芒格:哦,我认为在公用事业领域,凡是说得通的事情,伯克希尔旗下的子公司几乎都会是领先者。我想我们都可以为中美能源以及它的两位领导人感到十分自豪。

9. 星座能源(Constellation)与迪纳基(Dynergy)的交易

巴菲特:是的,我们为中美能源感到无比自豪。随着时间推移,我们会在公用事业方面做更多的事情。星座能源那笔交易没能成功。我真希望它能成。但我们当时——星座能源,我们是在一个星期二中午得知他们出问题的。我是说,我们是从股价之类的变化中看出来的。

戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔当天晚上就到了巴尔的摩,带着一份确定的全现金报价,要为星座能源解决问题。而星座能源很可能会在48小时之内,甚至24小时之内,被下调评级。

那样一来,他们在各种衍生品交易中就会面临抵押品追加要求,而他们很可能满足不了这些要求。我的意思是,他们当时是在面临破产。

我们真的是从戴夫中午或下午一点打给我的一通电话,一路走到当天晚上在巴尔的摩递给他们一份确定的报价。而这正是伯克希尔的优势之一。我认为那是一种持久的竞争优势。

我认为很少有组织能以那种方式行事——也很少有组织拥有那样的人才,让你作为首席执行官敢于用那么大一笔钱去支持他们,而不必为此担心。

所以那是——对伯克希尔来说是一个加分项——尽管那次交易没能成功。我们会在公用事业领域做更多的事情。

芒格:嗯,你不是大概花了两个小时就买下了一条管道吗?

巴菲特:是的,我们确实买了一条管道,而且后来证明这笔交易非常成功。

就那个具体案例而言,那家公司迪尼吉(Dynegy)——那是2002年前后的事了——这家公司急需资金。他们从安然(Enron)那里拿到了一条管道。那是一笔非常复杂的交易。

但他们需要这笔钱。而我们需要联邦贸易委员会的批准,也就是FTC对这笔交易的批准,任何要收购它的人都需要这个批准。

于是我们真的写了一封信。我给委员会写了封信。我说,你知道的,「这些人急需这笔钱。他们需要在30天期限届满之前拿到。请让我们提前完成这笔交易。之后你们让我们做什么,我们都照办,一句怨言都没有。」

伯克希尔能够做成这种交易。我们做之前不会先去问律师什么的。我们就直接去做。

这是一个优势。对迪尼吉来说也是一个优势。这帮他们渡过了一个难关——我不确定他们要是没有我们,能不能挺过去。所以,需要的时候,我们可以行动得很快。

但是——我们之所以能快,有几个原因。第一,我们手头始终有钱。你知道的,而且——我们对此有一种心态。

但我们也知道,一旦我们拥有了这些资产,我们有能够把业绩做出来的经理人。这是一个巨大、巨大的优势。回到——

(录音中断)

10. 外资持股限制制约了中国的投资机会

沃伦·巴菲特(发言中):——中国。我们会受到那项持股限制的约束。

但很难想象我们不会随着时间推移,在中国找到更多可做的事情。我是说,那是一个巨大的市场。我们做很多事情。其中一些是可以出口的。

而且,或许也会有机会在那里收购更多企业。要是可以的话,我们本会买下超过10%的比亚迪(BYD)股份。但那是他们愿意卖给我们的全部份额。所以我们希望以后能有机会。

11. 美国的贸易逆差其实是中国的问题

沃伦·巴菲特:就中国持有的美元资产而言,你知道,从某种意义上说,他们没法不继续持有更多美元资产。我是说,这事的本质是,如果我们要出现——就像几年前,或者一两年前那样——

如果我们对中国的贸易逆差要达到2,500亿美元,我是说,如果他们要把商品运给我们——而我们想要那些商品——比我们卖给他们的多出2,500亿美元,那他们最终就会拿到2,500亿美元的一堆小纸片。

而他们可以把这些叫作美元的纸片,转换成——美国的房地产、美国的股票、美国的政府债券。他们可以做各种各样的事情。

他们甚至可以把这些美元交易给法国人,你知道,换成欧元之类的东西。但那样一来,问题就变成法国人的了。

所以——只要中国对美存在显著的贸易顺差,中国持有的美元资产就会不断累积。然后他们就要选择把这些美元投向哪里。而到目前为止,他们选择把相当大一部分——投入美国政府债券。

而且——我记得——大约一个月前左右,中国的一位重要官员说,他对投入美国政府债券的那些资金未来购买力的前景不太满意。我认为他是对的。

我是说,他——这——他——任何在这个国家之外持有美元债务的人,如果长期持有,将来兑换回来的购买力,都会比他们当初承担这些美元债务时要少。

这是一个重大问题,不是世界上最糟糕的问题,但对于中国的财政部长或政府来说,因为存在贸易顺差而不断累积的这部分资金该如何处置,是一个重大的问题。

而且——他们成立了中国投资公司(Chinese Investment Corp),里面有几千亿美元——用于决定在全世界进行投资,但是——

12. 芒格:中国的经济政策「完全正确」

沃伦·巴菲特:这是个有趣的问题,如果让我当中国的财政部长,我会怎么处理这笔贸易顺差、这笔因贸易顺差而流入的资金。

我想把这个问题交给查理,问问他,如果他是中国的财政部长,他会怎么做。

查理·芒格:嗯,我(听不清)这其实是个很简单的问题。我会完全照他们现在做的那样去做。

我认为中国拥有全世界最成功的经济政策之一。中国的发展速度比世界其他地方都快。而且,我认为他们的政策是完全正确的。

而他们的发展速度是如此之快、如此举足轻重,以至于即便他们在美元资产上损失一点购买力,从中国的角度来看,在大局中也不过是九牛一毛。

所以,对于中国人管理自身事务的方式,我只有钦佩。他们在全世界范围内将会变得非常难以匹敌。而这正是对中国来说完全正确的政策。要想快速崛起,就是要在全世界范围内变得非常难以匹敌。

所以我认为他们做得完全正确。而且我认为美国和中国应该是非常友好的国家。因为我们是骨肉相连的关系。

沃伦·巴菲特:那么你的建议是他们继续买入美国国债,即便——

查理·芒格:那还用说。

沃伦·巴菲特:——收益率几乎为零?

查理·芒格:不管收益率多少。它们又不是零收益率。因为他们可以买期限更长的。

沃伦·巴菲特:好吧,我们算是给中国政府提了点建议。(笑)

13. 交易复盘不应该公开

沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:「过去,你曾表示,管理层应该——」

这个问题来自英格丽·亨德肖特(Ingrid Hendershot)。

「过去,你曾表示,管理层应该在几年之后,被要求对其所做的收购进行复盘。你们二位能否分别就伯克希尔最大的一笔收购——通用再保险(General Re)——给我们做一个复盘?」

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我不认为——我会就通用再保险发表一些评论,但我不认为我们通常应该把复盘结果公开。我不认为——我认为,如果我们收购了——

我们确实相信复盘。我们非常坚信这一点。我们认为,做复盘的公司实在太少了。提出一笔交易很容易,事后为它负责就难得多了。

而且——查理很喜欢把任何人的鼻子按到他们自己捅出的问题里去。

这绝对应该做。但我不认为它一定要公开。

我不认为,你能靠这种方式——即便你身为收购方,是在自己的预测上犯了错的那个人——去指出那些管理者们的不足之处,来吸引企业和管理者们,而那些管理者也许正在非常努力地工作,想要弥补你当初收购时犯下的错误。所以我不想——我不想陷入那种局面。

14. 巴菲特:我对通用再保险声誉的判断“大错特错”

沃伦·巴菲特:通用再保险(Gen Re)经历了一个非常、非常糟糕的开局之后,如今表现得相当不错。1998年我买下它的时候,我以为它还是15年前的那家通用再保险——那时它在保险业里拥有绝对首屈一指的声誉,而我的判断是彻头彻尾错了。

当时它在准备金和承保方面的一些做法已经有所变化。但我很高兴地说,多亏了泰德·蒙特罗斯——他今天也在现场——和乔的共同努力……

查理·芒格:是乔·布兰登。

沃伦·巴菲特:对,当然是乔·布兰登。乔和泰德是什么时候接手的来着,2001年9月吧——差不多正好是世贸中心事件那段时间——他们把所有问题都揪出来了。准备金也好,承保也好,不管是什么问题,他们都直接下手去解决。

如今的通用再保险,正是我1998年买下它时以为自己买到的那家公司。

所以我们为他们感到骄傲。这是一份非常艰难的工作,不是那种自己就能水到渠成的事。而且在某种程度上,当你要整顿一个已经变得松懈的组织时,那——你知道的,这可不是件容易的事。

他们两个人,或者说他们各自,本可以去别的地方,赚一样多、甚至更多的钱,也不必面对他们在通用再保险所面对的那些难题。但他们坚持了下来。如今我们拥有一个让我们感到无比自豪、前途一片光明的组织。

查理?

查理·芒格:嗯,我觉得说得没错。而且——很重要的一点是,你得有本事把柠檬变成柠檬水。

我们非常、非常幸运,有乔和泰德在这个过程中帮我们。这个过程并不愉快,也谈不上体面,但结果非常成功。

这不是一件普通的经理人会愿意去做的事。要修复通用再保险,你必须非常强硬、非常有决断力。他们真的把它修好了。

沃伦·巴菲特:我们做事后复盘的时候,从某种意义上说,是在审视我们自己的手笔。因为决策是我们自己做的。

你知道,这不是什么战略部门、也不是负责并购的副总裁、更不是哪个管理顾问跑来告诉我们该买这个或那个。我们审视的是我们自己的决策。

这一点非常重要,我们也经常谈到这一点。我们确实做过一些愚蠢的决定,而且大多数都是我做的,因为坐在奥马哈做大多数决策的人是我。

但如果公开讨论我做过的那些愚蠢决定,可能会牵连到某些业务领域的某些经理人,那就真的不合适了。所以我们不会披露那些具体决定,但我们可以告诉你们,伯克希尔确实做过一些蠢事。

查理·芒格:在通用再保险这笔交易中,真正高明的决定是乔·布兰登做出的。是他决定伯克希尔应该收购通用再保险,是他促成了这笔交易。我认为如果没有他,这事就不会发生。你同意这个说法吗?

