Annual Meeting股东大会

1995 Annual Meeting1995 年度股东大会

1995 Meeting

Morning session

1. Welcome

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning. I’m Warren Buffett, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. And on my left is Charlie Munger, the vice chairman and my partner. And we’ll try to get him to say a few words at some point in the proceedings. (Laughter)

The format today is going to be just slightly different.

We have one item to — normally, we breeze through the meeting pretty fast, and we’ll do that, but we have one item of business on the preferred stock that I could tell caused some confusion with people. So, I’ll discuss that a little bit.

And if, before the vote on that, anybody would like to talk about the preferred issue, we’ll have any comments or questions at that time. And then we’ll breeze through the rest of the meeting, and then we’ll open it up. And I’ll have one announcement to make then, too.

And then after that, we’ll go for, maybe, close to noon. And feel free, earlier, anybody that would like to leave, you’re free to, obviously, at any time. Better form to do it while Charlie’s talking, as I’ve mentioned. (Laughter) And you’ll have to be quick. (Laughter)

But then we’ll have a break a little before noon for a few minutes, while a more orderly retreat can be conducted. And we’ll have buses outside to take you back to the hotels or to any of the commercial establishments that Berkshire’s involved in.

And then because so many of the — we have people here, at least based on the tickets reserved, from 49 of the 50 states. Only Vermont is absent. We have — but we have Alaska, we have a delegation from every place.

We have people from Australia, Israel, Sweden, France, the U.K., 40-some from Canada. So, a lot of people have come a long way. So, Charlie and I will stick around.

In fact, we’ll eat our lunch right up here. And we will — you don’t want to watch what we eat. The — but the — well, we’ll stick around until perhaps as late as even 3 o’clock, but if the crowd gets below a couple of hundred, then we’ll feel we can cut it off.

But we do want to answer everyone’s questions. You people are part owners of the company. And any question that relates to your ownership of Berkshire, we want to be able to give you a chance to ask.

And it’s tough because of the numbers of people here. I don’t know how many are in the other room. But there’re about 3,300, I believe, in this room. And we want to get to you — to all of you. So, that will come after the meeting.

Now, we’ve got a little business to take care of.

2. Election of directors

WARREN BUFFETT: The meeting will come to order. And I’ll first introduce the directors of Berkshire, in addition to myself. They’re right down here. And if you’ll stand up when I give your name.

Susan T. Buffett (Applause).

Howard Buffett (Applause)

These are names we found in the phone book, you can understand — (Laughter)

Malcolm Chace, III (Applause)

And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause)

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH). They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.

Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. He will certify to the account of votes cast in the election for directors.

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 998,258 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards.

That number of shares represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that we’ll entertain questions you might have.

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting.

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? (Laughter)

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We’ll vote on the motion by voice vote. All of those in favor say, “Aye.”

VOICES: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion is carried. (Laughter)

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 7, 1995, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,177,750 shares of Berkshire common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

Of that number, 998,258 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the two items of business provided for in the proxy statement, he or she may do so.

Also, if any shareholder that’s present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person on these two items, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish two ballots to you, one for each item.

Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so we may distribute them? Just raise your hand and you’ll get one.

The first item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? There any discussion? You’re doing fine. (Laughter)

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election for directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Collect those, please.

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections, a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they’ve received?

Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 996,892 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of shares outstanding.

The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. Have been elected as directors.

3. Motion authorizing preferred stock

WARREN BUFFETT: The second item of business at this meeting is to consider the recommendation of the board of directors to amend the company’s certificate of incorporation.

The proposed amendment would add a provision to the certificate of incorporation authorizing the board of directors to issue up to one million shares of preferred stock in one or more series, with such preferences, limitations, and relative rights as the board of directors may determine.

Now, we discussed this some in the annual report. But I would say — and we’ll find out the exact number — but I think we probably had 11 or 12 — maybe 12,000 or so shares voted against the proposal. And I think we had a couple thousand shares that abstained.

And since there really is no downside to the proposal, that indicated to me that I’d not done a very adequate job of explaining the logic of authorizing the preferred. So, I’d like to discuss that for a minute now.

And I’d also like anybody that would like to ask questions about it, they can do so now. We can talk about it later, too. But if you’d like to do it before the vote, that’d be fine.

The authorization is just that. It’s an authorization. It’s not a command to issue shares. It’s not a directive. It simply gives the directors of the company the ability, in a situation where it makes sense for the company to issue preferred shares, to do so.

Now, when we acquire businesses — and I’ll tell you about one when we’re through with this in a few minutes — when we acquire businesses, sometimes the seller of the business wants cash. Sometimes they would like common stock.

And it’s certainly possible, as one potential seller did last year, that they wanted, in that case, a convertible preferred stock.

Now, from our standpoint, as long as the value of the consideration that we give equates, we really don’t care, aside from a question of tax basis we might obtain, but we —

In other economic respects, we don’t care what form of consideration we use, because we will equate the value of cash, versus a straight preferred, versus a convertible preferred, versus common stock, whatever it may be.

So, if the worry is that we will do something dumb in issuing the preferred stock, you should — that’s a perfectly valid worry. But you should worry just as much we’ll do something dumb in terms of using cash or common stock.

I mean, if we’re going to do something unintelligent, we can do it with a variety of instruments. (Laughter)

And we will not get more licentious in our behavior or anything simply because we have the preferred stock.

And the preferred stock may offer sellers of a business the chance to do a tax-free exchange with us. And they may not want common stock, because they may have an ownership situation where they don’t want to run the risk of common stock ownership. And that’s why our preferred is flexible as to terms.

Because we could give those people a straight preferred with a coupon that made it worth par at the time we issued it. And then they would know what their income would be for the next umpteen years. And that may be of paramount interest to them.

We could issue them an adjustable-rate preferred, which as money market conditions change, would also change its coupon. And then they would be sure of a constant principal value for the rest of their lifetimes. And one or both of those factors could be more important to one seller or another.

So that we simply have more forms of currency available to make acquisitions if we have the ability to issue various forms of preferred. Because a preferred stock, if it’s properly structured, allows for the possibility of a tax-free transaction with a seller. And that’s important to many sellers.

Now, in the end, many sellers will prefer cash, just as in the past. And probably most of the sellers that don’t want cash will want common stock. But we will have a preferred stock available.

We’re only authorizing a million shares because under Delaware law, there’s an annual — I think there’s an annual fee. I know there’s an initial fee. And I think there’s an annual fee that relates to the amount of shares authorized.

So, if we authorized a hundred million shares, we would be paying a larger annual fee, which is something Mr. Munger wouldn’t let me do. (Laughter)

So what we will do, if we issue this, we will issue — undoubtedly, we will issue some sub-shares so that the numbers of shares, for taxation purposes, is relatively limited.

But that we will issue sub-shares to make it easier to make change, essentially, in the market.

We may issue — if the occasion demands — we may issue a convertible preferred. But that convertible preferred would not be worth any more, at the time we issue it, than a straight preferred. We would adjust, in terms of the coupon, and the conversion price, and so on.

So we can equate various forms of currency to fit the desires of the seller of the business. And this is simply one more tool to do it. There’s no downside, like I say, unless we do something stupid.

And if we do something stupid with this, we would do something stupid with cash or whatever. So it —we probably should’ve done this some time ago, but we never had a case of a seller wanting that form of currency before.

And so it just — and we always felt we could get it authorized promptly. But there’s no reason to lose a couple of months, if a transaction is pending, to call a meeting to get this on the books. So, it’s simply one more tool.

And if there are — anybody that has any questions or comments on the preferred, like I say, you can hold them until later, but I’d be glad to have them before we have the vote. Do we have any?

Yeah, there’s a question over there. If you’ll wait just a second, we’ll get a microphone to you.

When you ask questions, now or later, if you’ll give your name and where you live, I’d appreciate it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Dr. Lawrence Wasser. I’m from New York.

My question is this. If you want to buy a business and the people in the business want cash, you have to have cash, cash that — you know, this kind of cash.

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re familiar with it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. (Laughter and applause)

But it strikes me that the preferred isn’t really cash, it’s fiat currency. That is, it’s currency that we can create.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true. It’s like common stock in that respect. It is the — it is a form — it is an alternate form of currency, and — but it is —

Just in terms of common stock, for example, assuming we had enough authorized, we have an unlimited ability to create currency. Now, if we created the wrong price, it dilutes the value of the old currency. But go ahead on.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Until we vote in the affirmative, which I’m sure that this group will probably do because of their confidence in you, but until we vote in the affirmative, it doesn’t exist.

WARREN BUFFETT: That is correct. That would be true, incidentally, with common stock. If we had no more authorized common stock out than we had issued, we have, I think, a million and a half authorized.

But let’s assume that we’d issued all that we had authorized. Until more was authorized by the shareholders, there would — it would not be available to be issued.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But if more were authorized by the shareholders then isn’t it true that the value of the shareholders’ holding would be diluted?

WARREN BUFFETT: Only if we receive less in value than we give. That’s the key to it.

I mean, if we issue $200 million worth of preferred and we receive a business that’s only worth 150 million, there’s no question you’re worse off than before. So are we, incidentally. But we’re all worse off.

The — and that’s true if we give cash that’s worth more for a business than the business is worth. If we give 200 million of cash for a business that’s worth a 150 million, we are worse off. We may not have issued a share of stock. But we have diluted the value of your stock if we do that.

As long as we get value received, in terms of whether — of cash, common stock, or preferred stock — then you are not diluted in terms of value. It’s an important point.

And obviously, a number of companies, as you may have — Charlie and I have commented about in reports and elsewhere — a number of companies, in our opinion, have issued common stock, particularly, which has a value greater than what they receive.

And — when they do that, they are running what I — what John Medlin of the Wachovia called a “chain letter in reverse.” (Laughter)

And that’s cost American shareholders a lot of money. I don’t think it’ll cost them any money at Berkshire. But it’s a perfectly valid worry for shareholders to have.

Because a management can build an empire just by issuing these little pieces of paper, which they feel don’t cost them anything.

I think Charlie had one story about that in the past. You want to comment on that, Charlie? No-names basis, of course. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: There was a particular bank where one of the officers wanted stock options, pointed out to the management that they could issue all these shares and it didn’t cost anything.

Now, imagine hiring a manager who thinks that way and paying them money — (laughter) — to behave like Judas in your very midst.

WARREN BUFFETT: We have had conversations with managers — (laughter) — where they tell us how fortunate they feel because the stock is down and they can issue options cheaper.

Now, if they were issuing those to the third parties, you know, I’m not sure whether they’d have exactly the same attitude.

But we have no feeling that we’re getting richer when we issue shares. We have a feeling we’re getting richer when we get at least as much value in a business as the shares are worth that we issue. And we don’t intend to issue them under any other circumstances. But it’s a perfectly valid worry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second part of the question is that, obviously, with preferred issue, you have a situation where the common shareholder is — moves to the back of the line, as it were.

Why should the common shareholder in this room want to step to the back of the line if he’s at the front of the line now?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it — but it’s also true if we buy a business for cash, and we — let’s say we borrow the money, the bank that we borrow the money from will come ahead of the common shareholder.

There’s no question. Any time you move — you engage in transactions that involve the capital structure, you are changing the potential for each part of the capital structure.

If you issue a lot of common and you’ve got some debt outstanding, you’ve generally improved the position of the debt.

And the question really becomes whether you think that the position of the common shareholder is improved by issuing either preferred stock, or perhaps borrowing a lot of money, to make an acquisition.

I mean, a couple of times in the history of Berkshire, we’ve borrowed money to buy something, to buy a business. And when we do that, we are placing a bank, or an insurance company, or whomever, ahead of the position of the common shareholder. We did that when we issued some debt a few years back.

And there’s a question of weighing whether the common shareholders are going to be better off by borrowing money. But borrowing money is not necessarily at all harmful to shareholders — although certainly, if it’s carried to excess, it is.

And the preferred is a form of quasi-borrowed money that does rank ahead of the common shareholder. But then, at the same time, we’re adding a business which we think is going to benefit the shareholder, if we issue that. So that’s the tradeoff.

Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Matt Zuckerman (PH). I’m from Miami, Florida.

My question is, it seems to me that there’s some requirement for shareholder votes if convertible stock — preferred stock — is issued beyond a certain limit. What are those limits?

WARREN BUFFETT: There are no limits on the conversion term that we might do. But for example, if we were going to issue a convertible preferred — now we have no plans to do it, but it could happen. In fact, it might well happen this year.

The — we would — and the alternative, we’ll say, was giving somebody a hundred million dollars in cash for a business. If we were to issue a straight preferred, we would figure out what a hundred million dollars’ worth of a straight preferred would sell for, what coupon would be necessary.

And that would depend on call provisions and a few things. But for a triple-A credit like Berkshire, you know, it would be somewhere in the area of 7 percent or thereabouts. And then they would have no participation in the upside of the common.

If they wanted something that was sure to maintain its principal value, then you have to issue an adjustable-rate preferred that will keep its value around par.

That preferred might have an initial coupon of, say, 5 percent or something of the sort, because it has the ability to go up or down based on interest rates. But it would always be worth about par.

If we were to issue a convertible preferred, it might have a conversion price of, just to pick a figure, 28,000 or something of the sort, and a coupon well below the coupon on a straight preferred.

And so, whatever we did, they would equate out in our mind as to the value we were giving.

We’re not going to give 120 percent of X if we’re only willing to pay a hundred percent of X, just because the form of a deal changes.

But you may well see us issue, at some point — you may see us issue a convertible preferred. You may see us issue a straight preferred. You may see us issue an adjustable-rate preferred. I hope we do something because I’d like, you know —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. Based on —

WARREN BUFFETT: If we do it, we’ll think we’re better off.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, based on your past performance, I’m sure you’ll get more value than you give.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But in any case, it was my understanding that if the amount of shares issued for a conversion of a convertible issue were greater than 20 percent of the total amount of shares outstanding, then it would require a vote of the stockholders, under Delaware law. I may be wrong.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think it’s a stock exchange rule, isn’t it, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re right about the rule, but —

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a New York Stock Exchange rule.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a New York Stock Exchange rule. That would be $5 billion-plus of deal. And, you know, we would love to make a $5 billion deal, but I don’t think we’re going to do it.

So I would say that the chances of any acquisition being large enough so that it requires a shareholder vote is probably slim.

But it isn’t because we wouldn’t be interested. (Laughter)

And you know, if we have one, we’ll be coming back to you — (laughter) — with the votes already in hand. (Laughter and applause)

Are there any other questions on the preferred? We can talk more about it later, too. I just want to — oh, here we are. Sure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett.

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Raina Di Costiloy (PH) from Chicago. I’m very proud to be here. And I’ve seen you grow so, that pretty soon we’re going to be out in a football field. (Laughter)

I think your explanation was very helpful. Because as I read this, and I’m sure many of the other lay folk, I didn’t understand what you —

WARREN BUFFETT: (Inaudible)

RAYNA DI COSTILOY: — what you were doing. And you mentioned the preferred stock. But in the prospectus, it’s not clear whether it would be the convertible preferred, the straight preferred. And you cleared that, answering a few other questions, but some of the people felt it would dilute their stock.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I should’ve made that clear in the annual report. And I’m glad I’ve had this chance to do it today.

Anything else on the preferred? OK.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You don’t have to come back to the shareholders for a vote, after these shares are authorized, for the terms of it. And you’ve discussed this in terms of buying companies.

My question is, you yourself, through Berkshire Hathaway, own the preferred shares of several companies: Salomon, USAir, American Express.

Do those shareholders have to vote on the terms of the preferred shares that you bought for those companies? Or is that left at the board of directors’ decision level.

WARREN BUFFETT: Those —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you clarify that point?

WARREN BUFFETT: Go — excuse me, go ahead.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you clarify that point, please?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We bought a — I think we’ve probably bought six issues of preferred directly from companies.

And since none of those triggered that New York Stock Exchange rule that we discussed earlier — and they could’ve if they’d been somewhat larger, but they didn’t — none of those deals had to be approved by the shareholders.

I think the only deal we’ve had with a company that had to be approved by the shareholders was when we bought the Cap Cities/ABC stock. Well, we bought early in 1986. I think it was approved by their shareholders in 1985.

But the only situations where it would’ve had to have been approved is if it triggered the New York Stock Exchange rule. And our purchases were not that large that they did that.

Any other questions? Yeah, there’s one more.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dale Vocawitz (PH). I’m from Champagne, Illinois.

A recent issue of Barron’s indicated that it may be possible to issue a best of all possible worlds preferred, that being one where the dividend looks like interest to the issuer and is tax-deductible.

And to the purchaser, it would qualify for the dividends received deduction. Do you think that structure might be possible with these shares?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we haven’t thought about that. I know what you’re talking about on that, but I don’t think it would be possible.

For one thing, I don’t think you probably have a tax-free deal that way. Charlie, do you?

CHARLIE MUNGER: We probably wouldn’t try and be that cute. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve got several quips in mind, but I think I’ll keep them to myself. (Laughter)

My guess is that that form does not work for a long time. I know what you’re talking about on it, but my guess is it doesn’t.

Some companies — then we’ll get on with this — but some companies care about the consideration they give in a deal, whether it’s cash, or preferred, or so on, because they care about the accounting treatment that they get.

They want — they usually want pooling treatment rather than purchase accounting treatment. I won’t get into that here. I know it’s going to disappoint you, but I won’t get into that here. Although I may in the next annual report.

And that is of absolutely no consequence to us. We care not a wit about the accounting treatment that we receive. We feel that we have a shareholder body that’s intelligent enough to understand the economic reality of a transaction.

And that by playing various games, in terms of how we try to structure it, and maybe flow part of the purchase price back through the income statement or anything of the sort, which is done — that’s not something that we care about at all.

We would rather do whatever makes the most sense for us and for the seller, and then explain to you whatever accounting peculiarities may arise out of the transaction. And that probably differentiates us from most companies. And it probably helps us make a deal, occasionally.

Anything else?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — really

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now I can hear you fine.

DALE VOCAWITZ: OK. And I was wondering, will there be any opportunity for shareholders who may find the preferred issue preferable, for any number of reasons, to participate in that?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we issued a preferred and it became actively traded — let’s say it was a company with many shareholders instead of a few. Obviously, that would be something that any new or present shareholder could make a decision on whether they preferred that issue than others.

We could, but have no plans of doing it and I don’t see it happening, we could offer to exchange preferred for present common.

And it’s conceivable a few people would have an interest, but the — most people have self-selected in terms of the kind of security they want to own in terms of owning Berkshire common.

So it’s unlikely they would want to switch into a preferred, because they would — we wouldn’t have a premium of value, it would just be an alternative security.

We could do that, though. I mean, and it would probably be a tax-free deal.

We have no plans of doing that, but it’s something that if we ever thought that enough people might want, we could offer it. But no one would be obliged to take it. It’s a good question.

OK? We’ll move on.

Is there a motion to adopt the board of directors’ recommendation?

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the adoption of the amendment to the fourth article of the certificate of corporation as set forth in exhibit A of the company’s proxy statement for this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion’s been made and seconded to adopt the proposed amendment to certificate of incorporation. Any further discussion?

We are ready to act upon the motion. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election.

Collecting a few there. Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposed amendment voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?

We’ll wait just a second here.

Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready you may give your report.

ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast lot — not less than 928,889 in favor of the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation.

That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. The amendment to the certificate of incorporation as set forth in exhibit A to the proxy statement for this meeting is approved.

After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the businesses of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting.

Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned.

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”

AUDIENCE: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “No.” The meeting is adjourned. (Laughter)

4. Helzberg’s Diamonds acquisition

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I’d like to tell you about one thing that — since the annual report — that some of you probably read about in the papers, but maybe not all of you have heard about.

Just shortly after the annual report was issued, we completed a transaction with Helzberg’s Diamonds, with Barnett Helzberg, who’s here today. Barnett, would you stand up, please? All right. There he is. Give him a hand. (Applause)

You may be interested in how it came about, because Barnett attended two of the last three meetings of Berkshire. He had a few shares in an IRA account, and he was here last year.

And shortly after this meeting, I was back in New York City. And I was crossing the street at 58th Street, right near the Plaza Hotel on 5th Avenue. And a woman said, “Mr. Buffett,” and I turned around.

And she came up, and she said she’d attended the annual meeting last year — or a few days ago — and said that she enjoyed it. And I said, “That’s terrific,” and I started to cross again.

And Barnett had been about 30 or 40 feet away. I didn’t know him, and he had heard this woman. So, he said the same thing. And I turned around. And we shook hands. First time I’d met him, and he said, “You know,” he said, “I might have a business you’d be interested in.”

And I get that all the time, so — (Laughter)

So I said, “Well, why don’t you write me?” And a time went by, and I got a letter from Barnett. And he’d been thinking about doing something with the business his father had started in 1950, and based in Kansas City that whole time. And he’d been exploring various avenues.

But probably, in some part because of his background as Berkshire shareholder, he had some specific interest in the company becoming associated with Berkshire. He cared very much about the company having a permanent home.

He cared very much about it having an environment in which it could grow and be run autonomously and be based in Kansas City. And he wanted to receive something in exchange — that he was happy to own for the rest of his life.

And so, we worked out a transaction shortly — just very shortly after the annual report went to press.

And so now Berkshire, as of 12:01, I guess, yesterday morning, the deal closed. There’s this waiting period because of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and a few other things.

The transaction closed. And now Berkshire is the owner of Helzberg’s Diamonds, which has roughly 150 stores around, perhaps, 26 or 27 states. I’m not sure the exact number. And mostly in malls, although some others. It’s been enormously successful.

Barnett brought in Jeff Comment, who formerly ran Wanamaker’s about eight years ago, I guess it is.

And the company has both expanded in its traditional format — it’s gone with a new format recently, which has been very successful.

It is — in its position in the jewelry industry, it tends to compete with a Zales or Gordon’s, but it does a far, far better job.

Their sales, per store, on roughly equivalent square footage, will be very close to double what competitors achieve.

It’s got a magnificent morale, and organizational structure. And the people — Barnett was very generous with people in making the sale. He took it out of his own pocket to treat people right because they’d done such a terrific job over the years.

And I think you’ll see Helzberg’s become a very big factor in Berkshire over time. And it just shows you what can come out of these annual meetings. So, the rest of you, you know, do your stuff. (Laughter)

So anyway, that is an acquisition that was made for — largely for common stock. It did not involve preferred, and — because Barnett preferred common.

And — but different people have different needs. And sometimes there’s a group of shareholders that can have different priorities. And that’s the reason we want to have various currencies.

If we had not been able to use common stock, we would not have made this transaction, because Barnett has been in no hurry to write a large check to the government. And we can help him in that respect with a common stock deal.

So anyway, we’re glad to have Helzberg’s become part of Berkshire. I wouldn’t be surprised if we have another announcement or two in the next year before we have the next meeting. I hope so. But there’s no guarantees.

5. Buffetts on the board adds stability

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re going to turn the meeting open for questions. We’ll do it as we’ve done before. We’ve got this room divided into six zones. And if you will raise your hand, the monitor in that — in your zone will recognize you. And we’ll keep going around.

We will not go to a second person in any zone until we’ve exhausted all those who have yet to ask their first question. We have — we also have a zone in the overflow room. So, there’ll be a total of seven.

And we’ll just keep going around, if you’ll identify yourself, please. And we’ll be delighted to answer your questions. And the more, the better. So, we’ll start with zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Fred Elfell Jr. (PH) from Sacramento, California.

And I wanted to ask if you could elaborate upon the logic of adding two family members to the board of trustees?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s terrific for family harmony, just to start with. (Laughter)

The — as I’ve talked about in the annual report, the — if I die tonight, you know, my stock goes to my wife, who is a member of the board of directors.

And she will own that stock until her death, when it will go to a foundation. So, there is a desire to have as long a term and permanent ownership structure as can really be done, in terms of planning, and the tax laws, and so on.

I mean, I — we have invited people like Helzberg’s to join in with Berkshire into what we think is a particularly advantageous way for them to conduct a business and to know the future that they’re joining.

And part of knowing the future that they’re joining involves knowing that the ownership is stable. And it will be stable for a very long period of time in Berkshire, probably about as long as you can — anybody can plan for in this world.

After my death, the family would not be involved in the management of the business, but they’d be involved in the ownership of the business.

And you would have a very large concentrated ownership position, going well on into the foundation, that would care very much about having the best management structure in place.

And to, in effect, prepare for that over time, I think it’s very advisable that family members who will not be involved in management, but who will have a key ownership role to play, become more and more familiar with the business and the philosophy behind it.

I discussed that some in the — I guess, it was the 1993 annual report, because I think it’s important that you understand.

And anybody that wants to sell us a business — if you’ve built a business since 1915, and you care enormously about it, and you care about the people that you’ve developed, but you’ve got something else you want to do in life, it’s more than, you know, advertising your car in the paper to sell it.

I mean, it is an important — a very important transaction to you. Not just in terms of how much money you receive, but in terms of who you deliver thousands of people that have joined you — who you deliver them to.

And I think we have a structure that is about as good as you can do. Nothing is forever.

But we have a structure that’s about as good as you can do, in terms of people knowing what they’re getting into when they make a deal with us and being able to count on the conditions that prevail at the time of the deal, continuing for a long period in the future.

Many people — I had a fellow tell me the other day about a business where he’d been wooed by the acquirer. And, you know, the day after the deal, they came in and fired the top half-dozen people. They had a secret plan all along. Well, I don’t think you run into much of that.

But what you do run into is the company that’s the acquiring company, itself, either being acquired or some new management coming along, or some new management consultant coming along, and saying, “Well, this doesn’t fit our strategic plan anymore, so let’s dump this division.”

And people that join in with Berkshire can be relatively, I think, comfortable about nothing like that happening.

Charlie, you want to elaborate on —

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I was hoping Charlie would have a near-life experience this morning. (Laughter)

Keep encouraging him.

6. No comment on Kerkorian’s Chrysler bid

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Jim Lichty (PH) from Des Moines. I’m interested in, like, Chrysler. Can you make a comment on the Chrysler Corporation? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I don’t think I can make a comment on Chrysler. (Laughter)

I think Salomon Brothers, incidentally, has been retained by them. We have nothing to do with it. Charlie and I — I read that in the paper.

And Charlie and I are not familiar with — normally — with investment banking arrangements at Salomon.

But it has been in the paper that Salomon’s involved with that. We have no involvement.

Charlie, you’re not interested in commenting on the question? No? (Laughter)

Try him on something else.

7. Managers need to know “money costs money”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Jim Vardaman (PH) from Jackson, Mississippi.

In describing the — your allocation of capital to your wholly-owned subsidiaries, you wrote in the annual report that, quote, you “charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release,” end quote.

How do you determine this high rate, and how do they determine how much capital they can release?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we try to do with those — the question’s about incentive arrangements we have with managers or other situations, where we either advance capital to a wholly-owned subsidiary or withdraw it — usually, that ties in with the compensation plan.

And we want our managers to understand just how highly we do value capital. And we feel there’s nothing that creates a better understanding than to charge them for it.

So, we have different arrangements. Sometimes it’s based a little on the history of the company. It may be based a little bit on the industry. It may be based on interest rates at the time that we first draw it up.

We have arrangements depending on the — on those variables and perhaps some others and perhaps just, you know, how we felt the day we drew it up, that range between 14 percent and 20 percent, in terms of capital advanced.

And sometimes we have an arrangement where, if it’s a seasonal business where, for a few months of the year, when they have a seasonal requirement, we give it to them very cheap at LIBOR.

But, if they use more capital over — beyond that, we start saying, “Well, that’s permanent capital,” so we charge them considerably more.

Now, if we buy a business that’s using a couple hundred million of capital, and we work out a bonus arrangement, and the manager figures out a way to do the business with less capital, we may credit him at a very high rate — same rate we would use in charging him — in terms of his bonus arrangement.

So, we believe in managers knowing that money costs money. And I would say that, just generally, my experience in business is that most managers, when using their own money, understand that money costs money.

But sometimes managers, when using other people’s money, start thinking of it a little bit like free money. And that’s a habit we don’t want to encourage around Berkshire.

We — by sticking these rates on capital, we are telling the people who run our business how much capital is worth to us.

And I think that’s a useful guideline, in terms of the decisions they’re making, because we don’t make very many decisions about our operating business. We make very, very few. I don’t see capital budgets, in most cases, from our hundred percent-owned subsidiaries.

And if I don’t see them, no one else sees them. I mean, we have no staff at headquarters looking at this kind of thing.

We give them great responsibility on it. But we do want them to know how we calibrate the use of capital. And so far, I would say, it’s really worked quite well.

Our managers don’t mind being measured, and they like getting a — I think they enjoy seeing a batting average posted. And a batting average that does not include a cost of capital is a phony batting average.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: And his name isn’t even Buffett. I mean — (Laughter)

8. The two reasons for buying insurance

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name’s Dave Lancasam (PH) with Business Insurance Magazine.

The sum of property-casualty risk management experts are advising commercial insurance buyers to forge five- and 10-year policies with their property-casualty insurers to promote stronger partnerships with their insurers, as well as to maintain the smooth PC market of the past seven, eight years.

Do you believe this idea will take hold for most policyholders? And if so, what would be the implications for policyholders’ costs and insurers’ underwriting results?

WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about partnerships between, probably, commercial policyholders and their insurers. And there are a lot of ways of doing that by various retrospective plans or adjustable rates of various sorts, and self-insured retentions, and that sort of thing.

As a general matter, there are only two reasons for buying insurance. One is to protect yourself against a loss that you are unable or unwilling to bear yourself. And that is partly a — an objective decision. It’s partly subjective.

For example, a manager that’s terribly worried that his board of directors may second-guess him if he has an uninsured loss, is going to buy a lot more protection, probably, than the company really needs.

But he knows he’s never going to have to go in front of his board of directors and say, “We just had a million-dollar fire loss.”

And then the next question the director asks is, “Was it insured?” And then he doesn’t want to answer no.

So, he may do something that is very unintelligent from the company’s standpoint merely to protect his own position.

But the reason for buying insurance is, whether — and this is true of life insurance, it’s true of property-casualty, it’s true of personal insurance, it’s true of commercial insurance — is to protect against losses that you’re unwilling or unable to bear yourself.

Or the second reason, which occasionally comes up, is if you think the insurance company is actually selling you a policy that’s too cheap, so that you really expect, over a period of time, to have a mathematical advantage by buying insurance.

Well, we try to avoid selling the second kind and to concentrate on selling the first kind.

And we think any company we can sell insurance to — and of course, we — much of the insurance we sell is to other insurance companies. I mean, we are a reinsurer, in very large part.

We are selling them insurance against a loss that they are either unable or unwilling to sustain.

And a typical case, you know, might be a company that had a lot of homeowners policies in California. And if those include earthquake coverage, they may not be able to sustain the kind of loss that is possible, even though they want to keep a distribution system in place that merchandises en masse to homeowners in California.

So, we will write a policy. They may take the first 5 million of loss, they may take the first 50 million of loss — depends on their own capabilities — but then they come to us.

And we are really uniquely situated to take care of problems that no else — that the companies can’t bear themselves and that they can’t find anybody else to insure.

But we really don’t want to insure someone for a loss that they can afford themselves, because if we’re doing that it may because they’re dumb. But it may be because they also have a loss expectancy that’s higher than the premium we’re charging, which is not what we’re trying to do in business.

I think that — I think probably, as compared to 30 years ago, that risk managers at corporations are probably more intelligent about the way they buy their insurance than many years ago. I think it’s become a — I think they’re more sophisticated and they’ve thought it through better.

But there’s a lot of insurance — there’s some — there’s a fair amount of insurance bought that doesn’t make sense. And there’s a fair amount of insurance that isn’t bought that should be bought.

There are certain companies that are exposing themselves in this country to losses which would wipe them out. And they prefer not to buy reinsurance because it’s, quote, “expensive.” But what they’re really doing is betting on something that won’t happen very often, happening not at all.

And if you take a huge hurricane on Long Island or you take a major quake in California, there are a number of companies that are not — that have not positioned themselves to withstand those losses.

And if you’re a 63-year-old CEO and you figure, “I’m going to retire in a couple of years,” you know, the odds are pretty good that it won’t happen on your watch.

But the — it will happen on somebody’s watch. And we try to sell reinsurance to those people. And usually, we do. But sometimes we don’t.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. (Laughter)

9. “We can sustain shocks … that others can’t”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 5.

He’s saving himself. He’ll be dynamite when he gets going. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stephenson (PH). I’m a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia. My question involves the company’s catastrophe lines of insurance.

It seems that there’s a relative ease of entry into that business through Bermuda-based companies and others. And given the importance of that business to the overall company, I’m curious how the ease of entry into the business affects its long-term competitive position and its rates of return?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re very right, there is an ease of entry into the catastrophe business. And, you know, it’s sort of attractive for — it’s particularly attractive for promoters.

Because if you start an insurance company to write earthquake insurance in California and you raise a few hundred million dollars, you’ll either have essentially have no losses or, if you write enough of it, you’ll go broke. And most years, you’ll have no losses.

So, if your intention is to sell your stock publicly in a year or two, that — the odds are very good that you will have a beautiful record for a couple of years. And you can sell.

And, you know, maybe one time out of ten, you’ll go broke. And nine times out of ten, you’ll sell to somebody else who will eventually go broke.

And it — there is — there’s real ease of entry. The only thing that may restrict that is that if the buyer is sophisticated enough to question the viability of that company under really extreme conditions, which is the only conditions that count when you’re buying catastrophe insurance, that may restrict it.

The second thing is, of course, none of the people that have started up can offer anywhere near the amount of coverage that Berkshire has. Berkshire is really one of a kind in terms of its capital strength in the business.

I’m — I don’t think any money in Bermuda that I can remember — I don’t think Ajit’s out there. But I don’t think anybody has a billion of net worth. And you know, we have — at present, we probably have close to 13 billion of net worth and considerably more of value.

So we can sustain shocks, and we will sustain shocks, I should add, that others can’t. And we try to get paid appropriately for that.

But when we say we can take a billion-dollar loss, we can take a billion-dollar loss. And we will have a billion-dollar loss at some point.

And anyone buying it knows we can take it, or something greater. And they should know that very few other — very few of our competitors can. So, there’s competition.

We do an unusual proportion of our business with the eight or ten largest insurance — reinsurance companies and insurance companies in the world. So, we really have established with the people who understand the real risks of the business.

They come to Berkshire and — a lot more often than they stop in Bermuda, because they know that we’ll pay. And they’ve been around long enough to know that, in the end, that’s what really counts with an insurance company.

If the rates — if there were enough capacity at really ridiculous rates, I mean, in the end, we wouldn’t be writing that business at that time. But I don’t think that will happen. It certainly hasn’t happened so far. And if it happens, you know, so be it. We’ll all play golf until the loss occurs.

Charlie? (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

10. Graham’s principles for high-tech stocks?

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? Or did we do — yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chairmen, most company Berkshire invest at this time are not high in — are not in high-technology sector. What we have seen in the last few years, that there seems to be a significant growth, both in sales and earnings of the high-technology area.

And also, what invest — what U.S. shareholder believe that the times are changing from a brand name to high-technology.

My question is, can someone apply your investment principle, business philosophy, and your discipline in life to build a portfolio of, say, five or six high-technology company? Let’s call it Berkshire Hathaway Technology Fund? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it would sell. (Laughter)

The question about — Charlie and I won’t be able to do it. We — Charlie probably understands high-tech. But you can see how hard it is to get any information out of him. So — (laughter) — he hasn’t told me yet.

We try not to get into things we — that we don’t understand. And if we’re going to lose your money, we want to be able to come before you, you know, next year and tell you we lost your money because we thought this and it turned out to be that.

We don’t want to say, you know, somebody wrote us a report saying if, you know, “This is what’s going to happen,” in some field that we don’t understand and that, therefore, we lost your money by following someone else’s advice. So, we won’t do it ourselves.

At — I think that the principles — I think Ben Graham’s principles — are perfectly valid when applied to high-tech companies. It’s that we don’t know how to do it, but that doesn’t mean somebody else doesn’t know how to do it.

My guess is that if Bill Gates were thinking about some company in an arena that he understood and that I didn’t understand, he would apply much the same way of thinking about the investment decision that I would. He would just understand the business.

I might think I understand Coca-Cola or Gillette. And he may have a — he may have the ability to understand a lot of other businesses that seems as clear to him as Coke or Gillette would seem to me.

I think once he identified those, he would apply pretty much the same yardsticks in deciding how to act.

I think he would act — I think he would have a margin of safety principle that might be a little different because there’s essentially more risk in a high-tech company. But he would still have the margin of safety principle on a — sort of adjusted for the mathematical risk of loss in his mind.

He would have — he would look at it as a business, not as a stock.

You know, he would not buy it on borrowed money. I mean, it — a bunch of principles would be carried through.

But our circle of things we understand is really unlikely to enlarge, maybe a tiny bit here or there. But if the capital doesn’t get too large, the circle’s OK.

And — but we will not —if we have trouble finding things within our circle, we will not enlarge the circle. You know, we’ll wait. That’s our approach.

11. USAir: “You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it”

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, how are we set up for Zone 7? Can we do it out — yeah, here we are.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are you there? Hi, I’m Susie Taylor (PH) from Lincoln, Nebraska.

By way of explaining — we wrote down the value of USAir, reflecting our investment’s current market value.

You had a good explanation in your report as to why the economics of the business are unattractive. And I presume, given the choice, we wouldn’t do it over again.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s a fair assumption. (Laughter)

I should mention, anybody wanted to ask about USAir, we put them in the other room, just so you’ll know why. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And then the second part is better.

WARREN BUFFETT: But I’m watching you. I can see you on the monitor. (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And quoting from your profound statement, “You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wouldn’t it be a good idea to put that 89 million in something you are really behind as opposed to USAir?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question. Because it is true that a very important principle in investing is you don’t have to make it back the way you lost it. And in fact, it’s usually a mistake to make — try and make it back the way that you lost it.

And we have — when we write our — an investment down, as we did with USAir at 89 million, we probably think it’s worth something more than that. But we tend to want to be on the conservative side. But it’s worth a whole lot less than we paid.

And the nature of that preferred, as well as other private issues we’ve bought, usually makes it quite difficult to sell. That’s one of the things we know going in.

When we bought preferred, some people thought that we were getting unusually favorable terms. I haven’t heard from them lately on USAir, but — (Laughter)

But one of the considerations in that is that, if you buy a hundred shares of a preferred that’s being offered through a securities firm, from the same issuer, you can sell it tomorrow. And we are restricted, in some ways legally, and in other ways simply by the way that markets work, from disposing of holdings like that.

And we know that there’s an extra cost involved to us if we should try to sell, or it may be impossible.

And that’s not of great importance with us because we don’t buy things to sell, but it’s of some importance.

And we are not in the same position owning our Series A preferred of USAir as we would be if we bought a thousand shares or 5,000 shares of the Series B preferred, I believe it is, that trades on the New York Stock Exchange. That would be very saleable.

And our preferred could well even be saleable at a price modestly above what we carry it for, but it would require — it would not be very easy to do.

It might — if it were do — if we went about to do it, we could probably — assuming we could do it at all — we could probably get a little more money for it.

But it would not be easy to do, partly because of legal restrictions. Charlie and I are on the board. That complicates things.

We always know something that, just by being on the board, that the public doesn’t know. So, that complicates things.

And in the end, we usually find that dealing with anything where we’ve got fiduciary obligations is, maybe, not practical at all. And if it is, it’s probably more trouble than it’s worth.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s certainly been an interesting experience, the USAir experience. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Is that it, Charlie? OK. No, he —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d like to repeat that business about not having to get it back the way you lost it. You know, that’s the reason so many people are ruined by gambling.

They get behind and then they feel they have to get it back the way they lost it. It’s a deep part of the human nature.

And it’s very smart just to lick it by will, and little phrases like that are very useful.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, one of the important things in stocks is that the stock does not know that you own it. You know, you have all these feelings about it. You know, and — (laughter) — you remember what you paid, you know? (Laughter)

You remember who told you about it. All these little things, you know?

And it — you know, it doesn’t give a damn, you know? (Laughter)

It just sits there. And it — you know, a stock at 50, somebody’s paid a hundred, they feel terrible. Somebody else paid 10, they feel wonderful. All these feelings, and it has no impact whatsoever.

And so, it’s — as Charlie says, gambling is the classic example. Someone builds a business over years. You know, that, they know how to do.

And then they go out some place and get into a mathematically disadvantageous game. Start losing it and they think they’ve got to make it back, not only the way they lost it, but that night. And — (laughter) it’s a great mistake.

12. Beware of complicated fads and “high priests”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Donald Stone. I’m from Riverside, Connecticut. I’m — this is my second shareholders meeting, ever, at age 61. So, I’m really very privileged to be here.

My first was Coca-Cola a week and a half ago. And there were only 200 people there. I’m trying to figure this out. (Laughter)

I think the rule is that the number of people present is in direct proportion to the price of the shares.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case, we won’t split. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.

Prefatory comment to my question: the November 24th, 1994 issue of Fortune Magazine had an article, a featured article, entitled “America’s Greatest Wealth Builders,” dealing with the concepts of market value added and economic value added.

It was with great glee that I noticed that Coca-Cola was number two on that list, second only to General Electric, and that Coca-Cola had done twice as well as Pepsi-Cola, number nine on the list, with one-third as much capitalization.

My question is this: whether the concept of market value added and economic value added, as such, or any of its variants, is a concept that’s applicable and useful to Berkshire Hathaway as a whole, or in analyzing its line of business segments?

I’d really like to hear from Charlie Munger on this first. (Laughter) Because I’ve heard —

WARREN BUFFETT: So would I. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve heard —

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve heard that he’s thought a lot about this particular subject.

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: If Warren is using economic value added exactly the way they’re now teaching it in the business schools, he hasn’t told me.

Obviously, the concept has some merit in it. But the exact formal methods, I don’t believe we use.

Warren, are you using this stuff secretly?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — (laughter) — in a sense, they’re trying to get at the same thing we do. Or we’re trying to get at the same thing they do. But I think it’s — A, I think it has some flaws in it.

Although I think it generally comes out with the right answers, it sort of forces itself to come out with the right answers.

But I really don’t think you need that sort of thing. I mean, I do not think it’s that complicated to figure out, you know, where it makes sense to put money. You can make mistakes doing it. But in terms of the mental manipulations you go through, I don’t think it’s a very complicated subject.

And I don’t think that — I think that the people marketing one or another fad in management tend to make them a little more complicated than needed so that you have to call in the high priest.

And, you know, it — if all that really counts is the Ten Commandments, you know, it’s very tough on religious counselors and everything. (Laughs)

It doesn’t take — it just doesn’t make it complicated enough.

And I think there’s some of that in — quite a bit of that — in management consulting and in the books that you see and all of that, that come out.

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s way less silly than the capital assets pricing model. So that, at least academia’s improving. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Really, yeah. The capital asset pricing model, which is — I don’t know how much it’s used now. Certainly — you know, they had these great waves of popularity. You get that in management. You get it in investing. I mean, real estate, you know, may have been popular, or international.

I — you can read Pensions & Investment magazine, which is a pretty good magazine. But you can just see these fads sort of going through. And then they have seminars on them and everything. And, you know, the investment bankers create product to satisfy the demand.

And there’re these fads in management — I mean, obviously, listening to your customer and things like that, I mean, that is — nothing makes more sense. But it’s hard to write a 300-page book that just says, “Listen to your customer.” (Laughter)

And, you know, that’s one of the things I liked about Graham’s book. I mean, you know, he wrote — everything he wrote sort of made sense. He didn’t sort of get into all the frills and try and make it more complicated than it really, truly is.

You know, I really didn’t need to read the November issue — 1994 issue of Fortune — to know that Coca-Cola had added a lot of value. (Laughter)

We added about 4 billion-some of value to Berkshire. That’s good enough for me. (Laughter)

13. Derivatives: “Potential for mistakes and mischief”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Maurus Spence from Omaha, Nebraska. I have a two-part question on derivatives.

Does Berkshire Hathaway currently, or had they in the past, engaged in strategies involving derivatives?

If so, do you as CEO, fully understand these financial instruments? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Whoever suggested that crazy notion? (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Finally, would Charlie care — you or Charlie — care to comment on the use of these by other financial institutions?

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about derivatives — the reason I inject that remark — in a Fortune article that all of you should read if you haven’t, I suggested that the use of derivatives would be dramatically reduced if the CEO had to say in the report whether he understood them or not, and — (Laughter)

The answer to your question, though, is we have two types, I guess it would be, of derivative transactions, of very modest size. But that doesn’t mean we wouldn’t — if the conditions were right, we either wouldn’t have them on a much greater scale now, or we wouldn’t have done it in the past.

We have two types of transactions, and I do understand them. And there are times when there are things that we would want to do — not often — but there would be times when they could be best accomplished by a transaction involving a derivative security. And we wouldn’t hesitate to do so.

We would obviously care very much about the counterparty, because that transaction is just a little piece of paper between two people. And it’s going to cause one of the two to have to do something painful at the end of the period, usually, which is to write a check to the other person.

And therefore, you want to be sure that that person will be both willing and able to write the check. And so, we’re probably more concerned about counterparty risk than most people might be.

Last year and the year before, I think I said that derivatives often combine borrowed money with ignorance, and that that is a rather dangerous combination. And I think that we’ve seen some of that in the last year.

When you can engage in, sort of, non-physical transactions that involve hundreds of millions, or billions, or tens of billions of dollars, as long as you can get some party on the other side to accept your signature, that really has — that has the potential for a lot of mistakes and mischief.

And if you’ve looked at the formulas involved in some, particularly I guess, interest rate-type derivative instruments, it is really hard to conceive of how any business purpose could be solved by the creation of those instruments.

I mean, they essentially had a huge, really, gambling element to them.

And I use that in the terms of engaging in a risk that doesn’t even need to be created, as opposed to speculative aspects. They involved a creation of risk, not the transfer of risk, you know, not the moderation of risk, but the creation of risk on a huge scale.

And it may be fortunate that in the last year, half a dozen or so cases of people that have gotten into trouble on them have come out because it — that may tend to moderate the troubles of the future.

The potential is huge. I mean, you can do things in the derivative markets —

Well, I’ve used this example before, but in borrowing money on securities, the Federal Reserve of the U.S. Government decided many decades ago that society had an interest in limiting the degree to which people could use borrowed money in buying securities.

They had the example of the 1920s, with what was 10 percent margin. That was regarded as contributing to the Great Crash.

So, the government, through the Fed, established margin requirements and said, “I don’t care if you’re John D. Rockefeller,” you know, “You’re going to have to put up 50 percent of the cost of buying your General Motors stock,” or whatever it may be.

And they said that maybe Mr. Rockefeller doesn’t need that, but society needs that. They don’t — we don’t want a bunch of people on thin margins gambling, you know, essentially, in shares, where the ripple effects can cause all kinds of problems for society.

And that’s still a law. But it means nothing anymore because various derivative instruments have made 10 percent margins of the 1920s, you know, look like what a small-town banker in Nebraska would regard as conservative, compared to what goes on.

So, it’s been an interesting history. You know, like I say, perhaps the experiences of the last year — they’ve got everybody focused on derivatives. Nobody knows exactly what to do about them.

Berkshire Hathaway will — if we think something makes sense and Charlie and I understand it — we may find ways to use them to what we think will be our advantage.

Charlie, you want to add anything on that?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I disapprove even more than you do, which is hard.

If I were running the world, we wouldn’t have options exchanges. The derivative transactions would be about 5 percent of what they are. And the complexity of the contracts would go way down. The clearing systems would be tougher.

I think the world has gone a little bonkers. And I’m very happy that I’m not so located in life that I have to be an apologist for it.

You know, a lot of these people, I feel sorry for them. You know, they had great banks. And they have to go before people, sometimes even including their children and friends, and argue that these things are wonderful.

14. Salomon’s murky future

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m John Nugier (PH) from Kingsburg, California. And my question relates to Salomon.

And where — I’m just asking if you could take us out the next two or three years in your vision. It started out as a good investment. You got a good return on it, or your interest.

And it’s clearly had some problems. And we have gotten in deeper and deeper as those problems have continued. And it doesn’t look like it’s superbright.

So, it — you must understand where it’s going. But could you just give us where you see it going in the next two or three years?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, no, I think it’s very difficult to forecast where Salomon or, really, almost any major investment bank, slash, trading house will do over actually the next two or three months, let alone the next two or three years.

The nature of that business is obviously far more volatile than the blade and razor business. Now the — and the tough part is assessing over a longer period of time whether — because of volatility, it’s much harder to assess whether — what the average returns might be from a business.

And the answer is, Charlie and I, probably, if we were to try and write the forecast for the next two or three years, we would not have a high — a feeling that we had a high probability of being able to predict what that company, or other companies in that industry either, would earn three years out or would probably have in the way of average earnings.

Our own commitment is to a $700 million preferred issue, which has five redemption dates starting in October 31st of this year and then every year thereafter.

On those dates, we can either take cash or stock. And that’s an advantage, obviously, to have an option. Any time you have an option in this world, it’s to an advantage — it’s to your advantage.

It may be a very small advantage, but it’s — giving options is generally a mistake, and accepting options is usually a good idea, if it doesn’t cost you anything.

And we will — the other thing about options is you don’t make a decision on them until you have to make a decision. But — so, we, in addition to that $700 million of preferred, which in our view is a hundred percent money-good — I mean, we’d like to own more of that.

But we also have about 6 million-odd shares of common, which we paid perhaps $48 a share for, or something in that area. In any event, considerably more than the present market of 35 or ’6. So, we have a loss of probably 80 or $90 million, or some number like that, at market in the common.

The preferred has actually treated us fine. We’ve received $63 million a year.

Incidentally, by owning the amount of common we own, this probably isn’t generally known, but — or recognized — if you own 20 percent of the voting power of a company, you have a somewhat different dividends-received credit. You have somewhat different tax treatment than if you own less than 20 percent.

So, until we own that common, we paid somewhat more tax on our preferred dividend than we now pay. It’s not a huge item, but it’s not immaterial, either.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree, it’s hard to forecast what’s going to happen in the big investment banking, dash — slash, trading houses.

I would like to say that Berkshire Hathaway was a large customer of Salomon long before we bought the preferred, and that we’ve had marvelous service over the years.

I think Salomon’s going to be around for a long time, rendering very good service to various clients.

WARREN BUFFETT: We sold —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Satisfied clients.

WARREN BUFFETT: We sold our first debt issue of Berkshire, I think, in 1973, through Salomon. So, we’ve had an investing banking relationship for 21 or 22 years there. And actually, we’d done business with them before that in various other ways. So, it’s a long-term relationship.

