2010 meeting
Morning session
1. Opening remarks
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren, he’s Charlie.
He can hear, I can see. We work together for that reason. (Laughter)
Like to make one correction in the movie. My fast ball was filmed in slow motion. They tried the regular way and you couldn’t even see it, so — (Laughter)
Our approach today will be to announce a couple of things, our earnings, and introduce you to the directors. But as soon as that’s through, we’ll move on to questions. We’ll have those until noon.
We’ll break for an hour and we’ll come back at 1:00. Those of you who are in the overflow rooms may find that you can get into the main arena here at that time.
And we’ll go till 3:30 with the questions and then we’ll have the annual meeting, business meeting, for those of you who are still around at that point. And at that time, we will have the election of directors.
2. Board of directors introduced
WARREN BUFFETT: But because not all of you may be here at that time, I would like to introduce the directors to you, and I’ll ask them to stand.
And if you’ll hold your applause until they’re all done standing, or you can even hold it after that — (laughter) — it will make — it will make for a very orderly meeting.
So let’s start in with Howard Buffett. I’m the next one alphabetically. Our new director, Steve Burke.
They didn’t hear the part about stay standing, but that’s OK. They’re generally fairly obedient, but the — (laughter)
Susan Decker. Bill Gates. David Gottesman, Sandy Gottesman. Charlotte Guyman.
Don Keough is unable to be with us today. He’s had a serious operation but he’s recovering very well and he’s got a lot of friends in this audience and he’ll be with us next year.
Charlie, we’ve already introduced. Tom Murphy. Ron Olson, the manager in our movie. And Walter Scott.
Now you can go wild with applause for the group. (Applause)
3. Some recovery for “sputtering” economy
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, before we start with the questions, we do have preliminary earnings figures for the first quarter.
And I’d like to ask the projectionist to put up slide A. There’s nothing really very surprising in these numbers, but we’d like to give them to you. They up there OK? Yeah. If you have any questions on these later on.
What we’re seeing in our businesses is that, in what was sort of a sputtering recovery a few months ago, seems to have picked up steam in March and April.
And our businesses that kind of serve broad industry, such as the railroad or Marmon or ISCAR, we’re seeing a pretty good uptick. It’s a long way from where it was a couple years ago, but what was very spotty in the recovery a couple of months ago, the trends really seem a fair amount stronger in the last few months.
And we always encourage you to focus on operating earnings. We have the figures there for our investments and derivative businesses.
We don’t really think they mean anything on a quarterly basis. Obviously, they’re meaningful over the years. I mean, we’ve piled up a lot of net worth over the years with capital gains. But in any quarter, they mean absolutely nothing.
And you’ll notice another thing about our report. We don’t even put down — we have to when we publish generally — but we don’t even put down the earnings per share. We’re not focused on that number in any quarter or any year.
We’re focused on the buildup of value. And we really think that an undue focus on quarterly earnings, not only is probably a bad idea for investors, but we think it’s a terrible idea for managers.
If I had told our managers that we would earn three dollars and 17 1/2 cents for the quarter, you know, they might do a little fudging in order to make sure that we actually came out at that number.
And there was a very interesting study that was published a few months ago where thousands of earnings reports were examined.
And instead of taking it out to the penny, which is customary in the reporting, they took it out one further digit. And of course if you go out one further digit, and it’s four or less, you round downward, and if it’s five or more, you round upward.
And they found out that a statistically impossible number of — small number — of fours showed up because if they got to four-tenths of a cent, somehow somebody in the accounting department managed to find another tenth of a cent so they could round upward. It was not an accident.
And, you do not want to have — in our view, we think it’s terrible practice to be thinking about trying to report to some penny that you’ve whispered to Wall Street analysts in previous months.
And we probably carry that to an extreme at Berkshire. But we always think of the enterprise as a whole. We think about building value over time.
And we do not worry about earnings per share, and we don’t worry about investment gains or losses.
Charlie may want to weigh in on this one a bit. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He is the perfect vice chairman. (Laughter) They don’t come any better. OK.
With that preliminary — we probably ought to quit at that point, actually. (Laughter)
4. Panel of journalists introduced
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to alternate the questions between a panel of three journalists here. We have Carol Loomis of Fortune magazine on the — on the far right. (Applause)
And we didn’t do it quite alphabetically. We have Andrew Ross Sorkin from The New York Times. (Applause)
And Becky Quick of CNBC. (Applause)
Andrew’s maneuvered for a seat there, apparently, to get earlier in the questioning order, but I’ll probably stick with the alphabetical list.
And we will alternate between our journalists, and then we will go around the auditorium here where people have been chosen by chance to ask questions.
And we also will go to just I guess one of the overflow rooms; we have a whole lot of overflow rooms, but we’ll not go to all of them.
5. To be deleted
WARREN BUFFETT: So let’s just start things off. Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: Well, since I won the alphabetical lottery, I get to make two very short statements also.
One is that we received an awful lot of questions. We really don’t know how many because some people sent their question to all three of us. But I would guess we had something between 1,500 and 2,000 questions.
And obviously, we’re not going to be able to ask all of those, and we’re sorry for those we didn’t get to ask. They were very good questions and we appreciate the work that people put into them.
The other thing I want to mention is that Warren and Charlie have had absolutely no hint as to what the questions will be so they will have to field them just as they come up.
6. Buffett strongly defends Goldman Sachs
CAROL LOOMIS: However, Warren and Charlie may be smart enough to have guessed that the first question will be about topic A, which is Goldman Sachs.
And I received several emails about the SEC’s lawsuit against Goldman, all of them asking a different question about that problem.
I have combined the several thoughts in these questions, and with thanks to Greg Firman (PH), Kai Pan (PH) of Morgan Stanley, Brian Chan (PH), and Vic Timono (PH), here is the question:
Warren, every year in the Berkshire movie, you did it again today, you use the clip from the Salomon crisis in which you tell Congress that you have warned Salomon’s employees that if they lose a shred of the firm’s reputation, you will be ruthless in your reaction.
Clearly, Goldman Sachs has lost reputation because of the SEC’s action. Could you tell us your reaction to the lawsuit, your reflections in light of it about Berkshire’s large investment in Goldman?
And what advice, in light of your own Salomon experience, you would give Goldman’s board of directors and management?
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Anytime you ask me these multiple questions, I may go back to you to get all parts.
But, well, let’s start with the transaction, because that’s the important thing.
A few weeks ago on a Friday, a transaction described as ABACUS was made the subject of an SEC complaint. I think it ran about 22 pages. And I think there’s been probably sort of misreporting, not intentional obviously, but misreporting of the nature of that transaction in at least — probably a majority of the accounts that I’ve read about it.
So, I would like — this will take a little time, but I think it’s an important subject. I would like to go through that transaction first. And then we’ll get further into the questions posed by the people that emailed Carol.
The transaction, the ABACUS transaction, there were four losers in, but we’re going to focus on two of them.
Goldman itself was a loser. They didn’t intend to be a loser, I’m sure. They couldn’t sell the piece — a piece of the transaction — and they kept it, and I think they lost 90 or $100 million because they kept it.
But the main loser, in terms of actual cash out, was a very large bank in Europe named ABN AMRO, which subsequently became part of the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Now, what did ABN AMRO — why did they lose money? They lost money because they, in effect, guaranteed the credit of another company, ACA.
ABN AMRO was in the business of judging credits, deciding what credits they would accept themselves, what credits they would guarantee.
And in effect, they did something in the insurance world called fronting a transaction, which really means guaranteeing the credit of another party.
We have done that many times at Berkshire. We get paid for it. And people do not want the credit of the XYZ insurance company but they say they’ll take a policy from XYZ if we guarantee it. And Berkshire has made a lot of money guaranteeing things over the years.
And Charlie can remember back to the early 1970s when we ran into some very dishonest people and we lost money, and we lost a fair amount of money at that time, because we guaranteed the credit of somebody that turned out to be not so good.
It happened to be some syndicates at Lloyd’s, of all things. But they found ways not to pay when our name was on it.
So ABN AMRO agreed to guarantee about $900 million of the credit of a company called ACA. They got paid for that, and this is in the SEC complaint. It’s not mentioned very often, but they got paid, what, 17 basis points, that’s 17/100 of 1 percent.
So they took on a $900 million risk of guaranteeing credit. They got paid about a million-six. And the company whose credit they guaranteed went broke, and so they had to pay the 900 million. It’s a little hard for me to get terribly sympathetic with the fact that a bank made a dumb credit deal.
But let’s look at ACA, because they were sort of the nub of the transaction.
ACA, and you wouldn’t really know this by reading most press accounts, ACA was a bond insurer. Now, they started out as a municipal bond insurer. They guaranteed various credits and they were like Ambac, they were like MBIA, they were like FGIC, they were like FSA.
And all of those companies — and we wrote about this a few years ago in the report — all of those companies started out insuring municipal bonds. Some of them started 30 years ago. And there was a big business in insuring municipal bonds.
And then the profit margins started getting squeezed in the municipal bond business. So what did they do? Instead of sticking to the business they knew and accepting lower profits, they went out and got into the business of insuring structured credits and all kinds of different other deals.
I described their activities a couple years in the annual report as being a little bit like Mae West who said, “I was Snow White but I drifted.” (Laughter)
These bond insurers — and almost all of them did it — these bond insurers drifted into insuring things they didn’t understand quite as well but where they could make a little more money.
ACA did it, MBIA did it, AMBEC did it, FGIC did it, FSA did it, and they all got into trouble, every one of them.
Now, is there anything wrong with a bond insurer insuring structured credit or something other than municipals? No. But you better know what you’re doing.
Now, interestingly enough, Berkshire Hathaway, when these other guys got into trouble, went into the municipal bond insurance business.
And we insured things that were almost identical to what ACA or others had insured, the difference being that we thought we knew more about what we were doing. We got paid better than they got paid, and we stayed away from things we didn’t understand.
We never insured a CDO; we never insured any kind of a RMBS deal or anything of the sort.
But I want to give you an example of something we did insure, because I think it will help you understand better this ABACUS transaction. So if the — if the projectionist would put up slide number 1, I’m going to describe a deal to you.
And as you — as you look at this — is it up there yet? Yeah. Somebody came to us a couple of years ago. I’ll tell you the name a little later. But a large investment bank came to us a couple of years ago.
Now, we were insuring bonds regularly. We insured bonds here of the Omaha Public Power District that’s familiar to many of you. We insured the bonds of the Nebraska — of the Methodist Hospital, which is six or seven miles from here.
We have told people that if the Nebraska Methodist Hospital does not pay its bonds, Berkshire Hathaway will pay them. And we’ve done that to the tune of about $100 million in their case. So we are in the business of insuring bonds.
Now, a couple of years ago, somebody came to us, large investment bank, and they said, “Take a look at this portfolio.”
And as you can see, it’s got the names of a whole bunch of states. Yeah, it’s up there. And very different amounts. It’s got a billion-one for Florida; it’s only got 200 million for the State of California.
And they said to us, “Will you insure these states, that these bonds of these states, will pay for the next 10 years? If any of the states don’t pay, you have to pay as the insurer.”
And I looked at the list, Ajit Jain looked at the list, and we had to decide, A) whether we knew enough to insure them, and B) what premium we would charge, because that’s what we’re in the business for.
And we don’t have to insure them. We can say, “Forget it. We don’t know enough to make the decision.” But we made the decision and we offered to insure those bonds for about $160 million for 10 years.
So we collected a premium of a little over 160 million, and somebody on the other side, the counterparty they call it, somebody on the other side, for 10 years, gets an assurance that, if these states don’t pay, we will pay as if they did pay.
And this gets to the crux of the SEC’s case — or complaint — in respect to Goldman. Somebody came to us with this list; we didn’t dream up the list. Another party came to us.
Now, there’s about four possibilities. Now I’ll tell you who the party was that came to us two years ago: It was Lehman Brothers. So Lehman Brothers, there’s four possibilities, roughly.
Lehman Brothers might own these bonds and want protection against the credit. They might just be negative on the bond market and, in effect, be shorting these bonds and using this method as a way of shorting it.
They might have a customer that owned these bonds who wanted to buy protection against the credit.
Or they might have a customer who was negative on these bonds and was simply wanting to short it.
We don’t care which scenario exists. It’s our job to evaluate the risk of the bonds and to determine the proper premium.
If they told me Ben Bernanke was on the other side of the trade, it wouldn’t make any difference to me.
If I have to care about who’s on the other side of the trade, I should not be insuring bonds. They could have told me Charlie was on the other side of the trade. (Laughs)
So, in effect, we did with these bonds exactly what ACA did with the bonds that were presented to them.
Now, ACA said, with the list of 120 that was presented to them, they said, “There’s about 50 of these that we’re willing to insure.”
And then they went back and negotiated and took on 30 more of them.
We could have said, presumably, “We don’t like Texas that well at a billion-150, and we’d rather have you give us more Floridas,” or something like that.
We didn’t do it. We just took the list that was submitted. So it was totally the other guy’s list that we insured.
In the case of the ABACUS transaction, it was sort of a mutual — a negotiation — as to which bonds were included.
Now, in the end, the bonds that were included in the ABACUS transaction all went south very quickly.
That wasn’t quite so obvious they were going to do that in early 2007, as you could see by studying something called the ABX Index.
But the housing bubble — really, mania — started blowing up in 2007.
Now, there could be troubles in these states that we insured. You can say they have big pension obligations, and maybe the guy who’s shorting them on the other side knows more about that than we do, but, you know, that is our problem.
I mean, if we want to insure bonds, in the case of ACA, in the case of MBIA, they have teams of people do it. We just do it with a couple people at Berkshire.
But I see nothing whatsoever — I mean, if we lose a lot of money on these bonds, I am not going to go to the guy on the other side of the transaction and say, “Gee, you took advantage of me.”
I don’t care if John Paulson is shorting these bonds to me. He has no worries that I’m going to claim that he had superior knowledge about the finances of these states or anything of the sort.
So that was basically the ABACUS transaction. I think the central part of the argument is that Paulson knew more about the bonds than the bond insurer did.
My guess is the bond insurer employed more people than John Paulson did in his business, and they just made — they made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a dumb insurance decision.
And for the life of me, I don’t see whether it makes any difference whether it was John Paulson on the other side of the deal, or whether it was Goldman Sachs on the other side of the deal, or whether it was Berkshire Hathaway on the other side of the deal.
Let’s say we had decided to short the housing market in some way in early 2007. I don’t think anybody should blame us for taking our position if we did it. We didn’t do it. Or if we’d taken the long side.
I think before we get to the other part of Carol’s questions, I’d ask Charlie to comment as this as Charlie has a law degree, and in other ways is superior to me, so we’ll get his views.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my attitude is quite simple. This was a three-to-two decision by the SEC commissioners under circumstances where they normally act unanimously.
If I had been on the SEC, I would have voted with the minority two and not with the three who authorized the lawsuit.
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol, would you get to the three parts that we probably haven’t answered yet? And then I’ll tackle this one.
But I really feel it’s important to understand the transaction. I have not seen — I have seen ACA referred to as an investor. It’s true that ACA had a management company, but it was 100 percent owned by ACA.
ACA was a bond insurer, pure and simple. And they had this — very simple, as it turned out — and they had one part of the organization did this and that. But ACA lost money because they were a bond insurer.
Yep, Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: Well, I’m assuming that you have covered the part that says could you tell us your reaction to the lawsuit. So the next part was your reflections, in light of it, about Berkshire’s large investment in Goldman.
And then the third was what advice you would have, given your Salomon experience and the thread of reputation that you have planted, those words you have planted. Those are the last two parts.
WARREN BUFFETT: Ironically, very ironically, it’s probably helped our investment in Goldman in a certain way, because we have a $5 billion preferred stock that pays us $500 million a year.
Goldman has the right, the legal right, to call that at 110 percent of par. So anytime they want to, they can sent Berkshire 5 1/2 billion, and they get rid of this preferred stock which is costing them 500 million a year.
If we got that 5 1/2 billion in, immediately we’d put it in very short-term securities, which probably, under today’s conditions, might produce 20 million a year or something like that.
So every day that goes by that Goldman does not call our preferred is money in the bank. It’s been pointed out that our preferred is paying us $15 a second. So as we sit here, tick — (laughter) — tick, tick, tick, that’s $15 every tick. (Applause)
I don’t want those ticks to go away. (Laughs)
I just love them. They go on at night when I sleep — (laughter) — on weekends.
And frankly, Goldman would love to get rid of that preferred. I mean, they only agreed to sell us that preferred because it was sort of at the height of the crisis.
The U.S., I’m not sure what part of the government, probably the Fed, but they have been telling companies that took TARP money whether they could increase their dividends or not, whether they could redeem preferred, and all that.
Up till now, probably the Federal Government has been doing us a big favor by telling — even before this thing happened — they’ve probably been telling Goldman that, “You can’t call that preferred until we tell you you can. And you can’t increase your dividend.”
They’ve been pretty strong with all of the TARP companies. That has not been publicized too much, but believe me that it’s the case.
So I was just sitting here hoping that the — basically, that the Fed, or whomever, would be — continue to be — quite tough, in terms of letting Goldman call our preferred. But it wasn’t going to go on forever.
I think that — I think recent developments have probably delayed the calling of our preferred by some time so the tick, tick, tick — (laughter) — will go on, and we will be getting $500 million a year instead of $20 million a year.
We love the investment, and I would expect that — the question about losing reputation.
There’s no question that the allegation alone causes the company to lose reputation, and obviously the press of the past few weeks, they hurt. They hurt a company. They can hurt morale, a lot of things. Nothing — it’s not remotely mortal or anything like that, but it hurts.
Incidentally, Goldman Sachs had a situation in connection with the Penn Central, 30 — 40 years ago now. And that hurt at that time.
They had a connection with one fellow in terms of Boesky that hurt at that time. And it was the source of great pain to John Weinberg, who was running Goldman.
But I don’t believe that the allegation of something falls within my category of losing reputation. If something is proven, then you have to look at it.
My advice, in times of some kind of an emergent — when some transgression is either found or alleged, you know, basically, you saw Ron Olson in our movie, he was the manager of the team.
And back when we were working at Salomon together in a somewhat similar situation, we had as our motto, “Get it right. Get it fast. Get it out. Get it over.”
But, “Get it right,” was number one. I mean, you have to have your facts right, because if you go out with the wrong facts you get killed, and you can’t redo it afterwards.
But that does mean sometimes some delay. You have to gather information from within your own organization, and you are on the defensive.
I would not — I do not hold against Goldman at all the fact that an allegation has been made by the SEC. And if it leads into something more serious, you know, then we’ll look at the situation at that time.
But what I’ve seen in terms of the ABACUS activity, I just don’t — I do not see that that would be any different than me complaining about the list of municipals that were given to me to insure a couple of years ago.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with all of that. But I also think that every business ought to decline a lot of business that’s perfectly legal and proper to accept.
In other words, the standards in business should not be what’s legal and convenient. The standards should be different.
And I don’t think there’s an investment bank in America of any consequence that didn’t take too many scuzzy customers and deal in too many scuzzy securities.
WARREN BUFFETT: I would agree with that. But, Charlie — (applause) — do you think we should have done our municipal bond deal?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it was a closer case than you do.
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) OK.
We insure, probably, 40 billion now, or something like that, of municipal bonds. And we have done very little in the last year, not because of Charlie’s views that he just expressed, but basically because the price isn’t right, the premiums are wrong.
And the reaction of other people when premiums are wrong is to take more risk. And our reaction when premiums are wrong is just to go play golf or something and tell somebody to call us when premiums get right again.
I do want to — Charlie and I will give our views on a lot of the activities that have gone on on Wall Street, and we do think plenty has been wrong.
I do want to point out, though, that our experience with Goldman goes back 44 years. And during those years, we’ve bought more businesses through them than through any other Wall Street investment bank. We’ve probably done more financing.
They have helped build Berkshire Hathaway. And we trade with them as well.
We don’t hire them as investment advisors. They have a big investment advisory business, and, you know, our reaction to that is, “No, thanks.” You know, we are in the business of making our own decisions.
But when we trade with them, they can very well be shorting to us a stock we’re buying. You know, they can be buying for their own account some stock we’re selling.
They do not owe us a divulgence of their position any more than we need to explain to them our reasoning or what we are doing in our position.
We are acting there in a non-fiduciary capacity, and they are operating in a non-fiduciary capacity, in my view, when they are trading with us.
Now, if they’re working on our behalf on an acquisition or a financing, that’s a different story.
But I would say that we have had a lot of very satisfactory transactions with Goldman Sachs.
And I don’t want to prolong this. I won’t do this on any more questions. But I’d like to — some people here will remember this — I’d like to take you back to the very first bond issue that Charlie and I ever did.
This was our maiden voyage back in 1967, I believe. Yeah. And if we could put slide 2 up there, I will direct your attention to the —
This is an offering that was made in 1967. We’d just bought a department store and we had a company called Diversified Retailing. Now, Diversified Retailing only owned one retailing operation, but we were sort of imaginative in those days, so we called it Diversified Retailing. (Laughter)
And we went out to raise $5 1/2 million. And Charlie Heider of Omaha, whom many of you know, helped me in the financing.
And you will notice our tombstone ad there has on the top two lines “New York Securities” and “First Nebraska Securities.”
They were the lead underwriters. And as customary with tombstones, there are a group of underwriters listed below, and they’re usually listed in the degree of their participation.
In other words, the more that they’re involved, the higher up in the list they are, with the lead underwriters on top. And that’s been true of every tombstone I’ve ever seen, except this one.
And what happened in this one was that we were having trouble raising $5 1/2 million. And I called Gus Levy of Goldman Sachs, and I called Al Gordon of Kidder Peabody. Those were two of the most prestigious firms in Wall Street at the time.
And I said, “Would you guys help me? We’re trying to raise 5 1/2 million and there’s nobody that wants to give Charlie and me 5 1/2 million. And the underwriters we’ve lined up are having trouble getting it done.” And both Gus Levy and Al Gordon said to me, “Warren, we’ll take a big piece.”
And if you’ll put — if you put up slide number 3, you will see the list of underwriters, and Goldman Sachs highlighted and Kidder Peabody highlighted were actually the next-largest underwriters. But they were so ashamed of being associated with our dinky little company that they asked us to leave their names off. (Laughter)
They wanted to give us money under an assumed name. (Laughter)
But they did — they did come through for us. They did come through for us. And believe me, a lot of people weren’t coming through for us then. I do have a long memory for people that have taken good care of Berkshire over time.
And Al Gordon died last year at the age of 107. He worked until he was 104. He was a remarkable man. Gus Levy was a remarkable man. And I thank them for their participation, even though they did want to do it under an assumed name. (Laughter)
7. Munger: “I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to — we’ll go to area number 1 and we’ll shorten the answers. (Laughs)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Guy Pope and I’m from Portland, Oregon.
I’m curious about your thoughts on financial reform that Congress is currently working on. Specifically, what are the good ideas that you think are out there that should be included in the bill, and what are the bad ideas that you think should be left out?
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, it’s 1,550 pages so you take the first 1,500, I’ll take the last 50 pages. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think anybody in America right now, including the people in Congress, know what’s going to happen. And my guess is that most of them have not read the bill, either.
So I think we’re all in the doubt — (applause) — as to what’s going to happen.
To me, one thing is perfectly clear and that is that our governmental system, which regulates the big investment banks, was so permissive and the investment banking culture had a nature, that together helped arrange that, under stress, every big investment bank except Goldman Sachs was going to go blooey.
A system that likely to go blooey, that is so important to the country, should be changed so it’s less permissive in what it allows the banks and the investment banks to do. And people are thinking about that right now.
The banks and investment banks just hate the idea of losing investment flexibility. For instance, on maintaining the biggest derivative book in the world at, say, JPMorgan Chase.
They hate giving that stuff up. That doesn’t mean that it’s good for the country that they be allowed to continue to do as they have done.
WARREN BUFFETT: Based on what you know about the bill, and I know you haven’t read all 1,550 pages, but would you vote for it today or not?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I simply don’t know enough about it. I know what I would do if I were the benevolent despot of America. And I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: You want to get more specific than that? That’s quite a word picture. (Laughs)
Want to get more specific, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would reduce the activities that are permitted. If you’re de facto using the government’s credit to help your business run, you shouldn’t have a bunch of financial statements in the trillions, which you can’t really understand even if you’re a partner in the business.
This is crazy. The complexity that has come into the system is quite counterproductive. And of course, the people have proven they can’t really control it.
So I think what we need is a new version of Glass-Steagall that drastically limits what — (applause) — what both commercial banks and investment banks are allowed to do.
They should have a much simpler and safer mode of business.
When we owned a savings and loan association, it had a very restricted repertoire that it could use. And of course, it had government credit for its deposits.
And by and large, as long as the repertoire was quite limited, the savings and loans stayed out of trouble. But you give human beings the flexibility the do any damn thing they please with absolutely unlimited credit under the repo system and other systems, and they will go plum crazy. And of course, they did.
8. We shouldn’t have to collateralize previous deals
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. On that cheery note, we’ll move to Becky. (Laughter)
BECKY QUICK: We received a lot of questions about the financial regulatory impending legislation. This question comes in from Jay Gelb, who wants to follow up on the point that Mr. Pope just made.
“What’s the anticipated impact of pending financial reform legislation on Berkshire? In particular, how much additional collateral may need to be posted on Berkshire’s existed $63 billion of derivative contracts? And could Berkshire get too close to its minimum requirement of $20 billion of cash on hand as a result?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. As I understand the bill now, the one that got presented a couple of days ago — and I could be wrong but I think I understand it and I’ve read the sections — the requirements would be zero.
If we were found — Berkshire were found — to be a — and I don’t know the exact term in the bill — but basically, dangerous to the system, by the secretary of the treasury, or I believe some commission, then we could be required to post collateral on retroactive contracts — on contracts that were written in the past.
I think the chances of us being regarded as a danger to the system when we have 250 contracts and other companies have a million contracts — our position was described in the Journal not long ago as “huge.”
You know, our position is 1 percent, in terms of notional value or liabilities or a lot of ways of measuring. It’s 1 percent of that of several other very large institutions.
So I — I’ve really wondered if you use the word “huge” to describe our position, what you would use for 100 times that position?
That must be some adjective that lurks out there someplace to be attributed to those other positions.
We had 23,000 positions 10 years ago when we bought Gen Re. And we proceeded promptly to get rid of all but less than a hundred that are left.
So we have absolutely, in my view, we have no problems.
If for any reason though, the Treasury or this commission should go back and maybe in some more sweeping declaration decide that they wanted all past contracts to be collateralized, we would comply, obviously.
We also would feel that we were due substantial money because, in negotiating those contracts, there was one price for collateralized contracts and there was another price for un-collateralized.
So if I sell my house to you for $100,000 and wanted $120,000 if it were furnished, but you said, “I’ll take it unfurnished for $100,000,” and then Congress comes along later on and says, “All houses have to be sold furnished, and by the way, that’s retroactive,” if I give you the furniture now I want something for it. A little unreasonable, maybe.
We do think — well, just a week ago we were offered an equity put contract that’s identical, basically, it’s a 10-year contract, by one of the very largest investment banking houses.
The price that they would pay us was 7 1/2 million un-collateralized and $11 million collateralized. So there’s a very different — there’s a price to be paid for having a collateralized contract.
And we elected to forgo probably a billion dollars of extra premiums we could have received in the past for our contracts if we had agreed to have them collateralized.
And with a few exceptions, we declined that. And we would feel, if we ever had to collateralize them, we would be entitled to fair compensation for it, and we would like that language to be in the bill.
And incidentally, Secretary Geithner — we’ll put up slide number 7. We have his testimony before the Senate Ag Committee on December 2nd. And as you can see, he testified very strongly, in terms of the sanctity of past contracts.
But if the bill passes tomorrow, the way it reads to us and to our attorneys, we would not have to put up a dime.
And I would think there might be some other companies that would be determined to be dangerous to the system before Berkshire Hathaway would be.
So I really — I don’t see any — I don’t see any consequences unless there’s some sweeping declaration that any company of a certain size that has derivatives shall be required to put up collateral.
And if that’s required, we will, and it would be no problem. It would — it would have a cost to us in terms of the opportunity cost, but then of course we would argue about what collateral was proper and so on.
And if we could put our Coca-Cola stock, you know, we’re going to hold our Coca-Cola stock anyway. So it really changes nothing. We still get the dividends from the Coca-Cola stock if it’s placed as collateral, we get the profit if it goes up.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. If collateral requirements were inserted by fiat of the government into existing contracts, it would be just like having a contract to buy a house for a million dollars, and the government passing a law saying, “No, you’ve got to pay $2 million.”
I mean, it would be of dubious constitutionality, and it would be both unfair and stupid. I don’t think the government is that crazy. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Plus, I think what they would see — there’s a whole list, in fact I think I’ve got a page even for that. Yeah, let’s put up slide number 8.
And this is just a sample page of people who oppose putting up collateral — being required to put up collateral — prospectively. And you’ll see IBM, you’ll see Ford Motor, you’ll see 3M, you’ll see HCA.
I mean, there’s all kinds of companies that don’t want to do it in the future. We don’t care what we do in the future as long as we get paid for it.
So this is not anything that is peculiar to Berkshire at all. In fact, we happen to be in a different position than the IBMs and the 3Ms and those of the world, in respect to this. As long as we get paid for it, we’re indifferent to what the rules are going forward.
But considering the fact that we took lesser premiums in the past, we would not like something retroactively to take money out of our pocket.
But bear in mind, Burlington Northern, when we buy it, it has some fuel contracts. MidAmerican has energy contracts.
There was a story in Businessweek about Anheuser-Busch a couple of weeks ago. And, you know, they say, “We don’t want to take money out of our business and send it to Wall Street as a deposit on collateral.”
And I think when — if they really saw that the net effect of this would be to send a whole lot of money to be held by Wall Street that was otherwise employed in operating businesses, there might be a little less congressional enthusiasm.
9. Greek debt crisis: “I don’t know how this movie ends”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning to all of you. Switching topics, Charlie and Warren, I’m Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany. I want to first give you a big thank you and then a question.
“Come by train,” you wrote in the shareholder letter, and that is how I came to Omaha for the first time back in 1997.
I deliberately took the train from Denver to experience Omaha as a railroad city, and I immediately liked Omaha a lot. But the train ride, I saw room for improvement. So thank you very much for taking the future of American railroads into your gifted hands. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s one of the best questions I’ve ever heard. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, here a question.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s about Greece, the future of the euro, and the fiscal discipline all over the world, and what we have to prepare for as investors.
In the past, you have been warning us about structural weaknesses of the U.S. dollar. Now we see Greece, and potentially other European countries, in crisis.
Berkshire has significant investments in the eurozone, the big ones like Cologne Re, Munich Re, and even small ones like ISCAR’s (inaudible) in Hamburg.
How are you preparing Berkshire Hathaway for potential currency failures? And what are your thoughts on the sustainability of the euro? And what is your advice for us as investors?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’m going to — Charlie and I have not talked about Greece, actually, recently, so I’m going to be very interested in hearing his views on that. I will — I’ll answer the last part of your question first.
We have a lot of exposure in various countries on both the asset and liability side. In other words, we do own stock in Munich Re, and they’ve got lots of assets, majority, probably, in the euro.
We have Cologne Re, a subsidiary of General Re, which has a substantial net worth that is basically tied to the euro.
On the other hand, we have very substantial liabilities that are denominated in other currencies, including fairly big time in the euro around the world.
For example, when we reinsured three or four years ago, three years ago maybe, Equitas, we took on many, many, many billions of liabilities around the world. And we were paid by, in effect, Lloyd’s. And we took that money and invested it in dollars.
So we keep those liabilities for all kinds of old insurance claims arising from Equitas in foreign currencies.
And if the euro depreciates against the dollar, we benefit on that side, but we lose, as you point out, on other sides.
I can’t tell you, and it’s something I’m not concerned about, whether our net balance in euros or sterling or yen or whatever, I can’t tell you what it is on any given day. Some of it enters into our equity put options and things of that sort.
But we have no dramatic exposures in any other currency. That doesn’t mean that other currencies are unimportant to us, because what happens with the Greek situation and what may fall out from that can be quite important, in terms of the world’s economy.
And Charlie’s going to explain to you exactly what that might be. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, generally speaking and with rare exceptions, of course, we’re agnostic about currencies. We simply do our business and we take those fluctuations as they fall, wouldn’t you agree with that?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’re agnostic in terms of the relative values, of —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yes.
WARREN BUFFETT: — course. Yeah, we’re not agnostic about where we think all currencies are headed, generally.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no.
WARREN BUFFETT: But the relative value —
CHARLIE MUNGER: But —
WARREN BUFFETT: — agnostic.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — Greece presents an interesting problem, of course. What’s happened is that the past conservatism of a place like the United States gave it wonderful credit, a combination of success and conservatism.
And we used that credit to win World War II, and help revive Germany and Japan in one of the most constructive and intelligent foreign policy decisions ever made in the history of the world.
And we used that credit to help assure prosperity for all these decades in which Berkshire has flourished.
And now, of course, the government does not have quite as good a credit as it had before it started using it so heavily. And that’s happened pretty much all over the world.
And so Greece is just the start of a very interesting period, and of course, it’s more dangerous to civilization when governments push their credit so hard.
Because if you need credit to help civilization function, and you’ve blown it by your own aggression in using it in the past, that’s not a good thing.
And I think in this country, and in other countries too, responsible voices are now realizing that we’re nearer trouble from lack of government credit than we’ve been, well, in my lifetime.
WARREN BUFFETT: Everything you read about country credits, currency, you always want to make a — you always want to distinguish between countries that are borrowing in their own currency pretty much exclusively, like Japan has or the United States, and countries that are being forced for one reason or another, because the world doesn’t trust them, to borrow in other countries’ currencies.
I mean, in the past, you know, if you were some South American country and you were borrowing in your own currency, you never default, you just buy a new printing press or work it a little harder.
But the world doesn’t like that sort of thing. So with weaker credits, and countries with poorer reputations, they force those countries to borrow in other currencies, frequently the United States currency.
And that can really put you out of business very quickly because, you can’t — if you’re some South American country, you can’t print U.S. dollars, although you can print your own currency. And that’s what’s caused failures among countries.
The European Monetary Union, it’s a really interesting situation, because Greece, they are a sovereign country, in terms of their own budget. But they can’t print their own currency, you know, they’ve got the euro.
And this is — you know, the euro was regarded as quite an experiment 20 years or whenever it was ago, or less than that. But you may be seeing sort of a test case play out here of a country that is not using its own currency, in effect, or using a common currency, and yet is sovereign, in terms of making its own promises to its citizens.
And I don’t know how this movie ends. That doesn’t mean I’m forecasting disaster or anything, I really just don’t know how this movie ends. And I try not to go to movies like that, if I can. (Laughter)
But I’ll be watching. Really, this will be high drama, in my view, what happens here.
The one thing, Charlie says we’re agnostic on currencies, and we don’t make big currency plays. We did make one a few years ago and we did all right on it. But we very seldom will develop a strong view on one currency versus another.
I would say this though, that events in the world of the last few years would make me more bearish on all currencies, in terms of their future — holding their value over time — than previously. But it’s not unique to the United States, it’s not unique to the United Kingdom.
If you really could run budget deficits of 10 percent of your GDP and do it for a long period of time, believe me, the world would have been doing it a long before this. I mean, that is — that’s a lot of fun if you can keep it up.
And the reason it hasn’t been done in the past, I think, is probably that most people understand that it can’t be kept up.
And how the world weans itself off huge deficit financing by country after country after country — it’s going to be easy — I mean, it’s going to be interesting — to watch.
You do not need to worry; as long as the United States government borrows in U.S. dollars, there is no possibility, none, of default. If the world won’t take our obligations denominated in dollars then we — then you have a real problem.
But you don’t default when you can print your own currency.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. And of course, the published statistics are quite misleading because the debts of the currencies — of the countries — are normally stated in terms of the government bonds outstanding, and the unfunded promises of the various governments are much greater than the government bonds outstanding.
So whatever you think this problem is when you read the statistics, it’s miles bigger.
And those unfunded promises don’t bind if you keep growing GDP at 2 or 3 percent per annum, per person, or something like that. You can afford the unfunded promises.
But if you get to where the growth stops, then you’re going to have enormous social strains. And God knows what the effect will be on government policy and on currencies.
10. Did Goldman need to disclose SEC notice?
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew, you’ve been very patient.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I’ve received over 300 questions just related to Goldman Sachs, and I know we’ve covered it already but there are a couple outstanding questions and one individual sent three specific questions that I thought I’d ask.
The first is, since Berkshire is a Goldman shareholder, who would you like the see run Goldman Sachs if not Lloyd Blankfein?
Were you made aware of Goldman’s Wells notice, or anything about the case, prior to it being brought?
Do you think the Wells notice constituted material information and should have been disclosed? Would have you disclosed it?
And finally, have you been contacted as part of the Galleon investigation and the allegation that a Goldman Sachs board member passed inside information about your pending investment in Goldman in 2008 at the height of the crisis to Galleon?
I know there’s a lot of pieces to that, but I thought we’d get Goldman out of the way —
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good.
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — right now.
WARREN BUFFETT: Good. Yeah. Well, let’s answer the third one first.
We’ve not been contacted in any way about Galleon. I read about that in the paper and the allegation, apparently, of a contact between a Goldman director and Galleon.
And I think in one of the stories, I read something about, presumably, Galleon trading on it. But the answer is no contact from anybody. And I can’t pronounce the name of the guy that runs Galleon. (Laughter)
The Wells notice, I’ve talked to a number of lawyers about that. And I think — when we got a — we didn’t get the Wells notice, but when the Gen Re executives got the Wells notice, I’m quite sure we stuck that in the 10-K or 10-Q that came up.
And maybe we filed an 8-K announcing it. That was not us receiving it ourselves but certain executives receiving it.
I have been on the board of at least one well-known company over the past 40 years, and I won’t narrow it down any more than that.
But before, they received a Wells notice and they didn’t publicize it, and, in truth, it was nothing. So lawyers tell me that if you regard it as material, you report it.
I don’t think if I’d received something relating to the ABACUS transaction, based on what I know about it, I would have considered it material to a company that was making many, many, many billions of dollars a year.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I wouldn’t have regarded it as material, either.
If every company reported every little thing that might happen with what they regarded a tiny probability, we’d just have unlimited confusing reports.
There has to be some materiality standard. And you don’t want to give blackmail potential to people that are mad at you and make claims. I’m not saying that’s what the SEC was doing, but —
WARREN BUFFETT: No, but it could happen with a lot of — (laughter) it could happen with individual —
CHARLIE MUNGER: It could happen with other people, yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: And I know what percentage of Wells notices result in something that’s material to the company. But my guess is that there are plenty of them that wouldn’t be.
And of course, the bigger the company, the less likelihood that it would be material.
And then your other question about who I would want running, if Lloyd wasn’t running it?
I guess if Lloyd had a twin brother, I’d go for him. But I’ve never given that a thought.
We think about who would run Berkshire — (laughs) — but there’s really no reason to think about that.
There wasn’t any reason to think about, in my view, back in 1970, when they had the Penn Central problem whether somebody other than Gus Levy should be running Penn Central — be running Goldman.
And when the event happened in connection with the Boskey thing, John Weinberg was running it then. And I thought that John Weinberg was a terrific manager of Goldman.
So I just don’t see this as reflecting on Lloyd.
I think, as Charlie — and we’ve got strong feelings. There’s plenty of stuff goes on Wall Street that we don’t like. But we do not think it’s specific — we know it isn’t specific — to Goldman.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are plenty of CEOs I’d like to see gone in America. (Laughter)
But Lloyd Blankfein is not one of them.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3. (Laughter)
I was afraid he might start naming names. (Laughter)
11. Driver feedback technology
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is David Clayman (PH) and I come from Chicago, Illinois. This question is for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Gates, principally as Berkshire shareholders, but also as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation trustees.
The leading cause of death for Americans my age are motor vehicle crashes. Over 6 million occur each year and you insure a significant number of these crashes.
The World Health Organization ranks motor vehicle crashes as the 11th leading cause of death in the world.
A new category of technologies are reaching the market. These technologies not only reduce driver distraction but also deliver positive feedback to drivers to help make drivers aware of how well they’re driving or how much better they could be doing.
Will GEICO or the Gates Foundation make an aggressive and visible bet on driver feedback technologies to stimulate road focus and save life, liberty, property, and insurance premiums?
I have a note here for Mr. Gates and Mr. Buffett. I’d be happy if I could get these to you somehow.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I think we know your position. (Laughter)
The Gates Foundation, I think, has a fairly major initiative, along with Mayor Bloomberg, in terms of cigarette smoking. And I think you’ll find a whole lot more people have been affected by that than auto accidents.
Auto accidents per mile driven, auto deaths, have diminished. I thought I heard a figure of six — I thought the figure was more in the 30,000 to 40,000 range actually, but it’s diminished over the years.
You know, there have been a lot of things done to make cars safer. I’m not sure that cell phones and BlackBerries are among them. (Laughter)
And I think they actually are — there will be more people die in auto accidents because the cell phone and various other instruments were invented than would otherwise be the case. I don’t know how significant that item will be.
But everybody has an interest in bringing down fatalities. And GEICO has a very active safety program, testing cars, doing all kinds of things, working usually in conjunction with other insurance companies.
I do not think that — The Gates Foundation has fairly specific and intelligent, in my view, guidelines as to where they direct their activities, and they believe in focus, so they are not going to try and solve every problem in the world.
But I can assure you that the insurance industry, as well as auto companies generally, are continuously working to make cars safer.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
12. Berkshire shares not affected by Buffett’s donations
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: This question also concerns the Gates Foundation but it’s entirely different.
“One of your owner-related business principles says that you will attempt, through your policies and communications, to keep Berkshire’s stock price rational.
“Yet every year, you give large amounts of your Berkshire stock to the Gates Foundation. And my understanding is that more will go to the foundation when you die.”
By the way, I forgot to say this is from Michael McLaughlin (PH) of Omaha, who continues: “Already, we have seen that foundation regularly sell Berkshire stock, and it will sell more because its purpose is to give money to charities not hold the stock forever.
“Won’t the foundation selling create a downward pressure on the stock because as much as 25 percent of it will be turned over?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Basically, there’s five foundations I give money to every year, every July.
And the amount I would be giving now, it’s a 5 percent declining balance, the amount I would be giving now would amount to about 1 1/2 percent of the shares outstanding annually, something like that.
So if they sell, and they will, that stock fairly promptly after receipt in order to make charitable gifts, you basically have 1 1/2 percent of the shares being sold annually.
Now, if you contrast that with trading on the New York Stock Exchange, which averages well over 100 percent of the amount of shares outstanding, it’s not anything unusual at all in the way of sales.
And it is a free country. I mean, I could sell 10 percent of the company if I wanted to. I’ve never sold a share in my life, and I never plan to sell a share in my life. And I won’t sell a hell of a lot of shares after I die either, probably. (Laughter)
If 1.5 percent of the outstanding shares at Berkshire move the price down in a year, it probably deserves to move down.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, I regard that degree of stock distribution to aid charity as almost a nonevent, and it may actually have been a constructive event, in terms of getting Berkshire into the Standard and Poor’s indexes and so on.
WARREN BUFFETT: Excuse me.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve got more important things to worry about. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT: If I’d owned 100 percent of Berkshire, for sure it would not have been in the S&P 500. It was always a problem of concentration.
So if by selling down it enhanced — and it did to some degree — enhanced the chances of Berkshire being in the S&P 500, that probably accounted for maybe 7 percent or so of the capitalization, some number like that.
So that was extraordinary, you might call it, buying that was brought in, to some extent because of the diminution of my own holdings.
As Charlie said, I would say if none of the stock had been given away in the last four years, I don’t know whether — I have no idea — whether the stock would be selling a little higher or a little lower. I think that’s sort of an even money bet.
13. Buffett: “I would not run from the United States”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 4.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. Hello, Mr. Munger. My name’s Vern Cushenbery. I’m from Overland Park, Kansas.
What do you see as the biggest challenge facing the United States economy relative to other countries? And what are the implications of that with regard to investing globally over the next decade?
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you for steering that easy problem to me. (Laughter)
I think the answer to that is that by and large we haven’t made our way in life by having great global allocations systems.
Berkshire’s attitude, generally, is to find things that seem sensible to us and to concentrate, to some extent, in those matters. And then let the world economy and the world’s currency fluctuations fluctuate as they will.
I do think we’d prefer some countries to others, and the more responsible the countries seem, the more comfortable we are. Wouldn’t you agree with that?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we —
CHARLIE MUNGER: But beyond that, we can’t help you very much because we really don’t have a global allocation system at Berkshire, unless Warren is keeping it secret from me. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Not that one. (Laughter)
We did not buy Burlington Northern with the idea of moving it to China or India or Brazil — (laughter) — and we love that. We love the fact that Burlington Northern is in the United States.
The biggest threat we have is some kind of a massive nuclear, chemical, or biological attack of one sort or another.
And if you would say what are the probabilities of that over a 50-year period, it’s pretty high. Over a one-year period, it’s very low.
But if you talk about whether the qualities that have led to the last 220 years of incredible progress, with a lot of hiccups, but incredible progress, you know, in the status of mankind that we’ve experienced in these two centuries compared to any two centuries you want to pick out in history, this country is remarkable and its system is remarkable.
And it does unleash human potential like has never been seen before.
This crowd here is not smarter than a similar crowd 200 years ago, and they don’t work harder.
But, boy, do they live differently. And they live differently because this system has enabled fairly ordinary people, over a period of time, to do extraordinary things. And that game isn’t over.
There is nothing that says we have come close, in my view, to the limits of what humans can achieve.
We probably don’t even know our own potential, any more than the people in 1790 knew their own potential. I mean, they thought it would be great if somebody finally came along with some farm tool that let them work 10 hours a day instead of 12 hours a day.
So I — there’s no reason — you know, I hope the rest of the world does well, and I think they will do well. And it is not a zero-sum game. If China and India do well, that does not mean we do worse; it may mean we do better.
So we are not — it’s not what they get is taking it away from us. But I would be perfectly content if Berkshire Hathaway were forced in some way to limit its investment to the opportunities available in the United States.
We would have plenty of opportunities. I’d rather have the whole world, obviously, in terms of opportunities, but there will be ample in this country. I would not run from the United States. OK. (Applause)
14. No rush to find new investment chief
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This is a question that has to do with the Berkshire succession plans. It comes from Craig Merrigan in Sprucegrove who asks, “How did the four potential candidates for Berkshire’s CIO position perform over the course of 2008 and 2009?
“Did any of the four employ leverage? And have any of the four now been excluded from consideration?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, the answer to that is that, in 2008, I reported to you last year that they didn’t, I think we got a question like that last year, they did not distinguish themselves. 2009, they did pretty darn well.
It’s not — I would say that the four — it’s not the same four. I would say that none of them, Charlie, I believe you may use leverage at all. Do you think so?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the one with which I’m most familiar made a little over 200 percent using leverage of zero.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that narrows it down. (Laughter)
The potential investment people, that list will be subject to more movement around than probably the CEO succession.
And it’s really far less urgent. If I die tonight, there will be a new CEO in place in Berkshire within 24 hours, and all the directors know who it would be, and they’re all comfortable with it.
And there should be somebody in place within 24 hours.
The investments, they don’t need anything done next week. I can go on vacation on investments. And we could go — we wouldn’t do it, or the directors wouldn’t do it, I won’t be there — but they could wait a month, they could wait two months.
I mean, the Coca-Cola isn’t going to go away, Procter & Gamble’s not going to go away, American Express. There’s no great need to be doing things day by day. We don’t do things day by day.
So they can be fairly leisurely in working out, probably in conjunction with a new CEO, who they would like to bring in, how they would like to compensate them, what the number might be.
That is not fixed in stone at all. The one thing I can tell you is that there are some very able people who would like very much, I think, to be managing money for Berkshire, and who would do a good job, and who are familiar to at least some of the directors. And that problem would get solved.
The CEO problem — which is not a problem — but the CEO question, you want an answer for right now and you want to be prepared to implement it, you know, the next day, although I did just have a physical. (Laughs) Came out fine. (Laughter)
Charlie? (Applause)
My doctor isn’t here today so I will tell you, it drives him nuts because I eat like I do and he can’t find anything wrong — (laughs) — and he wants to, believe me. (Laughter)
And with that —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I’m — (Laughter)
I am not the most optimistic of the two people up here. And — (laughter) — yet, I’m quite optimistic that the culture of Berkshire will last a long, long time and will outlast, greatly, the life of the founder. I think it’s going to work.
WARREN BUFFETT: I really think — I mean, we shouldn’t be getting into superlatives — but I think we have as strong a culture, and as distinctive a culture, in terms of managers, ownership, the whole works, of any really large company in the country.
And it’s taken a long time to develop, but it becomes self-reinforcing after a point. And we love it, and I think they’ll love it after I’m gone. (Applause)
Don’t clap there. (Laughter)
15. Good, but not brilliant, returns for businesses needing capital
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 5.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Steve Fulton (PH) from Louisville, Kentucky. Once again, I gave up a box seat to the Kentucky Derby to come ask you a question. (Laughter)
And I appreciate that opportunity.
My question’s focused on the shift, if you will, to investing in the capital-intensive businesses and the related impact on intrinsic value.
You again stated in the annual report that best businesses for owners are those that have high returns on capital and require little incremental capital.
I realize this decision is somewhat driven by the substantial amounts of cash that the current operating companies are spinning off, but I would like you to contrast the requirement for this capital against the definition of intrinsic value, which is the discounted value of the cash that’s being taken out.
And just for all of us to be aware, you’ve mentioned the fact that you think these businesses will require tens of billions of dollars over the few decades, and just the time value of that, I’d like to understand a little bit more of your insight into that.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Although it’s clear you understand the situation quite well, and it’s — as important a question as you could ask, virtually, I would say, at Berkshire.
We are putting money into good — big money — into good businesses from an economic standpoint. But they are not as good as some we could buy when we were dealing with smaller amounts of money.
If you take See’s Candy, it has 40 million or so of required capital in the business, and, you know, it earns something well above that.
Now, if we could double the capital, if we could put another 40 million in at anything like the returns we receive on the first 40 million, I mean, we’d be down there this afternoon with the money.
Unfortunately, the wonderful businesses don’t soak up capital. That’s one of the reasons they’re wonderful.
At the size we are, we earn operating earnings, $2.2 billion, or whatever it was in the first quarter, and we don’t pay it out, and our job is to put that out as intelligently as we can.
And we can’t find the See’s Candies that will sop up that kind of money. When we find them, we’ll buy them, but they will not sop up the kind of money we’ll generate.
And then the question is, can we put it to work intelligently, if not brilliantly? And so far, we think the answer to that is yes.