沃伦·巴菲特:对,确实如此。

查理·芒格:而乔是通用再保险股东利益的守护者。我们得到了一个不错的结果,而他们的股东得到了一个极好的结果。所以如果说这笔交易里资本主义有什么英雄的话,那这个英雄就是乔。

15. “我们不太相信合同这一套”

沃伦·巴菲特:好,我们来看第6个问题。

观众:是,先生。巴菲特先生、芒格先生,我是来自加利福尼亚的查克·霍斯默(音译)。

您刚才提到了布法罗报社与工会的合作。在没有引入工会的情况下,您如何看待伯克希尔旗下其他子公司员工的合同问题?

沃伦·巴菲特:我正在想,我们究竟有没有什么真正意义上的合同。

查理·芒格:但愿没有。

沃伦·巴菲特:对,我们并不怎么相信合同这一套。有些时候,我们会拿出数亿甚至数十亿美元,交给别人,让他们把自己的企业卖给我们。

而我们必须做出的判断是:在他们把股票证书交给我们、我们把钱交给他们之后,他们对这份事业是否还会保有和之前一样的热情?他们是否还会像交易之前那样投入?

如果我们在这一点上判断错了,任何合同都救不了我们。

我们不希望我们的合作关系是建立在合同基础上的。所以——我实在——你知道,我——我真的想不出我们有什么正式合同。

我们和各位经理人之间就奖金安排之类的事情有一些默契、共识——这也没有那么复杂。

我是说,我们——各家公司最高负责人的薪酬安排,基本上是我个人的职责。而且我们有各种各样不同的安排,因为我们旗下有各种各样不同的业务。

在我们的一些业务里,资本是一个重要因素,所以你得把这一点纳入薪酬安排中。而在另一些业务里,资本根本无关紧要。我们有些业务做起来非常轻松,也非常赚钱;有些业务则非常艰难,做出一个差强人意的结果都需要天才才行。

所以在这方面,我们有一大堆不同的安排。但我们不会试图靠合同来留住人,那样也行不通。而且我们基本上不喜欢去搞这一套。所以你们看到的,是一家——查理,你能想起我们有什么合同吗?

查理·芒格:想不出来。我们的模式是一张双方都当之无愧的、天衣无缝的信任之网,这就是我们追求的目标。好莱坞那种模式——人人都有合同,双方都不值得被信任——完全不是我们想要的。

沃伦·巴菲特:对,我们——我们不想去谈判高管专用卫生间有多大这种事。我是说,那不是我们玩的游戏。

16. 怎样才能被巴菲特赶出办公室

沃伦·巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:这是来自马萨诸塞州贝尔蒙特的爱德华·多纳休(音译)提的问题。

“本着在当下这种时期提升合伙人价值的精神,沃伦有没有考虑过把某些业务分拆成独立的公司?

“我的想法是,其中一些公司如果独立出来,估值倍数(相对账面价值)可能会高于伯克希尔目前的水平。此外,在合适的情况下,可以把行业相似的公司合并,以节省管理成本、行政开支,甚至潜在的销售成本。”

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我们不会分拆任何公司。信不信由你,我们曾经是一家银行控股公司——那是很久以前的事了。我们是在1969年成为银行控股公司的。之后我们被要求在10年内处置我们持有的银行,那家银行在伊利诺伊州的罗克福德,我们确实对它做了一次事实上的分拆。

但要是有人跑来跟我们说,“瞧,你现在的估值倍数是X,可如果把这家子公司分拆出去,你就能拿到1.5倍X的估值”,你知道吗,我们巴不得立刻把他们轰出办公室。这种事根本引不起我们的兴趣。

我们要找的不是那种能让市值在一个月内蹿升一下的东西。如果我们拥有一家很棒的企业,我们希望它继续留在伯克希尔旗下。

我们在伯克希尔内部有这样一种能力,这本身就是一项实实在在的资产:可以在不产生税务后果的情况下,把资金在各种机会之间自由调配。因为它们都属于同一份合并报表。

所以,如果喜诗糖果是一家很棒的企业——它确实是——但它产生的大量资本在这门生意本身里派不上什么有效用场,我们就可以把这些资本调去别的业务,或者用它去收购其他公司。

而且我们在资本配置上确实有一个优势——股东自己去做的话,税务效率基本没法像我们在公司内部做得那么高。

另外,当我们从别人手里买下企业时,我们会给他们一个承诺。你知道,他们可以在年报后面读到我们的经营原则。他们知道我们买下来是为了长久持有。

你知道,这是一桩会长久维系的婚姻。我们不会因为一时能拿到更高的估值倍数之类的,就把某项业务拆分出去。

除此之外——还有那些其他的成本。但那不是决定性因素。伯克希尔的基本原则就是买了就不卖。人们可以相信我们会信守这一点。

查理?

芒格:是的——那么多的分拆案,因为你的市值会稍微高一点,华尔街就会推销那玩意儿,好让他们收取费用。

在一般情况下,这其实并没有为谁真正带来多少好处。

我想唯一可能的例外情况是,如果监管疯狂到一定程度——你可以想象某种情形会导致伯克希尔不得不一分为二。但除非出现那种情况,否则你得到的就是你已经拥有的东西。

巴菲特:是的,如果监管真的集中在某个方面,伤害到了某项业务,从而束缚住了伯克希尔集团内其他公司的手脚,那我们就得考虑一下了。

但是,正如查理所说,这些年来我们听过一场又一场的推介,都是投资银行家们说的,大意是,“如果你只要做这件美妙的事情”,你知道,诸如此类的话——市场就会爱上你。

而这——这里面有多少是有意为之,有多少是下意识的,我们永远不会知道。但我们确实知道的一点是,其中总会伴随着一笔费用。

17. 对学生贷款业务不太了解

巴菲特:7号区。

观众:下午好。我是来自新泽西州蒙特克莱尔的迈克·诺兰。

直到最近,美国的学生贷款业务一直是一项很有吸引力、也很成功的业务。然而,华盛顿方面提出的一些改革方案,让这个行业陷入了混乱。

这个行业既高度依赖信任,也高度依赖融资,能否请您评论一下这个行业,并谈谈这个领域里的公司?

巴菲特:是的,我对此了解不多。也许查理知道。

芒格:不,我对这个也不太了解。在销售手法上出过不少丑闻。这个领域里有些公司跟一些大学行政人员之类的走得太近了。

巴菲特:查理和我已经很久没考虑过申请学生贷款了。所以我们——(笑)——没有太仔细地去查过这方面的监管规定。

芒格:但是,你知道,我们对这个了解不多。

巴菲特:是的。(笑)

其实我大概在一年前,或者一年半前,被人找过,就是那笔后来告吹的萨利美(Sallie Mae)交易。

当时我跟打电话给我的那位说,我对这个不是特别了解。结果证明我不了解也是件好事。

18. 高盛和通用电气的盈利“管理”

巴菲特:安德鲁?

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:好,这个问题来自约翰·麦克唐纳(音)。

他问道,“沃伦,在您对通用电气和高盛的投资中,您认为自己挑选的是有吸引力的企业,还是仅仅是有吸引力的证券?

“本·格雷厄姆在《证券分析》里指出,管理层能做的最可怕的事情之一,就是操纵盈利,而这两家公司都可以说存在这种情况。您对此有何看法?”

巴菲特:嗯,我可以说,在过去15年里,美国工业界中相当大一部分公司都曾在某个时候操纵过盈利。我亲眼目睹过,也反对过,但没什么效果。

所以,我不认为这是一种局限于个别经验的弊病。我对此并不了解具体情况。我不会去谈论那两家公司的具体细节。

就他们所拥有的业务质量以及管理层的素质而言,我对这两家公司感觉良好。但促使我们达成这些交易的,主要是交易条款。

我的意思是,这些交易是在市场一片混乱的时期达成的,在那种时候投入资金,本就应该拿到非常好的条款。

很少有人愿意——或者说在很多、大多数情况下,有能力——在短时间内投入大笔资金。要让我们出手,就必须有好的条款。这——

而且,正如我所说,我不确定在那些情况下还有没有别的可能性。那真的是一段非常特殊的时期。

我们很乐意去做这些交易。我对这些交易感觉良好,这显然是因为我们拿到了非常好的票息。但考虑到达成这些交易时的情形,我认为当时没有别的选择。

所以,如果他们在那两笔交易上分别想要50亿美元和30亿美元,我想我们实际上是出价最低的那个。但我也认为我们做成了非常划算的交易。

你知道,我们当时能不能把这笔钱用在别的更好的地方?我不——就我当时所能判断的,我找不到比这更中意的了。压倒一切的是交易条款,尽管我们显然也喜欢这两家企业本身。

这两家公司的管理层,也就是首席执行官,我都非常熟悉。我认为他们都是了不起的人。我认为他们都很聪明。

而且我认为他们一直——早在我们和他们达成交易之前很久,就一直对我们很坦诚。所以我们对这些交易感到非常满意。

查理?