But there’s no question about Salomon being around. The question — and that’s why our preferred is absolutely money-good.

But the question is what the average return on capital will be. And we knew that was difficult to predict when we went in. And we found out it’s even more difficult to predict than we thought.

15. Honoring mutual fund pioneer Phil Carret

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for the opportunity. Dick Jensen (PH) from Omaha, a fellow Nebraska University supporter.

A rather convoluted question: very interested in your recent purchase and your future intention of American Express. And as I understand the company, I know it’s a rather involved and complicated and rather expansive company, insofar as it has its interest in many areas.

I know one of which, of course, is the credit card. But there’s also the major part of the organization of IDS and others that I don’t even know about.

And I wondered, what your hopes are for that investment.

And I also, just recently, as perhaps you have, became curious to know if you are personally acquainted with Mr. Phil Carret, I believe, his name is. And how about the purchase of his firm in your future? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Dick, I think Phil Carret is here today. Phil?

CHARLIE MUNGER: He’s right back there.

WARREN BUFFETT: Phil, would you stand up? There he is. (Applause)

Give him a hand.

Phil is 98. I first met him in 1952, 43 years ago. He attends every eclipse around the world. And you can run into him in some very strange places.

Wrote his first book on securities, I believe, in 1924. I — am I right on that, Phil? Yeah.

And wrote an autobiography here, recently.

Probably the greatest long-term investment record in this country’s history. And — but I think — I, you know, my impression is that Phil sold part, or a good bit, of Pioneer some years ago, which he managed for decades, many decades.

In fact, I first learned about Phil when I was leafing through Moody’s Banks and Financial Manual 40-odd years ago, and I saw this company with this great record and with some securities that looked terribly interesting.

So, we got in touch. And he was out in Omaha and we got acquainted. It — so, anybody that can get Phil to talk to them, listen carefully. I advise that.

16. Cards are key to future of American Express

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about American Express: we own just under 10 percent of American Express. And obviously, even though you mentioned they’re in a number of businesses, the — by far, the key, the most important factor in American Express’s future for a good many years to come — a great many years to come — will be the credit card.

And that is a business that has become, and will forever, probably, become ever more competitive. I mean, I followed it since — I think I met Ralph Schneider at the Diners Club in the late 1950s.

And American Express entered into the credit card business out of fear. I mean, they were worried about what the credit card was going to do to their traveler’s check business. Traveler’s check business had been originated back in 1890-something, I believe.

And that was, in turn, building off of the old express business where, I think, it was Henry Wells and William Fargo, they would chain themselves to the express boxes as they delivered them through the — to the West.

And they decided that maybe issuing traveler’s checks would a little easier — (laughter) — than carrying all this stuff around.

So, that — the traveler’s check was the — evolved out of the express business.

And the credit card business with American Express arose out of fear of what — particularly Diners Club at the time. They were all terrified of Diners Club, which got this — got the jump on everybody.

And they became enormously successful with it. And the American Express card, as you know, had a terribly strong position in what they called the “travel and entertainment” part of the card business.

And of course, the banks entered in on a big scale. And Visa’s been enormously successful.

So, the card has a strong franchise in certain areas, like the corporate card. Although people like First Bank System are very aggressive in going after them there.

The card — but the card has a significant franchise, but it does not have the breadth of franchise that it had many years ago.

For a while, it was “the” card. And now it’s “the” card in certain areas, but nothing like as broad an area as before.

It has certain, very important, advantages and economic strengths and it has some weaknesses. And you have to suss those, in deciding where it’ll be in the year 2000 or 2005.

And we think that the management of American Express thinks well about the question of how to — how you keep the card special in certain situations. And they’ve reacted to the merchant backlash for higher discount fees, I think, in an intelligent way.

So, we’ll see how it all plays out. But the key — IDS, which has now been renamed, but is a very big part of American Express — it accounts for close to a third of their earnings — but the real key will be how the card does over time.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

17. “Corruption won” in stock option accounting rule

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Philip King (PH) from San Francisco.

And my question has to do with how the FASB has caved in on the stock option proposal.

And the people opposed to the proposal argue that it would hurt capital formation for companies and that the cost of stock options is already reflected in shares outstanding, in fully diluted calculations.

And I was curious, what is your feelings about what’s happened?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as those of you have followed this issue — FASB did cave, and they were — they hated it. I mean, they knew they were right. Matter of fact, most of the, what are now, I guess, the big six auditing firms, many years ago, sided with the position.

But in my opinion, the auditing firms caved to their clients, in that respect.

In terms of capital formation, I would argue that the most intelligent form of capital formation follows from the most accurate form of accounting.

I mean, it — if all the companies with — whose names began with A through M didn’t have to count depreciation and all the ones with N through Z did, or something, you know, that might help in capital formation for companies that were — had names with A thru M. And incidentally, they probably all change their names.

But I don’t think that bad accounting is an aid to capital formation. In fact, I think probably over time, it distorts capital formation.

Because if we were to pay all of the shareholders with — I mean, all of the people who worked for Berkshire Hathaway — in stock, and therefore record no wage expense, you know, we might be able to sucker in a bunch of people who thought the earnings were real.

But that would not be a great step forward for capital formation, in my view.

I really think that — you know, I’ve talked privately to a number of managers about this. And they understand it. But they, you know, they prefer the present situation. And they used a lot of muscle in Washington many years ago.

And I think I have this authenticated now. This fellow — mathematics professor — sent me some material after I’d written this. I try to get a little proof after the fact when I can.

I believe it was in the Indiana legislature, where a legislator introduced a bill to change the value of pi, the mathematical symbol pi, to three. Because he said that it was too difficult for the schoolchildren to work with this — (laughter) — complicated 3.14159.

And he was right. I mean, it was difficult. And I — and Congress, in connection with the stock option question, received all kinds of pressure to, in turn, pressure FASB and the SEC to not count stock option costs as part of compensation.

I’ve never met anybody that wanted to be compensated that felt that, if he received his present salary plus an option, he was not getting compensated more than if he just received a salary. So, he thought it was compensation.

And I will tell you that if we’d been issuing options over a period of time at Berkshire for things unrelated to the performance of the entire business, that we would’ve had a cost, perhaps measuring in the billions of dollars, whether it was recorded or not.

So, it goes back to Bishop Berkeley’s question of whether a tree that falls in the forest and doesn’t make a sound, you know, when — et cetera.

But it — I think it is — I really think that it makes you a bit of a cynic about American business when you see the extent to which a group has pressured — even to the extent of talking about financial — withdrawing financial support from the Financial Accounting Standards Board — the degree to which they’ve pressured people to make sure the value of pi stays at three instead of 3.14, simply because it was their own ox that was being gored a bit.

In any event, it’s — it looks like it’s all over now for some time. In fact, now they’re pressuring them to even weaken further the standards that have been set. So, self-interest is alive and well in corporate America.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think dishonor won. And I think that — I think it is quite important for a civilization to have sound engineering and good accounting.

And it is a very regrettable episode, leading politicians — leading venture capitalists.

I think to some extent, it’s an indictment of the educational system, that this thing could be so widely looked at, and so wrongly.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s bad enough people want to cheat on their accounting. And they do cheat on their accounting. But to want it to be endorsed as the system —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

WARREN BUFFETT: — is really kind of disgusting.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, corruption won.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, put us down on undecided on that and we’ll move on to zone 6. (Laughter)

18. Why there’s no video of Berkshire meetings

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, Mike Lee-Chin from Hamilton, Ontario.

Could you consider availing a videotape of this meeting to us, the shareholders?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t quite get that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Would you consider availing this videotape of the shareholder — this particular shareholder meeting to us, the shareholders?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Distributing a videotape?

WARREN BUFFETT: A transcript or a videotape?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve had that suggested a number of times. It’s a good suggestion, and we’ve considered it.

The thing we’re worried about, in connection with that, is discouraging attendance.

I mean, it — (laughter) — we’d hate to have two people here asking questions and then send it out to tens of thousands. So — (laughter) — in the end —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Particularly if it might make sales go down at the jewelry store.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter and applause)

Since we were just attacking hypocrisy in American business, Charlie felt like he should add that to my comments. (Laughter)

But we — it’s a close call on that because we would like everybody —

Of course, we try to cover a great many subjects in the annual report. But we like the idea of the meeting — answering a lot of shareholders questions.

We don’t want to discourage attendance. And it’s fun to have everybody come in and ask questions.

And the chances are, if we had far fewer people, we would have, you know, far more — far fewer — good questions. So that the quality of the meeting is enhanced, I think, by having a lot of people come.

But you’ve come a long way, so I can understand why you might be interested in a transcript. (Laughs)

I apprentice that. Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — or no. Is that a yes or a no?

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a no.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a no.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Most everything we say is a no. But we have various ways of getting there. (Laughter)

19. Berkshire meetings boost Borsheims’ sales

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 7 from the other room, I can see you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.

I was wondering if you could tell us what the sales at Borsheims were yesterday and how it compared to a year ago?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can tell you how it compared to a year ago. They were 15 percent above a year ago. And a year ago it was 40-odd percent above the year before. And I forget how much that was before.

So, we keep setting records. But we haven’t announced any numbers. But it’s a pretty good size number. You’re a sporty crowd.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. (Laughter)

20. An “idiot” could successfully run Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Patrick Terhune from Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

And first of all, I see, per your request, there are a lot of people who wore red in honor of the Cornhuskers. (Applause)

Of course, my team was the — or is the Miami Hurricanes. And I’ve got my green and orange on under my clothes. So — but if we were to lose, I’m glad we lost to Nebraska and Tom Osborne.

I’ve got a request for Warren and Charlie, and that is, recognizing that the value, both intrinsic and extrinsic, of Berkshire Hathaway, is the result of your combined skills in acquiring growth companies and with your prudent and expert investing of the company’s capital for growth, I’d like to know if you have a plan — a succession plan — to be executed in the event, God forbid, something happens to one or both of you, which would remove your input to the strategic decisions.

I sincerely hope you’re in the process of developing individuals to carry forward your collective visions and to manage the company’s resources as effectively and as profitably as is being done now.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I appreciate that question. And the answer is, obviously, we do care enormously about that because both Charlie and I — in addition to a lot of other reasons, but in — we both have a very significant percentage of our net worth in Berkshire.

And neither one of us has figured out how to sell it all exactly, you know, 15 minutes before we get hit by a truck. So, we will not have the jump on the rest of you.

And therefore, our continuing interest will go — financially — will go well, well beyond our deaths.

And it will — in terms of foundations or something like that, it will go to organizations that we care very much about having maximum resources available to.

So, we do have some plans. We don’t name names or anything of the sort.

It’s not quite as tough as you might think because we have a collection of fabulous businesses. Some of them owned totally, some of them owned in part.

And I don’t think razor blade sales or Coca-Cola sales are going to fall off dramatically the day Charlie or I die. It — we’ve got some great businesses. And then same is true of the wholly-owned businesses.

So the question is more that of allocating capital in the future. And you know, that’s a problem for Charlie and me right now, simply because of the size with — it’s not easy to find things to do that make sense with lots of money.

And sometimes a year will go by and we don’t find anything. And other times a year goes by, and we think we found something, but it turns out we were wrong.

So, it’s not easy. But we think we will have some very smart people working on that.

And we don’t think it will be the end of the world if they don’t find anything the first year, because the businesses will run very well.

We have a big advantage in that, as contrasted to virtually almost every other company, we, now and in the future, are willing — eager — to buy parts of wonderful businesses or all of them.

I mean, most managements have a — most investors are limited to buying parts of businesses. And most managers, psychologically, are geared to owning all of something that they can run themselves.

We — you know, it’s like, I think Woody Allen said some years ago, the advantage of being bisexual is it doubles your chances of a date on Saturday night. (Laughter)

And we can go either direction, in that respect. (Laughter)

And our successors will also. So very — Charlie, you want to add anything?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think few business operations have ever been constructed to require so little continuing intelligence in corporate headquarters. (Laughter)

An idiot who was willing just to sit here would have a very good record long after the present incumbents were dead.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s true.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think it would be a little better if Warren would keep alive, in terms of allocating the new capital. I don’t think we’ll easily replace Warren.

But, you know, we don’t have to keep getting rich at the same rate we have in the past. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a tie vote. (Laughter)

21. Decisions so obvious that exact numbers aren’t needed

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, this —

WARREN BUFFETT: (Inaudible)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Keith Briar from San Francisco.

I have a question. When you’re valuing the companies and you discount back the future earnings that you talk about, how many years out do you generally go? And if you don’t go out a general number of years, how do you arrive at that time period?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question. And it’s — I mean, it’s the heart of investing or buying businesses, which we regard as the same thing, but —

And it is the framework in which we operate. I mean, we are trying to look at businesses in terms of what kind of cash can they produce, if we’re buying all of them, or will they produce, if we’re buying part of them. And there’s a difference. And then at what discount rate do we bring it back.

And I think your question was how far out do we look, and all that.

Despite the fact that we can define that in a very kind of simple and direct equation, you know, we are — we’ve never actually sat down and written out a set of numbers to relate that equation.

We do it in our heads, in a way, obviously. I mean, that’s what it’s all about.

But there is no piece of paper. And we never — there never was a piece of paper that shows what our calculation on Helzberg’s or See’s Candy or The Buffalo News was, in that respect.

So, it would be attaching a little more scientific quality to our analysis than there really is, if I gave you some gobbledygook about, “Well, we do it for 18 years and stick a terminal value on and do all of this.”

We are sitting in the office thinking about that question with each business or each investment. And we have discount rates, in a general way, in mind.

But we really like the decision to be obvious enough to us that it doesn’t require making a detailed calculation.

And it’s the framework. But it’s not applied in the sense that we actually fill in all the variables.

Is that a fair way of stating it, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Berkshire is being run the way Thomas Hunt Morgan, the great Nobel laureate, ran the biology department at Caltech.

He banned the Friden calculator, which was the computer of that era. And people said, “How can you do this? Every place else in Caltech, we have Friden calculators going everywhere.”

SYNC VIDEO TO PARAGRAPH

And he said, “Well, we’re picking up these great nuggets of gold just by organized common sense, and resources are short, and we’re not going to resort to any damn placer mining as long as we can pick up these major aggregations of gold.”

That’s the way Berkshire works. And I hope the placer mining era will never come.

Somebody once subpoenaed our staffing papers on some acquisition. And of course, not only did we not have any staffing papers, we didn’t have any staff. (Laughter and applause)

22. “Something will happen” and we want to be ready

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Morrow (PH) from Laguna Beach, California. And the question I have to ask pertains to the issuance of the new stock.

And again, as Charles mentioned, is there some potential gold mine out there that you have specifically in mind with the — some large acquisition that you have specifically in mind at this time, without revealing any strategic secrets?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There are things we would like to do. Whether we ever get a chance to do them or not is another question. But you know, I will be surprised if, in the next five years, we haven’t used some preferred stock one time or another.

As I mentioned in the report, we had one last year that if we’d done it, it would’ve involved the issuance of maybe a billion dollars’ worth of — no, more than that, I’m sorry — a couple billion dollars’ worth of preferred.

That one isn’t going to happen, in my view. I mean, it — there’s one chance in a hundred it’ll — it could happen or something of the sort — but, probably, it isn’t going to happen.

On the other hand, we want to be prepared for it. Something will happen. That’s always been our experience.

You know, we have sat through some dry spells. And this is true in both the stock market and the acquisition business.

You know, I closed up the partnership in 1969 because there was nothing that made sense to do. And I’m glad I did because that situation prevailed in ’71 and ’2.

But in 1973 and ’4, you know, there were all kinds of things to do.

And that will happen from time to time. People will behave, particularly in markets, just as foolishly in the future as they have in the past. It’ll come at unexpected times. But we will get a chance to do something.

Now, that’s more of a cash-type purchase, obviously, in the market. But we will get a chance to use the preferred.

And we will try to think about big things. We may not find them. But Charlie and I, the larger something is, the more interested we are.

23. Big assets make float more flexible

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jim Moss (PH) from Los Angeles.

I was reading through your annual report. And to me, an eye-popping number in there was the amount of float in 1994, at a cost of less than zero — I think it was $3 billion.

And I was wondering if there are any restrictions on your investment of that money, or can that go into your marketable equity securities?

WARREN BUFFETT: The question relates to — we have that long table we put in — we introduced about four years ago or so in the annual report, that shows the amount of float and the cost of float.

And that’s a very important table. It — in terms of our operating businesses, that’s probably the most important piece of information in the report.

And that float is, as you noted, well over $3 billion now — last year, because of various favorable factors, including the fact that our super-cat business was favorable, but also, because our other insurance businesses did very well — amazingly well.

The cost of that float, which is money that we’re holding that eventually — does not belong to us, but will go to somebody else. The cost of that float was less than zero, and that is a very valuable asset.

And the question is, how much flexibility we have in investing that, which I think was the core of your question.

The answer is we have a lot of flexibility. We are not disadvantaged by that money being in float, as opposed to equity, really, in any significant way.

Now, if we had a very limited amount of equity and a very large amount of float, we would impose a lot of restrictions on ourselves as to how we would do it, because we would want to be very sure that we were in a position to distribute that float, in effect, to policyholders, or claimants, or whatever it may be at the time that was appropriate.

But we have so much net worth that, in effect, that float is just about as useful to us as equity money. And that means quite useful. It’s a big asset of Berkshire’s.

24. Not feeling threatened by Beardstown Ladies

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, we’ve got zone 5.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Susan Scott (PH) from Madison, Wisconsin.

On a more serious note, are you beginning to feel threatened by the success of the Beardstown Ladies? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Which lady?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I —

WARREN BUFFETT: Which lady was that? I —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t get it.

WARREN BUFFETT: I got everything except what lady that was.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The Beardstown Ladies, the investment group?

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, that group. Yeah, the best-seller. Yeah. I have not read that book. I hate to admit that to an audience of shareholders, that I —

This is a book that’s — I think it’s probably number, I don’t know, seven or eight or something like that on the Times best-seller list, and been up there for a couple of months now.

It’s a group — an investment group — that, apparently, is sharing with the world their secrets of success.

I’m always suspicious of people when they’re sharing with the world any great ideas on investments. But we are not threatened at the moment, no. (Laughter)

25. Economics of the moat and the castle

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

WARREN BUFFETT: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City.

In the mistake du jour section of the annual report, you mentioned a fundamental rule of economics that you missed. I’d like to know the two or three most important fundamental rules of economics you habitually get right.

In other words, what are the fundamental rules of economics you used to make money for Berkshire?

And I’m not talking about Ben Graham’s principles here, but rather, rules of economics which may be found in an economics textbook. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: We — Yeah, we try to — I mean, we try to follow Ben’s principles, in terms of the attitude we bring toward both investing and in buying businesses.

But the most important thing you can — you know, what we’re trying to do is we’re trying to find a business with a wide and long-lasting moat around it, surround — protecting a terrific economic castle with an honest lord in charge of the castle.

And in essence, that’s what business is all about. I mean, you want to be the lord of the castle, yourself. In which case, you don’t worry about that last factor.

But what you’re trying to — what we’re trying to find is a business that, for one reason or another — it can be because it’s the low-cost producer in some area, it can be because it has a natural franchise because of surface capabilities, it could be because of its position in the consumers’ mind, it can be because of a technological advantage, or any kind of reason at all, that it has this moat around it.

And then our — then what we have to decide is — all moats are subject to attack in a capitalistic system, so everybody is going to try and — if you’ve got a big castle in there, people are going to be trying to figure out how to get to it.

And what we have to decide — and most moats aren’t worth a damn in, you know, in capitalism. I mean, that’s the nature of it. And it’s a constructive thing that that’s the case.

But we are trying to figure out what is keeping — why is that castle still standing? And what’s going to keep it standing or cause it not to be standing five, 10, 20 years from now. What are the key factors? And how permanent are they? How much do they depend on the genius of the lord in the castle?

And then if we feel good about the moat, then we try to figure out whether, you know, the lord is going to try to take it all for himself, whether he’s likely to do something stupid with the proceeds, et cetera. But that’s the way we look at businesses.

Charlie, you want to add anything?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think he wants it translated into the ordinary terms of economics. The honest lord is low agency cost. That’s the word in economics.

And the microeconomic business advantages are, by and large, advantages of scale — scale of market dominance, which can be a retailer that just has huge advantages in terms of buying cheaper and enjoying higher sales per square foot.

So you’re — by and large, you’re talking economies of scale. You can have scale of intelligence. In other words, you can have a lord with enough extra intelligence that he has a big advantage. So you’re — by and large, you’re talking scale advantages and low agency costs.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, to some extent, Charlie and I try and distinguish between businesses where you have to have been smart once and businesses where you have to stay smart.

And, I mean, retailing is a good case of a business where you have to stay smart.

But you can — you are under attack all of the time. People are in your store. If you’re doing something successful, they’re in your store the next day trying to figure out what it is about your success that they can transplant and maybe add a little something on in their own situation. So, you cannot coast in retailing.

There are other businesses where you only have to be smart once, at least for a very long time. There was once a southern publisher who was doing very well with his newspaper. And someone asked him the secret of his success. And he said monopoly and nepotism. (Laughter)

And I mean, he wasn’t so dumb. I mean, he didn’t have any illusions about himself.

And if you had a big network of television affiliates station 30 years ago, there’s still a major difference between good management and bad management. I mean, a major difference.

But you could be a terrible manager and make a fortune, basically. Because the one decision to own the network TV affiliate overcame almost any deficiency that existed from that point forward.

And that would not be true if you were the first one to come up with some concept in retailing or something of the sort. I mean, you would have to be out there defending it every day.

Ideally, you know, is you want terrific management at a terrific business. And that’s what we look for.

But as we pointed out in the past, if you have to choose between the two, get a terrific business.

Charlie, any more?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

26. Compliments for Helzbergs of Kansas City

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, zone 7, I believe is next?

VOICE: No questions from zone 7.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. How about zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Paul Miller (PH) from Kansas City.

First, I’d like to comment on your purchase of Kansas City-based Helzberg Jewelers. You commented about Barnett Helzberg and his — what he’s done, retailing-wise.

For those of us in Kansas City, you’ve also picked up Barnett and Shirley Helzberg, who are the first family in philanthropy in Kansas City.

And for the shareholders in this room, the Helzbergs are wonderful people. And to have them added to this group of companies says miles about Warren Buffett and that they pick companies based upon their management and their people.

So, kudos to Berkshire Hathaway for picking up the Helzbergs, and thanks to the Helzbergs for everything they’ve done to Kansas City. Now, my — (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Appreciate that. (Applause)

27. Putting a value on the subsidiaries

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question relates to value. We can look in the annual report, and we can all see the purchase of a Washington Post, for instance, for $10 million that has a value today of 420 million.

But discerning the value of the other consortium of non-publicly traded businesses, the Nebraska Furniture Marts, the Borsheims, et cetera — the value of their purchase price over the years versus their value today, how can we understand that value and how is it reflected in the annual reports?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we try to — that’s a good question. We try to give you the information that we would want in answering that question, in the annual report.

Part of it, we do in those pages where we say it’s not according to GAAP accounting. But there’s a lot of useful information in there.

We’re not — we don’t stick a number on each company. But we try to give you enough information about the capital employ, the margins, and all of that sort of thing on the bigger businesses that you can make estimates that are probably just about as good as ours.

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I would not need more information than is in the report to come up with a pretty good idea of what the controlled businesses are worth. And there’s no information we’re holding back that we think would be of any real importance in evaluating those businesses.

But you’re right, it’s a lot easier with marketable securities than it is — at least in terms of current numbers — than it is with the wholly-owned businesses.

The wholly-owned businesses, generally speaking, some of them are worth a whole lot more than we’ve — than they’re carried on the books for. And we feel pretty good about, essentially, all of them.

But they’re — they’ve turned out remarkably well, I would say that, over the years. And my guess is that they keep working pretty well.

We have managers in a number of those businesses here. I’m not going to introduce them all because we have so many that it would take a considerable period of time.

But you named The Washington Post. In the front row there, close to the front row, we have Don Keough, would you step up, of Coca-Cola? (Applause)

And we have Kay Graham for the Post. (Applause)

And Tom Murphy from Cap Cities. (Applause)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Is Paul Hazen here, too?

WARREN BUFFETT: And I’m going to try and do — well, there’s a whole bunch more. I don’t want to get — but I — but those three were sitting together and I was struck by the fact that if — those three combined, we have about 6 1/2 billion of profit in, so far. (Laughs)

So, I would say that that’s a — (Applause) —

Those are three businesses that have been fantastic. And like — I emphasize “so far” because we’d like to be able to name a bigger number in the future.

But we have a group of managers, both at the controlled companies and at the partly-owned companies, that have just created incredible value for Berkshire.

I mean, Charlie and I sit around and read the paper every day and a lot of magazines and things, watch OJ Simpson or whatever it may be. (Laughter)

And these people are out there creating a ton of value for us. So, we’re not going to change it. That —

28. Salomon Brothers culture clash

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, let’s see. I think, zone — is it zone 2 now? Or is it — yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Tim Palmer (PH) from Dillon, Colorado. I have a question for you regarding Salomon.

In the past week, there’s been an article in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and I believe it’s Businessweek, that were rather unflattering, as far as what’s going on with the management and your selection. There seems to be a — somewhat of a cultural clash there.

I don’t know that to be a fact. But I wondered, number one, how you keep yourself open to bad news before it’s news.

And what is going on in Salomon there, the compensation plan, et cetera? How do you think that, culturally, is going to work out?

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are always — we’re more interested in bad news, always, than good news. We figure good news takes care of itself. And one — we only give a couple of instructions to people when they go to work for us.

And one of them is to think like an owner. And the second one is to just tell us the bad news immediately, because good news takes care of itself. And we can take bad news, but we don’t like bad news late.

So, I would say, in connection with Salomon, that there is, and has been, some culture clash. And there probably almost always would be a culture clash in a business where there is that amount of tension.

Whether it be the entertainment business, or the investment banking business, or the sports business, there’s going to be a certain amount of tension when — between compensation to the people that work there and compensation to the owners.

And I think there’s been some — that strain has existed at Salomon from the day I was first there and far before that. I mean, I — that was no surprise. It’s understandable.

You’re seeing a tension, actually, in the airline business between the people that work there and capital. And it’s produced terrible results in the airline business. And the people that work there have been able to — and I’m not talking about USAir specifically, although that’s a case. But it goes beyond that.

They have had contracts, which were, as I pointed out in the report, were executed in an earlier age, which, essentially, will not allow — in many cases — capital to receive any compensation. And that produces a lot of tension.

You don’t have contracts like that in the investment banking business or Wall Street, generally. But you have that same sort of tension.

And changing a culture around, A, takes time and, B, probably takes some change in people. I mean, I don’t think that’s a great surprise if you expect to do it.

I have — I don’t think you can find two better people than Bob Denham and Deryck Maughan. They’re smart, they’re high-grade, they’re willing to work very hard. And there will be people that buy into the arrangements they want to have. And there are people that won’t.

Not all of the people that have left, by a long shot, are leaving of their own volition, but most of them are. But some aren’t. I mean, there — Salomon lost a lot of money last year. And many of the people that have left were not responsible for some of those losses, but some of the people were.

So, that is not something where you announce names in the paper. But some people are leaving because they can make more money elsewhere. And some people are, maybe, leaving because we think we can make more money without them. (Laughter)

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t think the tensions that have been commented on within Salomon are all that unusual. I think they pretty well exist everywhere on Wall Street. And even in the banks, which have tried to imitate Wall Street. I just think it comes with the territory.

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know what percentage of the Goldman Sachs partners left this year, but they had tensions that were produced, obviously, when they had a bad year. And they’re going to have a bad year from time to time. Everyone’s going to have a bad year.

But it — the partners — the general partners — of Goldman Sachs, in the year ended November 30th, 1994, did not do well. They may have not done anything at all. And they’d made some very big money in prior years. And they’ll probably make some very big money in subsequent years.

But in the year when they didn’t make any money, it was a lot of turnover. And maybe some of that turnover, also, was not all at the volition of the general partners that you read about leaving. I don’t know the facts in that case.

But there’s a certain amount of tension that exists in Wall Street under any circumstances. And when you aren’t making money, there’s a lot of tension.

29. Best edition of Ben Graham’s “Security Analysis”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. My name is Michael Johnson. I’m a native to Omaha, and however, my family and I are Americans living abroad in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

My question is related to intrinsic value and Ben Graham’s “Security Analysis.”

I read a book earlier this year by Janet Lowe, who said that you were more toward the first or second editions of “Security Analysis” and not so much toward the fourth.

Yet, the fourth edition seemed to move more toward growth and value being kind of joined at the hip, like you’ve said in your last few annual reports.

And so, if I’m a person who’s always studying security analysis like I do — I think I spend more time with that — do you think I need to get those first editions? Or is the fourth edition kind of more of what you’ve moved toward, with your comments such as value and growth are joined at the hip?

WARREN BUFFETT: Janet Lowe is here, incidentally, today. She wrote a very good book on Ben Graham. I recommend that any of you that haven’t read it, go out and buy a copy.

The — I still prefer the — I think the second edition is cheaper to buy than the first edition, by some margin. And I think it’s basically the same book. So, I — that’s the one I would recommend. I — it isn’t because of differences on value and growth.

I just think that the reasoning is better and more consistent throughout the second edition, which is really the last one that Ben was the hundred percent — along with Dave Dodd helping him in various ways — was responsible for writing.

So, I think that the book has gotten away, to quite an extent, from both Graham’s thinking and from his way of expressing himself. So I really — but I have no quarrel with anybody that wants to read later editions at all.

I do think, probably, the second edition, if you’re a real student of security analysis and you read and understand that, you’ll — you should do all right.

In terms of — a lot of the mistakes that were made, in terms of junk bonds and accounting and all of that sort of thing, were covered in 1934 in that first edition, and subsequently in 1940 in the second edition. There’s a lot of meat in there.

Later on, you know — I must admit, I didn’t read the last edition as carefully as the earlier ones. But it struck me, it was — it — what was said was not as important and it wasn’t said as well. And it was more expensive. (Laughter)

Charlie, you have any thoughts on that?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

30. Why Berkshire doesn’t sell businesses

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Jeff Peskin (PH) from New York City.

And I was — I have a question on the annual report where you say that, obviously, going forward, due to the size of Berkshire, the returns going forward probably won’t match the returns of the past.

And then you go on to state that one thing that may hinder that is the fact that you don’t really like to sell companies that you own.

And I would just like to know what the reasoning is in that, if you’ve got a company or investment that you don’t think is going to do as well as where you can put the money going forward. What really the reasoning is for holding on and not redeploying the money elsewhere?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll just correct you just slightly. A, I didn’t say we’d probably do worse than the past. I said we will do worse than the past. I mean, there’s no way we can match percentage numbers of the past.

That, you know, we would — in a period that would not take that long, we would — assuming we paid out nothing — we would gobble up the whole GDP, which is something we may think about, occasionally, but — (laughter) — we don’t really expect to accomplish. The —

But — and the second point, that relates to size. That does not relate to our unwillingness to sell businesses, because that unwillingness has existed for decades. But the size has not existed for decades.

The size is — you know, doubling 12 billion or so is harder than doubling 1 billion-2, which was harder than doubling 120 million. I mean, there’s no question about that.

So, eventually — well, already it will be a drag on performance. It doesn’t mean that the performance will be terrible, but it does mean that 23 percent is an historical figure. It has no predictive value.

The unwillingness to sell businesses, like I say, goes back a long way. That is not what — that —

If that hurts performance, it’s peanuts. That’s simply a fact — a function of the attitude Charlie and I have, is that if we want to live our lives, we find it a rarity when we find people in the business that we want to associate with. When we do find that, we enjoy it.

We don’t see any reason to make an extra half a percent a year or 1 percent a year — don’t try us on higher numbers. But the — (laughter) — we don’t see a reason to go around ending friendships we have with people, or contact, or relationships. It just doesn’t make any sense to us. It —

We don’t want to get committed to that sort of activity. We know we wouldn’t do it if we were a private company.

Now, in Berkshire, we feel we’ve enunciated that position. We want to get that across to everybody who might join with us because we don’t want them to expect us to do it.

We want them to expect us to work hard to get a decent result, and to make sure that the shareholders get the same result we get, and all of that sort of thing.

But we don’t want to enter into any implicit contract with our fellow shareholders that will cause us to have to behave in a way that we really don’t want to behave.

If that’s the price of making more money, it’s a price we don’t want to pay.

There’s other things we forgo also, but that is the one that people might disagree with us on. So, we want to be very sure that everybody understands that, going in. That’s part of what you buy here.

And it may — I don’t think it’ll hurt performance that much anyway. But to the extent that it does, it’s a limitation you get with us.

Charlie? (Applause)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think there’s any way to measure it, exactly. But my guess is that, if you could appraise something you might call the character of the people that are running the operating businesses in Berkshire, many of whom helped create the businesses in the first place, and are leading citizens in their community, like the Helzbergs —

I don’t think there’s any other corporation in America that has done as well as we have, if you measure the human quality of the people who are in it.

Now, you can say we’ve collected high-grade people because we sure as hell couldn’t create them. But one way or another, this is a remarkable system. And why would we tinker with it?

WARREN BUFFETT: If you want to — (applause) — attract high-grade people, you probably ought to try and behave pretty well yourself.

I mean it’s just — besides, it wouldn’t be any fun doing the other. I mean, it — I was in that position, a little bit, when I ran the partnership back in the ’60s.

And I really — you know, people were coming into partnership with me. And my job was to turn out the best return that we could. And I found that if I got into a business, that presented certain alternatives that I didn’t like. So, Berkshire’s much more satisfactory in that respect.

31. Focus on Graham’s three principles

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Rankin (PH), Fort Collins, Colorado. Thanks for having us.

In the book, “Warren Buffett Way,” the author describes the capital growth model that you’ve used to evaluate intrinsic value in common stock purchases.

My question is, do you also still use the formula Ben Graham described in “The Intelligent Investor,” that uses evaluating anticipated growth, but also book value?

It seems to me that fair value is always a bit higher when using Mr. Graham’s formula than the stream of cash discounted back to present value that is in “Warren Buffett Way” and also that you’ve alluded to in annual reports.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve tried to put in the annual report pretty much how we approach securities. And book value is not a consideration — virtually, not a consideration at all.

And the best businesses, by definition, are going to be businesses that earn very high returns on capital employed over time. So, by nature, if we want to own good businesses, we’re going to own things that have relatively little capital employed compared to our purchase price.

That would not have been Ben Graham’s approach. But Ben Graham was — Ben was not working with very large sums of money. And he would not have argued with this approach, he just would’ve said his was easier. And it is easier, perhaps, when you’re working with small amounts of money.

My friend Walter Schloss has hewed much more toward the kind of securities that Ben would’ve selected. But he’s worked with smaller amounts of money. He has an absolutely sensational record. And it’s not surprising to me at all. I mean, when Walter left Graham-Newman, I would’ve expected him to do well.

But I don’t look at the primary message, from our standpoint, of Graham, really, as being in that — in anything to do with formulas. In other words, there’s three important aspects to it.

You know, one is your attitude toward the stock market. That’s covered in chapter eight of “The Intelligent Investor.” I mean, if you’ve got that attitude toward the market, you start ahead of 99 percent of all people who are operating in the market. So, you have an enormous advantage.

Second principle is the margin of safety, which again, gives you an enormous edge, and actually has applicability far beyond just the investment world.

And then the third is just looking at stocks as businesses, which gives you an entirely different view than most people that are in the market.

And with those three sort of philosophical benchmarks, the exact — the evaluation technique you use is not really that important. Because you’re not going to go way off the track, whether you use Walter’s approach — Walter Schloss’s — or mine, or whatever.

Phil Carret has a slightly different approach. But it’s got those three cornerstones to it, I will guarantee. And believe me, he’s done very well.

Charlie?

32. Don’t believe projections

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. To the extent that the method of estimating future cash flow requires projections, I would say that projections, while they’re logically required by the circumstances, on average, do more harm than good in America.

Most of them are put together by people who have an interest in a particular outcome. And the subconscious bias that goes into the process, and its apparent precision, make it — makes it some — well, it’s fatuous, or dishonorable, or foolish, or what have you.

Mark Twain used to say a mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar. And a projection prepared in America by anybody with a commission, or an executive trying to justify a particular course of action, will frequently be a lie.

It’s not a deliberate lie, in most cases. The man has gotten to believe it himself. And that’s the worst kind.

So, I don’t think we should — projections are to be handled with great care, particular when somebody has an interest in misleading you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I, I think it’s fair to say, we’ve never looked at a projection in connection with either a security we’ve bought or a business we’ve bought. We’ve had them offered to us in great quantities.

Now, the fact that we voluntarily turn them away when people try to thrust them upon us — I mean, it — the very fact that they are prepared so meticulously by the people who are selling the businesses, or by the executives who are presenting to their boards and all of that sort of thing, you know, I mean, either we’re wrong or they’re wrong.

It’s a ritual that managers go through to justify doing what they wanted to do in the first place, in about nine cases out of ten.

I have never, you know, I have never met an executive who wanted to buy something that said, “Well, I had to turn it down because the projections didn’t work.” I mean, it’s just — it’s never happened.

And there will always be somebody that will come up with the projections that will satisfy the guy who’s signing his paycheck or will sign the deal that provides the commissions.

And they will pass those along to whomever else they need, the bankers or the board, to approve it.

It is total nonsense. I was recently involved in some — in a situation where projections were a part of the presentation. And I asked that the record of the people who made the projections, their past projections also be presented at the same time. (Laughter)

It was a very rude act. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was regarded as apostasy.

WARREN BUFFETT: It — but believe me, it proved the point. I mean, it was a joke, I mean. So, we’ll leave it at that.

33. First question when looking at an investment

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to have another — one more question, maybe. And then we’ll take a break.

And Charlie and I will be eating up here. The ones who want to stick around can stick around. And the ones who are in the other room, undoubtedly there will be seats in here to fill.

So, we’ll sort of regroup in 10 or 15 minutes. And then we’ll go on as long as that group lasts.

So, let’s take one more from zone 6. And then we’ll take a break.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden.

What is the absolutely first question you ask yourself when you look at a potential investment? And do you and Mr. Munger ask yourself the same first question?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I think — I don’t ask myself whether Charlie’s going to like it because — (laughter) — that will be a tough one.

No, the first question is, can I understand it? And unless it’s going to be in a business that I think I can understand, there’s no sense looking at it.

There’s no sense kidding myself into thinking that I’m going to understand some software company, or some biotech company, or something of the sort. What the hell am I going to know about it? I mean, you know, I can — so that’s the first threshold question.

And then the second question is, you know, does it look like it has good economics? Has it earned high returns on capital? You know, does it strike me as something that’s likely to do that? And then I sort of go from there.

How about you, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We tend to judge by the past record. By and large, if the thing has a lousy past record and a bright future, we’re going to miss the opportunity. (Laughter and applause)

Afternoon Session

1. Banks are in our circle of competence

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re ready to start here with a question from zone 1, if you’ll take your seats, please. We’ve got to —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Brian Murphy (PH) from Clearwater, Florida.

I’d like to ask you a question concerning your present thinking behind your acquisitions of banks, such as PNC and SunTrust, particularly in light of the fact that banks were selling so cheaply in 1990 and now many have tripled in price.

And it would appear from recent publications and the financial literature that you’ve become much more interested in banks at these higher prices, relative to the 1990 valuations. Could you comment on your thinking there?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we really have no different — there’s no difference in the criteria we apply to banks than to other businesses. And a couple of publications have, maybe, made a little more of that than is warranted, because I doubt if there’s more than a couple percentage points difference in —

And we don’t think of it that way, incidentally. And we do not have a lot of sector — we don’t have any sector allocation theories whatsoever.

So, we simply apply the same criteria when looking at banks that we would at any other business that —

There — incidentally, there — sometimes, you should know, that there’s — I would say that maybe half, or maybe even a little more, of the reports about our activities are — in the press are erroneous. Now, some are accurate, too.

And then, of course, some are way out of date. I mean, we get confidential treatment on our — on the filings we make with the SEC as to our holdings, so they’re published well over a year after we’ve filed them.

And therefore, there have been a couple of stories in the last month or two as to something we’ve bought. And of course, if you read the story carefully, we bought it a year and a half ago, maybe. And we may have sold it, we may have bought more, all kinds of things.

So that, I’d be careful about press reports, generally.

We’ve — we actually — we bought a bank for Berkshire in 1969, the Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford. We’ve had an interest in the banking business.

We feel it’s something that we can — that falls within our circle of competence to evaluate. That doesn’t mean we’ll be right every time, but it — we don’t think it’s beyond us to understand the banking business. And so, it’s — we look at businesses in that area.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

2. Buffett always plans to write a book “six months from now”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. And do we have zone 2?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Larry Myers from Omaha.

Warren, two quick questions, the first one very brief. Do you have any timetable regarding when you will write your own book about your career and philosophy?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, my timetable’s always been six months from now. (Laughter)

The answer on that is I’ve thought about doing it a few times, and I think about it. It always seems to me there’s way more interesting things yet to happen than have happened so far, and I don’t want to — I know I won’t write a second one, so I keep postponing it. That’s my rationale on it, anyway.

3. Coca-Cola “doing exactly the right thing” with its cash

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Second question concerns dividends. Last Friday night, by coincidence, on Louis Rukeyser’s weekly television show, the special guest was Philip Carret.

And Mr. Carret made the statement that his favorite American stock is Berkshire Hathaway. And one of the major reasons he stated was that, “Berkshire has never paid a dividend, as we all know,” and consequently, you had superior utilization of the extra cash.

Now, if you extend that reasoning, could it also be a beneficial policy if Coca-Cola and Gillette stopped paying dividends and utilized the cash in other ways?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it depends what they could use the — how they would use — utilize the cash, what they could use it for. Those are more focused enterprises than Berkshire, at least in terms of products.

And they — I think — I commend managements that have a wonderful business for utilizing cash in those wonderful businesses, or in businesses that they understand and that will also have wonderful economics, and for getting the rest of the money back to the shareholders.

So, Coca-Cola, in my book, is doing exactly the right thing with its cash when it both — when, A, it uses all the cash that it can, effectively, in the business to expand in new markets and all of that sort of thing.

But then beyond that, it pays a dividend which distributes cash to shareholders, and then it repurchases shares in a big way, which returns cash on a selective basis to shareholders, but in a way that benefits all of them.

So, we — you will benefit from us not paying dividends just as long as we can use the — every dollar we retain — to produce more than a dollar of value, and of market value over time.

Whether we can continue doing that, you know, how long we can continue doing that, I can’t promise you, but that is the — that’s the yardstick by which the decision is made.

And that is the yardstick, I think, by which Coca-Cola’s making the decision, too. And I think that they deserve great credit for exercising the discipline to quit when they — using cash — when they’ve run out of the opportunities to use it well, and then to use it — then to further deploy it advantageously by repurchasing shares.

I think one of the things I admire about my friend, Bill Gates, he’s got 4 1/2 billion of cash in Microsoft, and very few managements can stand having 4 1/2 billion of cash and not doing something unintelligent with it.

So far, it’s made sense for us to retain everything we earn, and I think it’ll make sense for a while longer, but it may not make sense indefinitely.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I hope it lasts a long time. (Laughter)

4. Why is Wall Street compensation so high?

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dan O’Neil from Santa Fe, New Mexico.

And I would ask — like to ask you a more specific question about Salomon Brothers, which is, why do we pay our employees there so much?

WARREN BUFFETT: Why what?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Why do we pay our employees there so much money? The conventional theory seems to be that there’s just a different pay scale on Wall Street than the rest of the world.

And it’s based on the idea that traders are smarter than — that some traders are smarter than others, and, in some supernatural way, are able to receive signals that the future is sending back to the present. And how do we know that that isn’t just an urban legend like alligators in the New York City sewers?

Another theory would be that the large amount of shareholders’ capital allows the traders to capture inefficiencies that are in the market in the same way that the house does in Las Vegas.

I mean, if we owned a casino, it wouldn’t make any difference if we hired Albert Einstein or Forrest Gump to run the blackjack table, and we would pay them the same. And I wonder which theory you think is closer to the truth.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you put it well. (Laughter and applause)

In the end, of course, you end up paying at a, what you think, at least, is a market rate. And to some extent, the market tests you out by whether people leave because they can get a higher rate.

But the limiting factor on that should be that you pay them a market rate as long as you are getting a market rate on capital. But it’s harder to measure the market rate on capital in a short period than it is to measure the market rate on compensation.

So, the — a good many of the people that have left — but far from all — have left because they felt that they would obtain — presumably — because they would obtain greater compensation elsewhere.

The market was working in that way, just as it works in entertainment that way and it works in the athletic field that way.

And whether it — when it works that way, it leaves a return for capital that’s adequate, is an open question. I mean, I haven’t looked at the figures on all the baseball teams, but I’ve seen some of them. And certainly, in some of the smaller markets, I mean, the books were not phony.

I mean, it is very hard to pay market rates for ballplayers in Kansas City and still make money running a ball team, where you’ve got a smaller television market and all of that of the big cities.

So, in the end you’re going to have to pay market rates to retain people, but part of that will also depend upon the period over which they measure their — what they are going to be paid.

I mean, if you want to look at Goldman Sachs last year, they were paid nothing. Does that mean that everybody will leave because they can get paid something someplace else? No, because 80 percent of the partners, or 90 percent of the partners, have a longer time horizon than that. And they have an anticipated earnings figure in mind when comparing it with what they’re being offered elsewhere.

If you have a situation where market rates, you know, exceed the earning capacity of the business, then at some point, capital will flow away from the business.

In the airline industry, which I use as an example, the market rate — most — well, the — in terms of the bigger airlines, people are not being paid market rates, they’re being paid contractual rates. Well, you can’t blame anybody for that.

If you have a contract that entitles you to X and the current market is a half of X, you’re going to hang onto that contract very aggressively. And like I say, you don’t blame anybody for that, it’s just if you end up in that condition, though, you’ve got a real problem.

And if you have the same problem that you have if the market is higher than — or a similar problem — the one you have if the market is higher than one that you can sustain in your own business.

My guess is that there — that, in effect, Salomon has put in a more Goldman Sachs-like system because, essentially, it created, to a degree, a partnership within it. That —

To have that work, A, over time, the partners have to earn good money or it won’t work, but, B, you have to have people that have a partnership mentality in it. And if you change from one culture to another, you are not going to get a hundred percent acceptance of any new system.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, it was kind of a bad break to put in a new compensation system and then have a very bad year. In the very nature of things, people are going to blame the compensation system subconsciously.

And then, two, I think that Wall Street generally has more envy-jealousy effects than are typically present elsewhere.

5. Buffett on the “real” advantage of being rich

I have a friend whose grandmother used to say that she couldn’t understand why people got into envy-jealousy, because it was the only one of the sins that you could never possibly have any fun at. And — (Laughter)

But generally speaking, on Wall Street I think a lot of people have had the wrong kind of grandmothers. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ve commented from time to time that — what’s his name? Robin Leach has it all wrong on “Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous,” because he’s presenting all these wonderful things that will happen to you if you get rich.

But they really aren’t that all that wonderful, these fancy houses and boats and all that. The real advantage of being rich, as I explain to people, is that it enables you to hate so effectively.

That if you’re terribly rich, you know, and — but your brother or whomever, cousin or somebody, is getting a little more attention in the world or something of the sort, you can hate in a very major way.

You can hire accountants and lawyers to cause him all kinds of trouble. If you’re poor, you just snub him at Thanksgiving and don’t show up or something of the sort. (Laughter)

But I’ve noticed that these rich people, particularly when they inherit great amounts of money, sooner or later they start — frequently — they get very antagonistic toward siblings, or cousins, or whatever it may be.

And they really can — they can hate in a way that — or get envious in a way that the rest of us really can’t really aspire to. So, that’s the benefit that hasn’t appeared on Robin Leach lately, but I —

But you see that — you see a little of that in the athletic field and the entertainment field, and perhaps even on Wall Street, that making a million dollars a year looks great until this guy that sits next to you that can’t possibly be as smart as you is making a million-two. And then the whole world, it turns into a very unfair place. (Laughter)

6. “It’s never a policy of ours to hold a lot of cash”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My question is simply about the cash and cash equivalents that are shown on the balance sheet this year versus last year.

In my thinking, cash equivalents is always something good to have around in case of a big market drop, being able to make opportunistic buys, as I know you’ve referred to “Mr. Market” getting manic-depressive at times.

Is there something that is less than obvious here that I’m not seeing? Or is the position not there now, should that happen in the marketplace?

WARREN BUFFETT: Cash at Berkshire is a residual. I mean, we would like to have no cash at all times. We also don’t want to owe a lot of money at any time.

But we — if we have cash around, it’s simply because we haven’t found anything we like to do, and we hope — always hope —- to deploy it as soon as possible.

We never are thinking about whether the market’s going to go down or something of the sort, or whether we might buy something even cheaper. If we like something, we’ll buy it.

And when you see cash on our balance sheet of any size, that’s an acknowledgement by Charlie and me that we have not found anything, in size anyway, attractive at that point. It’s never a policy of ours to hold a lot of cash.

7. Newspaper business is “exceptionally good,” but not as good

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. I’ll stand up.

David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.

Years ago, you said you loved the newspaper business and then, over time, I guess, it — said it declined a bit in how much you loved it. And I’m kind of wondering how you feel about it now, and if you can prognosticate a little bit for us at all?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I used to love it in two respects. I loved the economics and I loved the activity, both. The activity — the love of the activity has not diminished.

The economics are still exceptionally good compared to virtually any business in the world. They aren’t quite as good as they were 15 years ago.

So, they have — I wrote about that a couple of years ago, whereas what was — seemed almost the most bulletproof of franchises is still an exceptionally good business, but it isn’t quite as bulletproof as might’ve been the case 10 or 20 years ago.

I still think it’s about as interesting a business as there is in the world I’m in. But if you’re talking pure economics, the — I can’t think of many other businesses that, if I just owned one asset over my life, that I would rather own than a newspaper in a single-newspaper town.

But I wouldn’t have quite the feeling of absolute certainty that I had — that I would’ve had 10 or 15 years ago.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think it’s obvious, I — the newspaper proprietors are getting a touch of paranoia for the first time.

I mean, they worry about the electronic revolution, they worry about the fact that young people, you know, don’t read. It’s not as much fun going to newspaper conventions as it used to be.

WARREN BUFFETT: They’re still making exceptional money. I mean, that’s the interesting thing.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Ah, but they — I’ve heard you say a dozen times, “People don’t seem to care what floor they’re at, just whether the elevator is going up or down.”