We think it makes sense to go into the capital-intensive businesses that we have. And incidentally, so far, it has made sense. I mean, it’s worked quite well. But it can’t work brilliantly.
The world is not set up so that you can reinvest tens of billions of dollars, and many, many tens over time, and get huge returns. It just doesn’t happen.
And we try to spell that out as carefully as we can so that the shareholders will understand our limitations.
Now, you could say, “Well, then aren’t you better off paying it out?”
We’re not better off paying it out as long as we can translate, as you mentioned, the discounted value of future cash generation. If we can translate it into a little something more than a dollar of present value, we’ll keep looking for ways to do that.
In our judgment, we did that with BNSF, but the scorecard will be written on that in 10 or 20 years.
We did it with MidAmerican Energy. We went into a business, very capital intensive, and so far, we’ve done very well, in terms of compounding equity.
But it can’t be a Coca-Cola, in terms of a basic business where you really don’t need very much capital, if any, hardly. And you can keep growing the business if you’re lucky, if you’ve got a growing business.
See’s is not a growing business. It’s a wonderful business, but it doesn’t translate itself around the world like something like Coca-Cola would.
So I would say you’ve got your finger right on the right point. I think you understand it as well as we do. I hope we don’t disappoint you, in terms of putting money out to work at decent returns, good returns.
But if anybody expects brilliant returns from this base in Berkshire, you know, we don’t know how to do it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m just as good at not knowing as you are. (Laughter)
16. Making loans vs. buying stock in credit crisis
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew? (Laughter)
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Victor and Amy Liu (PH) who are shareholders from Santa Monica, California.
And they ask, “When you made investments during the financial crisis in February of 2009, why did you lean towards debt instruments rather than equity?
“For example, why did you invest $300 million in Harley-Davidson at 15 percent interest instead of buying equity when the shares were at $12? Today, they’re at $33.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that if I were writing that question now, I might write the same question. But I’m not so sure you would have written the same question in February.
Now, there were different risk profiles, obviously, in investing. And the truth is, I don’t know whether Harley-Davidson equity is worth $33 or $20 or $45. I just have no view on that.
You know, I kind of like a business where your customers tattoo your name on their chest or something. But — (laughter) — figuring out the economic value of that, you know. I’m not sure even going out and questioning those guys I’d learn much from them. (Laughter)
But I do know, or I thought I knew, and I think I was right, that, A) Harley-Davidson was not going out of business. And that, B) 15 percent was going to look pretty damned attractive.
And the truth is, we could probably sell those bonds, I don’t know, probably at 135 or something like that. So we could have a very substantial capital gain, a lot of income.
I knew enough to lend them money; I didn’t know enough to buy the equity. And that’s frequently the case. And, you know, we love buying equities, but we love buying the Goldman preferred at 10 percent.
Now, let’s say Goldman, instead of offering me the 10 percent preferred and warrants had said, “You can have a 12 percent preferred, non-callable,” I might have taken that one instead. I mean, the callable — so there’s a tradeoff involved in all these securities.
And obviously, if I think I can make very good money, as we did on Harley-Davidson, with a very simple decision, just a question of, “Are they going to go broke or not?” as opposed to a tougher decision, “Is the motorcycle market going to get diminished significantly? And, you know, are the margins going to get squeezed somewhat?” And all of that. I’ll go with a simple decision.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course your one good answer, that you simply didn’t know enough to buy the stock but you did know enough to buy the bond, is a very good response.
The other side to that is, after all, we are a fiduciary for a lot of people, including people with permanent injuries and et cetera, et cetera. And to some extent, we are constrained by how aggressively we buy stocks versus something else. And you mix those together, why, you get our investment policy.
I think, generally speaking, you raise a very good question. I think very often, when you’re looking at a distress situation and buy the bonds, you should have bought the stock. So I think you’re looking in a promising area.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Ben Graham wrote about that in 1934, actually, in “Security Analysis,” that in the analysis of senior securities, the junior securities usually do better, but you may sleep better with the senior securities.
And we, as Charlie points out, we have 60 billion of liabilities to people in our insurance operation that, in some cases, extend out for 50 years or more.
And we would never have all of our money in stocks. I mean, we might have very significant amounts, but we are running this place so that it can stand anything.
And a couple years ago, we felt very good about where that philosophy left us.
I mean, we actually could do things at a time when most people were paralyzed, and we’ll keep running it that way.
17. Creating a good corporate culture is easier than changing a bad one
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, thanks for having us here.
I recently joined a new organization and for me to succeed there, the culture of the organization needs to change.
So I’m interested in hearing your thoughts about how do you change culture of an organization? And if you’re building a new organization, then how do you make sure you have a strong and unique culture?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s a lot easier to build a new organization around a culture than it is to change the culture of an existing organization. It is really tough. And I like that fact, in the sense of Berkshire.
I mean, it would be very tough to change the culture of Berkshire. It’s so ingrained in all our managers, our owners. Everything about the place is designed, in effect, to reinforce a culture.
And for anybody to come in and try and change it very much, I think the culture would basically reject it.
And the problem you describe, if you want to walk into, you know, whatever kind of organization you want to name — I’ve got to be a little careful here — it is tough to change cultures.
Charlie and I have bucked up against that a few times. And I would say if you have any choice in the matter, I would much rather start from scratch and build it around it.
But that was the — I’ve had the luxury of time with Berkshire. I mean, it goes back to 1965, and there really wasn’t much of anything there, you know, except some textile miles, so I didn’t have to fight anything.
And as we added companies, they became complementary and they bought into something that they felt good about, but it took decades.
And, you know, at Salomon, I attempted to change the culture, in terms of some respects, and I would not grade myself A+ in terms of the result.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m quite flattered that a man would say that he’s in a new place where he can’t succeed unless he changes the culture and he wants us to tell him how to change the culture.
In your position, my failure rate has been 100 percent. (Laughter) And —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie started a law firm. Go back to, what, 1962, Charlie, what was it?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I can move out but I couldn’t change the culture. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT: We can tell some interesting stories from the old law firm, but we’ll go on to Carol now.
18. Ajit Jain can’t be replaced
CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Jon Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff in New York City.
“You have emphasized many times how important Ajit Jain is to Berkshire and National Indemnities reinsurance operations. So I’m wondering whether you expect National Indemnities’ float to continue to grow or instead to unwind after he retires?”
Well, of course we don’t think —
WARREN BUFFETT: No.
CAROL LOOMIS: — Ajit will retire.
“Another way of asking that is whether National Indemnity has competitive advantages beyond Ajit, or is all of its value, above book value, tied up in Ajit and the runoff profits from the deals he has already put on the books?”
WARREN BUFFETT: His operation has competitive advantages that go beyond Ajit, but they have been developed by Ajit, and he has maximized them, and he knows how to use them in a way that’s far better, in my view, than anyone else in the world could.
But they don’t all go away. I mean, he has a cadre of about 30 people who are schooled in it, you know, in a way that would make the Jesuits look quite liberal, in terms of what they let their membership do.
Ajit — you can’t imagine a more disciplined operation than Ajit has. But Ajit cannot be replaced. On the other hand — well, I’ll state that absolutely, categorically — it would be a huge loss to Berkshire if anything happened to Ajit.
But it would not mean that the Berkshire Hathaway reinsurance operation would not continue to be an extremely special place that would do large deals that nobody else would do, that could think and act quickly in ways that virtually no other insurance organization can.
We’ve got something very special in that unit, and then we’ve got the most special of leaders in Ajit.
As to our float, every year I think our float has peaked. I never see how we can add to it. It’s up to 60 billion-plus now. And we have things like the Equitas deal that are runoffs.
Every day, in insurance, some of the float runs off, it’s just that we add additional amounts. And like I say, I was ready to quit, you know, at 20 billion and think, you know, that we’d reached the apex of it.
But it’s over 60 billion. Things keep happening.
Berkshire has become, in my view, the premiere insurance organization of the world, and we’ve got — a lot of good things come from that.
I don’t see how, with 60-odd billion of float, I don’t see how we can increase it significantly unless we would make some very significant acquisition. And I don’t rule that out, but there’s nothing imminent on that.
But we will not organically grow the float of Berkshire at a fast clip from here. It can’t be done. And we may fight to stay even.
But we may come up with something out of the blue. I mean, who would have known that Equitas was going to come along three years ago? There are various things that could happen of a positive nature.
But when I tell you about the value that Ajit has added to Berkshire, believe me, if anything, I’ve understated it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you, and I’ve got nothing to add.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well. (Laughter)
19. Opportunities in India, but government paralysis is a deterrent
WARREN BUFFETT: In that case, we’ll go to number 7. Here we are.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Uncle Charlie. I have to call you Uncle because my parents are from India and we call anybody older than us Uncle or Auntie.
WARREN BUFFETT: You may have to call us great uncle. (Laughter)
SABRINA CHOOG: I’m Sabrina Choog (PH) from Los Angeles and I’m 12 years old.
My mom owns a bunch of Berkies, which obviously I’m gonna get one day. (Laughter)
My question is, 17 percent of the world is Indian. That’s one of six people in the world.
India’s economy has been growing at 7-8 percent per year. At this rate, it will surpass total U.S. GDP in 2043.
Can you please tell me why aren’t you investing in India?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a good question — (applause) — and we have connections there, obviously.
But it hasn’t — in the insurance field, there have been very distinct limitations on what a non-Indian company — a non-Indian-owned company — can do.
We’ve looked a lot, mostly through Ajit. We’ve looked a lot at the possibility of being in the insurance business there.
And actually, as of yesterday, I agreed next March to go to India because our ISCAR business — (applause) — is doing very well there.
But, I don’t know what they think I can do additionally, but in any event they said, “Come on to India in March and see if we can’t expand it substantially.”
India is going to grow dramatically, and ISCAR belongs in every industrial country in the world. I mean, we are very basic to industry, and we’ve done wonders for our customers all over the world.
And we have a good-sized operation in India. But ISCAR management hopes that if we take a trip over there in March, we might land a few more accounts.
We do not rule out India, believe me, in looking at either direct investments or marketable securities.
In fact, POSCO, Charlie can describe the POSCO situation better than I, but they have big plans for India.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the one trouble that India presents is that its governments tend to have a fair amount of paralysis, endless due process, endless objection. Zoning is hard, planning permissions are hard, et cetera.
And that has caused the very wise founder of modern Singapore to say that China is going to grow much faster than India, because their government causes less paralysis.
So these countries are different in the opportunities they present.
But of course we like India, and we — kind of admire the democracy that causes the paralysis, but we still don’t like the paralysis.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not ordained, however. You know, if you’d looked at China 40 years ago, you wouldn’t have dreamt of what would happen.
So countries do learn from each other, I mean, and they should. I mean, I think they’ve learned many things from the U.S. that they adapt — I’m not talking about India specifically, I’m talking about other countries generally.
They don’t take on everything we have. But if you looked at a country that was as successful as this country has been over a couple hundred years, you might figure that there could be a few good ideas you could steal.
And I think that you’re seeing that around the world, and maybe they can improve on us.
So I don’t think I would feel that any impediments to growth that existed now are necessarily ones that have to be permanent. Indian — we ought to figure out a lot of ways to do business in those countries.
My preference is, obviously, in something like insurance, which I understand, and where we’ve got terrific people. Both China and India do limit us right now quite significantly in what we can own of a company.
And I really hate to take some of our managerial talent and put them to work for something we only own 25 percent of. I’d rather have them working on something we own 100 percent of.
So it will depend on the laws. But people in India are going to be living a lot better 20 years from now than they are now, as they are in China, and as they are in the United States.
20. “Prospects for significant inflation have increased”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Jonathan Marsh (PH) in Sydney, Australia.
He says, “Many shareholder letters in the 1970s and 1980s discussed various aspects of inflation and its potentially destructive effects on investment.
“The 2008 letter mentioned the current Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing could again bring about inflation, yet the 2009 letter made no mention of this threat.
“What are your current thoughts on the risk level of higher inflation in the United States?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I may be a little biased on this because I’ve always worried a lot about inflation, and there’s been a lot of inflation.
You know, Charlie’s pointed out, you know, since I was born in 1930, the dollar’s depreciated by well over 90 percent. But as he also points out, we’ve done OK. So it isn’t the end of the world, necessarily.
I think that the prospects for significant inflation have increased, you know, with what — not only here, but around the world, with the situation that governments have either been forced into or elected to embrace.
And they may well have been the correct responses, but we may find that weaning ourselves from the medicine was harder than solving the original illness. And the medicine, you know, has been massive dosages of debt. And, like I say, not only here, but elsewhere.
And I don’t see any way that countries running very high deficits, relative to GDP, don’t have a significant diminution in the value of their currency over time.
Now, it could be done for a while. I mean, we’ve done it through wars and everything else, and maybe we will correct the situation.
But if we don’t, I wrote an op-ed piece in The New York Times about a year ago on this.
And I do think that if you wanted to bet on higher or lower inflation, bet your life on it, I’d bet on higher, and maybe a lot higher.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, again, I agree. (Laughter)
21. Munger: McDonald’s is better educator than universities
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 8.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Lucas Rineswell (PH) and I’m from Whangerei. And in case you don’t know where Whangarei is, it’s in New Zealand.
At the moment, it’s quarter past 4 in the morning in New Zealand, so I’d be safe to say that my wife will be sound asleep.
So I’m an idealist. What can be done to educate the children about the sage of Omaha’s philosophy of successful money management, and to prevent another reoccurrence of the financial mayhem that we’ve all seen and experienced in the 2007 and 2008 years?
WARREN BUFFETT: We will see financial mayhem, as you put it, from time to time. I hope we reduce it, I hope we reduce the magnitude, et cetera.
But people do crazy things, and it’s not a function of IQ, and sometimes it’s not a function of education.
In fact, I would argue that some of the problems, and not a small part of what’s occurred in the last 30 years, has been because of what became the prevailing conventional wisdom in the leading business schools.
So, I’m not particularly positive about modifying the madness of mankind from time to time.
The first part though, however, is the kind of thing in our movie. I really do believe that getting good financial habits — other kinds of habits, too, but what I’m thinking about here is primarily financial habits — getting those early in life is enormously important.
I mean, Charlie and I were probably lucky that we grew up in households where we were getting all kinds of unspoken lessons, even, in terms of how to handle our life, but in particular, how to handle finances.
And not everybody gets that. And Andy Heyward, who did a terrific job with “Liberty’s Kids” in teaching about the history of America three or four years ago, has come up with this idea of “The Secret Millionaires Club.”
And if we get through to 2 or 3 percent, or 5 percent, or whatever it may be, of the kids, in terms of giving them some ideas they might not otherwise have, and they build some habits around it, you know, it isn’t going to change the world, but it could be a plus in their lives.
It’s very important to get the financial habits. And really, Charlie’s a big fan, and so am I, of Ben Franklin’s. And he was teaching those habits a couple hundred years ago. So we’re just going to try and take Ben Franklin’s ideas and make them entertaining for children’s stories, in effect.
And I think that’s about what you should be doing. I don’t think — I think it’s much more important to have good learning at the elementary level than, frankly, to have it in terms of advanced degrees and graduate schools.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are other great educational institutions in America to help handle this problem. One of the ones I admire most is McDonald’s.
I had fun once at a major university when I said I thought McDonald’s succeeded better as an educator than the people in the university did.
And what I meant was McDonald’s hires a lot of people who are quite marginal at the very start of their working career. And they learn to show up on time for work and observe the discipline.
A lot of them go on in employment to much higher jobs. And they’ve had an enormous constructive effect about educating into responsibility a lot of people who were threatened with not making it.
So I think we all owe a lot to the employment culture of McDonald’s. And it’s not enough appreciated.
WARREN BUFFETT: I learned a lot from a paper manager at The Washington Times-Herald named John Daley (PH).
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: And probably 13 years old or 14 years old, and I was lucky to run into him.
Basically, my life would have been somewhat different if I didn’t get those lessons from a guy that taught them to me in a very enjoyable manner. He wasn’t preaching them to me, he just told me I’d do better if I did this and that, and it worked.
So you’re lucky if you’ve got the parents to teach you that. But anything that brings it into a broader teaching environment, I’m for.
And like I say, I really think Andy has got a terrific project in this and we’ll see how it goes.
22. Giving away everything is a “terrific tax dodge”
WARREN BUFFETT: And speaking of Andrews or Andys, Andrew? (Laughs)
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: So we received about a dozen questions, at least I did, on the subject of your taxes, Mr. Buffett, from shareholders no less. And I chose what I hope is the most polite version of the question.
WARREN BUFFETT: I hope so, too. (Laughter)
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This one came from Tom Cornfeld (PH).
And he says, “Mr. Buffett is often quoted as saying that his assistant pays at a higher tax rate than he does, because of the disparity between the long-term capital gain and ordinary income tax rates.
“The implication is that taxes should be much higher on people like himself.
“However, I note that Mr. Buffett has donated virtually 100 percent of his estate to charitable organizations. Because he has owned his Berkshire shares for many, many years with no dividend distributions, it is virtually certain that the bulk of his estate will therefore never be subject to taxation by the U.S. government.
“My question is that, if Mr. Buffett feels that he should pay more taxes, how should the tax system be changed?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you could have a wealth tax, would be one way. I mean, you could tax — I don’t know how many countries do that now, Charlie.
In effect, you have that with a property tax in certain ways, but you could have a wealth tax. I would say this: he is absolutely correct. If you want to give away all of your money, it’s a terrific tax dodge. (Laughs)
Although, I will say this also. In the tax return I just filed, on the “charitable contributions” line, I have an unused carry-forward of something over $7 billion that I haven’t gotten a deduction for. (Laughter)
But I welcome the questioner or anybody else following my tax dodge example and giving away their money. They will save a lot of taxes that way, and the money will probably do a lot of good. (Laughs) (Applause)
Taxes — if we continue to spend 25 percent or 26 percent of GDP, as a country, and we made those elections through our representatives, we are not going to be able to keep taxation at 15 percent of GDP.
Now, we’ve got a deficit commission. You couldn’t have two better guys than Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson heading it. You have got two classy individuals there. They’re smart, they’re decent. People like to work with them. I mean, the president made a great choice in picking those two.
But in the end, they’re either going to — they’re going to have to recommend, and it will be some combination of taxes quite a bit higher, and expenditures quite a bit lower, and then they won’t be quite as popular as they are today.
And I doubt very much if you’re going to be able to increase taxes significantly as a percentage of GDP and do it, essentially, from taxing lower income people a higher amount. So it’s going to be an interesting equation to solve and I wish them the very best. They’re two terrific fellows.
Charlie, what do you have to say about taxes?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think those who worry about your unfairly low taxes should be consoled by the fact that eventually you pay 100 percent. When you die and they ask, “How much did old Warren leave?” the answer will be, “I believe he left it all.”
WARREN BUFFETT: And I hope they emphasize old. (Laughter)
No, it’s kind of interesting. I mean, just take Berkshire. You know, essentially, I will never sell a share of Berkshire.
But I’ve known that for a long, long, long time. So basically, that’s fine.
If I was a trustee for some trust and they owned Berkshire, which, in effect, I am, you know, it’s a lot of fun to run and everything. And I’ve got everything in life I could possibly need, and I always will.
And, you know, in the end, because Berkshire’s done well, we can give away the rest.
Now, if you want, you can argue that if I gave it all to the federal government instead of giving it to the charities, society would be better off, but I don’t think many of you would want to hold that position. (Laughter)
23. The best defense against inflation
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9. (Applause)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello.
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Jeff Chen (PH) from San Francisco.
I wanted to ask you a little bit more detail about the inflation question, wanted to know what are the key metrics you look at when you evaluate future inflation and your valuation methodology?
And what are some of the catalysts that’s going to cause the inflation to rise in the future?
WARREN BUFFETT: You give me credit for more brain power than I actually bring to the question.
I don’t think you can look at any given metric in any given month and figure out exactly what that’s going to do to inflation rates because, so much — if it gets going so much, it creates its own dynamic.
You know, we saw that in the late 1970s and early 1980s until Volcker came along with a sledgehammer to the economy.
But we had people running from money at that time, and, of course, we got the prime rate up to 21-and-a-fraction percent, and we got governments up to very close to 15 percent.
So we had a little demonstration project 30 years ago in this country of what happens when people get fearful about money.
And if we were to continue the policies we have now, I would think something — a rerun of that, you know, could be fairly likely.
But, you know, trend is not destiny. We have the power to do things, and Congress has the power. And that’s why I wrote that op-ed piece a year ago, to sort of flash a yellow light.
We have the power to control our future, and we do it through elected representatives.
I will just go back to the conclusion that, based on what I see happening, American people, government around the world, I think currencies are a poorer bet than they have been for some time. But I have no idea what that means in terms of rates of inflation. And I hope I’m wrong on it.
I would say if inflation ever really gets in the saddle, that it gets very unpredictable as to how fast it can accelerate and how faith in institutions can break down. A lot of things — a lot of bad things could happen with it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The best defense, of course, is to contribute as much as you can to the civilization and expect to counter inflation’s effects by your own merits.
That’s the safest antidote. The idea that just by outsmarting other people you can somehow profit from the inflation is a much more dangerous course of action.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Your money can be inflated away but your talent can’t be inflated away. If you’re the best brain surgeon in Omaha, or the best painter, or whatever it may be, you will always command your share of the resources around you, you know, whether the currency is seashells or $10 million notes, or whatever it may be.
Talent is a terrific asset to deal with any kind of a monetary situation. But Charlie and I have to fall back on money.
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Too late for talent.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
24. Problems at NetJets
CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Douglas Ott of Banyan Capital Management in Atlanta.
“In your recent letter to shareholders, you wrote that it was clear you failed us in letting NetJets descend into such a condition that it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss over the 11 years we have owned the company.
“What specifically were the errors committed by you and the previous CEO? What have you learned? And how will you prevent such a thing from happening with any of our other businesses in the future?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I probably won’t. (Laughs)
We’ll make mistakes from time to time, and some of our managers may make mistakes. And sometimes you run into conditions that are really extraordinary.
But the mistake, the biggest mistake made with NetJets is essentially we kept — we were buying planes at prices that were fictitious, in terms of the price at which we would later be able to sell them. And there’s a certain time lapse involved in buying fractional shares.
There’s a lot of explanations for it. But in the end, we didn’t properly prepare for what was obviously happening. And we lost a lot of money, a good bit of which was attributable to the write-down of planes, which you could call is our inventory, where we bought them at X and we couldn’t sell them at X or 90 percent of X.
Some of those were new planes that we should not have taken on, and many of them were planes coming back from owners.
We also let our operating costs get out of line with recurring revenues.
But, you know, I’ve made plenty of mistakes. I stayed in the textile business for 20 years. I knew it was a lousy business. Charlie was telling me it was a lousy business in the first year, the second year.
And 20 years later, I woke up. I was like Rip Van Winkle. I mean, it’s kind of depressing when you think about it. (Laughter)
But the one thing we will guarantee, we’ll make some mistakes. It was a big mistake at NetJets, $711 million is the figure.
We are now operating at NetJets at a very decent profit. The figures you saw there on the screen reflect a pretax profit of well over $50 million in the first quarter, and that’s not with any big boom in plane sales or anything else. It’s just with a business plan that involves not an iota of diminution of safety or service, but just got things in line that needed to be in line.
And I give Dave Sokol enormous credit. I mean, he turned that place around like nobody could have, and all the shareholders here owe him a big vote of thanks for that.
Charlie? (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but I believe that the episode ought to be reviewed in context.
If we buy 30 big businesses and generally let the people who run them successfully and before run them with very little interference from headquarters, and it works out 95 percent of the time very well, and we have one episode when the basic franchise was protected but we lost profit opportunities for a while, it’s not a big failure record.
Nor does it indicate that we should stop being pretty easy with the remarkable people who join us with their companies.
WARREN BUFFETT: No, it does not change our management approach at all. I think that we have gotten performance, overall, from managers that are beyond the dreams I would have had when I was first putting this company together.
So, it’s been a — we let managers do their stuff. And I think —
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s worked for us, net.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it’s worked — it’s worked very well for us, net. And we’re going to keep doing it.
25. BYD investment shows the “old men” are still learning
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. This is Eric Chang from Beijing, China.
First, thanks for the occasion for us to engage with you like this, and also for inspiring young people to learn. Mr. Munger has described you as an incredible learning machine in terms of learning new areas, and expanding your circle of competence.
So I would like to understand is if you can make it more concrete, recently you make investment in BYD, a company in China that makes batteries and also electric cars which are, arguably, technology companies.
So can you sort of go through that example and see how you sort of like analyzed the case and asked questions that helped you make a decision to invest in such a company? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie deserves 100 percent of the credit for BYD, so I’m going to let him answer that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s an interesting example because Berkshire would not have made an investment in BYD if the opportunity had come along five or 10 years earlier. And it shows that the old men are continuing to learn, and that’s absolutely essential.
Berkshire would have a lower potential than it does if we had stayed the way we were. And — so you are absolutely right in calling attention to this episode.
Again, Dave Sokol helped. I wasn’t at all sure I could get Warren to do this all by myself so I inveigled Dave into going over to China, and the two of us were able to help the learning process. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well put. Well put.
26. Why we will never hire a compensation consultant
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Mark Wares (PH) and it has to do with Berkshire’s compensation.
He says, “How does Berkshire structure the performance based-compensation of the CEOs of its subsidiaries? Please because as specific as you can regarding the metrics on which you focus the most, and how the degree to which those are attained translates into compensation.”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the first thing we do is we never engage a compensation consultant. (Applause)
And we have, whatever it may be, 70-plus or whatever number businesses we have.
They have very different economic characteristics. To try to set some Berkshire standard to apply to businesses such as insurance, which has capital as a bulwark but which we get to invest in other things we’d invest in anyway, so there’s minus capital involved, to a BNSF or our utility business where there’s tons of capital involved, or in between See’s where there is very little capital involved.
We have other businesses that are basically just so damn good that a, you know, a chimpanzee could run them, and we have other business that are so tough at times that, you know, if we had Alfred P. Sloan back, you know, we wouldn’t be able to do very well with them.
So there’s enormous differences in the economic characteristics of our business.
I try to figure out what — if I owned the whole business — what is a sensible way to employ somebody and compensate them, considering the economic characteristics of the business. So we have all kinds of different plans.
It doesn’t take a couple of hours of my time a year to do it. We have managers who stay with us, so they must be reasonably happy with the plans.
And, you know, it is not rocket science, but it does require — it requires the ability to differentiate.
If we had a human relations department, it would be a disaster. They would be attending conferences and people would be telling them all these different things to put in equations and so on. It just requires a certain amount of common sense.
And it requires, incidentally, an interaction with the managers where, you know, I listen to them, they listen to me, and we sort of agree on what really is the measure of what they’re actually adding to the company.
And — what do you — what do you say to that, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the U.S. Army and General Electric have centralized personnel policies that probably work best for them, and we have just the opposite system, and I think it clearly works best for us.
And practically nobody else is entirely like us, which makes us very peculiar. And I like it that way, don’t you?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we really like it that way. We get worried when people agree with us. (Laughter)
We pay people — we pay some very big money. We have managers that have made and will make in the tens of millions annually, and we have managers that, you know, when we suffer, they suffer.
But you’ve got to treat people fairly. Even though they don’t need the money, everybody wants to be treated fairly.
And so the rationale for how you’re doing it should be understood, but there is no cross-Berkshire rationale at all. I mean, if you run See’s Candy, to put a cost of capital factor in or something like that, what the consultant would tell you, it’s nonsense.
It isn’t going to make any difference whether there’s 40 million or 43 million or 37 million of capital in the business.
The main thing to do is, in terms of market position and all that sort of thing, the real thing I really want to pay managers for is widening the moat that separates our business from our competitors’ businesses over time. Now, that gets very subjective, so I don’t have any perfect way of doing that. But that is always going through my mind in trying to design compensation systems.
So far, like I say, I don’t think — I can’t — can you recall any manager that’s ever left us over compensation, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s amazing how simple it’s been and how little time it has taken and how well it has worked.
There’s this idea that headquarters can do these wonderful things. Headquarters, in a conglomerate kind of a company, is frequently hated in the field. We don’t want to be hated in the field. We don’t want an imperial headquarters with big costs that’s imposed everywhere.
And averaged out, it’s worked wonderfully well for us.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we make no headquarters charges. We charge for our credit with a couple of companies, but — most companies are allocating a couple percent of sales, maybe, or whatever it might be, to all their different operations. And usually it’s resented out in the field. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Is it ever.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So we don’t do it.
27. “We won’t trade reputation for money”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. My name is Joe Bob Hitchcock. I’m a winemaker from the Napa Valley in California.
I would like to suggest that the next time you and Charlie have a steak at Gorat’s that you accompany it with a new health food, a Napa Valley red wine. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: We just went in the wine distribution business, as you may know. (Laughs)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excellent.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren is helpless, but I’m with you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. (Laughter)
I’ll send you a bottle.
One of the keys to the success of Berkshire is your policy to allow the managers of the various Berkshire Hathaway companies to operate with minimal interference from Omaha.
But if you became aware of unethical or illegal activities at a Berkshire Hathaway-owned company, would you directly and personally intervene?
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. We have to jump in.
We have a hotline, which I think was a very good invention of — it wasn’t an invention, but a good policy embodied in Sarbanes-Oxley. And, you know, that’s been a plus to us. I get letters directly sometimes.
So I want to hear about problems. I hope somebody else has heard about them first and already gotten them solved, but if they don’t get solved someplace else, I want to hear about them.
And we have an internal audit function, which is important at Berkshire. And anything that comes in, you know, when somebody calls in on the complaint line and says, “The guy works next to me has bad breath,” I tend to skip over those.
But if anything comes in that relates to alleged bad behavior, it’s going to get investigated at Berkshire. And it does.
And every now and then, there have been some important transgressions that have come to us via either letters to me, or calls on the hotline, or maybe letters to the audit committee, whatever. We encourage that.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We care more about that than business mistakes, way more.
WARREN BUFFETT: We have a letter that goes out every roughly two years; it’s the only communication. I probably ought to put a copy of it in the annual report sometime so that the shareholders see it.
But it’s a page and a half long. It asks the manager to tell me who, if something happened to them that night, who I should consider putting in charge of the place the next day.
Doesn’t mean I’ll follow their advice, but I want to know their reasons and the pluses and minuses.
But it starts off basically and it says, “Look, we’ve got all the money we need.” We’d like to make more money. We love making money.
But we don’t have a shred more reputation than we need, and we won’t trade reputation for money.
And we want that message to get out. It’s the reason we stick that Salomon thing in the movie every year. I mean, you can — probably some of you can recite it by now, but I don’t think it can hurt to keep repeating that story.
And the one thing we tell — we tell them that message, and then I’ve added a new line in this. And I say, if the reason you’re doing something, the best reason you can come up with, is that the other guy is doing it, it’s not good enough.
There’s must be — there’s got to be some other reason besides, “The other fellow’s doing it,” or you’re in trouble. And I tell them, “Call me if anything’s questionable. You think it’s close to the line, give me a call.”
By saying that, nobody gives me a call because they — (laughs) — they know that the very fact that they think it’s that close to the line probably tells them it’s over the line.
But I want to hear about stuff. We can cure any problem if we hear about it soon enough and take action soon enough. But if it’s allowed to fester out someplace and people cover it up — and sometimes they have — then we’ve got a problem.
And we will have more of that in the future, there’s no getting around it, you know. If you have 260,000 people, there can be some things going on. I just hope we hear about them fast.
And I hope their managers hear about them even faster and do something before it even gets to us. But we want very much to protect the reputation of Berkshire. It’s the right thing to do.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it is absolutely essential. And Berkshire, averaged out, has a very good reputation, as you can tell by the ratings from major media and surveys.
And that is absolutely precious to us. In a sense, you people are part of the culture, too.
The ideal is not to just make all the money that can be legally be made without causing too much legal trouble. The idea is bigger than that. It’s that we celebrate wealth only when it’s been fairly won and wisely used.
And if that idea pervades the culture of a place, including the shareholders, we think that’s very helpful to us. (Applause)
28. BNSF has benefitted from good regulations
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question relates to your investment in Burlington Northern, and it comes from Josh Sanbules (PH), who I believe is in New York City.
And he asks, “You mention in your annual letter that regulators of the railroad industry need to provide, quote, ‘certainty about allowable returns,’ unquote, in order to make huge investments. If you were going to help the regulators calculate, quote, ‘allowable returns,’ how would you suggest they do it?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the Service Transportation Board — and maybe Matt Rose could help give more details — but I think they’ve adopted something like 10 1/2 percent, or thereabouts, on invested capital.
And if you had a major enough change in interest rates or something, you could argue that there should be some adjustment, perhaps, in one direction or another.
Usually, in the case of regulated utilities, they talk about return on equity. And you have different amounts in different states, but some states it may be 11 percent, in some states it may be 12 percent or something like that. It’s usually in that range.
With the railroads, they’ve gone toward this return on invested capital, which includes debt as an adjusted figure.
And I don’t think that’s a crazy, crazy standard. I mean, the railroad, unlike the electric utility, when you get an allowed return in the electric utility you’re almost certain of earning it, I mean, if you behave yourself. And your demand is never going to fall off that much, probably, that you’ll go way below your return.
The railroad’s got more downside in it if you run into a terrific industrial recession, so you’re not as protected on the downside.
But there should be some figure, and I would argue that the 10 1/2 percent, or whatever it may be on invested capital, that’s been achieved by the four big railroads in recent years, something close to that or right around that figure.
And you want the railroads investing a whole lot more than depreciation, and I would think that would be — it’s certainly an inducement to me to invest money in improving the transportation system.
And on the other hand, if that return were far lower than that, it would be crazy to put money, because you can’t change that railroad system and do something else with it.
So I think the country and the railroad systems have a very common interest in not earning exorbitant profits or anything like that, but getting a decent return on what is sure to be much needed investment over the next 10, 20, 30 years.
And I’d go along with — if the Service Transportation Board says 10 1/2 percent, or some number like that, I think that’s not a crazy number.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, the railroads have been a hugely successful system, in terms of a regulated business. If you stop to think about it, the railroads of America have been essentially totally rebuilt in the last 30 or 40 years.
They’ve improved the tracks, they’ve changed the size of the tunnels, they’ve improved the bridges. The average train can be more than twice as long and twice as heavy.
And you can hardly imagine a business that’s done a better job in adapting to the needs of the rest of us than the American railroad industry. And that’s by and large been a system of wise regulation accompanied by wise management. And that was not always the case.
If you go back a long time, neither the management nor the regulation was all that wise. But the existing system has worked very well for all of us.
29. “Lumpy” earnings as competitive advantage
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 12.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Ashish Texali (PH). I am from New Delhi, India.
First of all, I would like to thank Kelly Bruce (PH) and Carol from American Express to the help they’ve extended to make this event possible.
The question regarding General Re and reinsurance business.
As the insurance business uses complex models, how is Berkshire more comfortable that insurance business models are not exposing you to significant risks like the models did for Wall Street?
Also, if it is not confidential, is there concentration of risk? That is, what are those few events which can cause significant loss for insurance businesses?
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I got all of that, but we run significant risks from earthquakes. We had, in the Chilean quake — I don’t know how much would have been in the first quarter. When you read our 10-Q there will be a number in there. But we insure 20 percent of Swiss Re. We will take 20 percent of their loss from that.
We have various other exposures in something like that. We included our best estimate in those figures I put up earlier.
Our peak risks now, in terms of earthquakes or hurricanes — which are the two biggest natural catastrophes, in terms of frequency and severity — are probably down quite considerably from a few years ago, not because of any diminished appetite for risk. But we just haven’t felt that the rates were that attractive in those areas.
But if we thought the rates were attractive, we’re perfectly willing to take on a group of risks where, if something very close to worst case happened, you know, we would lose $5 billion or something like that.
We lost 3 billion-plus in Katrina. We lost well over 2 billion, I think quite a bit more than that actually, on 9/11.
There will be things come along like that. Nothing that ever remotely comes close to making us uncomfortable, though, in terms of the level. I don’t know whether I got his full question there or not, Charlie, but you —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, pretty close. I would say that the main difference between our practice and that of most other people is that we are deliberately seeking a method of operation which will give us occasional big losses in a single year, big overall losses.
And everybody else is trying to avoid that. And we just want to be rich enough so a big loss in a single year is a blip.
And that’s a competitive advantage, that willingness to endure fluctuating annual results. Big advantage, wouldn’t you say?
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a huge advantage. It’s a huge advantage. And it’s one that no one else is going to pick up on. I mean, they know what we do, they just don’t want to do it, or they’re unable to do it, in terms of financial resources.
So, I would say that comes very close to a permanent and substantial advantage at Berkshire.
I don’t — forget about — you shouldn’t forget about it, but forget about the human suffering and all that. Just the financial consequences of a Katrina, you know, when we lose 3 billion in that, I don’t feel any different the next day than I felt the day before, financially. I mean, it just doesn’t make any difference, because we are in that particular game.
And as long as we make the right decisions over time, in terms of the premiums we get, and as long as we never expose ourselves to a loss that would really shake up our capital structure or anything, you know, that is a game in which we have a huge competitive edge. And it gets wider every year.
So, you know, risk — we are in the business — in insurance, we are in the business of taking the other guys’ desire to smooth their earnings, and, in exchange, get what we think are larger, lumpy earnings over time. We like the business.
Carol? Oh, go ahead, Charlie.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I was going to say Warren has a different position than a lot of other people in the insurance business. After a year in which Berkshire has a big loss, he can look into his shaving mirror and say, “Your shareholder still loves you.” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Other people are not in that position.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I knew a guy from Omaha who, 40 or 50 years ago, was one of the richest guys in the United States, named Howard Ahmanson. And Howard had a fetish about owning 100 percent of everything that he came in contact with.
And so he said, when asked why, he said, “I like to look in the mirror and say, ‘All my shareholders love me.’” (Laughter)
And I’m not quite that extreme, but I like to look in the mirror and say, “Enough of my shareholders love me.” (Laughter)
30. “Gambling” with derivatives
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol.
CAROL LOOMIS: This question is about derivatives.
“What useful function do derivatives serve in our economy? We got along quite well without them for many years. If they serve no useful purpose, and in fact, have demonstrated that they can do considerable damage to the economy, why are they not made illegal, especially the naked ones? There is precedent for that.
“I believe that short selling of stocks that one does not own or has managed to borrow is illegal.”
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie has — he can get worked up more on this than I can, so I’m going to let him answer that. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the usefulness of derivatives has always been overrated. If we didn’t have any derivatives at all, including contracts to buy and sell grain that were traded on exchanges, we’d still have plenty of oats and wheat.
I mean, I think it is slightly more convenient for people to be able to hedge their risks of farming by using derivative markets and commodities.
And the test is not, “Is there any benefit in derivatives?” The question is, is the net benefit versus disadvantage from derivatives useful? Or would we be better off without it?
My own view is that, if we went back to having nothing but derivative trading in commodities, metals, currencies, safely conducted under responsible rules, and all other derivatives contracts vanished from the earth, it would be a better place. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll take a current example. Burlington Northern has hedged diesel fuel, which they use a lot of, over the years. And then they also have fuel adjustment clauses in a lot of their contracts for transportation.
With Matt Rose, who does a wonderful job of running Burlington, I basically say, “Look at. If I were running the place, I wouldn’t bother to hedge them,” because if you hedge it — if you hedge it for a million years, you know, you’re going to be out the frictional costs, probably, of doing it, unless you’re smarter than the market generally on diesel fuel. And if you’re smarter than the market on diesel fuel generally, we’ll go into the business of speculating on diesel fuel.
I mean, if we’ve really got an edge, you know, why bother to run the trains? Let’s just speculate diesel fuel.
But I also say, you know, they’ve got — and if you have an organization where you have somebody in charge of that activity, it’s going to take place.
On the other hand, Matt Rose has done a fabulous job, as well as his management team, in running Burlington Northern. If they are more comfortable, or they find it useful in any way, in terms of pricing contracts, or anything, to hedge it, that’s fine with me, too.
I mean, it’s his company, he can figure out the best way of running it. I’ll hold him responsible for how it does over time. And, you know, I would do it one way and somebody else would do it another way. I don’t think that’s —
I would not condemn anybody that’s running a railroad for hedging diesel fuel, nor would I condemn anybody that runs an energy company, like we do at MidAmerican, for hedging energy costs in certain ways.
But I do think, if we could put up a presentation, number 4 on the screen, please.
I think it was said very well in 1935. In fact, chapter 8 of Keynes’s General — chapter 12, I’m sorry — chapter 12 of Keynes’s “General Theory” is, by far, in my view, probably Charlie’s too, the best description of the way capital markets function, the real way people operate. It’s prescriptive, it’s descriptive.
Everybody should read chapter 12. It’s a little — it starts a little slow in the first few pages.
But Keynes — I’m going to read this because I don’t think Charlie has it in front of him.
The first part of it is very familiar to people. I mean, this quote has been used a lot. But every word in this, to me, is right on the money.
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.”
You can change that to “gambling” if you want to.
“When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” That’s the famous part of the quote.
Keynes went on to say, “The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism - which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in fact directed towards a different object.”
That was written in 1935. I don’t think there’s been anything better written about how government, how citizens, should look at Wall Street and what it does and it doesn’t.
It’s always had this mixture of a casino operation and a very socially important operation.
And when derivatives became popular, and academia was behind them 100 percent. They were teaching more about how to value an option than they were about how to value a business. And I witnessed that and it drove me crazy.
But in 1982, Congress was considering, really, the expansion of a derivative contract to the general public in a huge, publicized way. It was the S&P 500 contract. That changed the whole derivatives game.
At that point, basically, Wall Street just said, “Come on in, and everybody can speculate in an index. Not any real company, just an index. And you can buy it at 10 o’clock in the morning and sell it at 10:01, and you’re contributing to this wonderful society by doing it.”
And I wrote a letter to Congressman Dingle, and we’ll put up exhibit 5. I just excerpted a few of the statements I made there. This was one month before they put in trading in the S&P 500, April. They put it in April, 1982, in Chicago; did a little in Kansas City first.
And I went through four pages of things and I just pulled out a few things. But I think that, to some extent, what I forecasted then has turned out to be the case.
And then it got squared and all of that, as both the people in Wall Street kept dreaming up new and new ways for people to gamble.
And as I say, academia was applauding all along the way and getting hired as consultants to various exchanges to tell them how wonderful they were, in terms of their social purpose.
I think that — well, it’s up there for you to read. I’d be glad — the whole letter was reprinted, I believe, in Fortune at one time, Carol. Was it—?
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, if I remember right, this was like the only letter in opposition to this uniformly acclaimed new world of better gambling in things related to securities. Warren wrote the letter —
WARREN BUFFETT: And it’s a —
CHARLIE MUNGER: — all those years ago, and it was the only letter —
WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally —
CHARLIE MUNGER: He basically said the idea’s insane. It will do more harm than good. Then, as now, people didn’t pay that much attention to him.
WARREN BUFFETT: And I’ll venture that very few people in this room know — you all know that if you buy a stock, you have to hold it for a very long period of time to get a special capital gains treatment on it.
If you buy an S&P 500 contract at 11 o’clock and sell it at 11:01 and have a profit, it’s taxed 60 percent as a long-term capital gain, and 40 percent as short-term capital gain.
So you really get better tax treatment if you’re gambling on an S&P 500 derivative, which is what it is, in Chicago, than you do if you invest for four or five months in some security and then have to sell it for some reason.
It’s a tribute to the lobbying power of a rather small group that has done very well off this particular activity.
Charlie, can you think of any reason why it’s 60 percent long-term gain if you hold something for 30 seconds? (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course it’s crazy. It’s neither fair nor sensible.
But if a small group with a lot of money and influence cares a great deal about something and the rest of us are indifferent, why, they tend to win before our legislative bodies.
That’s just the way it is. I always liked Bismarck’s remark that you shouldn’t watch two things: sausage making and legislation making. (Laughter)
31. Buffett is losing his bet against hedge funds
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, with those hopeful words — (laughter) — we’re going to break for lunch. Before we break for lunch, I made a charitable wager with a group, Protégé Partners, two years ago about the behavior of funds of funds that they would select, hedge funds, and the S&P index fund.
The duration of our wager is ten years, and whichever one loses, the money goes — well the money from both goes to the winner’s charity, is what it amounts to.
Interesting firm out on the West Coast that supervises what they call these long bets. So if we’ll put up exhibit 6, you can see at this point I’m behind.
And have we gotten exhibits? Yeah. Let’s go to lunch. OK. (Laughter)
Afternoon session
1. Speak out, but speak responsibly
WARREN BUFFETT: And I think therefore we go to 13, which is in a separate room. And is there anybody at the microphone in 13?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, there is.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. This is a shareholder from New York. One could argue that a major contributor to the great bubble was that there wasn’t a healthy and open debate. That all the opinion and all of the money was on one side of the trade.
And I was thinking about this recently as I read Christine Richard’s new book, “Confidence Game,” about Bill Ackman and his battle with what was once the largest bond insurer, MBIA.
The story also reminded me of David Einhorn and the questions he raised about Allied Capital and Lehman Brothers. We now know that they were 100 percent correct, but at the time that they first spoke up they were attacked by the companies, pilloried by the media, ignored by the accountants of those firms and the rating agencies, and perhaps most alarmingly were investigated by the SEC for daring to go public with their bearish analyses.
And I can tell you that watching what happened to them, it’s a real deterrent to anyone else speaking up and raising similar questions.
So I’d be curious for your thoughts on this, and is having short sellers speak out healthy for our markets?
And in general what should be done to encourage a greater diversity of opinions so that we can avoid future bubbles? Thank you. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t see anything wrong with people who are positive or negative speaking out, as long as they’re willing to be held responsible for the kind of statements they make. I mean, there are — obviously —
Well, take the extreme example. If there were two banks in town, and I owned one of them and I was of kind of a devious type of mind, I might go out and hire 50 people to stand in line in front of the other bank, and I would probably not have a competitor before long.
So you can do things on either side, the long side or the short side, that I would regard as certainly unethical and in many cases should be illegal.
But anytime you attack the conventional wisdom, you’re going to meet with a lot of opposition because you’re threatening people’s positions.
When we would talk about the efficient market theory 30 years ago when it was absolutely de rigueur that — and virtually every finance department in the country, major schools, you either had to swear allegiance to it or you were not going to be promoted.
You know, people don’t like that. And any institution, when they get a threat from the outside, they will attack both the threat and the threatener.
But that exists on both sides. I have no problem with short selling, and I have no problem with speaking out responsibly about your reasons for doing so, any more than I have on the long side.
There have been some very bad practices on the short side, and there have been some very bad practices on the long side, in terms of people trying to literally spread things that are untrue.
But that has probably been more on the long side over the years than on the short side, by some margin.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think to some extent you’re criticizing the wrong people. In many cases, the accountants that allowed the lousy accounting are the ones that ought to be held in the dock. And they get very little criticism in America and that’s a mistake.
2. Why there’s no synergy among subsidiaries
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? (Applause)
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ben Soh (PH) who lives in the metro Vancouver area in British Columbia, Canada. This is for either Mr. Buffett or Mr. Munger.
He wants to know about synergies at Berkshire, specifically, “Does it make sense that the Dairy Queen stores here sell PepsiCo products and would not expect — accept — American Express, only Mastercard or Visa? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: There are — around the world, there are pretty close to 6,000 Dairy Queen outlets of one sort or another. And some are called Grill and Chill now, different things, but roughly 6,000, and company-operated are 70 of those.
So almost 99 percent are franchised, and at Dairy Queen we do not control what the franchisees do. Most of the franchisees — last time I checked sometime back — but most of the franchisees serve Coke, the enlightened ones — (laughter) — but it is entirely their business.
They can — they can — they can serve Coca-Cola products or Pepsi. It seems some of the other franchise operations seem to have more control over that than Dairy Queen.
But if you think about it, Dairy Queen goes back before McDonald’s, before Wendy’s, before Burger King, before Kentucky Fried, all of those. It goes way back into the ’30s, and a lot of the agreements with franchisees were territorial operators were done on the back of a napkin, or something of the sort.
So to some extent we have less control over what franchisees do, particular in certain — a few parts of the country — than other people.
But we’ll — keep asking for Coke, and maybe you can cause them to see the light. The synergies, any synergies, any synergies at Berkshire come about at the operational level pretty much.
We do not tell our companies to do business with each other. We hope they do do business with each other, and, you know, and we hope that each side of a subsidiary A offers good reasons for subsidiary B to do business with them.
But the whole idea at Berkshire is that our managers are responsible for their businesses, and if they’re going to be responsible for their businesses it means we shouldn’t tell them what to do, except in very limited ways.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve accurately described the way it is. What’s interesting about it is we really like it that way. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a lot less work. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
WARREN BUFFETT: And I think, actually, that there’s some merit. Sometimes people work better together if it’s their decision to work together than if you tell them to work together.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes beyond that. Warren and I would like it that way if we were in the subsidiaries. There’s no doubt about that.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’d probably leave if it wasn’t that way. (Laughs)
3. Act as if “you were an owner of the place”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger, my name is Steven Roman (PH). I’m a student of engineering maschinenbau at the University of Vienna in Austria.
If I one day want to apply as a manager with one of the Berkshire companies, what qualities are you especially looking for? And what do I have to do to become your successor? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably shoot me. (Laughter)
The managers of our subsidiaries hire their own people. The number of decisions I have to make about managers are really, really few.
As I mentioned earlier, they do send me a letter that if something happens to them, gives me their ideas about who should succeed them.
But I make no decisions about who gets hired at GEICO, or Burlington, or Mid-American or anything of the sort. I mean, if they need a CFO they go out and hire a CFO, or if they need somebody to run a plant they go out and hire them themselves.
They are responsible for their operations, and occasionally we have a death, we have an occasional — very occasional, I can’t even hardly think of one — resignation.
And at that point I have to make a decision about who should be put in charge of the operation. But I don’t think I’ve had more than 10 or 12 of those in 45 years.
So I’m not a very good employment agency. We have 21 people, I think it is, at headquarters, and I made a terrific hire here a few months ago. But that’ll take care of me for four or five years.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there’s no indication we’d be particularly good at it, either. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I wasn’t going to mention that. (Laughter)
But I would say this: if you want — what is interesting to me is that when you find somebody outstanding, boy, do they jump out. I mean, somebody that is thinking about the place the right way, is working extra hard, whatever it may be.
There aren’t — you don’t have that much competition in this world. So, in terms of generally advancing within organizations, I think you’d be surprised at how little competition you really have if you start thinking like you would if you were an owner of the place, and working like you would if you were an owner of the place, and pretty soon you may be running something.
4. Retained earnings, present value, and dividends
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Tomer Malon (PH) from Tel Aviv, Israel. And he has clearly been a long-time shareholder because he references your 1984 Chairman Letter.
He writes, “You have previously stated that a company should retain its earnings only if, quote, ‘For every dollar retained, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners,’ unquote.