19. 与高盛“非常愉快的关系”

芒格:是的,你知道,围绕这个领域,投资银行业受到了不少批评,从那部电影开始就是这样。但伯克希尔自己从它所有的投资银行那里得到的服务都很出色,这一点很有意思。

巴菲特:想想看,如果我们受到过糟糕的对待,我们会说些什么。(笑)

这些年来我们和高盛做了很多生意。我和他们的渊源可以追溯到我10岁的时候,那时我认识了西德尼·温伯格,他当时执掌着这家公司,是华尔街的传奇人物——嗯,很长很长一段时间里,他就是“华尔街先生”。

我还是格斯·利维的朋友。格斯·利维也为我们做过一些非常好的事情,包括在我们还只有一家不起眼的小公司,叫作多元零售(Diversified Retailing)的时候,那是查理、我,还有桑迪·戈特斯曼三个人一起创办的。

格斯参与了纽约证券公司牵头的一笔600万美元的证券承销,那种规模的交易在大多数情况下,他是想都不会想去参与的。当时他还拉了高盛一起加入。

所以有很多事情促成了我们与高盛之间非常愉快的关系。我对他们感觉很好。

当然,我们也和通用电气有大量业务往来。我们不知道从他们那儿买了多少台风力涡轮机了。

但通用电气——你知道,是一个非常、非常重要的美国机构。我们会卖给他们很多东西,也会从他们那儿买很多东西。而且我们会在我们的投资上赚钱。所以这让我很开心。

20. 巴菲特对美国生活水平持乐观态度

沃伦·巴菲特:8号区。

观众:你好。我是来自加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥的马克·霍夫曼(音)。想感谢您这些年来的智慧和建议。

也想感谢布卢姆金家族的兄弟们——家具卖场的那些人。他们前几天带我们参观得很棒。我来自一个叫Eel(音)的组织。他们真的让我们看到了伯克希尔的文化,以及你们在做的事情。

我的问题是,纵观整个世界经济,伯克希尔旗下的企业都很棒。但我想问的是,您是否看到世界经济存在一些深层次的问题,比如40年前脱离金本位制,以及各国像疯了一样印发法定货币?

如果伯克希尔的企业都很好,但底层经济存在问题,那我们接下来该往哪里走?关于世界经济,您在问自己哪些问题?谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,这个世界总是存在很多问题。不幸的是,这是我们唯一拥有的世界。所以,我们就与它共处,去应对它。

但美妙之处在于,这个体系运转得非常好。我对未来一两年商业或市场会发生什么,一点头绪都没有。

但我知道的一件事是,随着时间推移,这个国家的人们会过得越来越好。我们拥有一个行之有效的体系,它释放了人类的潜能。

我刚才在想,我们今天在座的大约有35,000人。那几乎相当于1790年美国第一次人口普查时全国人口的1%。只要有100个这样规模的群体,就等于整个国家的人口了。

如果你想想看——如果1790年时,这间屋子坐满了35,000名当时的美国公民,就天赋而言,他们和我们一样聪明。

他们生活在一个资源相同的国家里,显然是同样肥沃的土壤,同样的气温,同样的矿产,所有这一切都一样。所以他们的能力和我们一样。

但他们创造出的东西完全无法和我们今天相比。我是说,你只需看看我们现在的生活方式,和几百年前那些人的生活方式相比就知道了。

所以我们拥有一个行之有效的体系,它释放了人类的潜能。而中国长期以来一直没有一个能释放潜能的体系。现在他们有了一个正在释放人类潜能的体系。

我们远远没有走到这条路的尽头。我是说,我们基本上才刚刚起步。我们的资本主义还会有糟糕的年份。我是说,市场会出现过度反应,会被恐惧和贪婪之类的东西所左右。

但如果你看看19世纪,我们经历过内战,整个世纪里大概有15年左右的经济不景气时期。我们经历了六次那个年代所谓的“恐慌”。

20世纪经历了两次大战,也有过不少次衰退,还有大萧条。所以我们的社会在前进的过程中会有这些中断。

但总的来说,我们在向前迈进。而且我们不仅在向前迈进,仔细想想,我们前进的速度还相当快。

我是说,在20世纪,我们的生活水平提高了7倍。而我们确实做到了。你知道,我们曾长期存在奴隶制。黑人曾被算作五分之三个人。我们大约130年时间里都不允许女性投票。

我是说,我们一直在浪费人类的潜能,现在依然如此。但过去几个世纪里我们浪费得更严重。不过我们始终在断断续续地向前推进。

而眼下,就经济而言,我们多少有些停滞不前。但在我看来,毫无疑问,人类潜能是巨大的,在我们相聚的每一段时期、每一年,你都能列举出一大堆问题。

我是说,问题总会发生。但最终,机遇会胜出。你的孩子会过得比你更好,你的孙辈会过得更好。

我们会找到越来越多更简单、更好的办法,去做那些我们现在甚至还没有想到过的事情。

查理?

21. 芒格对太阳能持乐观态度

查理·芒格:好吧,既然我已经这么接近死亡的年纪了,我发现自己对经济的未来反而变得更乐观了——(笑)——虽然我不会在这儿享受这个未来了。

真正让我感到高兴的是,我们显然即将驾驭太阳的直接能量。我们将在全世界范围内获得电力。

这将使人口过剩的国家能够把海水变成淡水。这也将消除很多环境问题,并为未来作为化工原料的需求,保留更多的碳氢化合物资源。

我看到的是,人类的主要技术难题即将得到最终突破。你可以看到它就在地平线那边逐渐显现。当然,中美能源(MidAmerican)和比亚迪(BYD)都将参与其中。

所以,我认为只考虑自己可能遭遇的不幸,是一个巨大的错误。你也应该想想自己处境中好的一面。

而我们现在处境中好的一面是,人类的主要技术难题即将得到解决。只要你有足够的能源,你就能解决很多其他问题。

沃伦·巴菲特:他年纪越大反而越乐观了。(笑)

22. 对瑞士再保险交易并不担心

沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:这是一个关于伯克希尔投资瑞士再保险的问题。“既然您对瑞士再保险的承保业务没有控制权,除了您已经持有的相当规模的普通股头寸之外,您怎么能对再投入26亿美元于一种相对次级的证券感到放心呢?

“通用再保险(Gen Re)收购案在您持有它的头几年出现的那些问题,难道没有让您对再保险业务中潜藏的地雷有所警惕吗?

“既然您对其没有管理控制权,瑞士再保险岂不是更有可能继续犯错吗?

“还是说,自您签订份额分保协议以来,您对其承保文化的深入了解,反而提高了您对它所承担风险的信心?

“您过去说过,伯克希尔的浮存金价值等于甚至高于股权价值。您会对瑞士再保险的浮存金作出同样的评价吗?”

沃伦·巴菲特:瑞士再保险的什么,再说一遍?

卡罗尔·卢米斯:瑞士再保险的浮存金。

巴菲特:哦,我们和瑞士再保险有几项安排。一项是一年多前达成的,我们承接他们财产意外险业务(主要是再保险业务)的20%份额,为期五年。

然后我们又做了一项——那是大约一年前开始的。再然后,一两个月前——那时候,我们买了瑞士再保险大约3%的普通股。

再然后,大约一个月前,我们投资了300万——30亿——瑞士法郎,购买了一种每年支付我们12%利息的证券,两年后他们可以按本金的120%赎回。如果到第三年还没被赎回,它就可以转换为每股25瑞士法郎的股票。

这只证券很可能会被赎回。如果被赎回,我们会不太高兴,因为他们唯一会赎回的原因,就是这对他们有利、对我们不利。

但如果它真的被赎回,我们将获得面值的120%,加上每年12%的利息。

实际上,我们的偿付顺位高于瑞士再保险大约200亿瑞士法郎的股权。所以我不会把它看作是一种次级证券。

瑞士再保险过去一年左右遇到的问题,绝不是由他们的保险承保业务造成的。

多年来,他们的保险承保业务一直不错。我们对持有其中20%的比例分保感到满意,也对我们的投资感到满意。所以,我会认为——

他们会产生大量浮存金——就像许多再保险公司一样——相对于每一美元的保费收入,他们会产生大量浮存金。

所以我们预计,我们已经持有一年的这20%比例分保,将相对于其约30亿的保费规模,产生一笔相当可观的浮存金。

而且我认为这笔浮存金最终会证明是有吸引力的。这对我们来说会很有吸引力,对瑞士再保险来说甚至更有吸引力一些。因为实际上,我们付给他们的佣金,相当于给了他们一点额外的加成。

我想,就像我说的,最可能发生的情况是,我们那30亿美元的头寸会被赎回。

我们还有那20亿美元,或者说20亿瑞士法郎的——如果我刚才说了“美元”,我指的其实是瑞士法郎——20亿瑞士法郎的不利损失保障。

这项安排本质上是说,如果他们的准备金——就说,在财产意外险业务上,截至2008年底——大约是600亿法郎——一旦他们赔付出去——这些不是精确数字——但一旦他们赔付了580亿,比他们提列的准备金少20亿,那么接下来的50亿就由我们来付。

就像我说的,我们不太可能在15年之内就要为此付钱。而且如果他们的准备金是准确的,我们只会付出那20亿。

所以,这又是一笔在瑞士再保险承受相当大压力的时候达成的交易。他们当时面临评级被下调的威胁。

我在华盛顿特区的一个星期天,和瑞士再保险的首席执行官——当时的首席执行官——以及他的投资顾问见了面。我们安排了一笔交易,后来他们的股东和董事都批准了。我认为我们满足了他们的需求,也认为我们得到了一笔有吸引力的交易。

这没什么问题——你知道,我们可能更偏爱通用再保险——但瑞士再保险的承保业务并没有什么问题。他们现在遇到的问题,没有一个是承保业务造成的。

那些问题的产生,跟AIG的问题有点类似——尽管规模上完全无法与AIG相提并论——一部分出在金融产品上,一部分出在资产端。它不是承保业务造成的。

查理?