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right, that is true. (Laughter)

People feel better when they’re on the second floor of an elevator that’s just come from one than they do when they’re on the 99th floor coming down from a hundred, there’s no question about that.

They have this projection. And of course, it’s particularly the case where they’ve been in a business where the money — the profits — were automatic, because they start thinking about, you know, questions of whether they really have the ability to make a lot of money, absent this favored position.

And that’s not something they’ve had to dwell on before. So, it can make them uncomfortable.

They’re all screaming about newsprint prices. We’d probably scream about them a little bit, too.

I mean, if you compare being in the newsprint business over time to being in the newspaper business, I mean, it’s a joke.

And newsprint prices, if you — you can graph them from any point, you know, 15 or 20 years ago, or 10 years ago, and the price of the newspaper, the price of advertising has gone up more.

I mean, it is interesting to hear them yelling foul, because they have moved a lot in the last 12 months and they’ll move some more in the next six months. But believe me, it’s better to be in the newspaper business than the newsprint business.

8. Buffett’s semi-hostile takeover of Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Liz Pruce (PH), I’m from New York City.

I was wondering, on your acquisition criteria — I know part of that is that Berkshire Hathaway won’t participate in unfriendly takeovers. I wondered how that philosophy may or may not apply to your role as a member of the board of several other companies.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s an interesting question. And I haven’t been on the board of any company where the CEO has brought to the board the question of a hostile takeover.

Can you think of anything I’m forgetting? No, and — but there’s no rule that that can’t happen.

So, I don’t know exactly what I would do if that came along. That’s a very good question.

I used to be — I used to have a whole different attitude on that. I mean, in effect — we actually — if you go back 40 years, we bought, in effect, control of companies.

Well, in the case of Berkshire, Malcolm Chace, the chairman, was all in favor of us buying our stock in Berkshire. But Seabury Stanton, the president, would not have been in favor of it, and Seabury was the — was managing the business.

So, it wasn’t hostile, but Seabury would not have been in favor of it. It would — but Malcolm would’ve been.

So, I don’t know what the situation would be today if somebody walked in Gillette or Cap Cities, or someplace like that.

I don’t think it’s going to happen, but I have not — I don’t have any policy on it at this point.

What do you think we’d do, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think our behavior is totally predictable. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: And he’s right. (Laughter)

9. Comparing investing styles of Ben Graham and Phil Fisher

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Neil McMahon (PH), New York City, also a Sequoia shareholder.

Ben Graham investing encouraged turnover. Looking at Berkshire’s holdings, concentration and long-term, are you still a 15 percent Phil Fisher and 85 percent Graham?

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know what the percentage would be. I’m a hundred percent Ben Graham in those three points I mentioned earlier, and those really count.

I am very — I was very influenced by Phil Fisher when I first read his two books, back around 1960 or thereabouts. And I think that they’re terrific books, and I think Phil is a terrific guy.

So, I think I probably gave that percentage to — I think I first used it in Forbes one time when Jim Michaels wrote me. And I think I, you know, it was one of those things. I just named a number.

But I think I’d rather think of myself as being a sort of a hundred percent Ben Graham and a hundred percent Phil Fisher in the points where they don’t — and they really don’t — contradict each other. It’s just that they had a vastly different emphasis.

Ben would not have disagreed with the proposition that if you can find a business with a high rate of return on capital that can keep using more capital on that — that that’s the best business in the world. And of course, he made most of his money out of GEICO, which was precisely that sort of business.

So, he recognized it, it’s just that he felt that the other system of buying things that were statistically very cheap, and buying a large number of them, was an easier policy to apply, and one that was a little more teachable.

He would’ve felt that Phil Fisher’s approach was less teachable than his, but his had a more limited value because it was not workable with really large sums of money.

At Graham-Newman Corp — Graham-Newman Corp was a closed-end fund — oh, it was technically an open-end fund, but it had $6 million of net worth. And Newman and Graham, the partnership that was affiliated with it, had 6 million. So, you had a total pool of 12 million.

Well, you could go around buying little machine tool companies — stocks in machine tool companies, whatever it might be, all statistically cheap. And that was a very good group operation.

And he had — you have — if you own a lousy business, you have to sell it at some point. I mean, if you own a group of lousy businesses, you better hope some of them get taken over or something happens. You need turnover.

If you own a wonderful business, you know, you don’t want turnover, basically.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: What was interesting to me about the Phil Fisher businesses is that a very great many of them didn’t last as wonderful businesses.

One of his businesses was Title Insurance and Trust Company, which dominated the state of California.

It had the biggest title plant, which was maintained by hand, and it had great fiscal solvency, and integrity, and so forth. It just dominated a lucrative field.

And along came the computer, and now you could create, for a few million dollars, a title plant and keep it up without an army of clerks.

And pretty soon, we had 20 different title companies, and they would go to great, big customers like big lenders and big real estate brokers, and pay them outlandish commissions by the standards of yore, and bid away huge blocks of business.

And in due course, in the State of California, the aggregate earnings of all the title insurance companies combined went below zero — starting with a virtual monopoly.

WARREN BUFFETT: From what looked like a monopoly.

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, very few companies are so safe that you can just look ahead 20 years. And technology is sometimes your friend and it’s sometimes your bitter enemy.

If Title Insurance and Trust Company had been smart, they would’ve looked on that computer, which they saw as a cost reducer, as one of the worst curses that ever came to man.

WARREN BUFFETT: You can — it probably takes more business experience and insights, to some degree, to apply Phil Fisher’s approach than it does Graham’s approach. If you —

The only problem is, you may be shut out of doing anything for a long time with Ben’s approach, and you may have a lot of difficulty in doing it with big money.

But if you strictly applied, for example, his working capital test to securities, you know, it will work. It just may not work on a very big scale, and there may be periods when you’re not doing much.

Ben really was more of a teacher than a — I mean, he had no urge to make a lot of money. It did not interest him. So he was — he really wanted something that he thought was teachable as a cornerstone of his philosophy and approach.

And he felt you could read his books sitting out here in Omaha and apply — buying things that were statistically cheap, and you didn’t have to have any special insights about business or consumer behavior, or anything of the sort.

And I don’t think there’s any question about that being true, but I also don’t think you can manage lots of money in accord with it.

10. Munger’s sales of Berkshire shares

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Rob Pitts, shareholder from New York City.

This is a question for Mr. Munger. I’ve noticed, in the insider sales activity sheets, that you’ve been a rather consistent seller of your Berkshire stock over the last few months.

Wondered if you would comment on why you’re doing this, especially in light of the prospective tax change in capital gains, where it might be reduced, which would obviously be beneficial to you and beneficial to Berkshire by reducing its deferred tax liability?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve given away a fair amount of Berkshire in the last couple of years and I’ve also sold some. I gave away the Berkshire because I thought it was the right way to behave, and I sold some because I had uses for the money. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: He doesn’t know anything I don’t know. I (Inaudible) it’s selling, I’d checked that, but — (Laughter)

11. When a company’s accounting is confusing, stay away

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

Charlie has a very high percentage of his net worth in Berkshire, as do I.

Go ahead. I’m sorry, go ahead. I don’t think it’s working, quite —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello?

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Gorem Pulich (PH) from New York City.

I have a two-part question, first part very short. I think a lot of people have difficulty valuing businesses because of some convoluted accounting schemes that are out there.

Do you have any suggestions, in terms of books, or something you can read, where you can sort of make sense of some of the accounting stories that are going around?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. Abe Briloff used to write for Barron’s quite frequently on various accounting machinations, and Barron’s has continued that somewhat.

But you’re right that there are people out there who will try to paint pictures with accounting that are something far from the economic reality. And sometimes, the rules of accounting themselves lead to that.

I would say that when the accounting confuses you, I would just tend to forget about it as a company. I mean, it’s probably — it may well be intentional, and in any event, you don’t want to go near it.

I — we have never had any great investment results from companies whose accounting we regarded as suspect. I can’t think of a one. Can you, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a very bad sign.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I made a short sale once that worked out well — (laughter) — in a case like that.

WARREN BUFFETT: It really — accounting can be a — accounting can offer you a lot of insight into the character of management.

And I would say there’s a lot — you know, there’s a — you run into a fair amount of bad accounting. I used to call it creative accounting. And you’d probably run into a lot more, if it was allowed.

But some companies have been able to push their auditors pretty far, and I would be very skeptical of anything that looks suspicious to you.

I think there have been — there’ve been a couple of things written, but I can’t think of where they’ve appeared, where people talk about the questions of, you know, what —

Obviously, if some prepaid expense, deferred asset accounts start building up suspiciously high, and inventories look out of line, you know, with sales and, particularly, the trend of them and all that, you want to look twice at companies like that.

Life insurance, you know, frequently, you know, we see weak accounting in. You can — when you don’t have a product where revenues and expenses are being matched up on something close to cash in the short-term, you have the opportunity for people playing games with numbers.

And some people have learned how to do that very well, and they’ve sometimes created long-lasting stock manipulation or promotion schemes that have enriched themselves, or they’ve enriched the managers or the creators of it, at the expense of the public, over time.

If you ever get suspicious about accounting, just go onto the next company.

12. Lloyd’s of London has slipped in recent years

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Miss Wasserman (PH) from Chicago.

In order to understand the reinsurance business a little better, can you explain your relationship with Lloyd’s of London in the marketplace, how you — which is probably the leader in the field?

How often do you compete directly, or if you’ve ever done reinsurance business for them, since they’ve had losses in recent years, and how you see the industry changing as their economics changes?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Lloyd’s, which is not an insurance company, as you know, but a — well, originally it was a place — it was a coffee house, but people think what — it’s a place where a large number of syndicates operate and congregate in a given physical location. And it’s had a history for larger, more exotic risks over time.

Lloyd’s has lost its relative position to a fairly significant degree in the last 10 or so years, partly because — well, in significant part, because of bad results, which had the other effects of causing capital to withdraw and people who backed the syndicates to become unhappy.

So, Lloyd’s is still an important competitive factor in the reinsurance business and in certain specialized kinds of primary insurance. It’s a very — you know, it’s very important factor.

But it’s not the factor it was 10 or 15 years ago. And I’m not sure how Berkshire’s capital compares with the capital of all those syndicates at Lloyd’s, but it’s certainly changed in its relative importance in the last five or 10 years.

And the ability of Lloyd’s to attract capital with the problems they had has been diminished, although they’re working on that problem.

But we regard Lloyd’s as a competitor just like we would regard any one of a number of reinsurance companies as competitor.

But we also do business with a number of syndicates at Lloyd’s, and we’ll probably do a lot of business over the next 10 years with various syndicates.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Lloyd’s is a very interesting institution because it had this reputation for integrity, what they paid off in — what, the San Francisco fire, and so on, and so on.

But I would argue that 10 or 15 years ago, a lot of slop and folly got into Lloyd’s, in certain syndicates particularly.

And too many commissions coming off the top as the same risks circulated around the system. Too much fine tailoring and three-hour lunches with fine wines. And it wasn’t right, and they got in a lot of trouble.

WARREN BUFFETT: Actually, in the history of Berkshire, the most significant insurance problem we ever had was in connection with Lloyd’s almost — or certain syndicates of Lloyds — almost 20 years ago.

And as Charlie said, they had this terrific reputation — behavioral reputation — over centuries. And I think that they coasted for a while on that. And we had a behavioral problem with — in one situation. And it was very expensive to us. So, we may have gotten an early lesson in what was coming.

There are a lot of different syndicates at Lloyd’s, and there are different people running them, and they have had different standards of behavior, to some extent. And people who assumed that, because they were dealing with Lloyd’s, that they would have no problems of any kind have found out otherwise.

But they will continue to be a major force in insurance, and they will get by their present troubles, and they’ll probably come out of it better structured than they went in.

13. We’ll keep a dollar if we can make more than a dollar of value

WARREN BUFFETT: Was that zone 5 that we did there?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Christopher Jones (PH) from Scottsdale, Arizona. I had a couple of questions for you.

You’ve mentioned several times today about the difficulty and the frustration that you both have in trying to find capable companies to acquire, or acquire parts of, in the United States.

And I realize that, of course, when we own Coca-Cola and Gillette we are a part of the global environment.

But it’s surprising to me that there haven’t been any global franchises or global managements that have been interesting to either of you that — and I realize, in the past we’ve owned some pieces of some.

So, I was — questioned, because of the size of Berkshire now, might we see something more of a global flavor to the portfolio?

And second question, you’ve also addressed the intelligent use of cash as something that you look for in management.

Many management teams now are buying back their own shares because they can’t find anything cheaper or better in the marketplace.

Does your current philosophy of not buying back your own shares suggest that maybe you think Berkshire’s overpriced at these prices?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have never bought back shares. I — we actually bought a few back in the ’60s — but we basically have never bought back shares, although there were plenty of times when we thought it would be quite attractive to do it.

But we’ve also felt that if we could create more than a dollar of market value by — and maybe well over a dollar of market value — by retaining a dollar, that on balance that that would work out better over time.

As long as we can find ways to use the cash, which, overall, we feel will turn dollar bills into something larger than dollar bills, we will — we’ll keep retaining the money.

And we won’t measure that on whether we can find anything this week or this month, but we’ll certainly measure it based on whether we can find anything in a couple of years, always.

We’ve had dry spells. Actually, right now, there’s a little more going on than usual. But we’ve had dry spells a lot of times over a 20-odd year period. And you know, as I said, I wound up the partnership during one dry spell.

So that — it will be measured — it’s measured partly on what’s going on now, and it’s measured partly on the expectancy.

And I don’t think, whether our stock was selling at X or three-quarters of X right now, would make a lot of difference. But it would make a difference if we thought we couldn’t find things to do with the money externally.

14. “Not too likely” we’ll buy a business outside the U.S.

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about nondomestic operations, as you mentioned, we’ve got almost $8 billion in Coca-Cola and Gillette combined, and Coke has 80 percent-plus of their earnings from non-U.S. sources, and Gillette has maybe two-thirds or thereabout.

So, you can argue that almost 40 percent of the net worth of Berkshire — 35 to 40 percent — is operating outside the United States, just in those two investments alone.

In terms of buying a business outright, we don’t preclude buying a non-U.S. domicile business. But it’s not too likely that it’ll happen.

We’d like to do it, particularly if it were large and if we understood it. But are we as likely to get a fix on a Helzberg’s of Europe as we would a Helzberg’s in the United States? You know, I doubt it.

I just don’t know whether we would develop as much confidence in understanding the scene in which they operated, and understanding the management, and all that. But we might.

It would have to be a pretty simple business, and it would have to be a business where we thought we really understood the moat for a long time.

And it would have to be a business where we could establish a rapport with the management, despite coming from somewhat different backgrounds. It’s not impossible, but I would say it’s, you know, it’s less than likely.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

15. Buffett: my growing fame isn’t a distraction

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there. My name is Lee Debroff (PH) from Morgantown, West Virginia.

Ever since the Salomon debacle, it appears that you have attracted more and more media attention.

In this regard, there have been numerous displays that would appear to be distractions from the actual business of investing. To wit, we have watched as you attended Bill Gates’ wedding in Hawaii, and bought a personal computer, and now wear striking designer ties. (Laughter)

And yesterday —

WARREN BUFFETT: Bill would’ve invited me to the wedding even if I hadn’t have been at Salomon. (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yesterday, we got those pennants during the rainout.

A very serious question, now that you’ve become this media darling, how can you assure us that you’re still keeping your eyes concentrated on the proverbial ball? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I do get more mail than I used to, so we’ve developed a little more of a system on that. But I just — I do what I like to do.

Just take speeches, I probably get asked to make, maybe, 20 times as many speeches as I would’ve been asked to make 10 years ago, but I make the same number. You know, I’ve got the — I’ve got my own selection process for what I do on that.

And it’s the same way, you know, I’m invited to, you know, I don’t know how many dinner tributes, et cetera. And you know, they basically — I don’t change the way I — what I do, because I don’t want to change the way —

If I wanted something else — if, while I was building Berkshire, that was being done to end up in some other spot, I’d have been there by now. And it just doesn’t change anything.

It does change the volume of mail, but I’ve got that so that that is not a big distraction.

Pardon me?

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I’ll remain in Omaha. Yeah, there’s no question about that. I mean, I — if I hadn’t wanted to be in Omaha, I would have figured out ways to change, and it would have been very easy to change decades ago.

I think it’s — we’ve got a lot of people here who aren’t from Omaha, but that’s their problem. I mean — (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have been watching Warren for a long time, and people who are concerned that he will change have a huge appetite for needless worry. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: The odds that I will change are about as good as the odds that Charlie will change. (Laughter)

The mail thing is a, you know, you wish you didn’t — that there was an easier way to handle it.

But you essentially can’t answer all the letters you get, it’s that’s simple. And that’s about the — once you get past that and get a form letter that takes care of it, that takes care of it.

16. Decline in GEICO’s return on equity

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’m Samuel Park (PH) from Tulsa, Oklahoma.

My question is regarding GEICO. I noticed that, for the last five years, their return on equity has come down every year. Is this something that signifies change of a business, or just temporary things?

WARREN BUFFETT: Question is about GEICO’s return on equity?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. Well, it’s true, it has come down to some extent. The — GEICO’s growth is, more or less, a function of, basically — I mean there’s a natural rate of growth there.

And the growth in capital has been greater than the growth rate in premium volume and in invested assets, so that achieving the same success on underwriting and achieving the same success on investments will produce a lower return on capital unless they buy in stock, which they have done fairly significantly. But that’s limited by availability, too, but —

It’s a very good business. But it’s not a business where, if you double the capital, you can double the earnings easily.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

17. No comment on Guinness investment

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Mark Hake (PH) from Scottsdale.

And I think your question — my question — about foreign equity investment was pretty much answered by the other gentleman.

But I noticed that you had made an investment in Guinness in the past. And can you comment on that? Do you — is it still owned? And if not, why not?

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t comment on purchases and sales of securities or ownership, unless either we’re legally required to, or they hit this threshold level where we report annually.

And we move the threshold level up as our assets move up. We don’t move it up as a percentage of assets. So that we used, as a cutoff this year, 300 million, I believe, of market value as to where we reported.

Now, if we’d owned the same amount of Guinness — which I’m not saying that we did — but if we owned the same amount of Guinness on December 31st, 1994, it would not have hit that threshold as we had on December 31st, ’93. It would not have hit that threshold.

And we really don’t want to get in the business where we are talking at all about what we’re buying or selling. We get a lot of speculation on that, but it’s of no use to Berkshire to be talking about purchases or sales.

If we were acquiring a piece of land downtown and we bought a quarter of what we intended to buy, for example, we would not feel we were benefitted by a front-page story in the paper saying that we were acquiring land.

And it — we are not in the business of giving investment advice, basically. We’ll talk about our principles.

So, the only conclusion you can come to about Guinness, or anything else that does not show up on our list at year-end, is that we did not own $300 million’s worth at market value at that time.

18. Buffett’s Berkshire shirt isn’t available

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett. My name is Don Bresca (PH), I’m from Boston, Massachusetts.

Recently I’ve noticed you wearing an IZOD shirt with Berkshire Hathaway in the middle — there was a fist grasping cash. Is that the new insignia?

And the second question is, is that shirt available to stockholders? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: The shirt is not available. That shirt was a gift from someone, and the shirt is not available to stockholders. But you can draw your own conclusions, the meaning of it. (Laughs)

19. No matchmaking for Mrs. B and Phil Carret

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’m Lyle McIntosh from Missouri Valley, Iowa, about 25 miles up the road.

And Warren, recognizing this is corn country, and I farm, and there’s several other farmer shareholders, this meeting hits right in the middle of corn planting.

Could you move it back about three weeks? (Laughter)

And also, I noticed [mutual fund pioneer] Phil Carret was on “Wall Street Week” Friday night. I’m sorry I don’t know his marital status, but if he is available have you thought about introducing him to Mrs. B. [Nebraska Furniture Mart founder Rose Blumkin]? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Mrs. B., incidentally, was out working yesterday. I went out and dropped by to see her about 4 o’clock, and she was doing fine.

She will be 102 late this year, and my guess is she will be working on her 102nd birthday as well. But I’ll let Phil and Mrs. B. handle their own affairs, in that respect. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: He’s probably a little too young for her. (Laughter)

20. “We’re open to buying anything”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I’m Ken Donovant (PH), a Cincinnati investor.

You’ve addressed the subject of your feelings about buying entire foreign corporations.

I wonder if you’d say something about, or is Berkshire looking for opportunities to buy, we’ll call them near-franchise companies, that might be based overseas — buying a stock interest or a part interest? And also, how do you feel about fixed-debt investments of overseas companies?

WARREN BUFFETT: Debt investments, was that?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Well, the first part was buying a stock investment rather than a whole company.

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the second part was debt investments.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we’re open to buying anything. When you say, are we looking at them, I’ve never been quite sure how we look at things anyway. I mean, they just seem to sort of pop up from reading or something of the sort.

But we’re — it’s less likely we end up doing it, for some of the reasons I’ve given earlier. But we have bought stock in companies that — aside from Guinness, that are domiciled outside of the United States. And we would have — we could conceivably buy debt instruments.

We don’t buy a lot of debt instruments anyway, so it’d be very unlikely.

But we will do anything we think makes sense at Berkshire, that’s compatible with the way we want to operate. And certainly, we don’t care where — the domicile is not that important.

Charlie?

21. Helzberg has unusually good sales for jewelry retailer

WARREN BUFFETTL OK, zone 5, is it?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Scott Spilcovich (PH), New York City.

My question is regarding the Helzberg acquisition. Can you comment on things such as the acquisition price, your sales and profit expectations, and how much debt was on the books at the time of the acquisition?

WARREN BUFFETT: This is in reference to which acquisition?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Helzberg.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Helzberg.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have not put out the figures on Helzberg’s, and we won’t be.

But we evaluate — the sales have been published at about 280 million for the year that ended in February, and there’ll be considerably more in the current year.

But we have not put out the figures. I can tell you that, obviously, that we think that, in terms of the amount we are laying out in terms of shares and/or cash — we think, over time, that it’s going to be a very decent acquisition.

It’s the same line of reasoning we’ve applied in other businesses. Retailing, as I mentioned earlier, is the kind of business where you have to stay smart over time, and we have a terrific manager, a fellow named Jeff Comment, who’s going to be running it.

And his record is extremely good, and I would bet the record would stay good.

It earns good returns on invested capital or we wouldn’t be buying into it. We always look for good returns on capital.

And a lot of companies in the jewelry business do not get good returns on capital. I mean, it’s not an industry that — where most of the participants are prosperous.

It takes unusual sales per square foot compared to competitors to succeed in that, and we have one operation that does that in spades at Borsheims, and then a different type of operation that does it at Helzberg’s.

The typical jewelry store operation is not a very good business, but we think we’ve got two good operations.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we frequently find that owners of entire businesses have schizophrenia. They want to sell their business for a little more than it’s worth, taking stock, so they don’t have to pay taxes.

And they want the stock to be the kind of — to be in a kind of business that will make just one dumb acquisition — theirs, and thereafter will guard the stock like gold, making no more dumb acquisitions. (Laughter)

Needless to say, the world is not that easy. And I think over time, we’ve made acquisitions that were fair on both sides, and averaged out, they’ve worked well for Berkshire.

And I think a company that behaves that way is giving the best long-term value to the private owner who wants to sell. You do not want to sell your business for stock to a firm that likes issuing stock.

22. Insurance float important in estimating intrinsic value

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?

VOICE: That was six.

WARREN BUFFETT: Where do we have the mic? Oh, there. I don’t think it’s on.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you hear me now?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, sure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jack Glanding (PH) from Knoxville, Tennessee.

I have a question which may not be appropriate for the officers of Berkshire to answer, but I think I’ll ask it anyway.

You focused on intrinsic value in your annual report, and you suggested that by reviewing the grey pages in the back that one could come up with a — possibly come up — with a value of intrinsic value for Berkshire.

I’ve made an effort to do this, and I think I come up with a price-to-earnings ratio somewhere around 21, which seems to be a little overvalued.

I’d like to ask you, Mr. Buffett, if you would care to divulge what you believe is the intrinsic value of Berkshire?

And if you’re not willing to do that, do you consider the price of Berkshire at this level to be fair?

WARREN BUFFETT: I — every year I get asked that, in one form or another, and I always say that I don’t want to spoil the fun for those of you who are working out the intrinsic value for yourself.

You have all the numbers that we have that are key to it.

And I would say that there are some important factors besides P/E. I mentioned earlier that I thought that the page where we describe float, for example, is probably as important a page as there is in the report.

And then the question is, you know, what do you do with the capital as you allocate it over time? And obviously, that makes a difference in intrinsic value, too.

But I would say in a general way that I — and this has been true virtually all of the time that — I think — I would say that the intrinsic value of Berkshire in relation to its — actually, I’ll put it the other way.

The price of Berkshire in relation to its intrinsic value, I think, probably offers as much value as, or more, than the majority of stocks that I see. But I don’t want to go any further than that.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

The — your story about the fun of working it out, though, there’s a famous English headmaster who used to say to each graduating class, he said, “Five percent of you are going to become criminals, and I know just who you are.

“But I’m not going to tell you, because I don’t want to deprive your lives of a sense of excitement.” (Mild laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll explain that later on. (Scattered laughter and applause)

There is a lot more to — there’s more to intrinsic value, as we’ve discussed earlier, than just adding up what you think you can sell the pieces for at any given time, because it is a prospective figure. It is future cash discounted back to the present. And capital allocation is a good part of that.

What you expect the float to do, for example, over time, would not — that would lead to a large swing in possible numbers relative to value.

I mean, if — when we bought National Indemnity in 1967, when it had whatever it had, 15 or 20 million in float, we didn’t see it then.

But if we could have foreseen the eventual development of float over time, it might have turned out that the intrinsic value of National Indemnity was many multiples of what most people might have thought at the time, and probably what we thought at the time.

23. Hagstrom book had “some effect” on Berkshire’s stock price

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Richard Ducheck (PH) from Melbourne, Florida.

I have a two-prong question, first on the stock. As we all know, the first month this year we ramped up about 25 percent and then we pulled back, I guess, about 20.

Just wondering your thoughts on that, if specifically you attribute that to the books perhaps, or institutional buying or, you know, what explanation you might have for that. And second —

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say — I’ll answer that first. I would say [Robert] Hagstrom’s book [“The Warren Buffett Way”] undoubtedly had some effect on that. It’s impossible to measure, but that book sold a lot of copies. And my guess is that that had some effect.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. More so than institutional buying? Because I’ve heard rumors like Fidelity and whatever were buying —

WARREN BUFFETT: I can’t — I just don’t know the — I don’t know how to separate out the variables, but I would say that the book was certainly a factor at that time, and it’s unreasonable to assume that it had no effect.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a lot of the buying came in in odd lots, so —

WARREN BUFFETT: A lot of odd lot activity, yeah.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Certainly looked like book buyers. (Laughter)

24. Buffett doesn’t understand Microsoft, despite his friendship with Gates

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Secondary question, I’m an electronics engineer by profession. So, the technology sector is of prime interest to me, and I think we’ll all agree, at least the last six to eight months has been phenomenal for the technology sector.

And I also see that you’re somewhat befriending Mr. Gates, inviting him into your house, et cetera.

Is there a possibility down the road apiece of you doing some type of purchase of Microsoft, or acquiring that? Or is there something — (laughter) — you two could work out together?

WARREN BUFFETT: I bought a hundred shares one of the day — first day — I met Bill, and that was the end of it. I just want to be sure I got his reports from that point on. This is personal, not in the — not in Berkshire.

There’s no chance we’ll be in businesses we don’t understand, and I won’t understand it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, you’re quite clear on that. I just thought maybe there’d be an exception, because apparently —

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you made an exception, he would be a good guy to make — a very good guy — to make an exception with. But I don’t think I’ll make an exception.

25. Business schools should study Mrs. B’s success

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is (inaudible) from Arlington, Texas.

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, what possibility to use these two great minds for a long term in life, by either taking apprenticeship in Berkshire or open a school?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t follow that one. Warren, you handle it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is it a question of what —?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What the possibility of using these two great minds of yours to educate a new generation as a long-term investment in this country, either through apprenticeship in Berkshire for young people or open a business school?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, let me try that one because I have a demonstrated record of nonperformance. (Laughter)

I have had great difficulty enabling my children to know what I know. (Laughter)

And Warren, maybe you have failed less. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: My children, in many ways, are a lot smarter than I am. So, I’ve had different experience, Charlie. (Laughs)

No, I think you can — you know, I’ve mainly learned by reading myself, so I don’t think I have any original ideas that — I’ve certainly got a lot —

I mean, I’ve talked about reading Graham, I read Phil Fisher, and I’ve gotten a lot of ideas myself from reading. And in my own case, I mean, talk about your parents having influences, you know, my parents had an enormous influence.

So, I think you can learn a lot from other people. In fact, I think, if you learn reasonably well from other people, you don’t have to get any new ideas or do much on your own. You can just apply the best of what you see.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Generally speaking, I think we always get a group of wise people after sifting millions. But I don’t think anybody’s invented a way to teach so that everybody is wise.

It’s extraordinary how resistant some people are to learning anything. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Really, what is astounding is how resistant they are when it’s in their self-interest to learn.

I mean, I was always astounded by how much attention was paid to Graham — I mean, he was regarded 40 years ago as the dean of security analysts —but how little attention was paid, in terms of the principles he taught. And it wasn’t because people were refuting them, and it wasn’t because people didn’t have a self-interest in learning sound investment principles. It’s just this incredible resistance to thinking or change.

I mean, I quoted Bertrand Russell one time as saying — who said that, “Most men would rather die than think. Many have.” (Laughter)

In the financial sense, that’s very true. It’s not complicated. I mean, human relations, you know, usually aren’t that complicated, but — and certainly it’s in people’s self-interest to develop habits that work well in human relations, but an amazing number of people seem to mess it up one way or another.

CHARLIE MUNGER: How much has Berkshire Hathaway been copied, either in investing America or corporate America? I’m not saying we deserve to be, necessarily. But people don’t want to do it differently than they’re presently doing it.

WARREN BUFFETT: You might argue that Mrs. B. [Nebraska Furniture Mart founder Rose Blumkin], having started what you may have seen out there this weekend, with $500 in 1937, you know, without a day in school in her life, and building that into a great enterprise, you might say, “Well, that is something to study.”

I mean, is it because she couldn’t speak English when we got — you know, she got over? Maybe we can explain to people — I mean, what is there to learn from seeing somebody create an incredible success like that in a competitive business?

She didn’t invent something that the world had never seen before. She didn’t have a lock on some piece of real estate that protected her from competition.

You know, all of these — and yet, she accomplished something that virtually no one has accomplished.

Now, why aren’t business schools studying her? You know, why are they talking about EVA, you know, economic value added, as we talked about earlier? I mean, here is a success. Something has made her a success.

You know, is it something — is it a 200 — and she’s very smart — but is it a 220 IQ? No, it isn’t. It’s a very smart woman, but it’s not something that’s incapable of being replicated in the habits and the way of thinking. But who is studying her?

I mean, they present her as a curiosity. But if you go to any of the top 20 business schools, you know, there’s not one page that’s being given to anybody to study what is an incredible success. And I just — I find that very interesting that — and to some extent, you know, I’ve seen it in the investment world.

There’s this — for one thing, the high — you know, it’s probably a little discouraging to a professor of management at some major business school that has gone on to get his doctorate and everything, to think he has to come and hang around the Furniture Mart — (laughter) — study a woman in a golf cart, I mean — (Laughter)

But you could — they’d be better off if they did.

26. Do what you like now, not later

WARREN BUFFETT: Where were we on that? What zone are we on, four, are we? Wherever it is. Zone 3 maybe, huh?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, thank you. I’m Jim Ludke (PH) from Phoenix, Arizona.

And I haven’t been to one of your annual meetings for about 10 years now. The last one was down at the Red Lion Inn by the water. And I congratulate you on your popularity.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wish I had bought more stock then. (Laughter)

But like Charlie, I too, have been giving mine away for charitable purposes. So, your beneficial effects have reciprocated and rippled throughout the economy. I congratulate you.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I congratulate you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What do you think has changed — well, one thing is that Ben Graham — commenting on what you just said — I’m a student of Ben Graham, and he said it never ceased to amaze him how widely read he was and least followed.

But how have you changed in the last 10 years? Much, if any? Or none at all? Or —

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll let Charlie — he’s been watching me. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d say about one stone. (Laughter)

Takes one to know one. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: If we’d wanted to change, we would have changed a long time ago.

I mean, I’ve never believed much in this theory of, you know, if I have 2X instead of X that I’m going to do this or that, or I’ll take this job I don’t like now, and I’ll get one I like later on, or —

It doesn’t make that much sense to me. I mean, there aren’t that many years around, so you ought to be doing what you like at the present time, and Charlie and I have always followed that pretty well.

27. “We let .400 hitters swing the way they want to swing”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Peter Borma (PH), Chicago.

Every year, you have your operating companies send a check back to Omaha. What percentage do the heads of the operating companies keep as a bonus, and how do you set that figure?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have different bonus arrangements at different companies. It would be a big mistake, with businesses with as many different economic characteristics, or as varying economic characteristics existing, as they do at Berkshire, to try and have some formula approach that paid managers in all of these different businesses based on a simple formula of one kind.

So, we have, I think, four businesses where they own a part of it. And we have varying arrangements with the various businesses.

Some businesses, capital employed is unimportant. There simply isn’t a way to employ a lot of capital. So, we do not have a capital charge, even, at those businesses. We don’t believe in going through a lot of machinations if it’s going to involve peanuts at the end.

So, some businesses have a capital charge, some businesses don’t have a capital charge. If they use a lot of capital, they’re going to have a capital charge, is what it amounts to.

Some businesses are easy businesses, some businesses are tougher businesses. So, we have different thresholds where things kick in based on that.

We simply sit down and try and figure out, in the case of each business, what makes sense. And that usually isn’t very hard to figure out.

I mean, we want something that’s fair. The best managers, we aren’t going to change their behavior much by the compensation thing. We may a little bit, in terms of teaching them how we think about capital employed.

But in terms of their enthusiasm for the business, imagination, and marketing, and all that, basically we usually buy businesses with those people in place.

But it would be — A, it’d be wrong not to treat people fairly, and they would resent it if they weren’t treated fairly, too, understandably.

So we try to have a system that rewards the things that we want to have rewarded, and treats them fairly in a way that they understand they’re treated fairly.

And I don’t think we have any two businesses that have the same arrangement. They’re different in each case.

Incidentally, that applies in their policies, too. We don’t get into — very seldom, I should say, maybe once or twice — but they have different arrangements in terms of compensating their employees.

Some of our businesses have budgets, some of them don’t. We don’t have any budgets that come up to headquarters. We let .400 hitters swing the way they want to swing. And some of them, you know, have a little different swings than others, but overall, they’re extremely effective.

And they feel, and we want them to feel, like they own their own business. If they felt — if somebody that’s independently wealthy sold us a business and we started telling them how to swing, they would tell us what we could do with it very quickly, because they don’t need that in life.

So, what we have to do is create a situation, or maintain a situation, where they are having more fun doing what they’re doing than anything else they can do in life, and that’s what’s we’re designing for. And then we have to treat them fairly in respect to that.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

28. “Foreign exchange baffles me, frankly”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Roger Hill from Racine, Wisconsin.

Gentlemen, a little change of pace. Could we get your opinion on the present situation with international exchange? Do you think we have a dollar problem, or is — the Japanese have a yen problem?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m going to let Charlie answer that. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have no comment. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s probably — that’s a very good question, but the trouble is anytime I say, “That’s a very good question,” it’s probably because I don’t know the answer.

And I — you know, I don’t know the answer to that. Foreign exchange baffles me, frankly.

I mean, you know, I think in terms of purchasing power parity, because that’s a natural way to approach it. But purchasing power parity does not work very well as a guide to how exchange values will behave in any shorter, medium, or maybe even long term, because the world adapts in different ways.

Sometimes it adapts by high rates of inflation to a sinking currency. Usually it does. It hasn’t done that in respect to ours, but we’re only sinking relative to a couple of other important currencies.

I don’t have a great answer for you on that, sorry.

29. We don’t look for small stock bargains anymore, but they exist

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Howard Winston (PH) from Cincinnati, Ohio.

First, I wanted to thank you and Charlie for sharing your time with us today.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is, you’ve repeatedly said that you see many wonderful stock ideas but can’t invest because they’re too small.

Given that many in the audience today have a lower dollar investment threshold — (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: “Do these stocks have names?” (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. Well said. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that is that we don’t look anymore. We assume that there are a reasonable number of opportunities as you work with smaller amounts of capital because it’s always been true.

I mean it was — over the years, as I looked at things, clearly, you run into companies that are less followed as you get smaller. And there’s more chances for inefficiency when you’re dealing with something where you can buy $100,000 worth of it in a month, rather than 100 million.

But that is not because I am carrying around in my head the names of 25 companies that we could put 100,000 in. I just don’t look at that universe anymore. I —

Sometimes, people send me annual reports, or I get letters from managers and they say, you know, “I’ve got this wonderful thing.” I look — I usually know ahead of time, but I mean, I would first look at the size. And if the size isn’t right — and it isn’t going to be virtually any time — I don’t look any further, because there’s just no time to be looking at all kinds of smaller opportunities.

I do think, if you’re working with very small amounts of money, that there almost always are some significant inefficiency someplace — to find things.

I’ve mentioned to some people, when I started out, I actually went through all of the Moody’s manuals and the Standard and Poor’s manuals page by page.

And you know, it was probably 20,000 pages, but there were a lot of things that popped out, and none of them were in any brokerage report or anything of the sort. They were just plain overlooked, and you had to —

You could find out about them, but nobody was going to tell you about them. And my guess is that continues to be true, but not on anything like the scale it was then.

Charlie?

30. Early Buffett cigar butt: Delta Duck Club

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can remember when you bought one membership in some duck club that had oil under it, when you were young.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that was a company called Atled —

CHARLIE MUNGER: When you get down to one duck club membership, well, you’re really scavenging for cigar butts. (Laughter) But —

WARREN BUFFETT: Not a bad cigar butt. There were 98 shares outstanding. It was the Delta Duck Club. And the Delta Duck Club was founded by a hundred guys who put in 50 bucks each, except two fellows didn’t pay, so there were only 98 shares outstanding.

They bought a piece of land down in Louisiana, and one time somebody shot downward instead of upward, and oil and gas started spewing forth out of the ground. (Laughter)

So, they renamed it Atled, which is Delta spelled backwards, which was — sort of illustrated the sophistication of this group. (Laughter)

And a few years later, they were taking up — at $3 a barrel oil — they were taking about a million dollars a year in royalties out of the place. And the stock was selling at $29,000 a share, and it was earning $10,000 a share —

No, it was earning about $7,000 a share after-tax, about 11,000 pretax, and it had about 20,000 a share in cash. And it was a long-lived field.

So, you know, I use that sometimes as an example of efficient markets, because somebody called me and offered me a share of it, and those things, you know — is that an efficient market or not?

You know, 29,000 for 20,000 of cash, plus 11,000 of royalty income at 25 cent gas and $3 oil? I don’t think so.

You can find things out there. I’ll give you hunting rights on all my duck clubs in the future. (Laughter)

31. Secret to avoiding lawsuits: “You can’t make a good deal with a bad person”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

Don’t think the mic —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do Berkshire and Berkshire companies protect themselves against lawsuit-happy lawyers? And is it possible for American businesses to survive the financial and time-consuming costs of dealing with lawyers?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question and we’ve probably had less litigation than any company, you know, with a $25 billion market value in America.

But it’s, you know — we were sued one time at Blue Chip Stamps — what was it for, Charlie, and how many billion by some guy?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Lots.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It was — you know, there — you cannot protect yourself against lawsuits, and there are certainly a lot of frivolous ones we’ve — like I say, we have — it’s not been a drain on our time or money — but particularly time — to date.

And I think one thing you’d have to do is, if you ran into anything of that sort, you would not pay and you would make life as — try to make life comparably difficult for the other party as they made it for you. But that has not been our experience so far.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I can tell an Omaha story on that one which demonstrates the Berkshire Hathaway technique for minimizing lawsuits.

When I was a very young boy, I said to my father, who was a practicing lawyer here in Omaha, “Why do you do so much work for X,” who was an overreaching blowhard — (Laughter) — “and so little work for Grant McFayden,” who was such a wonderful man?

And my father looked at me as though I was slightly slow in the head. And he said, “Charlie,” he said, “Grant McFayden treats his employees right, his customers right, everybody right.

“When he gets involved with somebody who’s a little nuts, he gets up from his desk, and walks to where they are, and extricates himself as soon as he can.” And he says, “Charlie, a man like Grant McFayden doesn’t have enough law business to keep you in school. (Laughter)

“Ah, but X,” he said, “he’s a walking minefield of continuous legal troubles, and he’s a wonderful client for a lawyer.”

Now, my father was trying to teach me, and I must say it worked beautifully, because I decided that I would adopt the Grant McFayden approach.

And I would argue that Warren independently reached the same approach very early in life. Boy has that saved us a lot of trouble. That is a — it is a good system.

WARREN BUFFETT: You can’t — yeah, we basically have the attitude that you can’t make a good deal with a bad person. And you can — that means we just forget about it.

I mean, we don’t try and protect ourselves by contracts, or getting into all kinds of, you know, due diligence, or —

We just forget about it. We can do fine over time, dealing with people that we like, and admire, and trust.

So we have never — and a lot of people do get the idea, because the bad actor will tend to try and tantalize you in one way or another, and —you won’t win. It just pays to avoid them.

We started out with that attitude, and you know, maybe one or two experiences have convinced us, even more so, that that’s the way to play the game.

32. Why there’s just one Borsheims store

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Clarence Cafferty from Long Pine, Nebraska.

I’d like to know if we can get another .400 hitter by starting another Borsheims store someplace in this United States.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s an interesting question about both the Borsheims and the [Nebraska Furniture] Mart. I mean, they — and of course, they’re owned — as you probably know — historically, by the same family. I mean, it was Mrs. B.’s sister’s family that bought Borsheims, but, in effect, started it virtually from scratch.

And the — both of those institutions offer this incredible selection, low prices brought about by huge volume, low operating costs, and all of that.

Operating multiple locations, you would get some benefit, obviously, from the name and the reputation.

But you would lose something, in terms of the amount of selection that could be offered. There’s $50 million-plus at retail of jewelry at Borsheims’ one location.

Well, when someone wants to buy a ring, or a pearl necklace, or something of the sort, they can see more offerings at a place like that than they possibly could at somebody who is trying to maintain inventory at 20 or 50 locations.

Similarly, that gives us a volume out of a given location that results in operating costs that, again, can’t be matched if you have an enormous number of locations.

So, I think those businesses tend to be more successful in that particular mode as one-location businesses.

Now, a Helzberg’s will be bringing merchandise to people all over the country at malls. And they will do — through that mode of operation, they perform that exceptionally well.

But Borsheims can’t be Helzberg’s, and Helzberg’s can’t be Borsheims. They’re both going for two different — in a sense, two different customers, to some degree.

Sol Price, Charlie’s friend who started the Price Club, the first big wholesale club, said that part of his success was due to figuring out the customer he didn’t want. I think that’s right, isn’t it, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right.

WARREN BUFFETT: You have to figure out what you’re good at and who you really can offer something special to. Borsheims offers something very special to people, but in part, it comes about through being at one location.

You can see more of almost any kind of jewelry you want there than you’re going to see virtually any place in the world. And that will bring people there, or it will bring male people there.

And that gives you operating costs that are many — oh, 20 percentage points — off of what somebody else will be doing without that pulling power.

And that, in turn, enables you to offer the lower prices, which keeps the circle going. I mean, it’s very hard to replicate something like that. And trying to do it in 10 spots probably wouldn’t work well.

But it’s a question you ask yourself as you go along, obviously, when you — McDonald’s certainly did well by deciding to open a second store. I mean — (Laughter)

33. Factors boosting reported return on equity

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, I’m Frank Martin from Elkhart, Indiana.

You have written extensively on the subject of the immutability of return on equity for American industry, as a whole, being stuck in the 12 to 13 percent range.

What forces do you see, since we’re above the mean, to cause that number to regress to the mean over time?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s true, it has been higher in the last few years. Although Fortune’s got some interesting figures in the current issue, on the 500, that shows decade by decade what the return has been on the Fortune 500 group — which is a shifting group, of course.

And it’s tended to stick, although I would say it was more between 12 and 13 than 11 and 12, probably, in that one.

The return, to some extent, in certain business has gotten a big kick because they finally put the health liabilities on the balance sheet, and therefore reduced equity.

So if you — anything you do that tends to pull down equity, if it doesn’t change your ability to do the same sales volume — it’s leveraged American business, in effect, by putting the health liabilities on the balance sheet.

It may be wrong. It may be that business can earn 15 percent or so. But I think competitive factors tend to, over time, keep pushing that number down, somewhat.

And 12 or 13, when you think about it, is not bad at all. I mean, it’s a level, with 7 percent interest rates, that allows stocks and equity to be worth much more when employed in equity than elsewhere in the world.

But if I had to pick a figure for the next 10 years, I would pick some figure between 12 and 13, but that doesn’t mean I’d be right on it.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think all of those published averages overstate what’s earned anyway. They’re the biggest companies, they’re the winners, they’re the ones whose stock sells at high multiples, so they can issue it to other people for high-earning assets.

And many of the low-return people are constantly being dropped out of the figures. Now, you can say that was true in the past, too. But it would be remarkable to me if, on average, American business earned 13 percent on capital after taxes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Those figures, incidentally — it isn’t a huge item, but it’s not totally insignificant. They don’t show as a cost, for example, the cost of stock options.

And the American shareholders pay that, so the American shareholder has not gotten the returns on equity shown by those numbers, although it’s not a huge factor.

But I wouldn’t be surprised if it was, you know, two or three-tenths of a percent just for that one cost that’s omitted.

If you let me omit my costs, I can show a very high return on equity. (Laughter)

34. Return on capital at Berkshire subsidiaries

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jeff Peskin (PH) from New York. And I have a question for you.

It’s really more of an observation, in that you’ve written about when you look at acquiring a business, you look a lot at how they allocate capital.

And my question is, once you acquire a stake in a company, do you find that, just by the fact that you are helping doing the allocation of capital and doing the compensation, that that alone makes a company have a lot higher return?

Or is there some benefit by the fact that you own, or some major shareholder, owns a big slug of the company that also allows a company to increase its return on capital?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. The answer is sort of, some of the time, some of the places. It’s the —

There’s no question, in a business that earns a high rate on capital, that doesn’t have natural ways to employ that money within the business, that we actually may contribute significantly to the long-term results of that business by taking the capital out.

Because if they don’t have a place to use it, nevertheless, they might well use it someplace. And we have the whole universe to spread that money over.

So we can take the money that’s earned in some operating business and we can buy part of the Coca-Cola Company with it, and buy into another wonderful business, whereas very few managements probably would do that. So, there’s an advantage there.

Now on the other hand, Helzberg’s, for example, will probably grow very substantially. They’ll probably use all the capital they generate. Maybe they’ll even use more. Well, they don’t really need us for that. I mean, they would’ve done that under any circumstances.

We may actually give them the ability to grow even a little faster because if a company — and this is not the — these are not the Helzberg’s figures — but if a company is earning 20 percent on equity but can grow 25 percent a year, you know, they’re going to feel equity strains at some point. And we, obviously, would love the idea of supplying extra capital that would earn 20 percent on equity.

So, there can be some advantage to having us as a parent, in terms of sending capital to the business, as well as taking capital from the business.

We also, I think, can be helpful in some situations, in that once we are there, a lot of the rituals — particularly in a public company — but a lot of the things that people waste time doing in business, they don’t have to do with us.

I mean, there’s an awful lot of time spent in some businesses just preparing for committee meetings, and directors meetings, and all kinds of things like that, show-and-tell stuff. And none of that’s needed with us. We won’t go near them.

And so, we really free them up to spend a hundred percent of the time thinking about what is good for the business over time. If they have extra money, they don’t have to worry about what to do with it.

If they need extra money for a good business, it’ll be supplied. So, there are some advantages that way. And I guess —

Charlie, can you take it any further?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think our chief contribution to the businesses we acquire is what we don’t do.

(BREAK IN RECORDING)

35. “Advanced math is of no use” in investing

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — it’s hard to continue to grow at the rate you’ve grown in the past because the company has gotten so big. And I’m wondering if you could elaborate a little bit on that.

And my second question, which is totally unrelated, but I’ve also read where you’re very good with numbers, with working things in your head. And I’m totally a rookie when it comes to economics and accounting and things like that, but I’m very good with numbers and keeping things in my head.

And I’m wondering if there’s some way a mathematician who knows very little about the business world, what I could read or what I could do to learn how better to invest and how you did that.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, going to the first question, when you say it’s going to be hard — it’s going to be impossible. I mean, now that’s the answer. We cannot compound money at 23 percent from a $12 billion base.

We don’t know how to do that, and it would be a mistake for anybody to think that we could come close to that. We still — we think we can do OK with money, but we did not start with a $12 billion base.

And we’ve never seen anybody in the world compound numbers like that, at that rate. So, we’ll forget it — that part of it, but there are intelligent things we can be doing.

The second part of the question, I don’t think any great amount of mathematical aptitude is — not aptitude, but mathematical knowledge is a — advanced math is of no use in the investment process.

And understanding a mathematical relationship, sort of an ability to quantify — a numeracy, as they call it, I think that’s generally helpful in investments because something that tells you when things make sense or don’t make sense, or sort of how an item in one area relates to something someplace else.

But that doesn’t really require any great mathematical ability. It really requires sort of a mathematical awareness and a numeracy. And I think it is a help to be able to see that.

I mean, I think Charlie and I probably, when we read about one business, we’re always thinking of it against a screen of dozens of businesses — it’s just sort of automatic, and —

But that’s just like a scout in baseball thinking about one baseball player against an alternative. I mean, you only have a given number on the squad and thinking, you know, “One guy may be a little faster, one guy can hit a little better,” all of that sort of thing. And it’s always in your mind, you are prioritizing and selecting in some manner.

My own feeling about the best way to apply that is just to read everything in sight. You know, I mean, if you’re reading a few hundred annual reports a year and you’ve read Graham, and Fisher, and a few things, you’ll soon see whether it kind of falls into place or not.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the set of numbers — the one set of numbers in America that are the best quick guide to measuring one business against another are the Value Line numbers.

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d agree with that.