“You also noted that if such conditions will no longer apply to Berkshire, as measured on the basis of a five-year rolling average, then quote, ‘We will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe cannot be effectively used.’
“However, during the five-year period between July third — I’m sorry, January 3rd, 2005 and December 31st, 2009, the average annual earnings per share for class A, as reported, amounted to $5,930, while at the same period the average annual change in the share’s market price was only $2,420.
“Consequently, are you considering a distribution of a dividend or buying back shares? I imagine I know the answer, but I thought we had to ask.” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he does know the answer, but we’ll elaborate.
I did write that, not only in 1984 but continuously in the back of the Berkshire annual report where I’ve got our economic principles.
And frankly, the way I wrote that the first time was not well thought out. And in the 2009 annual report, partly because somebody asked that question last year, I actually rewrote that section.
And I pointed out that even when I wrote it in 1984, we would have flunked the test in many previous years when, generally speaking, the stock market had suffered a significant decline over a period of time.
As you can tell by looking at our report, right now every dollar that we have left in the business, you know, has produced, in present value terms, something over $1.30 of market value.
We have met the test of retained earnings proving their worth. But the way I phrased that originally, anytime the stock market went down a whole lot in a five-year period, because we were carrying our Coca-Cola at a certain price five years earlier or whatever it was that entered into our asset value, we could have done a great job of allocating capital in the five-year period and we still would have looked bad.
And similarly if the stock market had gone up a whole lot, we could have done a dumb job and looked good.
So, if you will look in the back of the 2009 annual report, I think it’s number 11, or — I’m not sure about that.
But read the economic principles. You’ll see that I had to confess my error in how I originally worded that.
But I think it is still intellectually honest, in terms of meeting what I intended to say.
You know, I voted against this before I voted for it, or something like John Kerry said in 2004. (Laughs)
I think it does meet the test of a dollar retained earnings producing more than a dollar of market value. And we will continue to measure ourselves based on whether we meet that test.
If we don’t — if keeping a buck doesn’t produce more than a buck in present value, I don’t mean every day or every week, but over time, we should figure out something else to do.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like people that parse through a long series of documents and find an error and rub my nose in it, particularly when it’s your error.
WARREN BUFFETT: Rub my nose in it. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: How tolerant. (Laughter)
I should have had him word it originally. Actually I think those were his words. It’s just coming back to me. (Laughter)
5. Safety net needed for the unemployed, but Berkshire isn’t it
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glen Molinar (PH) from Cleveland, Ohio. It’s been on my bucket list to come meet you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, so it’s a privilege to be here.
My question has to do with hope and jobs. You know, in America, I think we need to figure out how we can go about creating jobs. I have been trying to help people get jobs.
My question is, and a challenge maybe, how can we get Berkshire Hathaway and your board to maybe go out and just basically hire people to give them hope?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we will hire people when we have something for them to do. (Applause)
But — and we are actually, net, hiring people now.
I mean, when the Burlington is carrying 173,000 cars a week like last week, as opposed to some time back 155,000, we need more people. And we need more people at some of our other businesses.
But our carpet business, we are down 6,000 people-plus from our peak. But people aren’t going to quit buying carpet forever. And we will be hiring a number of people, but there’s no sense hiring them when they’re not — when there’s nothing for them to do.
I went through a period, particularly, it was dramatic to me, because we owned — Berkshire Hathaway owned — a couple of textile mills, one of them in New Bedford.
And eventually we had to close those mills after we tried for 20 years to make them work.
And if you get somebody that’s working in a textile mill and they’re 55 years old, and in many cases still were speaking Portuguese, you know, retraining doesn’t mean much to them.
I mean, you need — if you believe in creative destruction and you believe in capitalism, essentially figuring out ways to do the same things with less and less people, you better have a social safety net.
And we’ve got a pretty good one in this country, a whole lot better than we had 30 or 40 years ago.
But right now there is significant unemployment. Not any higher than it was in 1982 or thereabouts, but it’s a lot and it’s not going to go away fast, although it is going to go away.
And we should take — in my view, society owes some minimum living standard to people who are looking for work, trying to get work, and frankly, at a time like this, they’re not going to be able to find it.
But I don’t think that Berkshire Hathaway should be the social safety net.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I would say that if Berkshire started out to create a bunch of make-work jobs in order to increase human hope, the net effect would, over time, would be the reduce human hope. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s true, but I’d rather have Charlie saying it than me. (Laughter)
6. Why GEICO isn’t looking at China or India
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: “Our car insurance business” —
Oh, this comes from a New York man who asked that I use his initials, A.J.
“Our car insurance business has continued to return excellent profits and expand its business within the United States. Why hasn’t Berkshire made any progress in the car insurance business in China, or India, or even Europe?
“As BYD has shown, these markets are exploding in automobile sales, so aren’t they ripe for the picking?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s no — we’ve known for a long time there’s no shortage of drivers around the world. That — there may be a lot of business in the United States, but there’s a whole lot of business elsewhere.
In terms of India and China specifically, we can only own a limited amount, I believe 24.9 percent, of a company in either of those countries. And we’re not eager to work hard on something where we own 24.9 when we could work hard on something where we can own 100 percent.
Obviously, we talk all the time, we’ve thought for decades about ways we can possibly expand GEICO, because it’s a wonderful, wonderful company.
And we have gone from a market share of 2-and-a-faction percent when we bought control to 8 1/2 or so now.
But there’s plenty to do here. And we do not have the same kind of advantages — or we don’t think we could build those in any reasonable period of time — as we look at other markets.
I mean, obviously we look at Canada. You know, I mean — Tony and I talk about this kind of thing frequently.
I agree with his decision that now, and probably for a long time to come, there is so much opportunity in the United States. And the other areas, for one reason or another, as we’re looking at them, do not give us the same kind of competitive advantage we have here, that we pass on them.
But we love the idea of taking a business that’s working in one area and figuring out a way to have it work in other areas. Whether it’s geographical adjacencies or product extensions, or all kinds of things.
We’re well aware of possibilities out there. In the case of GEICO, we have not decided to go to other countries, but it isn’t because we didn’t know there were cars there. (Laughter)
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)
7. China’s economic growth is “fun” to watch
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 3.
CHINESE STUDENT: Good afternoon. My name is Shin Tse Chen (PH). I am a Chinese student from Kansas State University.
My question is, Mr. Buffett, what is the most important thing that you have learned from China? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Most important thing I’ve learned from China?
CHARLIE MUNGER: China, yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What’s the most important thing you’ve learned from China, Charlie? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: It has some very unusual people in BYD. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve learned —
CHARLIE MUNGER: No other lesson is as important as that one. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve learned they like Sprite better than Coke. Sprite outsells Coke in China by two-to-one. But they’re both growing dramatically.
I think China is an amazing economy. I mean, there is no question in my mind that, you know, the growth on a per-capita basis is going to be dramatic going forward. They’re just starting to exercise their potential.
When you think about it, in 1790, there were four million people in the United States, just under four million. There were 290 million in China in 1790. Just as smart, you know, just as hard working, resources of the land, the minerals, everything, its climate, very, very similar.
And for 170 years or so, relatively little progress was made in the standard of living for those people, like you say, who had all the native abilities that America had.
But, you know, in recent decades, the potential of the Chinese is being unleashed and it’s huge. And I think it’s very, very interesting to watch.
Charlie and I, and a group of some of the directors, are going over there at the end of September.
You know — and I was over there a couple of years ago. It’s a sight to behold.
But, in terms of specific lessons, they haven’t taught me how to eat Chinese food, I will say that. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think I always knew that the Chinese people had an enormous potential for huge and rapid progress, because I could see that in all the Chinese-Americans that I dealt with.
And indeed, people came in here as Chinese “coolies” — in effect, slaves — and they rose so rapidly that it was a marvel.
So I always knew that China had a potential to be a huge credit to human civilization. But I think I underrated how fast it could happen.
China is setting a new record for advancement of civilization at a very rapid rate. It’s fun to watch.
8. Why Buffett addresses the annual report to his two sisters
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder in Aiken, South Carolina who asks not to be identified, but he asks that Mr. Buffett or Mr. Munger discuss changes that have been made in the Berkshire annual report in the last several years, and the reasons for making some of these changes.
Two of the changes that he’s noticed are, number one , look-through earnings no longer seem to be discussed, and number two, the unaudited combined financial statements of the business groups no longer seem to be included, although at least some of the business groups material seem to be covered in other places in the report.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the second point I’m confused about, because we have broken them down into four groups and tried to give the relevant financial information for what we thought was a logical grouping, and will continue to do that. So I’m not sure I totally get that.
We really do have four fairly logical breakdowns. Now, you can break it down 70 ways and all that, but there’s a point at which adding 100 pages to an annual report obfuscates information rather than illuminates.
And that’s what — we’re trying to, in a reasonable number of words — Carol might say too many — but in a reasonable number of words, convey as much as we can about the information we’d want to have if we were in your place and you were writing to us.
And we think these four classifications — regulated industry is terribly capital intensive. You know, insurance: capital, really not a factor, but the amount of capital it gives us being a factor, and so on.
And so I don’t think we really changed on that. Now, when you get into look-through earnings or sometimes when we talk about the earnings per share and the investments per share, some of that I don’t repeat every year because we try to get — run at, maybe, 12,000 words or something like that in the annual report.
I really think if you extend it too much — I’ll say this, nobody’s told me it was too short, yet — (laughs) — including my editor, who is here today.
And every other year I may do that breakdown between operating earnings and the — but that takes 1,000 words or so to explain it to people.
The whole report is guided, as it has been ever since I really started taking it seriously in the mid ’70s, is guided by the idea that I’m — actually, I’m writing it to my two sisters who are here. And I have my audience in my mind — is two very intelligent, interested people but who are not around the place, been gone for a year, and they’re very capable of understanding anything but they’re not necessarily familiar with all the lingo.
If I get too esoteric on it, so I should explain that. And I really want them to understand how I’m thinking about the business, and by implication, how I think they should think about it, and to answer the questions that I think would be in their mind.
And they’ve got most of their net worth in it, so they’re going to read to the end. And I really haven’t changed that framework in my mind for how I’ve written it.
I start mentally off writing, “Dear Doris and Bertie,” and then I just cross them off and put, “To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway.” But that’s the way it’s done.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but the details can change as the facts change. The undistributed earnings of corporations in which we hold shares, but do not control, used to be way more important than they are now. It’s perfectly natural that the emphasis would shift.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the undistributed earnings now, without me looking at it very carefully, you know, are probably — they’re not more than, probably, 15 percent of our reported earnings or something like that.
They used to be a much higher percentage. And they’re still important. But I don’t think they’re — I think the people that understand that Coca-Cola and American Express aren’t paying out all their earnings, and it’s not a big enough number that I would want to spend a lot of the report explaining it.
9. Munger endorses Roth IRAs
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Joe Hudson (PH), a shareholder from Culver, Indiana.
I doubt either of you have any money in Roth IRAs, but what are your thought on the opportunity this year for anyone to convert IRAs to Roth IRAs, thus having all future growth on Berkshire or other investments 100 percent tax free?
Is the government making a big mistake here, and should people be concerned about the deal changing down the road?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll take this one, because I have an IRA that I am going to convert to a Roth IRA. So there’s your answer. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I still don’t understand it, but —
CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t have to. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. He’s always telling me that. (Laughter)
I assume - if Charlie said it, it must be true.
10. Newspapers are losing ground in battle with internet
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Andrew. (Laughter)
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question I’m actually very self-interested in. It comes from Anton Ossip (at) Alexander Forbes from Johannesburg, and (he writes), “Last year you said you were down on the newspaper industry.
“Given your life-long interest in newspaper companies and your stake in the Washington Post Company and others, has your view changed in the past year with the introduction of the iPad and other e-reading technologies?
“Do you think we will see a contraction in the value of — in the value retained by — media houses versus what will be passed on to distributors of the media?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you could probably answer it better than I can.
My relatively uninformed opinion — because I’m not that up on the technology — but I just have a feeling that when the money — has basically — the money to run good newspapers has come from advertising, you know, three-quarters of the money or thereabouts — the papers become less useful to advertisers.
I mean, they were the only game in town for a long, long time. They are not the only game in town. And what a difference that makes if you’re selling something.
So, when the Philadelphia Inquirer, I — Stan Lipsey is here — I called Stan up and I said, “Stan, this is probably like an old fire horse or something, but let’s think about it anyway a little bit.”
And it was sold yesterday at a bankruptcy sale, although I think that’s pending confirmation.
But, you know, it is very tempting, if you’ve still got fairly substantial circulation - The Philadelphia Inquirer and they’ve got the Daily News there, too.
But the math is really tough. I mean, the distribution costs, the printing costs, everything, and maybe all this changes that in some way that you would understand better than I would.
But since I don’t understand it, I have to stay with — and there are plenty of things I don’t understand — and I cannot make an affirmative decision on newspaper ownership.
I just got the — the ABC puts out Fast Facts, this big yellow publication — I just got it a couple days ago and I can’t resist looking through there. And I flip the pages and look at circulation of all kinds of papers.
Actually, in Buffalo, we were down less than a great many papers, even though, you know, our population demographics are very tough. We were down less than Rochester, I might mention, which is owned by Gannett.
But you look at San Francisco Chronicle, you know, down 20-odd percent. Dallas —
These are communities that are thriving, and it blows your mind how fast people are dropping it.
It’s not just older — it’s not just that younger people aren’t picking it up. I mean, the world has really changed, in terms of the essential nature of newspapers.
There’s nothing that looked — back when Charlie and I would talk about them in 1970 or ’65, there was probably nothing that looked more bulletproof than a daily newspaper where the competition had melted away.
But it’s a form of distributing information and entertainment that has lost its immediacy in many cases.
It’s certainly — it is not the essential place to get — think about how stock market quotations were, you know, 30 or 35 years ago. You looked in the paper to see what stocks had done. You looked in the paper to see how sports games had turned out.
So its primacy has withered away, and the advertisers weren’t there because they love the publisher of the newspaper. They were there because it was a microphone to talk to everybody in town, and they had to talk to everybody in town.
And so you get this chicken and egg thing that the newspaper becomes less valuable as the advertisers float away, and the advertisers float away as the subscribers diminish. And I don’t see a good answer to it, but Charlie, what do you have to say?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the independent newspapers, due to the accidents of history, as they became dominant in their individual towns, for decades had impregnable economic strength.
And by and large they behaved better because they were so strong. And they were called the ”Fourth Estate.” They were really a branch of the government, they helped keep government honest.
And if you take this state in which we’re located, The World-Herald has been a very constructive force, net, over a long period of time. As those dominant franchises have weakened and weakened, it’s not good for the country.
I think we’re losing something that we have no substitute for. And I think it’s very sad and I don’t have the faintest idea what to do about it.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I love newspapers.
I think The World-Herald hit a 300,000 circulation peak on Sunday at one time. I don’t think they averaged that for the six-month period, but I seem to remember that, I could be wrong.
And the figures — 100,000 off that or something of the sort, and the state has gained population, the city’s gained population.
I think it’s as vital to me as ever, but it clearly — it has changed for the populous as a whole.
And, you know, when I look at the Philadelphia Inquirer and I forget what it was, 350,000 or something like that of circulation, and, you know, I’m not worried about Philadelphia going away.
But when I look at the figures being down — I don’t know, I forget what it was now — 30 or 40,000, you know, in a year, it doesn’t work very well as that goes along, because the advertiser just does not need you the same way as they needed you 10 or 15 years ago. So your ability to price evaporates in them.
It used to be — Charlie and I met Lord Thompson in 1970 or so, and he owns the paper — he owned the paper — in Council Bluffs, right across the river. And he was a jovial fellow, he was very happy to see us.
And we said to him, “Lord Thomson,” we said, “We noticed you own the paper in Council Bluffs. Have you ever been there?” He said, “I wouldn’t dream of it.” (Laughter)
And then I said, “Well, Lord Thomson,” I said, “You seem to increase the price of your paper every year and your poor advertisers” — I mean the advertising price. And I said, “What can they do about it?” He says, “Nothing.”
And then I said to him, “Well, in that case, how do you decide how much to increase prices, since it’s totally at your discretion?”
And he said — I think Charlie will remember these words — he says, “I tell my U.S. managers to price to make 40 percent pre-tax. Above that, I feel I may be gouging.” (Laughter)
Those days are gone. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and the politicians are not behaving better as the newspapers are weakening. We’re going to miss the newspaper power.
WARREN BUFFETT: I agree with that. (Applause)
11. There will “always be opportunities to overperform”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Robert McArthur (PH) from Boston, Massachusetts.
I’m starting a career in investing, and many, if not most, investors my age think they’re value investors.
Also, there’s a record number of people here to see you this year, and the same value investors who were laughed at three years ago are now celebrated by the financial press.
Will there be fewer metaphorical $100 bills left on the street going forward, and if so, should I look for a career in managing a business instead of managing money?
WARREN BUFFETT: There will probably be fewer, but I would say there will always be — except in the most bubbly of markets, perhaps — but there will always be opportunities if you’re not working with large amounts of money.
The money manager — there’s a basic conflict. There’s conflicts in most businesses. Everybody’s pointing out the conflicts now in the investment banking business.
But the investment management business has a conflict that’s equally as significant in the fact that asset gathering can become a way more important part of your income than asset managing.
But if you manage moderate sums of money, I think there will always be opportunities to overperform. That doesn’t mean lots of people are going to do it, but they will be out there.
And, you know, it might have been easier many years ago when there were fewer people looking and not as much information was available on the internet and all that.
But people still make the same mistakes and they still get — well, I’ll give you an illustration.
Charlie has a company called the Daily Journal Company. And the Daily Journal Company has a bunch of cash. And it sat there with cash, and it sat there with cash, and I own 100 shares — which is all he’ll let me own — and I got their annual report here a while back.
And in their fiscal year of 2009, they never bought stocks before that I’d seen, and all of a sudden they’d bought $15 million worth of stocks and they were worth 45 million.
So by sitting around for a while, but waiting until things got really ridiculous in certain cases, he put $15 million out that became 45 million within, probably, a six month period or so.
So opportunities come around. You have to be prepared to grab them when they come. And you can’t do it with the kind of money — I mean, you can’t get the extraordinary things with the kind of money that we’re running.
With moderate amounts of money, I think there will always be opportunities. Charlie’s going to tell you something more pessimistic now, probably. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. One piece of advice that Warren frequently gives — and it’s particularly useful to those going into money management — take the high road. It’s far less crowded. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Alan Simpson used to say, he said, “Those who take the high road in Washington are seldom bothered by heavy traffic.” (Laughter)
But getting to the last part of your question, there’s going to be opportunities for talent, whether it’s in money management, operating management, whatever. It’s going to work.
Money management, you know, is easier to scale up and easier to get into and all of that. So it was certainly my natural inclination, in any event.
I would not have wanted to work my way up to plant superintendent and all of that — (laughs) — until I got a job at the top, you know, about the time they were going to give me a gold watch.
But there’s opportunities in both places.
12. Municipal bond insurers must worry about contagion
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: This question is about municipal bonds. Municipal bond defaults, on the scale you described in the 2008 letter, have so far not materialized.
To what extent will we see municipalities default outright in the next five to 10 years? Will the bond insurance companies be able to swallow the losses? Will there be federal bailouts of states?
And considering all of these risks, should investors be getting paid more than they already are for holding municipal bonds?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if the bonds are insured by Berkshire, you don’t need to worry at all. (Laughs)
But we’re not insuring a lot of bonds currently, because we don’t think the premiums are appropriate, which gets to the question.
Just the other day, within the last few days — you’ve probably read about it in the papers — Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, defaulted on a relatively small amount of bonds.
And the bond insurer, named Assured Guarantee, starts paying the interest.
And Harrisburg may get things worked out in a week, you know, and they may not. There’s certainly some incentive to do that. And if they do get it worked out, the bond insurer’s not too much on the hook.
But what you worry about is correlation in this field, that if one entity defaults — and particularly if nothing terrible happens, that the police are on the street the next day, and the fire trucks still go to fires and all that — and people start thinking, “Why should I have a great fiscal reputation when I can have lower taxes and still have all the services I need?”
It’s very hard to tell how that will play out. I personally think it would be very hard, in the end, for the federal government to turn away a state that was having extreme financial difficulties when they’d, in effect, gone into General Motors and various other entities and saved them.
I don’t know exactly how you would tell the governor of state X that you were going to stiff-arm him, and when you’d participated in so many other bailouts of corporations.
But who knows what would happen, and who knows how contagious it would be? The big thing you worry about if you’re a bond insurer is contagion.
Obviously the bond insurers — except for Berkshire — the bond insurers, in my view, have got extraordinary liabilities in relation to their capital.
And virtually every one of them either failed or effectively failed — had to spin off a bad bank versus a good bank type of thing, or something like that — with merely the troubles they encountered when they got into structured securities.
And I think they’ve had a very optimistic attitude toward what could happen in the field. But I don’t know the answer on what default rates are going to be over the next few years.
I knew that I felt I was getting paid fairly for taking that risk on a year-and-a-half ago, and I don’t feel that we’re getting offered a premium that’s fair now, so we’re going to let somebody else do it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, with the municipal bonds, I would try and invest in places that were both prosperous and disciplined.
You want to invest in the prosperous, because Ben Franklin was right when he said, “It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.”
And you want to invest in the disciplined places because integrity still matters. It’s not very difficult, it’s not very complicated.
WARREN BUFFETT: But you could argue that in a country, if the undisciplined are not being punished for being undisciplined, that the taxpayers in disciplined areas would say, “Wait a second. You know, why should we keep up a record of financial prudence and all that and pay our bills when other guys aren’t paying their bills?”
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s no question about the fact that bad behavior is contagious. That’s the way human nature works. But I’d still rather be with the disciplined, —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — prosperous people.
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why I like the Berkshire meeting. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: That, and free fudge. (Applause)
13. Short-term stock moves aren’t predictable and don’t matter
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m (inaudible) from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. First of all I want to thank you for sharing your wisdom with us so generously.
Back in October of 2008, you highly recommended buying U.S. stocks and that was a brilliant idea, it worked very well.
And I just want to get your opinion how you think about the market going forward.
Are you still that optimistic, and what’s a reasonable rate of return to expect from equities in the next decade or so?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I write articles very infrequently, or get interviewed very infrequently, on the subject of the general level of the market itself. Probably only four or five times in 40 years have I really declared myself about — what I thought — about the general level of the stock market.
And it turned out I was pretty premature, actually, in October of 2008, as was pointed out to me by a number of people.
But I felt — and what I said in that article really was that it would be way better to own stocks over the long term than to follow a policy of buying either long-term bonds or holding cash. And I knew I could make that statement and I would be eventually — I thought odds were very high — I’d be proven right on that.
But I don’t like — I don’t know what the stock market’s going to do next week, or next month, or next year. I don’t have any idea.
People always think I do. I know I don’t have any idea, I don’t think about it, it doesn’t make any difference because Charlie and I — I can’t recall a discussion we’ve ever had on it, basically.
But I do think over the next 10 years or 20 years, I’d much rather own equities — including U.S. equities — I’d much rather own them than cash, or I’d much rather own them than a 10 or 20-year bond. But that’s partly because I’m very unenthusiastic about the alternatives.
I think equities are likely to give you some positive — modest positive — real return over time. But beyond that I really don’t know anything.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s a cheerful thought that equities are the best of a bad lot of available opportunities. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: You disagree with it?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think you’re right. (Laughter)
I think people should get accustomed, on average, to doing less well in their investment portfolios, in real terms.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I don’t —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’re in for a long period of where the ordinary result is not going to be very exciting.
WARREN BUFFETT: But we like owning businesses. And we’re in a position where we can own entire businesses, but we also like partial ownership of businesses.
And we want to own businesses where we really think they have some competitive advantage over time, and where we feel good about the management, and where we think the price is reasonably attractive.
I think you can find things like that now, but they aren’t dramatically attractive at all. They do beat, in my view, they do beat holding cash or five, 10, or 20-year bonds.
14. Why we don’t use bond rating agencies
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from John Bailer (PH), who’s asking about the rating agencies. He points out that you started selling your stake in Moody’s this year.
“Has the investment case for Moody’s changed due to potential regulation, and if so, why not sell the position to zero?”
WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t discuss what we will or won’t do with any position, but I would say this. The ratings agencies have had, and still have, under current conditions, an incredibly wonderful business.
I mean, it takes no capital at all, you know, the pricing power is significant. And certain parts of the world feel they need rating agencies.
There are also — a certain part of the world is very mad at rating agencies. And many feel that the rating agencies let them down when the rating agencies, essentially, succumbed to the same mania, in effect, you can say, that prevailed throughout the investment world, and, really, the political world, and the media world, et cetera.
They made the same mistake that, again, politicians made, I made, you know, you made, mortgage brokers made, whomever.
They couldn’t see a world where residential housing, countrywide, would collapse.
And I don’t think that was done because they were — the incentive part of it, there may have been some small aspect that that played. I just think that, you know, it’s very hard to think contrary to the crowd.
And on the other hand, there is a, obviously, a backlash against rating agencies. There may be legal remedies. You can get views on that either way.
If they are not forced to change their — the whole structure around them does not change in some dramatic way — it’s a pretty darn good business in that you can’t shop pricing in the rating agency business.
We have never paid any attention to ratings for bonds, I mean, you know, at Berkshire. We don’t think we should farm out, outsource, investment judgment.
If we can’t do it ourselves, we just don’t do it. And we’re not going to rely on somebody else’s opinion, whether it’s a rating agency or an investment advisory organization, or a management consultant firm, or anybody else.
So, it’s not a business that we rely on, but we do recognize that if the, sort of, the social model doesn’t change, it still remains a phenomenal business.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that the rating agencies, in their present forum, and structured with their present incentives, have been a wonderfully constructive influence in our country for a great many decades.
And what happened, of course, is that the cognition faltered. They drifted with the stupidity of their times in a way that was regrettable.
Part of it came out of asininity in American business education. They overbelieved in these ridiculous models and so on and so on. And I have yet to hear a single apology from business academia for its huge contribution to our present difficulties. (Applause)
15. World will find a solution when oil “windfall” gives out
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike McCoy (PH) from San Francisco.
Chairman Buffett, you frequently speak favorably about the prosperity of future generations, that our children and our children’s children will live better than us.
How much of our current prosperity do you attribute to us being able to get oil out of the ground at a fraction of the cost of its value to us in the economy?
And how will we be able to live better in the future when we can no longer get more and more of this free lunch and we become dependent on more dilute sources like solar and wind?
Couldn’t this turn out like trying to satisfy a drug addict with a Coca-Cola?
WARREN BUFFETT: The oil business — obviously, the discovery of oil — what was it, about 1850- something? Colonel Drake at Titusville, Pennsylvania, or something?
That changed the world in a very major way, and it was only 150 years ago.
And since then we’ve been sticking straws into the earth at an incredible pace. There’s over 500,000 producing wells in the United States, would you believe that? I mean, 11 barrels, 10 barrels a day average or something of the sort.
We have really exploited what may have taken, I don’t know, whether it was hundreds of thousands of years or millions of years to create.
It’s contributed in a huge way to the prosperity of the world, but the world, in my view, will not be dependent upon that particular — call it “windfall” — for the next hundred years.
And Charlie knows way more about this subject than I do, but there will be other free lunches available. You know, whether it’s solar or — there’s lots of possibilities.
Don’t ever give up on humans’ ability to innovate in ways that create solutions to problems that seem insolvable.
We’ve faced all kinds of predictions. You know, all of the inventions having been invented — there’s some famous statement, I forget who made, on that.
We haven’t really started. I mean, if you could pick a time in history when you would want to be born — leaving out the nuclear, chemical and biological threat, which is something to leave out — but I would pick today. The world has a bright future.
Now, Charlie will give you the other side of that. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I think you’re failing to recognize something really important. In the technology of 150 years ago, they really needed the oil to get ahead.
In our advanced civilization, which has benefited from this last 150 years of technological expertise, we can get ahead without the oil if we have to.
Now, Freeman Dyson is a physicist who is not an economist but a genius, and he’s been very good at pointing out that it isn’t that horrible to contemplate a world which goes off oil, provided that world is as rich and knowledgeable as ours is now.
So the fact that they couldn’t have got to where we are now without the oil starting 150 years ago, does not mean we can’t do without the oil if we have to.
We need the oil and the gas, and the coal, eventually, for chemical feed stocks more than we need it for keeping warm and propelling our vehicles.
WARREN BUFFETT: And the adjustment, fortunately, will be fairly gradual. I mean, it isn’t like 85 million barrels in the day goes to 50 million or something in five or 10 years. So it’s a workable period of adjustment, in my view.
CHARLIE MUNGER: If it doesn’t bother Freeman Dyson, who knows more about it, I don’t think it should bother you too much. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s always pulling that on me. (Laughter)
16. Buffett doesn’t like Kraft’s purchase of Cadbury
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I received a number of questions regarding Kraft, and this one comes from a shareholder who says they prefer to remain anonymous.
The question is, “Given your stake in Kraft and your public criticism earlier this year about the Kraft-Cadbury deal, how would you grade the Kraft board of director’s capital allocation and the management compensation abilities?
“What did you think of Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld’s $26.3 million compensation package for services, including her leadership in completing the Cadbury acquisition and selling Kraft’s North American frozen pizza business?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I didn’t like either the Cadbury decision or the pizza decision. But we’ve made our share of dumb deals at Berkshire, you know.
So I’ve gotten more tolerant of other people, and incidentally the fact I think it’s a dumb deal doesn’t for certain make it a dumb deal, but I think the odds are it was a dumb deal.
In fact, I think the odds are that both deals were dumb. The pizza deal was particularly dumb, but — in my view.
But just think of all the dumb things we’ve done, right? Starting with that department store in Baltimore.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah, right. A few Irish banks, you know.
WARREN BUFFETT: Right, (inaudible).
CHARLIE MUNGER: We never seem to go —
WARREN BUFFETT: I wish you hadn’t brought this up.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — we never get over it. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT: We expect to do some dumb things, it’s just we get mad when other people do dumb things with our money. (Laughs)
You know, the pizza business — somewhere I probably have some figures on that — but when they sold the pizza business for $3.7 billion they announced it as selling it for $3.7 billion.
They didn’t sell it for $3.7 billion, that’s what the other guy paid. What they got was about $2.5 billion. And that was a terribly tax-inefficient deal when they’d already shown their ability to understand that you could do a tax-efficient deal when they sold the Post cereals business earlier.
And when they referenced — well, they didn’t reference at all what pizza was earning beforehand, but I think that Nestle said it was earning something like 280 million pre-tax, but that was referring to the previous year.
When they talked about the Cadbury earnings they were buying, they were talking about next year. And when they talked about the pizza earnings they were selling, they talked about last year.
Pizza in 2009, believe it or not, earned three hundred and, I think, 40 million pre-tax.
So they got 2 1/2 billion for 340 million of pizza earnings that were growing as fast or faster than the Cadbury earnings and where the sales were going as fast or faster. It really didn’t make sense in my view.
Now, you know, Irene is a perfectly capable manager and she may know a lot of things about that business I don’t know. Like I say, we’ve made plenty of mistakes ourselves.
But if it’d been me, I would have voted to keep pizza and not buy Cadbury. And I expressed myself, and I don’t do that too often, but we owned a lot of Kraft.
And Kraft, still, is selling for considerably less than the value of its constituent parts, particularly if you value them the way they valued Cadbury. (Laughter)
But if they don’t sell them all like they sold pizza, you know, the present price is below the value of Kool-Aid and A.1. Sauce and — and Jell-O and Oscar Meyer wieners and a few things.
Those are very good businesses. I just hated to see them give up a significant portion of those businesses to buy Cadbury at what I felt was a very fancy price.
Charlie?
And in terms of her compensation, you know, we’ve got a compensation system at Berkshire that I regard as quite rational. And there’s a lot of companies in the United States that have different compensation systems. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think generally, at the top of American businesses, people think they know too much about strategy. And they tend to hate the tough competitive conditions in the business they’re in, and to yearn for some business where it’s less difficult.
You remember when Xerox bought Crum & Forster, an American insurance company, one of the dumbest acquisitions in all time?
The reason Xerox did that is they didn’t have any tough Japanese competing in the insurance business. They were really tired of facing the tough competition they had in the business they were in.
I think it’s quite typical to dream, if you’re in business, that something that’s a little different, no matter how much you pay for it, will make your troubles less.
WARREN BUFFETT: And you will have an absolute army of lawyers, investment advisors, public relations people, all of whom will have a strong economic interest in having you push ahead on deal, after deal, after deal, regardless of how the shareholders come out. It’s just — it’s the way it works. OK.
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why Berkshire is a better deal. (Laughter)
We are very stupid in many ways, but we have avoided a slight subset of stupidities. (Laughter)
And they’re important.
17. Biggest threat to integrity: “everyone else is doing it”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK Number 8.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger. My name is Richard Rentrop. I’m a shareholder from Germany.
Mr. Munger, you just mentioned again the importance of integrity. My question is about changes in integrity of management.
One of your three key questions is, does management love what they do or does management love the money? So how do you see the crisis having changed integrity of management?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think what led to the crisis involved, to some extent, a lack of integrity in many a management. Fortunately, some of them are now gone. So, integrity’s very important.
It’s the safest way to make money, also. There’s an occasional perfect knave who succeeds pretty well with money, but that kind of success reminds me of what Pope Urban said about Cardinal Richelieu.
He said, “If there is a God, Cardinal Richelieu has much to answer for. But if there is no God, he’s done rather well.” (Laughter)
And too many people want to be like Pope Urban’s view of Cardinal Richelieu.
And — the integrity is important, it’s terribly important. And of course everybody mouths the integrity, even when it’s lacking.
So it’s difficult to be sure that professing integrity is the same as having it.
WARREN BUFFETT: The “everyone else is doing it” is the toughest thing. I think —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: You had this classic example. In about 1993, roughly, you know, the Accounting Standards Board came out and says what was obvious to everybody all along, was that stock options were actually expense, and that expenses, for some reason or another, belonged on the income statement.
And America — corporate America — fought back like you cannot believe. I mean, it was like World War III had broken out, in terms of armies of CEOs marching on Washington.
So the Accounting Standard Board backed off. Congress — the Senate — voted 88 to 9 to tell them that, you know, what the hell did the Accounting Standards Board know about accounting, and that the Senate would tell them what accounting was all about.
When the Accounting Standards Board backed off, they said, “We’ll now say that you can do it one of two ways. Number one is preferred,” which was to expense. Number two was acceptable, but not preferred.
Of the Standard & Poor’s 500 companies, 498 chose number two, the non-preferred way. Two took the preferred method.
And I talked to a number of people in that 498 that I would trust to be a trustee of my will, you know, I’d love to have them as a next door neighbor, they could marry my daughter, but in the end they said, “I can’t do it if the other guy isn’t doing it.”
It was a variation on the, “I’m doing it because the other guy is doing it.”
They basically said, “I’ll be penalizing my shareholders if I report less in the way of earnings than I can report. And all the other guys are doing it that way, and I understand your point.”
And the situational ethics problem is huge. I gave you earlier that illustration of how rare it is to find, if you carry it out to tenths of a cent, a four in reported earnings, quarterly.
That’s not accidental and it’s — but if you talk to the people that play games to get that four up to five, they would say, “Everybody else is doing it, your own statistics proved that.”
And that is, you know, it is a tough problem to deal with.
We try to create as few situations in Berkshire as we can that would induce such behavior. I don’t have the managers submit budgets to me, there is no Berkshire budget, you know. They can use them in their own operations. Some do and some don’t. Many do, a great many do.
But if they submit them to me, you know, and the temptation becomes, if they’re not quite making it and they think I’m looking at them all the time, the temptation becomes to fudge in some way.
And very few would do it, but the more that thought the other ones were doing it, the more that would do it. It’s just human behavior. And you want to try and create a structure that minimizes the weaknesses in human behavior.
And I think Berkshire’s about as good a place at that as any, although I’m sure we’re not perfect at it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what’s really interesting on this issue is that so much of the bad behavior does not come from malevolence or overweening greed or anything like that.
It comes from subconscious poor cognition that justifies a lot of behavior that’s really not justifiable if it’s better understood. And that happens to practically everybody.
And the cure is very difficult. The best cure is to have a system where the people who are making the decisions bear the consequences.
And that’s why the system that Wall Street created where nobody really owned the mortgages, they just passed them rapidly to somebody else at a profit. And so nobody felt any responsibility that the mortgages be any good.
Systems like that, at a basic level, are irresponsible systems, and it’s deeply immoral to create irresponsible systems like that.
But the people who create them don’t realize they’re being immoral, they think those systems are wonderful.
Who do you see apologizing for the behavior you now find so regrettable in our recent mess?
There are very few apologies, you’ll note. People think they did fine.
18. Can’t make money if you’re scared when everyone else is scared
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? (Applause)
CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from James A. Star.
“I have read an enormous amount about past market declines and the opportunities they presented to investors.
“The last two years have seemed to me, a 43-year-old investor, a real opportunity. Yet in the thick of the action, I was too scared, because I felt the market decline, while severe, was not necessarily sufficient to match the risks of global financial meltdown.
“So my question is, given that we are possibly not totally out of the woods, how did the two of you assess this latest buying opportunity against the previous opportunities of your life?”
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not the greatest one. We’ve seen a few that scream at us, and we’ve seen a few periods of overvaluation that scream at us. And 90 percent of the time we’re somewhere in between and we don’t know exactly where we are in between.
The business of being scared, you know, I don’t know what you do about that.
If you’re of that — if you have a temperament that when others are fearful you’re going to get scared yourself, you know, you are not going to make a lot of money in securities over time, in all probability.
You know, people really — if they didn’t look at quotations — but, of course, the whole world is urging them to look at quotations, and more than that, do something based on small changes in quotations.
But think how much more rational — we’ve talked about it before — but think how much more rational investing in a farm is than the way many people buy stocks.
If you buy a farm, do you get a quote next week, do you get a quote next month? If you buy an apartment house, do you get a quote next week or month?
No, you look at the apartment house or the farm and you say, “I expect it to produce so many bushels of soy beans and corn, and if it does that, it meets my expectations.”
If they buy a stock and they think if it goes up it’s wonderful, and if it goes down it’s bad.
We think just the opposite. When it goes down we love it, because we’ll buy more. And if it goes up, it kills us to buy more.
And I — you know — all kinds — you know, Ben Graham wrote about it. It’s been explained. But if you can’t get yourself in that mental attitude, you’re going to be scared whenever everybody else is scared.
And to expect somebody else to tell you when to buy and therefore get your courage back up or something, you know, I could get this fellow’s courage up substantially by saying this is a wonderful time to buy, and then a week from now he’d run into somebody else that tells him the world is coming to an end and he’d sell.
I mean, he’s a broker’s friend, but he’s not going to make a lot of money.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think I developed more courage after I learned I could handle hardship. So maybe you should get your feet wet with a little more failure. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve certainly followed that advice. (Laughter)
No, some people really do not have the — apparently, they don’t have the temperament, or emotional stability, or whatever it may be, to invest in securities.
They’d be much better off if there were no quotations at all. And Keynes talked about that some in the past, too.
To take something that should be an asset, a quotation every day, you know, terrific liquidity, nobody says, “How liquid is my farm?” or something of the sort. So they’re not expecting the prices to tell them something about how they’re doing.
The market is saying this or that. Whenever anybody says, “The market is saying this or that,” you know, it’s sort of unbelievable.
But there’s a lot of interest in investing, and people are going to yak about it all the time.
And in the end, what counts is buying a good business at a decent price, and then forgetting about it for a long, long, long time. And some people can do it and some people can’t.
19. Munger is “enormously optimistic” about solar power
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Joe McCabe (PH). I’m from Littleton, Colorado. I want to thank you for the opportunity to ask a question and for your annual discussions in your report, just wonderful reading.
Charlie Munger, you are on a YouTube video that discusses BYD and solar energy, and I really appreciate that interview and it being available to everyone. I want to talk about that in relationship to your other companies.
So the BYD was mentioned as electric car and battery, but I understand their second goal is solar energy.
And you also own roofing companies and buildings companies, (inaudible) and Clayton, as well as utilities, Mid-America, PacifiCorp, and Pacific Power.
This seems to be a perfect golden opportunity for solar to be on these buildings in those kinds of utility companies.
You’ve mentioned you don’t interfere with individual companies, but is there a way you can direct, suggest, motivate a synergy between all these companies to bring solar solutions? Thank you.
CHARLIE MUNGER: As the solar solutions are coming, because they’re so obviously needed.
And regarding solar panels on roofs, I never pass an opportunity to decline to put them in, because I think they’re going to get a lot cheaper and I’d rather wait.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, at 86 you can afford to, Charlie. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I have to think about the long term. (Laughter)
And I’m going to miss you terribly. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Touché.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It reminded me of the wife, and the husband said, “Will you still love me if I lost all of my money?” And she says, “Yes, I would always love you, but I would miss you terribly.” (Laughter)
Well, the solar is coming because we have no other practical alternative.
And it should be regarded as a very good thing, because what in hell would modern civilization do if we had no alternative to fossil fuels? That would be a really serious problem.
And so of course, the cities that are chocking to death on their own poisonous air are going to go to electric cars and we’re going to get a lot more renewable energy from the sun.
I’m also quite negative about growing corn in America using fossil water and fossil fuels in order to burn up in automobiles. (Applause)
That is a stunningly stupid idea, and another example of how our politicians have failed us.
But I am enormously optimistic about what is going to happen. Our politicians will eventually create a big electric grid that’s way better than what we have now. We’ll eventually have the energy we need, and we will be way better for it.
And it’s wonderful that these technical problems are proving solvable.
It is not all that important over the long term, if solar power costs twice as much as what we’re used to. That’s a blip in the economic future of our country, it’s just a blip.
And I think it’s probably a good thing that we have all these big capital needs coming that will create a better system in the end and solve our problems in the end.
So I’m quite optimistic. But in terms of immediate business decisions, I think frequently the right answer is counterintuitive, like mine, to say, if you want to put in solar panels, wait. They’re going to get cheaper.
Warren, do you want to criticize that?
WARREN BUFFETT: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)
20. No “exploding bananas” now in our stock portfolio
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Jennifer Mancuso (PH) who is a shareholder here in Omaha. And she’s hoping that you can settle a debate between her husband and her.
WARREN BUFFETT: That a promising assignment. (Laughs)
BECKY QUICK: She says that he believes the Berkshire Hathaway stock will rise significantly in the next one to two years because of all the smart buys Warren made last year in Fortune 500s when stock prices were bottomed out.
She says she knows this type of purchasing has driven much of your financial success, but she doesn’t know how impactful these buys are, given the size of Berkshire Hathaway and that Warren himself indicates that we shouldn’t expect to see large increases in his stock price in the next few years.
So the question is, what percentage of the portfolio is represented by those stock purchases, and what kind of an impact might they have on the fund’s value as the valuation of that stock increases?
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say this, that our portfolio now — I’ve always regarded our portfolio as something that we thought would be worth more money later on.
But the degree of undervaluation in our portfolio now compared to what I would expect it to produce over time is not dramatic, and that undervaluation has been exceeded many times in the past.
So it isn’t like we’re sitting here on some exploding bananas or anything like that. That couldn’t be further from the truth.
We think we’ll do reasonably well over time. We’ve got a lot of good businesses, we try to allocate capital rationally, we don’t waste a lot of money at the top.
But we do not have a whole bunch of things that are likely to increase dramatically in value from here, it just isn’t the case. So I hope she and her husband get along fine. (Laughter)
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I can solve any of those domestic troubles, either. In my own day, I simply accepted the other point of view. (Laughter)
21. “If I can be optimistic when I’m nearly dead, surely the rest of you can handle a little inflation”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello gentlemen, my name is Randy Bellows (PH) and I’m from Rock Hall, Maryland.
I’ve been coming here for many, many years, yet today I sense from each of you a guarded sense, a sense of reserve.
Not quite overt pessimism, but real reserve. You have spoken of impending inflation, government debt, both here and abroad, that’s higher than we’re accustomed to, increased regulation and red tape that may slow innovation and growth.
And just a few minutes ago, Charlie, you spoke of that we have to reduce our expectation of investment returns.
And yet in the same day you say children in India will live better than we do, Chinese will live better than we do, and our own children here in this country will live better than we do today.
Can you give me four or five facts that explain your optimism? And thank you.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, having the main technical problems of civilization — which, of course, are all energy related — having a solution that’s on the horizon and nearly here, that is not a small benefit to humanity.
That is the biggest single problem we have, so of course I’m optimistic about that.
And — I’m optimistic about the culture that generally pervades in Berkshire, because I think it will continue to work.
And of course it gives me some pleasure to see people that have had it tough for a long time — through their own extreme efforts and talents — rising rapidly, as in many parts of China and India.
All of that gives me pleasure, and why shouldn’t it? Of course there are terrible problems, and of course reduced expectations are the rational way. There’s no better way to be happy than getting your expectations down, it’s much easier than —
WARREN BUFFETT: Getting your results up.
CHARLIE MUNGER: — than getting your results up, yeah. (Laughter)
It’s just — we never know anything here except the most elementary common sense. It’s amazing that it’s sufficed for us.
So no, I’m optimistic about life. If I can be optimistic when I’m nearly dead, surely the rest of you can handle a little inflation. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: I really have nothing to add to that. (Laughter)
22. Why Buffett prefers TV interviews
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Myard Shields (PH), and I want to say in advance that I don’t — I’m not thrilled asking this question and you’ll see why.
The question is, “The American public almost certainly benefits from Mr. Buffett’s increasing media exposure, but is it the best use of your time for Berkshire’s shareholders?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably not. (Laughter)
I do a lot of things that aren’t the best use of my time for Berkshire shareholders. I play bridge on the internet 12 hours a week, you know. I’m not sitting there thinking improving my bridge skills is going to do wonders for Berkshire. (Laughs)
No, I — I do — I have seen over the years that the development of broadcast television, as opposed to print, and I would say that if you want to have a record of exactly what you said as opposed to interpreted through not only reporters but editors who bounce back things and say, “Take six paragraphs down to four paragraphs, and why don’t you ask this question?”
I would much rather have a record on Charlie Rose which is permanent. Where people can go back and look at exactly what I said, and my body language, and whether I was kidding.
I’m sure Lloyd Blankfein would have preferred to have a television interview. He would like to take back that remark about, you know, doing God’s work, under any circumstances. But I would bet that that was delivered as a throwaway line in terms of something that was said earlier.
Clearly he did not mean that in a literal sense, but he’s gotten killed in the media because somebody elected to treat it halfway seriously, and then other people, to fit other stories, play it that way.
I like the idea, whether it’s, you know, in terms of CNBC keeping a record of it or Charlie Rose keeping a record of it, of being judged by my own words rather than somebody writing a few paragraphs trying to summarize some views.
And that requires being on television instead of having people, essentially, take a one-hour interview, often just shopping for a single quote that fits their storyline, and having that somehow become representative of what I think.
So the clearer I can be about what I think, whether writing my own annual report or whether being in broadcast, the better I feel about the accuracy of the reporting.
And I figured that out a few years ago. So that’s the direction I go now. And whether it’s the best use of the time, it works fine.
I’ll tell you one story on that. You even have to be a little careful about broadcast.
After we made the Burlington deal, Charlie Rose, who may be here, did an interview with me and we taped it on a Friday morning. And we did the tape, and we had a good time doing it.
And during the tape there was a little section on it showing great railroad scenes, and one had Cary Grant and Grace Kelly, and another one had Marilyn Monroe in “Some Like It Hot,” and then they showed a bunch of the kind of things we had about railroads in our movie this morning.
And when we got all through that, he asked me some question. And just to give a flip answer, but it did tie in with what I’d just seen, I said, “Well, I would have paid more for the Burlington if they’d thrown in Grace Kelly and Marilyn Monroe.” (Laughter)
Well, this taped interview ran an hour and six minutes, so when they ran the tape that night they had to take out six minutes and they took out these railroad scenes that showed Grace Kelly and Marilyn Monroe. (Laughter)
So to anybody that viewed this thing, it looked like I was spending my time there fantasizing about these — while Charlie was talking to me. (Laughter)
So even television isn’t safe. (Laughter)
23. How Berkshire gets loyal shareholders
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Kip Johann-Berkel from Boston, Massachusetts.
First, thank you both for your writings, annual shareholder meetings, and even the Charlie Rose interviews — (Buffett laughs) — as they have helped me grow both as an investor and as a person.
Berkshire has, in my opinion, the best and most loyal shareholders of any publicly-traded company or mutual fund.
How do you attract and retain a shareholder base, particularly when many of the same behavioral tendencies that produce mispriced securities also produce fleet-footed shareholders? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the interesting thing about marketable securities is that, basically, anybody can buy them.
You might elect to join somebody in buying a McDonald’s franchise or a farm, or apartment house, or something, but if you’re running a public company, you know, you can have anybody from, you know, Osama Bin Laden, you know, to the Pope as your shareholder.
I mean, they elected — you don’t elect them, they elect you.
Now, if you want a shareholder body that is going to be in sync with you, it’s important — in my view — it’s important that you let them know exactly what sort of institution you plan to run.
And we’ve got the annual reports, we’ve got television interviews, we’ve got various ways of conveying to people what kind of a place Berkshire is. And to some, that says, “Come in,” and to others it says, “Stay out.”
Phil Fisher wrote a great book on investing back in the very early 1960s and he described the situation this way.
He said, “Look it, you can have a restaurant and it can say ‘French food’ and if you have French food inside, you know, people are going — you’re going to get a satisfied and returning clientele. And you can have another one that says hamburgers. But what you can’t do is have hamburgers on the outside on the marquee and deliver French food inside.”
And so many companies sort of try and promise everything to everybody. Their investor relations department tells them that any shareholder they can get interested, you know, they want.
We want people who think the way we do. And we think, on balance, we won’t disappoint them too much.
But if we get a bunch of people who think that the earnings next quarter are going to be up 10 percent for some reason, and that’s the reason they own the stock, we’re going to have a lot of disappointed people.
And our goal in life is not to spend our time associating with people who are going to be disappointed with us.
It’s our fault if we give out the wrong advertisement. So we try to advertise what we are, and then we try to deliver on that.
And I do think we have the best group of shareholders in the world, you know, among large publicly-traded companies.
And I think it’s because we’ve got people that basically look into buying a business, becoming our partners over the years, and they know we’ll treat them like partners.
And they, in turn, give us a lot of comfort in having a stable shareholder base and a good feeling about just running the whole place.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what happened here is, to some extent, an accident.
Warren and I started out investing money for our families and friends, and the people who trusted us when we were young and unknown, of course, we developed a strong affection for.
And we morphed into controlling public companies from that base, and so we tend to regard our shareholders, including the new ones, as family.