芒格:是啊,那真是个可怕的问题。我们真希望能多有一些这样的问题。(笑)

23. 不合理的CEO薪酬与激励机制

巴菲特:请9号区提问。

观众:我是来自菲律宾的Vishali(音)。我的问题是关于一家资本密集型子公司的薪酬问题。

我想斗胆假设一下,大量的银行倒闭,很大程度上是由激励偏差造成的。

如果董事会在薪酬安排上犯了错,那么董事会就引入了一种偏向盈利操纵的激励偏差。

那么,考虑到第一条规则,也就是“不要亏钱”,同时考虑到如果护城河因此拓宽,短期出现亏损也是可以接受的——在这种情况下,您如何为一位需要大量资本的子公司经理,设计出一套公平又明智的薪酬方案?

巴菲特:嗯,这显然是——这是个非常非常好的问题。这也是查理和我都思考过的问题。我们见过太多离谱的薪酬体系了,所以我们花了很多时间去思考、去讨论这个问题。

在一个资本密集型的业务里,你必须要有某种东西——薪酬安排里必须有一个包含资本成本的要素。

我们有几十家子公司。针对不同的业务,我们有不同的安排。

因为——正如你指出的——一家不需要资本的企业,比如喜诗糖果或者Business Wire之类的,它的薪酬安排必须和一家需要大量资本的企业有实质性的不同。

我们认为我们的薪酬体系是合理的。我们同意你说的,激励机制非常重要。

我想说,你的问题里多少暗示了,是董事会在制定这些制度。但事实是,至少根据我40多年的经验,我曾在19家公司的董事会任职,也观察了很多其他地方的行为——基本上,董事会对此的影响相对很小。

在大多数情况下——在很多很多情况下——CEO会想办法,成为决定自己(通常是“他”,偶尔是“她”)薪酬安排的重要因素。他们——你知道,人力资源——首先,是他们自己挑选薪酬委员会的成员。

所以在我任职过的19个董事会里,我只在一个薪酬委员会里待过。我是说,人们找的不是杜宾犬,找的是可卡犬。然后——(笑)他们找的是那种摇着尾——摇着尾巴、非常友好的可卡犬。

你知道,CEO们花很多心思去考虑谁会进他们的薪酬委员会。审计委员会反倒没那么重要。但薪酬委员会,他们可是想得很周到。

薪酬委员会每隔几个月开一次会。一位直接向CEO负责的人力资源副总裁会进来,大概还会推荐一位薪酬顾问。相信我,他们绝不会去找那种会把苹果车弄翻的顾问。

所以,这一直是一个由CEO主导的体系。

根据我的经验,董事会在真正作为所有者、或所有者代表,去认真思考“到底应该怎么给这些人合理付薪、怎么激励他们做正确的事,同时也别去做错误的事”这方面,做得非常少。

查理和我对这里本地的一家公司相当熟悉,就是Peter Kiewit集团。皮特·凯威特大概在50多年前,甚至更早,就想出了一套非常合乎逻辑的、给这一行的人付薪的办法。

这并不是什么高深的学问。我敢保证,他在这个问题上根本没有请教过任何薪酬顾问。他就是自己琢磨出来的。

你也能琢磨出一套办法来。我也能琢磨出一套。但你得明白,不是每个CEO都想要一套合理的薪酬体系,你知道吗?既然不合理能带来更多收益,谁还愿意讲道理呢?

所以,要在董事会这个层面解决这个问题,真的很难——我认为——我不认为应该设立一个薪酬委员会。我认为应该由董事会全体成员来一起把这件事彻底讨论清楚。

这样你就不会只是拿到薪酬委员会的一份报告,然后把它当成金科玉律——因为他们据说在前一天讨论了几个小时,然后就带着某个建议进来,大家全部照单盖章通过。

我认为这应该是一个大家公开讨论的议题。我认为如何给CEO付薪,是一件非常重要的事情。

我在我们的年报里说过,选对CEO、确保他们不越权、并在重大收购或剥离上行使独立判断,如果董事会把这些做对了,你可以把其他那些清单——检查表之类的东西——都忘掉。而如果他们没把这些做对,其他的也没什么区别。

所以我想说,这是可以做到的。但很难有一种制度,能让某个人——能让董事会——像所有者那样思考,或者代表所有者,像对面那个正在拿报酬的人一样在乎这件事。

我确实认为近年来情况有所好转。但它是从一个非常低的起点开始的。

查理?

芒格:是的,这个领域里有一些相当有意思的反直觉结论。

我要说的是,在美国的大型上市公司里,一个薪酬优渥的董事会,其优渥的薪酬对公司的良好管理反而是起反作用的。

这里存在一种互惠关系。你懂的,“你不断给我加薪,我也不断给你加薪。”于是就变得非常像一个俱乐部。而我认为,总体而言,如果董事完全不拿薪酬,美国的公司会被管理得更好。

巴菲特:我们正朝那个方向努力。(掌声)

嗯,这确实很有意思。因为按SEC的定义,所谓独立董事——他们会质疑,比如说,我的独立性,如果我们持有价值数十亿美元的某种证券,但我们又在Dairy Queen卖给他们冰淇淋之类的东西。

要找到真正代表所有者的人是非常——而且要懂行,因为他们必须懂商业。他们真的得有一些商业头脑。

而事实是,如果你找的这个人每年靠当董事拿20万美元、25万美元,而他在外面又没有多少收入或身家,还特别想再拿一个董事席位多赚20万美元,那他们是极不可能坐在那里跟CEO争论、指出这套激励薪酬制度被人为设计得对CEO有利之类的话的。

在薪酬安排里有更多的空话——

而现在,你们有这种100页的委托书。如果你要用100页来解释你是怎么给公司里的人发薪水的,那说明有什么地方不对劲。我是说,你不需要100页——我们没有100页的,你懂的,协议或诸如此类的东西。

但随着时间推移,这件事变得越来越像一场游戏了。

我要说的是,正如查理说的——当薪酬成为一个董事切身利益中非常重要的一部分时,你就没有一个独立董事了。

而有意思的是,按照现行制度的安排方式,恰恰是这些人,在大多数情况下,往往被认为是独立董事。

芒格:这比几乎所有人意识到的都要糟糕得多。伊莱休·鲁特——他是美国历史上最出色的内阁成员——曾经有句话,说一个人如果不是完全愿意随时放弃这个职位,就没资格担任公职。

当然,他一离开公职,马上又成了世界上最顶尖的律师。所以他没什么可失去的——

但一个从这个职位上有很多东西可失去的人,是极不愿意去当一名独立董事的。

所以我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的做法是,(董事薪酬)是美国平均水平的千分之一。而其他所有人的做法都很愚蠢。(笑)

巴菲特:(笑)我就喜欢跟他一起坐在台上。

24. 保险业务的最坏情形

巴菲特:贝姬。

贝姬·奎克:这是Paula Sauer(音)提的问题。既然查理看起来越来越乐观了,也许我们该先问他这个问题。然后沃伦,你可以试着比他说得更狠。

Paula写道:“关于保险业务,你能想象到的最坏情形是什么?”

芒格:你是指我们的,还是泛指整个行业的?

贝姬·奎克:我想她指的是你们的,具体来说。

芒格:是的。嗯,最坏的情形就是发生某种巨灾,我们在税前损失掉相当多的数十亿美元。即便如此,我认为也不会实质性损害现有的基本业务。

所以我认为我们有一门了不起的保险业务。我不想拿它去换我知道的任何别的业务。你怎么看,沃伦?

巴菲特:是的,不,这确实是一门了不起的业务。

最坏的情况——我过去常说,对于任何一场巨型灾难,我们大概会承担整个行业损失的4%到5%。

我不太确定卡特里娜飓风最终损失定在了多少。我不知道是600亿美元还是那个区间的某个数字。而我们大概支付了接近——我们大概处在那个4%到5%的区间。

现在我们的比例可能更低一些,未必低很多。但如果发生一场1000亿美元的巨灾,你懂的,按目前的情况我们大概会承担其中的3%到4%,也就是说要谈到30亿到40亿美元。

你知道,我认为可能发生的最坏情形是,如果我们遭遇的通胀严重到人们对日常生活中不得不购买的任何东西都感到非常非常不满。

这一点在公用事业行业也适用,但在汽车保险行业尤其如此,实际上,如果人们对通胀导致的涨价表达愤怒,说“干脆把整个行业国有化算了”,我是说,那将是一项巨大的资产就此消失,如果真的发生了那种情况。

我认为这不是高概率事件。但如果你是要我说出最坏的情形,那大概就是我会给出的答案。我——

芒格:嗯,这确实发生过。汽车保险在某个地方被国有化了,新西兰还是哪里。

巴菲特:哦,当然。

芒格:但这还不算——如果你想要绝对的最坏情形,你已经找到了。

巴菲特:是的,我们其实也在某种程度上把年金业务国有化了,你知道的,当我们建立社会保障制度的时候。我认为那是件好事。

但当人们对某件事的愤怒足够强烈时——你们听过关于银行的那些议论。我是说,当公众感到愤怒时,政治人物就会做出反应。

而在我看来,通货膨胀——恶性通胀——是最有可能导致这种情况的原因,如果说这种事情——我不认为这是大概率事件——但如果这种事情发生在汽车保险行业的话。

这是大多数人要支付的一笔账单,你知道的,每六个月一次,甚至更频繁。如果他们看到这笔账单不断上涨,而他们又不想放弃自己的车,他们就会发火。

而公用事业公司的客户,在通胀期间也会非常生气。因为他们需要开灯用电。而他们很讨厌看到那些月度账单不断上涨。

这是——这是他们无法放弃的东西。而且非常显眼。他们的反应就会是去找他们的民意代表,说:“对这件事做点什么。”

他们能采取的应对措施之一就是把它接管过来。所以这种概率非常低,但不是完全不存在。

25. 国际投资没有预设目标

沃伦·巴菲特:10 号区?