CHARLIE MUNGER: That stuff on the log scale paper going back 15 years, that is the best one-shot description of a lot of big businesses that exists in America. I can’t imagine anybody being in the investment business involving common stocks without that thing on the shelf.

WARREN BUFFETT: And, if you sort of have in your head how all of that looks in different industries and different businesses, then you’ve got a backdrop against which to measure.

I mean, if you’d never watched a baseball game and never seen a statistic on it, you wouldn’t know whether a .300 hitter was a good hitter or not.

You have to have some kind of a mosaic there that you’re thinking is implanted against, in effect. And the Value Line figures, you know, they cycle it every 13 weeks. And if you ripple through that, you’ll have a pretty good idea of what’s happened over time in American business.

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, I pay no attention to their timeliness ratings, or stock ratings.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, none of that means anything. It’s too bad they have to put that there, but that —it’s the statistical material, not the —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would like to have that material going all the way back. They cut it off about, what, 15 years back?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but I save the old ones. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But you know, I wish I had that in the office, but I don’t.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — Charlie and I — maybe even, I do it more — we tend to go back. I mean, if I’m buying Coca-Cola, I’ll probably go back and read the Fortune articles from the 1930s on it or something.

I like a lot of historical background on things, just to, sort of, get it in my head as to how the business has evolved over time, and what’s been permanent and what hasn’t been permanent, and all of that. I probably do that more for fun than for actually decision making.

But I think it is — I think if you think about if — we’re trying to buy businesses we want to own forever, you know, and if you’re thinking that way you might as well see what it’s been like to own them forever, and look back a ways.

36. Management made the difference for Wells Fargo

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Stewart Horejsi from Salina, Kansas.

When you first bought part of Wells Fargo a few years back, I looked at it and I couldn’t tell it was any better than any of the other banks. I think, now, anybody that would look at it can tell it’s better than almost any bank.

Now you’ve bought PNC Bank, and again, I can’t see how it’s distinguished from any of the other banks. (Laughter)

What did you see in PNC Bank that made you select it over all the other banks that were available?

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, we’re not going to give any stock advice on that. So, I think that going back to Wells, it was very clear that, if you —

I knew something about Carl Reichardt, and to a lesser extent at that time, Paul Hazen, from having met them and also from having read a lot of things they said.

So, they were different — they were certainly different than the typical banker. And then the question was, is how much did that difference make, in terms of how they would run the place?

And they ran into some very heavy seas, subsequently. And I think, probably, the difference — I probably think those human differences that were perceived earlier are what enabled them to come through as well as they did. But that’s about all I can say on banks.

CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, you might add to that slightly, because that Wells Fargo thing is a very interesting example. They had a huge concentration of real estate lending, a field in which people took the biggest —

It was the biggest collapse in 40 or 50 years in that field, so that if they had been destined to suffer the same sort of average loss per real estate loan that an ordinary bank would’ve suffered, the place would’ve been broke.

So, we were basically betting that their real estate lending was way better than average. And indeed, it was. And they also handled it on the way down, way better than average.

So, you can argue that everybody else was looking at this horrible concentration of real estate loans and this sea of troubles in the real estate field, and in bankers to the real estate field. And they just assumed that Wells Fargo was going to go broke.

And we figured, no, that since their loans were way higher quality, and their loan collection methods were way higher quality than others, that it would be all right. And so, it worked out.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we couldn’t have told that — if we hadn’t gone a little further, though, than just looking at numbers, we would not have been able to make that decision.

37. Nothing “magic” about a positive shareholders’ equity

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Carr, Durham, North Carolina.

Tambrands and U.S. Tobacco are two companies which are primarily single-focus product companies, that seem to possibly have some barriers to growth in unit sales and pricing, and have employed a strategy of returning cash to shareholders through stock repurchases.

Both companies have, at times — when they thought the stock was at a discount to intrinsic value — used debt to accentuate the repurchases.

Those companies recently have talked about problems with going into a negative shareholders — a negative stake to shareholders’ equity position — through the use of additional debt to repurchase more shares, at a time when both companies believe their stock’s very cheap. And they appear to have the type of long-term cash flow that would at least allow that.

Would you comment on the, at least, accounting treatment and the stated shareholders’ equity, and if you think that should be a real concern for management in those areas?

WARREN BUFFETT: What was the first company, besides U.S. Tobacco?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Tambrands.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you want to?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Tambrands?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think there’s anything magic about whether shareholder equity is positive or negative. The — Coca-Cola has a shareholder equity of $5 billion. It has a market value of 75 billion or so.

Now, they’re not going to do it and I’m not going to recommend it, but if they were to spend $10 billion buying in their stock they would have a negative shareholders’ equity of 5 billion. They would — their credit would be sound.

I mean, if somebody else were to buy the company for 75 billion, they’d have 5 billion of tangible assets and 70 billion of intangible assets.

And there is nothing magic about a company having a positive shareholders’ equity. And it isn’t done very often. And I can’t even think of a case where it’s been done, but it may have been.

But I see no — I see nothing wrong with a company having a negative shareholders’ equity, although it may be prohibited by the state in which they’re incorporated, in terms of repurchasing shares at a time that would produce that. You’d have to look at the state law on that.

But anytime a company in an LBO, or something, is bought out at some very large number over book value, in effect, they’re creating a negative— if they borrow enough money on it — they’re creating a negative shareholders’ equity, in terms of the previous shareholders’ equity. And it’s just a fiction, as to the numbers between the two organizations.

You should buy in your stock when you don’t have a use for the money. And that could be management specific. I mean, some managements might have a use for the money if their field of capital allocation were large enough, whereas another management that was more specialized in their own business might not.

But once a company has attended to the things that are required or advantageous for the present business, we think reacquisition of stock is a very logical thing to consider, as long as you don’t think you’re paying more than the intrinsic value of the business in doing it.

And obviously, the bigger the discount from intrinsic value, the more compelling that particular use of money is.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. Generally speaking, maybe Coca-Cola can have a negative equity, but I don’t think it would be a good idea for General Motors. I think there is something to be said for a positive shareholders’ equity.

38. Looking for winners in competitive credit card business

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Edward Barr, Lexington, Kentucky. I had a two-fold question.

Number one, you mentioned American Express earlier. And I was curious as to whether the fact that credit card usage is only 10 percent of all transactions, and that may continue to grow for some time going forward, was a factor in your decision?

And the other part of the question pertains to the durability and permanence of the banking franchise with regard to alternative delivery channels that may appear over the next few years, including the possibility of the Microsoft/Intuit merger.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the specific number you mentioned about credit card usage and so on, that’s not a big factor with us. We think credit cards are both here to stay and likely to grow, to some extent.

Although at some point you start reaching limits, at least in terms of outstandings [outstanding credit card debt] that people are — that make any sense.

But the credit card field is a very big field. The question is, is who’s got the edge in it? Because everybody is going to want to be in it, and they already are. And there are a lot of different ways you can play the game if you’re in the credit card business.

And you better have some way of playing one part of the game, preferably a large part. But you better have some way of playing one part of the game better than others or natural capitalistic forces are going to grind you down.

I mean, it’s a business that people are willing to change their minds about what they do in. I mean, if you offer somebody a credit card that gives them some advantages that don’t exist on their earlier card, people are quite willing to shift cards.

So, you need some kind of an edge in some particular segment of the market. So, the growth aspects overall of the market were not a big — are not a big factor with us.

It’s really a question of figuring out who’s going to win what game, and who’s going to lose what game.

And what was the second question again on that?

39. Expect big changes in banking over next 20 years

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second question pertained to the permanence and durability of the banking franchise.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah, sure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And whether alternative delivery channels over the next few years may erode the durability of that, including the Microsoft/Intuit merger.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. You’re certainly seeing the value of bank branches diminish significantly. It used to be a point of enormous pride with managements, in how many branches they had.

And it was, you know, often political influence and everything else was called into obtaining branch permits.

The world will change in banking, probably in some very major ways, over a 20 or 30-year period. Exactly what players will benefit and which ones will be hurt, you know, is a very tough question.

But I would expect — I would not — I don’t think I’d expect really significant change in banking over the next five years, but I’d certainly expect it over the next 20 years.

And there are a lot of people that have their eye on that market, including Microsoft, as you mention.

It may be to their advantage to hook up with the present players. I mean, I know it’s certainly something that gets explored. But they may figure out a way to go around the present players, too. And that’s one investment consideration.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The interesting player that went around the rest was Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch went heavily into banking with its cash management accounts. And I don’t think it’s the only innovation that’ll come along.

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s the name of that book?

CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, I’d forgotten, that’s a marvelous book.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, there’s a great book.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Maybe Molly remembers. What was that book you gave me? It was the history of the credit card.

WARREN BUFFETT: Was it Joe Nocera’s? Yeah, Joe Nocera was the author. I don’t remember the title [“A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class”]. But it came out about six months to a year ago. It’s a terrific history of the credit card business.

And if you read that you will get some idea of the amount of change that can occur in something like, you know, the movement of money. And my guess is that if there’s another edition of it in 20 years, there’ll be plenty more to write about. So —

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, that is a fabulous book. Most of the people who are here will not be able to put it down. I mean, for a book about an economic development, it captures the human background in a very interesting way.

40. No comment on SunTrust and PNC moats

WARREN BUFFETT: Is it zone 4? That seems far away for zone 3. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was — Adam Engel (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.

I was wondering if you could comment on the moat you see around the castles of SunTrust and PNC.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think I should comment on specific holdings like that. But — so I would say you would look at those in a general way very much as you’d look at banking operations first.

And then you’d try and figure out what are the specific strengths or weaknesses of both organizations. But there, again, I don’t want to spoil the fun for you.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

41. “Wiseass” comment on Salomon that Munger wishes hadn’t occurred

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bob McClure (PH). I’m from the States but I live in Singapore.

About a week ago, in the Asian Wall Street Journal, a remark was attributed to Mr. Munger, specifically that owning Salomon Brothers was like owning a casino with a restaurant in the front. (Laughter)

The casino, eluding to the proprietary trading, and the restaurant, to the so-called client-driven business. If that attribution is correct or accurate can you —

Charlie Munger: Well, I don’t think —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — elaborate on why you view the business in that way?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s entirely correct, but I have a pithy way of speaking on occasion. (Laughter)

And I frequently speak in a way that works with an in-group, but wouldn’t necessarily work everywhere else.

And every once in a while, when you take one of those wiseass comments — (laughter) — out of context — why, I very much wish that it hadn’t occurred. (Laughter)

This was such a case. (Laughter and applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: It won’t stop him in the future, though. (Laughter)

Or me.

42. National debt isn’t scary now, when compared to GDP

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? Or are we in 5? Which one are we in? Kelly? Or —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Randall Bellows (PH) from Chicago.

And the two questions I have, since you’re answering questions so far afield, are, if you were to look at the balance sheet of the United States of America, is the national debt as frightening as — that it appears to be?

And secondly, in terms of redeployment of capital, if Coca-Cola is such a wonderful investment, as it returned so much, why not redeploy some capital in purchasing additional shares of Coca-Cola?

And finally, thank you for letting Jane do that portrait of you. And if it’s good, we’ll do Mr. Munger next. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: First question about the U.S. balance sheet, it — the net national debt is about — it would be about 60-odd percent of GDP.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Without counting unfunded pensions.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but that’s — but also with a claim on the income, in effect, of future citizens, which was an asset, too, that you could set up the —

But that figure, I think, at the end of World War II, may have been — I know it was around at least 125 percent, may have been 150 percent or so, of GDP. So we have sustained —

Now, the interest rate on that debt was much lower. A lot of it was at 2.9 percent because that’s what savings bonds paid.

But that level of debt, which I don’t advocate in relation to GDP, turned out to be quite sustainable. And as a matter of fact, it drifted down year after year for a long time until the early ’80s, when it started rising again. And now it’s actually fallen a little bit in the last few years, the ratio of debt to GDP.

There are a lot of measurements of how much debt is too much and all of that. But, probably, I think that if I had to look at one single statistic, I would look at that ratio, just like I would look at a ratio of debt to income for an individual.

Then you’d get into the question of the stability of the income and to whom it is owed.

But I do not think that the level of debt, relative to the economy, is of anything that’s of a frightening nature. I like the idea of it trending downward a little bit over time rather than trending upward. And if it keeps trending upward, it can get awkward.

Although, it’s — I think, in Italy, I think it’s close to 150 percent now. And you start getting to 150 percent, and talk 8 percent interest rates, and you’re talking 12 percent of GDP essentially going to interest.

If you were to put a balance sheet of the country together, it’s kind of interesting, because you would have this 4 billion of net debt on the liability side, and you’d also have a lot of pension obligations, as Charlie mentions, on the liability side.

But you’ve got a lot of assets, too. You’ve got a 35 percent interest — profits interest — in all the American corporations. I mean, the government, if it has a 35 percent tax rate, really owns 35 percent of the stock of American business. They own a significant part of Berkshire Hathaway.

We write them a check every year. We don’t write you a check every year, but we write them a check. We plow your earnings back to create more value for their stock, in other words, the taxes they get.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Are you trying to cheer these people up? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: But what would you pay to have the right, today, to receive all the future corporate tax payments made by all the companies in the United States, the discounted value? You’d pay a very big number.

What would you pay to have a right to take a percentage of the income of every individual that makes more than X in the United States, and also the right to change your percentage as you went along? That’s a very big number, too. (Laughter)

So, you’ve got a very big asset there that — and you’ve got some very big liabilities, too. But the country is very solvent.

And I would not like to see debt rise at any rapid rate. I wouldn’t like to see it rise at all, but I wouldn’t like to see it, particularly, rise at a rapid rate, because that sets a lot of things in motion, if it’s rising as a percentage of GDP.

But if you tell me that 20 years from now the national debt will be $10 trillion, but that it’ll be the same percentage of GDP, does that alarm me? Not in the least. I mean, I expect it to increase and I think there’s some arguments why — even, why it may be advisable to have it increase.

But I don’t think it’s a good idea to have it take up more and more of your income, because that sets a lot of other things in motion.

So, I welcome what’s happened in the last couple of years, which is to see it decrease modestly from the trend that existed the previous 10 or 12 years.

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally I think that you’re right, that it isn’t all bad. And to the extent that it is bad, a great nation with a capitalistic economy will stand quite a bit of abuse on the political side. It’s a damn good thing, too, because — I don’t think we should be terribly discouraged.

If there’s anything that’s really going to do the country in it’ll be what I call a “Serpico effect,” where you start rewarding what you don’t want more of, and it then just grows, and grows, and grows. But I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad fiscal result, it’s just a bad result.

WARREN BUFFETT: Berkshire owes 7 or 800 million — or whatever it is now, in debt, and we owe another 3 billion-some of float. You know, those numbers would’ve sounded very big to me 25 years ago, but — and yet we’re one of the most conservatively financed operations you’ll find.

Ten years from now we may owe more money, and it may be a smaller percentage still. I mean, you can’t talk about debt levels without relating it to the ability to pay debt. And this country is probably in better financial shape now than it was in 1947.

43. Coca-Cola as “measuring stock” to evaluate alternatives

Zone 1. What, there was a second — was there a second question that I didn’t answer on that? Or —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible)

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, in terms of repurchasing shares. Right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you said, “Why don’t we buy more?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think about it.

CHARLIE MUNGER: We did, not long ago —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we did. We bought more last year, and it’s not a bad measuring stick against buying other things.

But there’s — I would not rule out Berkshire buying more. I don’t have any plans to do it right now, but I wouldn’t rule that out at all because it’s — if I’m going to look at another business I will say, you know, “Why would I rather have this than more Coca-Cola?”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there he is saying something that is very useful to practically any investor, when he said, “Use this as a measuring stick,” in terms of buying other things. For an ordinary individual the best thing you have easily available is your measuring stick.

If it isn’t — if the new thing isn’t better than what you already know is available, it hasn’t met your threshold, then that screens out, you know, 99 percent of what you see, and it’s an enormous thought conserver. And it is not taught in the business schools, by and large.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, and that’s why we think it’s slightly nuts when big institutions decide, because everybody else is doing it, to put 4 percent of their money in international equities or 3 percent in emerging growth countries — some damn thing like that.

I mean, the only reason to put the money in there is if they’ve measured against what they’re already doing.

And if they measure it against what they’re already doing and they think it’s a screamingly good idea to leave 97 percent in the other place and put 3 percent in, you know, I mean, it just doesn’t make any sense whatsoever.

But it’s what committees are talked to about and what keeps investment managers going to conferences and everything, so —

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re deliberately using a technique that takes away the best mental tool they have. And you can say this is nuts, and you’re right.

And I think {German philosopher Friedrich] Nietzsche said it pretty well when he said he laughed at the man who thought he could walk better because he had a lame leg.

I mean, they literally are blinding themselves and then they’re teaching our children how to do this in our own business schools. Very interesting, don’t you think?

And all Warren says is, deciding whether to do something, just compare the best opportunity you have. If that one is better and you’re not taking it, why would you do this just because somebody tells you you need 2 percent in international equities?

44. Buy Berkshire or let your money manager loose?

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Mark Wheeler (PH), I’m from Portland, Oregon. And I have a few eggs in your basket. My grandmother always said, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.”

I have a question, and I think you answered this a couple of years ago in one of your reports about Little Abner’s investment approach.

Suppose I had $100,000 and I decide to buy four or five more of your shares, and that was sort of a buy and hold thing for four or five years.

And also I have a money manager — I’ve already got one — and he does pretty well – 10, 15 percent.

But he churns the assets all the time. You know, every time I turn around all this mailbox full of paperwork. And I guess my question is, how can I arrive at which is a better deal for me?

In other words, to buy Berkshire, which I like, and obviously I’m here, so I’m interested in it, or hang onto my money manager, who just seems to be churning the hell out of the account?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s better than having a broker churning the hell out of the account. (Laughs)

He had a little less incentive if he’s getting a management fee.

But I can’t answer your question as to which decision you should make in that case.

But I would say that if — you’re right, in the sense that, if you buy Berkshire, you should only think about buying it for a very long period of time.

We have no idea what Berkshire is going to do, either intrinsically or in the market, in the next year. And you know, we care about the intrinsic part of it. We don’t care about the market aspect. We do care about building intrinsic value.

And you know, in the end, we don’t think — well, when we own Berkshire, we don’t think of all our eggs being in one basket, I mean, because we have got a lot of good businesses.

But if you’re talking about some, you know, lightning from someplace, the huge liability suit or something like that hitting one corporate entity, we’re one corporate entity. But if you think about it in terms of the business risk implicit in an entity, we have a lot of different good businesses.

In fact, we probably have as decent a collection of good businesses as any company I can think of.

But your money manager will also undoubtedly have the advantage of working with, probably, with smaller sums, too, and that gives him a bigger universe of opportunity.

We’re not set up, taxwise, perfectly, as compared to an individual working with their own capital. We’re set up, taxwise, fine for somebody that’s going to sort of own it forever. But we’re not set up, taxwise, as well for somebody that’s going to own it a year or something of the sort.

Charlie? Anything?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

45. “We like people who are candid”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone what? Oh, back there. I don’t think it’s on. OK.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Jeff Johnson (PH). I’m grateful to be here from Tulsa, Oklahoma.

I have two questions. First, I was hoping you could explain, or offer an opinion as to why investors in property-casualty insurance companies are willing to accept traditionally below-average type of returns.

Second question relates to an answer you gave me yesterday, that being that intuition or gut feeling has nothing to do in your — in making investment decisions.

I was wondering if there is anything subjective in yours and Mr. Munger’s assessment of whether or not you like someone, and how it is that you determine whether or not you like the lord of the castle?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well. I don’t know. Charlie, do you want to answer that second part?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we spoke about agency costs. And there are two different kinds of agency costs. One, the guy favors himself at the expense of the shareholders, and the other is he’s — he does foolish things. Or he’s not trying to favor himself, he just is foolish by nature.

Either way, it’s very costly to you, as the shareholder. So, you have to judge those two aspects of human character, and they’re terribly important.

And on the other hand, there are some businesses so good that they’ll easily stand a lot of folly in the managerial suite. And I — much as we like perfect people, I don’t think we’ve always invested with them.

WARREN BUFFETT: No. But generally, we like people who are candid. We can usually tell when somebody’s dancing around something, or where their — when the reports are essentially a little dishonest, or biased, or something. And it’s just a lot easier to operate with people that are candid.

And we like people who are smart, you know. I don’t mean geniuses. But that — and we like people who are focused on the business.

It’s not real complicated, but we generally — you know, there may be a whole bunch of people in the middle that we don’t really have any feeling on one way or the other, and then we see some that we know we don’t want to be associated with, and some that we know we very much enjoy being associated with.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Averaged out, we’ve been very fortunate.

WARREN BUFFETT: Very lucky.

46. Difficult to get capital out of a sub-par business

CHARLIE MUNGER: And your other question, you said, why is it that these investors accept below-average results? Well, in the nature of things, approximately half the investors are going to get below-average results. They didn’t exactly accept it in advance. It’s just the way it turned out.

WARREN BUFFETT: And the money tends to be fairly captive, once it’s in a company. I mean, it takes a lot — if you have a business that gets subnormal returns over time, there’s a big threshold in terms of either a takeover, or a proxy fight, or something like that to unleash the capital.

So, money that’s tied up in an unprofitable business, or a sub-profitable business, is likely to stay tied up for a good period of time.

Eventually something will probably correct it. But capitalism does not operate so efficiently as to move capital around promptly when it’s misallocated.

We are in a better position to do that when Berkshire owns a company. And obviously, we’re in no position to do it — because it involves something we don’t want to do — if we own it through some other enterprise. We just sell to somebody else who takes another — who takes our chair — at the table, in effect.

47. Focus on future, not current, earnings

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Philip King (PH) from San Francisco.

I’ve got another question about valuation — more specifically, the relation of P/Es to interest rates.

I understand that you don’t want to lay down a rigid formula for valuation, but I also know that you don’t want people to think that a multiple of 20 times earnings is cheap, or a multiple of five times earnings is expensive.

So, Benjamin Graham, he devised a central value theory that valued the average stock at an earnings yield that’s about a third above bond yields.

In other words, that would work out to maybe 11 times earnings, currently. And I know that you’ve compared the average business to a 13 percent bond that’s worth roughly book at 13 percent interest rates, and worth perhaps roughly twice book at 6 percent interest rates.

So, given current interest rates of 7 to 8 percent, as they are now, that would tend to imply that stocks are worth perhaps 12 to 13 times earnings.

And yet, the acquisitions that I’ve seen in the private market have gone out at more like 17 to 20 times earnings. And I’d like to know, what do you think is the rough range of multiples that make sense?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it isn’t a multiple of today’s earnings that is primarily determinate of things. We bought our Coca-Cola, for example, in 1988 and ’89, on this stock, at a price of $11 a share. Which — as low as 9, as high as 13, but it averaged about $11.

And it’ll earn, we’ll say, most estimates are between 230 and 240 this year. So, that’s under five times this year’s earnings, but it was a pretty good size multiple back when we bought it.

It’s the future that counts. It’s like what I wrote there, what Wayne Gretzky says, to go where the puck is going to be, not where it is.

So, the current multiple interacts with the reinvestment of capital and the rate at which that capital’s invested, to determine the attractiveness of something now.

And we are affected in that valuation process to a considerable degree by interest rates, but not by whether they’re 7.3, or 7.0, or 7.5. But I mean, we’ll be thinking much differently if they’re — long-term rates are 11 percent or 5 percent. And — but we don’t have any magic multiples in mind.

We’re thinking — we want to be in the business that 10 years from now is earning a whole lot more money than it is now, and that we will still feel good about the prospects of the business at that time.

That’s the kind of business we’re trying to buy all of, and that’s the kind of business that we try and buy part of. And then sometimes we buy others, too. (Laughs)

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t do any of that rigid formulaic stuff.

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s a general framework, that you can call a formula, in our mind. But we also don’t kid ourselves that we know so much about the specifics that we would actually make a calculation, in terms of the equation.

When we bought Coke in ’88 and ’89 we had this idea about what we thought the business would do over time, but we never reduced it to making a calculation.

Maybe we should, but I mean, it just — we don’t think there’s that kind of precision to it.

We think it’s the right way to think in a general way. And we think, if you try to — if you think that you can do it to pinpoint it, you’re kidding yourself.

And therefore, we think that when we make a decision, there ought to be such a margin of safety that it ought to be so attractive that you don’t have to carry it out to three decimal places.

We’ll take a couple more and then we’ll have to leave. We’ve got a directors — we have one directors meeting a year and we don’t want to disappoint them.

48. USAir was mistake, despite five years of dividends

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, I’m Roy Christian from Aptos, California.

I wanted to ask one question about USAir, which has not been questioned much at this meeting.

When you were on television talking about the losses there, it was funny how so many of my friends or, maybe, acquaintances came forward to tell me this piece of startling news. And, you know, I tried to stand up for you, a little bit. And at least —

WARREN BUFFETT: It was a mistake. (Laughter)

You should’ve just taken a dive. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, at least I wanted to point out to them —

WARREN BUFFETT: No —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — that you did have dividends over a period of —

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER — about five or six years, and that that money was reinvested, maybe at a better return than USAir.

So, that it wasn’t quite the disaster that was pictured on television when you spoke about it, or the impression that all my friends — or I should call them acquaintances — pointed out to me.

Just a comment, I guess, is what I’m asking for.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. Well, you’re right, it could’ve been worse. But it was a mistake. But we received five years, I guess — yeah, it’d be five years of dividends at a good rate while we got it.

But it’s like somebody says, “It isn’t the return on principal that you care about, it’s the return of principal.” And we —

But we’re better off — we’re a lot better off, obviously, than if we’d bought the common [stock], and we’re even better off than if we bought some other stocks.

But it was still a big mistake on my part. But keep standing up for me. I need all the help I can get on this one. (Laughter)

49. Charlie’s and Warren’s book recommendations

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Chris Stabru (PH) from New York.

Charlie, in addition to the book that you mentioned on credit cards, are there any other books you have been reading that you’d recommend to us?

And Warren, are there any books that you have been reading that you’d recommend? I know you’re a fan of Bertrand Russell. Any favorite one or two of his books?

WARREN BUFFETT: Been a long time since I’ve read those, though. I mean, I read a lot of Russell, but I did that a — he hasn’t written much in the last 10 or 15 years. (Laughs)

Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a textbook which is called, I think, “Judgment in Managerial Decision Making.” And it’s used in some of the business schools, and it’s actually quite a good book.

It’s not spritely — it’s not written in a spritely way that makes it fun to read, but there’s a lot of wisdom in it. It’s something like Braberman [Max Bazerman]. But it’s “Judgment in Managerial Decision Making.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Since taking up computer bridge, which is 10 hours a week, it’s really screwed up my reading. (Laughter)

It’s a lot of fun, though.

50. Despite “awkward to disadvantageous” per share price, Berkshire won’t split stock

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? We’ll take a couple more and then we’ll —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I am Dick Leighton from Rockford, Illinois.

This is the first annual meeting that I’ve attended and it’s been very beneficial to me. I’ve been extremely impressed with the number of people here, but even more so with the number of young people who have come.

And I would like very much to be able to bring my grandchildren as shareholders, but I find it difficult to get shares into their hands with the current per unit value.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the nicest introduction to the stock split question we’ve had. (Laughter)

It really is, too.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I thought you would appreciate that. (Laughter)

Obviously you understand the question. I understand the position you’ve taken over the years and the fact that it adds no value to make the split.

In this case, however, it could be a tax savings to many of us who would like to get stock shares into the hands of other family members.

Should I just go to work on my congressman to change the tax code, or would you consider a change? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very valid question. And there’s certainly a couple of areas, one of which you’ve just mentioned.

And I had someone else mention to me that they had their Berkshire in an IRA account. And now they were getting into the mandatory payment arrangement, and it didn’t work well, in terms of using the Berkshire — although I think they could sell it and then pay out a percentage of it.

There are certain aspects, primarily of gifting, where it is anywhere from awkward to disadvantageous to have the price per share on a stock that exists with Berkshire.

And you know, we’re aware of it, we’ve thought about it, and we’ve got our own personal situations even, sometimes, that are involved in that. I’ve got one in the family, which we’ve worked — figured out ways around.

The disadvantage, of course, is that you saw a little even earlier this year of what a book [“The Warren Buffett Way”] can do.

We want to attract shareholders who are as investment-oriented as we can possibly obtain, with as long-term horizons.

And to some extent, the publicity about me is negative, in that respect. Because I know that if we had something that it was a lot easier for anybody with $500 to buy, that we would get an awful lot of people buying it who didn’t have the faintest idea what they were doing, but heard the name bandied around in some way.

And secondly, to the extent that ever created a market that was even — that was stronger — you then would have people buying it simply because it was going up. We got a little bit of that going on this year.

There are a lot of people that are attracted to stocks that are going upward. It doesn’t attract us, but it attracts the rest of the world to some degree.

So we are almost certain that we would get — we don’t know the degree to which it would happen — we are almost certain we would get a shareholder base that would not have the level of sophistication and the synchronization of objectives with us that we have now. That is almost a cinch.

And what we really don’t need in Berkshire stock is more demand. I mean, that is not — we don’t care to have it sell higher, except as intrinsic value grows.

Ideally, we would have the stock price exactly parallel to change in intrinsic value over time because then everybody would be treated fairly among our shareholders.

They would all gain or lose, as the company gained or lost, over their ownership period. And anything that artificially stimulated the price in one period simply means that some other period’s shareholders are going to be disappointed.

I mean, we don’t want the stock to sell at twice intrinsic value, or 50 percent above intrinsic value. We want the intrinsic value to grow a lot.

And I don’t think there’s any question, but that we would get a worse result in that aspect if we introduce splits in, because then people would think about other possibilities that might give the stock a temporary boost.

We — they had a tabulation in Businessweek a couple of months ago on turnover on the exchange. We were at 3 percent, and I don’t think anybody was, that I saw on the list, was under double digits and bigger numbers.

But those are people who are simply, you know, their shareholders leaving frequently, and new shareholders coming in with shorter-term anticipations. We have wanted this to be as much like a private partnership as we can have, with everybody having the ability to buy it.

We don’t think the minimum investment is too high to — in this investment world. I mean, there are all kinds of investment opportunities that are limited to 25,000 or 50,000, and that sort of thing.

But the problem of making change, you know, in terms of gifts or — you know, that I wish I had a better answer for, because I think that is a —

CHARLIE MUNGER: My grandchildren pay me the difference between $20,000 and the current price. And I think that’s a very reasonable way for them to behave, particularly when they are, sometimes, they’re only six weeks old. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: You need a spouse’s consent to make it — to work with 20, obviously.

But most of the things can be solved, but I’ll admit it isn’t as easy to solve as if we just had a stock denominated in lower dollars per share.

I do think that once you get a shareholder base that is — has got — that has different objectives or expectations or anything, you can’t get rid of it. I mean, you can keep a shareholder base like Berkshire, but you can’t reconstruct it if you destroy it in some way.

And it’s important to us who we’re in with. I mean, it enables us to — I think it helps us in our operation. I think it even may — in some cases, it may even help us in acquisitions, in terms of who we attract.

It may — for all I know, it may hurt us someplace, too, that I don’t know about. But I don’t think so, because I think we can design — particularly with a preferred stock — we can design something to satisfy somebody who might have in mind a different denomination of security.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Look around you. Are we really likely to do a lot better? This is a good bunch.

1995年股东大会

上午场

1. 欢迎致辞

巴菲特:早上好。我是沃伦·巴菲特,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事长。在我左边的是查理·芒格,副董事长,也是我的搭档。我们会设法在会议进行到某个时候让他说上几句。(笑)

今天的形式会稍微有点不同。

我们有一项议程需要处理——通常我们把会议开得相当快,今天也会这样,但我们有一项关于优先股的议程,我看得出来它让一些人感到困惑。所以我会稍微讲一讲这件事。

在就这一项表决之前,如果有谁想就优先股的事发言,我们到时候会接受任何意见或提问。然后我们会把会议余下的部分快速过完,接着再开放提问。到那时我也有一项公告要宣布。

在那之后,我们大概会一直进行到接近中午。如果有谁想提前离开,请尽管离开,显然,任何时候都可以。不过正如我之前提到的,趁查理讲话的时候离开会更得体。(笑)而且你得动作快点。(笑)

接下来我们会在临近中午前休息几分钟,好让大家更有秩序地撤场。外面会有大巴,把各位送回酒店,或者送到伯克希尔旗下的任何商业场所去。

还有,因为有这么多——至少根据预订的门票来看,我们这里有来自50个州中49个州的人。只缺佛蒙特州。我们这里——连阿拉斯加都有人,每个地方都有代表团。

我们有来自澳大利亚、以色列、瑞典、法国、英国的人,还有40多位来自加拿大。所以很多人是远道而来。因此,查理和我会留下来。

事实上,我们会就在这上面吃午饭。我们会——你们可不会想看我们吃东西。我们会一直留到也许晚至3点,但如果人数降到两百以下,我们就觉得可以收场了。

但我们确实想回答每个人的问题。各位是公司的部分所有者。任何与你们持有伯克希尔股份有关的问题,我们都想给你们机会来问。

这很不容易,因为在场的人太多了。我不知道另一个房间里有多少人。但我相信这个房间里大约有3300人。我们想照顾到你们——照顾到你们所有人。所以那部分会在会议之后进行。

现在,我们有一点正事要处理。

2. 选举董事

巴菲特:会议现在开始。我先来介绍一下除我之外的伯克希尔董事们。他们就在下面这里。我念到你们名字的时候,请你们起立。

苏珊·T·巴菲特(掌声)。

霍华德·巴菲特(掌声)

你们可以理解,这些名字都是我们从电话簿里找来的——(笑)

马尔科姆·蔡斯三世(掌声)

还有小沃尔特·斯科特(掌声)

今天与我们在一起的,还有我们的审计机构德勤会计师事务所的合伙人,罗恩·伯吉斯先生和克雷格·克里斯蒂安森先生(音译)。他们可以回答各位可能提出的、与该所对伯克希尔账目审计有关的适当问题。

福里斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对本次会议作书面记录。

罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯先生已被任命为本次会议的选举监票人。他将对董事选举中所投票数进行核证。

本次会议指定的代理委托持有人是小沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。截至上周五收回的委托书代表998,258股伯克希尔股份,将由代理持有人按委托卡上所示进行表决。

这一股份数量已构成法定人数,因此我们将直接开始会议。我们将处理会议的各项事务,然后宣布正式会议休会。之后我们会接受各位可能提出的问题。

第一项议程是宣读上次股东会议的会议记录。我现在请小沃尔特·斯科特先生向会议提出一项动议。

小沃尔特·斯科特:我提议免去宣读上次股东会议记录这一程序。

巴菲特:有人附议吗?

一个声音:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:有人附议吗?(笑)

一个声音:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:动议已提出并获附议。有什么意见或问题吗?我们将以口头表决方式就该动议进行表决。所有赞成的请说「赞成」。

众声音:赞成。

巴菲特:反对的呢?动议通过。(笑)

秘书是否能报告有权投票并在本次会议上获得代表的伯克希尔已发行股份数量?

福里斯特·克鲁特:是的,我有。正如随本次会议通知一同寄出、并于1995年3月7日(即本次会议的股权登记日)以一类邮件寄送给所有在册股东的委托书声明所示,伯克希尔已发行的普通股为1,177,750股,每股就会议审议的各项动议享有一票表决权。

其中,998,258股已通过截至上周五收回的委托书在本次会议上获得代表。

巴菲特:谢谢。如果在场的股东希望撤回此前寄交的委托书,并就委托书声明中规定的两项议程亲自投票,他或她可以这样做。

另外,如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书,并希望领取选票以便就这两项议程亲自投票,你们也可以这样做。如果你想这样做,请向过道里的会议工作人员表明身份,他们会为你提供两张选票,每项议程一张。

想要领取选票的人士,能否请表明一下身份,以便我们分发?只要举手,就会拿到一张。

本次会议的第一项议程是选举董事。我现在请小沃尔特·斯科特先生就董事选举向会议提出一项动议。

小沃尔特·斯科特:我提议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和小沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

一个声音:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:已经有人提出并附议,选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和小沃尔特·斯科特为董事。还有其他提名吗?有什么讨论吗?你们做得很好。(笑)

提名已可以进行表决。如果有股东亲自投票,他们现在应当在董事选举的选票上做标记,并将选票交给选举监票人。请把那些选票收上来。

也请各位代理持有人按照所收到的指示对委托票进行表决,向选举监票人提交一张董事选举的选票。

菲茨西蒙斯先生,等你准备好了,就可以宣读你的报告。

罗伯特·菲茨西蒙斯:我的报告已准备好。截至上周五收到的代理持有人选票,为每位被提名人投出的票数不少于996,892票。该数字远远超过已发行股份数量的过半数。

特拉华州法律所要求的、关于票数精确统计的核证(包括在本次会议上亲自投出的票),将交给秘书,与本次会议记录一并存档。

巴菲特:谢谢你,菲茨西蒙斯先生。沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和小沃尔特·斯科特已当选为董事。

3. 授权发行优先股的提案

巴菲特:本次会议的第二项议程,是审议董事会提出的修改公司章程的建议。

拟议的修订将在公司章程中增加一项条款,授权董事会发行最多一百万股优先股,可分一个或多个系列发行,其优先权、限制以及相对权利由董事会决定。

我们在年报里对此谈过一些。但我得说——确切数字我们会查出来——但我想我们大概有11000或12000——也许12000股左右投了反对票。我想还有几千股弃权。

既然这项提案确实没有任何坏处,那这就向我表明,我没能很好地把授权发行优先股的逻辑解释清楚。所以,我现在想就这件事讲上一分钟。

我也愿意让任何想就此提问的人现在就提。我们稍后也可以谈。不过如果你想在表决前就谈,那也没问题。

这项授权就只是授权而已。它是一项授权,并不是发行股份的命令,也不是一道指令。它只不过赋予公司董事在某种情形下——在公司发行优先股有意义的情形下——这样做的能力。

现在,当我们收购企业时——过几分钟讲完这个我会给你们讲一桩——当我们收购企业时,有时卖方想要现金,有时他们想要普通股。

当然也完全有可能,就像去年某位潜在卖方那样,他们在那种情况下想要的是可转换优先股。

从我们的角度看,只要我们给出的对价价值相等,我们其实并不在乎——除了我们可能取得的计税基础这个问题之外,但我们——

在其他经济层面,我们不在乎用什么形式的对价,因为我们会把现金、纯优先股、可转换优先股、普通股等等的价值都换算成相等的。

所以,如果担心的是我们在发行优先股时会干蠢事,那你应该——那是一种完全合理的担忧。但你同样应该担心我们在动用现金或普通股时会干蠢事。

我是说,如果我们要干点不明智的事,我们用各种各样的工具都能干得出来。(笑)

而且,我们也不会仅仅因为有了优先股,行为就变得更放纵什么的。

优先股可能给出售企业的卖方提供一个跟我们做免税交换的机会。他们可能不想要普通股,因为他们的持股状况也许是那种不愿承担普通股持有风险的情况。这就是为什么我们的优先股在条款上是灵活的。

因为我们可以给这些人一只直接的优先股,配上一个能让它在发行时按面值计价的票息。这样他们就能知道未来许许多多年里自己的收入会是多少。这对他们来说也许是最看重的事。

我们也可以给他们发行一只可调利率优先股,随着货币市场环境的变化,它的票息也会变化。这样他们就能确保在余生里本金价值保持不变。这两个因素中的一个,或两个,对不同的卖方来说,重要性可能各不相同。

所以,如果我们有能力发行各种形式的优先股,我们手头就有更多形式的「货币」可以用来做收购。因为一只优先股,只要结构设计得当,就能让与卖方达成免税交易成为可能。这对很多卖方来说很重要。

当然,到头来,很多卖方还是会偏好现金,就跟过去一样。而那些不想要现金的卖方,大概多数会想要普通股。但我们手里会有优先股可用。

我们只授权发行一百万股,是因为根据特拉华州法律,有一笔——我想是有一笔年费。我知道是有一笔初始费用。而且我想还有一笔年费,跟授权发行的股份数量挂钩。

所以,如果我们授权发行一亿股,就得交更高的年费,而这是芒格先生绝不会让我干的事。(笑)

所以我们要做的是,如果我们发行这个,毫无疑问,我们会发行一些「子股」,这样出于税务目的,股份的数量就相对有限。

但我们会发行子股,本质上是为了在市场上更容易找零、流通。

如果情况需要,我们也可能发行一只可转换优先股。但这只可转换优先股在我们发行的当时,价值不会比一只直接优先股更高。我们会在票息、转换价格等等方面做相应调整。

所以我们可以把各种形式的「货币」等值起来,以契合企业卖方的意愿。这只不过是又多了一个做这件事的工具而已。就像我说的,没有什么坏处——除非我们做了蠢事。

而如果我们用这个干了蠢事,那我们用现金或者别的什么也一样会干蠢事。所以——我们大概早些时候就该这么做了,只是我们以前从来没碰到过有卖方想要这种形式「货币」的情况。

所以这只是——而且我们一向觉得我们能很快把它授权下来。但如果有一笔交易正悬而未决,没理由为了召集一次会议把这事记在账上,而白白损失几个月。所以,这只不过是又一个工具。

如果有——任何人对优先股有任何问题或意见,就像我说的,你们可以留到稍后,但我也很乐意在我们表决之前听一听。有没有?

对,那边有个问题。请稍等一下,我们给您递个话筒过去。

各位提问的时候,无论现在还是稍后,如果能报上您的姓名和居住地,我会很感激。

观众:您好,我叫劳伦斯·瓦瑟博士。我来自纽约。

我的问题是这样的。如果你想买一家企业,而企业里的人想要现金,你就得有现金,那种——你知道的,这种现金。

巴菲特:我们对它很熟悉。

观众:是啊。(笑声和掌声)

但我觉得,优先股其实并不是现金,它是一种法定信用货币。也就是说,它是一种我们可以凭空创造出来的货币。

巴菲特:没错。在这一点上它就像普通股。它是——它是一种形式——它是一种替代形式的货币,而且——但它是——

就拿普通股来说吧,假设我们有足够的授权额度,我们就有无限的能力创造货币。当然,如果我们把价格定错了,就会稀释旧货币的价值。不过你接着说。

观众:在我们投赞成票之前——我相信在座这群人大概会投赞成票,因为他们信任你——但在我们投赞成票之前,它是不存在的。

巴菲特:对,是这样。顺便说一句,普通股也是如此。如果我们授权发行的普通股不比已发行的多——我想我们授权了一百五十万股。

但假设我们已经把授权的股份全发行出去了。在股东授权发行更多之前——那就——它就没法被拿来发行。

观众:可如果股东授权发行了更多,那股东持股的价值不就会被稀释吗,难道不是这样吗?

巴菲特:只有在我们收到的价值比我们付出的少的时候才会。这是关键所在。

我的意思是,如果我们发行了价值 2 亿美元的优先股,而我们换来的企业只值 1.5 亿,那毫无疑问你比之前更糟了。顺便说一句,我们也一样。但我们大家都更糟了。

如果我们付出的现金,比一家企业的实际价值更高,情况也是一样的。如果我们为一家只值 1.5 亿的企业付出 2 亿现金,我们就更糟了。我们也许一股都没发行。但我们这么做的话,就稀释了你手中股票的价值。

只要我们收到了对等的价值——无论付出的是现金、普通股还是优先股——那么你在价值上就没有被稀释。这是很重要的一点。

显然,有不少公司——就像你们可能——查理和我在年报里以及别处都评论过的——在我们看来,有不少公司,尤其是发行了普通股,而这些股票的价值高于他们换回来的东西。

而——他们这么做的时候,就是在搞一种我所说的——瓦乔维亚银行的约翰·梅德林称之为「倒着发的连锁信」的把戏。(笑)

这让美国的股东们损失了一大笔钱。我不认为它会在伯克希尔让股东损失什么。但对股东来说,这是一种完全合理的担忧。

因为管理层可以仅仅靠发行这些小纸片就建起一个帝国,而他们觉得这些纸片没花他们一分钱。

我想查理过去有个关于这事的故事。你想说说吗,查理?当然,不点名。(笑)

芒格:有这么一家银行,其中一位高管想要股票期权,他向管理层指出,他们可以把这些股票全发出去,而且一分钱都不用花。

现在,想象一下雇了一个这样想事情的经理,还付钱给他——(笑)——让他就在你身边充当犹大。

巴菲特:我们跟一些经理人谈过话——(笑)——他们告诉我们,他们觉得自己多幸运,因为股价跌了,他们可以更便宜地发行期权。

那么,如果他们是把这些期权发给第三方的话,你知道,我可不敢肯定他们的态度还会一模一样。

但我们丝毫没有「发行股票就让我们变富了」这种感觉。我们的感觉是:当我们换回一家企业、其价值至少跟我们发行的股票相当时,我们才变富了。除非是这种情况,否则我们不打算发行股票。但这是一种完全合理的担忧。

观众:问题的第二部分是,显然,发行优先股之后,你就会出现这样一种局面:普通股股东——可以说——被排到了队伍的后面。

在座的普通股股东,如果现在排在队伍的最前面,为什么要愿意退到队伍的后面去呢?

巴菲特:嗯,这——不过,如果我们用现金买一家企业,而我们——比如说我们借钱来买,那我们借钱的那家银行也会排在普通股股东前面,情况也是一样的。

这毫无疑问。任何时候你只要——你只要进行涉及资本结构的交易,你就改变了资本结构中每一部分的潜在前景。

如果你发行大量普通股,而你又有一些在外的债务,那你通常就改善了那笔债务的处境。

问题其实就归结为:你是否认为,通过发行优先股、或者也许借入大量资金来做一笔收购,普通股股东的处境得到了改善。

我的意思是,在伯克希尔的历史上有那么几次,我们借钱去买东西、去买一家企业。而当我们这么做时,我们就把一家银行、或一家保险公司、或者随便谁,置于普通股股东之前。几年前我们发行一些债务时就是这么做的。

这里就有一个权衡的问题:借钱是否会让普通股股东处境更好。但借钱对股东未必有任何害处——尽管当然,如果借得过头了,那就是有害的。

而优先股是一种准借入资金的形式,它的确排在普通股股东前面。但与此同时,如果我们发行它,我们也在增添一家我们认为会让股东受益的企业。所以这就是其中的取舍。

好的。

观众:我叫马特·扎克曼(音)。我来自佛罗里达州迈阿密。

我的问题是,在我看来,如果可转换股——优先股——的发行超过某个限额,似乎就需要股东表决。这些限额是什么?

巴菲特:对于我们可能采用的转换条款,没有任何限制。但举个例子,假如我们要发行一只可转换优先股——现在我们并没有这样做的计划,但有可能发生。事实上,今年很可能就会发生。

那个——我们会——而备选方案,比方说,是为一家企业付给某人一亿美元现金。如果我们要发行一只直接优先股,我们会算出价值一亿美元的直接优先股能卖多少钱、需要多高的票息。

而这取决于赎回条款以及其他一些因素。但对于伯克希尔这样的 3A 级信用来说,你知道,大概会在 7% 上下的区间。而那样的话,他们就分享不到普通股上涨的好处。

如果他们想要一种能确保维持本金价值的东西,那你就得发行一只可调利率优先股,让它的价值保持在面值附近。

那只优先股的初始票息也许是,比如说,5% 之类的,因为它有能力随利率上下浮动。但它的价值会始终保持在面值左右。

如果我们要发行一只可转换优先股,它的转换价格也许会是——随便挑个数字——28,000 之类的,而票息则远低于一只直接优先股的票息。

所以无论我们做什么,在我们心里,它们都会折算成我们所给出的价值。

我们不会因为交易形式变了,就在只愿意支付 100% 的 X 的情况下,给出 120% 的 X。

但你很可能会在某个时点看到我们发行——你可能会看到我们发行可转换优先股,可能会看到我们发行普通优先股,可能会看到我们发行浮动利率优先股。我希望我们能做点什么,因为你知道,我想——

观众:是的。基于——

巴菲特:如果我们这么做,那我们会认为自己因此变得更好了。

观众:嗯,基于你过去的业绩,我相信你得到的价值会多于你给出的价值。

巴菲特:嗯。

观众:不过无论如何,我的理解是,根据特拉华州的法律,如果某只可转换证券转换后所发行的股份数量超过已发行股份总数的 20%,那就需要股东投票表决。我也可能弄错了。

巴菲特:我觉得那是一条证券交易所的规定,对吧,查理?

芒格:是的。

巴菲特:你说的这条规定没错,但是——

芒格:那是纽约证券交易所的规定。

巴菲特:那是纽约证券交易所的规定。那得是 50 亿美元以上的交易。而且,你知道,我们很乐意做一笔 50 亿美元的交易,但我不认为我们会做成。

所以我得说,任何一笔收购大到需要股东投票的可能性,大概都很小。

但这并不是因为我们不感兴趣。(笑)

而且你知道,如果我们真有这么一笔交易,我们会回来找你们——(笑)——而且票数早就攥在手里了。(笑声与掌声)

关于优先股还有别的问题吗?我们待会儿也可以再多聊聊这个。我只是想——哦,来了。当然,请讲。

观众:早上好,巴菲特先生。

巴菲特:早上好。

观众:我是来自芝加哥的 Raina Di Costiloy(音)。能来到这里我非常自豪。我看着你们这样不断壮大,要不了多久我们就得搬到橄榄球场里去开会了。(笑)

我觉得你的解释非常有帮助。因为当我读这些内容时——我相信其他许多外行人也一样——我没弄明白你——

巴菲特:(听不清)

Rayna Di Costiloy:——没弄明白你们在做什么。你提到了优先股。但在招股说明书里,并不清楚到底是可转换优先股,还是普通优先股。你在回答前面几个问题时把这点说清楚了,但有些人觉得它会稀释他们的股票。

巴菲特:是的。嗯,我本该在年报里把这点讲清楚的。我很高兴今天有机会把它讲明白。

关于优先股还有别的问题吗?好的。

观众:在这些股份获得授权之后,你们不必再就其条款回来征求股东投票表决。而且你刚才是从收购公司的角度来讨论这件事的。

我的问题是,你们自己,通过伯克希尔·哈撒韦,持有好几家公司的优先股:所罗门、全美航空、美国运通。

对于你们买入的那些公司优先股的条款,那些公司的股东需要投票表决吗?还是说这件事留在董事会层面来决定?

巴菲特:那些——

观众:你能澄清一下这一点吗?

巴菲特:请——抱歉,你请说。

观众:你能澄清一下这一点吗,麻烦了?