And that’s not put on, that’s the way we regard you. Other people can’t do that because they morphed into their situation in a different way.
And if you were a CEO and dealt with the average institutional investor, who is interested in having his portfolio management look good the next six months, you’d find it hard to love your shareholders.
They’re sort of a hostile force that are putting unreasonable expectations on you. And so I don’t think Warren and I deserve such wonderful credit for the fact that we have better relations with our shareholders. We came up in a totally different way.
Now, we did have enough sense, when we saw that it was such a good thing and so satisfying, that we stayed with it. But weren’t we — we got into this by accident, didn’t we?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we got in by accident, and we also were blessed with the fact that we did not have an investor relations department that wanted us to go out and pump up.
CHARLIE MUNGER: But that was on purpose.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. (Laughter)
I have seen them in operation at dozens of companies, I’ve been involved in one way or another. And it is really ridiculous, the idea that you go out and try and cater to the expectations of people that are expecting you to do things you can’t do by operations, but maybe you can do by accounting for a short period of time. It leads to the worst behavior.
And in the end, somebody’s going to own all your shares, you know. There’s no way that shares remain empty, you know, in the shareholder list. So why not get a bunch of people who are going to stick with you who are in sync?
And the way they’re going to be in sync is if you told them rather accurately what you expect, how you expect to do it, and tell them when you make mistakes, all of that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: But we probably shouldn’t be as critical of people who came up a different way dealing with a different shareholder face.
It’s not at all clear that we wouldn’t have ended up somewhat the same way if we’d had the same manner of rising.
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. Yeah. So we’ll give up being critical for the next five or 10 minutes, and then we’ll go back. (Laughter)
24. Low interest rates are hurting people scared out of stocks
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol?
CAROL LOOMIS: Very short question. Please comment on the implications of our existing, and perhaps continuing, zero percent interest rate.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s very tough for anybody that’s got their investment in short-term money.
You know, if you’re getting a tenth of a percent on some money market fund currently that if you’d started doing that when Columbus landed, and didn’t pay any taxes, you’d have almost doubled your money by now. (Laughter)
It’s really — I mean, people talk about easy money policies, but it isn’t so easy on the people who’ve got the money.
It won’t go on forever, but it may seem like forever to people that are on fixed income. I’m very sympathetic with them.
Basically they got, many of them, became fearful when the world was looking like it was collapsing in late 2008. And the price they pay is really — I know some people like that that are — it’s terrible in terms of returns and their purchasing power will be eaten away. But this will end at some point.
I don’t know how it will end, but I would not like to be chairman of the Fed or secretary of the treasury. Nobody’s ever asked me, but maybe that’s why I say I wouldn’t want to do it.
But the — we will — it won’t work forever to run huge budget deficits and try and have very easy monetary policy. And when — if we do run into trouble, the blame should not go to the Fed, the blame should go to Congress. (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: In some sense, the reality of our situation is almost amusingly depressing.
Stocks are up because the return from loaning your money out at interest in a safe way is so lousy, and of course, one answer is that can’t last.
In which case, stocks won’t be as pronounced a value, relatively speaking. And of course, if it does last, as it has in Japan, we won’t like that either because it will mean we’re mired in some horrible stagnation.
This is a very cheery message. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: The pressure that is exerted by extremely low interest rates — short-term rates — on the value of everything else, it’s hard to overestimate that.
I mean, the reason people have their money out at one-tenth of 1 percent is that they’re afraid of everything else. But as they’re being afraid of everything else abates, as it has over the last couple years, the pressure to push stock prices up, push real estate prices back up, it’s enormous.
And of course, that’s understood by people who have something to do with those matters. But I don’t think you should underestimate the degree to which the last year of stock prices has been a result of the agony that people are being put through that keep their money in short-term money instruments.
Unless they’re terrified of the world, they get pushed into other investments, and I think we’ve seen a lot of that, and we’ll see what happens when money rates do go up, if they do.
25. Valuing businesses by asking questions
WARREN BUFFETT: Twelve.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Jeff Colvette (PH) and I’m from Olathe, Kansas.
I got started in investing in 1999, right before the big tech bubble, and unfortunately I learned buy and hold and don’t fret about market price fluctuations before I learned the importance of valuing a business and applying a margin of safety.
So, as Charlie said, I got my feet wet with huge failure right away. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Join the club. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, I don’t feel so bad now.
So that leads to my question. It seems like I’ve read all the Berkshire reports and all the reading I can do about you two, and I thank you for these wonderful meetings.
But it seems like it boils down to some simple things, valuing a business and applying a margin of safety.
So my question is, what do you recommend for an approach to getting better and better at valuing companies?
WARREN BUFFETT: That was a very, very good question. And in my own case, you know, I started out without knowing anything about valuing companies.
And Ben Graham taught me a way to value a certain type of company that would prove successful, except the universe of those companies dried up.
But nevertheless — it was almost a guarantee against failure, but it was not a guarantee that these things would continue to be available.
Charlie taught me a lot about the value of a durable competitive advantage, and a really first-class business.
But over time, I’ve learned more about various types of businesses. But you’d be amazed how many businesses I don’t feel that I understand well.
The biggest thing is not how big your circle of competence is, but knowing where the perimeter is.
You don’t have to be an expert on 90 percent of the businesses, or 80 percent, or 70, or 50. But you do have to know something about the ones that you actually put your money into, and if that’s a very small part of the universe, that still is not a killer.
And I think if you think about what you would pay for a McDonald’s sandwich, you think you would pay for — you know, think about the businesses in your own hometown of Olathe.
Which would you like to buy into? Which do you think you could understand their economics? Which do you think will be around 10 or 20 years from now? Which do you think it would be very tough to compete with?
Just keep asking yourself questions about businesses. Talk with other people about them.
You will extend your knowledge over time. And always remember that margin of safety. And I think you basically have the right attitude because you recognize your limitations, and that’s enormously important in this business. You will find things to do.
Six or seven years ago — maybe not that long — six or seven years ago, when I was looking at Korean stocks, for example, I never had any idea that Korean stocks would be something that I would be buying.
But I looked over there, and I could see that there were a number of businesses that met the margin of safety test.
And there I diversified, because I didn’t know that much about any specific one, but I knew that a package of 20 was going to work out very well, even if a crook might run one of them, and a couple might run into competition I didn’t anticipate, because they were so cheap. And that was sort of the old Graham approach.
You will find opportunities from time to time, and the beauty of it is you don’t have to find very many of them.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well obviously, if you want to get good at something which is competitive, you have to think about it a lot, and learn a lot, and practice doing it a lot.
And the way the world is constructed in this field, you have to keep learning, because the world keeps changing and your competitors keep learning.
So you just have to get up each morning and try and go to bed that night a little wiser than you were when you got up.
And if you keep doing that for a long time — and accumulate some experience, good and bad, as you try and master what you’re trying to do — people who do that almost never fail utterly.
They may have a bad period when luck goes against them or something. But very few people have ever failed with that.
If you have the right temperament, you may rise slowly but you’re sure to rise.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, did you take any business courses in school?
CHARLIE MUNGER: None. I took accounting.
WARREN BUFFETT: And when did you start valuing businesses and how did you go about it?
CHARLIE MUNGER: When I was a little boy. (Laughter)
I can remember, I would come down to the Omaha Club, and there was an old gentleman who hit the Omaha Club about 10:30 every morning. He obviously did almost no work, and yet was quite prosperous.
WARREN BUFFETT: He became your ideal. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But he made me very curious as a little boy. I said to my father, “How in the hell does he do that?” And he said, “Charlie,” he said, “A business where he enjoys practically no competition. He gathers up and renders dead horses.”
That was an example of avoiding competition by one stratagem. And you keep asking questions like that of reality, starting at a young age, you gradually learn. And weren’t you doing the same thing?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thankfully he went beyond his original insight there. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: I noticed, it was rather interesting — you take the rulers of the businesses when I was a little boy, an awful lot of those businesses, in Omaha, a lot of those businesses went broke, a lot of them sold out at modest prices under distress.
And some of the people who rose, like Kiewit, from small beginnings, nobody thought of as the great glories of that early time.
And I think that’s kind of the way life is. It’s hard to get anywhere near the top, and it’s hard to hold any position once you’ve attained it.
But I think you can predict that Kiewit was likely to win. They cared more about doing it right. They cared more about avoiding trouble. They put more discipline on themselves.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you knew the individual well, you would have bet, right?
CHARLIE MUNGER: What?
WARREN BUFFETT: If you knew the individual.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not have bet on any of the people I knew who were already wealthy. But I would have bet on Pete Kiewit. His sister taught me math, and no, half-Dutch, half-German, you know, this is a tough culture. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s your — you just heard it folks. Half-Dutch, half-German. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well but —
WARREN BUFFETT: Go out looking for them. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the man who’s recommending this is named Munger. (Laughter)
Anyway, the — no — I don’t think it’s that — I was just automatically doing that. What was working, what was failing, why was it working, why was it failing?
If you have that temperament, you are gradually going to learn. And if you don’t have that temperament, I can’t help you. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: If you’d followed Pete Kiewit around for 10 years, you never would have seen him do anything dumb, right?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. It’s so —
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s avoiding the dumb thing. You really don’t have to be brilliant, but, you know, you have to avoid just sort of what almost seem the obvious mistakes.
But I would say that you’re on the right track back there, in terms of having the basic fundamentals, knowing your limitations, but still seeking to learn more about various kinds of businesses.
Charlie, I think, when he practiced law, any client that came in Charlie was thinking about that business as if he owned the place.
And he probably generally thought he knew more about the place than the guy that actually owned it, who was his client. (Laughs)
But I remember talking to him, you know, 50 years ago, and he would start talking about Caterpillar dealerships in Bakersfield or something of the sort. He was incapable of looking at a business without thinking about the fundamental economics of it.
How’d that guy do with the Caterpillar deal? (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he sold it for a perfectly ridiculous price to a dumb oil company. (Laughter)
It wasn’t worth half what he got for it.
WARREN BUFFETT: But they had a concept and a strategy.
CHARLIE MUNGER: They had a concept and a strategy, and turned out they had consultants. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughs)
26. Companies with the best return on capital
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Carson Mitchell in Aberdeen, South Dakota, who asks both of you, “What business has had the best return on capital for Berkshire, and what business of any on earth has had the best return on capital?”
And he adds, “PS, I would have come by rail but there are no seats in the grain rail cars.” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s two ways of looking at it.
If you talk about the capital necessary to run the business, as opposed to what we might have paid for the business — I mean, if we buy a wonderful business — you could run the Coca-Cola Company —assuming you had the bottling systems — you could run it with no capital.
Now, if you buy it for $100 billion, you can look at that as your capital or you can look at the basic capital. When we look at what’s a good business, we’re defining it in terms of the capital actually needed in the business.
Whether it’s a good investment for us depends on how much we pay for that in the end.
There are a number of businesses that operate on negative capital. Carol’s with Fortune magazine. You know, any of the great magazines operate with negative capital.
I mean, the subscribers pay in advance, there are no fixed assets to speak of, and the receivables are not that much, the inventory is nothing.
So a magazine business — my guess is that People magazine operates, or Sports Illustrated operates, with negative capital, and particularly People makes a lot of money.
So there are certain businesses. Well, we had a company called Blue Chip Stamps where we got the float ahead of time, and operated with really substantial negative capital.
But there are a lot of great businesses that need very, very little capital. Apple doesn’t need that much capital, you know.
The best ones, of course, are the ones that can get very large while needing no capital.
See’s is a wonderful business, needs very little capital, but we can’t get people eating ten pounds of boxed chocolates every day.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Except here.
WARREN BUFFETT: We want to. (Laughs)
Generally, the great consumer businesses need relatively little capital. The businesses where people pay you in advance, you know, magazine subscriptions being a case, insurance being a case, you know, you’re using your customer’s capital.
And we like those kind of businesses, but of course, so does the rest of the world, so they can become very competitive in buying them.
We have a business, for example, that’s run wonderfully by Cathy Baron Tamraz, called Business Wire. Business Wire does not require a lot of capital. It has receivables and everything, but it is a service-type business and many of the service-type businesses and consumer-type businesses require little capital.
And when they get to be successful, you know, they can really be something.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add, but at any rate, the formula never changes.
WARREN BUFFETT: If you could own one business in the world, what would it be, Charlie? (Laughter)
I hope we already own them, myself.
CHARLIE MUNGER: You and I got in trouble by addressing such a subject many decades ago.
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think I’ll come back to it.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) Number 13 —
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you name some business that has incredible pricing power, you’re talking about a business that’s a monopoly or a near monopoly.
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think it’s very smart for us to sit up here naming our most admired business or something, that other people regard as a monopoly.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move right along. (Laughter)
27. Phone hasn’t been ringing, but we’re still ready to buy
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, have we done number 13? No, I don’t think so, that’s in the other room again. Anybody there?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, greetings from the breakout room.
My name is Glenn Tongue from New York. I would like to thank you both for your exemplary stewardship through the economic crisis. We are all wealthier in several ways as a result of your efforts.
I’d like to ask about Berkshire’s growth, specifically your acquisition outlook and appetite. Has the phone been ringing?
WARREN BUFFETT: The phone doesn’t ring very often at Berkshire, you know. That’s partly because — well, we set out our criteria in the annual report for what we’re looking for, and we’re not looking for larger and larger things.
So when we start saying that we want to buy businesses that earn 75 or 100 million, at a minimum, before tax, that weeds out a lot of phone calls.
And I would say that, you know, if we get a couple of — three or four serious phone calls a year that sort of meet our criteria that look like they might be a possibility, that’s a good year, I like that.
I don’t think there’s been any major change in the frequency that something comes along that might interest us.
The answer is, in terms of being interested, we’re as interested as ever. I mean, we wrote a big check and issued shares in connection with BNSF.
But I would love it if Monday morning my phone rings with some big deal. We’ll figure out a way to do it.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s amazing to me that we have been as successful as we have been in buying desirable places.
And it’s human revulsion that has helped us, because many of the people who sell to us are so smart that they’re revolted by almost everything else.
They don’t want to sell into some fee-driven buying system that doesn’t care about their employees or their business.
And they finally decide they want to join this one, they don’t want to join the alternatives. And of course, that’s marvelous for us.
We’ve got a screening device out there that is protecting us, to some extent, from the wrong sort of people. And very few people have this particular —
We get offered things by people who would not sell to anybody else. That is really peculiar. And it’s happened what, how many times?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s happened, and on important ones. There’s one I’ve mentioned before, so I can mention the name.
When I heard from ISCAR, and I’d never heard of ISCAR before, I’d never heard of Eitan Wertheimer, who wrote me, but he basically told me and made it quite specific, they either wanted to sell to Berkshire Hathaway or they didn’t want to sell it to anybody.
And we met and we made a deal. And there was another person — I won’t even define exactly the time period — but he came in and he’d been thinking about it for about a year on this business, and he’d built it over many decades.
And he said, “There were three possibilities. One was to sell it to a competitor.” And he said, “They would have ideas immediately about all the people they could take out of this place and move the headquarters,” and everything, and they would dismantle something that he’d spent 30 years or so building.
And he decided that he didn’t want to do that, even though it was probably worth more to a competitor, because that’s often the case, than to anybody else.
And then he looked at selling to a leverage buyout firm — and now would call itself a private equity firm — and he decided he did not want his place being, basically, a piece of meat that would be resold in not that many years. He really wanted to find a permanent home.
So he said, “When I come to you, I don’t come to you because you’re so damned attractive.” He said, “You’re the only guy left.” (Laughter)
And we bought the business. So that happens from time to time, and it’s accidental. It’s when something happens in someone’s life that they decide they really want to assure a permanent home.
It may be because the family isn’t getting along. It may be, you know, a half a dozen reasons. Maybe somebody wants to monetize it because they want to give away a lot of money.
But periodically that will come up, and we are a logical place to get the call, and we will get the calls. But there’s not much we can do to accelerate the process or do anything of the sort.
We are ready to act when it happens. I mean, if I get a call, and it’s a $10 billion deal, on Monday, and I like it, I will say yes. (Laughs)
And then I’ll figure out how we do it.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t think it’s over. It may be, in fact, it will be, slower than it was in the early days. But that’s not so bad, considering how much richer we all are than we were then.
28. Big question for Berkshire’s future
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Since I imagine this may be one of the last questions, Peter Brotchie, a shareholder from Wenham, Massachusetts, writes to say, “Thank you, Warren and Charlie, for improving the Q&A session last year.
“Along those lines, are there important questions that you were surprised that you don’t get asked about Berkshire’s financials or businesses? And if so, what is the question you would ask yourself if the roles were reversed?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well Andrew, first of all, I will say we got a lot of compliments on changing the format. It worked, and that’s why we’re continuing it. So it’s worked very well. (Applause)
And that applause is for you, not for me, and you deserve it.
It really has improved the quality of questions, in terms of having it Berkshire-related and having a system of weeding them out without us being the ones that do the weeding out.
Now, I’ve given Charlie time to think about what the answer to that question is going to be, so I’m going to turn it over to him. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t have a lot of comment about things that should be done differently at Berkshire.
I think it is quite interesting that we got into BYD, because BYD is surfing along on the developing edge of new technology, and that has not — we have always bragged about avoiding that.
Isn’t that a fair statement?
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s fair.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And yet here we are.
I think it’s because we’ve shown some capability for learning. And I think the BYD investment is going to work out very well. And I think it’ll work out very well in a way that gives great pleasure to all of us shareholders, because I think they’re going to help solve some significant problems of the world.
And, that place is — you know, I spoke with pride of Kiewit. They tried harder, they were more self-disciplined. That’s the way I feel about BYD.
And it’s a pleasure to associate with such people, and in my life those are the people with whom I’ve achieved the most.
So as far as I’m concerned, we found our own kind, except they’re better. And we may do more of that.
And we wouldn’t have felt confident enough to go into venture capital, typically with just a bright young man with an idea, no matter how brilliant.
WARREN BUFFETT: Not me.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I wouldn’t either.
But BYD had won its spurs in life by the time we found it. They had accomplished things that struck me as almost impossible to do, and yet they’d done them.
And so I don’t think that’s the last unusual thing that Berkshire will do, and the last one that will work.
And I think the Burlington Northern acquisition — when we did it, we knew it would be better for their shareholders than it was for ours, because, after all, they were getting into Berkshire. (Laughter)
But we also thought it was good for our shareholders. And why should we care that it was better for theirs, if it was satisfactory for us? And I think that will happen again, too.
That’s our kind of a culture. You know, Middle Western, and constantly improving the place. And with MidAmerican and Burlington, we’re getting a fair amount of engineering into Berkshire, which of course, I like.
And so I hope you people are comfortable with the way things are going, because I think they’ll keep going in the same direction. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause) I think they will keep going in the same direction.
But to answer your question on that, Andrew, I would probably ask the question, you know, “Can you keep using all of the capital you generate, effectively, for a very long time?”
And the answer, I think, to that is that even — we will see more things and we will do some more of this. There comes a point where the numbers get big enough that it gets extraordinarily hard to do things that add value.
I mean, if you just play out the numbers, you could see where in 10 or 15 years, not only the capital that’s already accumulated, but the generation of capital in everything, would make it very hard to do things that are, essentially, creating more than a dollar of value per dollar invested.
A portion of the money may be able to be used that way, and likely would be used in the kind of businesses we’re in.
There comes a point where the numbers get too big. And actually, our history is a curve that approaches that point all the time.
It’s turned out to be that now I think we can go a lot further than I would have thought 30 years ago. I mean, it’s just — it’s developed that way. And partly that’s because we see things that I never would have thought we would have seen 30 years ago.
But there is a limit. And there will come a time when we cannot intelligent — in my view — there will come a time when we cannot intelligently use 100 percent of the capital that we develop internally.
And then we’ll do something that’s — whatever is in the most interest — best interest — of the shareholders will be done at that point.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we will get into Berkshire, on the investment side — probably starting sooner than many of you expect — people who have some promise of being, well, if not as good as Warren, a decent approximation. And in some cases with abilities that Warren lacks.
In other words, it won’t be all negative. (Laughter)
And so I’m really quite optimistic. (Laughter)
I can see — the reason I think we will succeed at that is because Warren never looks twice at anybody who isn’t a little eccentric, which, of course, is what you’re looking at when you look up here.
WARREN BUFFETT: Living proof, yeah. (Laughter)
29. “Find your passion, and then don’t let anything stop you”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well I think we’d better move on to section 1. (Laughs)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Joseph Mazzella from Jim Thorpe, PA.
I wanted to first thank Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, as well as the board of directors for this meeting, as well as the whole shareholder weekend. I’ve had a great time so far.
WARREN BUFFETT: Terrific. (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With that, I wanted to share. Aristotle, when asked how to define wealth, answered simply this, “It is he who spends less than he earns.”
What advice could you give a young entrepreneur as myself on how to go about defining and both building wealth within their own business, as I hope to build a business that, one day, you’d be interested in acquiring.
WARREN BUFFETT: I predict you’re going to build one. You know, it may not quite get to the size that — and we’re a moving target as well — but if you start off with that principle you just enunciated, there are probably some other similar principles that you’ll have that we would also agree with.
There’s nothing like following your passion. I mean, I love what I do, obviously, and I’ve loved it the whole time I’ve done it. Charlie is the same way.
We have managers, you know, they come — some of them went to business school, some of them didn’t, you know.
They’re all types. But the common factor in them — they’re successful — the common factor is they love what they do, you know.
And you’ve got to find that in life. And some people are very lucky in finding it very early. It was dumb luck that my father happened to be in the securities business, so when I would go to his office there were a lot of books to read, and I got entranced with that.
But, you know, if he’d been in some other occupation — I think I would have read those books eventually, but it would have been a lot later.
So if you find something that turns you on, my guess is you’re going to do very well in it.
And the beauty of it is, in a sense, there’s not that much competition. There are not a lot of people out there that are going to be running faster than you in the race that you elect to get into.
And if you haven’t found it yet — you may well have found it — but if you haven’t found it yet, you know, you’ve got to keep looking.
And we’ve got 70-plus managers. You know, some of them didn’t — we had one guy that didn’t go to high school, even, didn’t he, Charlie? (Inaudible)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: He quit in fourth grade, I think.
Well, Mrs. B never went to school a day in her life.
And when you go out to the Furniture Mart — I hope you go out this evening, we expect to set a record today in sales (laughter) — what you are looking at on those 78 acres, you know, is the largest home furnishing store, about 400 million in sales. The largest store in the United States, and it comes from $500 of capital paid in by a woman that never went to a day of school in her life and couldn’t read or write.
She loved what she was doing, and, you know, I tell the story, this is a true story.
When she was well into her 90s, she invited me over to her house for dinner. That was very unusual.
And a very nice house, six or seven blocks away from the store. And I went into the house, and the sofa, the chairs, the lamp, the dining room table, they all had little green price tags hanging down. (Laughter)
It made her feel at home. (Laughter)
And I said to her, “Mrs. B, you are my kind of woman.” Forget Sophia Loren and all of that, this is my kind of woman. She loved it.
And she loved it all her life, and just think of what that produced. I mean, it just — it’s incredible.
I mean, you know, one time — my dad used to quote Emerson, that “the power that lies within you is new in nature.”
And basically, the power that was within Mrs. B was new in nature. And over a lifetime it produced amazing things.
So find your passion, and then don’t let anything stop you.
30. Munger’s fundamental algorithm of life
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol? (Applause)
CAROL LOOMIS: This is a deeply philosophical question. “Many things that you” — the man did not want his name announced — “Many things that you and Charlie do and preach are opposite to those of what people practice and expect.
“For example, you do not change the management of the acquired company, you applaud long-standing employees while others always look for fresh blood and try to fire people as they grow old. You probably do not encourage retirement, while many companies do.
“You do not give large compensation to directors or compensate them using stock options. You do not seem to hire many MBAs. You don’t invest in high tech, but your company has grown very fast.
“You do not provide earnings guidelines. You do not live near New York. You do not like sushi.” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the key. (Laughter)
CAROL LOOMIS: “I wonder, what is the fundamental reason for all of these things? In other words, there appears to be a central philosophy here that I am missing.
“I can understand these as isolated principles, but where is the beef? Scientists and philosophers look for a unifying theory when possible.
“What is yours? Is it Buddhism, or Paganism, or something else? Yes, I am looking for your fundamental or unified theory of management in life or fundamental guiding principles.”
WARREN BUFFETT: In ten words or less. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me try that one, Warren.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh good. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s pragmatism. Partly, we do things in our different way because it suits us. And partly, we do it — it suits our temperaments and our natures — and partly, we do it because we’ve found through experience that it works better, at least with us sitting where we sit.
It’s just that simple. And we’ve had enough good sense when something is working very well to keep doing it.
So I’d say we’re demonstrating what might be called the fundamental algorithm of life. Repeat what works.
Is that terse enough for you? (Laughter)
31. Private high-speed passenger trains aren’t economic
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go on to number 3, I like it. (Laughs)
Or number 2, I’m sorry. Number 2.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, I am Carolyn Boyle, from Barrington, Illinois.
Thanks for the meeting and thanks everybody from behind the scenes who put this together. It’s quite well orchestrated. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: If I may interrupt you for just one second, that’s very well deserved. And I would to point out that at Berkshire, everybody in our home office — we have 21 of us — they all participate in working at this meeting.
I mean, our CFO works on it — you name anybody in the office — because they enjoy it.
We don’t think we should have a department, you know, for this or that, or the other thing. And I think that’s probably fairly unusual with companies with market caps of close to $200 billion. (Laughs)
But you’ve seen Marc Hamburg walking around here and doing things. It’s a group effort, and they have — I hope they have — fun doing it, because they sure don’t get a bonus for it. (Laughs)
But I think it exemplifies the organization. Thank you, I’m sorry to interrupt you, go ahead.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s OK. Let me share a bit.
I had some trouble getting the annual statement information, so I finally got on the internet and sent in the postcard request a week ago Friday, yesterday, and I got my tickets before the meeting. So it was very well orchestrated.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now that you own some rail business, I’d like to have your perspective on whether our country needs a high-speed passenger rail service.
And if you think it does, should that be a private or a public endeavor?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think by its nature, it would be non-economic when it competes with auto and competes with air. We don’t have the point-to-point density and demand that would produce a return on capital.
That just — that is my guess. I made no big study of it. But all of the times I’ve seen projections of the economics of it, it just doesn’t work that well.
So it will be — if it gets done — unless it’s heavily subsidized in some way, which means it’s public anyway — I don’t think it will happen under private — it won’t meet the test of private economics.
Charlie, you know, they’ve got a big proposal in California on this. What do you know about the economics of that?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know very little, but I’m at least as dubious as you are.
The cost of putting in a high-speed rail system in a place that’s already densely populated is awesomely large. And of course, you’re competing with a system that people prefer.
WARREN BUFFETT: They’re talking about in Omaha —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m very skeptical about sticking high-speed rails. I think it’s great in Japan and China.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s working.
CHARLIE MUNGER: They have a different calculus.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in Japan, But it worked — yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: But putting high-speed rail into Los Angeles just looks to me like a bottomless pit of cost and trouble. And just think of how difficult that would be.
WARREN BUFFETT: If it’s going to be high-speed, it can’t stop very often, you know, by definition. And it can’t go off into spurs and all of these kind of things.
So it really gets to point-to-point operation, and the cost gets staggering. There’s talk in Omaha about a trolley system, and I think — they’re talking about, you know, a couple hundred million dollars or something like that from the federal government.
And the projections of actual revenue are, as I remember, are something like $400,000, and that’s before operating costs.
So the math — you put $200 million into something to move people a few miles in Omaha, and most of the people are going to want to ride their cars. And to have it be efficient it has to be point-to-point, pretty much, for them. I mean, if you start living six blocks one way or eight blocks another way, you say, “Nuts, I’ll take the car.”
The math really gets to be staggering on these things.
And now, you know, everybody figures if you can get the money from the federal government, you know, it doesn’t cost anybody anything. But it would be a lot of money.
It’s been done in Buffalo, and people like it. But I’ve also — I’ve requested the figures on it, and it blows your mind, in terms — I mean, you could give everybody a cab ride or something and it’d be cheaper for society as a whole.
So I have a feeling that it works marvelously, maybe, between Tokyo and Yokohama or something. And it really does. And it even works well enough so I think it justifies private investment.
But it’s tough in a country of, you know, three million-plus square miles, and within the continental lower 48. It’s very tough to make the math work.
Now, if people get — it becomes a huge project or something of the government so it isn’t anybody’s math, you know, maybe it’ll happen. I don’t think it’ll ever happen with money that wants a return.
32. We can handle claims from a major earthquake
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This is a question on the insurance portfolio from Jerry Haller (PH).
What would be the impact on insurance companies, and the U.S. economy in general, if an earthquake of the same magnitude that struck Chile were to be focused on Los Angeles or San Francisco?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know the answer to that. The Richter Scale is not a perfect — it’s far from a perfect — index of the damage caused, even if you tell me where the epicenter will be.
And then you get into the — you know, the big damage in the famous San Francisco quake was the fire following.
They call that — when they distinguish between the — what coverages are involved — they call that the “shake and bake.”
I mean, how much is shake and how much is bake afterwards? (Laughter)
I think it gets hard to get up — I mean, in a really extreme quake — I think it gets hard to get up much more than 100 billion.
You know, a very big quake — the frequency is way less — but if you get up in the Pacific Northwest, you know, there is a possibility of a very high Richter Scale quake there.
And of course, the big ones that we know about — I mean, our history doesn’t go back that far — but New Madrid, Missouri, had three quakes in a relatively short period of time that were all well over eight.
And that will happen again someday, maybe 500 years, you know, maybe 1,000 years, and maybe tomorrow. That’s what the insurance business is all about.
I tend to think — and when I think about quake exposure, sort of worst case in California — I think 100 billion is getting up there.
Northridge caused far more damage than the one that was up near San Francisco a few years earlier.
But we’ll have them. And Berkshire is totally prepared to handle anything that comes along, even if it’s considerably worse than what I’ve —
The worst insured loss — I don’t know whether Katrina came in finally at 70 billion or something like that — I think in terms of a 250 billion sort of worst case.
And my guess is if that came along, and we had a normal year and everything else, Berkshire would still have positive earnings of some substantial amount. So we are prepared.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and, you know, the big San Francisco quake of whatever it was, ’06, caused a terrible fire. But the recent California quakes, the big ones, have not caused much fire. And a lot of earthquake damage is totally uninsured.
So you might have a hell of a lot of damage without massive — Warren would know more about that than I.
WARREN BUFFETT: So far in Chile —
CHARLIE MUNGER: The earthquake insurance is not universal like fire insurance.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh no, no, not at all, not at all. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: So it — an earthquake — a really terrible fire, or terrible wind conditions, it seems to me, catch people worse than the earthquakes.
WARREN BUFFETT: And so far in Chile, as I understand it — and I could be wrong on this and it may not be the way the final numbers come in — but as the numbers have been coming in, something like 40 percent of it has been the tsunami and 60 percent has been the quake, in terms of damage.
But that may well not hold to be — in terms of final figures.
There will be huge catastrophes from time to time. We’re in a different class, in terms of even being able to handle them.
I mean, we’ve got so much earning power outside of the insurance business that if you take a $250 billion quake, or hurricane, or whatever, and we have, probably now, not much more than 3 percent of that — but call it 4 percent — that’d be $10 billion — and, you know, our pre-tax earnings, in any given year, I would expect would be substantially greater than that.
So we would have other — we have net earnings in a year that every other insurance company, you know, would be gasping. So we’re in pretty good shape on that.
33. “Huge amounts of debt are not going to do us in”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.
This is probably the last question, and then we’ll go to the business meeting.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Frank Teed and I’m from Arkadelphia, Arkansas.
This is also an insurance-type question, but I did want to thank Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, the board, and in Arkansas we call them the associates — the managers — for your integrity in running Berkshire Hathaway and dealing fairly with the shareholders. So thank you very much.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We saw in the credit crisis the gross overuse of credit, which led to the big financial meltdown with the government ultimately stepping in.
Now we see a huge increase in debt in our cities, our states, our countries.
For Berkshire Hathaway, what could be our exposure on a global financial meltdown? Could there be correlated risk that could get us in trouble?
You’ve said we have 40 billion in municipal bond insurance. There’s 8 billion to the states, which I’m not sure exactly if that was a municipal bond.
Could a large event cause a large number of losses that was coupled with a decrease in our investments to make an AIG-type situation? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you postulate something where there was a total meltdown, and we essentially made the bet in 2008 there would not be.
It would be unnecessary, but we came close in 2008, and I decided that A) the government could solve the panic that existed, and finally that they would.
There wasn’t any question in my mind they could. The question is, would they get so muddled up, would decision making get paralyzed, would rivalries break out, would, you know, Congress grandstand? All of those sort of things.
And I thought there’d be some of that, but I thought in the end we would do the right thing, which was go all in, which we did.
And that would happen again. So I — if you talk about some massive nuclear, chemical, or biological attack that really does in a very significant proportion of the population or something, you know, who knows what would happen.
But I would say this, that I think Berkshire can withstand anything that any corporation can.
And it won’t be our insurance business that causes a problem. If something extraordinary happens — and I don’t anticipate that at all — but there could be a situation where the world becomes paralyzed.
But I think that having gone through 2008, I think that our government probably better understands the necessity of taking massive action at a time like that.
Doing whatever is necessary — when the guaranteed money market funds, when the guaranteed commercial paper — I mean, when there are things like that, you know, they were sort of unprecedented, and they did them very quickly.
They’d do it again, in my view. There is no reason — the plants of the country don’t disappear, the land doesn’t become less fertile, you know, people don’t become less innovative — things will work unless somehow the gears get all entirely messed up. And I don’t see that happening.
Berkshire, from any insurance catastrophe — and you’re right that things correlate on the downside — when things are bad in one area, they really do spread to another.
But we were built, I think, to withstand anything that — other than a total sort of wipe out of the world. That isn’t going to happen.
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not worried about it. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Huge amounts of debt are not going to do us in. That’s one thing I can guarantee you.
I can’t tell you about comets hitting us or something of that sort, but I don’t care how silly governments get in terms of finance, or corporations get, or anything of that sort, that will not harm Berkshire.
I want to thank you all for coming. Charlie and I really appreciate it. (Applause) And thank you.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I appreciate it, we appreciate that, I’m sure the panel does.
Now we’ll break for about five minutes. Some of you can go shop and some of you will want to stay around for the business meeting, and we’ll start the business meeting in five minutes and we’ll see how long it takes.
34. Berkshire business meeting begins
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I’ve already introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors.
Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of proceedings.
Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes casts in the election of directors.
The main proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 3, 2010, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,029,738 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 926,013,086 of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
Of that number, 705,611 Class A shares and 566,627,821 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 29th.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place the motion before the meeting.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last annual meeting of the shareholders and the special meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?
We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All of those in favor say aye.
VOICES: Aye.
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion’s carried.
35. Election of Berkshire directors
WARREN BUFFETT: Second item of business is to elect directors. The shareholders present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.
Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them?
I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to the election of directors.
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? Nominations are ready to be voted upon.
If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.
BETSY AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 756,041 votes for each nominee.
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.
Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.
36. Business meeting adjourns
WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?
If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.
WALTER SCOTT: I move this meeting be adjourned.
WARREN BUFFETT: Second?
VOICE: I second the motion.
WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye.
VOICES: Aye.
2010年股东大会
上午场
1. 开场白
巴菲特:早上好。我是沃伦,他是查理。
他耳朵好使,我眼睛好使。所以我们才搭档共事。(笑)
我想更正一下短片里的一个地方。我的快速球是用慢动作拍的。他们试过正常速度,结果根本看不清,所以——(笑)
我们今天的安排是,先宣布几件事,公布我们的盈利情况,并向大家介绍董事们。但一结束这些,我们就会进入问答环节,一直持续到中午。
我们会休息一小时,下午1点回来。届时,在分会场的各位可能就能进到这边的主会场了。
我们会一直问答到下午3点半,然后为还留在这里的各位召开年度股东大会、也就是业务会议。届时我们将进行董事选举。
2. 介绍董事会成员
巴菲特:不过,因为不是所有人都会留到那个时候,我想先在这里把董事们介绍给大家,我会请他们逐一起立。
如果大家能把掌声留到他们都站起来之后再鼓——或者干脆之后再鼓——(笑)——会让整个会议显得更有条理。
那我们就从霍华德·巴菲特开始。按字母顺序,下一个就是我。接下来是我们的新任董事,史蒂夫·伯克。
他们没听清要一直站着这部分,不过没关系。他们通常还是相当听话的,只是——(笑)
苏珊·德克尔。比尔·盖茨。大卫·戈特斯曼,桑迪·戈特斯曼。夏洛特·盖曼。
唐·基奥今天不能到场。他做了一个大手术,不过恢复得很好,他在现场有很多朋友,明年他会和我们在一起。
查理,我们已经介绍过了。汤姆·墨菲。罗恩·奥尔森,也就是我们短片里的那位经理人。还有沃尔特·斯科特。
现在大家可以尽情为这一群人鼓掌了。(掌声)
3. “步履蹒跚”的经济出现了一些复苏
巴菲特:在开始问答之前,我们有第一季度的初步盈利数字要告诉大家。
我想请放映员把幻灯片A打出来。这些数字里其实没什么特别令人意外的,但我们还是想给大家看看。这些数字投上去了吗?好的。大家之后如果对这些有什么问题,可以再提。
我们从旗下各项业务中看到的情况是,几个月前那种颇为“步履蹒跚”的复苏,似乎在3月和4月加快了步伐。
我们那些服务于广泛工业的业务,比如铁路公司、Marmon或者ISCAR,都出现了相当不错的回升。这离几年前的水平还差得很远,但几个月前那种时好时坏、参差不齐的复苏势头,在最近几个月确实明显强劲了不少。
我们一直鼓励大家关注营业利润。表上有我们投资和衍生品业务的数字。
我们并不认为这些数字在单个季度里有什么意义。当然,放在多年的跨度上,它们是有意义的——这些年下来,我们靠资本利得积累了不少净资产。但就任何单一季度而言,它们没有任何意义。
你们还会注意到我们报告的另一点:我们甚至没有列出——虽然正式公开披露时是要列的——但我们没有在这里列出每股收益。我们并不关注任何某一季度或某一年度的这个数字。
我们关注的是价值的积累。而且我们真心认为,过度关注季度盈利,不仅对投资者来说很可能是个坏主意,对经理人来说更是个糟糕透顶的主意。
如果我告诉我们的经理人,这个季度我们要赚3.175美元每股,那你们知道的,他们可能就会想方设法凑数,好确保最终真的落在那个数字上。
几个月前发表过一项很有意思的研究,考察了成千上万份盈利报告。
报告通常只精确到分,而这项研究把数字往后多取了一位。当然,如果你再往后多取一位,逢四以下就向下舍入,逢五以上就向上舍入。
结果他们发现,数字为“四”的出现次数少得在统计学上根本不可能——因为一旦算到零点四美分,会计部门的某个人不知怎么总能再多找出零点一美分,好把它凑成向上舍入。这绝非偶然。
依我们之见,你不应该——试图去凑出几个月前私下向华尔街分析师透露过的那个精确到分的数字,这是一种糟糕透顶的做法。
我们在伯克希尔大概把这一点做到了极致。但我们始终把整个企业看作一个整体,我们想的是随着时间推移积累价值。
我们不去操心每股收益,也不去操心投资的盈亏。
查理或许想就这个问题说几句。查理?
芒格:嗯,我同意你的看法。(笑)
巴菲特:是啊。他是完美的副主席。(笑)再没有比他更好的了。好了。
说完这个初步情况——其实我们大概就该到此为止了。(笑)
4. 介绍记者团
巴菲特:我们今天会在三位记者组成的小组之间轮流提问。坐在最右边的是《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯。(掌声)
我们没有完全按字母顺序来。这位是《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金。(掌声)
还有CNBC的贝姬·奎克。(掌声)
看样子安德鲁特意挪到了那个位置,好在提问顺序里靠前一些,不过我大概还是会按字母顺序来。
我们会在几位记者之间轮流提问,然后再转到会场各处,由随机抽中的观众提问。
我们还会连线到我想是其中一个分会场——我们有好多个分会场,但不会每个都连到。
5. 待删除
巴菲特:那我们开始吧。卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:好的,既然我在字母顺序抽签中"中奖",我也要先做两个简短的声明。
第一件事是,我们收到了大量的问题。我们其实并不清楚具体有多少,因为有些人把问题同时发给了我们三个人。但我估计大概有1500到2000个问题。
显然,我们不可能把这些问题都问一遍,对于没能提出的问题,我们深表歉意。它们都是非常好的问题,我们很感激大家在这些问题上花费的心血。
另外我想说的是,沃伦和查理事先完全不知道会被问到什么问题,所以他们只能随机应变,现场作答。
6. 巴菲特力挺高盛
卡罗尔·卢米斯:不过,沃伦和查理可能已经聪明地猜到,第一个问题会是关于甲话题——也就是高盛。
我收到了好几封关于美国证券交易委员会(SEC)起诉高盛一案的邮件,每封邮件问的角度都不太一样。
我把这些问题中的几点想法合并了一下,在此感谢摩根士丹利的Greg Firman(音)、Kai Pan(音),以及Brian Chan(音)和Vic Timono(音),下面就是这个问题:
沃伦,每年伯克希尔的短片里——今天你又这么做了——你都会放那段所罗门危机时期的片段,在片中你对国会说,你曾警告所罗门的员工,如果他们让公司的声誉受到哪怕一丝损害,你都会毫不留情地做出反应。
显然,由于SEC的这一行动,高盛的声誉已经受损。你能告诉我们,你对这起诉讼有何反应?考虑到伯克希尔在高盛的大笔投资,你对此有何反思?
基于你自己在所罗门事件中的经验,你会给高盛的董事会和管理层什么建议?
巴菲特:好。你每次问我这种多部分的问题,我可能都得回过头来把每一部分都答一遍。
不过,我们先从这笔交易说起,因为这才是重点。
几周前的一个星期五,一笔名为ABACUS的交易成为了SEC起诉书的主题,我记得那份起诉书大概有22页。而且我认为,在我读到的关于这笔交易的报道中,至少——可能是大多数——都在某种程度上误报了这笔交易的性质,当然不是有意的。
所以我想——这会花一点时间,但我认为这是个重要的话题——我想先把这笔交易讲清楚。然后我们再进一步谈谈那些给卡罗尔发邮件的人提出的问题。
这笔交易,也就是ABACUS交易,一共有四方是亏钱的,但我们只重点讲其中两方。
高盛自己就是亏钱的一方。我相信他们并不是有意要亏钱的。他们没能把交易中的一部分卖出去,只好自己留下了,我记得因为留了这部分,他们亏了9000万到1亿美元。
但从实际现金损失来看,最大的亏损方是欧洲一家非常大的银行,叫荷兰银行(ABN AMRO),后来它成了苏格兰皇家银行的一部分。
那么,荷兰银行——他们为什么会亏钱呢?他们亏钱是因为他们实际上为另一家公司ACA的信用做了担保。
荷兰银行的业务就是评判信用,决定自己愿意接受哪些信用、愿意为哪些信用做担保。
实际上,他们做的就是保险业里所谓的"代持交易"(fronting),说白了就是为另一方的信用做担保。
我们在伯克希尔也多次这样做过,而且是收费的。有些人不愿意接受XYZ保险公司的信用,但他们说,如果我们做担保,他们就愿意接受XYZ开出的保单。多年来,伯克希尔靠做担保赚了不少钱。
查理应该还记得,早在20世纪70年代初,我们遇到过一些非常不诚实的人,那次我们亏了钱,而且亏得还不少,因为我们为某个信用其实并不好的人做了担保。
说来也巧,那是劳合社(Lloyd's)的一些辛迪加。可是当我们的名字挂在担保上时,他们却想方设法不付钱。
所以荷兰银行同意为一家名叫ACA的公司大约9亿美元的信用做担保。他们为此收了费,这一点在SEC的起诉书里有提到,只是不太引人注意——他们收的费用是17个基点,也就是1%的17/100。
所以他们承担了9亿美元的信用担保风险,收到的报酬大概是160万美元。而他们担保信用的那家公司破产了,于是他们不得不支付这9亿美元。老实说,对于一家银行做了一笔愚蠢的信用交易,我实在很难产生多少同情。
但我们来看看ACA,因为它才是这笔交易的核心所在。
ACA——大多数媒体报道其实都没提到这一点——是一家债券保险公司。它最初是一家市政债券保险公司,为各种信用提供担保,就像Ambac、MBIA、FGIC、FSA这些公司一样。
所有这些公司——我们几年前在年报里也写过这件事——最初都是做市政债券保险起家的。有些公司是30年前开始的。当时市政债券保险是一门很大的生意。
后来市政债券保险业务的利润率开始被压缩。他们是怎么做的呢?他们没有守住自己熟悉的业务、接受较低的利润,而是跑去做结构性信用产品保险以及各种其他交易的保险业务。
几年前我在年报里形容他们的做法,有点像梅·韦斯特(Mae West)说的那句话:"我本是白雪公主,可我走偏了。"(笑)
这些债券保险公司——几乎每一家都是如此——渐渐"走偏",去承保一些它们并不太懂、但能多赚点钱的东西。
ACA是这样,MBIA是这样,AMBEC是这样,FGIC是这样,FSA也是这样,结果它们无一例外都陷入了麻烦。
那么,债券保险公司去承保结构性信用产品或市政债券以外的东西,本身有什么问题吗?没有。但你最好清楚自己在做什么。
有意思的是,就在这些公司陷入麻烦的时候,伯克希尔·哈撒韦却进入了市政债券保险这门生意。
我们承保的东西,几乎和ACA或其他公司所承保的一模一样,区别在于,我们认为自己更清楚自己在做什么。我们收取的费用比他们高,而且我们对不懂的东西一概不碰。
我们从未承保过CDO,也从未承保过任何RMBS之类的交易。
但我想给大家举一个我们确实承保过的例子,因为我认为这有助于大家更好地理解ABACUS这笔交易。那么——请放映员把第1张幻灯片放出来,我来给大家讲一笔交易。
大家看一下这个——放出来了吗?好,出来了。几年前有人找上我们——名字我等会儿再告诉大家——一家大型投资银行几年前找到了我们。
当时我们经常承保债券。我们承保过这里的奥马哈公共电力区(Omaha Public Power District)的债券,很多人都熟悉这家机构。我们还承保过内布拉斯加州——卫理公会医院(Methodist Hospital)的债券,那家医院离这里也就六七英里。
我们告诉大家,如果内布拉斯加卫理公会医院无法偿还其债券,伯克希尔·哈撒韦会替他们偿还。就这家医院而言,我们承担的担保规模大约是1亿美元。所以我们确实是在做债券保险这门生意。
几年前,有人找到我们,是一家大型投资银行,他们说:"看看这个投资组合。"
大家可以看到,上面列了一大堆州的名字。对,已经放出来了。金额差别很大:佛罗里达州是11亿美元,加利福尼亚州却只有2亿美元。
他们对我们说:“你们愿意为这些州承保吗?就是承保这些州的债券在未来10年内能偿付。如果哪个州不偿付,你们作为承保人就得赔付。”
我看了那份名单,阿吉特·贾因也看了那份名单,我们必须决定:第一,我们是否有足够的了解来对它们承保;第二,我们该收多少保费,因为这正是我们这门生意的本质所在。
我们并没有义务去承保。我们完全可以说:“算了吧,我们了解得不够,做不了这个决定。”但我们做出了决定,我们提出以约1.6亿美元的保费为这些债券承保10年。
于是我们收取了略高于1.6亿美元的保费,而对方——也就是所谓的交易对手——在这10年里得到了一份保证:如果这些州不能偿付,我们会像它们偿付了一样代为支付。
而这正是SEC对高盛这起案件——或者说指控——的核心所在。有人拿着这份名单来找我们;名单不是我们凭空想出来的,是另一方带来的。
这里大致有四种可能。我现在就告诉你们,两年前来找我们的那一方是谁:是雷曼兄弟。所以是雷曼兄弟,大致有四种可能。
雷曼兄弟可能自己持有这些债券,想要为信用风险买一份保护。他们也可能只是看空债券市场,实际上是在借这种方式做空这些债券。
他们也可能有一个持有这些债券的客户,想要为信用风险买一份保护。
或者他们可能有一个看空这些债券的客户,单纯想做空它。
我们并不在乎究竟是哪种情况。我们的工作是评估这些债券的风险,并确定合适的保费。
就算他们告诉我本·伯南克是交易的另一方,对我来说也没有任何区别。
如果我非得关心交易另一方是谁,那我就不该去做债券承保这门生意。他们本可以告诉我,交易另一方是查理。(笑)
所以,实际上,我们对这些债券所做的,和ACA对呈交给他们的那些债券所做的事情,完全一样。
ACA是这样的:面对呈交给他们的那份120只债券的名单,他们说:“其中大约有50只我们愿意承保。”
然后他们又回去谈判,又拿下了30只。
我们本也可以说,“我们不太喜欢按十亿一千五百万这个价钱来承保得克萨斯州的这部分,你们多给我们一些佛罗里达州的份额吧”,诸如此类。
但我们没有这样做。我们就是照单全收了呈交上来的名单。所以我们承保的完全是对方开出的名单。
而在ABACUS这笔交易中,纳入哪些债券多少是经过双方——某种协商——才确定的。
到头来,纳入ABACUS交易的那些债券很快就全部大幅贬值了。
但在2007年初,这一点并没有那么显而易见,你只要研究一下所谓的ABX指数就能看出来。
但住房泡沫——说真的,应该说是狂热——是在2007年才真正开始破裂的。
这些我们承保的州,或许确实存在麻烦。你可以说它们背负着庞大的养老金负担,也许交易另一方那个做空的人对此比我们了解得更多,但你知道,那是我们自己的问题。
我是说,如果我们想承保债券,像ACA、像MBIA那样,它们都有一整个团队来做这件事。而我们在伯克希尔只用了几个人来做。
但我看不出有任何理由——我是说,就算我们在这些债券上亏了很多钱,我也不会跑去找交易另一方说:“嘿,你占了我的便宜。”
我不在乎是不是约翰·保尔森在做空这些债券冲着我来。他完全不用担心我会说,他对这些州的财政状况掌握了什么超出我们的内幕信息。
这基本上就是ABACUS这笔交易的全貌。我认为这场争论的核心在于,保尔森是不是比债券承保方更了解这些债券。
我猜那家债券承保公司雇佣的人手比约翰·保尔森自己业务里的人手还多,他们只是——事后看来——做出了一个愚蠢的承保决定。
说实话,我实在看不出,交易另一方是约翰·保尔森,还是高盛,还是伯克希尔·哈撒韦,这中间会有什么区别。
假设我们在2007年初决定以某种方式做空住房市场。我不认为有谁应该因为我们采取了这个立场而责备我们,如果我们真那么做了的话。我们没有那么做。做多也是一样的道理。
我想在回答卡罗尔问题的其他部分之前,先请查理谈谈这个话题,因为查理拥有法学学位,在很多方面都比我强,所以我们来听听他的看法。
芒格:嗯,我的看法很简单。这是SEC委员们以三比二做出的决定,而在通常情况下,他们是全体一致行事的。
如果我当时是SEC委员,我会投票支持那两位少数派,而不是支持那批准了这场诉讼的三位。
巴菲特:卡罗尔,能不能把我们大概还没回答的那三个部分再说一遍?然后我来处理这个问题。
不过我确实觉得理解这笔交易很重要。我没见过——我见过有人把ACA称为一个投资方。确实,ACA有一家管理公司,但那家公司是ACA百分之百持股的。
ACA就是一家纯粹的债券承保公司,仅此而已。他们的组织内部有一部分做这个、一部分做那个,说起来其实很简单。但ACA亏钱是因为它是一家债券承保公司。
是的,卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:嗯,我想你已经回答了那部分,就是请你谈谈对这场诉讼的反应。所以下一部分是,鉴于此事,你对伯克希尔在高盛的巨额投资有何反思。
第三部分是,鉴于你在所罗门的经历,以及你一直以来所秉持、所倡导的诚信声誉这条主线,你会给出什么建议。这是最后两个部分。
巴菲特:说来讽刺,非常讽刺,这件事在某种程度上大概反而帮了我们在高盛的投资,因为我们持有50亿美元的优先股,每年能给我们带来5亿美元的收益。
高盛拥有合法权利,可以按面值的110%将其赎回。所以他们随时都可以给伯克希尔汇来55亿美元,甩掉这笔每年要花费他们5亿美元的优先股。
如果我们拿到那55亿美元,我们会立刻把它投入到非常短期的证券里,按今天的情况,大概一年能产生2000万美元左右的收益。
所以,只要高盛一天不赎回我们的优先股,那就是一天进账。有人算过,我们的优先股每秒钟给我们带来15美元。所以我们坐在这里,滴答——(笑声)——滴答,滴答,滴答,每一秒都是15美元。(掌声)
我可不想让这些滴答声停下来。(笑)
我就是喜欢它们。它们在我睡觉的时候也在走——(笑声)——周末也一样。
说实话,高盛巴不得甩掉那笔优先股。我是说,他们当初同意把那笔优先股卖给我们,说白了也是因为当时正处在危机的最高峰。
美国政府——我不确定具体是哪个部门,大概是美联储——一直在告诉那些接受了问题资产救助计划(TARP)资金的公司,它们能不能提高分红,能不能赎回优先股,诸如此类的事情。
到目前为止,联邦政府很可能一直在帮我们一个大忙——甚至在这件事发生之前——他们大概一直在告诉高盛:「在我们同意之前,你们不能赎回那笔优先股,也不能提高分红。」
他们对所有接受TARP资金的公司都相当强硬。这一点没怎么被公开报道,但相信我,事实确实如此。
所以我当时就坐在这儿,心里希望美联储也好,别的什么部门也好,能继续对高盛赎回我们优先股的事保持强硬态度。但这种局面不可能永远持续下去。
我想——我想最近的事态发展很可能把我们优先股的赎回时间往后拖延了一段,于是那滴答、滴答、滴答的计时——(笑)——还会继续,我们每年能拿到的就是5亿美元,而不是2000万美元。
我们很喜欢这笔投资,我预计——关于声誉受损的问题。
毫无疑问,仅仅是被指控这件事本身,就会让公司的声誉受损,而过去这几周的媒体报道,确实伤到了这家公司。它们会伤害士气,伤害很多方面。虽然这远远算不上致命的伤害,但确实是种伤害。
顺便说一句,高盛在30——不,40年前,因为宾州中央铁路(Penn Central)的事也曾陷入过类似的处境。那件事在当时也伤到了他们。
他们还因为博斯基(Boesky)那家伙的关系陷入过风波,当时也伤了元气。那给当时执掌高盛的约翰·温伯格(John Weinberg)带来了极大的痛苦。
但我不认为「被指控」这件事本身,就属于我所说的「声誉受损」的范畴。如果某件事被证实了,那就要另当别论、认真看待了。
我的建议是,在出现某种紧急情况的时候——当某种不当行为被发现或被指控时,你们知道的,基本上——你们在我们的电影里看到了罗恩·奥尔森(Ron Olson),他就是当年负责那个团队的人。
当年我们一起在所罗门公司共事,也遇到过类似的情况,我们当时的信条是:「把事情弄清楚。尽快弄清楚。公布出去。把它了结。」
但「把事情弄清楚」是第一位的。我是说,你必须把事实搞对,因为如果你带着错误的事实站出来,你会被彻底击垮,而且事后没法重来。
但这确实意味着有时会有所延迟。你得从自己的组织内部收集信息,而且你处于防守的位置。
我完全不会因为SEC提出了指控,就对高盛有什么不满。如果事情进一步发展成更严重的问题,那么到时候我们再来看这个情况。
但就我目前看到的关于ABACUS那笔交易的情况而言,我实在看不出这和几年前有人给我一份市政债券清单让我承保有什么本质区别,我不会为此抱怨。
查理?