观众:先生们,我是来自爱尔兰科克的帕特里克·奥多诺霍(音)。我想我该先说一句,很抱歉你们在我那个原本很美好的小国家吃了这么大苦头。

沃伦·巴菲特:我很喜欢爱尔兰人。我们在爱尔兰人身上——运气一直很好。那是我自己的失误。(笑)

观众:好的。我想增加我在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资。我想我们已经确认这是一家了不起的公司。

所以我还有另外几个问题,对于外国人来说,这些问题可能和国内的人有点不一样,第一个是,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的任何收益都可能因为美元兑欧元的下跌而被抹平。而我们谈的显然是长期投资。

第二个是,也许您可以谈谈——你们的——全球收购,这会降低你们对美元的依赖,增加你们的海外收入。

我把第三个问题忘了。麻烦您先谈谈这两个吧。

沃伦·巴菲特:好,行,如果你想起来了,再问也没问题。

预测欧元兑美元的走势——我可不擅长。你——

查理·芒格:你做得还不错啊。

沃伦·巴菲特:(笑)是的,我们确实赚了几十亿美元。但是——(笑声)

如果你愿意的话——我完全不是在建议这么做——但欧元兑美元是很容易对冲的。我不是在推荐这么做。我只是告诉你,如果你担心某种主要货币,这是一个选项。对于较小国家的货币来说,这就比较难做到了。

但如果你说的是欧元兑美元的问题,你想的话,可以一直对冲下去。

但正如我说过的,我们通常不做这种事情。而且这对你来说可能会挺麻烦的。

我想说,就伯克希尔的盈利而言,我们会继续做我们认为——我们认为合理的事情。那么,如果我们持有——

比如说,我们持有可口可乐超过 8% 的股份。可口可乐,你知道,它 80% 以上的利润都是在美国以外赚的。

我们持有很多宝洁的股份。他们的很多利润也是在美国以外赚的。卡夫也在美国以外赚了很多钱。

所以我们有很多间接的收入来源。同时我们也有很多在美国以外的直接收入来源。

ISCAR 的大部分利润——它在美国赚钱,但在其他地方也赚了不少钱。我们还有其他类似的业务。

我们完全没有预先设定要在这里或那里、这个地方或那个地方创造多少百分比利润的目标。我们只是每天照常,你知道,去上班干活。

我们不知道下一个投资机会的电话会是从以色列打来,还是从印第安纳打来。

我们希望我们所有的子公司都在到处寻找机会。有些会在海外找到,有些不会。所以我们并不是——我们并没有朝哪个方向发展,就收入来源而言。

有很多国家我们感觉很放心。我们也乐意把钱投到那些国家去。

但我们不会一早醒来就想着,我们想在德国或西班牙或别的什么地方多投点钱,或者想把钱从那些国家撤出来。

查理,你还有什么要补充的吗?

查理·芒格:有。人们看现代的自由民主制度,很容易得出结论说它一团糟、毛病一大堆。我认为这个看法是对的。

但我完全不确定,我们这边这些乱糟糟的毛病,是不是就比欧洲那些乱糟糟的毛病更严重。

对这些事情我是不可知论者。我认为大西洋两岸都各有对错,半斤八两。

26. 裁员这件事「没有人会因此感到高兴」

沃伦·巴菲特:好,安德鲁?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个问题来自三位股东,他们恰好是伯克希尔旗下公司的员工。他们要求不透露姓名——他们提出了以下问题。

他们说:「我们既担心公司的财务状况,也担心自己工作的稳定性。您能否谈谈您对用裁员来应对公司短期利润下滑的看法?」

沃伦·巴菲特:好,这些是被投资公司还是子公司?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这些——我猜他们是被投资公司的员工。他们——

沃伦·巴菲特:好的。

安德鲁·罗斯·索金:他们既是股东,也是员工。

沃伦·巴菲特:好,我的态度不会因此而不同。我只是想先弄清楚情况。

毫无疑问,业务状况的变化有时会迫使公司进行临时性或永久性的裁员。

我是说——各项业务的规模会发生变化。我们很幸运,像 GEICO 这样的公司,我们的业务正在扩张。所以我们大概会净增加,我估计,大约一千个 GEICO 的岗位。

但与此同时,我们在西南部的砖厂大概有近一半都关闭了,因为现在人们根本不盖房子了。不过这个行业会恢复的,到时候我们会重新招人。

另一方面,我们的纺织业务就再也没有恢复过。我们在《布法罗新闻报》雇用的人也比一年前少了。这些岗位我们不会再恢复,也回不到以前的水平了。

所以有些业务可能会永久性收缩。对此你必须正视,也就意味着要裁员。

还有一些业务存在严重的周期性收缩,这些业务将面临大规模裁员。

其他一些业务在这种时期也会受到一点影响,但影响很小。而我们会抵制裁员这种想法。

我们——你知道,没有人从中得到任何快乐。而且一般来说,你做这件事往往还偏晚了,因为你总是抱着业务会反弹之类的希望。

但你知道,如果业务发生了实质性的变化,你最好改变你的商业模式。不然,你知道,别人会改。到那时你面对的变化会更多。

总的来说,我们希望我们涉足的业务不会面临那类问题。

但在我们与建筑相关的业务中,确实——我们在Shaw裁过员,在Johns Manville裁过员,在Benjamin Moore裁过员,在Acme Brick裁过员,实在没有别的办法。我是说,这——我们的竞争对手也都一样。

你知道,在纺织业务上,我们是1965年进去的。最后,我们把所有人都裁掉了。我是说,这——我们——在我们进去之前它就已经严重萎缩了。我们尝试了各种办法。最后我们还是放弃了。

你知道,资本主义——你知道——就是一种创造性破坏。有时候,你就站在吃亏的那一端。

就我们现有的这些业务而言,今年,我们的雇员人数很可能会减少——我几乎可以肯定会减少——尽管GEICO会扩张。

减少的幅度不会很大,因为这只会冲击某些特定领域。但确实会减少。我们的经理们必须正视当前的现实情况。

查理?

芒格:是的。我们有一些业务采取的是共渡难关的模式,不裁员,至少目前还没有。而采用这种模式的业务往往在经济上处于非常强势的地位。

所以我想这证明了本杰明·富兰克林是对的,他说过:“空口袋难以立正站直。”

所以我们在这方面情况各异,整个行业也是如此。而且——

但我确实认为,理想的模式应该是一家业务足够强大的公司,能够采取共渡难关的方式,而不是裁员。

巴菲特:是的,有些公司正在这样做,就是——你知道,大家一起减少工时。但是——也有很多业务运营方式并不太适合这种做法。所以——

芒格:ISCAR就是这样运作的。

巴菲特:是的,ISCAR就是这样运作的。而在其他情况下,你基本上不得不整个整个地关闭工厂。我是说——

芒格:是的,当然。

巴菲特:是的,这就是它的本质。与其让每家工厂都以50%的产能运转,还不如干脆关闭效率最低的工厂,这样运营效果会更好。

芒格:在这样一个有时不得不截肢才能保命的世界里,你不能指望每一项业务都能原封不动。

27. 用羞耻感而非立法来对抗离谱的CEO薪酬

巴菲特:好,第11区。

观众:你好,我是拉尔夫·威特金(Ralph Witkin),来自康涅狄格州格林威治。我第一次来这里是在1995年。我真的很欣赏你们主持这个会议的方式。我参加过很多其他公司的股东会。我知道你们并没有义务这样做。我为此感谢你们两位。

我的问题和第9号提问者的问题很类似,也是关于高管薪酬的。

不是那么关心你对薪酬的看法,而是我们作为股东,能做出怎样的努力来纠正这个问题,把它拉回到某种平衡的水平上来。谢谢。

巴菲特:前几天有位参议员给我打了电话。而,他的选民显然对高管薪酬感到非常愤怒。

可能——你知道,AIG确实产生了巨大的影响,尽管,你知道,你也可以把美林之类的公司都算上。但那件事对民众的冲击是巨大的。

从某种意义上说,那种愤怒可能与实际发生的事情不成比例。但不管怎样——这没什么关系。人们就是对此感到愤怒。

所以这位参议员给我打了电话。他说,你知道——他其实是在说:“告诉我一部法规,能让我的选民对高管薪酬问题满意。”

而我给他的建议是,他大概是做不到的,而且上一次国会插手这件事,是在克林顿政府早期,当时他们通过了一项法案,我记得是规定,对于排名前五的高管,公司超过一百万美元的年薪酬部分不能抵税,除非该薪酬以某种方式与业绩挂钩。

那大概是国会有史以来出台过的最适得其反的立法,光是这句话本身就够说明问题了。(笑)

那项立法的最终结果是,当这项税负被征收时,当然是股东承担了这笔钱,而高管本人却没有承担。所以它惩罚的是股东,而股东本来就已经因为薪酬问题而受损了。

它导致了各种各样专门设计出来绕开这项规定的安排,涉及大量的律师工作、大量的顾问,以及大量页数的代理声明书,其净效果反而是把薪酬水平急剧推高了。在我看来,正是因为有了这项规定被写入法律,薪酬的增长幅度反而比原本要大得多。

所以我向他建议,他们首先应该做的——也应该做的——大概就是废除那项法律,说“我们错了”,然后再想清楚是否应该做一些正确的事情。但这个建议并不太受欢迎。(芒格笑)

所以我要说的是——我一直都在提这个建议。它从来没有得到过任何回应。但这不会阻止我继续提出这个建议。

在这个国家,你只需要那前六位左右的顶尖投资经理,他们管理的资产——你知道——动辄数千亿,在某些情况下甚至是数万亿美元。

如果他们愿意就那些最离谱的案例站出来发声就够了。就——你知道,现在有很多关于“薪酬表决权”之类的东西。但只要有那么六位这样的人,他们本身就自带大量媒体关注——他们根本不用担心自己的观点传不出去。

让那些大人物改变行为的办法,说到底,就是让他们感到难堪。而媒体在这方面有很好的机会。但是——他们需要大投资者的配合。

所以,如果你有三四位最大的投资者,在XYZ公司拿出某种疯狂的方案时,站出来直接说:“这太离谱了”,这就会改变行为方式。而且它还会——

董事们不喜欢显得愚蠢。他们不喜欢自己的名字上报纸,看起来很愚蠢。你会看到一些真正的改变。

我认为要为此立法,会——我只是不知道该怎么写这样的条文,你知道吗?