巴菲特:好的。我们买了——我想我们大概直接从公司手里买了六只优先股。

由于这些交易没有一笔触发我们前面讨论过的那条纽约证券交易所的规定——如果它们再大一些,是有可能触发的,但它们没有——所以这些交易没有一笔需要经过股东批准。

我想我们与某家公司之间唯一一笔需要经过股东批准的交易,是我们买入大都会/ABC(Cap Cities/ABC)股票那次。嗯,我们是在 1986 年初买入的。我想是他们的股东在 1985 年批准的。

但唯一可能需要批准的情形,就是它触发了那条纽约证券交易所的规定。而我们的买入规模没有大到会触发它。

还有别的问题吗?好,还有一个。

观众:我叫 Dale Vocawitz(音)。我来自伊利诺伊州香槟市。

最近一期的《巴伦周刊》指出,也许可以发行一种集所有优点于一身的优先股,也就是这样一种:对发行方而言,股息看起来像利息,可以税前扣除。

而对买入方而言,它又能够享受股息所得扣除(dividends received deduction)。你认为这种结构在这些股份上有可能实现吗?

巴菲特:嗯,我们还没考虑过这个。我知道你说的是什么,但我不认为这能行得通。

首先一点,我不认为你那样真能做成一笔免税的交易。查理,你说呢?

芒格:我们大概不会去耍那么聪明的小花招。(笑)

巴菲特:我脑子里冒出了好几句俏皮话,不过我想我还是留着自己听吧。(笑)

我猜那种结构没法长久奏效。我知道你说的是什么,但我猜它行不通。

有些公司——咱们接着往下讲——但有些公司很在意自己在一笔交易里所给出的对价,无论是现金、还是优先股等等,因为他们在意自己能得到的会计处理。

他们想要——他们通常想要权益结合法(pooling)处理,而不是购买法(purchase)会计处理。我在这儿就不展开讲了。我知道这会让你失望,但我在这儿就不展开了。不过我可能会在下一份年报里讲。

而那一点对我们来说完全无所谓。我们对自己能得到什么样的会计处理毫不在乎。我们觉得我们拥有的这群股东足够聪明,能够理解一笔交易的经济实质。

也就是说,通过在如何构建交易结构上玩各种花样,比如把一部分收购价款再通过损益表来回流——这种做法是有人在做的——但这根本不是我们在乎的事情。

我们宁愿去做对我们和卖方而言最合理的事情,然后再向你们解释这笔交易可能产生的任何会计上的特殊之处。这大概把我们和大多数公司区分开来了。而且这大概偶尔也能帮我们做成一笔交易。

还有别的吗?

观众:——真的

巴菲特:好的,现在我能听清你说话了。

Dale Vocawitz:好。我想问的是,对于那些出于种种原因可能更偏好这只优先股的股东来说,会不会有机会参与进来?

巴菲特:嗯,如果我们发行了一只优先股,而它开始活跃交易——比方说,那是一家有许多股东、而不是只有少数股东的公司。显然,那会是任何新股东或现有股东都可以自己做决定的事情——决定他们是更偏好那只证券还是别的。

我们可以——但并没有这样的计划,我也看不出会发生——我们可以提出,用优先股来换取现有的普通股。

可以想见,会有少数人感兴趣,但是——大多数人在自己想持有哪一类证券这件事上,已经做出了自我选择,那就是持有伯克希尔的普通股。

所以他们不大可能想转换成优先股,因为他们会——我们不会给出价值上的溢价,那只不过是一种替代证券而已。

不过我们是可以这么做的。我是说,而且那大概会是一笔免税的交易。

我们没有这样做的计划,但这是一件——如果我们哪天觉得有足够多的人可能想要,我们是可以提供的。但谁也不会被强制接受。这是个好问题。

好吗?我们继续往下进行。

是否有人提出动议,采纳董事会的建议?

小沃尔特·斯科特:我提议采纳对公司注册证书第四条的修正案,具体内容载于本次会议公司委托书的附件A。

巴菲特:有人附议吗?

一个声音:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:现在已有人提出并附议采纳拟议中的公司注册证书修正案。还有进一步的讨论吗?

我们准备就该动议进行表决。如果有股东要亲自投票,现在就请在拟议的注册证书修正案上勾选选票,并把选票交给计票监督员。

那边正在收一些选票。也请各位代理人投票人把拟议修正案的选票交给计票监督员,并按照所收到的指示行使委托票权。

我们在这儿稍等一下。

菲茨西蒙斯先生,您准备好了就可以宣读您的报告。

罗伯特·菲茨西蒙斯:我的报告已经准备好了。截至上周五收到的代理投票人选票统计——赞成拟议注册证书修正案的票数不少于928,889票。

这一票数远远超过所有已发行股份总数的过半数。按特拉华州法律要求、对票数精确计数(包括本次会议现场亲自投出的票)的认证文件,将交给秘书,与本次会议的会议记录存放在一起。

巴菲特:谢谢您,菲茨西蒙斯先生。载于本次会议委托书附件A的注册证书修正案获得通过。

在事务性会议结束休会之后,我将回答各位可能有的、与伯克希尔业务相关的问题,但这些问题不需要在本次会议上采取任何表决行动。

在我们休会之前,还有人有任何要提交本次会议的事务吗?如果没有,我请小沃尔特·斯科特向大会提出一项动议。

小沃尔特·斯科特:我提议本次会议休会。

一个声音:我附议这项动议。

巴菲特:休会动议已经提出并获得附议。我们将以口头方式表决。有讨论吗?如果没有,赞成的请说「赞成」。

观众:赞成。

巴菲特:反对的请说「反对」。会议到此休会。(笑)

4. 收购海兹伯格钻石公司

巴菲特:现在,我想跟各位讲一件事——这是年报发布之后发生的,你们当中有些人可能在报纸上读到过,但也许不是所有人都听说了。

就在年报发布后不久,我们和Helzberg's Diamonds(赫尔兹伯格钻石)完成了一笔交易,对方是巴尼特·赫尔兹伯格,他今天也在场。巴尼特,请你站起来好吗?好的,他在那儿。请大家给他鼓鼓掌。(掌声)

你们也许会对这事是怎么促成的感兴趣,因为在伯克希尔最近三次会议里,巴尼特参加了其中两次。他在一个IRA账户里有一些股份,去年他也来了。

就在那次会议之后不久,我回到了纽约市。我正在第58街过马路,就在第五大道、广场酒店旁边。一位女士喊道:「巴菲特先生」,我就回过头去。

她走过来,说她参加了去年的——或者说几天前的——年会,说她很喜欢。我说:「那太好了。」然后我又开始过马路。

而巴尼特当时大概在三四十英尺开外。我并不认识他,他听到了这位女士的话。于是他也说了同样的话。我回过头去,我们握了手。那是我第一次见到他,他说:「你知道吗,」他说,「我也许有一桩你会感兴趣的生意。」

我老是听到这种话,所以——(笑)

于是我说:「那这样吧,你为什么不给我写封信呢?」过了一段时间,我收到了巴尼特的来信。他一直在考虑,对他父亲于1950年创办、自始至终都设在堪萨斯城的这家生意,做点什么安排。他一直在探索各种途径。

不过,多半在某种程度上是因为他作为伯克希尔股东的背景,他对公司与伯克希尔结缘抱有某种特定的兴趣。他非常在意公司能有一个永久的归宿。

他非常在意公司能处在一个可以成长、能自主经营、并且依然立足堪萨斯城的环境里。而作为交换,他想得到某种他乐意持有一辈子的东西。

于是,我们很快就谈成了一笔交易——就在年报付印之后没多久。

所以现在,我想大概是从昨天凌晨12点01分起,这笔交易就完成交割了。因为《哈特—斯科特—罗迪诺法案》以及其他一些事项,中间有这么一段等待期。

交易交割了。现在伯克希尔成了Helzberg's Diamonds的所有者,这家公司大约有150家门店,分布在大概26或27个州,确切数字我也说不准。门店大多开在购物中心里,也有一些开在别处。它一直极其成功。

巴尼特请来了杰夫·考蒙特(Jeff Comment),他从前经营沃纳梅克百货(Wanamaker's),我想那大概是八年前的事了。

这家公司既以其传统门店形式不断扩张——最近又推出了一种新的门店形式,而且非常成功。

就它在珠宝行业的定位而言,它往往是和Zales或Gordon's这类公司竞争,但它做得要出色得多得多。

在大致相当的营业面积下,它每家门店的销售额几乎是竞争对手的两倍。

它有着极好的士气和组织架构。还有那些员工——在这笔出售交易中,巴尼特对员工非常慷慨。他自掏腰包善待员工,因为这些年来他们干得实在太出色了。

我想,随着时间推移,你们会看到Helzberg's成为伯克希尔里一个非常重要的组成部分。这也说明,从这些年会里能促成些什么。所以,你们其余的人,都拿出本事来吧。(笑)

总之,这是一桩主要以普通股完成的收购。它不涉及优先股,而——因为巴尼特更想要普通股。

不过——不同的人有不同的需求。有时候,一群股东之间可能会有不同的优先考量。这正是我们想要拥有多种「币种」(交易对价工具)的原因。

如果我们没能使用普通股,我们就不会做成这笔交易,因为巴尼特并不急于给政府开一张大额支票。而用普通股的方式做这笔交易,我们就能在这方面帮到他。

总之,我们很高兴Helzberg's成为伯克希尔的一部分。在下次开会之前的这一年里,如果我们再宣布一两桩收购,我也不会感到意外。我希望如此。但没有任何保证。

5. 巴菲特家族坐镇董事会增添稳定性

巴菲特:现在我们要把会议转入提问环节。我们还是按以前的方式来。我们把这个大厅分成了六个区。如果你举手,你所在那个区的引导员就会示意请你提问。我们会一轮一轮地转下去。

在还没问过第一个问题的人都问完之前,任何一个区我们都不会叫到第二个人。我们还——我们在那个外溢分会场里也设了一个区。所以一共会有七个区。

我们就这么一轮一轮转下去,请你提问时先报上自己的名字。我们将非常乐意回答你的问题。问得越多越好。那么,我们从1区开始。

观众:我叫小弗雷德·埃尔费尔(音),来自加利福尼亚州萨克拉门托。

我想请问,您能不能详细说说,把两位家族成员加入董事会背后的考量逻辑是什么?

巴菲特:嗯,首先一点,这对家庭和睦非常有好处。(笑)

正如我在年报里讲过的——如果我今晚就去世,你们知道,我的股票会归我太太所有,而她是董事会成员之一。

她会一直持有这些股票,直到她去世,届时股票会转给一家基金会。所以,从规划、税法等等方面来说,我们是希望能有一个尽可能长期、尽可能稳固的所有权结构,能做多久就做多久。

我的意思是,我们邀请像Helzberg's这样的企业加入伯克希尔,我们认为,对他们来说,这是一种特别有利的经营方式,也让他们清楚自己正在加入的是一个怎样的未来。

而要清楚自己正在加入的这个未来,其中一部分就在于:要知道所有权是稳定的。在伯克希尔,这种稳定会维持非常非常长的时间,大概就是这世上任何人所能规划的最长期限了。

在我去世之后,家族不会参与企业的经营管理,但他们会参与企业的所有权。

届时你会有一个非常庞大、非常集中的所有权头寸,一直延续到那家基金会,而这个所有者会非常在意要让最好的管理架构到位。

为了实质上随着时间推移为此做好准备,我认为非常明智的做法是:那些不会参与管理、但将扮演关键所有者角色的家族成员,应当越来越熟悉这门生意以及背后的理念。

这一点我在——我想是1993年的年报里——多少谈过一些,因为我觉得让你们理解这一点很重要。

还有,任何想把生意卖给我们的人——如果你从1915年起就把一门生意建立起来,对它无比在意,对你一手培养出来的员工无比在意,可你这辈子还有别的事想去做,那这就远不是在报纸上登个广告卖辆车那么简单了。

我的意思是,这是一桩重要的——对你而言非常重要的交易。不只是你能拿到多少钱,更在于你把追随你的成千上万员工——你把他们交托给了谁。

而我认为,我们有一种结构,差不多是你所能做到的最好的了。没有什么东西是永恒的。

但我们有一套结构,差不多是你能做到的最好的安排了——让人们在跟我们做交易时清楚自己将面对什么,并且能够指望成交当时所约定的条件在未来很长一段时间里继续保持不变。

很多人——前几天有位先生跟我讲起一家企业,他曾被收购方百般拉拢。结果你知道吗,成交的第二天,他们就进来把高层最重要的六七个人给炒了。原来他们一直藏着一套秘密计划。这种事,我觉得在我们这儿你是碰不太到的。

但你真正会碰到的情况是,那家收购方公司自己被人收购了,或者来了新的管理层,又或者来了某个新的管理顾问,然后说:“嗯,这个业务跟我们的战略规划已经不搭了,把这块业务甩掉吧。”

而加入伯克希尔的人,我认为可以相对安心,因为这类事情根本不会发生。

查理,你要不要展开讲讲——

芒格:不用。(笑)

巴菲特:我本还指望查理今早能有那么一次“近乎活过来”的体验呢。(笑)

继续鼓励他。

6. 对科克莱恩收购克莱斯勒不予置评

巴菲特:2 区。

观众:你好。我叫吉姆·利希提(音),来自得梅因。我对克莱斯勒这类公司挺感兴趣。你能就克莱斯勒公司说几句吗?(笑)

巴菲特:不行,我觉得我对克莱斯勒没什么可说的。(笑)

顺便说一句,我想所罗门兄弟公司已经被他们聘用了。我们跟这事没关系。查理和我——我是从报纸上看到的。

而且查理和我通常并不清楚所罗门那边的投资银行业务安排。

但报纸上确实登了,说所罗门牵涉其中。我们没有任何牵涉。

查理,你对这个问题没兴趣评论?没有?(笑)

换个别的话题问问他。

7. 管理者需要懂得“钱是有成本的”

巴菲特:3 号区。

观众:我是吉姆·瓦尔达曼(音),来自密西西比州杰克逊市。

在描述你们对全资子公司的资本配置时,你在年报里写道,引用原话,你们“按很高的费率向经理人收取他们所占用的增量资本费用,并以同样高的费率为他们释放出来的资本给予回报”,引用结束。

你们是怎么确定这个高费率的?他们又是怎么确定自己能释放出多少资本的?

巴菲特:嗯,我们对这些——这个问题问的是我们和经理人之间的激励安排,或者其他一些情形,也就是我们向全资子公司注入资本或者抽走资本——这通常跟薪酬方案挂钩。

我们希望我们的经理人明白,我们对资本看得有多重。我们觉得,没有什么比向他们收取资本费用更能让他们理解这一点的了。

所以我们有不同的安排。有时候多少要参考这家公司的历史,可能多少要参考所处的行业,也可能取决于我们最初订立这套安排时的利率水平。

我们会根据这些变量、或许还有其他一些因素、又或许就只是看我们订立那天的心情,来定出不同的安排,注入资本的费率从 14% 到 20% 不等。

有时候我们还会有这样的安排:如果这是个有季节性的业务,一年里有那么几个月他们有季节性的资金需求,我们就以 LIBOR 的利率很便宜地把钱给他们。

但如果他们用的资本超过了那个额度,我们就会说:“好吧,那这就是永久性资本了”,于是我们向他们收取的费率就要高得多。

再比如,如果我们收购了一家占用两三亿美元资本的企业,订了一套奖金安排,而那位经理人想出办法用更少的资本来经营这门生意,我们就可能以非常高的费率给他回报——和我们向他收费时用的是同一个费率——计入他的奖金安排里。

所以我们坚信要让经理人明白,钱是有成本的。我得说,总体而言,我做生意的经验是,大多数经理人在动用自己的钱时,都明白钱是有成本的。

但有时候经理人在动用别人的钱时,就开始有点把它当成免费的钱了。这种习惯是我们在伯克希尔不想去助长的。

我们——通过给资本贴上这些费率,我们是在告诉经营我们业务的人,资本对我们来说有多值钱。

我认为这是个有用的准则,对他们所做的决策很有帮助,因为我们对自己经营的业务并不做很多决策。我们做的决策非常非常少。大多数情况下,我连我们百分之百控股子公司的资本预算都看不到。

如果连我都看不到,那别人就更看不到了。我的意思是,我们总部根本没有什么人手去盯这类事情。

我们在这件事上给了他们极大的责任。但我们确实希望他们知道我们是如何衡量资本使用的。到目前为止,我得说,这真的效果相当好。

我们的经理人不介意被衡量,他们也喜欢拿到——我想他们乐于看到自己的“打击率”被张贴出来。而一个不计入资本成本的打击率,是一个假的打击率。

查理?

芒格:嗯,我当然同意。(笑)

巴菲特:而且他可不姓巴菲特。我是说——(笑)

8. 购买保险的两个理由

巴菲特:4 号区。

观众:你好,我叫戴夫·兰卡萨姆(音),来自《商业保险》杂志。

一些财产意外险风险管理专家正在建议商业保险的买家与他们的财产意外险保险公司签订五年期和十年期的保单,以促成与保险公司之间更牢固的合作关系,同时也维持过去七八年那种平稳的财产意外险市场。

你认为这个想法会被大多数投保人接受吗?如果会,那对投保人的成本和保险公司的承保业绩又会有什么影响?

巴菲特:这个问题问的大概是商业投保人和他们的保险公司之间的合作关系。要做到这一点有很多办法,比如各种追溯调整方案、各类可调费率、自留额之类的东西。

一般来说,买保险只有两个理由。一个是为了保护自己,防范一种你自己无力承担、或不愿承担的损失。这部分是一个客观决策,也部分是主观的。

举个例子,一位经理人如果非常担心一旦发生没有投保的损失、董事会会事后责难他,那他买的保障很可能就远远超过公司真正需要的水平。

但他知道,自己永远也不必站到董事会面前说:“我们刚刚发生了一场一百万美元的火灾损失。”

然后董事接下来会问的问题是:“投保了吗?”而他可不想回答“没有”。

所以,他可能会做出某种从公司角度看非常不明智的事,仅仅是为了保住自己的位置。

但买保险的理由——无论是寿险也好,财产意外险也好,个人保险也好,商业保险也好,都是一样的——就是为了防范那些你自己不愿或无力承担的损失。

或者第二个理由,偶尔也会出现,那就是如果你认为保险公司卖给你的这张保单其实定价过低,以至于你确实预期,在一段时间里,通过买这份保险你能在数学期望上占到便宜。

嗯,我们尽量避免卖出第二种保单,而专注于卖出第一种。

我们认为,任何我们能向其卖出保险的公司——当然,我们卖出的保险有很大一部分是卖给其他保险公司的。我的意思是,我们在很大程度上是一家再保险公司。

我们卖给他们的,是针对一种他们自己无力或不愿承担的损失的保险。

一个典型的例子,你知道,可能是一家在加州持有大量房主保单的公司。如果那些保单包含地震险,他们也许就承担不起可能发生的那种规模的损失——尽管他们想保留一套面向加州房主大规模分销的销售体系。

于是我们会承保一张保单。他们也许自留前 500 万美元的损失,也许自留前 5000 万美元的损失——取决于他们自身的承受能力——但再往上,他们就来找我们了。

在处理这类问题上,我们真的处在一个独一无二的位置:这些是别人——是这些公司自己承担不起、又找不到其他任何人来承保的问题。

但我们真的不想为某人投保一笔他们自己负担得起的损失,因为如果我们这么做了,那可能是因为他们犯傻。但也可能是因为他们的预期损失高于我们收取的保费,而那并不是我们做这门生意时想要的结果。

我想——我想,跟 30 年前相比,企业里的风险经理人在买保险的方式上,大概比许多年前要更聪明了。我认为这已经变成——我认为他们更老练了,也把这件事想得更透彻了。

但有不少保险——有一些——有相当一部分被买下的保险其实并不合理。而也有相当一部分本该买的保险却没有去买。

这个国家里有些公司,正把自己暴露在那种足以让其彻底覆灭的损失之下。而他们宁愿不买再保险,因为它“贵”,引用原话。但他们实际上是在赌一件不经常发生的事根本不会发生。

而如果长岛遭遇一场巨大的飓风,或者加州发生一次大地震,就会有不少公司——它们并没有让自己处在能够扛住那些损失的状态。

如果你是一位 63 岁的 CEO,心想:「我过几年就退休了」,那么很可能这件事不会发生在你任内。

但是——它终归会发生在某个人的任内。我们就是要把再保险卖给这些人。通常我们做成了,但有时也做不成。

查理?

芒格:没有要补充的。(笑)

9. “我们能承受别人扛不住的冲击”

巴菲特:好。5 区。

他在保存实力呢。等他放开了,那可是个炸药包。(笑)

观众:我叫 Hugh Stephenson(音)。我是来自佐治亚州亚特兰大的股东。我的问题与公司的巨灾保险业务有关。

通过设在百慕大的公司以及其他途径,进入这门生意似乎相对容易。鉴于这项业务对整个公司的重要性,我好奇这种进入门槛低的状况会如何影响它的长期竞争地位和回报率?

巴菲特:嗯,你说得很对,进入巨灾业务确实很容易。而且你知道,它颇有吸引力——对那些炒作者来说尤其有吸引力。

因为如果你成立一家保险公司,去承保加州的地震险,募集了几亿美元,那么你要么基本上没有任何损失,要么——如果你承保得足够多——你会破产。而大多数年份,你都不会有任何损失。

所以,如果你的打算是在一两年内把股票公开卖出去,那么——很有可能你会在头几年拥有一份漂亮的业绩记录。然后你就可以卖了。

而且你知道,也许十次里有一次你会破产。而十次里有九次,你会卖给另一个人,那个人最终会破产。

所以确实——进入门槛很低。唯一可能限制这一点的,是如果买家足够老练,会去质疑这家公司在真正极端的条件下能否生存——而当你购买巨灾保险时,唯一重要的就是这种极端条件——那或许能起到一些限制作用。

第二点当然是,这些新成立的公司,没有一家能提供接近伯克希尔那么大的承保额度。在这门生意里,论资本实力,伯克希尔真的是独一无二的。

我——我不记得百慕大有任何一笔资金——我想阿吉特并不在那边。但我认为那里没有谁有 10 亿的净资产。而你知道,我们——目前我们的净资产可能接近 130 亿,而真实价值还要高得多。

所以我们能承受冲击,而且我得补充一句,我们将会承受那些别人承受不了的冲击。我们也努力为承担这种风险拿到相应的报酬。

但当我们说我们能承受 10 亿美元的损失时,我们是真能承受 10 亿美元的损失。而且在某个时点,我们确实会出现一笔 10 亿美元的损失。

任何买保险的人都知道,我们能承受得起这样的损失,甚至更大的损失。他们也应该知道,我们的竞争对手当中——极少数——极少数能承受得起。所以,竞争是存在的。

我们有异乎寻常高比例的业务,是与全球八到十家最大的保险——再保险公司和保险公司做的。所以,我们确实已经在那些真正懂得这门生意风险的人当中建立了地位。

他们来找伯克希尔——比他们去百慕大要频繁得多,因为他们知道我们会赔付。而他们入行够久,足以明白,归根结底,这才是一家保险公司真正重要的东西。

如果费率——如果在低得离谱的费率水平上还有足够的承保能力,我的意思是,到那时,我们就不会去承保那种业务了。但我不认为那种情况会发生。至少到目前为止还没发生过。而如果真的发生了,你知道,那就随它去吧。我们大家就一起去打高尔夫,直到损失发生为止。

查理?(笑)

芒格:没有要补充的。

10. 格雷厄姆的原则适用于科技股吗?

巴菲特:6 区?还是说我们已经——对,就这儿。

观众:两位主席,伯克希尔目前所投资的大多数公司都不在——都不在高科技领域。我们过去这几年所看到的,是高科技领域无论在销售还是盈利上,似乎都有显著的增长。

而且,美国的股东们也相信,时代正在改变,正从品牌转向高科技。

我的问题是,有没有人能运用您的投资原则、商业理念和您奉行的人生纪律,去构建一个,比方说,由五六家高科技公司组成的投资组合?我们不妨叫它「伯克希尔·哈撒韦科技基金」?(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,我觉得它会卖得很好。(笑)

至于这个问题——查理和我做不来。我们——查理大概懂高科技。但你们也看到了,要从他嘴里掏出点信息有多难。所以——(笑)——他到现在还没告诉我呢。

我们尽量不去碰那些我们——我们不懂的东西。而且如果我们要亏掉你们的钱,我们希望能在明年站到你们面前,告诉你们:我们亏了你们的钱,是因为我们当初是这么想的,结果却变成了那样。

我们可不想说,你知道,有人给我们写了份报告,说在某个我们并不懂的领域里「将会发生这样的事」,结果我们因为听信了别人的建议而亏掉了你们的钱。所以,我们不会亲自去做这件事。

我认为这些原则——我认为本·格雷厄姆的原则——用在高科技公司上完全成立。问题在于我们不懂得怎么去做,但这并不意味着别人不懂得怎么去做。

我猜,如果比尔·盖茨在考虑某家公司,处在一个他懂而我不懂的领域,他在做投资决策时所运用的思考方式,会和我所运用的大同小异。只不过他懂这门生意罢了。

我也许自以为懂可口可乐或者吉列。而他可能有——他可能有能力去看懂许许多多别的生意,对他来说就像可口可乐或吉列对我来说一样清晰明了。

我想,一旦他认准了那些公司,他在决定如何行动时,会运用与我几乎相同的尺度。

我想他会这么做——我想他会有一条安全边际的原则,只是可能稍有不同,因为高科技公司本质上风险更大。但他仍然会有安全边际原则,只不过——在他心里,会根据亏损的数学概率作出相应调整。

他会——他会把它当作一门生意来看待,而不是当作一只股票。

你知道,他不会用借来的钱去买它。我是说,它——一整套原则都会贯穿其中。

但我们所懂的那个圈子,真的不太可能扩大,也许这儿那儿会扩大那么一丁点。但只要资本规模别变得太大,这个圈子就够用了。

而且——但我们不会——如果我们在自己的圈子之内都很难找到值得投的东西,我们也不会去扩大这个圈子。你知道,我们会等。这就是我们的做法。

11. 全美航空:“亏在哪不必从哪赚回来”

巴菲特:那么,7 区准备好了吗?我们能不能从那边——对,找到了。

观众:能听到吗?嗨,我是来自内布拉斯加州林肯市的 Susie Taylor(音)。

先解释一下背景——我们对全美航空(USAir)的投资做了减值,以反映我们这笔投资当前的市场价值。

您在报告里对这门生意的经济效益为何缺乏吸引力,作了很好的说明。我想,如果可以重新选择,我们是不会再做这笔投资的。

巴菲特:我认为这个假设很合理。(笑)

我得说一句,凡是想问全美航空问题的人,我们都把他们安排到另一个房间去了,让你们知道是为什么。(笑)

观众:然后第二部分要好一些。

巴菲特:不过我盯着你呢。我能在监视器上看到你。(笑)

观众:引用您那句精辟的话——「你不必非得用当初赔钱的那种方式把钱赚回来。」

巴菲特:没错。

观众:与其投在全美航空上,把那 8900 万投到一个您真正看好的东西上,不是更好吗?

巴菲特:嗯,这是个很好的问题。因为确实,投资中一条非常重要的原则就是:你不必非得用当初赔钱的那种方式把钱赚回来。而且事实上,硬要用赔钱的那种方式去把钱赚回来,通常是个错误。

而我们——当我们对一笔投资作减值时,就像我们把全美航空减记到 8900 万那样,我们大概认为它值的钱比这个数要多一些。但我们往往倾向于保守。不过,它的价值确实远远低于我们当初的买入价。

而那只优先股的性质,连同我们买入的其他私募证券,通常都使得它相当难以出售。这是我们一进场时就清楚的事情之一。

当我们买入这只优先股时,有些人觉得我们拿到了异常优厚的条款。最近在全美航空这件事上,我倒没怎么听他们再提起这话,不过——(笑)

但其中一个要考虑的因素是,如果你通过一家证券公司买入某家发行人公开发行的一百股优先股,你明天就能把它卖掉。而我们——在某些方面是受法律限制,在另一些方面则纯粹是受市场运作方式的限制——很难处置那样的持仓。

而且我们知道,如果我们真要去卖,会有一笔额外的成本,甚至根本卖不出去。

这对我们来说并不是什么了不起的大事,因为我们买东西不是为了卖,但它多少还是有点重要。

我们持有全美航空的 A 系列优先股,所处的境地,和我们假如买入一千股或五千股那种在纽约证券交易所交易的 B 系列优先股(我记得是这个)的境地,是不一样的。那种 B 系列是很容易出售的。

而我们这只优先股,甚至很可能能以略高于我们账面计价的价格卖出去,但那需要——做起来不会很容易。

如果我们真要去做这件事,那或许——假设我们根本做得成的话——我们大概能多拿到一点钱。

但这事并不好办,部分原因是法律上的限制。查理和我都在董事会里,这就把事情复杂化了。

我们仅仅因为身处董事会,就总会知道一些公众不知道的事情。所以,这就把事情复杂化了。

到头来,我们通常会发现,凡是涉及我们负有受托义务的事情,去操作可能根本就不切实际。就算可行,多半也是得不偿失,麻烦比它值的还多。

查理?

芒格:嗯,USAir 那段经历确实是一次很有意思的体验。(笑)

巴菲特:就这些吗,查理?好。不,他——

芒格:我想再强调一遍刚才那个道理:你不必以亏掉的同样方式把钱赢回来。要知道,这正是那么多人栽在赌博上的原因。

他们一旦落了下风,就觉得非得用亏掉的那种方式把钱赚回来。这是人性中根深蒂固的一部分。

而靠意志力把这个毛病克服掉,是非常明智的;像这样的小格言其实非常有用。

巴菲特:是啊,关于股票,有一点很重要:股票并不知道你持有它。你知道,你对它怀有各种各样的感情。你知道,而且——(笑)——你还记得自己当初付了多少钱,对吧?(笑)

你还记得是谁跟你推荐它的。所有这些鸡毛蒜皮的小事,你知道吧?

可它——你知道,它根本不在乎,对吧?(笑)

它就那么待在那儿。一只股票跌到 50,有人付了一百块,他们心里难受得要命;另一个人是 10 块买的,他们就乐开了花。所有这些情绪,对股票本身没有任何影响。

所以——正如查理所说,赌博就是个典型的例子。有人花了好多年建起一桩生意,那种事,他们是懂行的。

然后他们跑到某个地方去,玩起一种数学上对自己不利的游戏。开始输钱,就觉得非得把钱赚回来不可——不仅要以亏掉的那种方式赢回来,而且还得当晚就赢回来。而——(笑)这是个天大的错误。

12. 警惕复杂的潮流和“大祭司”

巴菲特:1 号区。

观众:我叫 Donald Stone,来自康涅狄格州的 Riverside。我——这是我有生以来参加的第二次股东大会,今年 61 岁了。所以能来到这里,我真的深感荣幸。

我参加的第一次是一个半星期前可口可乐的股东大会。那儿只来了 200 人。我正想搞明白这是怎么回事。(笑)

我想,规律大概是:到场人数与股价高低成正比。

巴菲特:那样的话,我们可不会拆股了。(笑)

观众:好的。

在提问之前先说几句作为铺垫:1994 年 11 月 24 日那期《财富》杂志登过一篇专题文章,题为《美国最伟大的财富创造者》,讲的是市场增加值(market value added)和经济增加值(economic value added)这两个概念。

令我大为得意的是,我注意到可口可乐在那份榜单上排名第二,仅次于通用电气;而且可口可乐的表现是百事可乐的两倍——百事在榜单上排第九——可口可乐的资本规模却只有百事的三分之一。

我的问题是这样的:市场增加值和经济增加值这个概念本身,或者它的任何变体,是否是一个适用于、并且对整个伯克希尔·哈撒韦有用,或者在分析它各个业务板块时有用的概念?

关于这个,我特别想先听听查理·芒格的看法。(笑)因为我听说——

巴菲特:我也想听。(笑)

观众:我听说——

巴菲特:查理?

观众:我听说他对这个具体话题想了很多。

巴菲特:没错。

芒格:如果沃伦真在完全按照商学院如今教的那一套使用经济增加值,那他可没跟我说过。

显然,这个概念有它的可取之处。但那一整套正式的方法,我不相信我们有在用。

沃伦,你是不是偷偷在用这玩意儿?

巴菲特:没有,我们——(笑)——从某种意义上说,他们想达到的目标和我们想达到的是一样的。或者说,我们想达到的目标和他们想达到的是一样的。但我觉得——第一,我觉得它本身有些缺陷。

虽然我认为它总体上能得出正确的答案,但它多少是在硬逼着自己得出正确的答案。

不过我真心认为你并不需要那种东西。我是说,要弄清楚把钱投在哪里才合理,我不觉得有那么复杂。你在这件事上是会犯错的,但就你脑子里要做的那些推演而言,我不认为这是个很复杂的课题。

而且我不觉得——我认为,那些兜售这样那样管理时髦理论的人,往往会把它们弄得比实际需要的更复杂一点,这样你就不得不去请教那位「大祭司」了。

而且,你知道,如果真正算数的就只有「十诫」,那对宗教辅导师之类的人来说可就很难过了。(笑)

它没法——它就是没法把事情搞得足够复杂。

我觉得在这方面也有几分这样的影子——而且还相当多——在管理咨询里,在你看到的那些书里,以及所有冒出来的那些东西里。

芒格:它可比资本资产定价模型(capital asset pricing model)靠谱多了。所以说,至少学术界是在进步的。(笑)

巴菲特:真的,是啊。资本资产定价模型,那玩意儿——我不知道现在还用得多不多。当然——你知道,这些东西都有过一阵阵的风行热潮。管理上有这种现象,投资上也有。我是说,房地产嘛,你知道,可能流行过一阵,或者国际投资。

我——你可以读读《养老金与投资》(Pensions & Investment)杂志,那是本相当不错的杂志。但你就能看到这些时髦风潮一阵阵地刮过去。然后他们还为这些办研讨会什么的。而且,你知道,投资银行家会创造出相应的产品来满足这种需求。

管理上也有这些时髦风潮——我是说,显然,倾听你的顾客之类的事,我是说,那是——没有比这更有道理的了。但你很难写出一本 300 页的书,内容就只是「倾听你的顾客」。(笑)

而且,你知道,这正是我喜欢格雷厄姆那本书的地方之一。我是说,你知道,他写的——他写的每一句话都挺有道理的。他没有去搞那些花里胡哨的东西,没有试图把事情弄得比它实际上真正的样子更复杂。

你知道,我其实根本不用去读 1994 年 11 月那期《财富》,就知道可口可乐创造了大量的价值。(笑)

我们给伯克希尔增加了大约 40 多亿美元的价值。对我来说,这就够好了。(笑)

13. 衍生品:“滋生错误与祸端的温床”

巴菲特:2 区。

观众:我叫 Maurus Spence,来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。我有一个关于衍生品的两部分问题。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦目前是否、或者过去是否曾经,涉足过涉及衍生品的策略?

如果有的话,作为首席执行官,您是否完全理解这些金融工具?(笑)

巴菲特:是谁出的这么个疯狂的主意?(笑)

观众:最后,不知道查理愿不愿意——您或者查理——能不能谈谈其他金融机构对这些工具的使用?

巴菲特:关于衍生品的问题——我之所以插那么一句——在《财富》的一篇文章里(你们要是还没读过,都应该去读一读),我提出,如果首席执行官必须在报告里写明他到底懂不懂这些东西,那么衍生品的使用就会大幅减少,而且——(笑)

不过,回答你的问题:我想我们有两类衍生品交易,规模都非常小。但这并不意味着我们不会——如果条件合适,我们要么现在不会以大得多的规模去做,要么过去就不会去做。

我们有两类交易,而且我确实理解它们。有些时候,会有一些我们想做的事——不常有——但确实会有那么些时候,通过涉及衍生证券的交易来完成它们是最好的办法。遇到这种情况,我们不会犹豫去做。

显然,我们会非常在意交易对手是谁,因为那种交易不过是两个人之间的一小张纸而已。而到期时,它通常会逼着这两人中的一方去做一件痛苦的事,那就是给另一方开出一张支票。

因此,你得确保对方既愿意、又有能力开出那张支票。所以,比起大多数人,我们对交易对手风险大概要更加上心。

去年和前年,我想我说过,衍生品常常把借来的钱和无知结合在一起,而这是一种相当危险的组合。我想,过去这一年里我们已经看到了一些这样的情形。

当你能够进行那种非实物的交易,涉及几亿、几十亿乃至几百亿美元,只要你能在交易另一头找到愿意接受你签名的对手方,那就真的——那就潜藏着大量犯错和惹祸的可能。

而且如果你看过其中某些工具所涉及的公式,尤其我想是那些利率类的衍生品工具,你真的很难想象创造出这些工具究竟能解决什么商业目的。

我的意思是,它们本质上带有巨大的、真真切切的赌博成分。

我这么说,指的是去承担一种根本不需要被创造出来的风险,而不是指投机的那一面。它们涉及的是风险的创造,而不是风险的转移,明白吗,不是风险的缓和,而是大规模地创造风险。

也许算是一种幸运,过去一年里有那么六七起因为这些工具而陷入麻烦的案例浮出水面,因为这——这或许有助于缓和未来的麻烦。

潜在的影响是巨大的。我的意思是,你在衍生品市场里能做出一些事情——

嗯,我之前用过这个例子,不过就以拿证券借钱来说,美国政府的联邦储备体系在几十年前就认定,社会有必要去限制人们用借来的钱买证券的程度。

他们手里有 1920 年代的例子,当时是 10% 的保证金。那被认为是导致大崩盘的一个因素。

于是政府通过美联储设立了保证金要求,并说:「我不管你是不是约翰·D·洛克菲勒」,明白吗,「你也得拿出买你那通用汽车股票成本的 50%」,或者无论那是什么。

他们说,也许洛克菲勒先生不需要这个,但社会需要这个。他们不——我们不希望一大群人用极薄的保证金去赌博,明白吗,本质上就是在拿股票赌,而由此产生的连锁反应会给社会带来各种各样的问题。

而这至今仍是一条法律。但它现在已经毫无意义了,因为各种衍生品工具使得 1920 年代的 10% 保证金,明白吗,相比如今所发生的一切,看上去就像内布拉斯加一个小镇银行家眼中的「保守」做法。

所以这是一段很有意思的历史。你知道,就像我说的,也许过去一年的种种经历——它们让所有人都把注意力集中到了衍生品上。没人确切知道该拿它们怎么办。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦会——如果我们认为某件事说得通,而且查理和我能理解它——我们或许会想办法利用它们,去做我们认为对自己有利的事。

查理,你想就这一点补充点什么吗?

芒格:嗯,我比你还要更不赞同,而这是很难做到的。

如果让我来管理这个世界,我们就不会有期权交易所。衍生品交易量大概会只剩现在的 5%。合约的复杂程度会大幅下降。清算系统会更严格。

我觉得这个世界有点发疯了。而且我很庆幸,自己在人生中所处的位置,不必去替它辩护。

你知道,这些人里有很多,我替他们感到难过。你知道,他们手里有很棒的银行。可他们却不得不站到众人面前,有时甚至包括自己的子女和朋友,去辩称这些东西有多么美妙。

14. 所罗门公司前景不明

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:早上好。我是来自加州金斯堡的约翰·纽吉尔(音)。我的问题与所罗门有关。

我想问的是,您能不能就您的展望,把我们带到未来两三年去看一看。它一开始是一笔不错的投资。您从中得到了不错的回报,或者说不错的利息。

而它显然也遇到了一些问题。随着这些问题持续下去,我们也越陷越深。看起来前景并不算特别光明。

所以——您一定明白它会走向何方。但您能不能跟我们说说,您觉得它在未来两三年会往哪儿走?

巴菲特:嗯,不,我觉得,要预测所罗门,或者说几乎任何一家大型投资银行兼交易商,在未来两三个月里会有怎样的表现,都是非常困难的,更别说未来两三年了。

那门生意的本质,显然要比刀片和剃须刀的生意波动大得多。如今——而难办的地方在于,要在一段较长的时期里去评估——因为有这种波动性,要评估——要判断一家企业的平均回报可能是多少,就难得多。

答案是,查理和我,很可能,如果我们真要去为未来两三年写下预测,我们不会有很高的——不会有那种自信,觉得自己有很高的概率能预测出那家公司,或者那个行业里的其他公司,三年后会赚多少钱,或者其平均盈利大概会是多少。

我们自己投入的,是一笔 7 亿美元的优先股,它有五个赎回日,从今年 10 月 31 日开始,之后每年一次。

在那些日期上,我们可以选择拿现金,也可以选择拿股票。显然,能有这样一个选择权是一种优势。在这个世界上,任何时候只要你拥有一个选择权,它都是一种优势——它对你有利。

这优势也许非常小,但是——给出选择权通常是个错误,而接受选择权通常是个好主意,只要它不让你付出任何代价。

而且我们会——关于选择权,另一点是,在你不得不做决定之前,你不用就它们做决定。不过——所以,除了那 7 亿美元的优先股之外(在我们看来它百分之百是稳妥可收回的)——我是说,我们还想多持有一些那样的优先股。

但我们同时还持有大约 600 万出头的普通股,我们当时买入的价格大概是每股 48 美元,或者那个区间的水平。无论如何,都明显高于目前 35 或 36 美元的市价。所以按市价算,我们在这些普通股上大概有 8000 万或 9000 万美元,或者类似数额的亏损。

那笔优先股其实待我们不薄。我们每年收到 6300 万美元。

顺便说一句,由于我们持有这么多普通股——这一点可能并不为大家普遍知晓,或者说并未被普遍意识到——但如果你持有一家公司 20% 的投票权,你享受的「股息收入抵免」就会有所不同。你享受的税务待遇会和持有不到 20% 时有所不同。

所以,在我们持有那些普通股之前,我们为优先股股息缴的税要比现在多一些。这不是一笔很大的项目,但也并非微不足道。

查理?

芒格:嗯,我当然同意,要预测大型投资银行兼——杠——交易商身上会发生什么,是很难的。

我想说的是,早在我们买入那笔优先股之前很久,伯克希尔·哈撒韦就已经是所罗门的一个大客户了,而且这些年来我们一直享受着极好的服务。

我认为所罗门还会存在很长时间,为各类客户提供非常优质的服务。

巴菲特:我们卖出了——

芒格:满意的客户。

巴菲特:我们卖出伯克希尔的第一笔债券,我想是在 1973 年,是通过所罗门做的。所以,我们在那儿已经有了 21 年或 22 年的投行合作关系。而实际上,在那之前我们还以各种其他方式跟他们打过交道。所以,这是一段长期的关系。

但所罗门会继续存在,这一点毫无疑问。问题在于——这也正是为什么我们那笔优先股是绝对稳妥可收回的。

但问题是它的平均资本回报率会是多少。我们当初进去的时候就知道这一点很难预测。而我们后来发现,它比我们原以为的还要更难预测。

15. 向共同基金先驱菲尔·卡雷特致敬

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:谢谢这个机会。我是来自奥马哈的迪克·詹森(音),一位同为内布拉斯加大学的支持者。

一个相当绕的问题:我对你们最近买入美国运通以及未来的打算非常感兴趣。就我对这家公司的理解,我知道它是一家相当庞杂、复杂而且业务相当广泛的公司,因为它涉足许多领域。

其中一项当然是信用卡,这我是知道的。但组织里还有很大一部分是 IDS 之类的业务,以及一些我甚至都不了解的东西。

我想知道,你们对这笔投资抱有怎样的期望。

另外,就在最近,我和您也许一样,开始好奇您是否私下认识一位叫菲尔·卡雷特先生的人,我相信他的名字是这个。还有,在您的未来规划里,会不会考虑收购他的公司?谢谢。

巴菲特:迪克,我想菲尔·卡雷特今天就在现场。菲尔?

芒格:他就在那后面。

巴菲特:菲尔,能请您站起来吗?他在那儿。(掌声)

给他点掌声。

菲尔今年 98 岁。我第一次见到他是在 1952 年,43 年前。世界上每一次日食他都会去观看。你会在一些非常奇怪的地方碰到他。

他写第一本关于证券的书,我想是在 1924 年。我——这个我说对了吗,菲尔?对。

最近还写了一本自传。

很可能是这个国家历史上最伟大的长期投资业绩。而且——不过我想——我,你知道,我的印象是,菲尔在若干年前把先锋(Pioneer)的一部分、或者相当大一部分卖掉了,这家公司他管理了几十年,许多个十年。

事实上,我最早知道菲尔,是在 40 多年前翻阅穆迪的《银行与金融手册》时,我看到这家公司有着如此出色的业绩,还持有一些看上去极为有趣的证券。

于是我们取得了联系。他来到了奥马哈,我们就此相识。这——所以,凡是能让菲尔愿意跟你交谈的人,都要仔细听他说。我建议这么做。

16. 信用卡是美国运通未来的关键

巴菲特:关于美国运通的问题:我们持有美国运通略低于 10% 的股份。而且显然,尽管你提到他们涉足多项业务,但——在未来相当多年里——在未来非常多年里——美国运通前景中那个最关键、最重要的因素,将远远是信用卡。

那是一个已经变得、而且很可能将永远变得越来越激烈竞争的行业。我的意思是,我从——我想我是在1950年代末在大来俱乐部(Diners Club)认识了拉尔夫·施奈德(Ralph Schneider)——那时起就一直关注这个行业。

美国运通是出于恐惧才进入信用卡业务的。我是说,他们担心信用卡会对他们的旅行支票业务造成什么影响。我相信旅行支票业务最早是在1890年代创立的。

而这又是在更早的快递业务基础上发展起来的。我想,当年是亨利·威尔斯(Henry Wells)和威廉·法戈(William Fargo),他们在往西部运送那些快递箱时,会把自己用链条拴在箱子上。

后来他们觉得,也许发行旅行支票会稍微轻松一点——(笑)——总比扛着这么一大堆东西到处跑要好。

所以,旅行支票就是从快递业务里演变出来的。

而美国运通的信用卡业务则是出于恐惧而产生的,尤其是当时害怕大来俱乐部。当年他们都被大来俱乐部吓坏了,因为大来抢占了先机,跑在了所有人前面。

他们靠这项业务取得了巨大的成功。如你们所知,美国运通卡在他们所谓的「旅行和娱乐」那一块卡业务上,占据了极其强势的地位。

当然,后来银行也大规模介入了。而Visa也取得了巨大的成功。

所以,这张卡在某些领域拥有强大的特许经营权,比如公司卡。不过像第一银行系统(First Bank System)这样的对手在这块上对他们的进攻非常凌厉。

这张卡——这张卡确实拥有相当不错的特许经营权,但它已经不再拥有许多年前那样宽广的特许经营范围了。

曾经有一段时间,它是「那张」卡——独一无二的卡。如今它在某些领域仍然是「那张」卡,但覆盖的范围远不如从前那么宽广了。

它有一些非常重要的优势和经济实力,也有一些弱点。在判断它到2000年或2005年会处于什么位置时,你必须把这些都看透。

我们认为,美国运通的管理层对于如何——如何在某些情境下让这张卡保持其特殊性这个问题,思考得很到位。而且我认为,在面对商户因折扣费率上调而产生的抵触情绪时,他们的应对方式是明智的。

所以,我们就看看这一切最终会如何演变吧。但关键是——IDS,它现在已经改名了,但它是美国运通非常重要的一部分——它贡献了他们将近三分之一的盈利——不过真正的关键,还是这张卡随着时间推移的表现如何。

查理?

芒格:没有要补充的。

17. 股票期权会计准则之争“腐败一方赢了”

巴菲特:5 号区?

观众:您好,我叫菲利普·金(Philip King),来自旧金山。

我的问题是关于美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)在股票期权提案上是如何屈服让步的。

反对该提案的人辩称,这会损害企业的资本形成,而且股票期权的成本在完全稀释的计算中、在流通股数里已经体现出来了。

我很好奇,您对所发生的这一切有什么看法?

巴菲特:嗯,正如你们当中关注过这件事的人所知道的——FASB确实屈服了,而且他们——他们恨透了这样做。我是说,他们知道自己是对的。事实上,许多年前,现在大概叫六大审计公司当中的大多数,都曾站在支持这一立场的一边。

但在我看来,在这件事上,那些审计公司向他们的客户屈服了。

就资本形成而言,我会主张,最理智的资本形成方式,应当建立在最准确的会计方式之上。

我是说——如果所有名字以A到M开头的公司都不必计提折旧,而以N到Z开头的公司就得计提,或者类似这样的安排,那么,你知道,这或许真能帮助那些名字以A到M开头的公司进行资本形成。顺便说一句,那样的话他们大概都会去改名字。

但我不认为糟糕的会计有助于资本形成。事实上,我认为长期来看,它很可能会扭曲资本形成。

因为如果我们要用股票来支付所有的股东——我是说,所有为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作的人——从而不记录任何工资费用,那么,你知道,我们或许能够忽悠一大批以为这些盈利是真实的人上当。

但在我看来,那并不会是资本形成的一大进步。

我真的认为——你知道,我私下里跟很多经理人谈过这件事。他们都懂这个道理。但他们,你知道,他们更喜欢现状。而且许多年前,他们在华盛顿动用了大量的影响力。

而且我想,我现在已经把这件事考证清楚了。有这么一位先生——一位数学教授——在我写了这篇东西之后给我寄来了一些资料。我喜欢在事后尽可能找点佐证。

我相信那是在印第安纳州的立法机构里,有一位议员提出了一项法案,要把圆周率π这个数学符号的值改成3。因为他说,让小学生去摆弄这个——(笑)——复杂的3.14159实在太难了。

他说得没错。我是说,这确实很难。而我——在股票期权这个问题上,国会受到了形形色色的压力,要求它反过来去对FASB和美国证券交易委员会(SEC)施压,让它们不要把股票期权成本计入薪酬。

我从没见过哪个想要拿报酬的人会觉得,如果他在现有薪水之外又拿到一份期权,他得到的报酬不比只拿薪水的时候更多。所以,他自己也认为那是一种报酬。

我可以告诉你们,如果这些年来我们一直在伯克希尔发放与整个企业业绩无关的期权,那么我们就会产生一笔成本,也许要以数十亿美元来计量,不管它有没有被记录下来。

所以,这又回到了贝克莱主教(Bishop Berkeley)那个问题:一棵树在森林里倒下却没发出声音,你知道,到底算不算……诸如此类。

但这——我认为——当你看到一个群体施压到了何种程度——甚至到了扬言要撤回对财务会计准则委员会的财务支持的地步——他们向众人施压、非要确保π的值停留在3而不是3.14的程度,仅仅因为被稍稍触动的是他们自己的利益——这真的会让你对美国商界变得有点愤世嫉俗。

无论如何,这——看起来这件事在相当一段时间内算是彻底了结了。事实上,现在他们还在施压,想把已经制定出来的准则进一步削弱。所以,自私自利在美国企业界依然活蹦乱跳、好得很。

查理?