芒格:嗯,我同意你说的这一切。但我也认为,任何一家企业都应该拒绝很多在法律上完全合法、也很方便去做的生意。
换句话说,商业上的标准不应该是「什么是合法且方便的」。标准应该是不一样的。
而且我不认为美国有哪家有点分量的投资银行,没有接受过太多不体面的客户,或经手过太多不体面的证券。
巴菲特:这点我同意。但是,查理——(掌声)——你觉得我们当年那笔市政债券的交易,应该做吗?
芒格:我觉得那件事比你想的更接近临界点。
巴菲特:(笑)好吧。
我们现在承保的市政债券,大概有400亿美元左右。而过去一年里我们做得很少,倒不是因为查理刚才表达的那种看法,而是基本上因为价格不对,保费不对。
别人在保费不对的时候会作出的反应是承担更多风险。而我们在保费不对的时候的反应,就是去打打高尔夫之类的,告诉别人等保费重新合适了再来找我们。
我确实想说一点——查理和我会就华尔街发生的很多活动发表我们的看法,我们也确实认为有不少事情做得不对。
不过我想指出的是,我们和高盛的交往可以追溯到44年前。这么多年里,我们通过他们收购的企业,比通过华尔街任何其他投资银行收购的都多。我们大概也通过他们做过更多的融资。
他们帮助建立起了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。我们和他们之间也有交易往来。
我们不聘请他们做投资顾问。他们有一块很大的投资顾问业务,你们知道,我们对此的反应是:「不用了,谢谢。」我们是靠自己做决定的。
但当我们和他们交易的时候,他们完全有可能在我们买入某只股票的同时,正在做空这只股票。你们知道,他们也可能在用自己的账户买入我们正在卖出的某只股票。
他们没有义务向我们透露他们的持仓状况,就像我们也不需要向他们解释我们的思路,或者我们在自己的仓位上在做什么一样。
在那种情况下,我们是以非受托的身份在行事,而在我看来,他们和我们做交易时,也是以非受托的身份在行事。
不过,如果他们是代表我们去做一笔收购或融资,那就是另一回事了。
但我要说,我们和高盛之间进行过非常多令人满意的交易。
我不想在这个问题上拖得太久,我不会在其他问题上再这么做了。不过我想带大家回顾一下——这里有些人应该还记得——查理和我做的第一笔债券发行。
那是我们的处女航,我记得是1967年的事。是的。如果我们能把第2张幻灯片放出来,我想请大家注意一下——
这是1967年的一份发行文件。我们刚买下一家百货公司,我们有一家叫「多元零售」(Diversified Retailing)的公司。那时候,「多元零售」其实只经营一项零售业务,但我们那时候想象力还挺丰富的,所以就给它取了这么个名字。(笑)
我们当时要筹集550万美元。奥马哈的查理·海德尔(Charlie Heider),在座很多人都认识他,他在这笔融资中帮了我的忙。
你们会注意到,我们那份广告(tombstone ad)最上面两行写着「纽约证券」(New York Securities)和「第一内布拉斯加证券」(First Nebraska Securities)。
他们是主承销商。按照这类广告的惯例,下面会列出一批承销商,通常是按照参与程度的高低排列的。
换句话说,参与得越多,在名单上的位置就越靠前,主承销商排在最上面。我见过的每一份这类广告都是这样,除了这一份。
这一份之所以特殊,是因为我们当时正为筹集这550万美元而发愁。我给高盛的古斯·利维(Gus Levy)打了电话,也给基德·皮博迪(Kidder Peabody)的阿尔·戈登(Al Gordon)打了电话。他们两家在当时都是华尔街最有声望的公司。
我说:「你们能帮帮我吗?我们想筹集550万美元,可没人愿意借给查理和我这550万美元。我们已经找好的承销商也遇到了困难,做不成。」古斯·利维和阿尔·戈登都对我说:「沃伦,我们会认购一大笔。」
如果你们把——如果你们把第3张幻灯片放出来,你们会看到承销商名单,高盛和基德·皮博迪都被标了出来,其实他们是仅次于主承销商的第二大承销方。但他们实在不好意思跟我们这家不起眼的小公司扯上关系,就要求我们把他们的名字从名单上去掉。(笑)
他们宁愿用一个化名把钱借给我们。(笑)
但他们确实——他们确实帮了我们。他们确实帮了我们。相信我,当时很多人是不帮我们的。对那些在伯克希尔困难时期善待过我们的人,我一直记得很清楚。
艾尔·戈登去年去世,享年107岁。他工作到104岁。他是个了不起的人。格斯·利维也是个了不起的人。我要感谢他们的参与,尽管当时他们是想以化名参与的。(笑)
7. 芒格:「我会让保罗·沃尔克看起来像个娘娘腔」
沃伦·巴菲特:好,我们去——我们去1号区,我们把答案缩短一点。(笑)
观众:早上好,巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫盖伊·波普,来自俄勒冈州波特兰市。
我很想知道你们对国会目前正在推进的金融改革有何看法。具体来说,你们认为哪些好的想法应该被纳入这项法案,哪些不好的想法应该被排除在外?
沃伦·巴菲特:查理,这份法案有1550页,你来讲前1500页,我讲最后50页。(笑)
查理·芒格:嗯,我认为现在美国没有任何人,包括国会里的人,知道接下来会发生什么。我猜他们当中大多数人也没读过这份法案。
所以我想我们大家都处在一片迷雾之中——(掌声)——不知道会发生什么。
对我来说,有一点是非常清楚的,那就是我们那套监管大型投资银行的政府体制过于放任,而投资银行的文化本身也有一种特质,两者结合在一起,导致在压力之下,除高盛之外,几乎每一家大型投资银行都差点垮掉。
一个如此容易垮掉、又对国家如此重要的体系,应该被改造得不再那么放任,不能再允许银行和投资银行做它们过去所做的那些事。人们现在正在思考这个问题。
银行和投资银行非常痛恨失去投资灵活性这件事。比如说,让摩根大通继续维持全世界规模最大的衍生品账簿。
他们痛恨放弃这些东西。但这并不意味着,继续允许它们像过去那样行事,对国家是有好处的。
沃伦·巴菲特:根据你了解的这份法案的内容——我知道你没有把全部1550页都读完——你今天会投票支持它,还是反对?
查理·芒格:我对它了解得不够多,说不好。我知道如果我是美国的一位仁慈独裁者,我会怎么做。我会让保罗·沃尔克看起来像个娘娘腔。(笑声与掌声)
沃伦·巴菲特:你想再具体说说吗?这个说法已经很形象了。(笑)
想再具体一点吗,查理?
查理·芒格:好吧,我会减少允许从事的业务范围。如果你实际上是在借用政府信用来支撑你的业务运转,那你就不该拥有一大堆你自己都搞不明白的、金额高达数万亿美元的财务报表——哪怕你是这家企业的合伙人也一样。
这简直是疯了。这套体系里冒出来的复杂性完全是适得其反的。当然,事实也证明,人们确实无法真正控制它。
所以我认为我们需要一部新版的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》,大幅限制——(掌声)——商业银行和投资银行都能从事的业务范围。
它们应该采用一种更简单、更安全的经营方式。
我们曾经拥有一家储蓄贷款协会,它能从事的业务范围非常有限。当然,它的存款也享有政府信用担保。
总的来说,只要业务范围受到相当的限制,储蓄贷款机构大体上就不会惹上麻烦。但如果你给人类以灵活性,让他们可以在回购体系和其他体系提供的近乎无限的信用支持下为所欲为,他们就会疯狂到极点。当然,他们也确实这么做了。
8. 我们不应该为以前的交易补交抵押品
沃伦·巴菲特:好,在这个令人振奋的话题之后,我们转到贝姬那边。(笑)
贝姬·奎克:我们收到了很多关于即将出台的金融监管立法的问题。这个问题来自杰伊·盖尔布,他想接着刚才波普先生提出的话题继续追问。
「即将出台的金融改革立法预计会对伯克希尔产生什么影响?具体来说,伯克希尔现有的630亿美元衍生品合约,可能还需要额外提交多少抵押品?由此,伯克希尔手头持有的、要求不低于200亿美元现金的底线,会不会因此变得岌岌可危?」
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。据我了解,就几天前提出的那个版本的法案而言——我可能理解有误,但我认为我看懂了,而且我读过相关条款——要求应该是零。
如果我们——伯克希尔——被财政部长,或者我想是某个委员会,认定为——法案里的确切用词我记不清了——总之大概是「对整个体系构成危险」,那我们就可能被要求为追溯性合约——也就是过去签订的合约——提交抵押品。
我认为,我们被认定为对体系构成危险的可能性微乎其微,因为我们只有250份合约,而其他公司有上百万份合约——不久前《华尔街日报》还把我们的头寸描述为「巨大」。
要知道,无论从名义价值、负债,还是其他各种衡量方式来看,我们的头寸都只相当于其他几家超大机构的1%。
所以我——我真的很想知道,如果用「巨大」这个词来形容我们的头寸,那你要用什么词来形容那些规模是我们100倍的头寸呢?
想必在世界上某个角落,一定潜藏着某个专门用来形容那些头寸的形容词吧。
十年前我们收购通用再保险时,手上有23000份头寸。之后我们很快就把它们清理掉了,只剩下不到一百份。
所以,在我看来,我们完全没有问题。
不过,如果出于某种原因,财政部或这个委员会真的回过头去、以某种更加宽泛的声明,决定要求所有过去的合约都追溯提交抵押品,我们当然会照办。
但我们也会认为我们理应获得相当一笔补偿,因为在谈判这些合约时,需要抵押品的合约有一个价格,不需要抵押品的合约则是另一个价格。
打个比方,如果我把房子卖给你,不带家具卖10万美元,带家具卖12万美元,而你说,「我就要不带家具的,10万美元」,然后国会后来跑出来说,「所有房子都必须带家具出售,而且这是有追溯效力的」,那如果我现在要把家具补给你,我总得要点什么补偿吧。这么想或许有点不合理,但道理是这么个道理。
我们确实认为——嗯,就在一周前,有一家规模数一数二的投资银行给我们提供了一份基本相同的股权看跌期权合约,是一份10年期合约。
他们愿意支付给我们的价格是:不带抵押品750万美元,带抵押品1100万美元。所以,是否需要抵押品,价格是很不一样的。
我们选择放弃的,是过去我们本可以为这些合约多收取的、大概高达10亿美元的额外保费——如果我们当初同意为它们提供抵押品的话。
除了极少数例外,我们都拒绝了那么做。而我们认为,如果我们真的有一天被要求为它们提供抵押品,我们理应得到公平的补偿,我们也希望法案中能写入这样的条款。
顺便说一下,盖特纳部长——我们放一下第7张幻灯片。上面是他12月2日在参议院农业委员会作证的证词。你们可以看到,在维护既有合约神圣不可侵犯这一点上,他的证词态度非常坚定。
但如果这份法案明天就通过,按照我们和我们律师的理解,我们不需要拿出一分钱。
我想,在伯克希尔·哈撒韦被认定为对体系构成危险之前,恐怕还有别的公司会先被这样认定。
所以我真的——我看不出有任何——我看不出会有什么后果,除非有某种全面的规定,说任何达到一定规模、持有衍生品的公司都必须提交抵押品。
如果真的要求这样做,我们会照做,也不会有问题。这对我们来说会有成本,是机会成本方面的,但那样的话,我们当然也会就什么样的抵押品才算合适之类的问题进行争论。
如果可以用我们的可口可乐股票来抵押,你知道,反正我们本来就打算一直持有可口可乐股票。所以这其实什么也没改变。就算它被作为抵押品,我们照样能拿到可口可乐股票的分红,股价上涨我们照样能获利。
查理?
芒格:嗯,是的。如果政府以行政命令的方式,把抵押品要求强加到既有合同中去,那就好比你签了一份以一百万美元买房的合同,然后政府通过一项法律说:“不,你得付两百万美元。”
我是说,这在宪法上是很可疑的,而且既不公平又愚蠢。我不认为政府会疯到那个地步。(笑)
巴菲特:而且,我认为他们会看到——这里有一整份名单,事实上我觉得我甚至有专门为此准备的一页。好,我们放第8张幻灯片。
这只是一页样本,列出了那些反对——将来被要求——提交抵押品的公司。你会看到IBM,你会看到福特汽车,你会看到3M,你会看到HCA。
我是说,各种各样的公司都不想在未来这么做。我们不在乎将来规则如何,只要我们为此得到了相应的报酬。
所以这并不是伯克希尔特有的什么问题。事实上,在这方面,我们所处的位置和IBM、3M这些公司还不太一样。只要我们为此得到了报酬,我们对未来的规则怎么定并不在乎。
但考虑到我们过去收取的保费较低这一事实,我们不希望有什么规定追溯生效,把钱从我们口袋里拿走。
但请记住,我们收购伯灵顿北方公司的时候,它有一些燃料合约。中美能源有能源合约。
几周前,《商业周刊》上有一篇关于安海斯-布希的报道。你知道,他们说:“我们不想把资金从自己的业务中抽出来,作为抵押品存到华尔街去。”
我认为,如果——如果他们真的看清楚了,这样做的净效果会是把大量本来用于经营业务的资金,转去由华尔街持有,国会的热情可能就会小一些。
9. 希腊债务危机:“我不知道这部电影会怎么收场”
巴菲特:好,我们看第2个问题。
观众:大家早上好。换个话题,查理和沃伦,我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普。我想先向你们表示衷心感谢,然后再提一个问题。
你在股东信里写道“乘火车来”,那正是我1997年第一次来奥马哈的方式。
我特意从丹佛坐火车来,想以铁路之城的方式体验奥马哈,结果我立刻就爱上了奥马哈。但那趟火车旅程,我觉得还有改进的空间。所以非常感谢你把美国铁路的未来交到了你那双能干的手里。(掌声)
巴菲特:这是我听过的最棒的问题之一。(笑)
观众:哦,这才是问题。
巴菲特:哦,好的。(笑)
观众:是关于希腊、欧元的未来,以及全世界的财政纪律,还有作为投资者我们该为此做好什么准备。
过去,你一直在提醒我们美元存在结构性弱点。现在我们看到希腊,以及可能其他一些欧洲国家,正陷入危机。
伯克希尔在欧元区有相当规模的投资,大的比如科隆再保险、慕尼黑再保险,小的甚至像伊斯卡在汉堡的(听不清)业务。
你们是如何为潜在的货币危机来筹备伯克希尔·哈撒韦的?你对欧元的可持续性有什么看法?对我们这些投资者,你有什么建议?
巴菲特:是的。我打算——其实查理和我最近还没聊过希腊的事,所以我会非常想听听他对这个问题的看法。我先回答你问题的最后一部分。
我们在很多国家都有相当大的风险敞口,资产端和负债端都有。换句话说,我们确实持有慕尼黑再保险的股票,而它们拥有大量资产,其中大部分可能是以欧元计价的。
我们还有科隆再保险,是通用再保险的子公司,其净资产在很大程度上是与欧元挂钩的。
另一方面,我们也有相当可观的、以其他货币计价的负债,其中相当大一部分是以欧元计价、遍布世界各地的。
举个例子,大约三四年前,也许是三年前,我们对Equitas进行再保险时,承接了全球范围内数额巨大的负债,金额是许许多多个十亿美元级别。作为回报,实际上是劳合社付钱给我们。我们拿到这笔钱后,用美元进行了投资。
所以,我们保留了那些因Equitas而产生的、以外币计价的各种老保险索赔负债。
如果欧元对美元贬值,我们在那一边会受益,但正如你指出的,我们在其他方面会有损失。
我无法告诉你——而且这也不是我关心的事——我们在欧元、英镑、日元或其他任何货币上的净头寸在任何一天具体是多少。其中一部分也和我们的股票看跌期权之类的东西有关。
但我们在任何其他货币上都没有戏剧性的风险敞口。这不是说其他货币对我们不重要,因为希腊局势的走向及其可能引发的后果,对世界经济而言可能是相当重要的。
查理会给你们详细解释一下那可能是什么情况。(笑)
芒格:是的。一般来说,除了少数例外情况,我们对货币是不可知论的态度。我们只是照常做我们的生意,波动来了就照单全收,你同意这个说法吧?
巴菲特:是的。我们对——相对价值——是不可知论的态度,当然……
芒格:是的,是的。
巴菲特:——当然。是的,但总体上,我们对各种货币的未来走向并不是不可知论的态度。
芒格:不,不是。
巴菲特:但相对价值——
芒格:但是——
巴菲特:——是不可知论的态度。
芒格:——希腊的情况当然提出了一个有趣的问题。事情的经过是,像美国这样的国家过去的保守作风,为它赢得了极好的信用,这是成功与保守相结合的产物。
我们利用这种信用赢得了第二次世界大战,并帮助德国和日本复兴,这是人类历史上最具建设性、最明智的外交决策之一。
我们也利用这种信用,在过去这几十年伯克希尔蓬勃发展的岁月里,帮助保障了繁荣。
而现在,当然,政府的信用已经不如从前那么好了,因为它把信用用得太狠了。而且这种情况在世界各地几乎都发生了。
所以希腊只是一个非常有意思的时期的开端,当然,政府把信用逼得太紧,对文明来说更为危险。
因为如果你需要信用来维持文明的运转,而你却因为过去过度滥用而把它毁掉,那可不是件好事。
我认为在这个国家,以及其他国家,负责任的声音现在都意识到,我们比我这辈子任何时候都更接近因政府信用不足而陷入麻烦的境地。
沃伦·巴菲特:你读到的关于各国信用、货币的一切内容,你总是要——你总是要区分那些几乎完全用本国货币借债的国家,比如日本或美国,和那些出于种种原因、因为世界不信任它们而被迫用别国货币借债的国家。
我是说,过去,你知道,如果你是南美某个国家,你用本国货币借债,你永远不会违约,你只需要买一台新的印钞机,或者让它多印一点。
但世界不喜欢这种事。所以对于信用较弱、声誉较差的国家,它们就被迫用别国货币借债,通常是美元。
而这真的可能很快就让你破产,因为你——如果你是南美某个国家,你不能印美元,尽管你可以印自己的货币。这就是造成一些国家陷入困境的原因。
欧洲货币联盟的情况非常有意思,因为希腊,就其自身的预算而言,是一个主权国家。但它不能印自己的货币,你知道,他们用的是欧元。
而这——你知道,欧元在20年前,或者更早一些的时候,曾被视为一场颇为大胆的实验。但你现在可能正看到这样一个试验案例上演:一个实际上不使用本国货币、或者说使用一种共同货币的国家,却在对本国公民的承诺上仍然是主权国家。
我不知道这部电影会怎么收场。这并不是说我在预测灾难什么的,我是真的不知道这部电影会怎么收场。而且如果可以的话,我会尽量不去看这种电影。(笑)
但我会一直关注。说真的,在我看来,这里将发生的事情会是一出精彩大戏。
有一点,芒格说我们对货币是不可知论者,我们不做大的货币投机。几年前我们确实做过一次,而且做得还不错。但我们很少会对某种货币相对于另一种货币形成强烈的看法。
不过我想说的是,过去几年世界上发生的事件,让我对所有货币的未来——也就是它们能否长期保值——比以前更加看空。但这并非美国独有,也并非英国独有。
如果你真的能够长期维持相当于国内生产总值10%的预算赤字,相信我,世界早就这么干了。我是说,如果你能一直这样干下去,那可真是件很爽的事。
而过去之所以没有人这么做,我想,大概是因为大多数人都明白这是难以持续下去的。
而这个世界要如何摆脱一个又一个国家的巨额赤字融资——这不会容易——我是说,这会很有意思——值得关注。
你不必担心;只要美国政府借的是美元,就绝无违约的可能,一点都没有。如果世界不再接受我们以美元计价的债务,那我们——那你才真的有大麻烦了。
但只要你能印自己的货币,你就不会违约。
查理·芒格:嗯,是的。当然,公开发布的统计数据颇具误导性,因为各国货币的债务——各国的债务——通常只按尚未偿还的政府债券来计算,而各国政府未拨备的各种承诺,要比未偿还的政府债券多得多。
所以不管你读到统计数字时认为这个问题有多大,实际上要大得多得多。
而那些未拨备的承诺,只要你能让人均GDP保持每年2%或3%左右的增长,就不会构成硬约束。你负担得起那些未拨备的承诺。
但如果增长停滞了,那你就会面临巨大的社会压力。天知道这会对政府政策和货币产生什么影响。
10. 高盛是否需要披露SEC通知?
沃伦·巴菲特:安德鲁,你一直很有耐心。
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:我收到了三百多个跟高盛有关的问题,我知道我们已经谈过这个话题了,但还有几个悬而未决的问题,其中有一位提问者发来了三个具体问题,我想在这里问一下。
第一个问题是,既然伯克希尔是高盛的股东,如果不是劳埃德·贝兰克梵,你希望由谁来执掌高盛?
在高盛的威尔斯通知被公开之前,你是否已经知情,或者对这个案子有所了解?
你认为威尔斯通知构成重大信息、理应披露吗?如果是你,你会披露吗?
最后一个问题,你有没有被卷入盖伦对冲基金调查,也就是有指控称一名高盛董事会成员在2008年危机最严重的时候,把有关你对高盛的拟议投资的内幕信息透露给了盖伦?
我知道这里面有好几个问题,但我想我们不如先把高盛的问题解决掉——
沃伦·巴菲特:好,好的。
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:——现在就解决。
沃伦·巴菲特:好。是的。那我们先回答第三个问题吧。
关于盖伦的事,我们完全没有被联系过。我是在报纸上读到那件事的,以及关于高盛一名董事与盖伦之间存在联系的指控。
而且我记得在其中一篇报道里,我看到了大概是盖伦据此进行交易的说法。但答案是没有任何人联系过我们。而且我连那个经营盖伦的人的名字都念不出来。(笑)
关于威尔斯通知,我跟好几位律师谈过这个问题。而且我想——当我们收到——我们并没有收到威尔斯通知,但当通用再保险的高管们收到威尔斯通知时,我很确定我们把这件事写进了随后提交的10-K或10-Q里。
而且我们可能还提交了一份8-K来公告此事。那次不是我们自己收到通知,而是某些高管收到了。
在过去40年里,我至少在一家知名公司的董事会任过职,我不会再进一步说明是哪一家。
但此前,他们收到了威尔斯通知,却没有公开,而事实上,那件事什么都不是。所以律师告诉我,如果你认为它属于重大信息,你就得披露。
我不认为——如果我收到了与ABACUS交易有关的通知,以我所了解的情况来看,我不会认为这对一家每年赚很多很多很多十亿美元的公司来说属于重大信息。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我也不会认为那是重大信息。
如果每家公司都要把它们认为概率极小的每一件小事都披露出来,我们就会有无穷无尽的、让人看不懂的报告。
必须有一个重要性标准。你也不希望给那些对你不满、想找茬的人以敲诈的可能性。我不是说这就是SEC在做的事,但——
沃伦·巴菲特:不,但这种情况可能发生在很多——(笑)这可能发生在个别——
查理·芒格:这可能发生在别人身上,是的。
沃伦·巴菲特:我知道有多大比例的Wells通知会导致对公司构成重大影响的结果。但我猜其中有相当一部分并不构成重大影响。
而且当然,公司越大,构成重大影响的可能性就越小。
然后你的另一个问题是,如果不是劳埃德在管理,我会希望谁来管理?
我想如果劳埃德有个双胞胎兄弟,我会选他。但我从没想过这个问题。
我们会考虑谁来管理伯克希尔——(笑)——但真的没什么理由去想这个问题。
在我看来,1970年宾州中央铁路(Penn Central)出问题的时候,也没有理由去想除了古斯·利维(Gus Levy)之外还有谁应该来管理高盛。
而当博斯基(Boskey)事件发生时,是约翰·温伯格(John Weinberg)在掌管高盛。我认为约翰·温伯格是一位非常出色的高盛管理者。
所以我完全不认为这件事反映了劳埃德本人的问题。
我认为,就像查理说的——我们对此有强烈的看法。华尔街上有很多我们不喜欢的事情。但我们并不认为这是——我们知道这不是——高盛特有的问题。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,在美国,我倒是很想看到不少CEO下台。(笑)
但劳埃德·布兰克费恩不是其中之一。
沃伦·巴菲特:好,第3个问题。(笑)
我还担心他会开始点名呢。(笑)
11. 驾驶反馈技术
观众:你好。我叫大卫·克莱曼(音),来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。这个问题主要是问巴菲特先生和盖茨先生的,既是以伯克希尔股东的身份,也是以比尔及梅琳达·盖茨基金会受托人的身份提问。
在我这个年龄段的美国人中,机动车事故是头号死因。每年发生超过600万起,而你们承保了其中相当一部分。
世界卫生组织将机动车事故列为全球第11大死因。
市场上正出现一类新技术。这些技术不仅能减少驾驶员分心,还能向驾驶员提供正向反馈,帮助他们意识到自己驾驶得有多好,或者还能做得更好。
GEICO或盖茨基金会是否会在驾驶反馈技术上进行积极而显著的投入,以促进道路专注,从而挽救生命、自由、财产和保险费?
我这里有一张给盖茨先生和巴菲特先生的便条。如果能想办法交给你们,我会很高兴。
沃伦·巴菲特:好,我想我们了解你的立场了。(笑)
盖茨基金会,我认为,联合彭博市长(Mayor Bloomberg)在吸烟问题上有一项相当重大的举措。而且我想你会发现,受吸烟影响的人数比因车祸受影响的人数要多得多。
按每英里行驶里程计算,车祸死亡人数其实在减少。我听到的数字好像是六——我原以为实际数字更接近3万到4万这个区间,但这些年来确实在下降。
你知道,已经有很多措施让汽车变得更安全了。我不确定手机和黑莓(BlackBerry)算不算其中之一。(笑)
而且我认为实际上——由于手机和其他各种设备的发明,因车祸死亡的人数会比原本更多。我不知道这个因素会有多大影响。
但每个人都有降低死亡率的共同利益。GEICO有一项非常积极的安全项目,进行汽车测试,做各种各样的工作,通常还与其他保险公司合作。
我不认为——在我看来,盖茨基金会有相当明确且明智的方针,来指导他们把精力投向哪里,他们相信要专注,所以他们不会试图解决世界上的每一个问题。
但我可以向你保证,保险行业以及整个汽车行业,都在持续不断地努力让汽车变得更安全。
查理?
查理·芒格:我没什么可补充的。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:好。
12. 巴菲特的捐赠不会影响伯克希尔股票
沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题也与盖茨基金会有关,但完全是另一回事。
“你的一条股东相关经营原则中提到,你将通过公司的政策和沟通,努力保持伯克希尔股价的理性。
“然而你每年都会把大量的伯克希尔股票捐赠给盖茨基金会。而且据我了解,等你去世后,会有更多股票流向该基金会。”
顺便说一句,我忘了说这个问题来自奥马哈的迈克尔·麦克劳克林(音),他接着写道:“我们已经看到该基金会定期出售伯克希尔股票,而且它还会卖出更多,因为它的宗旨是把钱捐给慈善机构,而不是永久持有这些股票。
“基金会的抛售难道不会对股票造成下行压力吗?因为其中多达25%的股票都会被换手。”
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。基本上,我每年七月都会给五家基金会捐款。
而我现在捐赠的数额,是按5%的递减余额计算的,我现在捐赠的数额大约相当于每年流通在外股份的1.5%左右,差不多是这个比例。
所以,如果他们出售——他们确实会出售——在收到股票后相当迅速地出售,以便进行慈善捐赠,那么基本上每年有 1.5% 的股份被卖出。
现在,如果把它与纽约证券交易所的交易情况对比一下——那里的年换手率平均远超流通股数的 100%——这在出售方面根本不算什么异常情况。
而且这是一个自由的国家。我是说,如果我愿意,我可以卖掉公司 10% 的股份。我这辈子从没卖过一股,也从不打算卖一股。而且很可能在我死后,也不会卖出多少股份。(笑)
如果伯克希尔 1.5% 的流通股在一年内使股价下跌,那这个跌幅大概也是应该的。
查理?
芒格:嗯,当然,我认为那种程度的股票捐赠分散,对慈善事业的助力几乎算不上一件大事,而且实际上,就伯克希尔被纳入标准普尔指数等等方面而言,它可能还起到了积极作用。
巴菲特:打断一下。
芒格:我觉得你有更重要的事情要操心。(笑)
巴菲特:如果我拥有伯克希尔 100% 的股份,那它肯定不会被纳入标普 500 指数。持股集中一直是个问题。
所以,如果通过减持在一定程度上提高了——事实上也确实提高了——伯克希尔被纳入标普 500 指数的可能性,那这大概带来了占市值大约 7% 左右的、某个类似数量级的额外购买。
所以那可以算是一种非同寻常的、被引入的买盘,在某种程度上正是因为我自己持股的减少。
正如查理所说,我想说,如果过去四年里没有捐出任何股票,我不知道——我完全不知道——股价会不会稍高一点或稍低一点。我认为这大概是五五开的赌局。
13. 巴菲特:「我不会逃离美国」
巴菲特:好,4 号麦克风。
观众:您好,巴菲特先生。您好,芒格先生。我叫弗恩·库申贝里,来自堪萨斯州奥弗兰帕克。
您认为美国经济相对于其他国家面临的最大挑战是什么?就未来十年的全球投资而言,这又意味着什么?
巴菲特:查理?(笑)
芒格:谢谢你把这个简单的问题引到我这儿来。(笑)
我认为答案是,总体而言,我们在人生中取得的成就,并不是靠什么了不起的全球资产配置系统。
伯克希尔的一贯态度是,寻找那些在我们看来合情合理的事情,并在一定程度上集中投入这些事情。然后随它世界经济和各国货币汇率去波动。
我确实认为我们会更偏爱某些国家而非其他国家,一个国家看起来越负责任,我们就越感到安心。你同意这个说法吧?
巴菲特:是的。不过我们——
芒格:但除此之外,我们帮不了你太多,因为伯克希尔其实并没有什么全球资产配置系统——除非沃伦一直瞒着我在偷偷搞一套。(笑)
巴菲特:那个可没有。(笑)
我们收购伯灵顿北方,可不是想把它搬到中国、印度或巴西去——(笑)——而且我们很喜欢这一点。我们喜欢伯灵顿北方就扎根在美国这个事实。
我们面临的最大威胁,是某种大规模的核、化学或生物攻击。
如果你问在 50 年这样的时间跨度里发生这种事的概率有多大,那相当高。但在一年这样的时间跨度里,概率非常低。
但如果说到,那些造就了过去 220 年不可思议进步的品质是否依然存在——虽然中间有不少波折,但确实是不可思议的进步——就人类在这两个世纪里所经历的境况提升而言,你随便挑历史上任何两个世纪来比较,这个国家都是非凡的,它的制度也是非凡的。
而且它确实释放出了前所未有的人类潜能。
在座的这群人,并不比 200 年前一群类似的人更聪明,他们也没有更努力地工作。
但是,天哪,他们的生活方式却截然不同。而之所以生活得如此不同,是因为这套制度使得相当普通的人们,经过一段时间之后,能够做出非凡的事情。而这场游戏还远未结束。
在我看来,没有任何迹象表明我们已经接近人类能够达到的极限。
我们大概甚至都不了解自己的潜力,就像 1790 年的人们并不了解他们自己的潜力一样。我是说,那时候他们觉得,要是终于有人发明出某种农具,能让他们每天干活 10 个小时而不是 12 个小时,那就已经很了不起了。
所以我——没有理由——你知道,我希望世界其他地方也过得好,而且我认为它们会过得好。这不是一场零和博弈。如果中国和印度发展得好,并不意味着我们就会变差;那可能意味着我们会变得更好。
所以我们并不是——他们得到的,并不是从我们这里夺走的。但如果伯克希尔哈撒韦被迫以某种方式只能把投资局限在美国境内的机会上,我也会完全心满意足。
我们会有充足的机会。就机会而言,我当然更愿意拥有整个世界,但在这个国家内,机会也会很充裕。我不会逃离美国。好了。(掌声)
14. 不急于寻找新的首席投资官
巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题与伯克希尔的接班计划有关。它来自 Sprucegrove 的克雷格·梅里根,他问:「这四位伯克希尔首席投资官(CIO)职位的潜在候选人,在 2008 年和 2009 年期间表现如何?
「这四人中有没有人使用了杠杆?现在这四人中有没有人已经被排除出考虑范围?」
巴菲特:是的,对此的回答是,2008 年——我去年向大家汇报过,我想去年我们收到过类似的问题——他们表现并不出色。2009 年,他们表现相当不错。
这——我想说这四位——已经不是原来那同样的四位了。我想说他们当中没有一个人,查理,我相信你可能会用杠杆。你觉得呢?
芒格:嗯,我最熟悉的那位,在完全不使用杠杆的情况下,收益率略超过 200%。
巴菲特:嗯,这一下子就把范围缩小了。(笑)
潜在的投资人选名单,变动幅度大概会比首席执行官的接班人选名单更大一些。
而这真的紧迫得多了。如果我今晚去世,伯克希尔会在24小时内有一位新的CEO到位,所有董事都知道会是谁,而且他们都对此感到满意。
而且应该会在24小时内有人到位。
投资方面,下周不需要做任何事情。我可以在投资上去度假。而且我们可以——我们不会这么做,董事们也不会这么做,我不会在那儿——但他们可以等一个月,可以等两个月。
我是说,可口可乐不会消失,宝洁不会消失,美国运通也不会。没有什么迫切需要天天去处理的事情。我们不是天天处理事情的。
所以他们可以相当从容地——可能是与一位他们希望引入的新CEO一起——商量出该如何补偿他,具体数字可能是多少。
这一点完全没有定死。我唯一能告诉你们的是,有一些非常能干的人,我认为,他们非常希望为伯克希尔管理资金,也会做得很好,而且至少有一些董事对他们是熟悉的。这个问题会得到解决。
CEO的问题——这不是个问题——但CEO的问题,你希望现在就有答案,并准备好第二天就能实施,虽然我确实刚做了体检。(笑)结果很好。(笑声)
查理?(掌声)
我的医生今天不在场,所以我要告诉你们,这让他抓狂,因为我这样吃东西他却查不出任何毛病来——(笑)——而他真的很想查出来,相信我。(笑声)
就说到这里——
芒格:嗯,我——(笑声)
在这两个人当中,我不是更乐观的那个。而——(笑声)——尽管如此,我相当乐观地认为,伯克希尔的文化会持续很长很长时间,会大大超越创始人的寿命。我认为它会行得通。
巴菲特:我真的认为——我是说,我们不应该用最高级的说法——但我认为,就管理者、所有权、整套体系而言,我们拥有全国任何一家真正的大公司当中最强、最独特的文化之一。
这花了很长时间才发展起来,但到了某个程度之后就会自我强化。我们喜爱它,我认为在我走了之后他们也会喜爱它。(掌声)
这里不要鼓掌。(笑声)
15. 需要资本的业务,回报不错但不亮眼
巴菲特:好,第5号。
观众:你好,我是来自肯塔基州路易斯维尔的史蒂夫·富尔顿(音)。我又一次放弃了肯塔基德比赛马的包厢座位,来问你一个问题。(笑声)
我很感激能有这个机会。
我的问题聚焦于——如果可以这么说的话——向资本密集型业务投资的转变,以及由此对内在价值的相关影响。
你在年报中再次说过,对股东而言最好的业务是那些资本回报率高、且几乎不需要增量资本的业务。
我意识到这个决定在某种程度上是由目前旗下运营公司产生的大量现金所驱动的,但我想请你把对这类资本的需求,与内在价值的定义——即被取出的现金的贴现值——做个对比。
另外为了让我们大家都清楚,你提到过你认为这些业务在未来几十年里将需要数百亿美元,我想更多了解一下你对这笔资金的时间价值方面的见解。
巴菲特:好的。虽然很明显你对这个局面理解得相当透彻,而且——这几乎可以说是在伯克希尔能问到的最重要的问题之一。
我们正在投入资金——大笔资金——投向从经济角度看不错的业务。但它们不如我们在资金规模较小时能买到的一些业务那么好。
如果你看喜诗糖果,它所需的资本大约是4000万美元左右,而且,你知道,它的盈利远高于这个数字。
那么,如果我们能把资本翻倍,如果我们能再投入4000万美元,且回报率能接近前4000万美元的水平,我是说,我们今天下午就会带着钱过去。
不幸的是,那些美妙的生意并不会吞噬资本。这正是它们之所以美妙的原因之一。
以我们现在的规模,我们的经营利润是22亿美元,或者说第一季度是多少就是多少,我们不把它分出去,我们的工作就是尽可能明智地把这笔钱投出去。
而我们找不到能吸纳这么多钱的喜诗糖果。等我们找到了,我们会买下它们,但它们吸纳不了我们将产生的那种规模的资金。
于是问题就变成了:我们能不能明智地——即便算不上高明地——把这笔钱用起来?到目前为止,我们认为答案是肯定的。
我们认为,进入我们现在所涉足的这些资本密集型业务是有道理的。而且顺便说一句,到目前为止,这确实是有道理的。我是说,效果相当不错。但它不可能表现得非常出色。
这个世界的运行方式并不是让你能够把数百亿美元、并且随着时间推移一次又一次的数百亿美元再投资进去,还能获得巨大的回报。这种事根本不会发生。
我们尽力把这一点尽可能清楚地说明白,好让股东们理解我们的局限性。
那么,你可能会说,“这样的话,你们把它分红出去不是更好吗?”
只要我们能像你提到的那样,把未来现金产生的贴现值转化为实际价值,把它分出去就不会更好。只要我们能把它转化为比一美元现值稍微多一点点的东西,我们就会继续寻找这样做的办法。
以我们的判断,我们在BNSF上做到了这一点,但这份成绩单要在10年或20年后才能写出来。
我们在中美能源上也做到了这一点。我们进入了一个资本非常密集的行业,到目前为止,就权益的复合增长而言,我们做得非常好。
但它不可能成为可口可乐那样的公司——就一门几乎不需要什么资本、甚至几乎不需要的基础业务而言。而且如果你运气好,如果你拥有的是一门在成长的业务,你可以让它不断成长。
喜诗不是一门在成长的业务。它是一门美妙的业务,但它没办法像可口可乐那样把自己复制到世界各地。
所以我要说,你正好点到了关键之处。我认为你对此的理解和我们一样透彻。我希望我们不会让你失望,能够把资金投出去获得像样的回报、良好的回报。
但如果有人指望从伯克希尔这样的基础上获得亮眼的回报,那么,你知道,我们不知道该怎么做到。
查理?
芒格:嗯,在不知道这一点上,我和你一样在行。(笑声)
16. 信贷危机中放贷与买股票的对比
巴菲特:好,安德鲁?(笑)
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个问题来自来自加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡的股东维克多和艾米·刘(音)。
他们问:“你在2009年2月金融危机期间投资时,为什么倾向于债务工具而不是股权?
“比如说,为什么你在股价12美元的时候,是以15%的利率向哈雷戴维森投资3亿美元的债券,而不是买它的股票?今天,股价已经到33美元了。”
巴菲特:嗯,我要说的是,如果我现在来写这个问题,我可能会写出同样的问题。但我不太确定你在2月份的时候会写出同样的问题。
那时候,投资的风险状况显然是不同的。而事实是,我不知道哈雷戴维森的股票值33美元、20美元还是45美元。我对此完全没有看法。
你知道,我挺喜欢这种生意的——客户会把你的名字纹在胸口上什么的。但是——(笑)——要弄清楚这种东西的经济价值,你知道的。我甚至不确定去问那些人本身能学到多少东西。(笑)
但我确实知道,或者说我当时自认为知道,而且我认为我是对的:第一,哈雷戴维森不会倒闭;第二,15%的利率将会显得相当有吸引力。
而事实是,我们现在大概可以把那些债券卖到135左右,或者差不多这个价位。所以我们可以获得非常可观的资本利得,加上大量的利息收入。
我了解得足够多,可以放心把钱借给他们;但我了解得还不够多,不敢买它的股票。这种情况经常发生。你知道,我们喜欢买股票,但我们也喜欢以10%的收益率买高盛的优先股。
现在,假设高盛当初给我的不是10%的优先股加认股权证,而是说,“你可以拿12%的不可赎回优先股”,我可能会选后者。我是说,可赎回条款——所以这些证券之间都存在权衡取舍。
显然,如果我认为我能凭一个非常简单的判断就赚到很好的钱——就像我们在哈雷戴维森上做的那样,只需要判断“他们会不会破产”这一个问题——而不是去做一个更难的判断,“摩托车市场会不会大幅萎缩?利润率会不会受到一定挤压?”诸如此类,那我会选择做那个简单的判断。
查理?
芒格:嗯,你那个回答很好——你说你不够了解,不敢买股票,但你了解得足够多,敢买债券,这是个非常好的回应。
另一方面,毕竟我们是很多人的受托人,其中包括那些遭受永久性伤害的人,等等等等。在某种程度上,我们在买多激进的股票、还是买别的东西之间,是受到约束的。把这些因素综合起来,就形成了我们的投资政策。
总的来说,我认为你提出了一个非常好的问题。我认为很多时候,当你面对困境公司、选择买债券的时候,其实本该买股票的。所以我觉得你关注的是一个很有前景的方向。
巴菲特:是的。本·格雷厄姆其实在1934年的《证券分析》里就写过这个问题——在分析优先级证券时,次级证券往往表现更好,但持有优先级证券你可能睡得更安稳。
而且,正如查理指出的,我们的保险业务对外负有600亿美元的负债,其中有些要延续50年甚至更久。
我们永远不会把所有的钱都投在股票上。我是说,我们可能会持有非常大比例的股票,但我们经营这家公司的方式,是要让它能够经受住任何冲击。
几年前,我们对这种理念给我们带来的处境感到非常满意。
我是说,在大多数人都被吓瘫的时候,我们实际上还能采取行动,而我们会继续以这种方式经营下去。
17. 缔造良好的企业文化,比改变一种糟糕的文化要容易得多
巴菲特:第6区。
观众:芒格先生、巴菲特先生,谢谢你们邀请我们来到这里。
我最近加入了一个新组织,而对我来说,要在那里取得成功,就需要改变这个组织的文化。
所以我很想听听你们的看法:该如何改变一个组织的文化?还有,如果你正在建立一个新组织,那要怎样确保它拥有强大而独特的文化?
巴菲特:嗯,我认为围绕一种文化去建立一个新组织,要比改变一个既有组织的文化容易得多。改变文化真的非常难。就伯克希尔而言,我很庆幸这一点。
我是说,要改变伯克希尔的文化会非常难。它已经深深植根于我们所有的经理人和股东之中。这里的一切,实际上都是为了强化这种文化而设计的。
任何人想要进来,试图对它做出很大的改变,我认为这种文化基本上会把这种尝试排斥出去。
你所描述的这个问题——如果你想走进,你懂的,随便哪种你想说出名字的组织——这里我得小心一点——改变文化都是很难的。
查理和我在这方面碰过好几次壁。我要说,如果你在这件事上有得选,我宁愿从零开始,围绕它去建立文化。
但那是——我有伯克希尔这个得天独厚的时间优势。我是说,这要追溯到1965年,那时候其实什么都没有,你知道的,除了一些纺织厂,所以我没有什么要去对抗的东西。
随着我们不断收购公司,它们逐渐变得相辅相成,它们也真心认同并融入了这种文化,但这花了几十年时间。
而且,你知道,在所罗门,我在某些方面尝试改变文化,但要给自己打分的话,就结果而言,我不会给自己打A+。
查理?
芒格:嗯,一个人说他到了一个新地方,如果不改变那里的文化就无法成功,还想让我们告诉他怎么改变文化,这让我很受宠若惊。
要是换成你这个处境,我的失败率是百分之百。(笑)而且——
巴菲特:是的,查理曾经开过一家律师事务所。查理,那是要追溯到,什么,1962年吧?
芒格:是的。我可以搬出去,但我没能改变那种文化。(笑)
巴菲特:关于那家老律师事务所,我们可以讲一些有意思的故事,不过现在我们还是接着请卡罗尔提问吧。
18. 阿吉特·贾因是不可替代的
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自纽约Ruane, Cunniff公司的乔恩·布兰特。
“你曾多次强调阿吉特·贾因对伯克希尔和国民赔偿公司再保险业务有多么重要。所以我想知道,你是否预计国民赔偿公司的浮存金会在他退休后继续增长,还是会逐渐收缩?”
嗯,当然我们不认为——
巴菲特:不会。
卡罗尔·卢米斯:——阿吉特会退休。
“换一种问法就是,除阿吉特之外,National Indemnity 是否还有竞争优势,还是说,超出账面价值的全部价值,都系于阿吉特一人以及他已经签下的那些业务带来的滚存利润?”