我是说,你最近读到切萨皮克能源(Chesapeake Energy)的那个案例了吧,7500万美元用于某种再签约奖金,另外还牵涉到一些别的事情。

我是说,这真是——你会很好奇人们究竟在想什么。你也知道那位CEO在想什么。而这——我不认为你能写出一部能够阻止这种事的法规。而且就像我说的,他们当年试图写出来的那一部,把一切都彻底搞砸了。

但我确实认为,大机构——如果他们能站出来发声——你只需要其中三四家联合起来站出来发声就够了。而且他们完全不必对每一家公司都这么做,只需要在情节足够离谱的时候站出来就行。

但如果他们在情节离谱的时候,时不时地能建立起敢于发声的声誉,这就会起到——我认为在美国企业界会产生某种约束力量。因为这种约束力量现在还不存在——现在还没有。

我是说,现在每个顾问都会来,带来所谓“纯业务”公司里的人拿多少薪酬的数据。而他们——

没有人愿意说自己公司的CEO处于后四分之一水平之类的。所以他们就一直跟更高的那几档比较。然后就一路往上拉。

你知道,这是一个非常好使的游戏。我称之为“荣誉制度”。股东守着荣誉,高管们掌控着制度。(笑)

查理?

芒格:嗯,我从大投资者这个角度来看,对解决这个问题不太乐观。

那些大投资者机构里,有不少投资经理年薪2000万美元,贡献却微不足道。他就像住在玻璃房子里却先扔石头的人。

而且公共养老基金,很多情况下是由左翼政客和工会主导的,他们往往有自己的一套议程,跟良好的管理其实没什么关系。所以,有时候,药方比病本身还糟糕。

28. 我们不雇佣“潜在的伟大经理人”

巴菲特:好吧,在这个令人振奋的话题上,我们接着请卡罗尔提问。(笑)

卡罗尔·卢米斯:这是彼得·波尔森(Peter Poulson,拼写为P-O-U-L-S-O-N)提的问题。

他说:“你们收购公司的时候,管理层是随之而来的。总的来说,伯克希尔在把合适的领导放到合适的位置上这件事上做得非常出色。

“但偶尔,你们也得为某个高管职位招聘人选。请描述一下你们和一位伯克希尔潜在运营高管的面谈会是什么样的。你们看重什么?你们怎么判断一个人成为优秀经理人的潜力?”

巴菲特:嗯,通常我们雇的人已经证明了自己是优秀的经理人。我是说,我们收购一家企业的时候,很——绝大多数情况下,管理层是随企业一起过来的。

我们收购ISCAR的时候,得到的是那批已经多年打出全垒打的团队。

而我们真正需要问自己的是,你知道,他们将来还会不会跟我们在一起?交易之后他们的感受会不会跟交易前一样?

在这方面我们也犯过一些偶发的错误。但总体来说,这一点是能体现出来的。所以——我们在经理人方面运气不错,虽然不是完美的。

而最难的部分是,因为我们没有退休年龄,就是当经理人失去了他们在更年轻时拥有的能力的时候。

而这——没有什么放之四海而皆准的统一标准可以用来衡量。所以——人在衰老,至少在业务能力上会衰老,但每个人衰老的方式和速度都很不一样。

而查理和我有时就要面对这样一个难题:判断某个人是否已经不再具备他早年拥有的那种管理能力。

然后我们就有责任对此采取行动。而我们讨厌这样做。但这就是——

芒格:顺便说一句,在这些事情上我们一直很迟钝。

巴菲特:我们每次都很迟钝。

芒格:我们很迟钝。如果我们真的很喜欢那个人,我们就会格外迟钝。(笑)我们远不是理想状态。

巴菲特:是啊,嗯,这非常——嗯,我们曾在Wesco有一位经理人,你知道,一位很棒的——我是说,一个我们俩都很喜欢的人。

后来他得了阿尔茨海默病。我是说,那——你知道,我们当时不愿意面对这件事。我们最终还是面对了。但这大概让我们多拖了一年、一年半的时间,是吧,查理?

芒格:是的。

巴菲特:是啊。

这基本上是我工作中唯一不喜欢的部分。我是说,我讨厌这件事。但——我愿意花很多钱来避免做这件事。不过偶尔它还是会发生。幸运的是,这种情况似乎不太常发生——

我们找的是那些真心热爱自己事业的人,你知道吗?我热爱伯克希尔。我——你知道,我每天都去上班,而且对此感到兴奋。而我们——你能从人身上看出这一点。

我是说,我想你们大多数人可能都能感觉到我对这份工作就是这种感觉。而我也知道我们旗下子公司的经理人们也是这种感觉。

我是说,托尼——托尼·奈斯利——在他还是个十几岁的少年时就去GEICO工作了。而他今天对GEICO的兴奋程度跟我一样。这一点第一次让我印象深刻是——

我昨天午餐时见到他。他做的第一件事,就是把那个我知道自己在等的数字递给我。你知道,“(听不清),我们增长了50.5万,”然后他会把这个数字一路说完,“——保单持有人。”

而且,我是说,我对这些数字感到兴奋。他也对这些数字感到兴奋。你知道,我们会聊各州各州的情况,不管具体是什么。而,这种东西是没法灌输给一个人的。

但我们确实能在它存在的时候认出它。而且我们会尽最大努力,确保我们不做任何会以任何方式削弱这种热情的事情。

29. 不要试图择时入市

巴菲特:好,12号区。

观众:下午好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我是吉米·钟(Jimmy Chong,音译),来自俄亥俄州代顿市。

巴菲特先生,去年10月,您在《纽约时报》的一篇专栏文章中写道,您正把自己的个人投资组合全部转为美国股票。

我的问题是,这个转变完成了吗?如果还没有,您还在继续买入吗?另外,在您整个投资生涯中,您会把最近这次市场下跌,按投资机会来排位,排在什么位置?

巴菲特:嗯,这肯定没有1974年那段时期那么剧烈。1974年股票比现在便宜得多。

但那时候你面对的利率环境也不一样。所以可以说,其实并没有便宜那么多。

当时你可以以大约四倍市盈率买到前景良好的优质公司。但那时候利率要高得多。

那是我见过的买入普通股最好的时期。当时这个国家陷入的麻烦,可能还没有去年9月那么严重。我不认为有那么严重。但那时候股票要相对便宜一些。

在最近这段时期,我——你知道,我买了一些股票。然后公司债看起来极其便宜。利差非常非常大。所以我也买了一些公司债。

但东西越便宜,我越喜欢买。我是说,如果我在麦当劳花X块钱买汉堡,前几天买的,然后他们第二天把价格降到X的90%——虽然不太可能——但如果真这样,我会很高兴。

我不会去想昨天付了多少钱买汉堡。我想我这辈子都会一直买汉堡,你知道吧?汉堡越便宜,我越高兴。

我这辈子都会一直买投资标的。而且我宁愿花X的一半价钱,也不愿花X。

而且,只要我了解这家企业的价值,昨天我付了X这件事本身并不会让我烦恼。

所以就我个人而言,我喜欢价格走低。我知道,当你们早上醒来看行情时,并不是所有人都是这种感受。

但道理很简单:东西打折的时候,你应该比平时更愿意去买,而不是相反。

最近——我在《纽约时报》写那篇文章的时候,我并没有预测股票会怎么走,因为我从来不知道它们会怎么走。

但我确实知道什么时候花同样的钱能买到更多东西,那正是我相信应该买入的时候。

查理?

芒格:嗯,如果股票平均下跌了40%,那它们显然比之前更接近一个有吸引力的价格了。

而且,当然,最近利率也下降了不少,至少短期利率是这样。

这跟1973、74年那种情形完全不一样。当年那种情况发生时,我就知道那是属于我的时机,而且是唯一一次。我知道自己再也不会遇到那样一次抄底的机会了。

可惜的是,我当时几乎没什么钱可用,这也是——(笑)

巴菲特:正因为如此,那种机会才会出现。

芒格:那种时机之所以会出现,原因正在于此。

巴菲特:对。

芒格:所以,如果我是你,我不会去等1973、74年那样的时机。

巴菲特:不,我们不会去猜底部,或者说——

我们对股市明天、下周或者下个月会怎么走没有看法。

所以,如果因为觉得以后会出现更有吸引力的机会,就按兵不动、不去做眼下合情合理的事情,那不是我们的做法。

只要我们有机会做一件合情合理的事情,我们就会去做。如果第二天这件事变得更合理,而我们手上又有钱,我们可能会加码。如果没有钱,那——我们又能怎么办呢?

所以,猜底部基本上不是我们玩的游戏。定价才是我们的游戏。而这并没有那么难。猜底部,我觉得大概是不可能做到的,但是——

当你发现同样的钱能买到很多东西的时候,你就买。正如我说的,我写完那篇文章之后,股票确实变得更便宜了。

公司债——公司债市场变得非常非常混乱。我们为伯克希尔买了一些规模相当大的债券。我自己也为个人买了一点点。

但我百分之九十九的时间都在思考伯克希尔的事情。这才是——

芒格:沃伦,到现在,我们那几家小型人寿保险公司是不是已经装满了收益率10%的优质债务工具?