芒格:是的,我认为是不光彩的一方赢了。而且我认为——我认为,对一个文明来说,拥有可靠的工程技术和良好的会计是相当重要的。

这是一段非常令人遗憾的插曲,牵涉其中的有顶尖的政客——有顶尖的风险投资家。

我认为在某种程度上,这是对教育体系的一种控诉:这样一件事竟然能被这么多人如此广泛地审视,却又被看得如此错得离谱。

巴菲特:人们想在会计上做手脚,这本身已经够糟了。而且他们确实在会计上做手脚。但还想让这种做法被认可为制度——

芒格:是啊。

巴菲特:——那就真的有点令人作呕了。

芒格:是啊,是腐败赢了。

巴菲特:好吧,就把我们俩在这件事上记为「尚未表态」吧,咱们继续看6号区。(笑)

18. 为什么伯克希尔股东大会没有录像

观众:早上好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生,我是迈克·李-钦(Mike Lee-Chin),来自安大略省汉密尔顿。

您能否考虑为我们这些股东提供一份本次会议的录像带?

芒格:我没太听清。

观众:您是否会考虑把这次股东——这次股东大会的录像带提供给我们这些股东?

芒格:发放录像带?

巴菲特:是文字记录稿还是录像带?

观众:对。

巴菲特:是的,已经有人多次提过这个建议了。这是个好建议,我们也考虑过。

在这件事上,我们担心的是会打消大家到场参会的积极性。

我是说,这——(笑)——我们可不希望落到只有两个人在现场提问、然后却把内容发给成千上万人去看的地步。所以——(笑)——到头来——

芒格:尤其是如果这会让珠宝店的销售额下滑的话。

巴菲特:是啊。(笑声和掌声)

既然我们刚才正在抨击美国商界的虚伪,查理觉得他应该把这一条也加到我的评论里来。(笑)

不过我们——这件事确实很难抉择,因为我们希望每一个人——

当然,我们在年报里尽量涵盖了很多话题。但我们喜欢开会这种形式——回答股东们的大量问题。

我们不想打消大家来参会的积极性。让所有人都来现场提问,是件很有意思的事。

而且很可能的情况是,如果来的人少得多,我们听到的好问题也会少得多。所以我觉得,正是因为来的人多,会议的质量才得以提升。

不过你大老远赶来,我能理解你为什么会对会议记录稿感兴趣。(笑)

我领会这一点。谢谢您。

观众:——还是不行。这算是同意还是不同意?

巴菲特:这是——(笑)

芒格:是不同意。

巴菲特:是不同意。

观众:好吧。(掌声)

巴菲特:我们说的几乎全都是「不」。只不过我们绕到这个结论的方式各有不同。(笑)

19. 伯克希尔股东大会带旺博希姆珠宝销售

巴菲特:好。隔壁房间的7号区,我能看见你。

观众:早上好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。

我想问问,您能不能告诉我们昨天波仙珠宝(Borsheims)的销售额是多少,跟一年前比怎么样?

巴菲特:嗯,跟一年前比,我倒是能告诉你。比一年前高了15%。而一年前又比再前一年高了40多个百分点。再往前那一年涨了多少,我就记不清了。

所以我们一直在创纪录。不过我们没有公布过任何具体数字。但确实是个相当可观的数字。你们这群人可真舍得花钱。

观众:谢谢您。(笑)

20. “蠢材”也能把伯克希尔经营好

巴菲特:1 号区?

观众:早上好。我叫帕特里克·特休恩(Patrick Terhune),来自佛罗里达州劳德代尔堡。

首先,我看到,按您的请求,有很多人穿了红色,向玉米剥皮人队(Cornhuskers)致敬。(掌声)

当然,我支持的球队曾经是——或者说现在是——迈阿密飓风队(Miami Hurricanes)。我在外衣里面穿着我们的绿色和橙色队服。所以——不过如果非要输的话,我很庆幸是输给了内布拉斯加队和汤姆·奥斯本(Tom Osborne)。

我有个问题想请教沃伦和查理,那就是:我认识到,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值——无论是内在价值还是外在价值——都源于你们二位收购成长型公司、以及审慎而专业地运用公司资本去实现增长的综合能力;我想知道,万一——但愿不会——你们其中一位或两位发生不测,使得你们无法再对战略决策提供意见,你们是否有一套计划,一套接班计划?

我衷心希望你们正在着手培养能够延续你们共同愿景的人选,让他们能像现在这样高效、盈利地管理好公司的资源。

巴菲特:嗯,我很感谢这个问题。答案显而易见,我们当然极其重视这件事,因为查理和我——除了很多其他原因之外——我们俩的净资产里都有相当大的比例放在伯克希尔上。

我们俩谁也没想出办法,在被卡车撞倒前整整15分钟把它全部精准地抛掉。所以我们不会比你们各位抢先一步脱身。

因此,从财务上讲,我们对它的持续关切,会一直延续到我们去世之后很久很久。

而且——以基金会之类的形式——它会归属于那些我们非常希望它们能拥有最大限度资源的机构。

所以,我们确实是有一些安排的。我们不会点名道姓或者透露任何具体细节。

其实没你想的那么棘手,因为我们手里有一批了不起的企业。有些是完全持有的,有些是部分持有的。

我不认为剃须刀片的销量或可口可乐的销量会因为查理或我去世的那一天而骤然下滑。我们——我们拥有一些非常好的企业。那些完全持有的企业也是一样。

所以问题更多在于未来如何配置资本。要知道,这眼下对查理和我来说就是个难题,纯粹是因为规模太大了——拿着这么一大笔钱,要找到说得通的投资标的可不容易。

有时候一年过去了,我们什么都没找到。还有些时候一年过去了,我们以为找到了什么,结果发现是我们看走眼了。

所以这并不容易。但我们相信,会有一些非常聪明的人来做这件事。

而且我们认为,就算他们头一年什么都没找到,那也不是世界末日,因为这些企业本身会运转得很好。

我们有个很大的优势:与几乎所有其他公司都不同,无论现在还是将来,我们都愿意——甚至是热切地——去买入优秀企业的一部分,或者整个买下来。

我的意思是,大多数管理层——大多数投资者只能买入企业的一部分。而大多数管理者,从心理上讲,都倾向于完全拥有某样自己能亲手经营的东西。

我们——你知道,这就好比,我记得伍迪·艾伦(Woody Allen)多年前说过,当双性恋的好处就是,能让你周六晚上约会的机会翻倍。(笑)

在这一点上,我们两个方向都能走。(笑)

我们的接班人也会如此。所以非常——查理,你想补充点什么吗?

芒格:我认为,很少有哪家企业的架构能像我们这样,在公司总部只需要这么一丁点儿持续的智力投入。(笑)

哪怕是个白痴,只要愿意老老实实坐在这儿,在如今这两位掌门人死后很久,照样能交出一份非常漂亮的成绩单。

巴菲特:我觉得确实如此。

芒格:是啊。我觉得,就配置新资本而言,要是沃伦能一直活着,情况会稍微好一点。我可不认为我们能轻易找到沃伦的替代者。

不过,你知道,我们也不必非得按过去那个速度继续变富。(笑)

巴菲特:这下是平票了。(笑)

21. 有些决策显而易见,无需精确数字

巴菲特:2 号区域?

观众:你好,这——

巴菲特:(听不清)

观众:——我是来自旧金山的基思·布莱尔(Keith Briar)。

我有个问题。你们在给公司估值、把你们常说的未来盈利折现回来的时候,一般会往后推算多少年?如果不是固定推算某个年数,那你们是怎么确定这个时间跨度的?

巴菲特:嗯,这是个非常好的问题。这——我是说,这是投资、或者说收购企业的核心所在——我们认为这两件事是一回事——但是——

这也是我们运作所依据的框架。我是说,我们试图从这个角度看待企业:如果是整个买下,它们能产出多少现金;如果只买一部分,它们将会产出多少现金。这两者是有区别的。然后,我们再用什么样的折现率把它折算回来。

我想你的问题是,我们会往后看多远,诸如此类。

尽管我们可以用一个非常简单直接的方程把它定义出来,但你知道,我们——我们其实从来没有真正坐下来,写出一整套数字去套用那个方程。

显然,在某种意义上,我们是在脑子里完成这件事的。我是说,这正是问题的关键所在。

但根本没有什么纸面文件。我们从来没有——从来就没有哪张纸,写明过我们对赫尔兹伯格珠宝(Helzberg's)、喜诗糖果或《布法罗新闻报》(The Buffalo News)在这方面的计算结果。

所以,如果我跟你讲一堆故弄玄虚的话,说什么「嗯,我们按18年来算,再套个终值,把这一整套都做一遍」,那其实是给我们的分析硬贴上了比它本身更多的科学色彩。

我们坐在办公室里,针对每一家企业、每一笔投资去思考这个问题。我们脑子里大致是有折现率概念的。

但我们真正希望的是,这个决策对我们来说足够显而易见,显而易见到根本不需要做什么详细的计算。

它是个框架。但并不是说我们真的会把所有变量都一一填进去那样去套用它。

这么说公平吗,查理?

芒格:是的。伯克希尔的经营方式,就像伟大的诺贝尔奖得主托马斯·亨特·摩尔根(Thomas Hunt Morgan)当年管理加州理工学院生物系的方式一样。

他禁止使用 Friden 计算器——那是那个年代的「电脑」。人们说:「你怎么能这么做?加州理工别的地方到处都有 Friden 计算器在转个不停。」

SYNC VIDEO TO PARAGRAPH

他说:「这个嘛,我们只靠有条理的常识,就在捡这些金灿灿的大金块;资源是有限的,只要我们还能捡到这些成块成堆的黄金,就绝不会去搞什么该死的砂矿淘金。」

伯克希尔就是这么运作的。我希望那种砂矿淘金的时代永远不要到来。

有一次,有人就某项收购对我们的「人员配备文件」发出了传票。当然,结果是我们不但没有任何人员配备文件,我们压根就没有任何工作人员。(笑声与掌声)

22. “总会发生点什么”,我们要做好准备

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:我是来自加州拉古纳海滩的汤姆·莫罗(Tom Morrow,音译)。我要问的问题与新股发行有关。

还有,正如查尔斯(查理)所提到的,在不泄露任何战略机密的前提下,你们眼下心里是不是已经有了某座潜在的「金矿」——某项你们此刻已经具体盯上的大型收购?

巴菲特:是的,确实有一些我们想做的事。至于我们最终有没有机会去做,那是另一回事。但你知道,如果在未来五年里我们一次都没有动用过优先股,我会感到意外。

正如我在报告里提到的,去年我们有一笔交易,如果当时做成了,可能会涉及发行大约 10 亿美元的——不,比这还多,抱歉——大约二三十亿美元的优先股。

在我看来,那笔交易是不会成了。我是说,它——大概有百分之一的机会会成、或者会发生类似的情况——但很可能是不会发生的。

但另一方面,我们要为此做好准备。总会有事情发生的。这一直是我们的经验。

你知道,我们也熬过一些颗粒无收的干旱期。这在股市和收购这两件事上都是如此。

你知道,我在 1969 年关闭了合伙公司,因为当时没有任何值得做的事情。我很庆幸自己这么做了,因为那种局面在 1971 年和 1972 年一直持续。

但到了 1973 年和 1974 年,你知道,可做的事情就五花八门、应有尽有了。

这种情况会时不时地出现。人们的行为——尤其是在市场里——将来一样会和过去一样愚蠢。它会在你意想不到的时候到来。但我们总会有机会去做点什么。

当然,那种机会更多是在市场上用现金去买东西。但我们也会有机会动用优先股。

而且我们会努力去琢磨大事。我们也许找不到,但查理和我,东西越大,我们就越感兴趣。

23. 庞大的资产让浮存金运用更灵活

巴菲特:4 号区。

观众:我是来自洛杉矶的吉姆·莫斯(Jim Moss,音译)。

我在读你们的年报。对我来说,里面有一个让人瞠目结舌的数字,就是 1994 年的浮存金规模,而且成本还不到零——我记得是 30 亿美元。

我想知道,你们对这笔钱的投资有没有什么限制,还是说它可以投进你们的上市股权证券里?

巴菲特:这个问题涉及——我们在年报里放了那张很长的表格,大概是四年前左右开始引入的,它列出了浮存金的规模以及浮存金的成本。

那是一张非常重要的表格。就我们的经营性业务而言,它大概是整份报告里最重要的一条信息。

而那笔浮存金,正如你所注意到的,现在已经远远超过 30 亿美元了——去年由于各种有利因素,包括我们的超级巨灾业务表现良好,同时也因为我们其他保险业务做得非常好——好得惊人。

那笔浮存金的成本——这笔钱是我们持有的、但最终并不属于我们、终将归于他人的钱。那笔浮存金的成本低于零,这是一笔非常宝贵的资产。

那么问题是,我们在投资这笔钱时有多大的灵活性——我想这才是你问题的核心。

答案是,我们拥有很大的灵活性。这笔钱以浮存金而非自有股本的形式存在,并没有在任何实质性的方面让我们处于不利地位。

当然,如果我们的股本非常有限、而浮存金又非常庞大,我们就会对自己怎么运用它施加许多限制,因为我们会非常想确保自己有能力在合适的时机把那笔浮存金——实质上——分配给保单持有人、索赔人,或者当时该付给谁就付给谁。

但我们的净资产如此之多,以至于实际上那笔浮存金对我们而言几乎和自有股本一样有用。而这意味着相当有用。它是伯克希尔的一大笔资产。

24. 不觉得“比尔兹敦女士”构成威胁

巴菲特:我看看,我们到 5 号区了。

观众:我是来自威斯康星州麦迪逊的苏珊·斯科特(Susan Scott,音译)。

说点更严肃的:你们有没有开始感到,自己正受到「比尔兹敦女士们」(Beardstown Ladies)的成功的威胁?(笑)

巴菲特:哪位女士?

芒格:我——

巴菲特:那是哪位女士?我——

芒格:我没听清。

巴菲特:除了那是哪位女士,别的我都听清了。

观众:就是「比尔兹敦女士们」,那个投资团体啊?

巴菲特:哦,那个团体。对,那本畅销书。是的。我还没读过那本书。在一屋子股东面前承认这一点,我实在不好意思——

这是一本——我想它大概排在《泰晤士报》(《纽约时报》)畅销书榜的第七还是第八名什么的,而且已经在榜上挂了好几个月了。

那是一个团体——一个投资团体——看样子,正在向全世界分享她们的成功秘诀。

每当有人向全世界分享什么了不起的投资点子时,我总是心存怀疑。不过眼下我们倒还没受到威胁,没有。(笑)

25. 护城河与城堡的经济学

巴菲特:6 号区。

巴菲特:来自纽约市的迈克·阿赛尔(Mike Assail,音译)。

在年报「今日之错」那一节里,你提到了一条你忽略掉的基本经济学法则。我想知道,有哪两三条最重要的基本经济学法则,是你惯常都能做对的。

换句话说,你用来为伯克希尔赚钱的那些基本经济学法则是什么?

我这里说的不是本·格雷厄姆的那些原则,而是那种可能在经济学教科书里找到的经济学法则。谢谢。

巴菲特:我们——是的,我们努力去——我是说,就我们在投资和收购企业时所抱持的态度而言,我们努力遵循本(格雷厄姆)的原则。

但你能做的最重要的事情——你知道,我们想做的,是找到一家四周环绕着又宽又长久的护城河的企业,护城河保护着一座了不起的经济城堡,而城堡里有一位诚实的领主在掌管。

本质上,做生意讲的就是这件事。我是说,你自己想当这座城堡的领主。果真如此的话,你就不必操心最后那个因素了。

但你想要——我们想要找的,是这样一家企业:出于这样或那样的原因——可能因为它在某个领域是低成本生产者,可能因为它凭借某种超凡能力而拥有天然的专营权,可能因为它在消费者心中的地位,可能因为某种技术优势,或者随便什么原因——它的四周有这样一道护城河。

然后我们——接下来我们要判断的是——在资本主义体制下,所有护城河都会受到攻击,所以每个人都会去尝试——如果你那里有一座大城堡,人们就会绞尽脑汁想办法攻进去。

而我们要判断的是——在资本主义里,大多数护城河其实根本一文不值,你知道。我是说,这就是它的本质。而且这种局面是一件有建设性的好事。

但我们要努力弄清楚的是,是什么让那座城堡——为什么那座城堡至今仍然屹立?又是什么会让它在五年、十年、二十年后继续屹立,或者让它倒下?关键因素是什么?它们有多持久?它们在多大程度上依赖于城堡里那位领主的天才?

然后,如果我们对那道护城河感到放心,我们就会进一步去琢磨,你知道,那位领主会不会想把一切都据为己有,他会不会拿着这些钱去干什么蠢事,诸如此类。但这就是我们看待企业的方式。

查理,你想补充点什么吗?

芒格:嗯,我想他是希望把这套话翻译成经济学里通常的术语。那位诚实的领主,就是低代理成本。这是经济学里的说法。

而微观层面的企业优势,大体上都是规模优势——市场主导地位的规模,比如一家零售商,凭借更便宜的进货价和更高的每平方英尺销售额,享有巨大的优势。

所以,你——大体上谈的是规模经济。你也可以有智力上的规模优势。换句话说,你可以有一位智力出众、足以带来巨大优势的领主。所以,你——大体上谈的是规模优势和低代理成本。

巴菲特:是的,在某种程度上,查理和我会努力区分两类企业:一类是你只要聪明一次就行的企业,另一类是你必须始终保持聪明的企业。

我是说,零售业就是一个你必须始终保持聪明的好例子。

但你会——你时时刻刻都在遭受攻击。人们就在你的店里。如果你做了什么成功的事,他们第二天就跑到你店里,琢磨你的成功究竟有什么诀窍,看看能不能照搬过去,或许还在自己的情况下再添点东西。所以,在零售业你不能松懈躺平。

还有另一些企业,你只需要聪明一次就够了,至少很长一段时间内是这样。从前有位南方的报业老板,他的报纸经营得非常好。有人问他成功的秘诀,他说:垄断加裙带关系。(笑)

我是说,他可不傻。我是说,他对自己没有任何幻想。

如果30年前你拥有一大批电视联播网的加盟台,好的管理和差的管理之间仍然有重大差别。我是说,重大差别。

但基本上,你可以是个糟糕透顶的经理,照样发大财。因为「拥有电视联播网加盟台」这一个决策,几乎能弥补从那一刻起此后存在的任何缺陷。

可如果你是第一个在零售业之类领域想出某个新概念的人,情况就不会是这样了。我是说,你得每天都出去捍卫它。

理想情况下,你知道,你想要的是一家了不起的企业配上了不起的管理层。这正是我们寻找的东西。

但正如我们过去指出的,如果你必须二选一,那就选一家了不起的企业。

查理,还有要补充的吗?

芒格:想不出来。

26. 盛赞堪萨斯城的海兹伯格家族

巴菲特:我看看,我想接下来是7号区?

声音:7号区没有问题。

巴菲特:好的。那1号区呢?

观众:我是来自堪萨斯城的Paul Miller。

首先,我想就你们收购总部位于堪萨斯城的Helzberg Jewelers发表点看法。你谈到了Barnett Helzberg,以及他在零售方面所做的事。

对我们这些堪萨斯城人来说,你们还顺带把Barnett和Shirley Helzberg夫妇也收入麾下了,他们是堪萨斯城慈善界的头号家族。

对在座的股东们来说,Helzberg一家都是了不起的人。能把他们加入这一群公司之中,充分说明了沃伦·巴菲特的为人,也说明了他们是根据管理层和团队来挑选公司的。

所以,要为伯克希尔·哈撒韦把Helzberg一家收入麾下喝彩,也要感谢Helzberg一家为堪萨斯城所做的一切。现在,我的——(掌声)

巴菲特:很感谢你这番话。(掌声)

27. 为子公司估值

观众:我的问题与价值有关。我们可以翻看年报,大家都能看到,比如说,当年以1000万美元买下的《华盛顿邮报》,如今价值4.2亿美元。

但要看清楚另外那一批非上市企业的价值——内布拉斯加家具城、Borsheims等等——这些年它们当年的买入价相对于今天的价值,我们怎么才能理解这种价值,它又是如何在年报里体现出来的呢?

巴菲特:是的,嗯,我们尽量——这是个好问题。我们在年报里尽量给你提供那些我们自己回答这个问题时会想要的信息。

其中一部分,我们放在那几页里,注明这不是按照GAAP会计准则编制的。但那里头有大量有用的信息。

我们不会——我们不会给每家公司贴上一个数字。但对于那些较大的企业,我们尽量给你提供足够的信息——所动用的资本、利润率,以及诸如此类的东西——好让你做出的估算,大概跟我们的估算一样靠谱。

巴菲特:要对这些控股企业值多少钱形成一个相当不错的判断,查理和我所需要的信息并不会比年报里更多。我们没有藏着任何我们认为对评估这些企业有真正重要意义的信息。

但你说得对,至少就当前的数字而言,可流通的有价证券要比全资企业容易处理得多。

那些全资企业,一般来说,其中有些的价值远远高于我们——高于它们在账面上记载的价值。而且基本上,对它们当中的每一家,我们的感觉都相当好。

但它们——我得说,这些年它们表现得出奇地好。我猜它们会继续运转得相当不错。

这些企业里有不少的经理人今天就在现场。我不会把他们一一介绍,因为人太多了,那得花相当长一段时间。

不过你提到了《华盛顿邮报》。前排那里,靠近前排的位置,我们请来了可口可乐的Don Keough,你能站起来一下吗?(掌声)

还有代表《邮报》的Kay Graham。(掌声)

以及Cap Cities的Tom Murphy。(掌声)

芒格:Paul Hazen也在场吗?

巴菲特:我还想试着——嗯,还有一大堆人呢。我不想——但我——但这三位正好坐在一起,我突然意识到一个事实:如果——把这三家加起来,迄今为止我们大约赚了65亿的利润。(笑)

所以,我得说这是一个——(掌声)——

这三家企业都棒极了。而我之所以强调「迄今为止」,是因为我们希望将来能报出一个更大的数字。

但我们有一批经理人,无论是在控股公司还是在部分持股的公司,他们都为伯克希尔创造了惊人的价值。

我是说,查理和我每天就坐在那儿看报纸、看一大堆杂志之类的东西,看O.J. Simpson的案子或者别的什么。(笑)

而这些人却在外头为我们创造海量的价值。所以,我们不打算改变这一点。那——

28. 所罗门兄弟公司的文化冲突

巴菲特:好,我看看。我想,是——现在是2号区吗?还是——对。

观众:你好。我是来自科罗拉多州Dillon的Tim Palmer。我有一个关于Salomon的问题想问你。

过去这一周,《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》,还有我想是《商业周刊》上,都登了文章,措辞相当不客气,谈的是管理层那里的状况以及你的人选。那里似乎存在着——某种程度的文化冲突。

我并不确定这是不是事实。但我想知道,第一,你是如何让自己对坏消息保持开放、在它成为新闻之前就能听到的。

Salomon那里到底在发生什么,薪酬方案等等?你觉得从文化上来说,这件事会怎么收场?

巴菲特:查理和我一向——我们对坏消息的兴趣,永远大于对好消息的兴趣。我们认为好消息会自己照顾好自己。而且——人们来为我们工作时,我们只给他们交代寥寥几条指示。

其中一条是要像所有者一样思考。第二条是,坏消息要立刻告诉我们,因为好消息会自己照顾好自己。坏消息我们承受得起,但我们不喜欢坏消息姗姗来迟。

所以,关于Salomon,我得说,那里确实存在、也一直存在某种文化冲突。在一个有那么大张力的行业里,几乎总会有文化冲突。

无论是娱乐业、投资银行业,还是体育产业,当——在付给那里员工的报酬和付给所有者的报酬之间——总会存在一定程度的张力。

我认为,从我最初到Salomon的那一天起,乃至在那之前很久,那种张力就一直存在。我是说,我——这一点毫不意外。这是可以理解的。

其实你在航空业里也能看到这种张力,存在于那里的员工和资本之间。它在航空业造成了糟糕透顶的结果。而那里的员工一直能够——我说的不是特指USAir,尽管它是个例子。但情况远不止于此。

他们手里有一些合同,正如我在年报里指出的,这些合同是在更早的年代签订的,实质上在很多情况下根本不会让资本得到任何回报。这就制造了大量的张力。

在投资银行业,或者整个华尔街,你不会有那样的合同。但你会有同样性质的张力。

而要扭转一种文化,第一,需要时间;第二,多半还需要换一些人。我是说,如果你打算去做这件事,这一点应该不会让你太意外。

我——我觉得你找不出比Bob Denham和Deryck Maughan更出色的两个人了。他们聪明,品格高尚,愿意非常努力地工作。会有人认同他们想要建立的那套安排,也会有人不认同。

那些离开的人,远不是全都出于自愿,但大多数是。不过也有些不是。我是说,那——Salomon去年亏了很多钱。离开的人当中,有许多并不该为其中某些亏损负责,但也有一些人是该负责的。

所以,这种事你不会在报纸上点名道姓。但有些人离开,是因为他们在别处能挣更多的钱。还有些人离开,也许是因为我们觉得没有他们我们能挣更多的钱。(笑)

查理?

芒格:是啊,我觉得人们所谈论的所罗门内部的那些紧张关系,其实一点也不稀奇。我认为这种情况在华尔街几乎随处可见,甚至连那些一直想模仿华尔街的银行也是如此。我就觉得,这是这个行业天生就带着的东西。

巴菲特:我不知道高盛今年有多大比例的合伙人离开了,但他们显然也出现了紧张关系——因为他们经历了糟糕的一年。而且他们时不时就会有糟糕的一年。每个人都会有糟糕的一年。

但是——高盛的合伙人——普通合伙人——在截至1994年11月30日的那一年里业绩并不好。他们也许根本没赚到什么。而在之前的年份里,他们赚过非常大的钱。在之后的年份里,他们大概也会赚到非常大的钱。

但在他们没赚到钱的那一年,人员流动很大。而且其中有些流动,也许并不全是出于那些你读到的、据说离职的普通合伙人自己的意愿。这件事的具体内情我并不清楚。

但无论在什么情况下,华尔街都存在着一定程度的紧张。而当你赚不到钱的时候,紧张就会非常大。

29. 本·格雷厄姆《证券分析》的最佳版本

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:是的。我叫迈克尔·约翰逊。我是土生土长的奥马哈人,不过现在我和家人是侨居海外的美国人,住在沙特阿拉伯的达兰。

我的问题和内在价值以及本·格雷厄姆的《证券分析》有关。

今年早些时候我读了珍妮特·洛(Janet Lowe)写的一本书,她说您更倾向于《证券分析》的第一版或第二版,而不太认同第四版。

然而,第四版似乎更倾向于把成长和价值看作密不可分的一体,就像您在最近几份年报里所说的那样。

所以,如果我是一个像我这样一直在钻研证券分析的人——我想我在这上面花的时间更多——您觉得我有必要去弄到那些早期版本吗?还是说第四版更接近您后来所倾向的方向,就像您说的价值和成长密不可分?

巴菲特:顺便说一句,珍妮特·洛今天就在现场。她写了一本关于本·格雷厄姆的非常好的书。我建议你们当中还没读过的人,去买一本来看。

我——我还是更喜欢——我觉得第二版买起来比第一版便宜不少。而且我认为它基本上就是同一本书。所以,那就是我会推荐的那一版。这倒不是因为它在价值和成长问题上有什么不同。

我只是觉得,第二版从头到尾的论证更好、更前后一致,而那其实是本最后一次百分之百负责撰写的版本——当然,戴夫·多德(Dave Dodd)在各方面也帮了他。

所以,我觉得这本书后来在很大程度上既偏离了格雷厄姆的思想,也偏离了他表达自己的方式。所以我真的——不过,谁要是想读后来的版本,我也完全没有意见。

我确实认为,如果你是一个真正钻研证券分析的人,读懂第二版,你大概——你应该就能学得不错。

就那些犯过的错误而言——在垃圾债券、会计之类的方面犯的种种错误——其实1934年的第一版里就已经讲到了,1940年的第二版里随后也讲到了。那里头有很多干货。

再往后嘛,你知道——我得承认,最后一版我读得没有早期的那几版那么仔细。但给我的印象是,它——它所讲的东西不那么重要,表达得也不那么好,而且还更贵。(笑)

查理,你对这有什么想法吗?

芒格:想不出来。

30. 伯克希尔为何不出售旗下企业

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:是的,我是来自纽约市的杰夫·佩斯金(Jeff Peskin)。

我有一个关于年报的问题。您在年报里说,显然,由于伯克希尔的规模,往后的回报大概没法和过去的回报相提并论。

接着您又说,可能拖累回报的一个因素是:您其实不太喜欢卖掉自己拥有的公司。

我只是想知道,这背后的道理是什么。如果你手上有一家公司或一笔投资,你认为它今后的表现,不如你把这笔钱投到别处去,那继续持有、而不把钱重新调配到别处,真正的道理究竟是什么?

巴菲特:好。我先稍微纠正你一点。第一,我没有说我们「大概」会比过去做得差。我说的是我们「一定」会比过去做得差。我的意思是,我们绝无可能在百分比数字上和过去相提并论。

因为,你知道,要不了多久——假设我们什么都不分红——我们就会把整个GDP都吞下去。这种事我们偶尔倒也会想一想,但是——(笑)——我们并不真指望能办到。这——

但是——第二点,那是和规模有关的。它和我们不愿卖掉企业无关,因为这种不情愿已经存在了几十年。但这样的规模可没存在几十年。

规模就是——你知道,把120亿左右翻一番,比把12亿翻一番要难,而后者又比把1.2亿翻一番要难。我是说,这一点毫无疑问。

所以,最终——其实现在它就已经会拖累业绩了。这不代表业绩会很糟糕,但它确实意味着,23%是一个历史数字。它没有任何预测价值。

至于不愿卖掉企业这件事,就像我说的,由来已久。那不是——那——

如果说那损害了业绩,那也是九牛一毛。这只是一个事实——是查理和我的态度所决定的一个结果:如果我们想这样过我们的人生,那么我们发现,能遇到我们愿意与之共事的人,是一件稀罕事。一旦真的遇到了,我们就乐在其中。

我们看不出有什么理由,为了一年多赚半个百分点或一个百分点——别拿更高的数字来试探我们——但是——(笑)——我们看不出有什么理由,到处去断送我们和这些人的友谊、联系或关系。这对我们来说根本说不通。它——

我们不想被绑进那种事里去。我们清楚,如果我们是一家私人公司,我们是不会那么干的。

如今在伯克希尔,我们觉得我们已经把这个立场讲明白了。我们想把它传达给每一个可能加入我们的人,因为我们不希望他们指望我们去那么做。

我们希望他们指望我们努力工作,去取得一个像样的结果,并确保股东得到和我们一样的结果,诸如此类。

但我们不想和我们的股东同伴们订立任何隐性契约,逼得我们不得不以一种我们其实并不想要的方式行事。

如果那是多赚钱的代价,那这个代价我们不想付。

我们放弃的还有别的一些东西,但这一条是人们也许会和我们有分歧的。所以,我们想非常确定,每个人一进来就明白这一点。这是你在这里买到的东西的一部分。

而且它也许——反正我觉得它对业绩的损害不会有那么大。但在它确实有损害的范围内,那就是跟着我们一起来的一个局限。

查理?(掌声)

芒格:我觉得没有办法把它精确地量出来。但我猜,如果你能去评估一种东西——你或许可以把它叫做伯克希尔旗下那些经营企业的负责人的品格,他们当中许多人当初还亲手创建了这些企业,而且像赫尔兹伯格一家(the Helzbergs)那样,是各自社区里数一数二的公民——

我不认为全美国还有任何别的公司能做得像我们这么好——如果你衡量的是公司里这些人的人品的话。

现在,你可以说我们是把高素质的人聚拢了起来,因为这些人我们是死活都造不出来的。但不管怎么说,这是一套了不起的体系。我们又何必去瞎折腾它呢?

巴菲特:如果你想——(掌声)——吸引高素质的人,那你自己大概就得设法表现得相当好才行。

我是说,这只是——再说,干别的也没什么乐趣。我是说,那——我当年在60年代经营合伙公司的时候,就多少处在那种位置上。

我真的——你知道,那时候人们带着钱进来和我合伙。我的任务就是尽我们所能拿出最好的回报。我发现,如果我介入到一门生意里去,那会带来某些我并不喜欢的选择。所以,在这方面,伯克希尔要让人满意得多。

31. 聚焦格雷厄姆的三大原则

巴菲特:5 号区?

观众:约翰·兰金(John Rankin),来自科罗拉多州柯林斯堡。谢谢你们让我们来到这里。

在《巴菲特之道》(Warren Buffett Way)这本书里,作者描述了您用来评估普通股购买时内在价值的那个资本增长模型。

我的问题是,您现在是否也仍在使用本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》里描述的那个公式——那个既评估预期增长、同时也考虑账面价值的公式?

在我看来,用格雷厄姆先生那个公式算出来的合理价值,总是比《巴菲特之道》里、以及您在年报中也提到过的那种「把现金流折算回现值」的方法所得出的,要稍高一些。

巴菲特:是的,我们已经尽量在年报里讲清楚了我们大致是怎么看待证券的。而账面价值并不在考虑之列——实际上,几乎根本不在考虑之列。

而最好的企业,按定义来说,将会是那些长期以来对所占用资本能赚取极高回报的企业。所以,从本质上讲,如果我们想拥有好企业,我们拥有的东西,相对于我们的买入价格而言,所占用的资本会相对较少。

这本不会是本·格雷厄姆的做法。但本·格雷厄姆——本打交道的资金量并不很大。而且他也不会反对这种做法,他只会说他那套更简单。而且当你打交道的是小笔资金时,他那套也许确实更简单。

我的朋友沃尔特·施洛斯,要远远更贴近本会挑选的那类证券。但他打交道的资金量较小。他有着绝对惊人的业绩记录。这一点我一点也不觉得意外。我是说,当沃尔特离开格雷厄姆-纽曼(Graham-Newman)的时候,我本来就料想他会做得很好。

但在我们看来,格雷厄姆真正的核心信息,我并不认为是在那里头——并不在任何和公式有关的东西里。换句话说,它有三个重要的方面。

你知道,其一是你对待股市的态度。这一点在《聪明的投资者》第八章里讲到了。我是说,如果你对市场抱有那种态度,你一开始就领先于市场上99%的人。所以,你拥有一个巨大的优势。

第二条原则是安全边际,它同样给了你一个巨大的优势,而且实际上,它的适用范围远远超出了投资领域。

还有第三点,就是把股票看作一门生意,这会让你拥有一个跟市场里大多数人截然不同的视角。

有了这三块大致的哲学基石,你具体用什么估值方法,其实就没那么重要了。因为你不会跑偏到哪儿去,无论你用沃尔特的方法——沃尔特·施洛斯的——还是用我的,或者别的什么方法。

菲尔·卡雷特(Phil Carret)的方法略有不同。但我敢打包票,他的方法也建立在这三块基石之上。相信我,他干得非常出色。

查理?

32. 不要相信预测

芒格:是的。就估算未来现金流的方法需要做预测而言,我得说,尽管这种情况在逻辑上需要预测,但在美国,预测平均而言是弊大于利的。

绝大多数预测,都是由对某个特定结果抱有利害关系的人凑出来的。掺进这个过程里的潜意识偏见,再加上它表面上那种精确感,让它变得——嗯,要么是愚蠢可笑的,要么是不光彩的,要么是糊涂的,随你怎么说。

马克·吐温过去常说,矿井就是一个由骗子拥有的地洞。而在美国,凡是由某个能拿到佣金的人、或某个想为某项行动辩护的高管所做的预测,往往就是一个谎言。

在大多数情况下,这不是蓄意的谎言。这个人自己已经信以为真了。而那是最糟糕的一种谎言。

所以,我认为我们不该——对待预测要格外当心,尤其是当某个人有兴趣误导你的时候。

巴菲特:我想这么说是公道的:无论是买入一只证券,还是买下一家企业,查理和我从来没看过任何预测。人家可是大批大批地把预测塞给我们。

如今,当人家硬要把这些东西塞给我们时,我们却主动把它们推开——我是说,正因为这些预测是由卖企业的人、或者向董事会做汇报的高管之类的人如此一丝不苟地精心准备出来的,你知道,我是说,要么是我们错了,要么是他们错了。

十有八九,这只是经理人走的一套过场,用来为他们一开始就想做的事情辩护。

你知道,我从来没碰到过哪个想买东西的高管会说:“嗯,我只好把它否了,因为预测算不过来。”我是说,这种事——压根就没发生过。

而且总会有人冒出来,拿出能让给他签工资支票的人满意的预测,或者能让那笔带来佣金的交易得以签成的预测。

然后他们会把这些预测递交给其他任何需要点头的人——银行家也好,董事会也好——好让交易获批。

这纯粹是胡扯。我最近就卷入了某件事——一个把预测作为汇报内容一部分的场合。于是我要求把做这些预测的人过往的业绩记录,连同他们以往的那些预测,一并同时拿出来。(笑)

这是个非常失礼的举动。(笑)

芒格:这被视为离经叛道。

巴菲特:这——但相信我,它印证了那个观点。我是说,简直是个笑话,我是说。所以,这事就说到这儿吧。

33. 审视一项投资时的第一个问题

巴菲特:我们或许再——再来一个问题。然后我们就休息一下。

查理和我会在上面这儿吃东西。想留下来的人可以留下来。而在另一个房间里的人,这边肯定会有空座位让他们填上来。

所以,我们大概在10到15分钟后重新集合。然后只要那群人还在,我们就一直讲下去。

那么,我们就从6区再接一个问题。然后我们就休息。

观众:你好,我叫彼得·贝弗林(Peter Bevelin),来自瑞典。

当你审视一项潜在投资时,你问自己的头一个问题究竟是什么?还有,你和芒格先生问自己的头一个问题是一样的吗?

巴菲特:是的。嗯,我想——我不会问自己查理会不会喜欢它,因为——(笑)——那可是个棘手的问题。

不,第一个问题是:我能理解它吗?除非它属于一门我认为自己能理解的生意,否则根本没必要去看它。

没必要自欺欺人地以为我能搞懂某家软件公司,或者某家生物科技公司,或者诸如此类的东西。我对它能他妈的懂个啥?我是说,你知道,我能——所以这是第一道门槛问题。

接着第二个问题是,你知道,它看上去有没有良好的经济效益?它有没有赚到很高的资本回报率?你知道,它在我看来像不像是一门很可能做到这一点的生意?然后我大致就从这里往下推进。

你呢,查理?

芒格:是的。我们往往是依据过往的记录来判断的。总的来说,如果一样东西过往记录糟糕、前景却光明,那我们就会错过这个机会。(笑声与掌声)

下午场

1. 银行业属于我们的能力圈

巴菲特:好,如果各位能就座的话,我们准备从1区接一个问题开始。我们得——

观众:巴菲特先生,我是布莱恩·墨菲(Brian Murphy),来自佛罗里达州克利尔沃特。

我想问您一个问题,关于您收购银行(比如PNC和SunTrust)背后目前的考量,尤其是考虑到这样一个事实:银行股在1990年卖得那么便宜,而如今许多银行的股价已经翻了三倍。

而且,从近期的出版物和财经文献来看,相对于1990年的估值,您似乎对这些价位更高的银行变得有兴趣得多了。能否谈谈您在这方面的想法?

巴菲特:是的,我们其实并没有什么不同——我们用在银行身上的标准,跟用在其他企业身上的标准并无二致。有那么几份出版物,也许把这件事渲染得有点过头了,因为我怀疑两者之间的差别充其量也就一两个百分点——

而且顺带说一句,我们根本不是那样想问题的。我们没有很多板块——我们压根就没有任何板块配置的理论。

所以,我们只是在看银行时,套用跟我们看任何其他企业时一样的标准——

另外,顺便说一句,你们应该知道——我得说,媒体上关于我们动向的报道,也许有一半、甚至再多一点,都是错的。当然,也有一些是准确的。

然后,当然,有些报道严重过时。我是说,我们向SEC提交的关于持仓的申报享有保密待遇,所以它们要等到我们申报一年多以后才会被公布。

因此,过去一两个月里,有那么几篇关于我们买了某样东西的报道。当然,如果你仔细读那篇报道,会发现我们也许是一年半以前就买了。而我们可能已经把它卖了,也可能买了更多,什么情况都有可能。

所以,总的来说,我对媒体报道是会留个心眼的。

我们其实——我们确实——在1969年为伯克希尔买过一家银行,就是罗克福德的伊利诺伊国民银行信托公司(Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford)。我们一直对银行这门生意抱有兴趣。

我们觉得这是我们能够——是落在我们能力圈之内、能够评估的东西。这并不意味着我们每次都能判断正确,但——我们不认为理解银行这门生意超出了我们的能力。所以,我们会去看这个领域里的企业。

查理?

芒格:没有要补充的。

2. 巴菲特总说书“再过六个月”就会动笔写

巴菲特:好。2区有人吗?

观众:我是拉里·迈尔斯(Larry Myers),来自奥马哈。

沃伦,两个简短的问题,第一个非常简短。关于您何时会写一本讲述自己职业生涯和投资哲学的书,您有没有什么时间表?

巴菲特:有,我的时间表向来都是“从现在起六个月以后”。(笑)

对此我的回答是,我有那么几次想过要写,我也确实在琢磨这事。可在我看来,总好像还有比迄今为止已经发生的事情更有意思得多的事情,正等着发生,而我不想——我知道我不会写第二本,所以我就一直往后拖。反正,这就是我的理由。

3. 可口可乐把现金用在了“完全正确的地方”

观众:谢谢您。第二个问题是关于分红的。上周五晚上,碰巧在路易斯·鲁凯泽(Louis Rukeyser)的每周电视节目上,特邀嘉宾是菲利普·卡雷特(Philip Carret)。

卡雷特先生当时表示,他最喜欢的美国股票是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。而他给出的一个主要理由是:“众所周知,伯克希尔从不分红”,因此,你们对那笔多出来的现金有着更出色的运用。

那么,如果把这套逻辑推而广之,假如可口可乐和吉列停止分红、把现金以别的方式加以运用,这会不会也是一项有益的政策呢?

巴菲特:嗯,这要看他们能拿这笔现金做什么——他们会怎么运用——怎么动用这笔现金,能把它用在什么地方。至少就产品而言,那是些比伯克希尔更聚焦的企业。

而它们——我想——对于那些拥有一门绝妙生意的管理层,我会称许他们把现金运用到那些绝妙的生意里,或者运用到他们懂行、并且同样会拥有绝妙经济效益的生意里,再把剩下的钱还给股东。

所以在我看来,可口可乐对它的现金所做的事情完全正确:当它一方面,A,把它能有效运用的全部现金都投进生意里,去开拓新市场以及诸如此类的事情。

但在那之外,它会派发股息,把现金分配给股东;然后它还大手笔地回购股票,这是有选择地把现金还给股东,但其方式让所有股东都从中受益。

所以,我们——只要我们能把留存下来的每一美元,都用来创造出超过一美元的价值、以及随时间推移超过一美元的市场价值,你们就会从我们不分红这件事上获益。

至于我们能不能继续这么做、能继续这么做多久,你知道,我没法向你们打包票,但那就是——那就是我们据以做出这一决策的标尺。

我认为这也是可口可乐做决策时所依据的尺度。我觉得他们值得高度赞扬,因为他们有纪律去及时收手——在动用现金时,当他们已经没有机会把现金用好时——然后再把这些现金以更有利的方式部署出去,也就是回购股份。

我钦佩我的朋友比尔·盖茨的一点是,他在微软里有 45 亿美元的现金,而很少有管理层能在手握 45 亿美元现金的情况下,还不去拿它做点蠢事。

到目前为止,把我们赚到的钱全部留存下来对我们是有意义的,我认为再过一段时间这依然会是有意义的,但它未必会永远有意义。

查理?

芒格:我希望这种状态能持续很久。(笑)

4. 为什么华尔街的薪酬如此之高?

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:我叫丹·奥尼尔(Dan O'Neil),来自新墨西哥州的圣菲。

我想问——想问一个更具体的、关于所罗门兄弟(Salomon Brothers)的问题,那就是:我们为什么要付给那里的员工那么多钱?

巴菲特:为什么什么?

观众:我们为什么要付给那里的员工那么多钱?传统的说法似乎是,华尔街的薪酬标准就是和世界上其他地方不一样。

这种说法基于一种观念,认为交易员比别人更聪明——某些交易员比另一些更聪明——并且能以某种超自然的方式,接收到未来发回到现在的信号。我们怎么知道,这不会只是个像「纽约市下水道里有鳄鱼」那样的都市传说呢?

另一种说法是,庞大的股东资本让交易员能够捕捉市场中存在的无效率,就像赌场在拉斯维加斯赚庄家钱的方式一样。

我是说,如果我们拥有一家赌场,那么我们雇阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦还是雇阿甘(Forrest Gump)来管二十一点的赌桌,其实没有任何区别,我们付给他们的钱也会一样多。我想知道你认为哪种说法更接近真相。

巴菲特:嗯,你这话说得很到位。(笑声和掌声)

当然,最终你付的,至少是你自己认为的市场行情价。在某种程度上,市场会通过「人们是否因为能拿到更高的薪酬而离职」来检验你。

但这件事的约束条件应该是:只要你拿到的资本回报是市场水平的,你就按市场行情付薪。但要在短期内衡量资本的市场回报率,比衡量薪酬的市场行情要难得多。

所以,离开的人当中——有相当一部分,但远非全部——是因为他们觉得自己能在别处获得——大概是因为他们能获得更高的报酬,才离开的。

市场就是这样运作的,就像它在娱乐业里那样运作,在体育界里也那样运作。

而这样运作时,它给资本留下的回报是否足够,是个悬而未决的问题。我是说,我没有看过所有棒球队的数据,但我看过其中一些。可以肯定的是,在一些较小的市场里,账本可不是做出来糊弄人的。

我是说,在堪萨斯城,要按市场行情付给球员薪水、同时还能靠经营球队赚钱,是非常难的,因为那里的电视市场比那些大城市要小,诸如此类。

所以,归根结底,你为了留住人,就得付市场行情价,但其中一部分还取决于他们衡量自己——衡量将要拿多少报酬——所参照的时间段。

我是说,如果你看高盛(Goldman Sachs)去年的情况,他们什么报酬都没拿到。这是不是意味着所有人都会离开,因为他们在别处好歹能拿到点报酬?不会,因为 80% 的合伙人,或者说 90% 的合伙人,看的时间跨度比这要长。他们心里有一个预期的盈利数字,会用它去和别处开出的条件作比较。

如果你遇到的情形是,市场行情价超过了这门生意的盈利能力,那么到了某个时点,资本就会从这门生意里流走。

以航空业为例——我常拿它举例——市场行情价,大多数——嗯,就那些更大的航空公司而言,人们拿到的不是市场行情价,而是合同约定的价。嗯,你不能为此责怪任何人。

如果你有一份合同,约定你有权拿 X,而当前的市场行情只有 X 的一半,你当然会非常拼命地死守这份合同。就像我说的,你不能为此责怪任何人,只不过,如果你最终落到了那种境地,你就真有麻烦了。

而且你面临的问题,和市场行情高于——或者说类似的问题——和市场行情高于你自己生意所能维持的水平时所面临的问题,是一样的。

我猜想,实际上,所罗门已经引入了一套更像高盛那样的制度,因为它在内部某种程度上创建了一种合伙人制。也就是——

要让这套制度奏效,第一,长期来看,合伙人必须挣到不错的钱,否则就行不通;但第二,你得有一批真正具备合伙人心态的人。而且如果你从一种文化转向另一种文化,任何新制度都不可能得到百分之百的接受。

查理?

芒格:是啊,刚引入一套新的薪酬制度,紧接着就碰上了非常糟糕的一年,这算是运气不太好。从事物的本性来看,人们会下意识地把责任归咎于这套薪酬制度。

还有第二点,我认为华尔街总体上比其他地方通常更容易出现「羡慕嫉妒」的效应。

5. 巴菲特谈富有的“真正”好处

我有个朋友,他的祖母过去常说,她想不通人们为什么会陷入羡慕嫉妒,因为在所有的罪当中,唯独这一桩是你绝不可能从中得到任何乐趣的。而且——(笑)

但总的来说,在华尔街,我觉得很多人摊上了不对的祖母。(笑声和掌声)

巴菲特:是啊,我时不时会评论说——他叫什么名字来着?罗宾·里奇(Robin Leach)在《富豪与名流的生活方式》(Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous)里全搞错了,因为他展示的全是你一旦发了财就会降临到你身上的种种美妙之事。

但这些其实并没有那么美妙,那些豪宅、游艇之类的东西。正如我向人们解释的,有钱真正的好处在于,它让你能如此高效地去恨。

也就是说,如果你极其有钱,而你的兄弟,或者随便谁,堂表亲什么的,在这世上得到了比你多一点的关注之类,你就可以以非常大的规模去恨。

你可以雇会计师和律师去给他制造各种各样的麻烦。要是你很穷,你顶多在感恩节冷落他、不露面之类的。(笑)

但我注意到,这些有钱人,尤其是当他们继承了巨额财富时,迟早会开始——而且常常会——对兄弟姐妹、堂表亲或随便什么人变得极为敌对。

他们真的能——他们能以一种我们其余人根本望尘莫及的方式去恨——或者说去嫉妒。所以,这就是最近没在罗宾·里奇节目里出现过的那种「好处」,不过我——

但你会看到——你在体育界和娱乐界能看到一点这种情况,也许在华尔街上也能看到,那就是:一年挣 100 万美元看起来很棒,直到坐在你旁边那个不可能有你聪明的家伙挣到了 120 万美元。于是整个世界,就变成了一个极不公平的地方。(笑)

6. “持有大量现金从来不是我们的政策”

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:下午好。我的问题很简单,是关于今年资产负债表上列示的现金及现金等价物,与去年相比的情况。

在我看来,手头持有现金等价物总是件好事,万一市场大跌,就能趁机择机买入,我知道你提到过「市场先生」有时会变得躁狂抑郁。

这里有没有什么不那么显而易见、而我没看出来的东西?还是说,万一市场上真出现那种情况,这笔头寸如今其实并不在那儿?