沃伦·巴菲特:他所经营的业务确实存在超出阿吉特个人的竞争优势,但这些优势是阿吉特打造出来的,是他把它们发挥到了极致,而且依我看,他运用这些优势的方式,远比世界上任何其他人都要高明得多。
但这些优势并不会随他一起消失。我是说,他手下有大约30个人受过他的训练,那种训练之严格,会让耶稣会士看起来都显得相当宽松——就其对成员行为的约束而言。
阿吉特——你无法想象还有比阿吉特的运作更有纪律性的操作了。但是阿吉特是无可替代的。另一方面——好吧,我要斩钉截铁地说——如果阿吉特出了什么事,那将是伯克希尔的巨大损失。
但这并不意味着伯克希尔·哈撒韦的再保险业务就不会继续是一个极其特殊的地方,它仍然会做别人不敢做的大交易,能够以几乎其他任何保险机构都做不到的方式快速思考、快速行动。
我们在那个部门拥有非常特别的东西,而在阿吉特身上,我们又拥有最特别的领导者。
至于我们的浮存金,每年我都以为我们的浮存金已经见顶了。我从来看不出我们还能怎么增加它。现在已经超过600亿美元了。而且我们还有像 Equitas 那样正在滚存清算的业务。
在保险业务里,每天都会有一部分浮存金逐渐流失,只是我们又不断补充新的进来。就像我说的,早在浮存金达到200亿美元的时候,我就以为,你知道的,我们已经到顶了。
但现在已经超过600亿美元了。总会有新情况发生。
依我看,伯克希尔已经成为世界上首屈一指的保险机构,而由此带来的好处也不少。
手握600多亿美元的浮存金,我看不出我们还能怎么大幅增加它,除非我们进行某项非常重大的收购。我不排除这种可能性,但目前并没有什么迫在眉睫的事情。
但从现在开始,我们不会靠有机增长让伯克希尔的浮存金快速扩张。这做不到。我们甚至可能要努力才能守住现有规模。
但我们也可能突然冒出点意想不到的机会。我是说,三年前谁能想到会出现 Equitas 这样的交易?还是会有各种带来正面影响的事情发生的。
但当我跟你们说阿吉特为伯克希尔创造了多大价值的时候,请相信我,如果说有什么不准确的地方,那也是我说得保守了。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我同意你的说法,我没什么要补充的。
沃伦·巴菲特:好吧。(笑)
19. 印度的机遇,但政府的僵滞令人却步
沃伦·巴菲特:既然这样,我们就转到7号麦克风。到你了。
观众:早上好,沃伦和查理叔叔。我得叫你“叔叔”,因为我父母是印度人,我们管比自己年长的人都叫叔叔或阿姨。
沃伦·巴菲特:你可能得叫我们“叔公”了。(笑)
萨布丽娜·崇(音):我叫萨布丽娜·崇(音),来自洛杉矶,今年12岁。
我妈妈持有一大堆伯克希尔的股票,很显然,这些股票有一天会归我。(笑)
我的问题是,世界上17%的人口是印度人。也就是说,世界上每六个人中就有一个印度人。
印度经济一直以每年7%到8%的速度增长。照这个速度,到2043年,它就会超过美国的国内生产总值总量。
请问,你为什么不投资印度呢?
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题——(掌声)——很显然,我们在那边也有些人脉关系。
但在保险领域,非印度公司——严格说是非印度资本所有的公司——能做的事情一直受到相当明确的限制。
我们做过不少考察,主要是通过阿吉特去做的。我们认真研究过在那边经营保险业务的可能性。
实际上,就在昨天,我答应明年3月要去一趟印度,因为我们的 ISCAR 业务——(掌声)——在那边做得非常好。
但我不知道他们还想让我额外做点什么,不过不管怎样,他们说,“3月来印度一趟吧,看看我们能不能把业务大幅扩展一下。”
印度将会实现大幅增长,而 ISCAR 这样的业务在世界上每一个工业国家都有立足之地。我是说,我们对工业来说是非常基础性的存在,我们已经为世界各地的客户创造了不少奇迹。
我们在印度已经有相当规模的业务了。不过 ISCAR 管理层希望,如果我们3月去那边走一趟,或许能再拿下几个客户。
相信我,无论是直接投资还是有价证券投资,我们都不会排除印度。
事实上,说到浦项制铁(POSCO),查理能比我讲得更清楚,他们在印度也有很大的计划。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的,印度存在的一个麻烦是,它的政府往往相当僵滞低效,行政审批程序没完没了,反对意见也层出不穷。区域规划难办,规划许可也难拿,诸如此类。
这也是为什么那位非常睿智的现代新加坡奠基人会说,中国的增长速度会远快于印度,因为中国政府造成的行政僵滞更少。
所以这些国家所呈现出的机会是不一样的。
但我们当然是喜欢印度的,而且——我们也颇为欣赏那种带来这种僵滞的民主制度,只是我们还是不喜欢那种僵滞本身。
沃伦·巴菲特:不过这也不是命中注定的。要知道,如果你在40年前看中国,你根本想象不到后来会发生什么。
所以各国确实会相互学习,我是说,也理应如此。我认为,它们已经从美国身上学到了不少东西并加以借鉴——我不是specifically在说印度,而是泛指其他国家总体上的情况。
它们不会照单全收我们的一切。但如果你看到一个国家在两百来年的时间里取得了这个国家这样的成功,你可能会觉得,那里面总有几个好点子值得借鉴。
我认为,你会看到这种情况正在世界各地发生,说不定它们还能在我们的基础上更进一步。
所以我不认为现在存在的任何增长障碍必然是永久性的。印度——我们应该想出很多办法在那些国家开展业务。
显然,我更偏好像保险这样我了解的、而且我们有优秀人才的业务。中国和印度目前都相当严格地限制了我们对一家公司的持股比例。
而我真的不喜欢让我们的一些管理人才去为一家我们只拥有 25% 股权的公司工作。我更愿意让他们为我们全资拥有的公司工作。
所以这要取决于法律。但 20 年后,印度人的生活水平会比现在好得多,就像中国人一样,也像美国人一样。
20.“出现严重通胀的可能性增加了”
沃伦·巴菲特:好,贝姬。
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自澳大利亚悉尼的乔纳森·马什(音译)。
他说:“上世纪七八十年代的许多股东信都讨论过通胀的各个方面,以及它对投资可能造成的破坏性影响。
“2008 年的信提到,当时美联储的量化宽松可能再次带来通胀,但 2009 年的信却没有提及这一威胁。
“您目前对美国通胀风险上升的看法是什么?”
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,在这个问题上我可能有点偏见,因为我一直非常担心通胀,而且确实一直存在很多通胀。
你知道,查理指出过,自我 1930 年出生以来,美元已经贬值了超过 90%。但他也指出,我们过得还不错。所以这未必是世界末日。
我认为出现严重通胀的可能性增加了,不仅是在这里,在世界各地,各国政府要么被迫、要么主动选择了目前这种做法。
这些应对措施很可能是正确的,但我们可能会发现,摆脱这剂药的难度,比治愈原来的病还要大。而这剂药,你知道,就是大剂量的债务。而且我要说,不只是这里,其他地方也是如此。
我看不出有什么办法,能让那些相对于 GDP 背负极高赤字的国家,长期下来不出现货币价值的严重贬值。
当然,这种情况可以维持一段时间。我是说,我们经历过战争等各种情况都撑过来了,也许我们还能纠正这种局面。
但如果我们做不到的话——大约一年前,我在《纽约时报》上写过一篇专栏文章谈这个问题。
我确实认为,如果你想就通胀是升是降下注,用身家性命去赌的话,我会赌通胀更高,甚至可能高很多。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我同样同意。(笑)
21. 芒格:麦当劳是比大学更好的教育者
沃伦·巴菲特:好,8 号。
观众:我叫卢卡斯·莱恩斯韦尔(音译),来自旺阿雷。如果你们不知道旺阿雷在哪里,它在新西兰。
此刻,新西兰正是凌晨 4 点 15 分,所以我可以有把握地说,我妻子这会儿正睡得香甜。
我是个理想主义者。我们能做些什么来向孩子们传授奥马哈圣人成功理财的哲学,并防止我们都目睹和经历过的 2007、2008 年那种金融浩劫再次发生?
沃伦·巴菲特:正如你所说的金融浩劫,我们会不时看到它发生。我希望我们能减少它,希望能降低它的规模,等等。
但人们会做出疯狂的事情,这与智商无关,有时候也与教育程度无关。
事实上,我甚至认为,过去 30 年里发生的一些问题,很大一部分正是源于那些顶尖商学院里盛行一时的所谓传统智慧。
所以,对于能不时地矫正人类的疯狂,我并不特别乐观。
不过第一部分,正是我们这部影片所要做的事。我真的相信,从小养成良好的理财习惯——其实其他方面的习惯也一样,但我这里主要指理财习惯——是非常重要的。
我是说,查理和我可能都很幸运,我们成长的家庭氛围中,一直在潜移默化地传授各种如何处理生活的道理,尤其是如何理财。
不是每个人都能有这样的机会。安迪·海沃德三四年前用《自由之子》出色地讲述了美国历史,如今他又想出了《秘密百万富翁俱乐部》这个点子。
如果我们能触及到 2%、3%,或者 5%,不管是多少百分比的孩子,给他们一些他们原本不会想到的想法,让他们由此养成一些习惯,这不会改变整个世界,但可能会给他们的人生带来一点好处。
养成理财习惯非常重要。而且说实话,查理和我都很推崇本·富兰克林。他在两百年前就已经在传授这些习惯了。所以我们打算借用富兰克林的这些理念,把它们改编成给孩子们看的、有趣的故事。
我认为这大概就是你们应该做的事。我不认为——我认为,把基础教育阶段的学习搞好,坦白说,比拿到高等学位、读研究生要重要得多。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的,美国还有其他一些伟大的教育机构可以帮忙解决这个问题。我最欣赏的机构之一就是麦当劳。
有一次我在一所名牌大学里说,我认为麦当劳作为教育者比那所大学里的人做得更好,说完还挺开心的。
我的意思是,麦当劳雇用了很多刚开始职业生涯时状况相当边缘化的人。而他们在那里学会了按时上班、遵守纪律。
他们中有很多人后来在职场上一路做到了高得多的职位。麦当劳对教育那些原本有可能一事无成的人学会承担责任,起到了巨大的建设性作用。
所以我认为,我们都要感谢麦当劳的用工文化,而这一点还远远没有得到足够的认可。
沃伦·巴菲特:我从《华盛顿时代先驱报》一位名叫约翰·戴利(音译)的发行经理身上学到了很多东西。
查理·芒格:是啊。
沃伦·巴菲特:那时我大概 13 岁还是 14 岁,我很幸运遇到了他。
基本上,如果我没有从那个人那里学到那些道理,我的人生大概会有所不同——他是以一种非常愉快的方式教给我的,他并不是在向我说教,只是告诉我,这样做那样做会让我过得更好,结果确实如此。
所以如果你有父母教你这些,你是幸运的。但只要能把这带进更广泛的教育环境,我都赞成。
就像我说的,我真的觉得安迪在这方面搞了个很棒的项目,我们且看它进展如何吧。
22. 把一切都捐出去是个“绝佳的避税手段”
巴菲特:说到安德鲁或者安迪们——安德鲁?(笑)
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:我们收到了大约十几个问题,至少我这边是这样,都是关于您税务问题的,巴菲特先生,而且还是股东提出来的。我挑了一个我希望是最委婉的版本。
巴菲特:我也希望如此。(笑)
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个问题来自汤姆·康菲尔德(音)。
他说:“巴菲特先生常被引用说,他的助理缴纳的税率比他本人还高,原因是长期资本利得税率和普通所得税率之间存在差异。
“这暗示着像他这样的人应该被课以更高的税。
“然而我注意到,巴菲特先生已经把他几乎100%的遗产捐给了慈善机构。因为他持有伯克希尔股票已经很多很多年,从未分红,所以他绝大部分遗产几乎肯定永远不会被美国政府征税。
“我的问题是,如果巴菲特先生觉得自己应该多缴税,那税制应该怎么改?”
巴菲特:这个嘛,可以搞财富税,这是一种办法。我是说,你可以对财富征税——我不知道现在有多少国家这么做,查理。
实际上,某种程度上财产税就是一种财富税,但你也可以专门搞一个财富税。我要说的是:他说得完全正确。如果你想把所有钱都捐出去,那确实是一个绝佳的避税手段。(笑)
不过,我还想说一点。在我刚提交的纳税申报表里,“慈善捐赠”那一栏,我还有超过70亿美元的未使用结转额度,一直没能拿去抵扣。(笑声)
但我欢迎这位提问者,或者任何人,效仿我这个“避税妙招”,把自己的钱捐出去。这样他们会省下很多税,而且这笔钱大概率会做很多好事。(笑)(掌声)
税收问题——如果我们作为一个国家,继续把GDP的25%或26%花出去,而这些都是我们通过民选代表做出的选择,那我们就不可能把税收一直维持在GDP的15%。
现在我们有一个财政赤字委员会。领头的两个人不可能比厄斯金·鲍尔斯和艾伦·辛普森更合适了。这两位都是很有格调的人。他们聪明、正派,大家都愿意和他们共事。总统挑选这两个人,选得非常好。
但到最后,他们必须——他们得提出建议,无非是税收大幅提高,同时支出大幅削减,两者的某种组合,到那时他们就不会像今天这么受欢迎了。
我非常怀疑,你们能否在不大幅提高对低收入人群征税的情况下,把税收占GDP的比重显著提高。所以这将是一道很有意思的方程,需要去求解,我祝他们好运。他们两位都很了不起。
查理,你对税收有什么看法?
芒格:嗯,我觉得那些担心你税交得不公平地低的人,应该感到欣慰,因为你最终会缴纳100%的税。等你去世了,人们问:“老沃伦留下了多少钱?”答案会是:“我相信他一分不剩,全留下了(捐出去了)。”
巴菲特:我希望他们把重音放在“老”字上。(笑声)
不,这其实挺有意思的。我是说,就拿伯克希尔来说吧。你知道,本质上,我永远不会卖出一股伯克希尔的股票。
但我很早很早以前就知道这一点了。所以基本上,这没什么问题。
如果我是某个信托的受托人,而这个信托持有伯克希尔的股票——实际上我确实就是这样——那么,经营它是很有乐趣的,各方面都很好。而且我这辈子想要的一切都已经拥有了,将来也永远会如此。
而且,你知道,最终,因为伯克希尔经营得很好,我们能把剩下的都捐出去。
现在,如果你愿意,你可以说,如果我把这些钱都给了联邦政府,而不是捐给慈善机构,社会会更好,但我认为你们当中没多少人会真的想持这种立场。(笑声)
23. 对抗通胀的最佳防御
巴菲特:9号。(掌声)
观众:您好。
巴菲特:你好。
观众:巴菲特先生,我叫杰夫·陈(音),来自旧金山。
我想更详细地问一下关于通胀的问题,想知道您在评估未来通胀和您的估值方法时,关注的关键指标是什么?
未来会导致通胀上升的一些催化因素又是什么?
巴菲特:你把我想得比实际聪明多了。
我不认为你能仅凭任何某个月份的某项指标,就准确判断出它会对通胀率产生什么影响,因为——一旦通胀真的动起来,它就会形成自己的动力机制。
你知道,我们在上世纪70年代末、80年代初就见过这种情况,直到沃尔克拿着大锤般的手段来治理经济为止。
但那时候我们眼看着人们纷纷逃离货币,当然,我们看到最优惠利率一度涨到21%多一点,政府债券利率也接近15%。
所以在这个国家,30年前,我们有过一次小型的“示范工程”,展示了当人们对货币感到恐惧时会发生什么。
如果我们继续现在这样的政策,我认为——重演那一幕,是相当有可能的。
但是,你知道,趋势并非命运。我们有能力去做一些事,国会也有这个权力。这正是我一年前写那篇专栏文章的原因,算是打出一盏黄灯示警。
我们有能力掌控自己的未来,而我们是通过选出的代表来实现这一点的。
我还是回到那个结论:根据我所观察到的情况——美国民众、世界各国政府的行为——我认为货币是一种比过去更差的赌注。但我完全不知道这在通胀率上具体意味着什么。我也希望自己是错的。
我要说的是,一旦通胀真的失控上位,它会变得非常难以预测——它能加速多快,人们对各种机构的信心会以怎样的方式崩溃。很多事情——很多坏事都可能因此发生。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的。最好的防御,当然是尽你所能为文明做出贡献,靠自身的本领去抵消通胀的影响。
那才是最安全的解药。以为只要比别人更精明就能从通胀中获利,这是一条危险得多的路。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。你的钱可以被通胀吞噬,但你的才能不会被通胀吞噬。如果你是奥马哈最好的脑外科医生,或者最好的画家,不管是什么,你总能获得周围资源中属于你的那一份,不管货币是贝壳还是1000万美元的钞票,都无所谓。
才能是应对任何货币状况的绝佳资产。但查理和我只能依靠钱了。
沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?(笑)
查理·芒格:谈才能已经太晚了。
沃伦·巴菲特:是啊。
24. NetJets的问题
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自亚特兰大Banyan Capital Management的道格拉斯·奥特。
「您在最近致股东的信中写道,很明显您让NetJets的状况恶化到这样一种地步,以至于在我们持有这家公司的11年里,它累计录得税前亏损。
「您和前任首席执行官具体犯了什么错误?您从中学到了什么?将来您将如何防止类似的事情发生在我们其他任何一家企业身上?」
沃伦·巴菲特:呃,我大概不会(防止)。(笑)
我们时不时会犯错,我们的一些经理人也可能犯错。有时候你会碰到一些确实很不寻常的情况。
但是,NetJets所犯的最大错误,本质上是我们一直在以虚高的价格买飞机,就我们日后能够卖出的价格而言是虚高的。而且购买份额飞机涉及一定的时间滞后。
这里有很多解释。但归根结底,我们没有为当时明显正在发生的事情做好充分准备。我们损失了很多钱,其中相当一部分归因于飞机的减记——你可以把那些飞机称为我们的存货,我们以X价买进,却卖不到X价,甚至连90%的X价都卖不到。
其中一些是我们本不该接手的新飞机,还有许多是从机主那里退回来的飞机。
我们也让运营成本与经常性收入脱节了。
不过,你知道,我犯过不少错误。我在纺织业里待了20年。我知道那是个糟糕的生意。查理在第一年、第二年就一直跟我说那是个糟糕的生意。
20年后,我才醒过来。我就像瑞普·凡·温克尔一样。我是说,想想还真挺让人沮丧的。(笑)
但有一件事我们可以保证,我们会犯一些错误。NetJets就是一次大错误,数字是7.11亿美元。
我们现在在NetJets的经营已经相当有起色。你们在屏幕上看到的数字显示,第一季度税前利润远超5000万美元,而这还不是靠飞机销售的什么大爆发,也不是靠别的什么,只是靠一个经营计划实现的,这个计划丝毫没有削弱安全性或服务水准,只是把该理顺的地方理顺了而已。
我要大大表扬戴夫·索科尔。我是说,他把那个摊子扭转过来的方式,别人根本做不到,在座的所有股东都应该好好感谢他。
查理?(掌声)
查理·芒格:是的,但我认为这段插曲应该放在整体背景下来看。
如果我们收购30家大企业,通常放手让经营者自己去经营,总部很少干预,而其中95%的情况都进展得很好,只有一次是特许经营权本身得到了保护、但我们有一段时间损失了一些盈利机会,那算不上什么大失败纪录。
这也不意味着我们应该不再对加入我们、带来自家公司的那些了不起的人保持宽松的态度。
沃伦·巴菲特:不,这完全不会改变我们的管理方式。我认为总体而言,我们从经理人那里得到的表现,已经超出了我当初创办这家公司时的梦想。
所以,我们一直是——放手让经理人去做他们的事。我认为——
查理·芒格:这个办法对我们是奏效的,净下来是奏效的。
沃伦·巴菲特:哦,这对我们非常奏效,净下来非常奏效。我们会继续这么做下去。
25. 投资比亚迪说明「老人」依然在学习
沃伦·巴菲特:第10个(问题)。
观众:巴菲特先生和芒格先生,我是来自中国北京的埃里克·张(Eric Chang)。
首先,感谢你们给我们这样一个与你们交流的机会,也感谢你们激励年轻人去学习。芒格先生曾形容您是一台不可思议的学习机器,在学习新领域、拓展能力圈方面尤为如此。
所以我想更具体地了解一下,你们最近投资了比亚迪,一家中国公司,生产电池,也生产电动汽车,可以说是一家科技公司。
能不能请你们大致讲一讲那个案例,说说你们是如何分析这个案子、又问了哪些问题,从而帮助你们做出投资这样一家公司的决定的?谢谢。
沃伦·巴菲特:比亚迪这笔投资的功劳100%归查理,所以我把这个问题交给他来回答。
查理·芒格:嗯,这是个很有意思的例子,因为如果这个机会早五年或十年出现,伯克希尔是不会投资比亚迪的。这说明老人们仍在不断学习,而这一点绝对至关重要。
如果我们还是原来那副样子,伯克希尔的潜力会比现在低。所以——你特别提到这段插曲,是完全正确的。
这里还要再提一次戴夫·索科尔的帮助。我一点都没把握能靠自己说服沃伦做这件事,所以我把戴夫也拉了进来,一起去了中国,我们两个人共同促成了这个学习过程。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:说得好。说得好。
26. 为什么我们永远不会聘请薪酬顾问
沃伦·巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自马克·韦尔斯(音译),是关于伯克希尔薪酬的问题。
他说,「伯克希尔如何构建其子公司首席执行官的绩效薪酬结构?请尽可能具体地说明你们最看重哪些指标,以及这些指标的达成程度如何转化为薪酬。」
沃伦·巴菲特:好的,我们做的第一件事就是——我们从来不聘请薪酬顾问。(掌声)
我们有大概70多家,也可能更多,各种各样的企业。
这些企业的经济特性千差万别。如果想套用某种统一的伯克希尔标准去衡量这些业务——比如保险业务,资本是它的堡垒,但我们可以拿这笔资本去投资其他我们本来就会投资的东西,所以其实是负资本占用;再比如BNSF或我们的公用事业业务,涉及巨额资本;又或者介于两者之间的喜诗糖果,几乎不占用什么资本——那是行不通的。
我们有些企业实在是太好了,好到就算让一只黑猩猩来经营也没问题;我们也有些企业有时候实在太难做了,就算把阿尔弗雷德·P·斯隆请回来,也未必能把它们经营得多好。
所以我们各项业务在经济特性上存在巨大差异。
我会去想——如果我拥有整个企业——雇用和支付某个人报酬的合理方式是什么,同时考虑到这项业务的经济特性。所以我们有各种各样不同的方案。
这件事一年花不了我几个小时。我们的经理人愿意留下来,说明他们对这些方案还算满意。
这不是什么火箭科学,但确实需要——需要有区别对待的能力。
如果我们有一个人力资源部门,那将是一场灾难。他们会去参加各种会议,然后被人灌输各种各样的东西,让他们往公式里塞这塞那。这件事其实只需要一定的常识就够了。
而且这还需要——顺便说一句——需要和经理人之间的互动,我听他们说,他们也听我说,然后我们大致就他们究竟为公司增加了什么价值这一衡量标准达成共识。
你怎么看,查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我认为美国陆军和通用电气那种集中化的人事政策,对他们来说可能是最合适的,而我们采用的是完全相反的体系,我认为这对我们来说显然是最合适的。
而且几乎没有别的公司完全像我们这样,这让我们显得很另类。我倒挺喜欢这样,你呢?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我们确实很喜欢这样。要是有人跟我们意见一致,我们反而会担心。(笑)
我们给人开工资——有些给得非常高。我们有些经理人过去每年、以后也会每年赚到数千万美元;也有些经理人,公司难过的时候他们也跟着难过。
但你必须公平对待每个人。就算他们不缺钱,每个人都希望被公平对待。
所以,你这么做的理由应该是能讲得通的,但伯克希尔内部并没有什么统一适用于各家公司的通用逻辑。我是说,如果你经营喜诗糖果,硬要往里塞一个资本成本系数之类顾问会建议你加的东西,那纯属胡扯。
这项业务里占用的资本是4000万、4300万还是3700万,根本没什么区别。
最重要的是,在市场地位等等方面,我真正想为经理人支付报酬的,是他们能否随着时间的推移,拓宽把我们的业务与竞争对手的业务分隔开来的护城河。这一点非常主观,所以我没有什么完美的办法来衡量它。但在设计薪酬体系时,我脑子里始终在想这件事。
所以到目前为止,就像我说的,我不记得——你还记得有哪位经理人是因为薪酬问题离开我们的吗,查理?
查理·芒格:我觉得神奇的是,这件事一直都很简单,花的时间很少,效果却出奇地好。
有一种想法认为总部能干出各种了不起的事情。在企业集团里,总部在一线往往是被人痛恨的。我们不想在一线被人痛恨。我们不想要一个强加于各处、成本高昂的“帝国式”总部。
平均下来,这种做法对我们非常有效。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我们不收取任何总部费用。我们对少数几家公司收取信用方面的费用,但——大多数公司都会把销售额的百分之几,或者别的什么比例,分摊到旗下各个不同的经营单位。而这种做法在一线通常都是招人怨恨的。而且——
查理·芒格:可不是嘛。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。所以我们不这么做。
27.“我们不会拿声誉去换钱”
沃伦·巴菲特:11号提问。
观众:谢谢。我叫乔·鲍勃·希契科克,来自加州纳帕谷,是一名酿酒师。
我想建议,下次你和查理在高拉特牛排馆吃牛排的时候,不妨配上一种新的健康食品——纳帕谷红葡萄酒。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:你可能知道,我们刚刚进入了葡萄酒分销行业。(笑)
观众:太好了。
查理·芒格:沃伦是没救了,但我支持你。
观众:好的。(笑)
我给你寄一瓶。
伯克希尔成功的关键之一,就是你允许伯克希尔哈撒韦旗下各家公司的经理人自主经营,奥马哈总部尽量少加干预的这项政策。
但如果你察觉到某家伯克希尔哈撒韦旗下公司存在不道德或非法的行为,你会亲自直接介入吗?
沃伦·巴菲特:当然会。我们必须介入。
我们有一条举报热线,我认为这是——它不算是什么发明,但《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》里体现的这项好政策,对我们来说是一大助力。有时候我会直接收到信件。
所以我希望能听到问题。我希望别人已经先听到并且已经把问题解决了,但如果问题没能在别处得到解决,我希望能听到。
我们还有一个内部审计职能,这在伯克希尔非常重要。任何反映进来的问题——你知道,如果有人打投诉热线说“我旁边那个人有口臭”,这种我一般会跳过。
但只要有涉及被指控的不当行为的举报进来,伯克希尔一定会去调查。而且确实会调查。
时不时地,也确实出现过一些重要的越轨行为,是通过写给我的信、举报热线的电话,或者写给审计委员会的信之类的渠道被我们知道的。我们鼓励这样做。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的。比起商业上的失误,我们更在意这类事,在意得多得多。
巴菲特:我们大概每两年发一封信,这是唯一的沟通方式。也许我该找个时候把它印一份放进年报里,好让股东们也能看到。
但那信也就一页半长。它要求经理告诉我,如果他们当晚出了什么事,我该考虑让谁在第二天接手管理那家公司。
不代表我一定会照他们的建议做,但我想知道他们的理由,以及各自的利弊。
但信一开头基本上是说,“听着,我们的钱已经够用了。”我们还想赚更多钱,我们也热爱赚钱。
但我们的名誉一分钱都不多余,我们绝不会拿名誉去换钱。
我们希望这个信息传达出去。这也是我们每年都在影片里放所罗门那件事的原因。我是说,你们——你们里面可能有人现在都能背出来了,但我不觉得反复讲这个故事会有什么坏处。
我们要告诉他们这个信息,然后我在这次信里又加了一句新的。我说,如果你做一件事,能想到的最好理由就是“别人也在这么做”,那这理由不够充分。
除了“别人也在这么做”之外,一定得有别的理由,不然你就麻烦了。我还告诉他们,“有什么事拿不准,就打电话给我。你觉得这事快挨着底线了,就给我打电话。”
这么说了之后,反而没人给我打电话,因为——(笑)——他们知道,正因为他们觉得这事离底线那么近,这多半就说明已经越线了。
但我想知道这些事。只要我们发现得够早、行动得够早,任何问题都能解决。可如果它被搁在某个角落里发酵,有人捂着盖着——有时候确实有人这么干过——那我们就有麻烦了。
以后还会有这种事,这是躲不开的,你知道。你要是有26万员工,总会出点什么事。我只希望我们能尽快听到消息。
而且我希望他们的经理比我们更早听到消息,并在事情传到我们这儿之前就处理掉。但我们非常希望保护伯克希尔的声誉。这是应该做的事。
查理?
芒格:嗯,这绝对是至关重要的。总的来说,伯克希尔的声誉非常好,从主流媒体的评级和各种调查中就能看出来。
这对我们来说是绝对珍贵的东西。从某种意义上说,你们这些人也是这种文化的一部分。
这个理想不只是在不惹上太多法律麻烦的前提下,合法地赚尽可能多的钱。这个理念要大得多。那就是,我们只在财富是靠公平手段赢得、并被明智地使用时,才为之喝彩。
如果这种理念能渗透到一家公司的文化里,包括股东在内,我们认为这对我们非常有帮助。(掌声)
28. 良好的监管让BNSF受益
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个问题是关于你们在伯灵顿北方的投资,来自我相信身在纽约市的乔希·桑布尔斯(音)。
他问:“你在年度信中提到,铁路行业的监管者需要提供,原话是,‘对可允许回报的确定性’,才能促成巨额投资。如果让你帮监管者计算这个‘可允许回报’,你会建议他们怎么做?”
巴菲特:嗯,我想地面运输委员会——也许马特·罗斯能提供更多细节——但我记得他们采用的是大约10.5%左右的投入资本回报率。
如果利率或其他方面发生足够大的变化,你可以说这个数字或许应该朝某个方向做些调整。
通常,对于受监管的公用事业公司,他们谈的是净资产收益率。不同州的数字不一样,有些州可能是11%,有些州可能是12%左右。一般都在这个区间。
至于铁路,他们采用的是这种投入资本回报率,其中把债务也作为一个调整后的数字计算在内。
我不觉得这是个特别离谱的标准。我是说,铁路和电力公用事业不一样,电力公司获准的回报,你只要规规矩矩经营,几乎肯定能赚到,而且需求也不太可能大幅下滑,让你的回报远低于这个数字。
如果遇上严重的工业衰退,铁路的下行风险更大,所以在下行方面没有那么受保护。
但应该有一个大致的数字,我认为10.5%左右,或者不管具体是多少,近几年这四家大铁路公司在投入资本上实现的回报,大致就在那个数字附近,或者接近那个数字。
你希望铁路公司的投资远远超过折旧额,我觉得这——这肯定会促使我愿意投钱去改善运输系统。
另一方面,如果回报远低于这个数字,那把钱投进去就太疯狂了,因为你没法把铁路系统改造成别的东西去用。
所以我认为,这个国家和铁路系统在这件事上有着非常共同的利益:不是要赚取过高的利润之类的,而是要在未来10年、20年、30年里那些必需的巨额投资上,获得一个体面的回报。
如果地面运输委员会说是10.5%,或者差不多这个数字,我觉得这不是一个离谱的数字,我认同。
查理?
芒格:嗯,是的,就受监管行业而言,铁路一直是一个极其成功的系统。你只要细想一下就知道,美国的铁路在过去三四十年里基本上被彻底重建了一遍。
他们改善了轨道,改变了隧道的尺寸,改善了桥梁。平均每列火车现在可以长两倍多、重两倍。
你很难想象还有哪个行业比美国铁路业更好地适应了我们其他人的需求。总体而言,这是一个明智监管配合明智管理的体系。但过去并非一直如此。
如果你回溯很久以前,无论是管理还是监管,都算不上多么明智。但现有这套体系对我们所有人都运作得非常好。
29. “起伏不定”的盈利作为一种竞争优势
巴菲特:好,第12个问题。
观众:你好,我叫阿希什·特克萨利(音)。我来自印度新德里。
首先,我想感谢美国运通的凯利·布鲁斯(音)和卡罗尔,感谢她们为促成这次活动所提供的帮助。
这个问题是关于通用再保险和再保险业务的。
由于保险业务使用复杂的模型,伯克希尔怎么能更放心地确信,保险业务的模型不会像华尔街的那些模型那样,让你们暴露在重大风险之下?
另外,如果不算机密的话,是否存在风险集中的情况?也就是说,有哪几类事件可能给保险业务造成重大损失?
巴菲特:我不确定我完全听清楚了,但我们确实承担着来自地震的重大风险。在智利地震中——我不知道第一季度会有多少损失体现出来。等你们看到我们的10-Q报告,里面会有一个具体数字。但我们为瑞士再保险承保20%的份额,他们在那次地震中的损失,我们会承担20%。
我们还有其他各种类似的风险敞口。我们已把最佳估计值纳入前面给出的那些数字里。
我们目前的峰值风险——就地震或飓风而言,这是频率和严重程度最高的两大自然灾害——比几年前已经大幅下降,这并不是因为我们承担风险的意愿有所减弱,而是我们觉得那些领域的费率不够有吸引力。
但如果我们认为费率有吸引力,我们完全愿意承接这样一组风险:如果发生非常接近最坏情形的事件,我们可能会损失50亿美元左右。
我们在卡特里娜飓风中损失了30多亿美元。在9/11事件中损失超过20亿美元,我想实际上还要多得多。
以后还会有类似的事情发生。但这些损失的规模都远远不足以让我们感到不安。我不知道我是否完整回答了他的问题,查理,但你——
芒格:嗯,差不多。我想说,我们和其他大多数人的做法之间的主要区别在于,我们是刻意寻求一种经营方式,让我们偶尔在某一年出现大额亏损,整体上出现大额亏损。
而其他所有人都在设法避免这种情况。我们只是想让自己足够富有,这样某一年的巨额亏损不过是个小波折。
这就是一种竞争优势——愿意承受年度业绩的波动。这是一个很大的优势,你说是不是?
巴菲特:这是一个巨大的优势。是巨大的优势。而且这是别人无论如何也学不来的优势。我是说,他们知道我们是怎么做的,他们只是不愿意那样做,或者在财务资源上做不到。
所以我认为,这几乎可以说是伯克希尔一项永久且实质性的优势。
我不——先不谈——你不应该忘记人的痛苦,那些不该忘记,但单从财务后果来看,卡特里娜飓风让我们损失了30亿美元,可我第二天的感受和前一天并没有什么不同,从财务角度讲。我是说,这完全不会有什么影响,因为我们本来就是在做这个游戏。
只要我们在保费方面长期做出正确的决策,只要我们从不让自己暴露在会真正动摇我们资本结构的损失之下,那么,这就是一个我们拥有巨大竞争优势的游戏。而且这个优势每年都在扩大。
所以,你知道,风险——我们所从事的——在保险业,我们的业务是承接别人想要平滑其盈利的愿望,作为交换,换取我们认为长期而言更大、但起伏不定的收益。我们喜欢这门生意。
卡罗尔?哦,你先说,查理。
芒格:我想说的是,沃伦在保险业中的处境和很多其他人不一样。在伯克希尔出现巨额亏损的那一年之后,他照镜子刮胡子时可以说:“你的股东依然爱你。”(笑)
巴菲特:没错。
芒格:别人可没有这样的处境。
巴菲特:查理和我认识一位来自奥马哈的人,四五十年前,他是美国最富有的人之一,名叫霍华德·阿曼森。霍华德有一种执念,凡是他接触到的东西,他都要拥有百分之百的所有权。
所以有人问他为什么会这样,他说:“我喜欢照镜子的时候说,‘我所有的股东都爱我。’”(笑)
我倒没那么极端,但我喜欢照镜子的时候说:“爱我的股东已经够多了。”(笑)
30. 用衍生品“赌博”
巴菲特:卡罗尔。
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题是关于衍生品的。
“衍生品在我们的经济中发挥了什么有用的作用?我们在没有衍生品的情况下也顺利地过了很多年。如果它们没有发挥任何有用的作用,而且事实上已经证明会对经济造成相当大的损害,那为什么不把它们定为非法,尤其是裸卖空的那种?这是有先例的。
“我认为,卖空自己并不拥有、也没有设法借入的股票是非法的。”
巴菲特:查理在这个问题上比我更容易激动,所以我打算让他来回答。(笑)
芒格:嗯,我认为衍生品的用处一直被高估了。如果我们完全没有衍生品——包括在交易所交易的粮食买卖合约——我们照样会有充足的燕麦和小麦。
我是说,我认为通过使用大宗商品衍生品市场来对冲农业风险,对人们来说会稍微方便一些。
检验标准不是“衍生品有没有任何好处”,而是衍生品的净收益相对于其弊端而言是否真的有用?还是说,没有它我们反而会更好?
我自己的看法是,如果我们回到只保留大宗商品、金属、货币的衍生品交易——在负责任的规则下安全地进行——而所有其他衍生品合约都从地球上消失,这个世界会变得更好。(掌声)
巴菲特:我们举一个眼下的例子。伯灵顿北方公司多年来一直对其大量使用的柴油进行套期保值。另外,在他们很多运输合同里也设有燃油调整条款。
我和把伯灵顿经营得很出色的马特·罗斯说,“听着,如果是我来经营这家公司,我不会去做套期保值,”因为如果你去对冲——如果你对冲上一百万年,你大概率会白白付出摩擦成本,除非你在柴油这件事上比市场整体更聪明。而如果你在柴油上真的比市场整体更聪明,那我们干脆去做柴油投机生意好了。
我是说,如果我们真的拥有优势,那何必还要去经营铁路呢?我们干脆去投机柴油得了。
但我也要说,你知道,如果一个组织里有专人负责这项活动,这种事情就会发生。
另一方面,马特·罗斯和他的管理团队在经营伯灵顿北方公司方面做得非常出色。如果他们觉得这样更安心,或者认为在定价合同之类的方面这样做有用,那对我来说也完全可以。
我是说,这是他的公司,他可以想清楚经营它的最佳方式。我会根据它长期的表现来要求他负责。而且,你知道,我会用一种方式去做,别人会用另一种方式去做。我不认为那——
我不会去谴责任何经营铁路公司而对柴油进行套期保值的人,我也不会去谴责任何像我们在中美能源那样经营能源公司、以某些方式对能源成本进行套期保值的人。
但我确实认为——如果能把第4号演示资料放到屏幕上,谢谢。
我认为这在1935年就已经说得非常好了。事实上,凯恩斯《通论》的第8章——不好意思,是第12章——凯恩斯《通论》的第12章,在我看来,或许查理也这么认为,是对资本市场运作方式、人们实际操作方式的最好描述,远胜其他。它既是规范性的,也是描述性的。
每个人都应该读一读第12章。开头几页读起来稍微有点慢。
但凯恩斯——我打算把这段念出来,因为我想查理手头没有这份材料。
这段话的前半部分大家都很熟悉。我是说,这句引言已经被引用了很多次。但对我来说,这里面每一个字都说到点子上了。
“投机者作为稳定的企业经营长河上的泡沫,或许并无大碍。但当企业经营变成投机漩涡上的泡沫时,情况就严重了。”
如果你愿意,也可以把这里的话换成“赌博”。
“当一国的资本发展成为赌场活动的副产品时,这项工作恐怕就做不好了。”这就是这句引言中著名的那部分。
凯恩斯接着说:“如果把华尔街看作一个机构,它应有的社会职能是把新投资引导到未来收益率最高的渠道,那么,就以这个标准衡量,华尔街所取得的成功,不能算是自由放任资本主义的一大胜利——如果我的判断没错,华尔街的最聪明的头脑们其实一直是朝着另一个目标努力的,这也就不足为奇了。”
这是1935年写的。我认为再没有比这写得更好的文字,说明政府、公民该如何看待华尔街,它做什么、不做什么。
它一直混杂着赌场经营和一项极具社会重要性的业务这两种性质。
衍生品变得流行之后,学术界百分之百地站在它们那一边。他们教人如何给期权估值,教得比教人如何给一家企业估值还多。我目睹了这一切,简直要被逼疯了。
但在1982年,国会正在考虑——这可是真事——以一种大张旗鼓、广为宣传的方式,把衍生品合约向普通大众推广。那就是标普500指数合约。它彻底改变了整个衍生品游戏的玩法。
到那时,华尔街基本上就说:“来吧,谁都可以来炒一个指数。不是什么真实的公司,就是一个指数。你可以在早上10点买入,10点01分卖出,这么做你就是在为这个美好的社会作贡献了。”
于是我给国会议员丁格尔写了一封信,我们把它放在展示资料5里。我只是摘录了我在信里说的几段话。这是在他们推出标普500交易的前一个月,也就是4月份。他们是1982年4月在芝加哥推出的,先在堪萨斯城做了一点试点。
我在信里洋洋洒洒写了四页,这里只挑出几点。我觉得,在某种程度上,我当时预测的情况后来还真的应验了。
然后事情就变本加厉,华尔街的人不断想出一个又一个让人赌博的新花样。
就像我说的,学术界一路都在为此鼓掌叫好,还被各家交易所聘为顾问,替它们宣扬这些做法在社会意义上有多么了不起。
我想——好吧,资料就在上面,大家可以看。我很乐意——卡罗尔,整封信我记得曾经被《财富》杂志转载过。是不是这样——?
芒格:顺便说一句,如果我没记错的话,这大概是当时唯一一封反对这个被普遍称颂的、有关证券类赌博新世界的信。沃伦写了这封信——
巴菲特:而且它是——
芒格:——那么多年前,而且这是唯一一封——
巴菲特:顺便说一句——
芒格:他基本上是说这个主意是疯狂的。它带来的害处会多于好处。可是当时和现在一样,没有多少人理睬他。
巴菲特:我敢说,这屋里很少有人知道——你们都知道,如果你买了一只股票,得持有很长一段时间才能享受特殊的资本利得税待遇。
但如果你在11点买入一份标普500合约,11点01分卖出并有盈利,那么这笔盈利中有60%按长期资本利得计税,40%按短期资本利得计税。
所以,如果你在芝加哥拿标普500的衍生品来赌博——这实际上就是赌博——反倒能享受比你老老实实持有某种证券四五个月、再因为某种原因不得不卖出更好的税收待遇。
这正是一小撮从这项特定活动中赚得盆满钵满的群体,其游说能力的一个明证。
查理,你能想出什么理由,为什么一样东西只持有30秒,就能算作60%的长期利得吗?(笑)
芒格:这当然是疯狂的。既不公平,也不合理。
但是,如果一小撮人拥有大量的金钱和影响力,对某件事非常上心,而我们其余的人却毫不在意,那么,在我们的立法机构面前,他们往往就会占上风。
事情就是这样。我一直很喜欢俾斯麦的那句话:有两样东西你不该去看——做香肠和立法。(笑)
31. 巴菲特在与对冲基金的赌局中正在落后
巴菲特:好了,说了这些鼓舞人心的话——(笑)——我们现在要休息去吃午饭了。在休息之前,我先说一下:两年前,我和一个叫Protégé Partners的机构做了一个慈善赌局,赌的是他们挑选的一批基金中的基金(投资对冲基金)和标普指数基金,孰优孰劣。
这场赌局为期十年,无论谁输,双方的钱最终都会——嗯,反正双方的钱都会归到获胜一方所指定的慈善机构,大致就是这么回事。
西海岸有一家很有意思的机构,专门监督他们所说的这类“长期赌局”。如果我们把展示资料6放上去,大家可以看到,目前我是落后的。
我们拿到展示资料了吗?拿到了。那我们去吃午饭吧。好。(笑)
下午场
1. 敢于发声,但要负责任地发声
巴菲特:那么我想我们接下来转到13号话筒,那是在另一个房间里。13号话筒那边有人吗?
观众:是的,有人。
巴菲特:好的。
观众:您好,巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自纽约的一名股东。有人可能会说,那场大泡沫的一个重要成因,就是当时缺乏一场健康而公开的辩论——所有的观点、所有的资金都押在了交易的同一边。
最近我在读克里斯汀·理查德的新书《信心游戏》(Confidence Game),讲的是比尔·阿克曼与MBIA之间的较量——MBIA曾是全球最大的债券保险公司——读到这段的时候我就想到了这个问题。
这个故事也让我想起了大卫·艾因霍恩,以及他当年对Allied Capital和雷曼兄弟提出的质疑。我们现在都知道,他们当初的判断百分之百正确,但在他们最初发声的时候,却遭到了那些公司的攻击、媒体的口诛笔伐,被那些公司的会计师和评级机构无视,最令人担忧的是,他们还因为胆敢公开发表看空的分析而遭到了SEC的调查。
我可以告诉你们,眼看着他们的遭遇,这实实在在地会让其他人不敢站出来提出类似的质疑。
所以我很想知道二位对此有什么看法:让卖空者站出来发声,这对我们的市场是有益的吗?
总的来说,应该怎么做,才能鼓励更多元的观点,从而避免未来的泡沫呢?谢谢。(掌声)
巴菲特:是这样,我不觉得不管是唱多还是唱空的人站出来发声有什么不对,只要他们愿意为自己所说的话负责就行。我是说,这里面显然有——
这么说吧,举个极端的例子。假如镇上有两家银行,我拥有其中一家,而我这个人又有点心术不正,我大可以出去雇50个人排队站在另一家银行门口,用不了多久,我大概就没有竞争对手了。
所以,无论是做多还是做空,都有一些做法在我看来是绝对不道德的,在很多情况下也应当被定为非法。
但只要你挑战传统观念,你就一定会遭遇大量的反对,因为你正在威胁到别人既有的地位。
30年前,当我们谈到有效市场理论的时候,那可是绝对的金科玉律——在全国几乎每一个金融系,尤其是那些名校,你要么表态效忠于它,要么就别想升职。
你知道,人们不喜欢这样。任何机构,一旦感受到外部的威胁,都会同时攻击那个威胁和发出威胁的人。
但这在双方都存在。我对卖空没有意见,我对负责任地公开讲出你这样做的理由也没有意见,就像我对做多方那样。
卖空方面存在一些非常糟糕的做法,做多方面也存在一些非常糟糕的做法,就是那种试图传播不实信息的行为。
但多年来,这种情况在做多方面出现得可能比在卖空方面更多一些,而且相差不小。
查理?
芒格:是的,我认为在某种程度上你批评错了对象。在很多情况下,那些允许出现糟糕会计处理的会计师,才应该受到指责。而他们在美国受到的批评极少,这是个错误。
2. 为什么子公司之间没有协同效应
巴菲特:贝姬?(掌声)
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自本·索(音),他住在加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省的大温哥华地区。这个问题是给巴菲特先生或芒格先生的。
他想了解伯克希尔内部的协同效应,具体来说,“Dairy Queen 门店卖百事可乐的产品,却不接受——不,是不接受——美国运通卡,只接受万事达卡或维萨卡,这合理吗?”(笑)
巴菲特:全世界大约有将近6,000家 Dairy Queen 门店,形式各异。有些现在叫 Grill and Chill,叫法不同,但大致有6,000家,其中由公司直接经营的有70家。
所以差不多99%都是加盟店,而在 Dairy Queen,我们并不控制加盟商的具体做法。我上次了解到的情况是,大多数加盟商——那些比较开明的——卖的是可口可乐——(笑)——不过这完全是他们自己的事。
他们可以——可以——可以卖可口可乐的产品,也可以卖百事可乐的产品。看起来其他一些特许经营体系在这方面似乎比 Dairy Queen 有更多的控制权。
但你想想看,Dairy Queen 的历史比麦当劳、比温迪、比汉堡王、比肯德基都要早,比这些都早得多。它一直可以追溯到上世纪30年代,很多和地区加盟商签的协议,都是在餐巾纸背面之类的东西上写成的。
所以在某种程度上,在全国某些——一些地区,我们对加盟商行为的控制力,比别人要小。
但我们会继续要求他们卖可口可乐,也许你能让他们看到光明。伯克希尔的任何协同效应,几乎都是在运营层面产生的。
我们不会指示我们的公司之间彼此做生意。我们希望他们之间会做生意,而且,你知道,我们希望子公司A能给子公司B提供充分的理由,让B愿意和A做生意。
但伯克希尔的整个理念是,我们的经理人要对自己的业务负责,如果要让他们对自己的业务负责,那就意味着我们不应该指挥他们该做什么,除非是在非常有限的范围内。
查理?
芒格:嗯,你把情况描述得很准确。有意思的是,我们真的就喜欢这样。(笑)
巴菲特:这样省事多了。(笑)
芒格:是的。
巴菲特:而且我确实认为这里有一定的道理。有时候,如果合作是他们自己的决定,人们合作起来会比你命令他们合作要好。
芒格:还不止如此。如果我和沃伦是在子公司里工作,我们也会喜欢这种方式。这一点毫无疑问。
巴菲特:是啊,要不是这样,我们大概早就走人了。(笑)
3. 表现得“像是这个地方的主人”
巴菲特:好。第1区。
观众:尊敬的巴菲特先生,尊敬的芒格先生,我叫史蒂文·罗曼(音)。我是奥地利维也纳大学机械工程专业的学生。
如果有一天我想到伯克希尔旗下的某家公司应聘做经理人,你们特别看重哪些素质?我要怎么做才能成为你们的接班人?(笑)
巴菲特:大概是先把我干掉吧。(笑)
我们各家子公司的经理人自己招聘自己的人。我要为经理人做的决定真的非常非常少。
就像我之前提到的,他们会给我写一封信,说明如果他们出了什么意外,谁应该接替他们,这是他们的想法。
但GEICO、Burlington、Mid-American 或者其他任何一家公司要雇谁,我都不做决定。我是说,如果他们需要一位首席财务官,他们自己去招聘一位首席财务官;如果他们需要人去管理一家工厂,他们自己去招人。
他们对自己的经营负责,偶尔会有人去世,也偶尔——非常偶尔,我几乎都想不起有哪一次——会有人辞职。
到那个时候,我就必须决定该让谁来负责那项业务了。但我想,在这45年里,这样的情况加起来不超过10到12次。
所以我不是一个很称职的职业介绍所。我想我们总部大概有21个人,几个月前我招到了一个非常出色的人。不过这就够我用四五年了。
查理?