巴菲特:我们手上确实比以前多了不少这类东西,没错。(笑)

不,我们——几个月前我们有机会以非常非常便宜的价格——至少在我看来是这样——买到一些公司债。

我们在人寿保险公司里有一些资金,不能用于其他某些领域,而那正是把这笔钱一股脑投进去的绝佳时机。

而且,每当我们喜欢做某件事的时候,我们是真的很想去做。我的意思是,我们的做法从来不是小心翼翼地试探,而是在价格合适的时候,尽快买进。

芒格:是啊,那波债券行情没持续多久,但是——

巴菲特:没错。

芒格:——当时有一些绝对安全的债券,收益率9%以上,还带有非常严密的赎回保护条款。

巴菲特:对。

芒格:其中有些债券现在已经涨了20%、25%。所以,当你盯着B壳的时候,机会往往就藏在A壳底下。

巴菲特:是啊。我们尽量把所有的壳都看一遍。

芒格:对,我们会把所有的壳都看一遍。

30.受监管公用事业公司「体面的」回报率

巴菲特:贝姬?

贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自加利福尼亚州科斯塔梅萨的吉姆·米切尔,他想问你们两位。

他说:「多年前,你曾教导我们要警惕像电力公用事业这样的资本密集型企业,因为它们可能会因为低估折旧而虚增利润。

「既然如今你正在投资公用事业和天然气管道,你是发现了发电厂长寿的秘诀吗?还是我们需要对你的公用事业盈利打个折扣?」

巴菲特:嗯,公用事业的盈利,很大程度上是来自于其经营所在辖区所允许的股权资本回报率。

所以,举例来说,如果在养老金成本之类的方面出现意外,你确实可以在之后的时间里把这部分收益赚回来。但你也不会得到什么意外之财。

所以我要说,真正让我更害怕的资本密集型企业,是公用事业领域之外的那些——你只是不断往里投更多钱,却不知道自己大体上、在某个范围内,能不能得到某种有保障的回报。

所以我们没有——我们不可能靠公用事业投资发大财,但我们也不会因此变穷。而且,我们留在里面的那部分权益资本,能获得一个体面的回报率。

而且不管有没有通货膨胀,我们大概都能获得这样的回报。不过,如果通胀率非常高,通货膨胀可能会削弱获得11%或12%净资产收益率的价值。

所以从这个意义上说,我同意吉姆的看法——顺便说一句,我认识他。他以前在Century 21跟我女儿共事过。他是个优秀的投资者。

但是——总体而言,如果你能找到一门不需要大量资本的好生意,从长期看,你的处境会比投资资本密集型企业更好。

我是说,这样的生意在世上很难找。但最好的企业就是那些不需要太多资本、却依然能赚大钱的企业。

它们有某种护城河来保护自己,而不是靠进入这个行业所需的资本门槛来保护自己。

如果你能找到那些持久的企业,你就拥有了一项出色的投资,而且在通货膨胀中也会表现得最好——正如我们之前提到的,通胀似乎相当可能会到来。

查理?

芒格:是啊,不幸的是,最近很多护城河都被沙子填满了,你知道的,日报、电视台,所有这些拥有美丽护城河的城堡,护城河都在被填平。

31. 巴菲特侄孙的意外求婚

巴菲特:好,说到这个令人高兴的话题,我们还有时间回答最后一个问题。马克·汉堡,我记得你说过有人想来结束这个环节。马克,你在哪儿?

马克·汉堡:在这儿。就在这儿,沃伦。

巴菲特:好,我——我还是看不到你。不过我能听到你。

马克·汉堡:他就在最前面。

巴菲特:就在最前面。好,很好。哦,我现在看到你了。

艾利克斯·罗泽克:嗨,沃伦。我是波士顿的艾利克斯。

我只是想问问,在我们即将离开前,您能否给我们一些关于如何改善经济的建议。

巴菲特:你叫什么名字?

艾利克斯·罗泽克:艾利克斯,来自波士顿。

巴菲特:啊。嗯,显而易见要做的,就是照我们政府说的去做,也就是出去消费。

而且正如我提到的,新家庭的形成对于——对于消化住宅建设中的过度建造很重要。所以——我不知道这是否给了你什么启发。不过……(笑)

艾利克斯·罗泽克:我想是的。

米米,你是我最好的朋友。你愿意做我的妻子吗?(掌声)

米米·克鲁格:愿意?(掌声)

一个声音:米米,你得说愿意啊。

米米·克鲁格:我说了,愿意。愿意!

巴菲特:我只有两——

艾利克斯·罗泽克:谢谢你,沃伦。

巴菲特:好。我有两点要说。艾利克斯是我妹妹多丽丝的孙子,是我的侄孙。米米棒极了。

那么就在这个话题上,我们结束本次会议。15分钟后我们将回来举行董事会会议。谢谢大家。(掌声)

32. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦正式会议开始

巴菲特:好,现在我们将召开年度股东大会。

现在会议正式开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特,本公司董事会主席。欢迎大家参加2009年度股东大会。

首先,除我之外,我要介绍一下今天在场的伯克希尔董事。有查尔斯·芒格。还有霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基欧、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森,以及沃尔特·斯科特。

今天在场的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人,他们是我们的审计师。如果各位对该事务所审计伯克希尔账目的相关工作有适当的问题,他们可以为大家解答。

福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对本次会议过程做书面记录。贝基·阿米克女士被任命为本次会议的监票人。她将对董事选举中的投票计数进行核证。

本次会议指定的代理投票持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

33. 伯克希尔流通股数与法定人数

巴菲特:秘书是否已准备好关于伯克希尔有权投票的流通股数量、以及本次会议出席股数的报告?

福雷斯特·克鲁特:是的,我已准备好。正如随本次会议通知一同寄送给2009年3月4日——即本次会议股权登记日——所有在册股东的委托书声明中所示,伯克希尔·哈撒韦A类普通股流通股共1,057,573股,每股在会议审议的动议中享有一票表决权——

以及伯克希尔·哈撒韦B类普通股流通股共14,749,861股,每股在会议审议的动议中享有1/200票的表决权。

在这些股份中,通过截至4月30日星期四晚间收到的委托书,共有821,400股A类股和10,298,152股B类股在本次会议中获得代表出席。

巴菲特:谢谢。

这一数字已构成法定人数。因此我们将直接进行本次会议。

34. 上次会议记录

巴菲特:第一项议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生发言,他将向本次会议提出一项动议。

沃尔特·斯科特:我提议免于宣读上次股东大会的会议记录,并批准该记录。

巴菲特:有没有附议?

某人:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:动议已经提出并获得附议。有没有任何评论或问题?

我们将以口头表决方式对此问题进行投票。所有赞成的人,请说“赞成”。

某人:赞成。

巴菲特:反对?动议通过。

35. 选举伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事

巴菲特:第一项议程是选举董事。如果在场的股东希望撤回此前提交的委托书并亲自对董事选举进行投票,他或她可以这样做。

另外,如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书,并希望获得一张选票以便亲自投票,也可以这样做。

如果您希望这样做,请向过道上的会议工作人员表明身份,他们会为您提供选票。

请希望领取选票的人士表明身份,以便我们分发选票。

现在我请沃尔特·斯科特先生就董事选举向大会提出一项动议。

沃尔特·斯科特:我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

巴菲特:有没有附议?

某人:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:现已提出并附议,选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

还有没有其他提名?有没有任何讨论?

提名已准备好付诸表决。如果有股东要亲自投票,现在应在董事选举选票上做标记,并将选票交给监票员。

阿米克小姐,等你准备好了,可以做汇报了。

贝基·阿米克:截至上周四晚间收到的委托书中,受托投票人为每位提名人投出的票数不少于859,366票。这一数字——这一数字远远超过了全部A类和B类流通股总票数的多数。

根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证,包括受托投票人根据本次会议上提交的委托书所投的额外票数,以及在本次会议上亲自投出的任何票数,将提交给秘书,与本次会议记录一并存档。

巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克小姐。

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已当选为董事。

36. 关于罗素运动品牌工厂工作条件的股东动议

巴菲特:下一项议程是由伯克希尔股东约瑟夫·彼得罗夫斯基提出的一项动议。

彼得罗夫斯基先生的动议已在委托书说明中列明,要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦为股东准备一份可持续发展报告。董事会建议股东对该提案投反对票。

现在我们请——我想是比伦内斯先生——彼得罗夫斯基先生的代表来陈述这项动议。

为了让所有感兴趣的股东都能表达自己的看法,我将请比伦内斯先生把发言时间限制在五分钟以内。1号区域的麦克风可以使用。好,我们先请比伦内斯先生发言。

西蒙·比伦内斯:非常感谢,巴菲特先生。我叫西蒙·比伦内斯,我代表约瑟夫·彼得罗夫斯基先生,他是提出今年这项决议、要求发布可持续发展报告的股东。

我将提出这项股东决议。诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯(音)小姐随后将附议这项决议。然后我会请求对已投票股份进行初步计票。

作为股东,我们为公司在诸多方面处于领先地位而感到自豪。一个突出的例子就是克拉马斯河上正在兴起的成功故事。这可能会成为美国历史上规模最大的河流修复项目。而且,无论对于太平洋电力公司(PacifiCorp)还是对我们股东来说,这在经济上都是合理的。

然而,在管理环境和人权风险,以及向股东披露这些风险方面,我们的管理层遗憾地是个落后者。

两家受人尊敬的代理投票顾问公司——PROXY Governance和RiskMetrics——都建议股东投票支持这项决议,理由是在向股东披露这些风险方面,管理层大大落后于其他公司。

上周,加州公务员退休基金(CalPERS)宣布,它将以价值近五亿美元的股票投票支持这项决议。

看看今天罗素公司的情况,它是Fruit of the Loom的子公司,也是伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下的公司。经过大学授权的服饰——比如印有大学校徽的运动衫——是一个每年50亿美元的市场。

罗素公司已承认在洪都拉斯多次严重侵犯劳工权益。而现在,包括哈佛大学、斯坦福大学以及整个加州大学系统在内的50多所大学,已决定终止罗素公司使用其校徽制作服装的许可。

我现在举着的这件运动衫,就是北卡罗来纳大学的。它是在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的一家工厂制造的。但这所大学此后已终止了他们的授权协议。

这种做法——罗素公司管理层的所作所为,使50亿美元的潜在业务处于风险之中。伯克希尔·哈撒韦的管理层应当向我们这些公司股东恰当地披露这一风险。

现在,我把发言权交给梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯女士。她是一名缝纫机操作工,曾在洪都拉斯那家处于这些问题中心的工厂工作。等她发言完毕后,我将请求对这项决议进行初步计票。

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:Yo trabajó como operadora de una maquila de costura en la fábrica Jerzees Honduras.