巴菲特:伯克希尔的现金是一项残余物。我是说,我们任何时候都希望一分现金都没有。同时,我们也不想在任何时候欠一大笔钱。

但我们——如果我们手头有现金,那纯粹是因为我们还没找到任何中意去做的事,而我们希望——总是希望——尽快把它部署出去。

我们从不去考虑市场会不会下跌之类,也不去想我们是不是可能买到更便宜的东西。如果我们看中了某样东西,我们就会把它买下来。

当你在我们的资产负债表上看到有任何规模的现金时,那是查理和我承认:在那个时点,我们没有找到任何有吸引力的东西,至少没有找到有相当规模的。持有大量现金从来不是我们的一项政策。

7. 报业生意“异常好”,但不如从前

巴菲特:5 号区?

观众:大卫·温特斯(David Winters),来自新泽西州的芒廷莱克斯(Mountain Lakes)。我站起来说。

大卫·温特斯,来自新泽西州的芒廷莱克斯。

多年前,你说过你热爱报业,然后随着时间推移,我想——你说这份热爱有所减退。我有点好奇你现在对它的感觉如何,以及你能否为我们稍微预测一下它的前景?

巴菲特:嗯,我过去在两个方面热爱它。我既热爱它的经济效益,也热爱这门生意本身的活动,两者都爱。这份对生意活动本身的热爱并没有减退。

和这世上几乎任何一门生意相比,它的经济效益依然格外地好。只是没有 15 年前那么好了。

所以,它们已经——几年前我写过这件事——曾经看起来几乎是最刀枪不入的特许经营权,如今仍然是一门格外好的生意,但已经不像 10 年或 20 年前那样刀枪不入了。

我仍然认为,在我所处的这个领域里,它差不多是最有意思的生意之一。但如果你纯粹谈经济效益,那么——我想不出还有多少别的生意,假如我这辈子只能拥有一项资产的话,会让我比拥有一家独家报纸城里的报纸更愿意拥有。

但我不会再有那种绝对确定的感觉了——那种我 10 年或 15 年前会有的感觉。

查理?

芒格:是啊,我觉得这是显而易见的,我——报纸的老板们头一回开始有了一丝偏执的不安。

我是说,他们担心电子革命,他们担心一个事实,就是年轻人,你知道,不读报。如今去参加报业大会,已经不像过去那么有乐趣了。

巴菲特:他们现在仍然在赚大钱。我是说,这才是有意思的地方。

芒格:啊,但是他们——我听你说过十几遍了,「人们似乎并不在乎自己停在哪一层,只在乎电梯是在往上走还是往下走。」

巴菲特:没错,确实如此。(笑)

一个人待在一部刚从一楼上来、停在二楼的电梯里,会比待在一部从一百层往下、停在99层的电梯里感觉更好,这一点毫无疑问。

他们脑子里有这么一种推断。当然,尤其是当他们身处一个赚钱——也就是利润——一直是自动到手的行业时更是如此,因为他们会开始琢磨,你知道的,会去想自己一旦离开了这种得天独厚的地位,是不是真的有能力赚到很多钱。

而这是他们以前从来不必反复掂量的问题。所以,这会让他们感到不自在。

他们都在大喊大叫新闻纸的价格。换了我们,恐怕也会跟着抱怨几句。

我是说,如果你把长期处在新闻纸行业和长期处在报纸行业这两件事拿来比一比,那简直就是个笑话。

再说新闻纸价格,如果你——你可以从任何一个时点画出曲线,比方说15年或20年前,或者10年前,而报纸的售价、广告的价格涨得都更多。

我是说,听他们大喊吃亏,倒是挺有意思的,因为过去12个月里新闻纸价格涨了不少,未来半年还会再涨一些。但相信我,待在报纸行业里要比待在新闻纸行业里强多了。

8. 巴菲特对伯克希尔的半敌意收购

巴菲特:6 区?

观众:巴菲特先生,我叫莉兹·普鲁斯(音译),来自纽约市。

我想请教,关于您的收购标准——我知道其中一条是伯克希尔·哈撒韦不参与敌意收购。我想知道这一理念在您担任其他几家公司董事会成员的角色时,是否适用、又是如何适用的。

巴菲特:这是个有意思的问题。我还没在任何一家公司的董事会上遇到过CEO把敌意收购的问题提交到董事会的情形。

你能想起来有什么是我忘了的吗?没有,而且——不过也没有什么规定说这种事不可能发生。

所以,如果真碰上这种事,我也说不准自己会怎么做。这是个非常好的问题。

我以前——我以前对这件事的态度完全不一样。我是说,实际上——我们实际上——如果你回到40年前,我们买的,实际上就是对公司的控制权。

嗯,就拿伯克希尔来说,当时的董事长马尔科姆·蔡斯是完全赞成我们去买伯克希尔股票的。但总裁西伯里·斯坦顿就不会赞成,而经营这家企业的——正是西伯里。

所以,那算不上敌意,但西伯里不会赞成。这本来会——不过马尔科姆是会赞成的。

所以,假如今天有人盯上了吉列或者大都会(Cap Cities),或者类似那样的公司,我也不知道会是什么局面。

我觉得这种事不会发生,但我并没有——我目前对此没有任何既定方针。

你觉得我们会怎么做,查理?

芒格:我觉得我们的行为没法被完全预测。(笑声与掌声)

巴菲特:他说得对。(笑)

9. 比较本·格雷厄姆与菲利普·费雪的投资风格

巴菲特:1 号区?

观众:是的,我叫尼尔·麦克马洪(音译),来自纽约市,同时也是红杉基金(Sequoia)的股东。

本·格雷厄姆式的投资鼓励高换手。看伯克希尔的持仓,又集中又长期,您现在还是15%的菲尔·费雪加85%的格雷厄姆吗?

巴菲特:我不知道这个比例到底该是多少。在我前面提到的那三点上,我是百分之百的本·格雷厄姆,而那三点才是真正要紧的。

我非常——我当年第一次读菲尔·费雪那两本书时,深受他影响,大约是在1960年前后。我觉得那是了不起的书,也觉得菲尔是个了不起的人。

所以,我大概是把那个比例给了——我想我第一次用这个说法,是有一次在《福布斯》上,吉姆·迈克尔斯写信问我的时候。我想,你知道的,这种事就是这样。我不过随口报了个数字。

但我更愿意把自己看成是这么一个人:在本·格雷厄姆和菲尔·费雪彼此并不——而他们确实并不——相互矛盾的那些观点上,我既是百分之百的本·格雷厄姆,也是百分之百的菲尔·费雪。只不过他们二人侧重的地方大不相同。

本不会反对这样一个命题:如果你能找到一家资本回报率很高、而且还能不断把更多资本投在这上面的企业,那它就是世界上最好的生意。当然,他自己绝大部分的钱正是从GEICO上赚来的,而GEICO恰恰就是这种生意。

所以,他是认识到这一点的,只不过他觉得另一套办法——买那些从统计上看非常便宜的东西,而且大量地买——是一套更容易付诸实践的方针,也是一套更便于传授的方针。

他会认为菲尔·费雪的方法比他自己的方法更难传授,但他自己的方法价值更有限,因为它在真正大额资金上行不通。

在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司(Graham-Newman Corp)——格雷厄姆-纽曼公司是一只封闭式基金——哦,从技术上说它其实是只开放式基金,但它的净资产只有600万美元。而与它关联的合伙企业纽曼-格雷厄姆(Newman and Graham),又有600万。所以你手上总共有1200万美元这么一笔资金池。

那么,你大可以四处去买一些小机床公司——买机床公司的股票,或者别的什么,反正都是从统计上看很便宜的。而那是一种非常成功的「成群操作」。

而他有——你会——如果你拥有的是一门糟糕的生意,你早晚总得把它卖掉。我是说,如果你拥有的是一批糟糕的生意,那你最好祈祷其中有几家被人收购,或者发生点什么。你需要换手。

如果你拥有的是一门绝佳的生意,那么,你知道的,你基本上压根就不想要换手。

查理?

芒格:菲尔·费雪那些企业里让我觉得有意思的一点是,其中很大一部分作为绝佳生意都没能维持下去。

他的其中一家企业是产权保险信托公司(Title Insurance and Trust Company),它在加利福尼亚州占据着主导地位。

它拥有最大的产权资料库,那是靠人工维护的;它财务上极为稳健,又讲诚信,等等。它在一个利润丰厚的领域里独霸一方。

接着计算机来了,如今你只要花几百万美元就能建起一座产权资料库,而且不用养一大批文员就能维护它。

很快地,我们就冒出了20家不同的产权公司,它们会去找那些大客户,比如大型放贷机构和大型房地产经纪商,按照以往的标准付给他们高得离谱的佣金,把大批大批的业务抢了过去。

到头来,在加利福尼亚州,所有产权保险公司加在一起的总利润竟然跌到了零以下——而它当初是从一个几近垄断的局面起步的。

巴菲特:是从一个看上去像垄断的局面起步的。

芒格:所以,能让你安心地往前看20年、安全到这种程度的公司,少之又少。而技术有时是你的朋友,有时却是你不共戴天的死敌。

如果产权保险信托公司当年够聪明,他们就该把那台被他们当作降本工具看待的计算机,看成是降临人间的最大祸害之一。

巴菲特:你可以——要运用菲尔·费雪的方法,从某种程度上说,可能比运用格雷厄姆的方法需要更多的商业经验和洞察力。如果你——

唯一的问题是,用本的方法,你可能在很长一段时间里被挡在门外、什么都做不了,而且要用大资金去做也可能困难重重。

但举例来说,如果你严格地把他那套营运资本测试用在证券上,你知道的,它是管用的。只是它可能没法在很大的规模上奏效,而且可能会有那么一些时期,你没什么可做的。

本其实更像是一位老师,而不是一个——我是说,他并没有想要赚很多钱的冲动。这事提不起他的兴趣。所以他——他真正想要的,是某种他认为可以传授的东西,作为他整套理念和方法的基石。

而且他觉得,你坐在奥马哈这儿读他的书就能照着去做——去买那些从统计上看便宜的东西,你不需要对企业、对消费者行为之类的有任何特别的洞察。

我并不觉得这一点有什么可怀疑的,它的确是真的,但我也不认为你能照着这套办法去管理大笔资金。

10. 芒格出售伯克希尔股票

巴菲特:2 号区域?

观众:你好,我叫罗布·皮茨(Rob Pitts),来自纽约市的股东。

这个问题是问芒格先生的。我注意到,在内部人售股动态的表单上,过去这几个月里您一直相当持续地在卖出自己手里的伯克希尔股票。

我想知道您是否愿意谈谈您这么做的原因,尤其是考虑到资本利得税即将变动、有可能下调的前景——那显然会对您有利,也会通过减少伯克希尔的递延所得税负债而对伯克希尔有利?

芒格:过去这几年里,我捐出了相当一部分伯克希尔股票,也卖出了一些。我捐出伯克希尔股票,是因为我认为那样做才合适;我卖出一些,是因为我有用钱的地方。(笑声与掌声)

巴菲特:他并不知道什么我不知道的事。我(听不清)那是在卖股票,我核实过这一点,不过——(笑)

11. 当一家公司的账目让人看不懂时,离它远点

巴菲特:3 号区?

查理的净资产中有很高比例押在伯克希尔上,我也一样。

请讲。抱歉,请讲。我觉得话筒好像不太管用——

观众:喂?

巴菲特:好的。

观众:你好,我是来自纽约市的 Gorem Pulich(音)。

我有一个分两部分的问题,第一部分很简短。我觉得很多人在给企业估值时遇到困难,是因为外头存在一些拐弯抹角、错综复杂的会计花招。

在书籍或者可以阅读的资料方面,您有没有什么建议,能帮我们理清现在流行的那些会计套路?

巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。Abe Briloff 过去常常给《巴伦周刊》撰稿,写各种会计操纵的手法,《巴伦周刊》后来也多少延续了这一点。

不过你说得对,外头确实有人会用会计手法描绘出一幅与经济现实相去甚远的图景。而有时候,会计规则本身就会导致这种结果。

我会说,当会计让你看不懂的时候,我往往就干脆把这家公司忘掉。我是说,这很可能——很可能是故意的,而无论如何,你都不该靠近它。

我——我们从来没有从那些会计被我们视为可疑的公司身上获得过什么了不起的投资回报。我一个例子都想不出来。你呢,查理?

芒格:想不出来。

巴菲特:这是个非常糟糕的信号。

芒格:在类似这样的情况下,我曾经做过一次卖空,结果还不错——(笑)。

巴菲特:会计确实——会计可以——会计能让你对管理层的品性有很多洞察。

我会说有很多——你知道,有一种——你会碰到相当多糟糕的会计。我过去管它叫创造性会计。而如果规则允许的话,你大概会碰到多得多的这种东西。

但有些公司有本事把他们的审计师逼得相当远,所以对任何在你看来可疑的东西,我都会非常怀疑。

我想——有过几篇文章写过这个,但我想不起它们刊登在哪里了,里面有人探讨过这些问题,就是,你知道,关于——

显然,如果某些预付费用、递延资产科目开始可疑地越堆越高,存货看起来又与销售额——尤其是与它们的变化趋势之类的——不成比例,你就该对这样的公司多看两眼。

人寿保险,你知道,我们经常在里面看到脆弱的会计。当你的产品不是那种短期内收入和费用几乎按现金对应起来的产品时,就给那些人玩弄数字留下了机会。

而有些人已经学会了把这一手玩得非常娴熟,他们有时炮制出持续多年的股价操纵或炒作骗局,让自己中饱私囊,或者让经理人、让骗局的策划者发了财,而代价则是随着时间推移由公众来承担。

如果你对一家公司的会计起了疑心,那就直接换下一家公司吧。

12. 劳合社近年有所滑坡

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:是的。我是来自芝加哥的 Wasserman 女士(音)。

为了更好地理解再保险业务,您能不能解释一下你们在市场上与伦敦劳合社(Lloyd's of London)的关系——劳合社大概是这个领域的领头羊吧?

你们多久会直接竞争一次,或者你们是否曾为他们做过再保险业务?因为他们近年来出现了亏损;以及随着他们的经济状况发生变化,您怎么看这个行业的演变?

巴菲特:嗯,劳合社,正如你所知,它并不是一家保险公司,而是——嗯,最初它是一个地方——是一家咖啡馆,但人们认为——它是一个让大量辛迪加(syndicate)在某个固定地点经营和聚集的地方。而长期以来,它一直有承接较大、较为冷僻奇特风险的历史。

在过去 10 来年里,劳合社的相对地位已经下滑到相当显著的程度,部分原因是——嗯,很大程度上是因为糟糕的业绩,而糟糕的业绩又带来了别的后果,导致资本撤出,让那些为辛迪加提供资金支持的人感到不满。

所以,劳合社在再保险业务以及某些专门化的原保险业务中,仍然是一个重要的竞争因素。它是一个非常——你知道,非常重要的因素。

但它已经不是 10 年或 15 年前的那个因素了。我也不确定伯克希尔的资本和劳合社那些辛迪加的资本加起来相比如何,但在过去五到十年里,它的相对重要性肯定已经发生了变化。

而且,鉴于他们遇到的种种问题,劳合社吸引资本的能力已经削弱,尽管他们正在着手解决这个问题。

不过,我们把劳合社当作一个竞争对手,就像我们把许多再保险公司中的任何一家都当作竞争对手一样。

但我们也和劳合社的不少辛迪加做生意,而且在接下来的 10 年里,我们大概还会和各种辛迪加做很多生意。

查理?

芒格:是的,劳合社是一家非常有意思的机构,因为它有这样一种诚信的声誉——比如他们在旧金山大火等等、等等事件中的赔付。

但我会说,10 年或 15 年前,相当多的草率和愚蠢混进了劳合社,尤其是在某些辛迪加里。

同样的风险在这个系统里转来转去,而每一道都要从最上层抽走太多佣金。太多精雕细琢的安排,太多配着好酒、长达三小时的午餐。这不对劲,于是他们陷入了大麻烦。

巴菲特:其实,在伯克希尔的历史上,我们遇到过的最严重的一次保险问题,就和劳合社——或者说和劳合社的某些辛迪加——有关,那差不多是将近 20 年前的事了。

正如查理所说,他们有过这样一种了不起的声誉——行为操守上的声誉——延续了好几个世纪。我觉得他们靠着这个吃了一阵子老本。而我们在某一桩业务上遇到了行为操守方面的问题。那对我们来说代价非常高昂。所以,我们也许等于提前上了一课,预见了后来要发生的事。

劳合社有许多不同的辛迪加,掌管它们的是不同的人,他们的行为标准在某种程度上也各不相同。那些以为只要是和劳合社打交道就不会有任何麻烦的人,后来发现并非如此。

但他们仍将是保险业里的一支主要力量,他们会渡过眼下的难关,而且很可能会以比陷入困境之前更好的结构走出来。

13. 只要留一美元能创造超过一美元的价值,我们就会留下它

巴菲特:我们刚才那个是 5 号区吗?

观众:我是来自亚利桑那州斯科茨代尔的 Christopher Jones(音)。我有几个问题想问您。

您今天好几次提到,你们两位在美国想要寻找有能力的公司去整体收购、或者收购其部分股权时,所面临的困难和挫折。

当然,我明白,当我们持有可口可乐和吉列时,我们就已经是全球大环境的一部分了。

但让我感到意外的是,竟然一直没有什么全球性的特许经营企业、或者全球性的管理层引起你们两位中任何一位的兴趣——而我也明白,过去我们曾持有过其中一些公司的部分股权。

所以我——我的疑问是,鉴于伯克希尔如今的体量,我们是否可能看到投资组合带有更多一点全球色彩?

第二个问题,您也谈到过,您在管理层身上寻找的一点是对现金的明智运用。

如今许多管理团队都在回购自家股票,因为他们在市场上找不到任何更便宜或更好的东西。

您目前不回购自家股票的理念,是否意味着您也许认为伯克希尔在当前价位被高估了?

巴菲特:嗯,我们从来没有回购过股票。我——其实我们在 60 年代回购过一点点——但我们基本上从未回购过股票,尽管有很多次我们都觉得这么做会相当有吸引力。

但我们同时也认为,如果我们能通过留存一美元创造出超过一美元的市场价值——甚至可能远远超过一美元的市场价值——那么总体而言,随着时间推移,这样做会带来更好的结果。

只要我们还能找到运用这些现金的办法——总体上让我们觉得能把一美元变成比一美元更大的东西——我们就会——我们就会继续把钱留存下来。

而且,我们衡量这一点,靠的不是我们这一周或这一个月能不能找到机会,但我们一定会以这样的标准来衡量:在未来几年里我们能不能找到机会,永远如此。

我们经历过青黄不接的时期。其实,眼下进行中的事情比平常稍微多一些。但在 20 多年的时间里,我们有过很多次青黄不接的阶段。而且你知道,正如我说过的,我当年就是在一段青黄不接的时期把合伙公司结束掉的。

所以——衡量它的标准,部分取决于眼下正在发生什么,部分取决于对未来的预期。

而且我并不认为,我们的股票眼下是按 X 的价格还是按四分之三 X 的价格在卖,会有多大区别。但如果我们认为没法在外部找到运用这笔钱的去处,那就会有区别了。

14. 我们“不太可能”在美国以外收购企业

巴菲特:关于非本土业务的那个问题,正如你所说,我们在可口可乐和吉列两家合计投入了将近 80 亿美元,而可口可乐有 80% 以上的盈利来自美国以外,吉列大概也有三分之二左右。

所以你可以说,伯克希尔净资产中几乎有 40%——35% 到 40%——是在美国境外运营的,仅仅就这两笔投资而言就是如此。

至于整体收购一家企业,我们并不排除收购一家注册地在美国以外的公司。但这种情况发生的可能性不大。

我们愿意这么做,尤其是如果它规模很大、而且我们能理解它的话。但我们对一家「欧洲的 Helzberg's」摸清门道的可能性,会和对一家「美国的 Helzberg's」一样大吗?你知道,我对此表示怀疑。

我只是不知道,对于他们经营所处的环境、对于他们的管理层,以及诸如此类的一切,我们能不能建立起同样多的把握。不过我们也许能。

那必须是一家相当简单的企业,而且必须是一家我们认为自己真正能看清其护城河、并且看得很长远的企业。

而且那必须是一家我们能与管理层建立融洽关系的企业,尽管彼此来自多少有些不同的背景。这并非不可能,但我得说,你知道,可能性是低于一半的。

查理?

芒格:我没什么要补充的。

15. 巴菲特:日渐增长的名气不会分散我的注意力

巴菲特:6 区?

观众:你好。我叫 Lee Debroff(音译),来自西弗吉尼亚州摩根敦。

自从所罗门那场风波以来,看起来你吸引了越来越多的媒体关注。

在这方面,出现了许多看似会分散你投资本业精力的场面。比如,我们看着你去夏威夷参加比尔·盖茨的婚礼、买了一台个人电脑,如今又戴上了抢眼的名牌设计师领带。(笑)

还有昨天——

巴菲特:就算我当年没卷进所罗门,比尔也会邀请我参加婚礼的。(笑)

观众:昨天,我们在比赛因雨取消时拿到了那些三角旗。

现在有一个很严肃的问题:如今你成了媒体宠儿,你如何向我们保证,你仍然把眼睛紧盯在那个众所周知的「球」上?(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,我收到的邮件确实比以前多了,所以我们为此建立了一套稍微完善些的处理办法。但我就是——我做我喜欢做的事。

就拿演讲来说,被邀请去演讲的次数,我现在大概是 10 年前的 20 倍,但我做的演讲数量还是一样多。你知道,对于做不做演讲,我有我自己的一套筛选流程。

其他事情也是一样,你知道,我被邀请去——你知道,我都不知道有多少次的晚宴致敬之类的活动。而你知道,基本上——我不会改变我做事的方式、我做的事,因为我不想改变——

如果我想要别的东西——如果在我构建伯克希尔的同时,这些事是为了让我最终落脚到别的位置而做的,那我现在早就到那里了。可这一切根本没改变任何事。

它确实改变了邮件的数量,但我已经把这件事处理好了,所以它并不会构成多大的干扰。

对不起,你说什么?

巴菲特:哦,我会继续留在奥马哈。是的,这一点毫无疑问。我的意思是,我——如果我当初不想待在奥马哈,我早就想出办法改变了,而且几十年前要改变是非常容易的。

我想——我们在座有很多人不是奥马哈人,但那是他们自己的问题。我的意思是——(笑)

芒格:我观察沃伦已经很久了,那些担心他会变的人,对毫无必要的忧虑可真是胃口惊人。(笑)

巴菲特:我会变的概率,大概和查理会变的概率差不多。(笑)

至于邮件这件事,你知道,你会希望——希望有更省事的办法来应对。

但你根本没法回复你收到的所有信件,就这么简单。而且差不多就是——一旦你想通了这一点,弄一封格式化的回信来处理它,事情就解决了。

16. GEICO 净资产收益率下滑

巴菲特:1 号区?

观众:好的。我是 Samuel Park(音译),来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨。

我的问题是关于 GEICO 的。我注意到,过去五年里,他们的净资产收益率每年都在下降。这是否意味着这门生意发生了某种变化,还是只是暂时的情况?

巴菲特:问题是关于 GEICO 的净资产收益率,对吗?

观众:对。

巴菲特:是的。嗯,确实如此,它在某种程度上是下降了。GEICO 的增长,大体上是——基本上是一个函数——我是说,那里有一个自然的增长率。

而资本的增长一直快于保费收入和已投资资产的增长,所以即便承保业务取得同样的成功、投资也取得同样的成功,资本回报率仍然会更低——除非他们回购股票,而这一点他们做得相当显著。但这也受可回购量的限制,不过——

这是一门非常好的生意。但它不是那种你把资本翻一倍、就能轻松把盈利也翻一倍的生意。

查理?

芒格:我没有什么要补充的。

17. 对吉尼斯的投资不予置评

巴菲特:2 号区域?

观众:我叫 Mark Hake(音译),来自斯科茨代尔。

我想你的问题——我的问题——关于海外股权投资的那个,基本上已经被另一位先生问过、也被回答了。

但我注意到,你过去曾投资过健力士(Guinness)。你能就此谈谈吗?你们——现在还持有吗?如果不持有了,为什么不持有了?

巴菲特:我们不会对证券的买入、卖出或持有情况发表评论,除非要么我们在法律上被要求披露,要么这些持仓达到了我们每年要申报的那个门槛水平。

而且随着我们资产规模的增长,我们会把这个门槛水平往上调。我们不是按资产的百分比来调的。所以今年我们用的那个分界线,我记得是市值 3 亿美元,达到这个水平的我们才申报。

那么,如果我们持有的健力士数量不变——我并不是说我们持有过——但假如我们在 1994 年 12 月 31 日持有的健力士数量,和我们在 1993 年 12 月 31 日持有的一样多,它也不会达到那个门槛。它就是不会达到那个门槛。

而且我们真的不想陷入那种——去谈论我们在买什么、卖什么的境地。围绕这一点会有很多猜测,但对伯克希尔来说,谈论买入或卖出毫无益处。

打个比方,如果我们正在收购市中心的一块地,而我们已经买下了打算买入的四分之一,我们不会觉得报纸头版登一篇说我们正在购地的报道对我们有什么好处。

而且,基本上,我们不是做提供投资建议这门生意的。我们会谈我们的原则。

所以,关于健力士,或者关于任何没有出现在我们年末名单上的东西,你唯一能得出的结论就是:当时我们持有的市值没有达到 3 亿美元。

18. 巴菲特的伯克希尔衬衫买不到

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:你好,巴菲特先生。我叫 Don Bresca(音译),来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。

最近我注意到你穿了一件 IZOD 衬衫,正中间印着「Berkshire Hathaway」——还有一只攥着现金的拳头。那是新的徽标吗?

第二个问题是:那件衬衫股东能买到吗?(笑)

巴菲特:那件衬衫买不到。那件衬衫是别人送的礼物,股东是买不到的。不过它的含义,你可以自己去琢磨。(笑)

19. 不为 B 夫人和菲尔·卡雷特做红娘

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:你好。我是 Lyle McIntosh,来自爱荷华州密苏里瓦利,就在这条路往北大约 25 英里的地方。

沃伦,要知道这里是玉米之乡,我自己务农,还有好几位其他的农民股东,而这场会议正好撞在玉米播种的当口上。

你能不能把会期往后挪大约三个星期?(笑)

另外,我注意到周五晚上 Phil Carret [共同基金先驱] 上了《华尔街一周》(Wall Street Week)。很抱歉我不清楚他的婚姻状况,但如果他还是单身,你有没有想过把他介绍给 B 太太 [内布拉斯加家具城创始人 Rose Blumkin]?(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,顺便说一句,B 太太昨天还在工作呢。我昨天大约 4 点钟出门顺道去看了她,她状态好得很。

她今年年底就要满 102 岁了,我猜她在 102 岁生日那天也照样会在工作。不过在这件事上,我还是让 Phil 和 B 太太自己去打理他们各自的事吧。(笑)

芒格:他对她来说可能太年轻了点。(笑)

20. “我们对收购任何东西都持开放态度”

巴菲特:5 号区?

观众:好的,我是肯·多诺万特(音译),一位辛辛那提的投资者。

您谈过对整体收购外国公司的看法。

我想知道您是否能谈一谈,或者说伯克希尔是否在寻找机会去收购——我们姑且称之为「准特许经营型」的公司,这类公司可能总部设在海外——也就是买入一部分股权或部分权益?另外,您对海外公司的固定收益债券投资怎么看?

巴菲特:您是说债券投资?

观众:是的。嗯,第一部分是指买入股权投资,而不是整家公司。

巴菲特:没错。

观众:第二部分是指债券投资。

巴菲特:好的。嗯,我们对买任何东西都持开放态度。你说我们是不是在「关注」这些标的——我其实从来都不太确定我们到底是怎么去关注东西的。我是说,它们似乎就是从阅读之类的事情里冒出来的。

不过我们——由于我前面提到的一些原因,我们最终真去做这件事的可能性要小一些。但我们确实买过一些注册地在美国境外的公司的股票——除了健力士(Guinness)之外。而且我们也——我们完全有可能买入债券工具。

反正我们本来就不怎么买债券工具,所以这种事发生的可能性非常小。

但在伯克希尔,只要是我们认为合理、并且与我们想要的经营方式相容的事,我们什么都会去做。当然,我们并不在乎在哪里——注册地并没有那么重要。

查理?

21. 作为珠宝零售商,Helzberg 的销售额异常出色

巴菲特:好的,是 5 号区,对吧?

观众:斯科特·斯皮尔科维奇(音译),纽约市。

我的问题是关于收购 Helzberg 的。您能不能谈谈诸如收购价格、您对销售额和利润的预期,以及收购时账面上有多少负债之类的情况?

巴菲特:这是指哪一笔收购?

观众:Helzberg。

芒格:Helzberg。

巴菲特:嗯,我们没有公布过 Helzberg 的数字,今后也不会公布。

但我们做过评估——截至 2 月份的那个财年,公开的销售额大约是 2.8 亿美元,而本年度的销售额会明显更多。

但我们没有公布过这些数字。我可以告诉你的是,显然,就我们以股份和/或现金的形式付出的代价而言——我们认为,随着时间推移,这会是一笔相当不错的收购。

这和我们在其他生意上运用的思路是一样的。正如我前面提到的,零售是那种你必须随着时间推移一直保持精明的行业,而我们有一位非常出色的经理人,一个叫杰夫·康门特(Jeff Comment)的家伙,将由他来经营这家公司。

他的业绩记录极其出色,而我敢打赌这份记录会一直保持下去。

它的投入资本回报率不错,否则我们也不会买入它。我们总是寻找资本回报率高的生意。

珠宝行业里有很多公司的资本回报率并不好。我是说,这不是那种大多数参与者都过得很滋润的行业。

要想在这一行成功,相比竞争对手你得做到非同寻常的「每平方英尺销售额」,而我们在 Borsheims 就有一家在这方面做得极为出色的店,另外在 Helzberg 又有一种不同类型、同样能做到这一点的经营模式。

典型的珠宝店生意并不是一门很好的生意,但我们认为自己手上有两家很好的经营企业。

查理?

芒格:是的,我们经常发现,整家企业的所有者会有一种精神分裂式的心态。他们想把自己的企业卖出一个略高于其真实价值的价钱,而且要换成股票,这样他们就不用缴税。

同时,他们还希望这股票是那种——是那种属于这样一类生意的公司:它只会做一笔愚蠢的收购——也就是收购他们这家——此后就会像守护黄金一样守护这只股票,再也不做任何愚蠢的收购了。(笑)

不用说,世界没那么简单。我认为随着时间推移,我们做过的那些收购对双方都是公平的,平均下来,它们对伯克希尔效果不错。

而且我认为,一家以这种方式行事的公司,恰恰能为那位想要卖出企业的私人所有者提供最好的长期价值。你可不会想把自己的企业卖给一家热衷于增发股票的公司、换它的股票。

22. 保险浮存金在估算内在价值时很重要

巴菲特:6 区?

声音:刚才那是 6 号区。

巴菲特:话筒在哪儿?哦,在那儿。我看它好像没开。

观众:现在能听到我说话吗?

巴菲特:能,当然能。

观众:杰克·格兰丁(音译),来自田纳西州诺克斯维尔。

我有一个问题,可能并不适合由伯克希尔的高管来回答,但我想我还是问一下吧。

您在年报里着重谈到了内在价值,并且建议说,通过查看年报后面那几页灰色页面,人们可以得出——或许可以得出——伯克希尔的一个内在价值数字。

我努力试着这么做了,我算出来的市盈率大概在 21 倍左右,看上去似乎略微高估了。

巴菲特先生,我想请问您,您是否愿意透露一下,您认为伯克希尔的内在价值是多少?

如果您不愿意透露的话,那您是否认为伯克希尔目前这个价位是合理的?

巴菲特:我——每年都有人以这样那样的形式问我这个问题,而我总是说,我不想破坏你们当中那些正在自己动手计算内在价值的人的乐趣。

凡是对计算至关重要的数字,我们有的,你们也都有了。

我还要说,除了市盈率之外,还有一些重要因素。我前面提到过,我认为比如说我们描述浮存金的那一页,可能是整份年报里最重要的一页。

接下来的问题就是,你知道的,随着时间推移,你如何配置这些资本?显然,这一点也会对内在价值产生影响。

但我大体上会说,我——而且几乎在所有时候都是如此——我认为——我会说,伯克希尔的内在价值相对于它的——实际上,我还是反过来说吧。

我认为,伯克希尔的价格相对于它的内在价值而言,所提供的价值大概不亚于、甚至超过我所看到的大多数股票。但我不想再往下多说了。

查理?

芒格:我没什么要补充的。

不过——你刚才说到自己动手算出来的那种乐趣,这让我想起一个英国的著名校长,他过去常对每一届毕业班说:「你们当中有 5% 的人将会成为罪犯,而我清楚地知道那都是谁。

「但我不会告诉你们,因为我不想剥夺你们生活中那份激动人心的感觉。」(轻笑)

巴菲特:这个我们待会儿再解释。(零星的笑声和掌声)

内在价值远不止——正如我们前面讨论过的,内在价值远不止是把你认为在某个时点能把各个部分分别卖出多少钱的数字加总起来那么简单,因为它是一个着眼于未来的数字。它是把未来的现金折现回到现在。而资本配置在其中占了很大一部分。

举例来说,你预期浮存金随着时间推移会怎样发展,这——这会导致与价值相关的可能数字出现很大的摆动。

我是说,当我们在 1967 年收购 National Indemnity 时,当时它的浮存金大概有,1500 万或 2000 万美元,我们那会儿并没有看清这一点。

但如果我们当时能够预见到浮存金随着时间推移最终的发展,那么结果可能会是:National Indemnity 的内在价值是当时大多数人所认为的——也很可能是我们当时所认为的——数字的许多倍。

23. 哈格斯特罗姆的书对伯克希尔股价有“一定影响”

巴菲特:1 号区。

观众:我是来自佛罗里达州墨尔本市的理查德·杜切克(音)。

我有一个分两部分的问题,第一部分是关于股票的。我们都知道,今年头一个月股价大约涨了 25%,然后又回落了,我估计大概跌了 20%。

我想听听您对此的看法,特别是您是否把这归因于那些书,或者机构买盘,或者说,您对此会有什么样的解释。第二点——

巴菲特:我会说——我先回答第一点。我会说,(罗伯特·)哈格斯特朗那本书(《巴菲特之道》)无疑对此有些影响。这没法量化,但那本书卖出了很多本。我猜想,那确实有些影响。

观众:好的。比机构买盘的影响还大吗?因为我听到一些传言,说富达之类的机构在买入——

巴菲特:我没法——我就是不清楚——我不知道怎么把这些变量分离开来,但我会说,那本书在那个时点上当然是一个因素,而且假定它毫无影响是不合理的。

芒格:嗯,很多买盘都是以零股的形式进来的,所以——

巴菲特:对,有很多零股交易。

芒格:那看上去肯定像是读书的人在买。(笑)

24. 尽管与盖茨私交甚笃,巴菲特仍不理解微软

观众:第二个问题,我职业上是一名电子工程师。所以科技板块是我最关心的,而且我想我们都会同意,至少在过去六到八个月里,科技板块的表现是惊人的。

我还注意到,您和盖茨先生有些交情,邀请他去您家里,等等。

将来某一天,您有没有可能对微软做某种类型的买入,或者把它收购下来?或者说,有没有什么——(笑)——是你们俩可以一起搞成的事?

巴菲特:在我认识比尔的那一天——头一天——我买了 100 股,到此为止。我只是想确保从那天起能收到他的财报。这是我个人的,不在——不在伯克希尔里。

我们绝不可能去做我们不懂的生意,而我是不会懂这个的。

观众:不,这点您说得很清楚。我只是想,也许会有个例外,因为看起来——

巴菲特:嗯,如果你要破一次例的话,他会是一个很好的——非常好的——可以破例的对象。但我想我是不会破例的。

25. 商学院应该研究 B 夫人的成功之道

巴菲特:2 号区域?

观众:我叫(听不清),来自得克萨斯州阿灵顿。

巴菲特先生、芒格先生,有什么办法能把你们这两位伟大的头脑长期地为人生所用,要么是在伯克希尔做学徒,要么是开一所学校?

芒格:我没听明白那个问题。沃伦,你来处理吧。

巴菲特:是问什么——?

观众:有什么办法能利用你们二位这两个伟大的头脑去教育新的一代,作为对这个国家的一项长期投资,要么是让年轻人在伯克希尔做学徒,要么是开一所商学院?

芒格:好吧,让我来试试这个,因为我在这方面有过明摆着的失败记录。(笑)

我连让我自己的孩子明白我所明白的道理,都遇到了极大的困难。(笑)

沃伦,也许你失败得没那么惨。(笑)

巴菲特:我的孩子们在很多方面都比我聪明得多。所以我的经历不一样,查理。(笑)

不过,我觉得你是可以——你知道,我主要是靠自己读书学来的,所以我不认为我有什么原创的想法——我当然是吸收了很多——

我是说,我谈过读格雷厄姆的书,我读菲尔·费雪的书,我自己从阅读中得到了很多想法。就我自身而言,谈到父母对人的影响,你知道,我的父母对我有着巨大的影响。

所以,我认为你可以从别人那里学到很多。事实上,我觉得,如果你能比较好地向别人学习,你都不必去想出什么新点子,也不必靠自己做太多事。你只要把你所见到的最好的东西拿来应用就行了。

芒格:总的来说,我觉得我们筛选了数百万人,总能筛出一小群有智慧的人。但我不认为有谁发明出了一种能让人人都变得有智慧的教法。

有些人对学习任何东西的那种抗拒,简直令人称奇。(笑声和掌声)

巴菲特:真正令人震惊的是,明明学了对他们自己有利,他们却还是那么抗拒。

我是说,我一直对格雷厄姆所受到的关注之多感到震惊——我是说,40 年前他被尊为证券分析师的泰斗——可就他所传授的那些原则而言,人们给予的关注却又那么少。这并不是因为人们在反驳那些原则,也不是因为人们学习稳健的投资原则对自己没有好处。这纯粹就是对思考或改变的那种难以置信的抗拒。

我是说,我有一次引用过伯特兰·罗素的话——是他说的:「大多数人宁可去死,也不愿思考。许多人确实如此(死了)。」(笑)

在财务的意义上,这话非常对。这并不复杂。我是说,人际关系,你知道,通常也没那么复杂,而且养成在人际关系中行之有效的习惯,肯定是对人自身有利的,可还是有数目惊人的人,似乎总能以这样那样的方式把它搞砸。

芒格:伯克希尔·哈撒韦被模仿过多少?不管是在投资界还是在企业界。我并不是说我们就一定值得被模仿。但人们就是不愿意用跟他们现在不一样的方式去做事。

巴菲特:你或许可以这么说,B 太太(内布拉斯加家具城创始人罗丝·布卢姆金),她创办了你们这个周末可能已经在外面看到的那家店,1937 年用 500 美元起家,你知道,她这辈子一天学都没上过,却把它打造成了一家了不起的企业,你可能会说:「嗯,这倒是值得研究研究。」

我是说,难道就因为我们认识她的时候——你知道,她刚移民过来时——她还不会说英语吗?也许我们可以向人们解释解释——我是说,看着一个人在一个充满竞争的行业里创造出那样惊人的成功,从中能学到些什么呢?

她并没有发明什么这世界前所未见的东西。她也没有独占某块能让她免于竞争的地产。

你知道,这些条件她都没有——可她却成就了几乎没有人能成就的事。

那么,商学院为什么不研究她呢?你知道,他们为什么在大谈 EVA——经济增加值,就像我们前面谈到的那样?我是说,这就是一个成功的例子。是某种东西让她成功了。

你知道,是不是某种——是 200——她非常聪明——但是不是 220 的智商?不,不是的。她是个非常聪明的女人,但那并不是一种无法在习惯和思维方式上被复制的东西。可有谁在研究她呢?

我是说,他们把她当成一桩奇闻来介绍。但如果你去任何一所排名前 20 的商学院,你知道,没有一页是拿给学生去研究这样一个惊人成功案例的。我就是——我觉得这非常有意思——而且在某种程度上,你知道,我在投资界也看到过同样的情况。

这里有个——首先,对于某所大商学院里一位已经拿到博士学位、什么头衔都有了的管理学教授来说,要他想到自己得跑来在家具城里晃悠——(笑)——去研究一个开着高尔夫球车的老太太,我是说——这大概是有点让人泄气的。(笑)

但他们本可以——如果他们真这么做了,他们会过得更好。

26. 想做什么现在就去做,不要等以后

巴菲特:我们刚才进行到哪儿了?我们到第几号区域了,4 号吗?不管是哪儿。也许是 3 号区域,对吧?

观众:是的,谢谢。我是来自亚利桑那州凤凰城的吉姆·卢德克(音)。

我大概有 10 年没参加过你们的年会了。上一次还是在水边的那家红狮客栈。我要恭喜你们如此受欢迎。

巴菲特:谢谢。

观众:我真希望我当时多买了点股票。(笑)

不过,跟查理一样,我也一直在把我手里的股票捐出去做慈善。所以你们带来的好处又反过来回馈、并波及到整个经济。我向你们表示祝贺。

巴菲特:不,我要祝贺你才对。

观众:您觉得有什么发生了变化——嗯,有一件事是本·格雷厄姆——回应您刚才说的——我是本·格雷厄姆的学生,他说过,他被人读得那么广、却又被人遵循得那么少,这一点一直让他惊叹不已。

那么在过去这 10 年里,您有什么变化吗?变化大吗,如果有的话?还是完全没变?还是——

巴菲特:嗯,我们让查理来说吧——他一直在盯着我看。(笑)

芒格:我会说,大概重了一块石头(约 14 磅)吧。(笑)

惺惺相惜嘛(自己是什么样的人才认得出来)。(笑)

巴菲特:如果我们想变,我们早就变了。

我是说,我从来都不怎么相信这种理论,你知道,就是说如果我有 2X 而不是 X,我就会去做这做那,或者说我现在先接下这份我不喜欢的工作,以后再去换一份我喜欢的,或者——

在我看来这没多大意义。我是说,人这辈子也没几个年头,所以你眼下就应该去做自己喜欢的事,而我和查理一直都做得相当不错。

27. “我们让打四成的强打者按自己的方式挥棒”

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:彼得·博尔马(音译),来自芝加哥。

每年,你都让旗下的运营公司把支票寄回奥马哈。这些运营公司的负责人会留下多大比例作为奖金,你又是怎么定这个数字的?

巴菲特:嗯,我们在不同公司有不同的奖金安排。考虑到伯克希尔旗下各家企业的经济特性差异如此之大、各不相同,要是想搞一套公式化的方法,用某种单一的简单公式去给所有这些不同业务的经理人发薪酬,那将是一个大错。

所以,我想我们有四家企业是让管理者持有一部分股权的。我们和各家企业之间的安排各不相同。

有些企业,所占用的资本无关紧要。它们根本就没办法投入大量资本。所以在那些企业里,我们甚至不设资本费用。如果到头来只涉及一点点钱,我们不相信值得去搞那么多名堂。

所以,有些企业有资本费用,有些没有。说到底就是,如果它们占用大量资本,就会有一笔资本费用。

有些企业是好做的生意,有些则是难做的生意。所以我们会据此设定不同的门槛,达到门槛才开始计奖。

我们只是坐下来,针对每一家企业去琢磨怎样才合理。而这通常并不难想明白。

我是说,我们想要的是公平的东西。对于最优秀的经理人,我们靠薪酬这套东西并不会太大地改变他们的行为。在教会他们如何看待资本占用这方面,或许会有那么一点影响。

但说到他们对生意的热情、想象力、营销能力等等,基本上我们在收购企业时这些人就已经在位了。

但那样做——第一,不公平地对待人是错的;而且如果得不到公平对待,他们也会心生怨气,这完全可以理解。

所以我们努力建立一套制度,奖励我们想要奖励的东西,并以一种让他们明白自己得到了公平对待的方式来公平地对待他们。

而且我认为我们没有任何两家企业的安排是相同的。每一家都不一样。

顺便说一句,这一点也适用于他们各自的政策。我们极少去插手——我得说,极少,也许就一两次——他们在给员工发薪酬方面有着各不相同的安排。

我们有些企业有预算,有些没有。我们没有任何上报到总部的预算。我们让那些四成打击率的击球手按自己想要的方式去挥棒。其中有些人,你知道,挥棒方式跟别人略有不同,但总体而言,他们都极其高效。

而且他们觉得——我们也希望他们觉得——这生意就像是他们自己的。如果他们觉得——假如有个本来就富甲一方的人把企业卖给了我们,而我们却开始对他们指手画脚该怎么挥棒,他们会很快地告诉我们可以拿这套去干什么,因为他们这辈子根本不需要受这个气。

所以,我们要做的就是创造一种局面,或者维持一种局面,让他们在做眼下这件事时所获得的乐趣,胜过这辈子能做的任何其他事,这就是我们设计的目标。然后我们还得在这方面公平地对待他们。

查理?

芒格:没有要补充的。

28. “坦白说,外汇让我摸不着头脑”

巴菲特:5 号区。

观众:罗杰·希尔,来自威斯康星州拉辛市。

两位先生,换个话题。能不能请你们谈谈对当前国际汇率形势的看法?你们觉得是我们有美元问题,还是——日本人有日元问题?

巴菲特:嗯,这个问题我让查理来回答。(笑)

芒格:我无可奉告。(笑)

巴菲特:这大概——这是个非常好的问题,不过麻烦在于,每当我说「这是个非常好的问题」,多半是因为我不知道答案。

而我——你知道的,我不知道这个问题的答案。坦白说,外汇这东西把我搞糊涂了。

我是说,你知道,我会从购买力平价的角度去想,因为那是切入这个问题的一种自然方式。但购买力平价作为汇率在任何较短期、中期、乃至或许长期内将如何变动的指南,并不怎么管用,因为这个世界会以各种不同的方式去适应。

有时它通过高通胀率来适应一种正在贬值的货币。通常都是这样。我们的货币还没出现这种情况,不过我们也只是相对于另外几种重要货币在贬值而已。

在这个问题上我没法给你一个很好的答案,抱歉。

29. 我们不再寻找小盘便宜股,但它们依然存在

巴菲特:6 区?

观众:你好,我是霍华德·温斯顿(音译),来自俄亥俄州辛辛那提。

首先,我想感谢你和查理今天抽时间与我们共度。

巴菲特:谢谢。

观众:我的问题是,你反复说过,你看到许多极好的股票点子,却因为它们规模太小而无法投资。

考虑到今天在座的许多人投资门槛的美元金额要低得多——(笑)

巴菲特:「这些股票有名字吗?」(笑)

观众:对。说得好。(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,答案是我们已经不再去找它们了。我们假定,当你打理较小金额的资金时,会有数量可观的机会,因为情况一向如此。

我是说——这些年来,当我审视各种东西时,很清楚,规模越小,你就越会碰到那些较少有人关注的公司。而当你面对的是那种你一个月能买十万美元、而不是一亿美元的东西时,存在低效(定价错误)的机会就更多。

但那并不是因为我脑子里随身装着 25 家可以让我们各投十万美元的公司的名字。我只是不再去看那个范畴了。我——

有时候,人们给我寄来年报,或者我收到经理人的来信说,你知道,「我手上有这么个绝妙的东西」。我一看——我通常事先就知道,但我是说,我会先看规模。如果规模不对——而几乎在任何时候它都不会对——我就不再往下看了,因为实在没时间去看各式各样的小机会。

我确实认为,如果你打理的是非常小额的资金,那么几乎总能在某个地方找到一些明显的低效之处——找到一些好东西。

我跟一些人提起过,当我刚起步的时候,我真的把所有的穆迪手册和标准普尔手册一页一页地翻了个遍。

而你知道,那大概有 20,000 页,但确实有很多东西冒出来,而且没有一个出现在任何券商报告之类的东西里。它们就那样被人们彻头彻尾地忽视了,你必须——

你能把它们查出来,但没人会主动告诉你。我猜这种情况至今依然存在,只是规模远不及当年那么大了。

查理?

30. 巴菲特早年的烟蒂股:Delta Duck Club

芒格:嗯,我还记得你年轻时,买下过某个猎鸭俱乐部的一份会员资格,那块地底下有石油。

巴菲特:对,那是一家叫 Atled 的公司——

芒格:当你沦落到去买一份猎鸭俱乐部会员资格的地步,那你可真是在翻拣烟蒂股了。(笑)不过——

巴菲特:那可不是一个差劲的烟蒂股。它一共只有 98 股流通在外。那是德尔塔猎鸭俱乐部(Delta Duck Club)。这个俱乐部是由一百个人创办的,每人出 50 美元,只不过有两个家伙没交钱,所以流通在外的就只有 98 股。

他们在路易斯安那州买下了一块地,有一次有人朝下而不是朝上开了一枪,结果石油和天然气就从地里喷涌而出。(笑)

于是他们把它改名为 Atled,也就是 Delta 倒着拼写——这多少体现了这群人的「高超水准」。(笑)

几年之后,他们从那块地里抽取的——按每桶 3 美元的油价——他们每年从中拿到大约一百万美元的特许权使用费。而那只股票当时每股卖 29,000 美元,每股盈利 10,000 美元——

不对,它每股税后盈利大约 7,000 美元,税前大约 11,000 美元,而且每股账上还有大约 20,000 美元现金。那还是一个寿命很长的油气田。

所以,你知道,我有时拿它当作有效市场的一个例子,因为有人打电话给我,要卖给我一股,而那些东西,你知道——这到底算不算一个有效市场呢?

你知道,29,000 美元的价格,背后是 20,000 美元的现金,外加按 25 美分天然气、3 美元油价计的 11,000 美元特许权使用费收入?我可不觉得这是有效市场。

外面是有好东西可找的。今后我所有的猎鸭俱乐部,都把狩猎权让给你们好了。(笑)

31. 避免官司的秘诀:“你没法和坏人做成好交易”

巴菲特:1 号区。

别以为话筒——

观众:伯克希尔以及伯克希尔旗下公司如何保护自己,免受那些动辄打官司的律师的纠缠?美国企业有可能在应付律师所带来的金钱和时间成本的同时还能生存下去吗?

巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。在美国,市值达到 250 亿美元的公司里,我们大概是诉讼最少的之一。

不过,你知道——我们在蓝筹印花(Blue Chip Stamps)那会儿被告过一次——查理,那次是为什么来着,有个家伙索赔了多少亿?

芒格:好多亿。

巴菲特:是啊。那次——你知道,你没法保护自己不被起诉,而且其中肯定有很多是无理取闹的官司——就像我说的,到目前为止,这些官司并没有耗费我们多少时间或金钱,尤其是时间。

我觉得,你必须做的一件事是,如果你真碰上这类事,你就坚决不掏钱,而且要让对方的日子也同样难过——尽量让对方付出和他们给你制造的同等的麻烦。不过到目前为止,我们还没遇到过这种情况。

查理?