芒格:是啊,也没有什么迹象表明我们在这方面特别在行。(笑)
巴菲特:是的。我本来没打算提这个的。(笑)
不过我要说的是:如果你想——让我觉得有意思的是,当你发现一个真正出色的人时,天哪,他们真的会一下子脱颖而出。我是说,那种以正确的方式思考这家公司的人,那种格外努力工作的人,不管具体是什么表现。
竞争并没有——在这个世界上,你的竞争其实没有那么多。所以,就在一个组织内部整体晋升而言,我想你会惊讶地发现,如果你开始像这个地方的主人那样去思考,像主人那样去工作,你面对的竞争其实少得让人意外,很快你可能就会去主管某项业务了。
4. 留存利润、现值与股息
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个问题来自以色列特拉维夫的托默·马隆(音)。他显然是位老股东了,因为他引用了你1984年的董事长信。
他写道:“你以前说过,一家公司只有在——原话是——‘每留存一美元利润,就能为股东创造至少一美元的市场价值’的情况下,才应该留存利润,引用结束。
“您还提到,如果这些条件不再适用于伯克希尔——以五年滚动平均值衡量——那么,用您的原话说,‘我们将把我们认为无法被有效利用的所有非限制性盈利全部分配出去。’”
“然而,在2005年1月3日至2009年12月31日这五年间——不好意思,我是说从7月3日……不对,是从2005年1月3日到2009年12月31日这五年间,A类股每股年均盈利(按报告数字计算)为5,930美元,而同期股价的年均变动仅为2,420美元。”
“因此,您是否在考虑分红,或者回购股票?我想我已经知道答案了,但我觉得还是应该问一下。”(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:他确实知道答案,不过我们还是详细说一下。
我确实写过那段话,不仅是1984年写的,而且一直保留在伯克希尔年报后面,也就是我们“经济原则”那部分里。
坦白说,我第一次写那段话时,措辞并不周全。在2009年年报里,部分是因为去年有人问了那个问题,我其实把那部分重新写过了。
我指出,即使我在1984年写下那段话的时候,我们在之前很多年份里也会“不及格”——因为在那些年份,股市普遍出现过一段时间的大幅下跌。
正如你从我们的报告中能看到的,现在我们留在公司里的每一美元,按现值计算,都产生了超过1.30美元的市场价值。
我们已经通过了留存利润创造价值这项检验。但我最初的措辞是这样的:只要五年内股市整体大跌一大截,因为五年前我们持有的可口可乐股票是按某个价格计入我们资产价值的(或者不管是什么股票),那么即便我们在这五年里做了非常出色的资本配置,我们看起来仍然会很糟糕。
同样地,如果股市大幅上涨,我们即便配置得很蠢,也可能显得很出色。
所以,如果你们去翻2009年年报后面的部分,我记得是第11条——或者,我不太确定具体是第几条。
但去读一读那部分“经济原则”,你会看到我不得不承认自己当初措辞上的错误。
但我认为,就我原本想表达的意思而言,那段话在理智上仍然是诚实的。
你知道的,就跟约翰·克里2004年说的那样,我是先投了反对票,后来又投了赞成票,差不多是这个意思。(笑)
我认为它确实通过了“留存一美元利润创造超过一美元市场价值”这项检验。我们也将继续以是否通过这项检验来衡量自己。
如果我们做不到——如果留存一美元没能在现值上创造出超过一美元的价值,我指的不是每天或每周,而是随着时间推移——那我们就该想想别的办法了。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我喜欢那些能从一大堆文件里找出错误、然后揪着我鼻子不放的人,尤其当那是你的错误的时候。
沃伦·巴菲特:揪着我鼻子不放。(笑)
查理·芒格:是啊,是啊。
沃伦·巴菲特:真够宽容的。(笑)
我当初应该让他来写这段话。其实我现在想起来,那些话本来就是他说的。(笑)
5. 失业者需要安全网,但伯克希尔不该充当这个角色
沃伦·巴菲特:好,第2位。
观众:我是来自俄亥俄州克利夫兰的格伦·莫利纳(音译)。能来见到您,巴菲特先生和芒格先生,这一直是我人生清单上的一项,能站在这里是我的荣幸。
我的问题跟希望和就业有关。您知道,在美国,我认为我们需要想办法创造就业机会。我一直在努力帮助人们找到工作。
我的问题是,或者说是一个挑战:我们怎样才能让伯克希尔·哈撒韦和董事会走出去,直接雇用一些人,给他们带去希望?
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,等我们有活儿给他们干的时候,我们就会雇人。(掌声)
但是——而且我们现在实际上正在净增雇员。
我是说,当伯灵顿铁路上周运送了17.3万节车厢,而不久前只有15.5万节的时候,我们就需要更多的人手。我们旗下其他一些业务也需要更多员工。
但我们的地毯业务,员工人数比高峰期少了6,000多人。不过人们不会永远不买地毯了。我们会招聘不少人,但在没活儿干的时候雇人是没有意义的。
我经历过这样一段时期,对我来说印象特别深刻,因为我们——伯克希尔·哈撒韦——曾拥有过几家纺织厂,其中一家在新贝德福德。
最终,在我们努力经营了20年之后,还是不得不关掉了那几家纺织厂。
如果你遇到一个在纺织厂工作、已经55岁的人,而且很多情况下他们还只讲葡萄牙语,那么对他们来说,“再培训”这种说法没什么意义。
我的意思是——如果你相信“创造性破坏”,也相信资本主义,本质上就是不断想办法用更少的人做同样的事情,那你最好有一张社会安全网。
在这个国家,我们已经建立起了相当不错的安全网,比30年或40年前要好得多。
但眼下失业率相当高。虽然并不比1982年前后更高,但绝对数字很大,而且不会很快消失,尽管它终将消失。
在我看来,社会应该为那些正在找工作、努力想找到工作的人提供某种最低生活保障,尤其是在眼下这种时候,他们很可能根本找不到工作。
但我不认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦应该充当这个社会安全网。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的,我想说,如果伯克希尔为了增加人们的希望而开始制造一堆“凑数的活儿”,长期来看,其净效果反而会削弱人们的希望。(掌声)
沃伦·巴菲特:我觉得这话没错,但我宁愿是查理来说,而不是我。(笑)
6. 为什么GEICO没有考虑进军中国或印度
沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:“我们的汽车保险业务”——
哦,这是一位纽约人提的问题,他要求我只用他的姓名首字母,A.J.。
“我们的汽车保险业务在美国境内持续获得优异利润并不断扩张。为什么伯克希尔在中国、印度、乃至欧洲的汽车保险业务上没有任何进展?
“正如比亚迪(BYD)所展示的那样,这些市场的汽车销量正在爆炸式增长,难道不正是摘取果实的好时机吗?”
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。这个——我们早就知道,全世界从来都不缺司机。美国的业务可能很多,但其他地方的业务同样多得很。
具体到印度和中国,我们在这两个国家的任何一家公司里都只能持有有限的股份,我记得是24.9%。而我们不太愿意为一家只能持有24.9%股份的公司拼命努力,因为我们本可以为一家能持有100%股份的公司拼命努力。
显然,我们一直都在谈论、几十年来一直在思考如何扩大GEICO的业务,因为它是一家非常、非常出色的公司。
我们收购控股权时的市场份额是2%多一点,现在已经达到8.5%左右。
但这里还有很多可做的事情。而当我们放眼其他市场时,我们并不具备同样的优势——或者说我们认为在合理的时间内无法建立起那样的优势。
我是说,显然我们也考虑过加拿大。你知道的,托尼和我经常谈论这类事情。
我同意他的判断:现在,而且很可能在未来相当长一段时间里,美国的机会实在太多了。而其他地区,出于这样那样的原因,在我们看来都无法给我们带来我们在美国所拥有的那种竞争优势,所以我们就放弃了它们。
但我们非常喜欢这样的想法:把一个在某个地区行之有效的业务,想办法拓展到其他地区去做,不管是地理上的相邻扩张,还是产品线的延伸,或者其他各种方式。
我们非常清楚外面存在的各种可能性。就GEICO而言,我们还没有决定进军其他国家,但这并不是因为我们不知道那些地方也有汽车。(笑)
查理?
查理·芒格:我没有什么可补充的。(笑)
7. 中国经济增长“很有意思”,值得关注
沃伦·巴菲特:好,第3个问题。
中国留学生:下午好。我叫Shin Tse Chen(音译)。我是来自堪萨斯州立大学的一名中国留学生。
我的问题是,巴菲特先生,您从中国学到的最重要的东西是什么?谢谢。
沃伦·巴菲特:我从中国学到的最重要的东西?
查理·芒格:中国,是啊。
沃伦·巴菲特:是啊。查理,你从中国学到的最重要的东西是什么?(笑)
查理·芒格:比亚迪里有些非常不寻常的人物。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:我学到的是——
查理·芒格:没有哪条教训比这个更重要了。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:我学到的是,他们更喜欢雪碧而不是可口可乐。在中国,雪碧的销量是可口可乐的两倍。不过两者都在大幅增长。
我认为中国是一个了不起的经济体。在我看来,毫无疑问,人均意义上的增长今后会非常显著。他们才刚刚开始释放自己的潜力。
想想看,1790年,美国只有400万人,刚刚不到400万。而1790年的中国有2.9亿人。同样聪明,同样勤劳,土地、矿产等资源,还有气候,都非常、非常相似。
但在此后大约170年里,这些拥有和美国人一样天赋的人们,生活水平却几乎没什么进步,就像你说的那样。
但是,你知道,最近几十年,中国人的潜力正在被释放出来,而且规模巨大。我觉得这非常、非常值得关注。
查理和我,还有几位董事,将在9月底前往那里。
你知道——几年前我去过那里一次。那真是令人叹为观止的景象。
不过,说到具体的经验教训,他们倒没教会我怎么吃中国菜,这个我得承认。(笑)
查理·芒格:我一直都知道中国人蕴藏着巨大的潜力,能够取得迅速而巨大的进步,因为我在与所有打过交道的美籍华人身上都能看到这一点。
确实,当年有些中国人是以“苦力”——实际上等同于奴隶——的身份来到这里的,而他们崛起的速度快得令人惊叹。
所以我一直知道,中国有潜力成为人类文明的巨大贡献者。但我想我低估了这一切发生的速度。
中国正在以极快的速度创造文明进步的新纪录。看着这一切很有意思。
8. 巴菲特为什么把年报致辞对象设定为他的两个妹妹
沃伦·巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自南卡罗来纳州艾肯市的一位股东,他要求匿名,但他希望巴菲特先生或芒格先生谈谈过去这些年伯克希尔年报所做的一些改动,以及做出这些改动的原因。
他注意到的两处改动是:第一,穿透盈利(look-through earnings)似乎不再被提及了;第二,各业务集团未经审计的合并财务报表似乎不再被收录了,尽管其中至少一些业务集团的相关内容似乎在报告的其他地方有所涉及。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,第二点我不太明白,因为我们已经把它们分成了四个组,并尽力就我们认为合理的分组方式提供了相关的财务信息,而且今后还会继续这样做。所以我不太确定我完全理解这个说法。
我们确实有四个相当合理的分类方式。当然,你也可以把它拆成70种分法之类的,但总有一个临界点,在年报里再多加100页,反而会让信息变得晦涩难懂,而不是更清楚。
而我们正努力做的,是用合理的篇幅——卡罗尔可能会说太多了——但用合理的篇幅,尽可能地传达出,如果我们站在你们的位置、由你们来写信给我们,我们希望得到的那些信息。
我们认为这四个分类是合理的——受监管行业的资本密集度非常高。你知道,保险业:资本本身其实不是一个决定性因素,但资本量给我们带来的影响却是一个因素,诸如此类。
所以我并不认为我们在这方面真的改变了什么。至于穿透盈利,或者有时候我们谈到的每股收益和每股投资额,其中有些内容我并不是每年都重复,因为我们尽量把年报控制在大约12000字左右。
我真的觉得,如果篇幅拉得太长的话——我要说一句,到目前为止还没有人跟我说篇幅太短——(笑)——包括今天在场的我的编辑。
隔年我可能还会做一下营业利润与——之间的那个拆分,但那得花上一千来字才能给大家解释清楚。
整份报告的指导思想,从我七十年代中期真正开始认真对待它以来一直没变,那就是——其实我是在写给我在座的两位姐妹。我脑子里想着的读者,是两位非常聪明、有兴趣的人,但她们不在公司里,已经离开一年了,她们完全有能力理解任何东西,但未必熟悉所有的行话。
如果我写得太玄乎,我就得解释一下。我是真心希望她们能理解我是怎么看待这家企业的,进而理解我认为她们应该怎么看待它,并回答我认为她们心里会有的那些问题。
而且她们大部分身家都在里面,所以她们会一直读到最后。这么多年来,我脑子里写作的这个框架其实一直没变过。
我落笔时心里想的开头是,“亲爱的多丽丝和伯蒂,”然后我就把这句划掉,改成,“致伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东们。”但事情就是这么做出来的。
查理?
芒格:是的,不过细节会随着事实变化而变化。我们持有股份但不控股的那些公司的未分配利润,过去比现在重要得多。侧重点自然而然会发生转移,这很正常。
巴菲特:是的,现在的未分配利润,我没有很仔细地去看,但大概——可能不超过我们报告利润的15%左右吧。
过去这个比例要高得多。它们仍然重要。但我不认为——我认为,能理解可口可乐和美国运通并没有把全部利润都分掉的那些人,这个数字还没大到需要我在报告里花很多篇幅去解释的地步。
9. 芒格力挺罗斯个人退休账户(Roth IRA)
巴菲特:第4个问题。
观众:我叫乔·哈德森(音),是来自印第安纳州卡尔弗的股东。
我猜你们两位可能都没在罗斯个人退休账户(Roth IRA)里放钱,但你们对今年大家把传统IRA转为罗斯IRA的机会怎么看,这样一来伯克希尔或其他投资未来的全部增值就能百分之百免税了?
政府在这件事上是不是犯了个大错?大家是不是应该担心以后这个规则会变?
芒格:这个问题我来回答,因为我正打算把我的一个IRA转成罗斯IRA。这就是我的答案。(笑)
巴菲特:好吧,我还是没搞明白,不过——
芒格:你不需要搞明白。(笑)
巴菲特:好吧。他老是这么跟我说。(笑)
我想——既然查理这么说了,那肯定没错。
10. 报纸在与互联网的较量中节节败退
巴菲特:我们请安德鲁提问。(笑)
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:这个问题我其实是相当有私心的。它来自约翰内斯堡Alexander Forbes公司的安东·奥西普,他写道:“去年你说你不看好报业。”
“考虑到你对报业公司的终生兴趣,以及你在《华盛顿邮报》公司等企业中的持股,随着iPad和其他电子阅读技术的问世,你今年的看法有没有变化?
“你认为——媒体机构所保留的价值——相对于将转移给媒体分销商的价值,会不会出现收缩?”
巴菲特:这个问题,你大概比我回答得更好。
我这个看法相对来说不太在行——因为我对这项技术不太了解——但我总有种感觉,既然经营一份好报纸的钱,基本上——四分之三左右的钱,都来自广告——报纸对广告主的用处就越来越小了。
我是说,很长很长一段时间里,它们是这座城市里唯一的游戏。现在它们不再是唯一的了。如果你是在推销什么东西,这其中的差别可就大了。
所以,当费城《询问报》——斯坦·利普西今天在场——我给斯坦打了个电话,说:“斯坦,这大概就像一匹老消防马看到火警一样吧,但我们还是稍微考虑一下。”
结果它昨天在一场破产拍卖中被卖掉了,不过我想这还有待最终确认。
但是你知道,如果一份报纸的发行量还相当可观,这确实很诱人——费城《询问报》,而且他们那儿还有份《每日新闻》。
但这笔账实在难算。我是说,发行成本、印刷成本,样样都算上——也许这一切正在以你比我更懂的某种方式发生变化。
但既然我不懂,我就只能不碰——不懂的东西多的是——我没法对拥有一份报纸做出肯定的决定。
我刚拿到——ABC发行的那本《快讯》(Fast Facts),一本厚厚的黄皮书——前几天刚拿到,我忍不住要翻一翻。我一页页翻过去,看各种报纸的发行量。
实际上,在布法罗,尽管我们的人口结构非常不利,我们的降幅还是比很多报纸小。我可以提一句,我们的降幅比罗切斯特那份(甘尼特旗下)还要小。
但你看看《旧金山纪事报》,降了20多个百分点。达拉斯——
这些都是欣欣向荣的社区,可人们抛弃报纸的速度之快,简直令人震惊。
这不仅仅是老年人的问题——也不仅仅是年轻人不再看报的问题。我是说,就报纸这种东西本质上的地位而言,这个世界真的已经变了。
回想1970年或1965年查理和我聊起报纸的时候,没有什么行业看起来比一份垄断本地竞争、竞争对手都已消失的日报更坚不可摧了。
但作为一种传播信息和娱乐的形式,它在很多情况下已经失去了那种即时性。
它肯定不再是——它已经不是获取信息的必需渠道了。想想30、35年前股市行情是怎么查的。你要看报纸才知道股票的走势。你要看报纸才知道体育比赛的结果。
所以它的首要地位已经逐渐消退,而广告主之所以在那儿,并不是因为他们喜欢报纸的发行人,而是因为它是一个能对全城人喊话的扩音器,他们必须跟全城人说话。
于是就出现了这种鸡生蛋、蛋生鸡的问题:随着广告主流失,报纸的价值变得更低;而随着订户减少,广告主又进一步流失。我看不出有什么好的解决办法,不过查理,你怎么看?
芒格:独立报纸由于历史的偶然,在各自城镇成为主导之后,数十年里都拥有坚不可摧的经济实力。
而且总体来说,正因为它们如此强大,它们的行事作风也更为得体。它们被称为“第四权”,实际上是政府之外的一个部门,起到监督政府诚信的作用。
就我们所在的这个州而言,《世界先驱报》长期以来一直是一股非常有建设性的力量,总体上是这样。随着这些占主导地位的报业逐渐式微,这对国家来说不是好事。
我认为我们正在失去一些我们没有任何替代品的东西。我认为这非常令人悲哀,而我完全不知道该拿它怎么办。
巴菲特:查理和我都热爱报纸。
我记得《世界先驱报》曾在某个星期天创下过 30 万份发行量的峰值。我不认为他们在那六个月期间平均达到过这个数字,但我似乎记得有过,我可能记错了。
而现在的数字——比那少了 10 万份左右吧,而这个州的人口增加了,这座城市的人口也增加了。
我认为它对我来说仍和以往一样重要,但很明显——对整体民众而言,情况已经变了。
你看,当我看《费城问询报》的时候,我忘了具体数字,35 万份左右的发行量吧,你知道,我并不担心费城会消失。
但当我看到发行量下降了——我忘了具体数字了——一年里下降了三四万份,你知道,这样下去情况并不好,因为广告商已经不像 10 年或 15 年前那样需要你了。所以你的定价能力也就随之蒸发了。
过去可不是这样——查理和我大约在 1970 年前后见过汤姆森勋爵,他拥有那家报纸——他曾经拥有那家报纸——就在河对岸的康瑟尔布拉夫斯。他是个很快活的人,见到我们非常高兴。
我们对他说,“汤姆森勋爵,”我们说,“我们注意到您拥有康瑟尔布拉夫斯的那家报纸。您去过那里吗?”他说:“我做梦都不会想去。”(笑)
然后我说,“嗯,汤姆森勋爵,”我说,“您好像每年都在提高报纸的价格,那您那些可怜的广告商”——我是说广告价格。我说,“他们能拿这怎么办?”他说:“毫无办法。”
然后我对他说,“那么,既然完全由您自行决定,您是怎么判断该涨多少价的呢?”
他说——我想查理会记得这句话——他说,“我告诉我在美国的经理们,定价要做到税前 40% 的利润率。超过这个数,我就觉得可能有点敲竹杠了。”(笑)
那样的日子已经一去不复返了。(笑)
芒格:是的,而且随着报纸的式微,政客们的行为并没有变得更好。我们会怀念报纸的力量的。
巴菲特:我同意这一点。(掌声)
11. 「永远会有跑赢市场的机会」
巴菲特:第 5 号话筒。
观众:我叫罗伯特·麦克阿瑟(音),来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。
我刚开始从事投资这一行,和我年龄相仿的许多——如果不是大多数的话——投资者都认为自己是价值投资者。
而且,今年来这里见您的人数创下了纪录,三年前还被人嘲笑的那些价值投资者,如今却被财经媒体奉为明星。
往后街头会不会更少留下那种打比方说的 100 美元钞票,如果是这样的话,我是不是应该考虑去从事经营企业而不是管理资金的职业?
巴菲特:机会可能会更少一些,但我要说,除了在最泡沫化的市场之外,也许——但只要你管理的资金量不是很大,机会将永远存在。
基金经理这个行业——存在一个根本性的利益冲突。大多数行业都有利益冲突。现在大家都在指出投资银行业存在的种种利益冲突。
但资产管理这个行业存在的利益冲突同样严重,事实是,揽资规模的扩大可能会变得比管好资产本身更能影响你的收入。
但如果你管理的是适度规模的资金,我认为跑赢市场的机会将永远存在。这并不意味着很多人都能做到,但这样的机会确实存在。
而且,你知道,多年前可能会更容易一些,那时候关注这个领域的人更少,互联网上能获得的信息也没那么多。
但人们仍然会犯同样的错误,他们仍然会——好吧,我给你举个例子。
查理有一家叫《每日新闻》公司的企业。这家《每日新闻》公司手里有一大笔现金。它就那么捧着现金,捧着现金,我持有 100 股——这是他允许我持有的全部股数——前段时间我收到了他们的年报。
在他们 2009 财年,我以前从没见他们买过股票,可突然之间他们买入了价值 1500 万美元的股票,后来这些股票值 4500 万美元了。
所以,通过按兵不动一段时间,但一直等到某些情况变得非常离谱的时候,他投出了 1500 万美元,大概在六个月左右的时间里就变成了 4500 万美元。
所以机会总是会出现的。你必须做好准备,等机会来了就抓住它。但用我们现在运作的这种资金量,是没法抓住那些非同寻常的机会的。
用适度规模的资金,我认为机会将永远存在。查理现在大概会跟你讲点更悲观的话了。(笑)
芒格:是的。沃伦经常给出的一条建议——对于那些要进入资金管理这一行的人尤其有用——走人少的那条路。那条路上没什么拥堵。(笑声与掌声)
巴菲特:艾伦·辛普森过去常说,他说,“在华盛顿走阳关大道的人很少被交通拥堵所困扰。”(笑)
但回到你问题的最后一部分,人才总会有机会的,不管是在资金管理,还是在企业经营管理,或者其他任何领域。都行得通。
资金管理,你知道,更容易做大规模,也更容易入行,等等。所以,不管怎样,这自然是我的天性所倾向的方向。
我可不愿意一路做到厂长——(笑)——一直干到快要给我发退休金表的时候,才好不容易爬到顶层的位置。
但这两个领域里都有机会。
12. 市政债券保险公司必须警惕传染风险
巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题是关于市政债券的。您在 2008 年信中描述的那种规模的市政债券违约,到目前为止还没有出现。
在未来五到十年里,我们在多大程度上会看到市政当局直接违约?债券保险公司能承受得住这些损失吗?联邦政府会救助各州吗?
考虑到所有这些风险,投资者持有市政债券是不是应该获得比现在更高的回报?
巴菲特:这个嘛,如果这些债券是由伯克希尔承保的,你完全不用担心。(笑)
但我们目前没有承保很多债券,因为我们认为保费不合适,这就说到了问题所在。
就在前几天——过去几天内——你们可能在报纸上读到过,宾夕法尼亚州的哈里斯堡(Harrisburg)在一笔相对较小的债券上发生了违约。
那家债券保险公司,名叫Assured Guarantee,开始支付利息。
哈里斯堡可能在一周内把事情解决掉,也可能解决不了。当然它是有动力这么做的。如果它真解决了,债券保险公司的风险敞口就不算太大。
但你真正担心的是这个领域里的相关性问题:如果一个主体违约了——特别是如果没有发生什么可怕的事,警察第二天照常上街执勤,消防车照样出警救火——人们就会开始想,“我为什么要维持良好的财政信誉,明明可以少交税,又照样享有我需要的一切公共服务?”
这事会怎么发展,很难说。我个人认为,联邦政府最终很难对一个陷入极端财务困境的州袖手旁观,毕竟联邦政府实际上已经出手救了通用汽车和其他一些实体。
我不知道你要怎么跟某个州的州长说,政府要对他撒手不管,而与此同时政府又参与了那么多对企业的救助。
但谁知道会发生什么,谁知道这种事的传染性会有多强?作为债券保险公司,你最担心的就是传染效应。
显然,那些债券保险公司——除了伯克希尔以外——在我看来,相对于其资本而言都背负着极其庞大的负债。
几乎每一家,仅仅因为它们在结构化证券上遇到的麻烦,就要么倒闭了,要么实际上已经倒闭——不得不把坏账银行和好账银行拆分开来之类的操作。
而且我认为它们对这个领域可能发生的情况一直抱有非常乐观的态度。但我不知道未来几年违约率会是多少这个问题的答案。
我当时知道,一年半前我承担这个风险时,感觉自己得到的报酬是公平的,而现在我不觉得对方开出的保费是合理的,所以我们就让别人去做这笔生意吧。
查理?
芒格:是的,说到市政债券,我会尽量投资那些既繁荣又自律的地方。
你想投资繁荣的地方,因为本杰明·富兰克林说得对,他说:“空口袋很难立得直。”
你也想投资那些自律的地方,因为诚信仍然重要。这并不难,也不复杂。
巴菲特:但你可以说,在一个国家里,如果不自律的一方不会因为不自律而受到惩罚,那些自律地区的纳税人就会说,“等一下。我们为什么要保持财政审慎的记录、按时还债,而别人却不还?”
芒格:嗯,坏行为具有传染性,这一点毫无疑问。人性就是这样运作的。但我还是宁愿站在那些自律——
巴菲特:是的。
芒格:——繁荣的人这一边。
巴菲特:第6号。
芒格:这就是我喜欢伯克希尔股东大会的原因。(笑)
巴菲特:那,还有免费的软糖。(掌声)
13. 短期股价波动不可预测,也无关紧要
观众:下午好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我是(听不清),来自佛罗里达州劳德代尔堡。首先我想感谢你们如此慷慨地与我们分享你们的智慧。
早在2008年10月,您极力建议购买美国股票,那是个绝妙的主意,效果非常好。
我想听听您对未来市场走势的看法。
您现在还是那么乐观吗?未来十年左右,股票的合理预期回报率大概是多少?
巴菲特:我很少写文章,也很少接受采访,去谈论整体市场水平这个话题。在过去40年里,我真正就股市整体水平表态,大概只有四五次。
事实证明,我在2008年10月那次确实说得相当早,很多人后来都跟我指出了这一点。
但我当时的感受——我在那篇文章里说的其实是,从长期来看,持有股票会比坚持买长期债券或持有现金的策略要好得多。我知道我可以做出这样的判断,而且我认为,我最终——我觉得概率非常高——会被证明是对的。
但我不喜欢——我不知道股市下周、下个月、明年会怎么走。我完全没有概念。
人们总以为我知道。但我很清楚自己不知道,我根本不去想这个问题,这也无关紧要,因为查理和我——基本上我想不起来我们俩就这个问题讨论过什么。
但我确实认为,展望未来10年或20年,我更愿意持有股票——包括美国股票——我更愿意持有股票,而不是现金,也更愿意持有股票,而不是10年期或20年期债券。不过这部分是因为,对于其他可选项,我实在提不起什么热情。
我认为股票很可能会在一段时间内给你带来一些正的——温和为正的——实际回报。但除此之外,我真的说不出别的什么了。
查理?
芒格:股票是眼下这堆糟糕选项里最好的一个,这倒是个令人振奋的想法。(笑)
巴菲特:你不同意这个说法吗?
芒格:不,我认为你说得对。(笑)
我认为,人们应该逐渐习惯,平均而言,他们的投资组合按实际购买力算,回报会不如从前。
巴菲特:查理和我不——
芒格:我认为我们即将经历相当长一段时间,普通的投资结果不会太令人兴奋。
巴菲特:但我们喜欢持有企业。我们目前的地位是既可以整体收购企业,也同样喜欢部分持有企业股权。
我们希望持有的企业,是那种我们真心认为长期具备某种竞争优势的企业,是我们对其管理层感到放心的企业,也是我们认为价格相当有吸引力的企业。
我认为现在你可以找到这样的企业,但它们绝算不上非常有吸引力。不过在我看来,它们确实比持有现金,或者持有5年、10年、20年期债券要强。
14. 我们为什么不用债券评级机构
沃伦·巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自约翰·贝勒(音译),他问的是关于评级机构的事。他指出,你今年开始出售所持有的穆迪股份。
“穆迪的投资逻辑是否因为潜在的监管而发生了变化?如果是这样,为什么不把这个仓位清空?”
沃伦·巴菲特:我们不会讨论我们会不会对任何仓位采取什么行动,但我想这么说。评级机构过去拥有、而且在目前的条件下仍然拥有一门极其美妙的生意。
我是说,它根本不需要资本,你知道,定价能力也相当可观。世界上有些地方觉得他们需要评级机构。
同时也有——世界上有些地方对评级机构非常恼火。很多人觉得,评级机构让他们失望了,因为评级机构基本上也屈从于同一种狂热,可以说,那种狂热当时弥漫在整个投资界,其实也弥漫在政界、媒体界,等等。
他们犯了和政客一样的错误,我也犯了,你知道,你也犯了,抵押贷款经纪人也犯了,随便谁都犯了。
他们没能预见到全国范围的住宅房地产会崩溃的情形。
我不认为这是因为——激励机制那部分,也许多少起了点作用。我只是觉得,你知道,要逆着大众去思考是非常难的。
另一方面,显然存在对评级机构的一种反弹。也许会有法律上的补救措施。这方面你可以有不同的看法。
如果他们不是被迫改变——围绕他们的整个结构没有发生某种剧烈的变化——这仍然是一门相当好的生意,因为在评级机构这一行,你没法货比三家去比价。
我们从来不关注债券的评级,我是说,你知道,在伯克希尔是这样。我们不认为应该把投资判断外包出去。
如果我们自己做不了,那我们就不做。我们不会依赖别人的意见,不管是评级机构,还是投资咨询机构,或者管理咨询公司,或者其他任何人。
所以,这不是一门我们会依赖的生意,但我们也承认,如果那种社会模式不发生变化,它仍然是一门非常了不起的生意。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,我要说,评级机构在它们目前这种形式、以及目前这种激励结构下,在我们国家过去许多个十年里,一直是一种极具建设性的良好影响力。
当然,后来发生的是,认知出了问题。他们随着那个时代的愚蠢一起漂移,这一点是令人遗憾的。
部分原因来自美国商学教育的愚蠢。他们过度相信那些荒唐的模型,如此等等。而我至今还没听到商学界为其对我们目前的困境所做的巨大“贡献”说过一句道歉。(掌声)
15. 等石油这份“意外之财”耗尽时,世界会找到解决办法
沃伦·巴菲特:7号区。
观众:我是来自旧金山的迈克·麦考伊(音译)。
巴菲特主席,您经常说,对未来几代人的繁荣抱有乐观看法,认为我们的孩子、以及孩子的孩子会比我们生活得更好。
您认为我们目前的繁荣,有多大程度要归功于我们能够以远低于石油对经济价值的成本把它从地下开采出来?
当我们不能再获得越来越多的这种“免费午餐”、而不得不依赖太阳能、风能这些更稀薄的能源来源时,我们又要如何在未来生活得更好?
这会不会变成像试图用一瓶可口可乐去满足一个瘾君子?
沃伦·巴菲特:石油这个行业——显然,石油的发现——那是什么时候来着,大概1850年代?在宾夕法尼亚州泰特斯维尔的德雷克上校,是吧?
那从根本上改变了世界,而这才是150年前的事。
从那以后,我们就一直以令人难以置信的速度往地里插吸管。你敢信吗,美国有超过50万口正在生产的油井?我是说,平均一天10桶、11桶左右的产量。
我们已经真的把——我也不知道,可能要花几十万年,甚至几百万年才能形成的东西——给开采殆尽了。
这对世界的繁荣做出了巨大的贡献,但在我看来,未来一百年,世界不会再依赖那种特定的——姑且称之为“意外之财”了。
查理在这个话题上懂得比我多得多,但会有其他的“免费午餐”出现。你知道,不管是太阳能,还是——可能性有很多。
永远不要低估人类创新的能力,人类总能想出办法,解决那些看起来无解的问题。
我们经历过各种各样的预言。你知道,说什么该发明的东西都已经发明完了——有一句很有名的话,我忘了是谁说的了。
我们其实才刚刚开始。我是说,如果让你在历史上选一个时间点出生——先撇开核、化学和生物威胁不谈,这个确实得撇开——那我会选今天。这个世界前途光明。
现在,查理会给你讲讲另一面。(笑)
查理·芒格:不。我认为你忽略了一件很重要的事。在150年前的技术水平下,他们确实需要石油才能取得进步。
在我们这个已经从过去150年技术专长中受益的先进文明里,如果非要的话,我们不靠石油也能取得进步。
弗里曼·戴森是一位物理学家,不是经济学家,但是个天才,他一直很擅长指出,只要那个世界像我们现在这样富裕和有知识,去设想一个摆脱石油的世界并没有那么可怕。
所以,他们在150年前如果没有石油就走不到我们今天这个地步,这个事实并不意味着,如果非要的话,我们就没法不靠石油过下去。
我们最终需要石油、天然气和煤炭,更多是用作化工原料,而不是用来取暖和为车辆提供动力。
沃伦·巴菲特:而且,幸运的是,这种调整会相当渐进。我是说,不会是一天8500万桶一下子在五年或十年内变成5000万桶那种情况。所以在我看来,这是一个可以适应的调整期。
查理·芒格:如果这事都不让更懂行的弗里曼·戴森烦心,那我觉得也不该让你太烦心。(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:他老是这么拿这事来说我。(笑)
16. 巴菲特不喜欢卡夫收购吉百利这笔交易
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:我收到了不少关于卡夫(Kraft)的问题,这个问题来自一位不愿透露姓名的股东。
问题是:“鉴于您持有卡夫的股份,并且您今年早些时候公开批评了卡夫收购吉百利(Cadbury)的交易,您会如何评价卡夫董事会的资本配置能力以及对管理层薪酬的把控能力?
“您怎么看卡夫首席执行官艾琳·罗森菲尔德(Irene Rosenfeld)2630万美元的薪酬方案,其中包括她领导完成吉百利收购以及出售卡夫北美冷冻披萨业务的贡献?”
巴菲特:嗯,吉百利那笔交易和披萨那笔交易我都不喜欢。不过,你知道,伯克希尔自己也做过不少蠢事。
所以我对别人变得更宽容了些,顺便说一句,我认为某笔交易蠢,并不代表它一定就是蠢的,但我认为它是蠢交易的可能性更大。
事实上,我认为这两笔交易很可能都是蠢的。披萨那笔交易尤其蠢——这是我的看法。
但想想我们自己做过的那些蠢事吧,对吧?从巴尔的摩那家百货公司说起。
芒格:噢对,是啊。还有几家爱尔兰银行,你知道的。
巴菲特:对,(听不清)。
芒格:我们好像总是不——
巴菲特:我倒希望你没提这个。
芒格:——我们始终忘不了这些事。(笑)
巴菲特:我们预料到自己会做一些蠢事,只是当别人拿我们的钱去做蠢事时,我们会生气。(笑)
你知道,披萨这项业务——我手头大概有一些相关数字——但他们出售披萨业务时,对外宣布的成交价是37亿美元。
但他们实际上并不是以37亿美元卖出的,那是买方支付的总价。他们自己拿到手的大约是25亿美元。而且这笔交易在税务上极其低效,尽管他们此前出售Post麦片业务时已经证明自己懂得如何做一笔税务高效的交易。
而在提到——嗯,他们根本没有提及披萨业务此前的盈利情况,但我记得雀巢(Nestle)说它的税前盈利大约是2.8亿美元,不过那说的是上一年度的数字。
他们在谈论所收购的吉百利的盈利时,说的是明年的数字;而在谈论所出售的披萨业务的盈利时,说的却是去年的数字。
披萨业务在2009年,说出来你可能不信,税前盈利大概是3.4亿美元。
所以他们用25亿美元换来的,是一项税前盈利3.4亿美元、增速与吉百利不相上下甚至更快、销售增长也同样不逊色的业务。在我看来,这实在说不通。
当然,你知道,艾琳是一位相当能干的管理者,她可能了解很多我不了解的关于这项业务的情况。就像我说的,我们自己也犯过不少错误。
但如果是我,我会投票主张保留披萨业务,不去收购吉百利。我表达了自己的看法,这种事我不常做,但我们持有大量卡夫的股份。
而卡夫目前的股价,仍然大幅低于其各组成部分的价值总和,尤其是如果你按照他们给吉百利估值的方式来估算这些部分的价值的话。(笑)
但只要他们不像卖披萨那样把这些业务都卖掉,你知道,目前的股价其实低于Kool-Aid、A.1.酱汁,还有Jell-O、Oscar Meyer香肠等几项业务本身的价值。
这些都是非常好的业务。我只是不愿看到他们放弃相当一部分这类业务,去以我认为极其高昂的价格收购吉百利。
查理?
至于她的薪酬,你知道,我们在伯克希尔有一套我认为相当合理的薪酬体系。而美国有很多公司采用的是不同的薪酬体系。(笑)
芒格:是啊,我觉得总体而言,美国企业的高层人士常常自以为对战略懂得太多了。他们往往厌恶自己所在行业里那种艰苦的竞争环境,渴望换到一个不那么艰难的行业去。
你还记得施乐(Xerox)收购美国保险公司Crum & Forster那次吗?那是有史以来最愚蠢的收购之一。
施乐之所以那么做,是因为保险业里没有强悍的日本竞争对手。他们实在是厌倦了在自己所在行业里面对的那种激烈竞争。
我认为,如果你身处商界,梦想着换一个稍微不同的行业、不管付出多大代价,就能减少自己的麻烦,这是相当典型的心态。
巴菲特:而且你身边会聚集起一整支律师、投资顾问、公关人员的大军,他们每一个人都有强烈的经济动机,怂恿你不断推进一笔又一笔交易,完全不管股东最终的处境如何。事情就是这么运作的。好了。
芒格:这就是为什么持有伯克希尔的股份更划算。(笑)
我们在很多方面都相当愚蠢,但我们躲开了其中一小部分愚蠢的做法。(笑)
而这些恰恰很重要。
17. 对诚信最大的威胁:“别人也都这么做”
巴菲特:好,8号。
观众:尊敬的巴菲特先生,尊敬的芒格先生。我叫理查德·伦特罗普(Richard Rentrop),是来自德国的一名股东。
芒格先生,您刚才又一次提到了诚信的重要性。我的问题是关于管理层诚信方面的变化。
您考察管理层的三个关键问题之一是:管理层是热爱他们所做的事,还是只热爱钱?那么,您认为这场危机在多大程度上改变了管理层的诚信状况?
芒格:我认为,导致这场危机的原因在一定程度上,与许多管理层缺乏诚信有关。幸运的是,其中一些人现在已经出局了。所以,诚信非常重要。
而且,诚信也是赚钱最稳妥的方式。偶尔也会有个别彻头彻尾的无赖在赚钱上混得相当不错,但那种成功让我想起教皇乌尔班(Pope Urban)评价黎塞留枢机主教(Cardinal Richelieu)时说的话。
他说:“如果真有上帝,黎塞留枢机主教有太多要交代的了。可如果没有上帝,那他这辈子过得相当不错。”(笑)
而太多人都想成为教皇乌尔班眼中那种黎塞留式的人物。
而——诚信很重要,极其重要。当然,人人都会把诚信挂在嘴边,即便他们其实并不具备。
所以很难确定,标榜诚信和真正拥有诚信是一回事。
沃伦·巴菲特:「别人都这么做」是最难对付的。我觉得——
查理·芒格:是啊。
沃伦·巴菲特:你们遇到过一个经典案例。大概在1993年前后,会计准则委员会出台了一项规定,说的是大家一直心知肚明的事:股票期权其实是一种费用,而费用出于某种原因,理应列在利润表上。
于是美国——整个美国企业界——展开了你难以想象的反击。我是说,那简直像爆发了第三次世界大战,一支支由首席执行官组成的大军开赴华盛顿。
于是会计准则委员会退让了。国会——参议院——以88票对9票投票告诉他们,会计准则委员会对会计到底懂个什么,参议院会告诉他们什么才是会计。
当会计准则委员会退让之后,他们说:「我们现在规定,你们可以用两种方法中的一种。第一种是首选方法,」也就是费用化处理。「第二种是可以接受的,但不是首选。」
在标准普尔500指数成分股公司中,498家选择了第二种,也就是非首选的方法。只有两家采用了首选方法。
那498家公司里,我和不少人谈过话,这些人我信得过,可以当我遗嘱的受托人,我很乐意他们做我的邻居,他们甚至可以娶我的女儿,但最后他们说:「如果别人不这么做,我也没法这么做。」
这其实是「我这么做是因为别人也这么做」的一种变体。
他们基本上是说:「如果我披露的盈利比我本可以披露的要少,那我就是在损害我的股东利益。而所有其他人都是那样做的,我理解你的意思,但……」
而情境伦理的问题非常严重。我之前给你们举过一个例子,说的是如果精确到十分之一美分,季度报告盈利中出现「4」这个数字的概率有多低。
这不是偶然的——但如果你去问那些玩把戏把「4」变成「5」的人,他们会说:「别人都是这么干的,你自己的统计数据就证明了这一点。」
这确实是个很难对付的问题。
我们在伯克希尔尽量少制造这类会诱发此类行为的情境。我不要求各位经理向我提交预算,伯克希尔没有所谓的预算。他们可以在自己的业务中用预算,有些用,有些不用。很多都用,相当多都用。
但如果他们把预算提交给我,而如果他们没能完全达标,又觉得我一直在盯着他们,那就会产生某种粉饰数字的诱惑。
真正会这么做的人很少,但一个人越是认为别人都在这么做,他自己这么做的可能性就越大。这纯粹是人性使然。你要努力构建一种结构,把人性弱点的影响降到最低。
我认为伯克希尔在这方面做得和任何公司一样好,尽管我确信我们也并非完美。
查理?
查理·芒格:是的,这个问题上真正有意思的是,很多不良行为并非出于恶意或极端贪婪之类的东西。
它源于一种潜意识里的认知缺陷,这种缺陷会为很多本不该被认可的行为找理由,而一旦你真正理解了,就会发现那些理由根本站不住脚。几乎所有人都会遇到这种情况。
要纠正它非常困难。最好的办法是建立一种制度,让做决策的人自己承担后果。
这正是华尔街所构建的那套体系出问题的原因所在——没有人真正持有那些抵押贷款,他们只是迅速把贷款转手给别人赚一笔差价。所以没有人觉得自己对这些抵押贷款的质量负有责任。
这类体系从根本上说是不负责任的体系,而制造这种不负责任的体系,是极不道德的。
但那些创造这些体系的人并没有意识到自己在做不道德的事,他们反而认为这些体系棒极了。
你见过谁为你现在深感遗憾的、在最近这场乱局中的所作所为道歉吗?
你会发现,道歉的人少之又少。大家都觉得自己做得挺好。
18.当所有人都害怕时,你若也害怕,就赚不到钱
沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?(掌声)
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这个问题来自詹姆斯·A·斯塔尔。
「我读过大量关于以往市场下跌以及这些下跌给投资者带来的机会的资料。
「过去两年,对我这个43岁的投资者来说,似乎是一次真正的机会。然而身处其中,我却感到太过害怕,因为我觉得市场的下跌虽然剧烈,却未必足以匹配全球金融体系崩溃的风险。
「所以我的问题是,鉴于我们可能还没有完全脱离险境,你们二位是如何将这一次最新的买入机会,和你们一生中之前遇到的机会相比较的?」
沃伦·巴菲特:这次不算是最好的一次。我们见过一些让人一望便知该出手的机会,也见过一些让人一望便知估值过高的时期。而90%的时间里,我们都处于两者之间的某个位置,而且并不清楚自己具体处在哪个位置。
至于害怕这件事,说实话,我不知道该怎么解决。
如果你——如果你的性情是,当别人恐惧时你自己也会跟着害怕,那么很大概率上,你长期在证券投资上是赚不到多少钱的。
要知道,人们真的——如果他们不去看报价——但当然,整个世界都在怂恿他们去看报价,不仅如此,还怂恿他们根据报价的微小变化去做点什么。
但想想看,投资一座农场比很多人买股票的方式要理性得多——我们以前也说过这个话题。
如果你买一座农场,下星期会有人给你报价吗?下个月会有吗?如果你买一栋公寓楼,下星期或下个月会有人给你报价吗?
不会,你看着那栋公寓楼或那座农场,你会说:「我预计它能产出这么多蒲式耳的大豆和玉米,如果真达到了,那就符合我的预期。」
如果他们买了一只股票,他们会觉得涨了就是好事,跌了就是坏事。
我们的想法恰恰相反。跌的时候我们喜欢,因为我们可以趁机多买一些。而涨了的时候,再想多买就让我们很难受。
而我——你知道——各种各样的——本·格雷厄姆写过这个道理,已经解释得很清楚了。但如果你没办法让自己具备那种心态,那么每当别人害怕的时候,你也会跟着害怕。
而指望别人来告诉你什么时候该买入,好让你重新鼓起勇气之类的,你知道,我可以通过告诉这个人「现在是绝佳的买入时机」,让他的勇气大大提振,可一周之后,他又会碰到别人告诉他世界末日就要来了,于是他又会把股票卖掉。
我是说,他是经纪人喜欢的那种客户,但他自己是赚不到多少钱的。
查理?
芒格:是的,我想我是在明白自己能挺过困境之后,才变得更有勇气的。所以也许你应该多经历一点失败,先把脚弄湿再说。(笑声和掌声)
巴菲特:这条建议我倒是身体力行了。(笑)
不,有些人确实没有——看起来他们不具备投资证券所需要的性情,或者说情绪上的稳定性,或者别的什么。
如果根本没有报价,他们的日子会好过得多。凯恩斯以前也谈过这个话题。
本该是一项资产的东西,却天天有报价,流动性还极好——没有人会问“我的农场流动性怎么样”这种问题。所以持有农场的人不会指望价格来告诉他们自己做得怎么样。
“市场是这么说的”“市场是那么说的”。每当有人说“市场是这么说的”,你就知道,这话多半靠不住。
但投资这件事有太多人感兴趣,人们会没完没了地对它说三道四。
归根结底,真正要紧的是以合理的价格买到一门好生意,然后把它搁在一边,很久很久很久都不去管它。有些人做得到,有些人做不到。
19. 芒格对太阳能“极度乐观”
巴菲特:9号提问者。
观众:您好,我叫Joe McCabe(音)。我来自科罗拉多州的利特尔顿。谢谢您给我这个提问的机会,也谢谢您在年报里的年度讨论,读起来非常精彩。
查理·芒格,我在YouTube上看到一段您讨论比亚迪和太阳能的视频,我非常感谢这段访谈,也感谢它能让所有人看到。我想就此谈谈它和贵公司其他企业之间的关系。
视频里提到比亚迪是做电动车和电池的,但我了解到他们的第二个目标是太阳能。
而您也拥有屋顶建材公司和建筑公司,(听不清)以及Clayton,还有公用事业公司,Mid-America、PacifiCorp和Pacific Power。
这似乎是一个绝佳的黄金机会,可以把太阳能装到这些公司的建筑上,以及那类公用事业公司上。
您提到过您不会干预旗下各家公司的具体经营,但有没有办法让您去引导、建议、推动这些公司之间产生协同效应,共同推出太阳能解决方案?谢谢。
芒格:太阳能解决方案正在到来,因为需求实在太明显了。
至于在屋顶上装太阳能板,只要有机会,我从不放过——拒绝安装的机会,因为我认为它们会变得便宜得多,我宁愿再等等。
巴菲特:好吧,都86岁了,你确实等得起,查理。(笑声)
芒格:是啊,我得为长远打算。(笑声)
而且我会非常想念你的。(笑声)
巴菲特:说得好。
芒格:这让我想起一个故事,丈夫问妻子:“如果我把钱都赔光了,你还会爱我吗?”妻子回答:“会啊,我会一直爱你,不过我会非常想念你。”(笑声)
好了,太阳能一定会到来,因为我们没有别的切实可行的替代方案。
而且这应当被视为一件大好事,因为如果我们没有化石燃料的替代品,现代文明该怎么办?那才真是个大麻烦。
所以,那些正被自己有毒的空气活活呛死的城市,自然会转向电动车,我们也会从太阳那里获得更多可再生能源。
我对美国用化石地下水和化石燃料来种玉米,然后把它烧在汽车里这件事,也持相当负面的看法。(掌声)
那是个蠢到令人瞠目的主意,也再一次证明我们的政客辜负了我们。
但我对未来会发生的事极为乐观。我们的政客最终会建成一张比现在好得多的大型电网。我们最终会拥有所需的能源,而且情况只会比现在好得多。
这些技术难题正在被证明是可以解决的,这非常棒。
从长远看,太阳能的成本即便是我们现在习惯价格的两倍,也没那么要紧。那只是我们国家经济前景里的一个小插曲,仅仅是个小插曲而已。
我认为,接下来会有这么多巨额资本需求涌现,最终会打造出一套更好的体系,最终解决我们的问题,这大概是件好事。
所以我相当乐观。但就眼前的商业决策而言,我认为往往正确的答案是反直觉的,就像我这样:如果你想装太阳能板,等等吧,它们会变便宜的。
沃伦,你想批评一下我这个说法吗?
巴菲特:我没什么可补充的。(笑声)
20. 我们的股票组合里现在没有“会爆炸的香蕉”
巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自Jennifer Mancuso(音),她是奥马哈本地的一位股东。她希望您能帮她和她丈夫解决一个争论。
巴菲特:这是个很有前途的任务啊。(笑)
贝姬·奎克:她说她丈夫认为,由于沃伦去年在股价触底时买入了大量《财富》500强公司的明智交易,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票会在未来一到两年内大幅上涨。
她说她知道这类收购一直是您取得财务成功的重要原因,但她不清楚考虑到伯克希尔·哈撒韦的体量,这些收购能有多大影响,而且沃伦您自己也表示,未来几年不应该指望公司股价出现大幅上涨。
所以问题是,这些股票收购在整个投资组合中占多大比例?随着这些股票估值的上升,它们又会给基金价值带来什么样的影响?
巴菲特:我会这么说,我们现在的投资组合——我一直把我们的投资组合看作是一个我们认为日后会更值钱的东西。
但就我们的投资组合而言,其目前的低估程度,相较于我预期它长期能产生的回报来说,并不算显著,而且这种低估程度在过去曾多次被超越。
所以并不是说我们坐在什么会爆炸的“香蕉”上之类的。事实完全不是这样。
我们认为随着时间推移会做得相当不错。我们拥有很多好业务,我们努力理性地配置资本,我们在顶层不会浪费很多钱。
但我们没有一大堆很可能从现在起价值大幅增长的东西,事实并非如此。所以我希望她和她丈夫相处融洽。(笑)
查理?