翻译:我曾在Jerzees de Honduras工厂担任缝纫机操作工。

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:En 2006, cuando Fruit de Loom compró la empresa, las condiciones empeoraron.

翻译:2006年,当Fruit of the Loom收购我所在的工厂后,工作条件变得更加恶劣。

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:La empresa empezó hacer acumulación de personal esto para ahorrarse mas y no pagar renta.

翻译:Fruit of the Loom开始整合人员,以便在租金上节省更多开支。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:这给工人们带来了很多健康方面的困扰,比如因为机器挨得太近而导致的背痛,还引发了过热的问题。

翻译:这在工厂里造成了许多导致工人健康问题的状况,比如缝纫机因为空间狭小而紧贴在我们背后,机器散发的热量造成了背痛。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:这意味着在疏散时会存在安全隐患。

翻译:过于拥挤的空间也使得紧急疏散时非常危险。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:在我们的工厂里,通风条件非常差,这使我们患上了肺癌等呼吸系统疾病。

翻译:部分也是因为过度拥挤,通风状况极差,导致了包括肺癌在内的多种呼吸道疾病。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:就连过滤水也是被污染的。

翻译:就连过滤过的水也是脏的。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:我们从早上6点30分工作到晚上5点30分,只有15分钟吃午饭的时间。

翻译:我们从早上6点30分工作到晚上5点30分,只有15分钟的午餐时间。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:我们的工资太低,根本请不起保姆,而公司也不遵守我国的劳动法,因为它没有提供托儿服务。

翻译:我们的工资太低,负担不起托儿费用。而管理层拒绝提供现场托儿服务,尽管这是洪都拉斯法律所要求的。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:正因如此,我们决定组织起来,迫使经理倾听我们的诉求,尊重我们的权利。

翻译:正因为这一切,我们决定组织起来,迫使管理层整顿工厂。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:正是在那时,公司因为我们组织工会而非法解雇了145名工人。

翻译:作为报复,Russell非法解雇了145名组织工会的工人。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:Russell本应依法尊重这个依法成立的工会。可是Russell却说,因为工会的缘故,它要关闭工厂,让我们忍饥挨饿。

翻译:在我们最终依法成立工会之后,Russell表示,因为这个工会,他们要关闭工厂,让工人们挨饿。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:就是从那时起,我们(工会)负责人开始受到死亡威胁。

翻译:也就是从那时起,我们开始收到死亡威胁。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:他们在洗手间和我的工位上留下字条和图画,说要把我的头砍下来。

翻译:他们会在洗手间和我的工位上留下字条和图画,威胁要砍掉我的头。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:最终,Russell说到做到,在今年1月30日关闭了工厂。

翻译:最终,Russell Athletic真的兑现了他们的威胁,在今年1月关闭了工厂。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:Russell声称会帮助我们找到新工作,但实际上却把我们列入黑名单,阻止我们找到新的工作。

翻译:现在,Russell一直声称会帮助我们找新工作。但事实上,他们把我们列入了黑名单,让我们无法在别处找到工作。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:正因如此,许多大学已经终止了与Russell的合同,这也成了这家公司的一个大问题。

翻译:这就是为什么这么多大学已经停止与Russell的业务往来,也是为什么这已经成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的一个大问题。

诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯:因此,我投票支持这项决议,并呼吁各位股东也投票支持。谢谢。

翻译:因此,我附议这项决议,并敦促各位股东投票支持。谢谢。

巴菲特:好的。我想请Fruit of the Loom的首席执行官约翰·霍兰德先生对刚才的发言做出回应,之后我们将对这项动议进行表决。

约翰·霍兰德:首先,我需要先介绍一下背景情况。在我们2006年8月收购Russell之前,它是一家在纽约证券交易所上市的公众公司。此次收购涉及47家工厂,员工略超过14,000人。

在我们开始参与Russell的运营、了解其经营方式,并将其整合进我们的业务体系时,我们发现洪都拉斯的几家工厂存在一些问题。

于是我们——我们承认了这些问题,并立即着手加以纠正。

稍后,我们收到了WRC(工人权益联盟,Workers Rights Consortium)的一封信,信中指出存在一些侵害员工权益的情况,并称有些员工因参与工会活动而被解雇。

我们当时并不知情工会活动的情况。我们对这些侵权行为进行了调查,但认为最好联系一家独立的第三方机构来进行审计。

于是我们联系了公平劳工协会(Fair Labor Association),这是一个全球性组织,由一批企业和美国的顶尖大学联合组成,旨在确保全球范围内工人权益得到遵守。

我们请他们进行审计,他们也确实做了审计。他们表示,经过独立审计,我们被指控的所有侵权行为都并不存在。

但他们确实告诉我们,有两名主管曾对员工使用过一些辱骂性语言,而且也很有可能有一些员工是因为工会活动而被解雇的。

因此,他们给了我们一份清单,列出了他们希望我们遵照执行以纠正问题的事项。相关主管以及工厂管理层都被撤换了。

我们已经立即着手,逐步落实公平劳工协会独立审计报告中的所有建议。

其中一项就是,对于他们认为可能因工会活动而被解雇的工人,我们要予以复职。

当时那家工厂还没有成立工会。因此我们主动与工会接触,承认并接受了这个工会。

我们把所有能够联系到的工人重新雇用,安置在这家工厂对面的一处厂房里。

从那时起,我们遵循了自由劳工协会(Free Labor Association)的所有建议。他们有一套监督流程。

大约三个月后,自由劳工协会和另一家相关组织——工人权利委员会(Workers' Rights Commission)——进行了另一次审计。他们表示,对于我们所做的努力,他们对进展感到非常满意。

正如我之前所说,我们承认了工会,并开始了谈判。他们希望讨论大约48个议题,我们就其中24个达成了一致。

而且——工会方面甚至也承认,我们之间的关系一直很好,我们对待谈判的态度是坦诚公正的。

还有一些议题他们希望提交仲裁——或者说调解——我们无法就此达成一致。

到那时,时间已经推移到2008年年中,服装行业的衰退极大地影响了我们的这项业务。

在随后的几个月里,我们不得不关闭了其中九家工厂。他们提到的Jerzees de Honduras工厂就是其中之一。

工厂关闭涉及的员工总共有12,780人。其中大约310人是工会成员——这一点工会自己也承认——因为在洪都拉斯,根据当地法律,只要有30人就可以组建并被承认为一个工会。

而且,在那之前,工会提出的所有问题都没有出现未能解决的情况。

除此之外,我还想跟大家谈谈我们在全球各地工厂的经营方式。

我们自1993年起就在洪都拉斯开展业务。我们所有的工厂都有空调,通风条件都很好。我们工厂的工资水平平均比洪都拉斯的最低工资标准高出26%。

我们提供11天带薪假日,有带薪休假,有免费的人寿保险,每家工厂都配有医生和护士。

关于过滤水的问题,我们收购那家工厂的时候,那家工厂有自己的过滤系统,这一点和我们其他工厂不一样,我们其他工厂用的是瓶装水。

我们立即对那些水进行了检测。虽然水有些变色,但检测结果显示是纯净的。不过我们还是立即关闭了那套过滤系统,改用了我们在其他工厂使用的瓶装水。

另外,我们提供带薪产假,有哺乳时间,我们会为员工庆祝生日,而且——我们还设有儿童节。

我可以自豪地告诉大家,我认为我们提供的福利,远远超过世界上大多数其他服装工厂所能提供的。

而且,从来没有发生过死亡威胁。我们一直努力以诚实、正直的方式经营我们的业务。

说实话,我在这家公司已经工作了,今年是第48个年头,我可以告诉大家,我为我们经营这些工厂的方式感到非常自豪。

我们与多所知名大学的代表进行了会面,试图说明事情的另一面。我们邀请了这些大学的校长和管理人员亲自来看看我们工厂的实际情况。

上周已经有两所大学接受了邀请,分别是普林斯顿大学和亚利桑那大学的代表。

我们欢迎把这一切都摆在公开的聚光灯下接受检视。我们还有一个网站,网址是www.russellsocialresponsibility.com——我们对公平劳工协会各项建议的所有回应措施,都发布在这个网站上,供全世界查看。

我们还在继续推进——公平劳工协会有一套三步的持续监督流程,他们会定期进行独立审计,以了解我们的进展情况。所有这些信息都发布在那个网站上。谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你,约翰。现在可以对这项动议进行表决了。(掌声)

如果有股东是现场投票,现在请在动议上标注你们的选票,并将选票交给监票人。阿米克女士,准备好之后,请报告结果。

贝姬·阿米克:我已经准备好了。截至上周四晚间收到的委托书中,代理投票人的投票结果是:赞成该动议49,251票,反对该动议702,963票。

由于反对票数超过了所有A类和B类流通股相关票数的多数,该动议未获通过。

依照特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证,将交给秘书归入本次会议记录。

沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克女士。该提案未获通过。

37. 伯克希尔正式会议闭幕

沃伦·巴菲特:在我们休会之前,还有人有其他事项要提交本次会议讨论吗?如果没有,我请斯科特先生提出休会动议。

沃尔特·斯科特:我提议本次会议休会。

沃伦·巴菲特:有人附议吗?休会动议已提出并获得附议。我们将以口头表决方式进行投票。