芒格:好。其实我可以讲一个奥马哈的故事,它正好展示了伯克希尔·哈撒韦把官司降到最少的诀窍。

我还是个小男孩的时候,曾经问我父亲——他当时在奥马哈做执业律师——「你为什么给 X 干那么多活儿」——那家伙是个又贪婪又爱吹牛的人——(笑)——「却只给格兰特·麦克菲登(Grant McFayden)干那么一点点」,而麦克菲登是个那么好的人?

我父亲看着我,那神情仿佛觉得我脑子有点不太灵光。他说:「查理,」他说,「格兰特·麦克菲登善待他的员工、善待他的客户,善待每一个人。

「每当他跟一个有点疯癫的人扯上关系,他就会从办公桌前站起来,走到对方那儿,尽快把自己脱身出来。」他还说,「查理,像格兰特·麦克菲登这样的人,他那点法律业务根本不够供你上学的。(笑)

「啊,但 X 呢,」他说,「他是一颗会走路的地雷,法律麻烦层出不穷,对律师来说,他是个绝妙的客户。」

当时我父亲是想教我点什么,而我必须说,这一招效果好极了,因为我下定决心要采用格兰特·麦克菲登的那套做法。

而且我敢说,沃伦在人生很早的时候就独立地得出了同样的做法。天哪,这帮我们省去了多少麻烦。这真是一套——这是一套好系统。

巴菲特:你没法——是的,我们的基本态度是,你没法跟一个坏人做成一笔好交易。所以我们就干脆——这意味着我们干脆不去理会。

我是说,我们不会试图靠合同来保护自己,也不会去搞各种各样的、你懂的,尽职调查,或者——

我们干脆把它抛在脑后。和我们喜欢、敬佩、信任的人打交道,随着时间推移,我们一样能做得很好。

所以我们从来没有——很多人确实会动这种心思,因为坏家伙往往会用这样那样的方式来引诱你,而——你赢不了的。躲开他们是值得的。

我们一开始就抱着这种态度,而你知道,也许一两次经历让我们更加确信,这就是这盘游戏该有的玩法。

32. 为什么 Borsheims 只开一家店

巴菲特:2 区。

观众:我是来自内布拉斯加州长松镇(Long Pine)的克拉伦斯·卡弗蒂(Clarence Cafferty)。

我想知道,如果我们在美国别的地方再开一家波仙(Borsheims)门店,能不能再造就一个打出四成打击率的好手。

巴菲特:嗯,这个问题无论对波仙还是对(内布拉斯加)家具城(Nebraska Furniture Mart)来说都很有意思。我是说,它们——当然,正如你大概知道的,从历史上看,它们都归同一个家族所有。买下波仙的,其实是 B 太太妹妹那一家人,但说实在的,几乎是从零开始把它做起来的。

而且——这两家机构都提供这种令人难以置信的丰富选择,靠巨大的销量、低廉的运营成本等等带来低价。

经营多个门店,显然你能从这个名号和声誉中得到一些好处。

但你也会失去一些东西,体现在所能提供的选择丰富程度上。光波仙这一个门店,按零售价计就有 5000 万美元以上的珠宝。

那么,当有人想买一枚戒指、一串珍珠项链或类似的东西时,在这样一个地方看到的款式,要比在那种试图维持 20 个或 50 个门店库存的商家那里能看到的多得多。

同样地,这让我们在单一门店实现的销量,带来了这样的运营成本——这同样是那些拥有海量门店的商家所无法企及的。

所以,我认为这类生意往往以单一门店的模式更容易成功。

如今,像赫尔兹伯格(Helzberg's)这样的店,会把商品送到全国各地商场里的顾客面前。而通过那种经营模式,他们把那件事做得极为出色。

但波仙成不了赫尔兹伯格,赫尔兹伯格也成不了波仙。从某种意义上说,它们俩瞄准的是两类不同的——在一定程度上是两类不同的顾客。

索尔·普莱斯(Sol Price),查理的朋友,创办了普莱斯俱乐部(Price Club)——第一家大型批发会员店——他说,他成功的一部分原因在于想清楚了他不想要哪类顾客。我想这是对的,是吧,查理?

芒格:对。

巴菲特:你得想清楚自己擅长什么,以及你真正能为谁提供与众不同的东西。波仙为人们提供了非常特别的东西,但这在一定程度上正是源于它只设在一个地点。

在那里,几乎任何你想要的珠宝,你都能看到比世界上几乎任何其他地方都更多的款式。而这会把人吸引过去,或者说会把男士们吸引过去。

而这给了你这样的运营成本——比别人没有这种吸引力时所能做到的低出许多个百分点,哦,差不多 20 个百分点。

而这反过来又让你能够提供更低的价格,从而让这个循环持续转下去。我是说,这种东西非常难以复制。要想在 10 个地方都做到,多半行不通。

不过显然,随着事情发展,你总要问自己这样一个问题——麦当劳(McDonald's)当年决定开第二家店,确实做得很不错嘛。我是说——(笑)

33. 推高账面净资产收益率的因素

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:沃伦,我是来自印第安纳州埃尔克哈特(Elkhart)的弗兰克·马丁(Frank Martin)。

你曾大量撰文谈到,美国整个产业的净资产收益率有一种恒定性,被卡在 12% 到 13% 这个区间。

既然我们现在高于均值,你认为有哪些力量会促使这个数字随着时间推移回归均值呢?

巴菲特:是的,这没错,最近几年这个数字确实更高了。不过《财富》(Fortune)杂志在当期上登了一些关于「500 强」的有趣数字,按十年为一段,展示了财富 500 强这个群体历来的回报率——当然,这个群体本身是在不断变动的。

而且这个数字往往很稳定,尽管在那份数据里,我得说它更接近 12% 到 13% 之间,而不是 11% 到 12%,大概是这样。

在某些行业里,回报率之所以在一定程度上被大幅推高,是因为它们终于把医疗负债列上了资产负债表,从而减少了权益。

所以如果你——任何会拉低权益、但又不改变你做同样销售额能力的做法——实际上等于给美国企业加了杠杆,方式就是把医疗负债列上资产负债表。

这个判断也可能是错的。也许企业能赚到 15% 左右。但我认为,随着时间推移,竞争因素往往会把这个数字多少往下压一压。

而且 12% 或 13%,你仔细想想,根本算不上糟糕。我是说,在 7% 的利率水平下,这样的回报率使得股票和权益在用于权益投资时,比在世界上别的地方更有价值得多。

但如果非要我为未来 10 年挑一个数字,我会挑 12% 到 13% 之间的某个数,但这并不意味着我就一定挑对了。

查理?

芒格:是的。我认为所有那些公开发布的平均数无论如何都高估了实际的盈利水平。它们都是最大的公司,是赢家,是那些股票以高倍数交易的公司,所以它们可以把股票发给别人去换取高盈利的资产。

而许多低回报的公司则不断被剔除出这些统计数字。当然,你可以说过去也是这样。但如果美国企业税后平均能赚到 13% 的资本回报率,那对我来说会是件很了不起的事。

巴菲特:顺便说一句,那些数字——这不是一个很大的项目,但也并非完全微不足道。比方说,它们没有把股票期权的成本作为一项成本列示出来。

而这笔成本是由美国的股东承担的,所以美国股东实际拿到的净资产收益率并没有那些数字所显示的那么高,尽管这并不是一个很大的因素。

但如果光是这一项被遗漏的成本就让回报率虚高了千分之二或千分之三,我也不会感到意外。

如果你也允许我把我的成本统统略去不计,我也能拿出一个非常高的净资产收益率来。(笑)

34. 伯克希尔各子公司的资本回报率

巴菲特:4 区?

观众:我是来自纽约的杰夫·佩斯金(Jeff Peskin,音)。我有一个问题想问你。

其实它更像是一个观察,因为你曾经写到,当你考虑收购一家企业时,你会非常关注他们是如何配置资本的。

我的问题是,一旦你们在一家公司里取得了股份,你们是否发现,仅仅因为你们参与帮助进行资本配置和薪酬安排,这一点本身就能让一家公司获得高得多的回报?

或者说,是不是由于你们、或某位大股东持有公司一大块股份这个事实本身,也能让一家公司提高其资本回报率?

巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。答案算是——有时候是,在某些地方是。这是——

毫无疑问,对于一家资本回报率很高、但在自身业务内部又没有自然途径来运用那些钱的企业,我们把资本抽走,确实可能对这家企业的长期业绩做出重大贡献。

因为如果他们没地方用这笔钱,他们很可能还是会把它用在某个地方。而我们则可以把这笔钱铺到整个天地里去配置。

所以我们可以拿某家经营性企业赚来的钱,用它去买可口可乐公司的一部分,买进另一家了不起的企业,而很少有哪家管理层大概会这么做。所以这里有一个优势。

而另一方面,比如说海尔兹伯格(Helzberg’s),很可能会大幅成长。他们很可能会把自己产生的全部资本都用掉。甚至可能用得更多。那么,在这方面他们其实并不需要我们。我的意思是,无论在什么情况下他们都会那么做。

我们实际上可能让他们有能力成长得稍微更快一点,因为如果一家公司——这不是——这些不是海尔兹伯格的数字——但如果一家公司的净资产收益率是 20%,却能以每年 25% 的速度成长,你知道的,他们在某个时点就会感到股本上的压力。而我们显然会非常乐意去提供能赚到 20% 净资产收益率的额外资本。

所以,无论是向企业输送资本,还是从企业抽走资本,有我们当母公司都可能带来一些好处。

我还认为,在某些情形下我们也能帮上忙,那就是一旦有了我们,很多繁文缛节——尤其是在上市公司里——很多人们在生意上浪费时间去做的事情,跟我们打交道时就都不必做了。

我的意思是,在有些企业里,光是为委员会会议、董事会会议以及诸如此类的各种事情做准备、搞那套展示汇报的玩意儿,就要花掉大量时间。这些跟我们打交道一概都不需要。我们根本不会去碰那些东西。

于是,我们真正把他们解放了出来,让他们能把百分之百的时间都用来思考从长远看什么对企业有利。如果他们有多余的钱,他们不必为该拿这钱怎么办而发愁。

如果一桩好生意需要额外的钱,钱就会被供上。所以在这方面是有一些优势的。我想——

查理,你能不能再往下补充补充?

芒格:好。我认为,我们对所收购企业的主要贡献,恰恰在于我们不做的那些事。

(录音中断)

35. “高等数学在投资中毫无用处”

观众:——要继续保持你们过去那样的成长速度是很难的,因为公司已经变得这么大了。我想知道你能不能就此稍微展开讲一讲。

我的第二个问题完全无关,但我也读到过你非常擅长跟数字打交道,能在脑子里把事情算清楚。说到经济学、会计之类的东西我完全是个新手,但我对数字很在行,能把事情都记在脑子里。

我想知道,对于一个对商业世界知之甚少的数学家来说,有没有什么办法——我可以读些什么、或者做些什么,来学会如何更好地投资,以及你当初是怎么做到的。

巴菲特:嗯,回到第一个问题,你说这会很难——其实是会变得不可能。我是说,这就是答案。我们没法在 120 亿美元的基数上还以 23% 的速度让钱复利增长。

我们不知道怎么做到那一点,谁要是以为我们能接近那个水平,那都会是个错误。我们仍然——我们觉得自己跟钱打交道还能做得不错,但我们当初可不是从 120 亿美元的基数起步的。

而且我们从没在世界上见过任何人能以那样的速度把数字复利成那样。所以,那一部分——我们就别去想了,但还是有些聪明的事情是我们可以去做的。

问题的第二部分,我认为投资过程并不需要多了不起的数学天赋——不是天赋,而是数学知识——高等数学在投资里毫无用处。

而理解一种数量关系,那种能够量化的能力——他们所谓的数感(numeracy),我认为在投资里通常是有帮助的,因为它能告诉你某件事是合乎情理还是不合情理,或者某个领域里的一项指标跟别处的某样东西是怎么联系起来的。

但这其实并不要求多高的数学能力。它真正要求的是一种数学上的敏感和数感。我认为,能看出这些联系是有帮助的。

我是说,我觉得查理和我大概是这样:当我们读到一家企业时,我们脑子里总是把它放在几十家企业组成的屏幕上去比照——这几乎是自动发生的,而——

但这就好比棒球里的球探,会把一名球员跟别的替补人选放在一起掂量。我是说,你的阵容名额就那么几个,你会想,你知道的,「这家伙也许快一点,那家伙打击好一点」,诸如此类。这种比较一直在你脑子里,你总是在以某种方式排定优先次序、做出取舍。

我自己觉得,把这种能力用到极致的最好办法,就是把眼前能看到的一切都读一遍。你知道,我是说,如果你一年读几百份年报,又读过格雷厄姆、费雪,还有那么几样东西,你很快就会看出这一切是不是各归其位、是不是说得通。

查理?

芒格:好。我认为,在美国,要快速地把一家企业拿来跟另一家企业作比较,最好的一套数字指南就是 Value Line 的那套数据。

巴菲特:这一点我同意。

芒格:那些印在对数坐标纸上、能回溯 15 年的东西,是美国现存对许多大企业最好的一次性概览。我无法想象有谁会在做涉及普通股的投资生意时,书架上却没有那玩意儿。

巴菲特:而且,如果你脑子里大致装着这一切在不同行业、不同企业里都长什么样,那你就有了一个用来衡量的参照背景。

我是说,假如你从没看过一场棒球赛、也从没见过任何相关的统计数字,你就不会知道一个打击率三成(.300)的击球手算不算好击球手。

实际上,你脑子里得有那么一幅镶嵌画似的底图,让你的思考有个东西可以比照着钉上去。而 Value Line 的数据,你知道,他们每 13 周轮一遍。如果你把那东西从头翻一遍,你就会对美国商业里这些年来发生了什么有个相当不错的概念。

芒格:顺便说一句,他们的「及时性评级」(timeliness ratings)和股票评级,我一概不理会。

巴菲特:对,那些东西毫无意义。可惜他们非得把那些印上去,但那——有用的是那些统计资料,而不是那些——

芒格:我倒希望那些资料能一直回溯到最早。他们大概是在多少——15 年前——就截断了?

巴菲特:是啊,不过我把旧的都留着呢。(笑)

芒格:对。可你知道,我真希望办公室里也有那些旧的,但我没有。

巴菲特:是啊,我们——查理和我——也许我做得还更多——我们往往会往回追溯。我是说,如果我要买可口可乐,我大概会回头去把《财富》(Fortune)杂志 1930 年代关于它的文章之类的读一遍。

我喜欢给事情找一大堆历史背景,就是为了把它装进脑子里,弄清楚这家企业是怎么随时间演变的,什么是恒久不变的、什么不是,诸如此类。我这么做大概更多是出于乐趣,而不是真为了做决策。

但我觉得这是——我认为,如果你想想看——我们要买的是希望永远持有的企业,你知道的,如果你是这么想的,那你不妨去看看永远持有它们会是个什么样子,往回多看一段。

36. 管理层造就了富国银行的不同

巴菲特:6 号区。

观众:我是斯图尔特·霍雷伊西(Stewart Horejsi),来自堪萨斯州萨利纳(Salina)。

几年前你们最初买进富国银行(Wells Fargo)一部分股份的时候,我看了看它,看不出它比其他任何银行好在哪儿。我想,现在嘛,任何人去看它,都能看出它比几乎所有银行都好。

现在你们又买了 PNC 银行(PNC Bank),而我同样看不出它跟其他任何银行有什么区别。(笑)

你们在 PNC 银行身上看到了什么,让你们从当时所有可选的银行里挑中了它?

巴菲特:(笑)嗯,关于那件事我们不会给任何选股建议。所以,我想回到富国银行那次,当时非常清楚的是,如果你——

我对卡尔·赖夏特(Carl Reichardt)有些了解,当时对保罗·哈森(Paul Hazen)了解得稍微少一些,这既来自我跟他们见过面,也来自我读了很多他们说过的话。

所以,他们是不一样的——他们肯定跟典型的银行家不一样。接下来的问题就是,这种不一样在他们如何经营这家机构方面,到底能起多大作用?

后来他们遭遇了非常凶险的风浪。我想,多半正是——我大概认为,正是早先察觉到的那些人的差异,使得他们能够像后来那样安然渡过。但关于银行,我能说的也就这么多了。

芒格:你知道,你可以就此再稍微补充一点,因为富国银行那个例子非常有意思。他们的房地产贷款高度集中,而房地产正是当时人们栽了最大跟头的领域——

那是该领域 40 年或 50 年来最大的一次崩盘,所以,假如他们注定要承受跟一家普通银行所会承受的那种每笔房地产贷款的平均损失,这家机构早就破产了。

所以,我们基本上是在赌:他们的房地产贷款远远好于平均水平。事实也确实如此。而且在下行过程中,他们处理这些贷款的方式也远远好于平均水平。

所以你可以这么说:其他所有人看到的,都是这种吓人的房地产贷款集中、房地产领域以及给房地产领域放贷的银行所陷入的这一片麻烦的汪洋。于是他们就想当然地认定富国银行要破产了。

而我们的判断却是:不,正因为他们的贷款质量高得多、他们的贷款催收手段也比别人高明得多,所以是不会出事的。结果,事情就这么成了。

巴菲特:是啊,我们当时本来判断不出这一点——不过,要不是我们比单纯看数字再往深里走了那么一点,我们是没法做出那个决定的。

37. 股东权益为正没有什么“神奇”之处

巴菲特:1 号区。

观众:戴维·卡尔(David Carr),来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆(Durham)。

Tambrands 和 U.S. Tobacco 是两家以单一产品为主的公司,它们在销量和定价上似乎都可能面临一些增长障碍,并且都采用了通过股票回购向股东返还现金的策略。

这两家公司有时候——在它们认为股价低于内在价值的时候——会动用债务来加大回购力度。

这些公司最近谈到,通过借入更多债务来回购更多股票,可能会导致股东权益出现负值——股东权益头寸变为负数——的问题,而当时两家公司都认为自家股票非常便宜。而且它们看起来都拥有那种至少能支撑这么做的长期现金流。

您能否谈一谈,至少在会计处理和列报的股东权益方面,以及您是否认为管理层在这些方面应当真正引起重视?

巴菲特:除了 U.S. Tobacco,第一家公司是什么来着?

观众:Tambrands。

巴菲特:你来说?

芒格:Tambrands?

观众:对。

巴菲特:是的,我认为股东权益是正是负并没有什么神奇之处。可口可乐的股东权益是 50 亿美元,而它的市值大约是 750 亿美元。

现在,它们不会这么做,我也不会建议这么做,但假如它们真要花 100 亿美元来回购自家股票,那它们的股东权益就会变成负 50 亿美元。而它们——它们的信用依然会很稳健。

我的意思是,如果别人花 750 亿美元收购这家公司,那他们将拥有 50 亿美元的有形资产和 700 亿美元的无形资产。

一家公司拥有正的股东权益并没有什么神奇之处。而且这种做法并不常见。我甚至想不出一个真有公司这么干过的例子,不过可能确实有过。

但我看不出——我看不出一家公司拥有负的股东权益有什么问题,尽管在它注册成立的那个州,可能会禁止在会产生负权益的情况下回购股票。这一点你得去查那个州的法律。

但任何时候,一家公司在杠杆收购之类的交易中以远高于账面价值的某个很大数字被收购时,实际上——只要他们借的钱足够多——他们就在制造一个负的股东权益,相对于此前的股东权益而言。这两个组织之间的数字差异,不过是一种虚构罢了。

当你没有更好的用途来运用这笔资金时,你就应该回购自家股票。而这可能因管理层而异。我是说,有些管理层如果其资本配置的领域足够广阔,或许能为这笔钱找到用武之地;而另一些更专注于自身业务的管理层,可能就找不到。

但一旦一家公司把现有业务所必需的或者有利的事项都安排妥当之后,我们认为回购股票就是一件非常合乎逻辑、值得考虑的事——只要你不认为自己在这么做时支付的价格高于该企业的内在价值。

而且显然,相对于内在价值的折扣越大,把钱用在这件事上就越有说服力。

查理?

芒格:我没什么要补充的。一般来说,也许可口可乐可以有负的权益,但我认为对通用汽车来说这不会是个好主意。我觉得拥有正的股东权益还是有其道理的。

38. 在竞争激烈的信用卡行业寻找赢家

巴菲特:3 号区。

观众:我是爱德华·巴尔,来自肯塔基州莱克星顿。我有一个两部分的问题。

第一,您前面提到了美国运通。我很好奇,信用卡支付仅占所有交易的 10%、而且这个比例往后可能还会持续增长一段时间——这一事实是否是您做出决策的一个考量因素?

问题的另一部分,涉及银行业特许经营权的持久性和稳固性,面对未来几年可能出现的替代性渠道——包括微软/Intuit 合并的可能性。

巴菲特:嗯,你提到的信用卡使用率之类的具体数字,对我们来说并不是一个重要因素。我们认为信用卡既会长期存在,也很可能在某种程度上继续增长。

不过到了某个时点,你就会开始触及上限,至少在那种还算合理的未偿余额[未偿信用卡债务]规模上是如此。

但信用卡这个领域是个非常大的领域。问题在于,谁在这里面占据优势?因为每个人都会想参与进来,而且他们已经在里面了。如果你身处信用卡业务,可以有很多种不同的玩法。

你最好得有某种方式去玩好这场游戏中的某一环,最好是很大的一环。但你最好得有某种方式,把这场游戏中的某一环玩得比别人更好,否则资本主义的自然力量就会把你慢慢碾碎。

我的意思是,这是一个人们愿意改变自己用卡习惯的行业。我是说,如果你给某人提供一张信用卡,带有他原来那张卡上没有的某些好处,人们是相当愿意换卡的。

所以,你需要在市场的某个特定细分领域里拥有某种优势。因此,市场整体的增长前景对我们来说并不是一个重要——并不是一个重要的因素。

这真正的问题是,搞清楚谁会赢得哪场游戏,谁又会输掉哪场游戏。

那第二个问题又是什么来着?

39. 预计未来 20 年银行业将发生巨大变化

观众:第二个问题涉及银行业特许经营权的持久性和稳固性。

巴菲特:哦对,没错。

观众:以及未来几年里,替代性渠道——包括微软/Intuit 合并——是否会侵蚀这种持久性。

巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。你确实正在看到银行分支机构的价值大幅缩水。过去,分行数量曾是管理层极为自豪的一点。

而且,你知道的,为了拿到开设分行的许可,往往还会动用政治影响力之类的种种手段。

在 20 到 30 年的时间跨度里,银行业很可能会发生一些非常重大的变化。至于究竟哪些参与者会受益、哪些会受损,你知道,这是个非常棘手的问题。

但我会预期——我不会——我想我不会预期未来 5 年里银行业出现真正重大的变化,但我肯定会预期未来 20 年里会出现。

而且有很多人都盯着那个市场,包括你提到的微软。

对它们来说,与现有参与者联手或许是有利的。我是说,我知道这肯定是会被探讨的一种思路。但它们也可能想出一种绕过现有参与者的办法。这就是其中一个投资上的考量。

查理?

芒格:是的。那个绕过了其他所有人的有趣参与者是美林。美林凭借它的现金管理账户大举进入了银行业务。而我认为这绝不会是唯一会出现的创新。

巴菲特:那本书叫什么名字来着?

芒格:你知道吗,我忘了,那是本了不起的书。

巴菲特:是的,有一本很棒的书。

芒格:也许 Molly 记得。你给我的那本书是什么来着?那是一本讲信用卡历史的书。

巴菲特:是乔·诺切拉写的吗?对,作者是乔·诺切拉。我不记得书名了[《A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class》(分一杯羹:中产阶级如何跻身有钱人之列)]。但它大约是在半年到一年前出版的。这是一部关于信用卡业务的精彩历史著作。

如果你读了它,你就会对诸如资金流动这类事情中可能发生的变化幅度有一些概念。我猜想,假如 20 年后再出一版,可写的东西肯定会多得多。所以——

芒格:顺便说一句,那本书棒极了。在座的大多数人会读得放不下手。我是说,对于一本讲经济发展的书来说,它以一种非常引人入胜的方式捕捉到了人的背景。

40. 对 SunTrust 和 PNC 的护城河不予置评

巴菲特:是 4 号区吗?对 3 号区来说那好像太远了。嗯。

观众:我是——亚当·恩格尔(音译),来自科罗拉多州博尔德。

我在想,您能否谈一谈您所看到的、环绕在 SunTrust 和 PNC 这两座城堡周围的护城河。

巴菲特:嗯,我觉得我不该对这类具体的持仓发表评论。不过——所以我会说,你应该先以一种笼统的方式去看待它们,就像你看待银行业务那样。

然后你再设法搞清楚这两家机构各自具体的优势或劣势是什么。但这一回,我还是不想替你把乐趣给破坏了。

查理?

芒格:没有要补充的。

41. 芒格希望没说过的那句关于所罗门的“自作聪明”评论

巴菲特:5 号区。

观众:我叫鲍勃·麦克卢尔(音译)。我是美国人,但住在新加坡。

大约一周前,《亚洲华尔街日报》上有一句话被归到了芒格先生名下,具体说的是,拥有所罗门兄弟公司就像拥有一家前面带着餐厅的赌场。(笑)

赌场,是暗指自营交易;而餐厅,则是暗指所谓的客户驱动型业务。这个对应是否正确、准确,您能不能——

芒格:嗯,我不认为——

观众:——详细说说您为什么会那样看待这门生意?

芒格:我不认为这完全正确,不过我偶尔说话比较俏皮辛辣。(笑)

我常常用一种在小圈子里行得通的方式说话,但换个场合就未必合适了。

每隔一阵子,当你把我那种自作聪明的俏皮话——(笑)——抽离上下文来看,我就非常希望它压根没说出口才好。(笑)

这次就是这么个情况。(笑声与掌声)

巴菲特:不过这也拦不住他将来还这么干。(笑)

也拦不住我。

42. 与 GDP 相比,国债目前并不可怕

巴菲特:6 号区?还是我们在 5 号区?我们现在是哪个区?凯利?还是——

观众:巴菲特先生,我是来自芝加哥的兰德尔·贝洛斯(音)。

既然您连这么离题的问题都回答,我有两个问题。第一,如果让您看一看美利坚合众国的资产负债表,国家债务是不是真的像它表面看起来那么吓人?

第二,就资本的再配置而言,如果可口可乐是这么棒的一笔投资,回报这么丰厚,那为什么不把一部分资本再投进去、增持可口可乐的股票呢?

最后,谢谢您让简为您画了那幅肖像。如果画得好,我们下一个就画芒格先生。谢谢。

巴菲特:关于美国资产负债表的第一个问题,净国家债务大约——大概相当于 GDP 的 60 多个百分点。

芒格:这还没把未拨备的养老金算进去。

巴菲特:对,但那也——实际上还有一笔对未来公民收入的索取权,那也是一项资产,你可以把那个也列上——

不过那个数字,我想,在二战结束时,可能曾经——我知道至少在 125% 左右,也许有 150% 上下,相对于 GDP。所以我们扛过来了——

当然,那时候那笔债务的利率要低得多。其中很大一部分是 2.9%,因为储蓄债券就是付这个利息。

但那样的债务水平,相对于 GDP 而言我并不主张达到那么高,最后却被证明是相当可持续的。事实上,它一年又一年地往下走,持续了很长时间,直到 80 年代初才又开始上升。而如今在过去这几年里,债务对 GDP 的比率其实又略微下降了一点。

衡量多少债务算太多之类的尺度有很多。但是,我想,如果非要我只看一个单一的统计数字,我会看这个比率,就像我看一个人的债务对收入比率一样。

接下来你就会涉及到收入的稳定性以及债务欠的是谁这些问题。

但我不认为相对于整个经济的债务水平有任何吓人的性质。我喜欢它随时间略微往下走、而不是往上走的局面。如果它一直往上走,就可能变得棘手。

不过,我想在意大利,现在大概已经接近 150% 了。一旦你到了 150%,再加上 8% 的利率,那基本上就意味着 GDP 的 12% 都要拿去付利息了。

如果你把这个国家的资产负债表拼起来,会很有意思,因为负债一侧你会有这 40 亿的净债务,还会有一大堆养老金义务,就像查理提到的那样,也在负债一侧。

但你也有一大堆资产。你在所有美国公司里都拥有 35% 的权益——利润分成。我是说,政府如果税率是 35%,那它其实就拥有了美国企业 35% 的股权。它们拥有伯克希尔·哈撒韦相当大的一块。

我们每年都给它们开支票。我们不会每年给你们开支票,但我们会给它们开支票。我们把你们的盈利留存再投入,去给它们的那份股权创造更多价值,换句话说,就是它们拿到的那些税。

芒格:你这是想让这些人开心点儿吗?(笑)

巴菲特:那么换个角度,今天如果让你买下这样一项权利:领取美国所有公司未来缴纳的全部公司税,这笔权利的折现价值,你愿意出多少钱?你会出一个非常大的数。

再换个角度,让你买下这样一项权利:从美国每个收入超过 X 的个人那里拿走一定比例,而且还能随时调整你拿的那个比例,你愿意出多少钱?那也是一个非常大的数。(笑)

所以,你在那边握着一项非常大的资产——同时你也背着几项非常大的负债。但这个国家的偿债能力非常充足。

我不希望看到债务以任何快速的步伐上升。其实我根本不希望它上升,但我尤其不希望它快速上升,因为一旦它作为 GDP 的百分比在上升,就会牵动起很多事情。

但是,如果你告诉我,20 年后国家债务会达到 10 万亿美元,但它占 GDP 的比例还是一样,那会让我惊慌吗?一点也不会。我是说,我本来就预期它会增长,而且我认为甚至有一些理由说明——为什么让它增长可能是明智的。

但我不认为让它占去你越来越多的收入是个好主意,因为那会牵动起很多别的事情。

所以,我对过去这几年发生的事情是欢迎的,也就是看到它相对于此前 10 年或 12 年存在的那个趋势温和地下降了。

查理?

芒格:嗯,总体上我认为你是对的,它并不全是坏事。而且就它确实是坏事的那部分而言,一个拥有资本主义经济的伟大国家,在政治层面是经得起相当多折腾的。这也是件天大的好事,因为——我不认为我们应该非常气馁。

如果真有什么东西会把这个国家搞垮,那将是我所说的「塞尔皮科效应」(Serpico effect)——你开始去奖励那些你并不想要更多的东西,于是它就不断地壮大、壮大、再壮大。但我不认为那必然是个糟糕的财政结果,它只是个糟糕的结果。

巴菲特:伯克希尔欠着 7 亿或 8 亿——反正现在大概是这个数的债务,另外还欠着 30 多亿的浮存金。要知道,这些数字在 25 年前听起来会让我觉得非常大,可是——然而我们却是你能找到的财务最保守的运营机构之一。

10 年后我们也许会欠更多的钱,而那可能仍然是一个更小的百分比。我是说,谈债务水平时,不能不把它跟偿债能力联系起来。而这个国家现在的财务状况,很可能比 1947 年时还要好。

43. 把可口可乐当作评估其他选项的“标尺股”

1 号区。什么,刚才还有个第二——那个问题里是不是还有个我没回答的第二问?还是——

观众:(听不清)

巴菲特:哦,是关于回购股份的。对。

芒格:不对,你说的是「我们为什么不多买一些?」

巴菲特:嗯,我们是有在考虑。

芒格:不久前我们就买过——

巴菲特:对,我们买过。去年我们就多买了一些,而且拿它当作和买别的东西作对比的衡量尺度,并不算坏。

不过——我不会排除伯克希尔再多买的可能。我眼下没有这么做的任何计划,但我完全不会排除这种可能,因为——如果我要去看另一门生意,我会问自己:「我为什么宁愿要这个,而不是多要一些可口可乐?」

芒格:瞧,他这话对几乎任何一位投资者都非常有用,他说「把这个当作衡量尺度」,用来对照买别的东西。对一个普通人来说,你手头最容易得到的最好的东西,就是你自己的那把衡量尺度。

如果它不——如果那个新东西没有比你已经知道、且唾手可得的东西更好,那它就没达到你的门槛,于是这一下就把你看到的东西筛掉了 99%,这是个了不起的省思利器。而商学院里基本上是不教这个的。

巴菲特:是不教,所以我们才觉得,当那些大机构因为别人都在这么干,就决定把 4% 的钱投到国际股票、或者 3% 投到新兴成长国家——诸如此类的鬼东西——这有点儿离谱。

我是说,把钱投到那里去的唯一理由,应该是他们拿它和自己已经在做的事情作过对比衡量。

而如果他们拿它和自己已经在做的事情作过对比衡量,却仍然认为把 97% 留在原来的地方、再投 3% 进去是个绝妙的主意,那你知道,我是说,这压根就毫无道理可言。

但这就是委员会里被灌输的那一套,是让投资经理们不停去开各种会议之类的由头,所以——

芒格:他们是在刻意使用一种把自己最好的思维工具给拿掉的手法。你可以说这很离谱,而你说得对。

我想〔德国哲学家弗里德里希·〕尼采有句话说得相当好,他说他嘲笑那种因为自己有条瘸腿、就以为自己能走得更好的人。

我是说,他们简直就是在蒙住自己的眼睛,然后还在我们自己的商学院里教我们的孩子们怎么这么干。非常有意思,你不觉得吗?

而沃伦所说的无非就是:在决定要不要做某件事时,去对照你手头最好的机会就行了。如果那个机会更好,而你却没去抓它,那你又凭什么仅仅因为有人告诉你「你需要在国际股票上配 2%」就去做这件事呢?

44. 买伯克希尔,还是放手让你的基金经理去管?

巴菲特:1 号区?

观众:你好,我叫马克·惠勒(音),来自俄勒冈州波特兰。我有几个鸡蛋放在你们这个篮子里。我奶奶总是说:「别把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里。」

我有个问题,我记得您几年前在某份报告里谈到莱尔·阿布纳(Little Abner)的投资方法时,回答过类似的问题。

假设我有 100,000 美元,决定再买四五股您的股票,差不多就是买入并持有四五年那种打算。

另外我还有一位资金管理人——我已经有一位了——他干得也不错,10%、15% 的回报。

但他总是不停地倒腾资产。您知道,我一回头,邮箱里就塞满了各种文书材料。我想问的是,我怎么才能判断哪一个对我更划算?

换句话说,是买伯克希尔——我喜欢它,显然我都来这儿了,所以我对它感兴趣——还是继续留着我这位似乎把账户倒腾得不亦乐乎的资金管理人?

巴菲特:嗯,这总比让一个经纪人把账户倒腾得天翻地覆要好。(笑)

如果他拿的是管理费,那他倒腾的动机就稍微小一点。

但就这种情况下你该做哪个决定,我没法替你回答。

不过我得说,从某种意义上你说得对——如果你买伯克希尔,你就应该抱着持有很长很长一段时间的打算去买。

我们也不知道伯克希尔明年会怎么样,无论是内在价值上还是市场表现上。你知道,我们在乎的是内在的那部分,我们不在乎市场层面的表现。我们确实在乎把内在价值做大。

你知道,归根结底,我们并不认为——嗯,当我们持有伯克希尔时,我们并不觉得是把所有鸡蛋放进了一个篮子里,我是说,因为我们旗下有一大堆好生意。

当然,如果你说的是天上掉下来的某种意外,比如一桩巨额责任诉讼之类的事砸到某一个公司主体身上——我们确实是一个公司主体。但如果你从一个主体所隐含的经营风险来考虑,我们旗下有许许多多各不相同的好生意。

事实上,我们手里这一批好生意,可能跟我能想到的任何公司一样出色。

不过你那位资金管理人,毫无疑问还有个优势,就是他大概操作的是较小的资金额,这给了他一个更大的机会空间。

在税务安排上,跟用自己资本运作的个人相比,我们并不是处于完美的状态。对于打算永远持有的人来说,我们在税务上的安排是没问题的。但对于只打算持有一年左右的人来说,我们在税务上的安排就没那么有利了。

查理?有什么要补充的吗?

芒格:没有要补充的。

45. “我们喜欢坦诚的人”

巴菲特:哪个区?哦,后面那位。我看话筒好像没开。好的。

观众:我是杰夫·约翰逊(Jeff Johnson)。我从俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨赶来,很高兴能来到这里。

我有两个问题。第一,我希望您能解释一下,或者谈谈您的看法:为什么财产意外险公司的投资者愿意接受历来低于平均水平的那种回报?

第二个问题跟您昨天给我的一个回答有关,就是您说在做投资决策时,直觉或者凭感觉这种东西完全不起作用。

我想知道,在您和芒格先生判断喜不喜欢某个人的时候,是不是有什么主观的成分?您又是怎么判断喜不喜欢「城堡的主人」的呢?

巴菲特:嗯,我不知道。查理,你想回答后半部分吗?

芒格:嗯,我们谈到过代理成本。代理成本有两种不同的类型。一种是这家伙以牺牲股东利益为代价来给自己捞好处;另一种是他做蠢事——他并不是想给自己捞好处,他只是天性愚蠢。

不管是哪一种,作为股东的你都要付出很大的代价。所以,你必须对人性的这两个方面做出判断,而它们极其重要。

另一方面,有些生意实在太好了,好到即便管理层干出一大堆蠢事,它也能轻松扛得住。而且我得说——尽管我们都喜欢完美无缺的人,但我不认为我们投资的对象总是这样的人。

巴菲特:是的。不过总体来说,我们喜欢坦诚的人。我们通常能看出某人是在绕着某件事打太极,或者看出他们的报告本质上有点不老实、有偏向,诸如此类。跟坦诚的人打交道,事情要省心得多。

而且我们喜欢聪明的人,你知道。我不是指天才。但就是——而且我们喜欢专注于经营自己生意的人。

这其实并不太复杂,不过总的来说——你知道,中间可能有一大批人,我们对他们说不上有什么特别的感觉,无论好坏;然后我们会看到一些人,是我们明确知道不想与之打交道的;还有一些人,是我们明确知道非常乐于与之共事的。

芒格:平均下来,我们一直非常幸运。

巴菲特:非常走运。

46. 很难从一门质量不佳的业务中把资本抽出来

芒格:至于你的另一个问题,你问,为什么这些投资者会接受低于平均水平的结果?嗯,事物的本质决定了,大约一半的投资者注定要拿到低于平均的结果。他们并不是事先就接受了这一点,只是结果恰好如此罢了。

巴菲特:而且这些钱一旦投进一家公司,往往就被「困住」了。我是说,这需要很多——如果你有一门长期回报低于正常水平的生意,要想把那些资本释放出来,无论是通过收购、代理权之争,还是诸如此类的手段,都存在一个很高的门槛。

所以,被套在一门不赚钱、或者盈利偏低的生意里的钱,很可能会被套上相当长的一段时间。

最终大概会有什么力量来纠正它。但资本主义的运作并没有高效到,一旦资本配置错了就能迅速把它挪走的地步。

当一家公司归伯克希尔所有时,我们更有能力做这件事。而显然,如果我们是通过别的某个企业间接持有它的,那我们就根本没有能力去做——因为这牵涉到一些我们不愿意去做的事。我们只是把它卖给别人,由那个人接手——实际上就是接过我们在牌桌旁的那把椅子。

47. 着眼于未来盈利,而非当前盈利

巴菲特:3 号区?

观众:您好,我是来自旧金山的菲利普·金(Philip King)。

我还有一个关于估值的问题——更具体地说,是市盈率与利率之间的关系。

我明白您不愿意定下一套僵硬的估值公式,但我也知道,您不希望人们以为 20 倍的市盈率就算便宜,或者 5 倍的市盈率就算贵。

那么,本杰明·格雷厄姆曾提出过一个「中枢价值」理论,他给普通股的估值,是按照大约比债券收益率高三分之一的盈利收益率来定的。

换句话说,按当前情况算,那大概相当于 11 倍的市盈率。而且我知道,您曾把一门普通生意比作一张 13% 的债券——在 13% 的利率下它大致值账面价值,而在 6% 的利率下它大概值约两倍的账面价值。

那么,按现在 7% 到 8% 的利率水平来看,这就大致意味着股票大概值 12 到 13 倍的市盈率。

可是,我在私人市场上看到的那些收购,成交价却更像是 17 到 20 倍的市盈率。我想知道,在您看来,合理的市盈率大致是个什么样的区间?

巴菲特:是的。嗯,主要决定问题的,并不是今年盈利的倍数。比如说,我们的可口可乐是在 1988 年和 1989 年买的,按这只股票来算,买入价是每股 11 美元——最低到过 9 美元,最高到过 13 美元,但平均下来大约 11 美元。

而它今年的盈利,我们可以说,大多数预测在 230 到 240 之间。所以这还不到今年盈利的 5 倍,但在我们当年买入的时候,那可是个相当大的倍数。

重要的是未来。这就像我在那儿写的,韦恩·格雷茨基(Wayne Gretzky)说的——要去冰球将要到达的地方,而不是它现在所在的地方。

所以,当前的市盈率会和资本的再投资、以及该资本的投资回报率相互作用,共同决定一样东西此刻的吸引力。

在那个估值过程中,我们相当大程度上会受到利率的影响,但不是受利率到底是 7.3%、7.0% 还是 7.5% 的影响。我是说,如果长期利率是 11% 还是 5%,我们的想法会大不相同。而且——但我们脑子里并没有什么神奇的倍数。

我们想的是——我们想置身于这样一门生意:10 年后它赚的钱比现在多得多,而且到那时我们对这门生意的前景仍然感觉良好。

这就是我们想整体收购的那种生意,也是我们想买入一部分的那种生意。然后有时候我们也会买点别的。(笑)

查理?

芒格:那种僵硬的套公式的事,我们一概不做。

巴菲特:在我们脑子里,是有一个大致的框架的,你可以把它叫做公式。但我们也不会自欺欺人,以为自己对具体细节了解得那么透彻,以至于真能照着那个方程式算出一个数来。

我们在 1988 年和 1989 年买可口可乐的时候,对这门生意随着时间推移会有怎样的表现,心里有个大致的想法,但我们从来没把它简化成一个具体的计算。

也许我们应该这么做,但我是说,这事就是——我们不认为它有那么高的精确度。

我们认为,从大方向上这样思考是对的。而我们认为,如果你试图——如果你以为自己能把它精确到某个点上,那你就是在自欺欺人。

因此,我们认为,当我们做一个决定时,应该有这么大的安全边际,应该有这么强的吸引力,以至于你根本不需要把它精算到小数点后三位。

我们再回答几个问题就得离场了。我们有个董事——我们一年只开一次董事会,可不想让董事们失望。

48. USAir 是个错误,尽管已连续五年发放股息

巴菲特:4 号区?(笑)

观众:是的,我是来自加州阿普托斯的罗伊·克里斯蒂安(Roy Christian)。

我想问一个关于 USAir 的问题,这次会上几乎没人提到它。

您上电视谈到那边的亏损时,很有意思,我那么多朋友——或者说熟人吧——都跑来跟我说这条惊人的消息。您知道,我还试着替您辩护了一下,至少——

巴菲特:那是个错误。(笑)

你当时就该直接认栽。(笑)

观众:呃,至少我想跟他们指出——

巴菲特:不——

观众:——您在那段时间里确实是拿到了股息的——

巴菲特:没错。

观众:——大概有五六年的股息,而且那笔钱被再投资了,回报率说不定比 USAir 还高。

所以,这件事并不像您在电视上谈它时所描绘的、或者像我那些朋友——我还是该叫他们熟人——向我指出的那样,是一场彻头彻尾的灾难。

我想,我要的大概就是您说两句评论吧。

巴菲特:是的。嗯,你说得对,本来可能更糟。但它确实是个错误。不过我们持有期间收到了五年的股息——对,应该是五年,利率还不错。

但就像有人说的:「你在乎的不是本金的回报(return on principal),而是本金的收回(return of principal)。」而我们——

不过我们的处境要好一些——显然要好得多——比起我们当初买了普通股的话;甚至比我们去买了别的某些股票还要好一些。

但这在我这边仍然是个大错误。不过你继续替我说话吧。这件事上我能得到多少帮助都不嫌多。(笑)

49. 查理与沃伦的推荐书目

巴菲特:5 号区?

观众:您好,我是来自纽约的克里斯·斯塔布鲁(Chris Stabru,音译)。

查理,除了您之前提到的那本讲信用卡的书之外,您最近还在读什么别的、可以推荐给我们的书吗?

还有沃伦,您最近有读什么可以推荐给我们的书吗?我知道您是伯特兰·罗素(Bertrand Russell)的粉丝。他的著作里有没有一两本是您特别喜欢的?

巴菲特:不过我读那些书已经是很久以前的事了。我是说,我读过不少罗素的书,但那都是——他在过去 10 年、15 年里也没写多少东西了。(笑)

查理?

芒格:有一本教科书,我想书名叫《管理决策中的判断》(Judgment in Managerial Decision Making)。有些商学院在用它,其实是一本相当不错的书。

它不算活泼——文笔不是那种读起来很有趣的活泼风格,但里面有很多智慧。作者好像叫布拉伯曼什么的[Max Bazerman]。不过书名是《管理决策中的判断》。

巴菲特:自从迷上电脑桥牌、每周打 10 个小时之后,我的阅读时间真是被搅得一塌糊涂。(笑)

不过它确实很好玩。

50. 尽管每股价格“不方便甚至不利”,伯克希尔仍不会拆股

巴菲特:6 号区?我们再回答几个问题,然后就——

观众:是的。我是来自伊利诺伊州罗克福德的迪克·莱顿(Dick Leighton)。

这是我第一次参加年会,让我受益匪浅。在场的人数给我留下了极深的印象,而到场的年轻人之多,更是让我印象深刻。

我非常希望能把我的孙辈也带成股东,但按目前每股的价格,要把股票交到他们手里实在很难。

巴菲特:这是我们听过的、引出拆股问题最漂亮的开场白了。(笑)

真的,确实如此。

观众:我就知道您会喜欢这一招。(笑)

显然您明白我的问题。我也理解您这些年所持的立场,以及拆股并不会创造任何价值这个事实。

不过在这种情况下,对我们当中许多想把股票交到其他家庭成员手里的人来说,拆股可能带来税务上的节省。

那我是该去缠着我的国会议员修改税法呢,还是您愿意考虑做点改变?(笑)

巴菲特:嗯,这是个很在理的问题。确实有那么几个方面,其中之一你刚才已经提到了。

还有另一个人也跟我提过,他们把伯克希尔股票放在 IRA 账户里。如今他们到了必须按规定提取的阶段,结果就用伯克希尔来操作起来很不顺——尽管我想他们可以把它卖掉,然后按比例提取一部分。

在某些方面,主要是赠与方面,伯克希尔现在这样的每股价格,从「不太方便」到「实实在在不划算」都有。

你知道,我们意识到了这一点,也想过这个问题,有时候我们自己的个人情况甚至也牵涉其中。我家里就有一桩,我们琢磨出了——想出了绕过去的办法。

当然,拆股的坏处在于,就在今年早些时候,你们也稍微见识了一本书[《巴菲特之道》(The Warren Buffett Way)]能掀起多大的波澜。

我们想尽可能地吸引那些注重投资、投资视野尽可能长远的股东。

而在某种程度上,外界对我的宣传在这方面是负面的。因为我知道,如果我们有一种但凡谁手里有 500 美元就能轻松买到的东西,就会有一大堆压根不知道自己在干什么、只是道听途说听过这个名字的人来买它。

其次,如果这种情况真的造出一个甚至更——更强劲的——市场,那你就会有人单纯因为它在涨而去买它。今年我们就有一点点这种苗头。

有很多人会被正在上涨的股票吸引。这对我们没有吸引力,但它在某种程度上确实吸引着世上其他人。

所以我们几乎可以肯定,我们会得到——具体程度我们说不准——我们几乎可以肯定,我们会得到一个股东群体,其老练程度、与我们目标的同步程度,都不如我们现在所拥有的。这几乎是板上钉钉的事。

而伯克希尔股票真正不需要的,就是更多的需求。我是说,那不是——我们并不在意它卖得更高,除非是随着内在价值的增长而上涨。

理想情况下,我们希望股价随时间精确地与内在价值的变化平行,因为那样我们的股东之间人人都会被公平对待。

在各自的持有期内,公司赚了他们就赚、公司亏了他们就亏。任何在某一时期人为刺激股价的做法,都只不过意味着另一时期的股东将会失望。

我是说,我们不希望股票以内在价值的两倍、或高出内在价值 50% 的价格成交。我们希望的是内在价值能大幅增长。

而且我认为毫无疑问,如果我们引入拆股,在这方面我们会得到更糟的结果,因为那样人们就会去琢磨别的、可能让股价获得暂时提振的种种可能性。

几个月前《商业周刊》(Businessweek)做过一份关于交易所换手率的统计表。我们是 3%,而据我所见,那份名单上没有一家是低于两位数的,数字都更大。

但那些公司的情况只不过是,你知道,它们的股东频繁离场,新股东则带着更短期的预期进来。我们一直希望,在人人都有能力购买它的前提下,尽可能让它像一家私人合伙企业。

我们并不认为在当今这个投资世界里,最低投资额定得太高。我是说,各种各样的投资机会都设有 2.5 万、5 万这类门槛。

但要做出改变的难题,你知道,就赠与这类情况而言——你知道,对此我真希望自己能有个更好的答案,因为我觉得那确实是个——

芒格:我的孙辈把 2 万美元和当前股价之间的差额付给我。我觉得这是他们一种非常合理的做法,尤其考虑到他们有时候才出生六周大。(笑)

巴菲特:要用 2 万这个额度来操作,显然得有配偶的同意。

不过大多数问题都是能解决的,但我承认,这解决起来不像我们干脆把股票定成更低的每股美元价那么容易。

我确实认为,一旦你的股东群体变成——拥有——拥有了不同的目标、预期或别的什么,你就再也甩不掉它了。我是说,你可以维持一个像伯克希尔这样的股东群体,但如果你以某种方式把它毁掉了,就再也重建不起来了。

而和谁同舟共济,对我们来说很重要。我是说,它让我们能够——我认为它对我们的经营有帮助。我甚至认为它可能——在某些情况下,就我们所吸引到的对象而言,它甚至可能在收购中帮到我们。

据我所知,这也可能在某些我还不清楚的地方对我们造成损害。不过我不这么认为,因为我觉得我们能设计出——尤其是用优先股——一些东西来满足那些心里想着另一种面额证券的人。

芒格:看看你们周围。我们真有可能做得好太多吗?这是一群很不错的人。