芒格:那些家务事我一件也解决不了。在我那个年代,我干脆就接受了另一方的观点。(笑)
21.“如果我都快要死了还能保持乐观,那你们其余人应付一点通货膨胀肯定没问题”
巴菲特:10号。
观众:两位先生好,我叫兰迪·贝洛斯(音),来自马里兰州的洛克霍尔。
我来这里很多很多年了,但今天我从你们两位身上都感觉到一种谨慎,一种保留态度。
不算是明显的悲观,但确实有所保留。你们谈到了即将到来的通货膨胀、国内外都比我们习惯的水平更高的政府债务、可能拖慢创新和增长的日益增多的监管和繁文缛节。
就在几分钟前,查理,你说我们必须降低对投资回报的预期。
可是同一天你又说,印度的孩子会过得比我们好,中国人会过得比我们好,我们自己国家的孩子也会比我们今天过得好。
你能给我几条支撑你乐观情绪的理由吗?谢谢。
芒格:嗯,文明面临的主要技术性难题——当然,都跟能源有关——已经有一个即将实现、近在眼前的解决方案,这对人类来说不是一个小小的好处。
这是我们面临的最大的单一问题,所以我当然对此感到乐观。
而且——我对伯克希尔普遍存在的这种文化感到乐观,因为我认为它会继续发挥作用。
当然,看到那些长期以来一直很艰难的人——通过自己极大的努力和才能——迅速崛起,比如中国和印度的许多地方,也让我感到高兴。
这一切都让我高兴,为什么不呢?当然存在可怕的问题,当然降低预期是理性的做法。让自己快乐没有比降低预期更好的办法了,这比——要容易得多——
巴菲特:比提高业绩容易。
芒格:——比提高业绩容易,是的。(笑)
这里的事——我们从来不懂什么高深的东西,只是最基本的常识。令人惊讶的是,这对我们来说已经足够了。
所以,不,我对生活是乐观的。如果我都快要死了还能保持乐观,那你们其余人应付一点通货膨胀肯定没问题。(笑声和掌声)
巴菲特:我实在没什么可补充的了。(笑)
22. 巴菲特为什么更喜欢电视采访
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:这个问题来自迈亚德·希尔兹(音),我要提前说明,我并不——我提这个问题并不感到兴奋,你们等下就会明白为什么。
问题是:“美国公众几乎肯定从巴菲特先生日益增多的媒体曝光中受益,但这对伯克希尔股东来说是你时间的最佳利用方式吗?”
巴菲特:大概不是。(笑)
我做了很多不是对伯克希尔股东来说最好地利用我时间的事情。我每周在网上打12个小时的桥牌,你知道。我坐在那儿可不是在想,提高我的桥牌技艺会给伯克希尔带来什么奇效。(笑)
不,我——我确实——这些年我注意到,广播电视的发展,相对于印刷媒体而言——我想说,如果你想要一份准确记录你说过什么的资料,而不是经过记者乃至编辑的转述、来回加工——他们会说,“把六段压缩成四段”,或者“你为什么不问这个问题?”——
我更愿意在查理·罗斯的节目上留下一份永久的记录。人们可以回过头去看我到底说了什么、我的肢体语言,以及我是不是在开玩笑。
我敢肯定,劳埃德·布兰克费恩会更希望当时接受的是电视采访。他一定很想收回那句关于——你知道的——“在做上帝的工作”的话,不管在什么情况下。但我敢打赌,那句话当时只是顺口一说,是针对之前说过的某件事的一句随口话。
显然他说那话并非字面意思,但他在媒体上被批得体无完肤,因为有人选择半认真地对待这句话,然后其他人为了配合别的故事情节,也这么处理。
我喜欢这样一个想法:不管是CNBC给它留下记录,还是查理·罗斯给它留下记录,让我被自己的原话评判,而不是被某个人写的、试图总结某些观点的几段文字所评判。
而这就要求上电视,而不是让人们——本质上——拿一个小时的采访,往往只是从中挑一句符合他们故事情节的话,然后让那句话莫名其妙地变成我想法的代表。
所以,不管是自己写年度报告,还是上电视,我能把自己的想法表达得越清楚,我就对报道的准确性越放心。
我几年前就想明白了这一点。所以那就是我现在采取的方向。至于这是不是时间的最佳利用方式,反正效果挺好的。
关于这一点我给你们讲个故事。就算是广播电视,你也得小心一点。
我们做完伯灵顿那笔交易之后,查理·罗斯——他可能就在这儿——采访了我,我们是在一个星期五早上录的。我们录了带子,录得挺开心。
录制过程中有一小段展示了伟大的铁路场景,其中一个是加里·格兰特和格蕾丝·凯利,另一个是玛丽莲·梦露在《热情如火》里的镜头,然后他们又放了一堆我们今天早上放映的那部影片里关于铁路的画面。
看完这些之后,他问了我一个问题。为了给一个俏皮的回答,但又确实跟我刚看到的画面有关联,我说:“唔,如果伯灵顿肯把格蕾丝·凯利和玛丽莲·梦露也搭进来,我愿意出更高的价钱。”(笑)
结果,这段录制好的采访有一小时零六分钟长,所以当天晚上播出时他们得剪掉六分钟,他们剪掉的正是那些放着格蕾丝·凯利和玛丽莲·梦露的铁路场景。(笑)
所以在看这段节目的人眼里,就好像查理跟我说话的时候,我坐在那儿一直在幻想这些东西似的。(笑)
所以就连电视也不安全。(笑)
23. 伯克希尔如何赢得忠诚的股东
沃伦·巴菲特:第11个问题。
观众:您好,我叫基普·约翰·伯克尔,来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。
首先,感谢你们二位的著作、股东大会,甚至查理·罗斯的访谈——(巴菲特笑)——它们帮助我在投资和为人处世上都有所成长。
在我看来,伯克希尔拥有所有上市公司或共同基金中最优秀、最忠诚的股东群体。
你们是如何吸引并留住这样一批股东的?尤其是,导致证券定价错误的那些行为倾向,往往也会造就一批见风使舵的股东。谢谢。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,上市证券有意思的地方在于,基本上任何人都可以买。
你可以选择和某人一起买一家麦当劳加盟店,或者一个农场、一栋公寓楼之类的东西,但如果你经营的是一家上市公司,你知道,从奥萨马·本·拉登到教皇,任何人都可能成为你的股东。
我是说,是他们选择了你——不是你选择他们,是他们选择你。
现在,如果你想要一批与你同频的股东,我认为很重要的一点是,你要让他们清楚地知道你打算把这家机构经营成什么样子。
我们有年报,有电视采访,有各种方式向人们传达伯克希尔是一个什么样的地方。对有些人来说,这传达的意思是“进来吧”,对另一些人来说,则是“别进来”。
菲尔·费雪早在1960年代初写过一本关于投资的好书,他是这样描述这种情形的。
他说:“你看,你可以开一家餐厅,招牌上写着‘法国菜’,如果店里卖的确实是法国菜,那么,你知道,人们会成为满意的回头客。你也可以开另一家,招牌上写着汉堡包。但你不能做的是,招牌上挂着汉堡包,店里却端出法国菜。”
所以很多公司都试图向所有人许诺一切。他们的投资者关系部门告诉他们,凡是能让他们感兴趣的股东,公司都想要。
我们想要的是那些和我们想法一致的人。而我们认为,总体而言,我们不会让他们太失望。
但如果我们招来一群人,他们认为下个季度盈利会因为某种原因上涨10%,并且这就是他们持有这只股票的原因,那我们就会有一大批失望的人。
而我们人生的目标,不是把时间花在和那些注定会对我们失望的人打交道上。
如果我们发出了错误的广告,那是我们的过错。所以我们努力宣传我们真实的样子,然后努力兑现它。
我确实认为,在大型上市公司中,我们拥有全世界最优秀的一批股东。
我认为这是因为,我们吸引来的这些人,本质上是想买下一家企业、多年来成为我们的合伙人,他们也知道我们会像对待合伙人一样对待他们。
而他们反过来也给了我们很大的安慰——拥有一个稳定的股东群体,让我们对经营这整个公司有一种良好的感受。
查理?
查理·芒格:嗯,事情之所以发展成这样,在某种程度上是个意外。
沃伦和我一开始是为家人和朋友管钱,那些在我们年轻、默默无闻时就信任我们的人,我们自然而然地对他们产生了深厚的感情。
我们就是从这个基础上,逐渐演变成控股上市公司的,所以我们倾向于把我们的股东,包括新股东,都当作家人看待。
这不是装出来的,我们就是这样看待你们的。别人做不到这一点,因为他们是以不同的方式演变到今天这个处境的。
而如果你是一位CEO,打交道的对象是那些只关心自己的投资组合在未来六个月表现好看的普通机构投资者,你会发现很难去爱你的股东。
他们更像是一股对你抱有不合理期望的敌对力量。所以我不认为沃伦和我因为与股东关系更好就该获得多大的赞誉。我们是以一种截然不同的方式走到今天的。
不过,当我们看到这是件如此美好、如此令人满足的事情时,我们确实还算有点头脑,一直坚持了下来。但我们最初是因为一个意外才走上这条路的,对吧?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我们是因为一个意外才走上这条路的,而且我们还很幸运,没有一个投资者关系部门要求我们出去大肆吹嘘。
查理·芒格:但那是我们故意为之的。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,是的。(笑)
我在几十家我以这样那样方式参与过的公司里,都亲眼见过这种(投资者关系)部门的运作。这种想法真是很荒唐——出去迎合那些人的期望,那些人期待你做到一些你在实际经营中做不到、但也许可以靠短期做账来实现的事情。这会导致最恶劣的行为。
而最终,总会有人持有你所有的股份,你知道。股东名单上不可能一直空着没人持股。那为什么不去争取一批会与你同心同德、会长期持有的人呢?
而要让他们与你同心同德的办法,就是相当准确地告诉他们你的预期是什么,你打算怎么去实现它,以及当你犯错的时候也要如实告知,诸如此类。
查理·芒格:不过,我们大概也不该对那些以不同方式走上来、面对不同股东群体的人太过苛责。
如果我们也经历了同样的成长方式,谁又能说我们最终不会走上大致相同的老路呢,这一点并不清楚。
沃伦·巴菲特:当然。是的。所以接下来的五到十分钟我们就不搞批评了,然后再回来接着批评。(笑)
24. 低利率正在伤害那些被吓出股市的人
沃伦·巴菲特:卡罗尔?
卡罗尔·卢米斯:一个非常简短的问题。请评论一下我们目前,或许还会持续下去的零利率的影响。
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,对于任何把资金投在短期货币市场上的人来说,这都非常艰难。
你知道,如果你目前在某个货币市场基金里拿到的收益率是十分之一个百分点,那么如果你从哥伦布登陆美洲那年就开始这么做,而且不用交任何税,到现在你的钱大概也就翻了将近一倍而已。(笑)
这真的——我是说,人们谈论宽松货币政策,但对那些手里有钱的人来说,这一点也不轻松。
它不会永远持续下去,但对那些依靠固定收益生活的人来说,可能感觉像是永远不会结束。我非常同情他们。
基本上,他们中的许多人,在2008年末世界看起来要崩溃的时候变得恐慌起来。而他们为此付出的代价真的——我认识一些这样的人——这在回报和购买力被不断侵蚀这个意义上是很糟糕的。但这种情况终究会在某个时候结束。
我不知道最终会怎样,但我不想当美联储主席或财政部长。从来没人问过我,但也许这正是我说自己不愿干这活儿的原因。
但是——我们会——长期搞巨额财政赤字,同时又想维持非常宽松的货币政策,这套路子不会永远奏效。而且——如果我们真的出了问题,责任不该归咎于美联储,应该归咎于国会。(掌声)
芒格:从某种意义上说,我们所处的现实几乎是一种令人啼笑皆非的沮丧。
股票之所以上涨,是因为把钱以生息方式安全借出去的回报实在太差了,当然,一个显而易见的道理是,这种状况不可能永远持续下去。
果真如此的话,相对而言,股票的价值优势就没那么明显了。当然,如果它真的持续下去,就像在日本发生的那样,我们同样不会喜欢,因为那意味着我们陷入了某种可怕的停滞。
这真是一条振奋人心的消息啊。(笑)
巴菲特:极低的利率——短期利率——给其他一切资产的价值所施加的压力,怎么估计都不为过。
我是说,人们之所以把钱以千分之一的利率放着,是因为他们对其他一切都心存恐惧。但随着这种对一切事物的恐惧逐渐消退——就像过去这一两年发生的那样——推动股价上涨、推动房地产价格重新上涨的压力就会变得巨大。
当然,那些与这些事务有关的人对此心知肚明。但我认为,你们不应低估过去一年股价上涨在多大程度上是人们被迫把钱留在短期货币工具中所经受的煎熬造成的结果。
除非他们对这个世界感到恐惧万分,否则他们就会被推向其他投资,我认为我们已经看到了很多这种情况,等哪天利率真的上涨了,我们再看看会发生什么。
25. 通过提问来给企业估值
巴菲特:十二点。
观众:您好,我叫杰夫·科尔维特(音),来自堪萨斯州奥拉西。
我是1999年开始投资的,正好赶在科技股大泡沫破裂之前,不幸的是,我先学会了买入并持有、不为市场价格波动而烦恼,之后才学会给企业估值、运用安全边际的重要性。
所以,正如芒格所说,我一入门就栽了个大跟头。而且——
芒格:欢迎加入俱乐部。(笑)
观众:谢谢,这下我感觉没那么糟了。
这就引出了我的问题。我读遍了伯克希尔所有的年报,也尽我所能阅读了关于你们二位的一切资料,我要感谢你们主持了这些精彩的股东大会。
但归根结底,这似乎可以归结为一些简单的事情:给企业估值,以及运用安全边际。
所以我的问题是,你们建议用什么方法才能不断提高给公司估值的能力?
巴菲特:这是一个非常、非常好的问题。就我自己而言,我一开始对给公司估值一无所知。
本·格雷厄姆教我用一种方法给某一类公司估值,这种方法当年确实很成功,只是后来这类公司的存量枯竭了。
但话说回来——那几乎是一种防止失败的保证,只是它不能保证这类机会会一直存在下去。
芒格教会了我很多关于持久竞争优势和真正一流企业价值的东西。
但随着时间推移,我对各种类型的企业了解得越来越多。不过你会惊讶地发现,有多少企业是我并不觉得自己真正理解的。
最重要的不是你的能力圈有多大,而是你要清楚它的边界在哪里。
你不需要精通90%的企业,或者80%、70%、50%。但你确实需要对那些你真正投入资金的企业有所了解,如果那只占整个企业宇宙很小的一部分,那也不是致命的问题。
我想,如果你想想自己愿意为一份麦当劳三明治付多少钱——你知道的——不妨想想你家乡奥拉西的那些企业。
你愿意投资哪一家?你认为自己能理解哪一家的经济状况?你认为哪一家在10年或20年后还会存在?你认为哪一家的竞争壁垒非常难以逾越?
就不断向自己提出关于企业的问题。和别人聊聊这些企业。
随着时间推移,你的知识面会不断扩展。永远记住那条安全边际。而且我认为你基本上已经具备了正确的态度,因为你认识到了自己的局限性,这在这个行当里极为重要。你会找到可做的事情的。
六七年前——也许没那么久——六七年前,我在研究韩国股票的时候,从没想过韩国股票会成为我要买入的东西。
但我看了看那边的情况,发现有不少企业符合安全边际的标准。
于是我在那里做了分散投资,因为我对其中任何一家都不算了解得那么透彻,但我知道一篮子20家的组合总体上会表现得很好,即便其中一家可能被骗子经营,也可能有一两家遇到我没预料到的竞争,因为它们实在太便宜了。这多少就是老格雷厄姆式的做法。
你会不时找到一些机会,而妙就妙在你并不需要找到很多这样的机会。
芒格,你怎么看?
芒格:嗯,很明显,如果你想在一件竞争激烈的事情上做得出色,你就必须为此下大量心思,学习大量东西,反复大量练习。
而这个领域的世界运行方式决定了,你必须不断学习,因为这个世界一直在变化,你的竞争对手也一直在学习。
所以你只需要每天早上起床,努力做到晚上睡觉时比早上起床时稍微聪明一点点。
如果你能长年累月坚持这样做——在努力精通自己所追求之事的过程中,不断积累好的和坏的经验——这样的人几乎从不会彻底失败。
他们可能会碰上运气不好之类的糟糕时期。但极少有人会因此而彻底失败。
如果你性情对路,你也许会进步得比较慢,但一定会不断进步。
巴菲特:芒格,你在学校学过商科课程吗?
芒格:一门也没有。我学的是会计。
巴菲特:那你是什么时候开始给企业估值的?又是怎么做的?
查理·芒格:在我小时候。(笑)
我记得,我常到奥马哈俱乐部去,那儿有位老先生,每天上午10点半左右就会到那儿。他显然几乎不干什么活,却过得相当富足。
巴菲特:他成了你的偶像。(笑)
芒格:是啊。但他让我这个小男孩非常好奇。我问我父亲,“他到底是怎么做到的?”他说,“查理,”他说,“那是一门几乎没有竞争对手的生意。他专门去收集、处理死马。”
那就是一个靠某种手段避开竞争的例子。你不断向现实提出这样的问题,从小就开始,慢慢地你就学会了。你不也是这么做的吗?
巴菲特:是啊,还好他后来在那份最初的洞见上又更进了一步。(笑)
芒格:我注意到,这挺有意思——你看看我小时候那些行业的领头企业,在奥马哈,有相当多的企业最后都破产了,很多都是在陷入困境后以低价卖掉的。
而有些从小起步、后来崛起的人,比如凯威特,当时根本没人把他们当成那个时代的了不起人物。
我觉得人生大抵如此。要接近顶峰很难,一旦爬上去了,要守住那个位置也很难。
但我认为你本可以预见到凯威特会成功。他们更在乎把事情做对。他们更在乎避免麻烦。他们对自己要求得更严格、更有纪律。
巴菲特:如果你了解那个人,你本会下注押他,对吧?
芒格:什么?
巴菲特:如果你了解那个人的话。
芒格:我不会押注在任何一个我认识的、已经很富有的人身上。但我会押皮特·凯威特。他妹妹教过我数学,而且,嗯,一半荷兰血统、一半德国血统,你知道的,这是一种很硬朗的文化。(笑)
巴菲特:各位听到了吧。一半荷兰血统,一半德国血统。(笑)
芒格:嗯,不过——
巴菲特:去找这样的人吧。(笑)
芒格:嗯,提出这个建议的人姓芒格。(笑)
不管怎样——不——我不认为是那样——我只是自然而然地在做这件事。什么行得通,什么行不通,为什么行得通,为什么行不通?
如果你有这种性情,你就会慢慢学会。如果你没有这种性情,那我也帮不了你。(笑)
巴菲特:如果你跟着皮特·凯威特观察十年,你绝不会看到他做过什么蠢事,对吧?
芒格:哦,是的。这就是——
巴菲特:关键在于避免犯蠢。你不必多聪明,但你得避开那些几乎显而易见的错误。
不过我要说,你在那方面的路子是对的,具备基本功,了解自己的能力圈边界,同时仍在不断学习各种各样的生意。
查理,我觉得,他当律师的时候,凡是有客户上门,查理都会像自己拥有那家公司一样去思考那门生意。
而且他多半觉得自己比真正拥有这家公司的客户还更了解这门生意。(笑)
但我记得跟他聊天,那是大概50年前了,他会开始谈起贝克斯菲尔德的卡特彼勒经销商之类的话题。他没办法看一门生意而不去想它背后的基本经济状况。
那个人后来在卡特彼勒那笔交易上做得怎么样?(笑)
芒格:嗯,他把它以一个高得离谱的价格卖给了一家愚蠢的石油公司。(笑)
那价钱连他实际拿到的一半都不值。
巴菲特:但他们有一个理念和一套战略。
芒格:他们有理念、有战略,而且后来还请了顾问。(笑)
巴菲特:是啊。(笑)
26. 投入资本回报率最高的公司
巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这个问题来自南达科他州阿伯丁的卡森·米切尔,他问你们两位:“对伯克希尔来说,哪门生意的投入资本回报率最高?而在这个世界上,哪门生意的投入资本回报率是最高的?”
他还补充说:“附言,我本想坐火车来的,可是运粮的火车车厢里没有座位。”(笑)
巴菲特:这个问题有两种看法。
如果你说的是经营这门生意所需要的资本,而不是我们为收购这门生意可能付出的代价——我是说,如果我们买下一门了不起的生意——比如说你可以经营可口可乐公司——假设你已经拥有装瓶系统——你几乎可以不需要资本来运营它。
如果你花1000亿美元买下它,你可以把那笔钱看作你的资本,也可以只看这门生意本身所需的基础资本。我们在判断什么是好生意时,是按这门生意实际所需的资本来定义的。
至于这对我们来说是不是一笔好投资,最终取决于我们为此付出了多少钱。
有不少生意是靠负资本运营的。卡罗尔就在《财富》杂志工作。你知道,那些顶尖杂志的运营基本上都是负资本的。
我是说,订户是预先付款的,几乎没有固定资产,应收账款也不多,存货几乎为零。
所以杂志这门生意——我猜《人物》杂志或者《体育画报》的运营都是负资本的,尤其是《人物》,赚了不少钱。
所以确实有一些这样的生意。嗯,我们曾经有一家公司叫蓝筹印花,我们预先就拿到了浮存金,运营时资本是相当可观的负值。
但也有很多伟大的企业只需要非常非常少的资本。苹果公司就不需要那么多资本,你知道的。
当然,最好的企业是那种可以做得非常大、却不需要资本的企业。
喜诗糖果是一家很棒的企业,需要的资本很少,但我们没办法让人们每天吃十磅盒装巧克力。
芒格:除了在这里。
巴菲特:我们希望如此。(笑)
一般来说,伟大的消费类企业需要的资本相对较少。那些客户提前付钱给你的企业,比如杂志订阅、保险,你用的是客户的资本。
我们喜欢这类企业,但当然,世界上其他人也喜欢,所以买这些企业时竞争会非常激烈。
举个例子,我们有一家由凯茜·巴伦·塔姆拉兹经营得非常出色的企业,叫Business Wire。Business Wire不需要很多资本。它有应收账款之类的东西,但它是一种服务型企业,很多服务型和消费型企业需要的资本都很少。
等它们成功之后,那真的会非常了不起。
查理?
芒格:我没什么要补充的,但不管怎样,这个公式从未改变。
巴菲特:查理,如果你只能拥有世界上一家企业,你会选哪家?(笑声)
我希望我们已经拥有它们了,就我自己而言。
芒格:你和我几十年前就因为谈论这个话题而惹上过麻烦。
巴菲特:没错。(笑)
芒格:而且我觉得我不会再回到这个话题上了。
巴菲特:好吧。(笑声)第13个问题——
芒格:如果你说出某家拥有惊人定价能力的企业,那你说的其实是一家垄断企业,或者接近垄断的企业。
巴菲特:没错。
芒格:我觉得我们坐在这里,说出我们最钦佩的企业之类的话,而别人会把它看作垄断企业,这样做不太明智。
巴菲特:好的,我们继续往下走。(笑声)
27. 电话还没响,但我们仍准备好收购
巴菲特:我看看,第13个问题我们回答过了吗?没有,我想还没有,那个问题又是在另一个房间。那边有人吗?
观众:有,巴菲特先生,芒格先生,来自分会场的问候。
我叫格伦·唐格,来自纽约。我想感谢你们二位在这场经济危机中所展现的典范式的管理。由于你们的努力,我们大家在多方面都变得更富有了。
我想问一下伯克希尔的增长情况,具体是你们的收购展望和收购意愿。电话响过吗?
巴菲特:伯克希尔的电话不常响,你知道的。部分原因是——嗯,我们在年报里列出了我们寻找目标的标准,我们并不是在寻找越来越大的东西。
所以当我们开始说我们想买的企业至少要有7500万到1亿美元的税前盈利时,这就把很多电话都筛掉了。
我想说,如果我们一年能接到那么三四个符合我们标准、看起来有可能成的正经电话,那就是很好的一年了,我喜欢这样。
我不认为在出现可能让我们感兴趣的机会这方面,频率上有什么大的变化。
答案是,就感兴趣而言,我们一如既往地感兴趣。我是说,我们为了BNSF开出了一张大支票,还发行了股份。
但如果周一早上我的电话响起,是什么大交易,我会很乐意接。我们会想办法把它办成。
查理?
芒格:是啊,我们能在收购理想的企业方面取得这样的成功,让我感到很惊讶。
帮了我们大忙的是一种人类的厌恶心理,因为很多卖给我们的人都非常聪明,以至于他们对几乎所有其他选择都感到厌恶。
他们不想把公司卖进某个只看中介费、根本不关心员工或企业本身的收购体系里。
他们最终决定想加入我们这家公司,而不想加入其他选择。而这,当然,对我们来说是妙不可言的。
我们在外面有一种筛选机制,在一定程度上保护我们免受不合适的人的干扰。很少有人拥有这种特别的——
有人主动把东西提供给我们,而这些人是不会卖给其他任何人的。这真的很特别。这种事发生过多少次了?
巴菲特:呃——
芒格:很多次。
巴菲特:确实发生过,而且是在重要的交易上。有一个例子我以前提过,所以我可以说出名字。
当我收到ISCAR的消息时,我之前从没听说过ISCAR,也从没听说过给我写信的埃坦·韦特海默,但他基本上告诉我,而且说得相当明确,他们要么把公司卖给伯克希尔·哈撒韦,要么谁都不卖。
我们见了面,谈成了这笔交易。还有另一个人——我甚至不想具体说明是什么时候——但他找上门来,在这件事上已经考虑了大约一年,而这项事业他已经花了几十年建立起来。
他说:“当时有三种可能。第一种是卖给竞争对手。”他说:“他们会立刻想到能从这个地方裁掉多少人、把总部搬走,”诸如此类,他们会把他花了大概30年建立起来的东西给拆散。
他决定不那么做,尽管这项资产对竞争对手的价值往往比对其他任何人都更高——事情常常就是这样。
然后他考虑过卖给一家杠杆收购公司——如今这类公司会自称私募股权公司——但他不想让自己的企业沦为一块待价而沽的肉,没过几年又被转手卖掉。他真正想要的是找一个永久的归宿。
所以他说:“我找你,不是因为你有多迷人。”他说,“是因为你是剩下唯一的人选了。”(笑)
于是我们买下了这家企业。这种事时不时会发生,而且带有偶然性。往往是因为某人生活中发生了某件事,让他们真正想要为企业找一个永久的归宿。
原因可能是家族内部相处不睦,也可能是别的什么原因——原因有很多种。也许有人想把资产变现,因为他想捐出一大笔钱。
但这种情况会时不时地出现,而我们正好是一个顺理成章的接洽对象,所以我们会接到这样的电话。但我们没什么办法去加速这个过程,或者做别的什么来促成它。
一旦事情发生,我们随时准备行动。我是说,如果周一有人打电话来,说有一笔100亿美元的交易,而我又喜欢,我会说行。(笑)
然后我再去想办法把它办成。
芒格:是的,我不认为这已经结束了。也许——事实上一定会——比早年间慢一些。但考虑到我们现在比那时富裕多少,这也不算太糟。
28. 关于伯克希尔未来的一个重大问题
巴菲特:安德鲁?
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金:我想这可能是最后几个问题之一了,来自马萨诸塞州温纳姆的股东彼得·布罗奇写道:“谢谢沃伦和查理去年改进了问答环节。
“沿着这个思路,有没有一些重要的问题,是你们没想到大家竟然不会问起——关于伯克希尔财务或业务方面的?如果有的话,倘若角色互换,你们自己会问什么问题?”
巴菲特:好的,安德鲁,首先我要说,我们因为改变了问答形式而收到了很多好评。这个办法奏效了,所以我们才继续沿用它。它的效果非常好。(掌声)
这掌声是给你的,不是给我,你受之无愧。
它确实提高了问题的质量,一方面让问题都与伯克希尔相关,另一方面有了一套筛选机制,而不用我们自己来做这个筛选者。
好了,我给了查理一些时间去思考这个问题该怎么回答,所以我把这个问题交给他。(笑)
芒格:嗯,关于伯克希尔应该有哪些不同做法,我没什么可说的。
我觉得挺有意思的是,我们竟然投资了比亚迪,因为比亚迪正冲浪在新技术开发的前沿上,而这恰恰是我们一直以来引以为豪的——避免涉足的领域。
这么说公平吧?
巴菲特:公平。
芒格:可我们还是投了。
我认为这是因为我们展现出了一定的学习能力。而且我认为比亚迪这笔投资会取得非常好的结果。我认为它会以一种让我们所有股东都感到欣慰的方式取得很好的结果,因为我认为他们将帮助解决世界上一些重大的问题。
那个地方——你知道,我曾自豪地谈起基维特公司。他们更努力,更自律。我对比亚迪的感觉也是如此。
能与这样的人共事是一种荣幸,而在我一生中,正是与这些人共事,我取得了最多的成就。
所以就我而言,我们找到了自己的同类,只不过他们更优秀。我们可能还会做更多这样的事。
我们本不会有足够的信心去做风险投资,通常那只是一个有想法的聪明年轻人,无论他多么聪明。
巴菲特:反正我不会。
芒格:不,我也不会。
但等我们发现比亚迪的时候,它在实践中已经证明了自己。他们已经完成了一些在我看来几乎不可能做到的事情,而他们却做成了。
所以我认为,这不会是伯克希尔做的最后一件不同寻常的事,也不会是最后一件能成功的事。
我认为收购伯灵顿北方公司也是如此——我们做这笔交易的时候就知道,这对他们的股东比对我们的股东更有利,因为说到底,他们要并入伯克希尔了。(笑)
但我们同样认为这对我们的股东也是有利的。既然对我们来说已经令人满意,那我们又何必在乎它对他们更有利呢?我认为这种情况还会再次发生。
那正是我们这种文化——你知道的,中西部式的,不断改进经营的地方。而通过中美能源和伯灵顿,我们为伯克希尔注入了相当多的工程技术含量,这一点我当然喜欢。
所以我希望各位对目前事情的走向感到满意,因为我认为它们会继续朝着同一个方向发展。(掌声)
巴菲特:是的。(掌声)我认为它们会继续朝同一个方向发展。
不过要回答你刚才的问题,安德鲁,我大概会问这样一个问题:“你能不能在很长一段时间里,持续有效地把你产生的所有资本都用起来?”
而我认为,答案是——即便如此,我们还会看到一些新机会,也还会再做一些这样的事。但总会有一个临界点,数字大到一定程度,要再做出能创造价值的事情就会变得极其困难。
我是说,如果你把数字一路推演下去,就会看到,再过10年或15年,不仅是已经积累下来的资本,还有各方面持续产生的新资本,都会让我们很难再做到——本质上——每投入1美元创造超过1美元价值的事情。
其中一部分资金也许还能以那种方式加以运用,而且很可能会用在我们目前所从事的这类业务上。
总会有一个数字大到一定程度的临界点。而实际上,我们的历史轨迹一直在不断逼近那个临界点。
结果是,现在我觉得我们能走得比30年前我所设想的要远得多。我是说,事情就是这样发展下来的。部分原因是,我们看到了一些30年前我根本没想到我们会看到的东西。
但这终究是有限度的。总会有那么一天——在我看来——我们无法再明智地运用我们内部产生的全部资本,百分之百地运用。
到那时,我们就会去做那件事——不管是什么,只要是最符合、最有利于股东利益的事,我们就会去做。
芒格:我认为,会有人加入伯克希尔的投资团队——可能比你们很多人预期的更早——这些人即便不像沃伦那么厉害,也算是相当不错的近似水平了。在某些方面,他们甚至具备沃伦所欠缺的能力。
换句话说,也不会全是负面的。(笑)
所以我其实相当乐观。(笑)
我能看出来——我认为我们能做到这一点的原因是,沃伦从来不会正眼瞧一个不带点古怪的人,而这,当然,正是你现在看到我这样的原因。
沃伦·巴菲特:活生生的例子,没错。(笑)
29. “找到你的热情所在,然后不要让任何事情阻止你”
沃伦·巴菲特:好,我想我们该转到第1部分了。(笑)
观众:你好,我叫约瑟夫·马泽拉,来自宾夕法尼亚州吉姆索普。
我想先感谢芒格先生和巴菲特先生,以及董事会举办这次会议,还有整个股东周末的活动。到目前为止我玩得非常开心。
沃伦·巴菲特:太好了。(掌声)
查理·芒格:谢谢。
观众:说到这个,我想分享一下。亚里士多德在被问及如何定义财富时,是这样简单回答的:“那就是花得比赚得少的人。”
作为一个像我这样的年轻创业者,你们能给我什么建议,教我如何在自己的企业里去定义和积累财富呢?我希望有朝一日能建立一家你们也愿意收购的企业。
沃伦·巴菲特:我预测你会建成一家企业的。你知道,它可能达不到——我们自己也是个移动的目标——但如果你从你刚才说的那条原则出发,很可能还会有一些类似的原则,是我们也会认同的。
没有什么比追随自己的热情更好的了。我是说,我显然热爱我所做的事情,而且从做这件事开始就一直热爱它。查理也是一样。
我们有很多经理人,你知道,他们——有些人上过商学院,有些人没上过,你知道。
他们各种类型都有。但他们身上的共同点——他们都是成功的——共同点就是他们热爱自己所做的事情,你知道。
你在人生中必须找到这一点。有些人非常幸运,很早就找到了。我父亲碰巧从事证券行业,纯属运气,所以我去他办公室时那里有很多书可读,我就迷上了那些东西。
但是,你知道,如果他从事的是别的行业——我想我最终还是会读那些书,但会晚很多年。
所以,如果你找到了让你着迷的东西,我猜你会在那件事上做得非常好。
而美妙之处在于,在某种意义上,竞争并不那么激烈。在你选择投身的那场赛跑中,不会有很多人比你跑得更快。
如果你还没找到——你可能已经找到了——但如果还没找到,你知道,你就得继续去找。
我们有70多位经理人。你知道,其中有些人——我们有一位甚至连高中都没上过,是吧,查理?(听不清)
查理·芒格:哦,是的。
沃伦·巴菲特:我记得他四年级就辍学了。
还有,B夫人一辈子都没上过一天学。
当你去家具商城的时候——我希望你今晚能去看看,我们预计今天的销售会创下纪录(笑)——你在那78英亩土地上看到的,是全美最大的家居用品商店,销售额大约4亿美元。这是美国最大的商店,而它的起点,是一个一辈子没上过一天学、不识字的女人投入的500美元资本。
她热爱她所做的事情,你知道,我要讲一个故事,这是真事。
她90多岁的时候,邀请我去她家吃晚饭。那非常不寻常。
那是一栋非常漂亮的房子,离商店六七个街区远。我走进屋子,沙发、椅子、灯、餐桌,上面全都挂着绿色的小价签。(笑)
这让她感觉像在家一样。(笑)
我对她说:“B夫人,您正是我喜欢的那种女人。”别提索菲亚·罗兰她们了,这才是我喜欢的那种女人。她热爱这一切。
她一生都热爱它,你想想这产生了什么样的成果。我是说,这简直令人难以置信。
我是说,你知道,有一次——我父亲常引用爱默生的话,说“蕴藏在你身上的力量,是自然中前所未有的。”
而基本上,蕴藏在B夫人身上的力量,正是自然中前所未有的。经过一生,它创造出了惊人的成就。
所以,找到你的热情所在,然后不要让任何事情阻止你。
30. 芒格的人生基本算法
沃伦·巴菲特:好,卡罗尔?(掌声)
卡罗尔·卢米斯:这是一个非常有哲理的问题。“你和查理做的、宣扬的很多事情,都和人们的实际做法与期待背道而驰。”——提问的这位先生不希望公布姓名。
“比如说,你们不更换被收购公司的管理层,你们赞赏长期任职的员工,而其他人总是在寻找新鲜血液,尽量让年长的员工离开。你们大概不鼓励退休,而很多公司都在这么做。
“你们不给董事发放高额薪酬,也不用股票期权来支付报酬。你们似乎不太雇用MBA。你们不投资高科技,但你们的公司却增长得非常快。
“你们不提供盈利指引。你们不住在纽约附近。你们不喜欢寿司。”(笑)
沃伦·巴菲特:这才是关键。(笑)
卡罗尔·卢米斯:“我很想知道,这一切背后根本的原因是什么?换句话说,这里似乎存在一种我没能领会的核心理念。
“我能把这些理解为一条条孤立的原则,但根本的道理何在?科学家和哲学家总是尽可能寻找一种统一的理论。
“你们的理论是什么?是佛教,还是异教,还是别的什么?是的,我在寻找你们关于人生管理的根本理论或统一理论,或者说根本的指导原则。”
沃伦·巴菲特:十个字以内。(笑)
查理·芒格:让我来试试,沃伦。
沃伦·巴菲特:哦好。(笑)
查理·芒格:这是实用主义。一部分是因为我们以不同的方式做事,是因为这适合我们。一部分是因为——这适合我们的性情和天性——还有一部分是因为我们通过经验发现,至少对坐在我们这个位置上的人来说,这样做效果更好。
就这么简单。而且当某件事运行得很好时,我们都有足够的判断力,会继续这么做下去。
所以我要说,我们展示的正是所谓的“生活的基本算法”:重复有效的做法。
这够简练了吧?(笑)
31. 私营高速客运铁路不划算
沃伦·巴菲特:我们接着讲第3个,我喜欢这个问题。(笑)
哦不对,第2个。抱歉。第2个。
观众:下午好,我是卡罗琳·博伊尔,来自伊利诺伊州巴林顿。
感谢这次会议,也感谢幕后所有筹办这一切的人。安排得非常有条理。(掌声)
沃伦·巴菲特:容我插一句,这个赞很实至名归。我想指出的是,在伯克希尔,我们总部的每一个人——我们一共21个人——都参与了这次大会的筹备工作。
我是说,我们的首席财务官也参与其中——你随便说出办公室里的任何一个人——因为他们乐在其中。
我们不认为应该为这个或那个专门设一个部门。而且我认为,对于一家市值接近2000亿美元的公司来说,这大概相当罕见。(笑)
但你们看到马克·汉堡在这里到处走动、忙前忙后。这是一个团队努力的成果,而且我希望——我希望——他们做这件事乐在其中,因为他们肯定拿不到什么奖金。(笑)
但我认为这正体现了这家公司的组织方式。谢谢,抱歉打断你了,请继续。
观众:没关系。让我讲一点。
我在获取年报信息时遇到了一些麻烦,所以我最后上网,在一周前的星期五发送了明信片申请,昨天,我在会议前拿到了我的门票。所以安排得非常有条理。
沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢。
观众:既然你们现在拥有一些铁路业务,我想听听你对我们国家是否需要高速客运铁路服务的看法。
如果你认为需要,那应该是私营还是公共事业?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我认为就其本质而言,当它与汽车和航空竞争时,它是不划算的。我们没有那种能够产生资本回报的点对点密度和需求。
这只是——这只是我的猜测。我没有做过什么大规模的研究。但每次我看到关于它经济性的预测,它的效果都不怎么好。
所以,如果它真要建成的话——除非以某种方式获得大量补贴,那样的话它其实就是公共事业了——我认为它在私营模式下不会实现——它经不起私营经济性的考验。
查理,你知道,加利福尼亚州在这方面有一个大的提案。你对它的经济性了解多少?
查理·芒格:嗯,我知道得很少,但我至少和你一样心存怀疑。
在一个已经人口稠密的地方铺设高速铁路系统,成本高得惊人。而且当然,你还要和一个人们更喜欢的系统竞争。
沃伦·巴菲特:他们在奥马哈也在谈这个——
查理·芒格:我对硬要修高速铁路这件事非常怀疑。我认为在日本和中国,这做得很好。
沃伦·巴菲特:确实行得通。
查理·芒格:他们有不同的算法。
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,在日本,但它确实行得通——是的。
查理·芒格:但把高速铁路建到洛杉矶,在我看来就像是一个无底洞,既费钱又麻烦。想想那会有多难吧。
沃伦·巴菲特:如果要做到高速,那按定义就不能经常停站。而且不能有很多支线之类的东西。
所以它实际上就变成了点对点运营,而成本会高得惊人。奥马哈那边在谈一个有轨电车系统,我记得——他们在谈,你知道,从联邦政府那儿拿个两三亿美元之类的。
而据我记得,对实际收入的预测大约是40万美元,这还是在扣除运营成本之前。
所以这笔账——你投入2亿美元,就为了在奥马哈让人们移动几英里,而大多数人还是会想开车。要想有效率的话,对他们来说几乎必须是点对点的。我是说,如果你住的地方往一个方向偏六个街区,或往另一个方向偏八个街区,你就会说,“算了,我还是开车吧。”
这些项目的账目算下来真的令人咋舌。
而现在,你知道,每个人都觉得只要能从联邦政府那儿拿到钱,对谁来说都不算成本。但那其实是一大笔钱。
水牛城已经建了这个,人们也很喜欢。但我也——我要过了相关数据,那真是令人瞠目结舌,就……我是说,你可以直接给每个人叫出租车什么的,对整个社会来说反而更便宜。
所以我有一种感觉,也许它在东京和横滨之间运作得非常出色。确实如此。而且它运作得足够好,以至于我认为它值得私人投资。
但在一个国土面积超过三百万平方英里的国家,在美国本土48州范围内,这就很难行得通了。要让这笔账算得过来非常困难。
现在,如果人们——它变成一个由政府主导的大项目,那就不是谁的算账问题了,你知道,也许它就会发生。但我认为,只要资金是要求回报的,它就永远不会发生。
32. 我们能够应对一场大地震带来的理赔
巴菲特:贝姬?
贝姬·奎克:这是杰里·哈勒(音)提出的一个关于保险投资组合的问题。
如果一场与袭击智利同等震级的地震发生在洛杉矶或旧金山,对保险公司以及整个美国经济会有什么影响?
巴菲特:这个我不知道答案。里氏震级并不是——远不是——衡量损失的完美指标,即使你告诉我震中会在哪里也一样。
然后你还要考虑——你知道,著名的旧金山大地震中,造成的巨大损失是随后而来的大火。
他们把这个叫做——在区分涉及哪些险种时——他们把它叫做“先震后烧”。
我是说,究竟多少是“震”,多少是随后的“烧”?(笑)
我认为,即使是一场极端地震,损失也很难超过1000亿美元。
你知道,非常大的地震——发生频率要低得多——但如果你到太平洋西北地区,那里就有可能发生里氏震级非常高的地震。
当然,我们所知道的那些大地震——我是说,我们的历史记录并没有追溯那么远——但密苏里州的新马德里,在相对较短的时间内发生了三次震级都远超8级的地震。
这种事总有一天还会再发生,也许要500年,也许要1000年,也许明天就会发生。这正是保险业存在的意义。
我倾向于认为——在我考虑加州地震风险敞口时——按最坏情况来看,损失接近1000亿美元。
北岭地震造成的损失,比几年前旧金山附近那次地震要大得多。
但我们迟早会遇到这种事。而伯克希尔完全有能力应对任何情况,即便比我说的这些还要严重得多——
史上损失最惨重的保险赔付——我不知道卡特里娜飓风最终是不是700亿美元左右——我是从2500亿美元这种最坏情况来考虑的。
我猜,如果真发生这种情况,而其余业务都正常,伯克希尔仍然会有相当可观的正收益。所以我们是有所准备的。
查理?
芒格:是的,你知道,不管是哪一年——06年吧——旧金山那场大地震引发了可怕的大火。但最近加州发生的那些大地震,即便是很大的那几次,也没有引发多少火灾。而且很多地震损失根本没有投保。
所以你可能会遭受巨大损失,却没有多少——沃伦对这方面会比我更清楚。
巴菲特:到目前为止,在智利——
芒格:地震保险不像火灾保险那样普及。
巴菲特:哦不,不,完全不是,完全不是。而且——
芒格:所以说——地震——在我看来,真正可怕的大火或恶劣的风灾,造成的损失比地震更严重。
巴菲特:而到目前为止,据我所知——我这里可能说得不对,最终数字出来时可能会不一样——但根据目前陆续出来的数字,损失中大约40%来自海啸,60%来自地震本身。
但最终的数字很可能并非如此。
时不时会发生巨大的灾难。而我们在应对这些灾难的能力上,处于完全不同的一个层级。
我是说,我们在保险业务之外拥有如此强大的盈利能力,即便发生一场2500亿美元的地震或飓风之类的灾难,而我们现在承担的份额可能不超过3%——但就算算作4%吧——那也就是100亿美元——而我们任何一年的税前盈利,我预计都会远远超过这个数字。
所以我们还会有其他收益——我们某一年的净收益,会让其他每一家保险公司都喘不过气来。所以在这方面我们的状况相当不错。
33.“巨额债务不会拖垮我们”
巴菲特:3号区域。
这大概是最后一个问题了,之后我们就要进入正式股东大会环节。
观众:我叫弗兰克·蒂德,来自阿肯色州的阿卡德尔菲亚。
这也是个保险类的问题,不过我想先感谢巴菲特先生、芒格先生、董事会,以及——在阿肯色州我们把他们称为“合伙人”的那些——管理者们,感谢你们在经营伯克希尔·哈撒韦时展现的诚信,以及公平对待股东的态度。非常感谢。
巴菲特:谢谢你。(掌声)
观众:我们在信贷危机中看到了信贷的严重过度使用,这导致了那场巨大的金融崩溃,最终由政府出手干预。
现在我们又看到我们的城市、州和国家的债务大幅增加。
对伯克希尔·哈撒韦而言,一场全球性的金融崩溃会给我们带来怎样的风险敞口?会不会存在某种相关性风险,让我们陷入麻烦?
您说过我们有400亿美元的市政债券保险。其中有80亿美元是针对各州的,我不太确定那是否算市政债券。
会不会有一个重大事件引发大量损失,同时又叠加我们投资资产的减值,从而造成类似AIG那样的局面?谢谢。
巴菲特:好吧,如果你假设发生一场彻底的崩溃——而我们其实在2008年就已经押注这种情况不会发生。
这本来是没必要的,但我们在2008年确实很接近了,当时我判断:第一,政府有能力化解当时存在的恐慌;第二,最终他们会这么做。
在我看来,政府是否有能力做到这一点,这一点毫无疑问。问题在于,他们会不会搞得一团糟,决策会不会陷入瘫痪,会不会爆发内部争斗,国会会不会借机作秀?诸如此类的事情。
我当时认为会出现一些这样的情况,但我认为最终我们会做正确的事,也就是全力以赴,而我们确实这么做了。
而这种情况将来还会再发生。所以——如果你说的是某种大规模的核、化学或生物袭击,真的重创了相当大比例的人口,或者类似的情况,那就谁也说不准会发生什么了。
但我可以这么说,我认为伯克希尔能够承受任何一家企业所能承受的一切冲击。
造成问题的不会是我们的保险业务。如果发生一些非同寻常的事情——我完全不预期会发生这种事——但也可能出现整个世界陷入瘫痪的情况。
但我认为,经历过2008年之后,我们政府大概更明白在那种时刻采取大规模行动的必要性了。
不惜一切代价——比如担保货币市场基金、担保商业票据的时候——我是说,出现那样的事情时,那在某种程度上是史无前例的,但他们行动得非常迅速。
依我看,他们还会再这么做的。没有理由不这样——这个国家的工厂不会凭空消失,土地不会变得不再肥沃,人们也不会变得不再有创新力——只要齿轮不是全都彻底乱了套,事情终将好转。而我不认为会出现那种情况。
伯克希尔要应对任何一场保险巨灾——你说得对,各类风险在下行时确实存在相关性——当某个领域出现问题时,它们确实会蔓延到其他领域。
但我认为,我们的架构足以承受除了那种整个世界被彻底摧毁之外的任何情况。而那种情况是不会发生的。
查理?
芒格:这个我不担心。(笑)
巴菲特:是的。巨额债务不会拖垮我们。这一点我可以向你保证。
彗星撞地球之类的事我没法跟你打包票,但我不管政府在财政上变得多荒唐,或者公司变得多荒唐,或者别的什么,那都伤不了伯克希尔分毫。
我要感谢大家的到来。查理和我真的非常感激。(掌声)谢谢大家。
芒格:谢谢大家。(掌声)
巴菲特:谢谢。我很感激,我们都很感激,我相信在座的各位嘉宾也是。
现在我们休息大约五分钟。有些人可以去购物,有些人想留下来参加股东大会,我们五分钟后开始股东大会,看看要开多久。
34. 伯克希尔股东大会开始
巴菲特:好。我已经介绍过伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事们了。
今天在座的还有德勤会计师事务所(Deloitte and Touche)的合伙人,也就是我们的审计师。他们随时可以回答你们就其事务所对伯克希尔账目的审计工作提出的任何相关问题。
福雷斯特·克鲁特(Forrest Krutter)先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议记录进行书面记载。
贝基·艾米克(Becki Amick)女士已被委任为本次会议的选举监票人,她将对董事选举中所投票数进行核实认证。
本次会议的主要代理投票人是沃尔特·斯科特(Walter Scott)和马克·汉堡(Marc Hamburg)。
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔已发行、有权投票且在本次会议中获得代表的股份数量的报告?
福雷斯特·克鲁特:是的,我有。正如随本次会议通知一并寄送给所有于2010年3月3日(即本次会议的股权登记日)在册股东的委托书声明所示,当时已发行的A类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股为1,029,738股,每股在会议所审议的议案中拥有一票表决权;已发行的B类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股为926,013,086股,每股在会议所审议的议案中拥有万分之一票的表决权。
其中,截至4月29日星期四晚间收到的委托书所代表的股份为705,611股A类股和566,627,821股B类股,在本次会议中获得代表。
巴菲特:谢谢。这个数字达到了法定人数,因此我们将直接进行会议。
第一项议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生向大会提出动议。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议,免于宣读上次年度股东大会及股东特别会议的会议记录,并批准该记录。
巴菲特:有人附议吗?
声音:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:这项动议已被提出并获得附议。有没有任何意见或问题?
我们将以口头表决的方式对这项动议进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。
众声:赞成。
巴菲特:反对的?动议通过。
35. 选举伯克希尔董事
巴菲特:第二项议程是选举董事。在场股东如果希望撤回此前寄出的委托书、亲自对董事选举进行投票,可以这样做。
此外,任何在场股东如果尚未提交委托书、并希望领取选票以便亲自投票,也可以这样做。
如果您想这样做,请向过道中的会务人员表明身份,他们会为您提供选票。请需要选票的各位举手表明身份,以便我们分发选票。
我现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生就董事选举向大会提出动议。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。
巴菲特:有人附议吗?
声音:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:现已有人提出并附议,选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。
还有其他提名吗?有没有任何讨论?各项提名现已准备就绪,可以进行表决。
如果有股东要亲自投票,现在请在董事选举选票上做出标记,并将选票交给选举监票人。
艾米克女士,准备好之后,请汇报。
贝齐·艾米克:我已准备好汇报。截至上周四晚间收到的委托书中,代理投票人的票数显示,每位被提名人所获得的赞成票均不少于756,041票。
这一票数远远超过所有A类股和B类股流通股总票数的多数。
根据特拉华州法律要求核证的确切票数——包括代理持有人根据本次会议交付的代理委托书追加投出的票数,以及在本次会议上亲自投出的票数——将提交给秘书,与本次会议记录一并存档。
巴菲特:谢谢你,阿米克女士。
沃伦·巴菲特、查理·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·戴克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特当选为董事。
36. 业务会议休会
巴菲特:在我们休会之前,还有人有其他事项要提交本次会议吗?
如果没有,我请斯科特先生向本次会议提出一项动议。
沃尔特·斯科特:我提议本次会议休会。
巴菲特:有人附议吗?
一个声音:我附议这项动议。
巴菲特:休会动议已经提出并获得附议。我们将以口头表决方式进行。有人要讨论吗?如果没有,赞成的请说“赞成”。
众人:赞成。